

Filed 12/8/25 In re Joshua R. CA2/3

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re JOSHUA R. et al., Persons  
Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

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LOS ANGELES COUNTY  
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND  
FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

B.B.,

Defendant and Appellant.

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B345368

(Los Angeles County  
Super. Ct. No.  
24LJJP00342AB)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles  
County, Stephanie M. Davis, Judge. Affirmed.

Emery El Habiby, under appointment by the Court of  
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,  
Assistant County Counsel, and Brian Mahler, Deputy County  
Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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In this juvenile dependency appeal, B.B. (mother) contends that the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings were unsupported by substantial evidence and the court abused its discretion by removing the children from mother's physical custody and allowing her only monitored visits. We affirm.

### **FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND**

Mother and Sean R. (father) are the parents of Joshua R. (born in June 2017) and Jameson R. (born in June 2018). Mother and father are not married and live separately. Both children have been diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and have significant special needs.

#### **I. Detention and petition.**

The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) received several reports concerning mother and the children in 2024. In May, a caller reported that Jameson said mother hit him " 'all the time' " and that both boys frequently had bruises all over their bodies. In August, DCFS received a report of domestic violence between mother and her boyfriend, Oscar G. The same month, a caller reported that Jameson said mother punched him. The reports were closed as inconclusive.

On October 22, 2024, DCFS received a report that mother told the caller that she and the children were being chased by demons and were not safe. DCFS received a subsequent report that mother had stopped taking her psychotropic medications, had not slept for eight days, had paranoid and delusional thoughts, and had said, “ ‘What if I end up hurting the children? What if I kill Jo Jo (the son)?’ ”

The following day, mother’s boyfriend Oscar contacted DCFS and expressed concern for mother and the children. He said he had been trying to get help for mother since she stopped taking her medication nine days earlier, but mother was “a very good manipulator and ha[d] talked her way out of getting help.” Oscar called law enforcement on October 22, 2024, but when they arrived, mother persuaded them she was fine and she and Oscar had broken up. As a result, law enforcement had asked Oscar to leave the house. Oscar saw mother at church the next day, and she asked him if “ ‘we are ready to kill Jameson.’ ” Oscar believed mother was a danger to herself and the children.

Mother’s friend Kim, a therapist, told DCFS that she had spent the prior night at mother’s home. Kim described mother’s behavior as erratic, manic, and delusional. Per Kim, mother spoke of “ ‘God talking to her’ ” and asked repeatedly if the children were breathing. Kim believed mother needed to be hospitalized and said she was very concerned for the children’s safety.

The maternal grandmother and a maternal aunt both expressed concerns about mother’s mental health. They said mother had cut off all ties with them and they were glad she was finally getting help.

The social worker interviewed mother, who was agitated and had difficulty answering questions. When Joshua sought a hug, mother asked him loudly if he was okay and felt his chest to see if he was breathing. Mother admitted saying she was going to kill Jameson, but said she did not mean it as a threat. She said she kept waking up with panic attacks because she did not know if the children were okay. She reported seeing different realities, and in some realities the children were hurt.

The social worker called an ambulance to take mother to the hospital, where she was placed on an involuntary psychiatric hold. The records of mother's hospitalization indicate mother had a history of bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, depression, and suicidal ideation, and currently was experiencing a manic episode and had thoughts of hurting herself and others. While hospitalized, mother tested positive for amphetamines and cannabinoids.

The social worker spoke to father, who reported that he has a developmental disability and had a guardian ad litem. Father said he could not take the children and asked that they be placed with maternal relatives.

On October 25, 2024, DCFS filed a petition alleging that the children were juvenile court dependents pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code<sup>1</sup> section 300, subdivision (b) because mother had mental and emotional problems, including erratic, delusional, and paranoid thinking, which rendered her unable to care for the children. The court ordered the children detained and placed under DCFS supervision.

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<sup>1</sup> All subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

## **II. December 2024 jurisdiction/disposition report.**

DCFS reinterviewed mother in December 2024. Mother denied having had erratic or paranoid behaviors or threatening to harm the children. She admitted having had a panic attack in October, but said her anxiety had abated since she began taking the medication prescribed during her hospitalization. Mother said she had scheduled a follow-up appointment with a psychiatrist in January 2025 and was seeing a therapist every other week.

Father reported that he saw the children every other weekend. He said mother's house was filthy and mother left her medications and marijuana vape pens accessible to the children. Father's guardian ad litem said the children had been getting services to help them with toileting, anger management, and speech, but mother had terminated those services.

Maternal aunt Hollie reported that mother's mental health declined when she began living with Oscar in January 2024. Hollie described an incident in April 2024 when mother came to a family gathering with a bag full of marijuana vape pens. Mother referred to Jameson as a "little fucking psychopath" and told a family friend that "if you want [Jameson] you can have him." The following month, Oscar called to say police were at mother's house. Hollie went to the house and saw it was "covered from floor to ceiling," there was "probably a hundred bottles of medication" lying around, and there was "a month[] of dirty dishes" in the kitchen. The children were dressed in T-shirts and diapers. Mother allowed Hollie to take the children, and Joshua said he was starving because mother had not let them eat that day. Jameson asked if he and Joshua could live with Hollie

because “[m]y mommy hits Josh and I all the time.” Joshua responded: “[N]o she doesn’t . . . we’re not allowed to tell.”

The maternal grandmother reported that mother had significant mental health issues as a teenager and had lived in a halfway house. Over the past year and a half, mother had threatened to kill herself and would ask maternal grandmother to take the children because mother “[couldn’t] take this anymore.”

Mother had a supervised visit with the children in early December 2024. Jameson had a tantrum during the visit, and mother said things to upset him, such as “ ‘haha you’re acting like a baby, keep eating your boogers,’ ” and “ ‘I’m going to eat your M&Ms and chips.’ ” During Jameson’s tantrum, mother said, “ ‘one of the reasons we have an open case is due to Jameson’s lying.’ ” Once during the visit, Jameson picked up a small chair and held it over his head, and mother said “ ‘throw it, I dare you to.’ ” At another time, Jameson stomped his foot, and mother mimicked him and said, “ ‘I can do it too.’ ” She told the children she didn’t like their caregiver and told Jameson he wouldn’t be allowed to come to the next visit if he had tantrums.

### **III. Domestic violence report; amended petition.**

The February 2025 addendum report included copies of a text exchange between mother and her sister Amber in early May 2024. Mother had texted Amber a picture of a broken television and said Oscar had smashed it with a lamp during an argument. Mother said she had “never felt so unsafe before,” and that Oscar had “stood over the foot of the bed smashing everything as I was wailing . . . , ‘PLEASE STOP STOP STOP!’ ” The children were in the house during the incident. Mother said she told Oscar that “what he just did is an act of domestic

violence. Standing above me in a fit of rage to destroy everything within reach while I'm below him screaming and covering my head because I didn't know what to expect or if he was going to hit me IS domestic violence! The fact that my children are right here in the house and are now panicking because they don't know what the hell is going on is domestic violence!" Mother also texted: "Now that things have calmed down here, I'm reminding myself of everything I've learned from you, the patterns, the cycles . . . . I want you to keep me accountable because I've already learned this lesson too many times before and I do not want to repeat it. . . . Being honest about Oscar sucks because I already know that I'm going to wish that I hadn't later. . . . I'm telling you because I know what I need to do and I know that telling you will force me to remember not to get clouded by emotions."

The May 2024 incident between mother and Oscar was also documented in a May 18 sheriff's incident report. According to the report, mother told a sheriff's deputy that "Oscar had grabbed a steel lamp and smashed it against the wall, [t]elelevision, and then the opposite wall. . . . Oscar had attempted to strike [mother] with the steel lamp, but she bent over to avoid being struck."

Father told DCFS that mother had called him sounding frantic the night of the incident with Oscar. Mother said Oscar was "going crazy" and had thrown a lamp that almost hit her. Mother asked father to come stay with her because she did not feel safe. When father arrived, the house was a mess and the television was smashed.

DCFS interviewed mother and Oscar about the May 2024 incident. Both denied any domestic violence. Mother said: "That

didn't happen, the worker stretch[ed] the truth. We had an argument. The police were never called for a domestic dispute. I don't know where that information came from. . . . [Oscar] did not throw a lamp. He knocked it over because both of his eyes had an infection. His eyes were swollen almost shut. The lamp was heavy and it did cause damage to the wall, but it was a very small hole. The kids were in their room and they had zero awareness of this. . . . We never argued or got loud. The lamp was sitting on a shelf that was about 4 1/2 feet from the ground. The flat screen was next to the lamp. The top part of the lamp hit the corner of the flat screen and I immediately took it outside. The TV had a small crack, it was already damaged. I just grabbed it . . . and took it outside." Oscar, too, denied any domestic violence between himself and mother. He also denied ever having reported that mother had stopped taking her medication, was disoriented, or had threatened to harm the children. Oscar said there appeared to be "some misunderstanding."

DCFS filed an amended petition on February 18, 2025. The amended petition alleged that mother had mental and emotional problems that rendered her incapable of caring for the children (count b-1), and mother and Oscar had a history of domestic violence in the children's presence (count b-2).

#### **IV. Jurisdiction/disposition hearing.**

The juvenile court held a jurisdiction/disposition hearing in March 2025, during which mother testified at length. Mother said she had a panic attack in October 2024 and agreed to go to the hospital at the social worker's request. Mother denied ever threatening to harm herself or the children. She said she took all her prescribed medication and had not had another panic attack

since her discharge from the hospital. To control her anxiety, she did dialectical behavioral therapy with her therapist, practiced breathing techniques, and attended a supportive parenting class.

Mother said she and Oscar continued to live together. She acknowledged an incident in May 2024 during which she and Oscar argued, but she denied any domestic violence between them. Mother said that during the May incident, a lamp had begun to fall on Oscar, and he “overcorrected. And, yes, in his overcorrection, he got so frustrated that he threw it, and there was a hole in the wall.” Mother said she contacted her sister Amber about the incident, seeking “kindness and empathy,” but Amber “weaponized” it against mother to create “turmoil and discord” with her family and DCFS.

During cross-examination, mother denied having suicidal thoughts as an adult, threatening to harm the children, saying that demons were chasing her, discontinuing psychotropic medication against medical advice, being in a manic state in October 2024, and leaving medication and vape pens within the children’s access. Mother also denied that she had ever referred to her children as “little psychopaths” or had interacted with her children as the monitor described in December 2024. Mother described the monitor’s account as “entirely fabricated.” She also denied that the May 2024 incident with Oscar had occurred in the way she had described it in her texts to her sister, saying she had “overembellish[ed]” to “garn[er] sympathy.”

At the conclusion of mother’s testimony, her counsel asked the court to dismiss the petition. Counsel urged that the evidence did not support the allegations, and the children were not currently at risk of harm because mother was being treated for her mental health conditions and there had been no further

incidents of domestic violence between mother and Oscar. Counsel for father, the children, and DCFS asked the court to sustain the petition as pled.

The juvenile court found that count b-1 of the petition was supported by “overwhelming evidence,” including mother’s medical records from her hospitalization, the observations of mother’s friend Kimberly, father’s statements about the condition of mother’s home and mother’s phone call to him, and Oscar’s initial statements to the social worker. The court found that this evidence demonstrated that mother had a number of psychiatric issues and had “not been able to manage her psychiatric conditions to the extent that she would be able to care for these children right now.”

The court also found count b-2 of the petition was supported by substantial evidence. It said: “[T]he court doesn’t doubt that she’s taken a domestic violence program . . . , because she is able to articulate what is learned in a domestic violence program. But her actions and her minimalization of what happened between herself and [Oscar] clearly demonstrate that she has no insight. And I’m not sure if it’s her psychiatric conditions that are preventing her from gaining the insight, but she does not have the insight with respect to domestic violence[.] . . .

“[Mother and Oscar] are living together. And so the court . . . does have to consider her current living situation as well . . . when determining whether or not there is a current risk. And the court believes that [there] is a current risk. And the court believes and finds that . . . those text messages to her sister were the reality of what happened on that day, and any attempt to minimize that does pose a risk to these children. [¶] So for the

reasons that have been stated on the record, [count] b-1 will be sustained as amended . . . to add the word ‘substantial’ in front of ‘risk.’ And then [count] b-2 will also be found true.”

The court declared the children juvenile court dependents and ordered them removed from the parents’ custody. The court further ordered mother to submit to random and on-demand drug testing, enroll in a parenting program tailored to parents of children with special needs, take all prescribed psychotropic medication, and participate in individual counseling to address case issues, including mental health and domestic violence. Mother was granted monitored visits with the children.

Mother timely appealed.

## **DISCUSSION**

On appeal, mother contends that substantial evidence did not support the jurisdictional findings, and the juvenile court abused its discretion by removing the children from her custody and restricting her to monitored visits. Mother’s contentions lack merit, as we discuss.

### **I. Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings.**

Section 300, subdivision (b)(1) provides that a child is within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction if, among other things, “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of . . . [t]he failure or inability of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child . . . [or] . . . [t]he inability of the parent . . . to provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s . . . mental illness.”

In deciding whether there is a substantial risk of serious physical harm within the meaning of section 300, subdivision (b)(1), courts evaluate the risk at the time of the jurisdiction hearing. “The basic question under section 300 is whether circumstances at the time of the hearing subject the minor to the defined risk of harm.’ ” (*In re J.N.* (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1022.) Jurisdiction may not be based on past endangering conduct in the absence of evidence that such conduct is likely to reoccur. (*In re C.V.* (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 566, 572.) However, “the court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction” and may “consider past events in deciding whether a child presently needs the court’s protection.” (*In re Cole L.* (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 602.) A parent’s “ “[p]ast conduct may be probative of current conditions” if there is reason to believe that the conduct will continue.’ ” (*Ibid.*; see also *In re Ma.V.* (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 11, 23 [there must be some reason to believe acts creating a risk of harm to the child will continue in the future]; *In re J.N.* (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 767, 775 [there must be “a nexus between the parent’s past conduct and the current risk of harm”].)

We review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings for substantial evidence. “ “In making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.” [Citation.] “We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely determine if there are sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.” ’ ” (*In re I.J.* (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)

Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by sustaining count b-1 of the petition because the evidence did not establish a current risk of harm to the children. Specifically, mother urges that although she had undergone a psychiatric hospitalization in October 2024, by the time of the jurisdiction hearing in March 2025 she was stable, was taking all prescribed medication, was under the care of a psychologist and psychiatrist, and had not had any further panic attacks. She therefore urges the children were not at risk of harm in her care.

We disagree and conclude that substantial evidence supported the trial court's findings. Mother had been diagnosed with several serious mental health conditions, including bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, anxiety, depression, and suicidality. Maternal grandmother reported that mother had struggled with many of these conditions since she was a teenager, and mother repeatedly had threatened to take her own life during the eighteen months before the children were detained. During this same period, family members reported that mother left medication and marijuana vape pens where the children could access them, and Jameson said mother hit him and Joshua. In October 2024, mother had an acute mental health crisis during which she had thoughts of harming herself and killing the children. Although mother was no longer in crisis by March 2025, the juvenile court was well within its discretion in concluding that mother was not sufficiently stable to be able to safely care for two young children with significant special needs.

Mother suggests that substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court's findings because she "consistently denied threatening to kill or otherwise harm the children." The question before us, however, is not whether some evidence supports

mother's position, but rather whether the evidence as a whole was sufficiently substantial to support the juvenile court's findings. (See, e.g., *People v. Mendez-Torres* (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1015 [“ ‘the court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value’ ” to support the judgment].) Here, it unquestionably was. Oscar reported—and mother acknowledged—that mother had discussed killing Jameson. Mother's friend Kim, a psychologist who had stayed with mother during her October 2024 mental health crisis, said she was very concerned for the children's safety. And the reports of mother's hospitalization reflect that mother had thoughts of harming herself and others. Mother's subsequent denials, therefore, did not undermine the juvenile court's findings.

Mother also suggests that substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court's findings because she was being treated by a psychologist and a psychiatrist, had completed a six-week mental health class, and maintained a job as a school librarian. We do not agree. While mother unquestionably was taking positive steps to address her mental health, the juvenile court was not required to conclude that a few months of treatment were sufficient to show she could manage conditions that had affected her since adolescence. Mother had previously received treatment and medication, and this episode occurred after she discontinued that medication. The court could reasonably conclude mother required more sustained treatment and monitoring before she was sufficiently stable to be able to safely care for the children.

The present case is distinguishable from *In re A.L.* (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 1044, on which mother relies. There, the mother, who had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, lived with the father and their two teenaged children. (*Id.* at p. 1046.) During a manic episode, mother believed she was being poisoned and threw a shoe that hit one of the children. The father called law enforcement, who placed the mother on an involuntary psychiatric hold. After the mother's release, she moved to Arizona to live with the maternal grandparents, and the children continued to live with their father. (*Id.* at pp. 1046–1049.) Under these circumstances, the Court of Appeal found that the juvenile court erred in sustaining a juvenile dependency petition because neither child suffered physical harm, the children were well cared for despite mother's mental illness, the children "were not youngsters," the father acted quickly to obtain appropriate help for mother, and there was no reason to believe that the father and family would not be able to safely handle any future problems. (*Id.* at p. 1051.)

The present case differs in significant ways from *In re A.L.* Here, the children were just six and seven years old with significant learning disabilities, and thus they were far less able to protect themselves from mother than were the teenaged children in *In re A.L.* Further, the children in *In re A.L.* lived with both parents, and their father was able to act quickly to protect them during their mother's manic episode by having her placed on a psychiatric hold and then arranging for her to live with her own parents after her release. In contrast, here father was not able to protect the children from mother because the parents did not live together and father had special needs and had a guardian ad litem. Oscar also had not been able to

promptly obtain help for mother during her psychiatric crisis; to the contrary, when he called law enforcement seeking help, law enforcement asked him to leave the house.

For all of these reasons, substantial evidence supported the allegations of count b-1 of the petition. Having so concluded, we need not consider whether substantial evidence also supported count b-2 of the petition. (See *In re I.A.* (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1492, overruled on another ground in *In re D.P.* (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 283 [“an appellate court may decline to address the evidentiary support for any remaining jurisdictional findings once a single finding has been found to be supported by the evidence”]; *In re Alexis E.* (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451 [“When a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court’s jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing court need not consider whether any or all of the other alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence”].)

## **II. Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s removal finding.**

Section 361, subdivision (c)(1) provides that a child shall not be taken from the parents’ physical custody unless the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence that “[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without

removing the minor from the minor's parent's . . . physical custody.”

We review a dispositional order removing a child from a parent for substantial evidence, “ ‘ “keeping in mind that the trial court was required to make its order based on the higher standard of clear and convincing evidence.” ’ (*In re I.R.* (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 510, 520.)” (*In re M.V.* (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 944, 960.) In applying this standard of review, “ ‘the question before the appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true.’ [Citation.] We view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and give due deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (*Ibid.*)

Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by removing the children from her custody because there was no clear and convincing evidence the children would be in substantial danger if they were returned home. Instead, mother urges, the juvenile court could have adequately protected the children by offering mother preservation services, family therapy, or wraparound services. We disagree. As we have discussed, mother had an acute mental health crisis just a few months before the disposition hearing during which mother threatened to kill herself and the children. Mother does not explain how in-home services would have been sufficient to protect the children if she were to cease taking her medication or have another such episode.

We applaud mother's recent medication compliance and participation in therapy, and we note that if this progress continues, it may be provide a basis for returning the children to her care. We nonetheless conclude that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's finding that this progress did not make it safe to do so at the time of the dispositional hearing.

**III. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in permitting mother only monitored visits.**

Finally, mother challenges the order requiring her visits with the children to be monitored. The issue is moot. While this appeal was pending, on September 22, 2025, the juvenile court entered a new order permitting mother unmonitored visits with the children.<sup>2</sup> Thus, mother has already obtained the relief she seeks on appeal. (*In re D.P.*, *supra*, 14 Cal.5th 266 [challenge to juvenile court order is moot where appellate court cannot provide appellant any practical relief]; *In re J.P.* (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 616, 623 [“ ‘ “An appeal becomes moot when, through no fault of the respondent, the occurrence of an event renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant the appellant effective relief” ’ ”].)

In any event, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering monitored visits between mother and the children. The juvenile court has broad discretion in ordering visitation

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<sup>2</sup> On the court's own motion, we take judicial notice of the juvenile court's September 22, 2025 minute orders in case No. 24LJJP00342A–B. (*In re Damian L.* (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 357, 369 [postjudgment evidence is admissible for the limited purpose of determining whether the subsequent developments have rendered appeal partially or entirely moot]; *In re M.F.* (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 86, 110 [taking judicial notice of minute orders from hearings that occurred after the challenged order].)

between dependent children and their parents. (*In re S.H.* (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1542, 1557; *Heidi S. v. David H.* (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1162–1163.) In making visitation orders, the court is guided by the principle that “[v]isitation shall be as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-being of the child.” (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A); *In re Nicholas B.* (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1138.) Equally important, however, is the statutory dictate that “[n]o visitation order shall jeopardize the safety of the child.” (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(B).) Thus, visitation orders necessarily involve “a balancing of the interests of the parent in visitation with the best interests of the child. In balancing these interests, the court in the exercise of its judicial discretion should determine whether there should be any right to visitation and, if so, the frequency and length of visitation. The court may, of course, impose any other conditions or requirements to further define the right to visitation in light of the particular circumstances of the case before it.” (*In re Jennifer G.* (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 752, 757.) We review an order setting visitation terms for abuse of discretion, and we will not disturb the order unless the trial court made an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination. (*In re Brittany C.* (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1356.)

As discussed above, mother had an acute mental health crisis just a few months before the disposition hearing during which mother threatened to kill herself and the children. In view of this history, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by allowing mother to visit the children only in a monitored setting.

**DISPOSITION**

The jurisdiction and disposition orders are affirmed.

**NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL  
REPORTS**

EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

ADAMS, J.

HANASONO, J.