#zen-kernel on irc.rizon.net does not exist. #17

Evi1M4chine · 2014-03-16T19:01:05Z

On zen-kernel.org, that IRC channel is mentioned for support. Yet it does not exist / is empty upon joining.

The site zen-kernel.org itself is a placeholder too.

Leaving no way to report bugs that looks like anyone would read it.

If this here is the correct place to report bugs, I suggest linking to it from zen-kernel.org, and taking away the IRC paragraph.

It feels very untrustworthy to let someone create your kernel, that is practically impossible to reach. How about something more… human… Like a weekly consultation hour via XMPP+Jingle video conferencing (Jitsi is great at that, and offers SRTP+ZRTP too.) Or something equally… human.

heftig · 2014-03-16T19:40:48Z

The proper channel is #zen-sources . Corrected.

Mike Galbraith captered the following: | >#11 [ffff88017b243e90] _raw_spin_lock at ffffffff815d2596 | >#12 [ffff88017b243e90] rt_mutex_trylock at ffffffff815d15be | >#13 [ffff88017b243eb0] get_next_timer_interrupt at ffffffff81063b42 | >#14 [ffff88017b243f00] tick_nohz_stop_sched_tick at ffffffff810bd1fd | >#15 [ffff88017b243f70] tick_nohz_irq_exit at ffffffff810bd7d2 | >#16 [ffff88017b243f90] irq_exit at ffffffff8105b02d | >#17 [ffff88017b243fb0] reschedule_interrupt at ffffffff815db3dd | >--- <IRQ stack> --- | >#18 [ffff88017a2a9bc8] reschedule_interrupt at ffffffff815db3dd | > [exception RIP: task_blocks_on_rt_mutex+51] | >#19 [ffff88017a2a9ce0] rt_spin_lock_slowlock at ffffffff815d183c | >#20 [ffff88017a2a9da0] lock_timer_base.isra.35 at ffffffff81061cbf | >#21 [ffff88017a2a9dd0] schedule_timeout at ffffffff815cf1ce | >#22 [ffff88017a2a9e50] rcu_gp_kthread at ffffffff810f9bbb | >#23 [ffff88017a2a9ed0] kthread at ffffffff810796d5 | >#24 [ffff88017a2a9f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff815da04c lock_timer_base() does a try_lock() which deadlocks on the waiter lock not the lock itself. This patch takes the waiter_lock with trylock so it should work from interrupt context as well. If the fastpath doesn't work and the waiter_lock itself is taken then it seems that the lock itself taken. This patch also adds "rt_spin_unlock_after_trylock_in_irq" to keep lockdep happy. If we managed to take the wait_lock in the first place we should also be able to take it in the unlock path. Cc: stable-rt@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Mike Galbraith <bitbucket@online.de> Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>

This patch tries to fix this crash: #5 [ffff88003c1cd690] do_invalid_op at ffffffff810166d5 #6 [ffff88003c1cd730] invalid_op at ffffffff8159b2de [exception RIP: ocfs2_direct_IO_get_blocks+359] RIP: ffffffffa05dfa27 RSP: ffff88003c1cd7e8 RFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88003c1cdaa8 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: ffff880027a95000 RDI: ffff88003c79b540 RBP: ffff88003c1cd858 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: ffffffff815f6ba0 R10: 00000000000001c9 R11: 00000000000001c9 R12: ffff88002d271500 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000001000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffff88003c1cd860] do_direct_IO at ffffffff811cd31b #8 [ffff88003c1cd950] direct_IO_iovec at ffffffff811cde9c #9 [ffff88003c1cd9b0] do_blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff811ce764 #10 [ffff88003c1cdb80] __blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff811ce7cc #11 [ffff88003c1cdbb0] ocfs2_direct_IO at ffffffffa05df756 [ocfs2] #12 [ffff88003c1cdbe0] generic_file_direct_write_iter at ffffffff8112f935 #13 [ffff88003c1cdc40] ocfs2_file_write_iter at ffffffffa0600ccc [ocfs2] #14 [ffff88003c1cdd50] do_aio_write at ffffffff8119126c #15 [ffff88003c1cddc0] aio_rw_vect_retry at ffffffff811d9bb4 #16 [ffff88003c1cddf0] aio_run_iocb at ffffffff811db880 #17 [ffff88003c1cde30] io_submit_one at ffffffff811dc238 #18 [ffff88003c1cde80] do_io_submit at ffffffff811dc437 #19 [ffff88003c1cdf70] sys_io_submit at ffffffff811dc530 #20 [ffff88003c1cdf80] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff8159a159 It crashes at BUG_ON(create && (ext_flags & OCFS2_EXT_REFCOUNTED)); in ocfs2_direct_IO_get_blocks. ocfs2_direct_IO_get_blocks is expecting the OCFS2_EXT_REFCOUNTED be removed in ocfs2_prepare_inode_for_write() if it was there. But no cluster lock is taken during the time before (or inside) ocfs2_prepare_inode_for_write() and after ocfs2_direct_IO_get_blocks(). It can happen in this case: Node A(which crashes) Node B ------------------------ --------------------------- ocfs2_file_aio_write ocfs2_prepare_inode_for_write ocfs2_inode_lock ... ocfs2_inode_unlock #no refcount found .... ocfs2_reflink ocfs2_inode_lock ... ocfs2_inode_unlock #now, refcount flag set on extent ... flush change to disk ocfs2_direct_IO_get_blocks ocfs2_get_clusters #extent map miss #buffer_head miss read extents from disk found refcount flag on extent crash.. Fix: Take rw_lock in ocfs2_reflink path Signed-off-by: Wengang Wang <wen.gang.wang@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

[ Upstream commit ce7991e ] Commit a71e3c3 ("net: phy: Set the driver when registering an MDIO bus device") caused the following regression on the fec driver: root@imx6qsabresd:~# echo mem > /sys/power/state PM: Syncing filesystems ... done. Freezing user space processes ... (elapsed 0.003 seconds) done. Freezing remaining freezable tasks ... (elapsed 0.002 seconds) done. Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000002c pgd = bcd14000 [0000002c] *pgd=4d9e0831, *pte=00000000, *ppte=00000000 Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] SMP ARM Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 617 Comm: sh Not tainted 3.16.0 #17 task: bc0c4e00 ti: bceb6000 task.ti: bceb6000 PC is at fec_suspend+0x10/0x70 LR is at dpm_run_callback.isra.7+0x34/0x6c pc : [<803f8a98>] lr : [<80361f44>] psr: 600f0013 sp : bceb7d70 ip : bceb7d88 fp : bceb7d84 r10: 8091523c r9 : 00000000 r8 : bd88f478 r7 : 803f8a88 r6 : 81165988 r5 : 00000000 r4 : 00000000 r3 : 00000000 r2 : 00000000 r1 : bd88f478 r0 : bd88f478 Flags: nZCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user Control: 10c5387d Table: 4cd1404a DAC: 00000015 Process sh (pid: 617, stack limit = 0xbceb6240) Stack: (0xbceb7d70 to 0xbceb8000) .... The problem with the original commit is explained by Russell King: "It has the effect (as can be seen from the oops) of attaching the MDIO bus device (itself is a bus-less device) to the platform driver, which means that if the platform driver supports power management, it will be called to power manage the MDIO bus device. Moreover, drivers do not expect to be called for power management operations for devices which they haven't probed, and certainly not for devices which aren't part of the same bus that the driver is registered against." This reverts commit a71e3c3. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #3.16 Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@freescale.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Not enough brown paper bags, you'll have to share one. (oops below). The initial match condition code was racy (locking is coming I hear). then along came: cd234b0 drm/i915: Do not dereference NULL crtc or fb until after checking Chris made an attempt to fix it, Ben "reviewed" it. Daniel merged it. Then drm/i915: Make use of intel_fb_obj() (v2) 2ff8fde made it worse by removing the obj check later. All in all, my laptop can't barely turn off the display without hitting this. Posted to #intel-gfx out of niceness, but I've merged this already into drm-next. Here's an oops. [ 11.528185] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000d0 [ 11.528233] IP: [<ffffffffa0161fde>] intel_edp_psr_match_conditions+0x1e/0x2e0 [i915] [ 11.528294] PGD 35bc0067 PUD c997c067 PMD 0 [ 11.528321] Oops: 0000 [zen-kernel#1] SMP [ 11.528916] CPU: 3 PID: 244 Comm: kworker/3:2 Not tainted 3.16.0-rc4+ zen-kernel#17 [ 11.528949] Hardware name: LENOVO 20ARS25701/20ARS25701, BIOS GJET72WW (2.22 ) 02/21/2014 [ 11.529004] Workqueue: events intel_edp_psr_work [i915] [ 11.529031] task: ffff8803079fdaa0 ti: ffff8803079c4000 task.ti: ffff8803079c4000 [ 11.529067] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0161fde>] [<ffffffffa0161fde>] intel_edp_psr_match_conditions+0x1e/0x2e0 [i915] [ 11.529129] RSP: 0018:ffff8803079c7d40 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 11.529155] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88030c11c000 RCX: c000000000000000 [ 11.529189] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 1df0000000000000 RDI: ffff88030c1190d8 [ 11.529222] RBP: ffff8803079c7d60 R08: ffffffff82691140 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 11.529256] R10: ffff8803079fdaa0 R11: 3e00000000000000 R12: ffff88030c11c728 [ 11.529290] R13: ffff88030c1190d8 R14: ffff88031e2d8e00 R15: 00000000000000c0 [ 11.529324] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88031e2c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 11.529361] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 11.529389] CR2: 00000000000000d0 CR3: 00000000c8d9d000 CR4: 00000000001407e0 [ 11.529423] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 11.529457] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 11.529489] Stack: [ 11.529500] ffff88030c119000 ffff88030c11c728 ffff88030c1190d8 ffff88031e2d8e00 [ 11.529541] ffff8803079c7d88 ffffffffa01679b2 ffff880035b29a80 ffff880307909f00 [ 11.529583] ffff88031e2d4740 ffff8803079c7df8 ffffffff810a78ab ffffffff810a7849 [ 11.529624] Call Trace: [ 11.529654] [<ffffffffa01679b2>] intel_edp_psr_work+0x52/0x90 [i915] [ 11.529689] [<ffffffff810a78ab>] process_one_work+0x1db/0x540 [ 11.529719] [<ffffffff810a7849>] ? process_one_work+0x179/0x540 [ 11.529750] [<ffffffff810a81ed>] worker_thread+0x11d/0x520 [ 11.529779] [<ffffffff810a80d0>] ? create_and_start_worker+0x60/0x60 [ 11.529810] [<ffffffff810aeb04>] kthread+0xe4/0x100 [ 11.529836] [<ffffffff810aea20>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x200/0x200 [ 11.529870] [<ffffffff81705ebc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0 [ 11.529896] [<ffffffff810aea20>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x200/0x200 [ 11.529926] Code: ba 31 13 f0 c9 85 f6 75 84 eb d0 66 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 48 8b 87 68 ff ff ff 48 8b 9f 28 ff ff ff <48> 8b 80 d0 00 00 00 4c 8b 63 28 48 8b 40 48 48 85 c0 0f 84 1a [ 11.530110] RIP [<ffffffffa0161fde>] intel_edp_psr_match_conditions+0x1e/0x2e0 [i915] [ 11.530163] RSP <ffff8803079c7d40> [ 11.530180] CR2: 00000000000000d0 Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>

Commit a71e3c3 ("net: phy: Set the driver when registering an MDIO bus device") caused the following regression on the fec driver: root@imx6qsabresd:~# echo mem > /sys/power/state PM: Syncing filesystems ... done. Freezing user space processes ... (elapsed 0.003 seconds) done. Freezing remaining freezable tasks ... (elapsed 0.002 seconds) done. Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000002c pgd = bcd14000 [0000002c] *pgd=4d9e0831, *pte=00000000, *ppte=00000000 Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] SMP ARM Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 617 Comm: sh Not tainted 3.16.0 #17 task: bc0c4e00 ti: bceb6000 task.ti: bceb6000 PC is at fec_suspend+0x10/0x70 LR is at dpm_run_callback.isra.7+0x34/0x6c pc : [<803f8a98>] lr : [<80361f44>] psr: 600f0013 sp : bceb7d70 ip : bceb7d88 fp : bceb7d84 r10: 8091523c r9 : 00000000 r8 : bd88f478 r7 : 803f8a88 r6 : 81165988 r5 : 00000000 r4 : 00000000 r3 : 00000000 r2 : 00000000 r1 : bd88f478 r0 : bd88f478 Flags: nZCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user Control: 10c5387d Table: 4cd1404a DAC: 00000015 Process sh (pid: 617, stack limit = 0xbceb6240) Stack: (0xbceb7d70 to 0xbceb8000) .... The problem with the original commit is explained by Russell King: "It has the effect (as can be seen from the oops) of attaching the MDIO bus device (itself is a bus-less device) to the platform driver, which means that if the platform driver supports power management, it will be called to power manage the MDIO bus device. Moreover, drivers do not expect to be called for power management operations for devices which they haven't probed, and certainly not for devices which aren't part of the same bus that the driver is registered against." This reverts commit a71e3c3. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #3.16 Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@freescale.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Chuck Lever reported the following stack trace: ================================= [ INFO: inconsistent lock state ] 3.16.0-rc2-00024-g2e78883 #17 Tainted: G E --------------------------------- inconsistent {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} -> {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} usage. swapper/0/0 [HC0[0]:SC1[1]:HE1:SE0] takes: (&(&iboe->lock)->rlock){+.?...}, at: [<ffffffffa065f68b>] mlx4_ib_addr_event+0xdb/0x1a0 [mlx4_ib] {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} state was registered at: [<ffffffff810b3110>] mark_irqflags+0x110/0x170 [<ffffffff810b4806>] __lock_acquire+0x2c6/0x5b0 [<ffffffff810b4bd9>] lock_acquire+0xe9/0x120 [<ffffffff815f7f6e>] _raw_spin_lock+0x3e/0x80 [<ffffffffa0661084>] mlx4_ib_scan_netdevs+0x34/0x260 [mlx4_ib] [<ffffffffa06612db>] mlx4_ib_netdev_event+0x2b/0x40 [mlx4_ib] [<ffffffff81522219>] register_netdevice_notifier+0x99/0x1e0 [<ffffffffa06626e3>] mlx4_ib_add+0x743/0xbc0 [mlx4_ib] [<ffffffffa05ec168>] mlx4_add_device+0x48/0xa0 [mlx4_core] [<ffffffffa05ec2c3>] mlx4_register_interface+0x73/0xb0 [mlx4_core] [<ffffffffa05c505e>] cm_req_handler+0x13e/0x460 [ib_cm] [<ffffffff810002e2>] do_one_initcall+0x112/0x1c0 [<ffffffff810e8264>] do_init_module+0x34/0x190 [<ffffffff810ea62f>] load_module+0x5cf/0x740 [<ffffffff810ea939>] SyS_init_module+0x99/0xd0 [<ffffffff815f8fd2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b irq event stamp: 336142 hardirqs last enabled at (336142): [<ffffffff810612f5>] __local_bh_enable_ip+0xb5/0xc0 hardirqs last disabled at (336141): [<ffffffff81061296>] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x56/0xc0 softirqs last enabled at (336004): [<ffffffff8106123a>] _local_bh_enable+0x4a/0x50 softirqs last disabled at (336005): [<ffffffff810617a4>] irq_exit+0x44/0xd0 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&(&iboe->lock)->rlock); <Interrupt> lock(&(&iboe->lock)->rlock); *** DEADLOCK *** The above problem was caused by the spin lock being taken both in the process context and in a soft-irq context (in a netdev notifier handler). The required fix is to use spin_lock/unlock_bh() instead of spin_lock/unlock on the iboe lock. Reported-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Jack Morgenstein <jackm@dev.mellanox.co.il> Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>

commit ecf5fc6 upstream. Nikolay has reported a hang when a memcg reclaim got stuck with the following backtrace: PID: 18308 TASK: ffff883d7c9b0a30 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "rsync" #0 __schedule at ffffffff815ab152 #1 schedule at ffffffff815ab76e #2 schedule_timeout at ffffffff815ae5e5 #3 io_schedule_timeout at ffffffff815aad6a #4 bit_wait_io at ffffffff815abfc6 #5 __wait_on_bit at ffffffff815abda5 #6 wait_on_page_bit at ffffffff8111fd4f #7 shrink_page_list at ffffffff81135445 #8 shrink_inactive_list at ffffffff81135845 #9 shrink_lruvec at ffffffff81135ead #10 shrink_zone at ffffffff811360c3 #11 shrink_zones at ffffffff81136eff #12 do_try_to_free_pages at ffffffff8113712f #13 try_to_free_mem_cgroup_pages at ffffffff811372be #14 try_charge at ffffffff81189423 #15 mem_cgroup_try_charge at ffffffff8118c6f5 #16 __add_to_page_cache_locked at ffffffff8112137d #17 add_to_page_cache_lru at ffffffff81121618 #18 pagecache_get_page at ffffffff8112170b #19 grow_dev_page at ffffffff811c8297 #20 __getblk_slow at ffffffff811c91d6 #21 __getblk_gfp at ffffffff811c92c1 #22 ext4_ext_grow_indepth at ffffffff8124565c #23 ext4_ext_create_new_leaf at ffffffff81246ca8 #24 ext4_ext_insert_extent at ffffffff81246f09 #25 ext4_ext_map_blocks at ffffffff8124a848 #26 ext4_map_blocks at ffffffff8121a5b7 #27 mpage_map_one_extent at ffffffff8121b1fa #28 mpage_map_and_submit_extent at ffffffff8121f07b #29 ext4_writepages at ffffffff8121f6d5 #30 do_writepages at ffffffff8112c490 #31 __filemap_fdatawrite_range at ffffffff81120199 #32 filemap_flush at ffffffff8112041c #33 ext4_alloc_da_blocks at ffffffff81219da1 #34 ext4_rename at ffffffff81229b91 #35 ext4_rename2 at ffffffff81229e32 #36 vfs_rename at ffffffff811a08a5 #37 SYSC_renameat2 at ffffffff811a3ffc #38 sys_renameat2 at ffffffff811a408e #39 sys_rename at ffffffff8119e51e #40 system_call_fastpath at ffffffff815afa89 Dave Chinner has properly pointed out that this is a deadlock in the reclaim code because ext4 doesn't submit pages which are marked by PG_writeback right away. The heuristic was introduced by commit e62e384 ("memcg: prevent OOM with too many dirty pages") and it was applied only when may_enter_fs was specified. The code has been changed by c3b94f4 ("memcg: further prevent OOM with too many dirty pages") which has removed the __GFP_FS restriction with a reasoning that we do not get into the fs code. But this is not sufficient apparently because the fs doesn't necessarily submit pages marked PG_writeback for IO right away. ext4_bio_write_page calls io_submit_add_bh but that doesn't necessarily submit the bio. Instead it tries to map more pages into the bio and mpage_map_one_extent might trigger memcg charge which might end up waiting on a page which is marked PG_writeback but hasn't been submitted yet so we would end up waiting for something that never finishes. Fix this issue by replacing __GFP_IO by may_enter_fs check (for case 2) before we go to wait on the writeback. The page fault path, which is the only path that triggers memcg oom killer since 3.12, shouldn't require GFP_NOFS and so we shouldn't reintroduce the premature OOM killer issue which was originally addressed by the heuristic. As per David Chinner the xfs is doing similar thing since 2.6.15 already so ext4 is not the only affected filesystem. Moreover he notes: : For example: IO completion might require unwritten extent conversion : which executes filesystem transactions and GFP_NOFS allocations. The : writeback flag on the pages can not be cleared until unwritten : extent conversion completes. Hence memory reclaim cannot wait on : page writeback to complete in GFP_NOFS context because it is not : safe to do so, memcg reclaim or otherwise. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.9+ [tytso@mit.edu: corrected the control flow] Fixes: c3b94f4 ("memcg: further prevent OOM with too many dirty pages") Reported-by: Nikolay Borisov <kernel@kyup.com> Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

@offset

commit 236cf17 upstream. When we allocate bitmaps in vgic_vcpu_init_maps, we divide the number of bits we need by 8 to figure out how many bytes to allocate. However, bitmap elements are always accessed as unsigned longs, and if we didn't happen to allocate a size such that size % sizeof(unsigned long) == 0, bitmap accesses may go past the end of the allocation. When using KASAN (which does byte-granular access checks), this results in a continuous stream of BUGs whenever these bitmaps are accessed: ============================================================================= BUG kmalloc-128 (Tainted: G B ): kasan: bad access detected ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- INFO: Allocated in vgic_init.part.25+0x55c/0x990 age=7493 cpu=3 pid=1730 INFO: Slab 0xffffffbde6d5da40 objects=16 used=15 fp=0xffffffc935769700 flags=0x4000000000000080 INFO: Object 0xffffffc935769500 @offset=1280 fp=0x (null) Bytes b4 ffffffc9357694f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Object ffffffc935769500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Object ffffffc935769510: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Object ffffffc935769520: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Object ffffffc935769530: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Object ffffffc935769540: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Object ffffffc935769550: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Object ffffffc935769560: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Object ffffffc935769570: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Padding ffffffc9357695b0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Padding ffffffc9357695c0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Padding ffffffc9357695d0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Padding ffffffc9357695e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Padding ffffffc9357695f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ CPU: 3 PID: 1740 Comm: kvm-vcpu-0 Tainted: G B 4.4.0+ #17 Hardware name: ARM Juno development board (r1) (DT) Call trace: [<ffffffc00008e770>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x280 [<ffffffc00008ea04>] show_stack+0x14/0x20 [<ffffffc000726360>] dump_stack+0x100/0x188 [<ffffffc00030d324>] print_trailer+0xfc/0x168 [<ffffffc000312294>] object_err+0x3c/0x50 [<ffffffc0003140fc>] kasan_report_error+0x244/0x558 [<ffffffc000314548>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x48/0x50 [<ffffffc000745688>] __bitmap_or+0xc0/0xc8 [<ffffffc0000d9e44>] kvm_vgic_flush_hwstate+0x1bc/0x650 [<ffffffc0000c514c>] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x2ec/0xa60 [<ffffffc0000b9a6c>] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x474/0xa68 [<ffffffc00036b7b0>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x5b8/0xcb0 [<ffffffc00036bf34>] SyS_ioctl+0x8c/0xa0 [<ffffffc000086cb0>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28 Memory state around the buggy address: ffffffc935769400: 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffffffc935769480: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffffffc935769500: 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ffffffc935769580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffffffc935769600: 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ================================================================== Fix the issue by always allocating a multiple of sizeof(unsigned long), as we do elsewhere in the vgic code. Fixes: c1bfb57 ("arm/arm64: KVM: vgic: switch to dynamic allocation") Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Acked-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit abb2baf upstream. The EFI firmware on Macs contains a full-fledged network stack for downloading OS X images from osrecovery.apple.com. Unfortunately on Macs introduced 2011 and 2012, EFI brings up the Broadcom 4331 wireless card on every boot and leaves it enabled even after ExitBootServices has been called. The card continues to assert its IRQ line, causing spurious interrupts if the IRQ is shared. It also corrupts memory by DMAing received packets, allowing for remote code execution over the air. This only stops when a driver is loaded for the wireless card, which may be never if the driver is not installed or blacklisted. The issue seems to be constrained to the Broadcom 4331. Chris Milsted has verified that the newer Broadcom 4360 built into the MacBookPro11,3 (2013/2014) does not exhibit this behaviour. The chances that Apple will ever supply a firmware fix for the older machines appear to be zero. The solution is to reset the card on boot by writing to a reset bit in its mmio space. This must be done as an early quirk and not as a plain vanilla PCI quirk to successfully combat memory corruption by DMAed packets: Matthew Garrett found out in 2012 that the packets are written to EfiBootServicesData memory (http://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/11235.html). This type of memory is made available to the page allocator by efi_free_boot_services(). Plain vanilla PCI quirks run much later, in subsys initcall level. In-between a time window would be open for memory corruption. Random crashes occurring in this time window and attributed to DMAed packets have indeed been observed in the wild by Chris Bainbridge. When Matthew Garrett analyzed the memory corruption issue in 2012, he sought to fix it with a grub quirk which transitions the card to D3hot: http://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=9d34bb85da56 This approach does not help users with other bootloaders and while it may prevent DMAed packets, it does not cure the spurious interrupts emanating from the card. Unfortunately the card's mmio space is inaccessible in D3hot, so to reset it, we have to undo the effect of Matthew's grub patch and transition the card back to D0. Note that the quirk takes a few shortcuts to reduce the amount of code: The size of BAR 0 and the location of the PM capability is identical on all affected machines and therefore hardcoded. Only the address of BAR 0 differs between models. Also, it is assumed that the BCMA core currently mapped is the 802.11 core. The EFI driver seems to always take care of this. Michael Büsch, Bjorn Helgaas and Matt Fleming contributed feedback towards finding the best solution to this problem. The following should be a comprehensive list of affected models: iMac13,1 2012 21.5" [Root Port 00:1c.3 = 8086:1e16] iMac13,2 2012 27" [Root Port 00:1c.3 = 8086:1e16] Macmini5,1 2011 i5 2.3 GHz [Root Port 00:1c.1 = 8086:1c12] Macmini5,2 2011 i5 2.5 GHz [Root Port 00:1c.1 = 8086:1c12] Macmini5,3 2011 i7 2.0 GHz [Root Port 00:1c.1 = 8086:1c12] Macmini6,1 2012 i5 2.5 GHz [Root Port 00:1c.1 = 8086:1e12] Macmini6,2 2012 i7 2.3 GHz [Root Port 00:1c.1 = 8086:1e12] MacBookPro8,1 2011 13" [Root Port 00:1c.1 = 8086:1c12] MacBookPro8,2 2011 15" [Root Port 00:1c.1 = 8086:1c12] MacBookPro8,3 2011 17" [Root Port 00:1c.1 = 8086:1c12] MacBookPro9,1 2012 15" [Root Port 00:1c.1 = 8086:1e12] MacBookPro9,2 2012 13" [Root Port 00:1c.1 = 8086:1e12] MacBookPro10,1 2012 15" [Root Port 00:1c.1 = 8086:1e12] MacBookPro10,2 2012 13" [Root Port 00:1c.1 = 8086:1e12] For posterity, spurious interrupts caused by the Broadcom 4331 wireless card resulted in splats like this (stacktrace omitted): irq 17: nobody cared (try booting with the "irqpoll" option) handlers: [<ffffffff81374370>] pcie_isr [<ffffffffc0704550>] sdhci_irq [sdhci] threaded [<ffffffffc07013c0>] sdhci_thread_irq [sdhci] [<ffffffffc0a0b960>] azx_interrupt [snd_hda_codec] Disabling IRQ #17 Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=79301 Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111781 Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=728916 Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=895951#c16 Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1009819 Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1098621 Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1149632#c5 Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1279130 Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1332732 Tested-by: Konstantin Simanov <k.simanov@stlk.ru> # [MacBookPro8,1] Tested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> # [MacBookPro9,1] Tested-by: Bryan Paradis <bryan.paradis@gmail.com> # [MacBookPro9,2] Tested-by: Andrew Worsley <amworsley@gmail.com> # [MacBookPro10,1] Tested-by: Chris Bainbridge <chris.bainbridge@gmail.com> # [MacBookPro10,2] Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Acked-by: Rafał Miłecki <zajec5@gmail.com> Acked-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Chris Milsted <cmilsted@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> Cc: Michael Buesch <m@bues.ch> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: b43-dev@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/48d0972ac82a53d460e5fce77a07b2560db95203.1465690253.git.lukas@wunner.de [ Did minor readability edits. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit b6bc1c7 upstream. Function ib_create_qp() was failing to return an error when rdma_rw_init_mrs() fails, causing a crash further down in ib_create_qp() when trying to dereferece the qp pointer which was actually a negative errno. The crash: crash> log|grep BUG [ 136.458121] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000098 crash> bt PID: 3736 TASK: ffff8808543215c0 CPU: 2 COMMAND: "kworker/u64:2" #0 [ffff88084d323340] machine_kexec at ffffffff8105fbb0 #1 [ffff88084d3233b0] __crash_kexec at ffffffff81116758 #2 [ffff88084d323480] crash_kexec at ffffffff8111682d #3 [ffff88084d3234b0] oops_end at ffffffff81032bd6 #4 [ffff88084d3234e0] no_context at ffffffff8106e431 #5 [ffff88084d323530] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff8106e610 #6 [ffff88084d323590] bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff8106e6f4 #7 [ffff88084d3235a0] __do_page_fault at ffffffff8106ebdc #8 [ffff88084d323620] do_page_fault at ffffffff8106f057 #9 [ffff88084d323660] page_fault at ffffffff816e3148 [exception RIP: ib_create_qp+427] RIP: ffffffffa02554fb RSP: ffff88084d323718 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000004 RBX: fffffffffffffff4 RCX: 000000018020001f RDX: ffff880830997fc0 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88085f407200 RBP: ffff88084d323778 R8: 0000000000000001 R9: ffffea0020bae210 R10: ffffea0020bae218 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88084d3237c8 R13: 00000000fffffff4 R14: ffff880859fa5000 R15: ffff88082eb89800 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #10 [ffff88084d323780] rdma_create_qp at ffffffffa0782681 [rdma_cm] #11 [ffff88084d3237b0] nvmet_rdma_create_queue_ib at ffffffffa07c43f3 [nvmet_rdma] #12 [ffff88084d323860] nvmet_rdma_alloc_queue at ffffffffa07c5ba9 [nvmet_rdma] #13 [ffff88084d323900] nvmet_rdma_queue_connect at ffffffffa07c5c96 [nvmet_rdma] #14 [ffff88084d323980] nvmet_rdma_cm_handler at ffffffffa07c6450 [nvmet_rdma] #15 [ffff88084d3239b0] iw_conn_req_handler at ffffffffa0787480 [rdma_cm] #16 [ffff88084d323a60] cm_conn_req_handler at ffffffffa0775f06 [iw_cm] #17 [ffff88084d323ab0] process_event at ffffffffa0776019 [iw_cm] #18 [ffff88084d323af0] cm_work_handler at ffffffffa0776170 [iw_cm] #19 [ffff88084d323cb0] process_one_work at ffffffff810a1483 #20 [ffff88084d323d90] worker_thread at ffffffff810a211d #21 [ffff88084d323ec0] kthread at ffffffff810a6c5c #22 [ffff88084d323f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff816e1ebf Fixes: 632bc3f ("IB/core, RDMA RW API: Do not exceed QP SGE send limit") Signed-off-by: Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com> Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com> Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 4dfce57 upstream. There have been several reports over the years of NULL pointer dereferences in xfs_trans_log_inode during xfs_fsr processes, when the process is doing an fput and tearing down extents on the temporary inode, something like: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018 PID: 29439 TASK: ffff880550584fa0 CPU: 6 COMMAND: "xfs_fsr" [exception RIP: xfs_trans_log_inode+0x10] #9 [ffff8800a57bbbe0] xfs_bunmapi at ffffffffa037398e [xfs] #10 [ffff8800a57bbce8] xfs_itruncate_extents at ffffffffa0391b29 [xfs] #11 [ffff8800a57bbd88] xfs_inactive_truncate at ffffffffa0391d0c [xfs] #12 [ffff8800a57bbdb8] xfs_inactive at ffffffffa0392508 [xfs] #13 [ffff8800a57bbdd8] xfs_fs_evict_inode at ffffffffa035907e [xfs] #14 [ffff8800a57bbe00] evict at ffffffff811e1b67 #15 [ffff8800a57bbe28] iput at ffffffff811e23a5 #16 [ffff8800a57bbe58] dentry_kill at ffffffff811dcfc8 #17 [ffff8800a57bbe88] dput at ffffffff811dd06c #18 [ffff8800a57bbea8] __fput at ffffffff811c823b #19 [ffff8800a57bbef0] ____fput at ffffffff811c846e #20 [ffff8800a57bbf00] task_work_run at ffffffff81093b27 #21 [ffff8800a57bbf30] do_notify_resume at ffffffff81013b0c #22 [ffff8800a57bbf50] int_signal at ffffffff8161405d As it turns out, this is because the i_itemp pointer, along with the d_ops pointer, has been overwritten with zeros when we tear down the extents during truncate. When the in-core inode fork on the temporary inode used by xfs_fsr was originally set up during the extent swap, we mistakenly looked at di_nextents to determine whether all extents fit inline, but this misses extents generated by speculative preallocation; we should be using if_bytes instead. This mistake corrupts the in-memory inode, and code in xfs_iext_remove_inline eventually gets bad inputs, causing it to memmove and memset incorrect ranges; this became apparent because the two values in ifp->if_u2.if_inline_ext[1] contained what should have been in d_ops and i_itemp; they were memmoved due to incorrect array indexing and then the original locations were zeroed with memset, again due to an array overrun. Fix this by properly using i_df.if_bytes to determine the number of extents, not di_nextents. Thanks to dchinner for looking at this with me and spotting the root cause. Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 45caeaa ] As Eric Dumazet pointed out this also needs to be fixed in IPv6. v2: Contains the IPv6 tcp/Ipv6 dccp patches as well. We have seen a few incidents lately where a dst_enty has been freed with a dangling TCP socket reference (sk->sk_dst_cache) pointing to that dst_entry. If the conditions/timings are right a crash then ensues when the freed dst_entry is referenced later on. A Common crashing back trace is: #8 [] page_fault at ffffffff8163e648 [exception RIP: __tcp_ack_snd_check+74] . . #9 [] tcp_rcv_established at ffffffff81580b64 #10 [] tcp_v4_do_rcv at ffffffff8158b54a #11 [] tcp_v4_rcv at ffffffff8158cd02 #12 [] ip_local_deliver_finish at ffffffff815668f4 #13 [] ip_local_deliver at ffffffff81566bd9 #14 [] ip_rcv_finish at ffffffff8156656d #15 [] ip_rcv at ffffffff81566f06 #16 [] __netif_receive_skb_core at ffffffff8152b3a2 #17 [] __netif_receive_skb at ffffffff8152b608 #18 [] netif_receive_skb at ffffffff8152b690 #19 [] vmxnet3_rq_rx_complete at ffffffffa015eeaf [vmxnet3] #20 [] vmxnet3_poll_rx_only at ffffffffa015f32a [vmxnet3] #21 [] net_rx_action at ffffffff8152bac2 #22 [] __do_softirq at ffffffff81084b4f #23 [] call_softirq at ffffffff8164845c #24 [] do_softirq at ffffffff81016fc5 #25 [] irq_exit at ffffffff81084ee5 #26 [] do_IRQ at ffffffff81648ff8 Of course it may happen with other NIC drivers as well. It's found the freed dst_entry here: 224 static bool tcp_in_quickack_mode(struct sock *sk)↩ 225 {↩ 226 ▹ const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);↩ 227 ▹ const struct dst_entry *dst = __sk_dst_get(sk);↩ 228 ↩ 229 ▹ return (dst && dst_metric(dst, RTAX_QUICKACK)) ||↩ 230 ▹ ▹ (icsk->icsk_ack.quick && !icsk->icsk_ack.pingpong);↩ 231 }↩ But there are other backtraces attributed to the same freed dst_entry in netfilter code as well. All the vmcores showed 2 significant clues: - Remote hosts behind the default gateway had always been redirected to a different gateway. A rtable/dst_entry will be added for that host. Making more dst_entrys with lower reference counts. Making this more probable. - All vmcores showed a postitive LockDroppedIcmps value, e.g: LockDroppedIcmps 267 A closer look at the tcp_v4_err() handler revealed that do_redirect() will run regardless of whether user space has the socket locked. This can result in a race condition where the same dst_entry cached in sk->sk_dst_entry can be decremented twice for the same socket via: do_redirect()->__sk_dst_check()-> dst_release(). Which leads to the dst_entry being prematurely freed with another socket pointing to it via sk->sk_dst_cache and a subsequent crash. To fix this skip do_redirect() if usespace has the socket locked. Instead let the redirect take place later when user space does not have the socket locked. The dccp/IPv6 code is very similar in this respect, so fixing it there too. As Eric Garver pointed out the following commit now invalidates routes. Which can set the dst->obsolete flag so that ipv4_dst_check() returns null and triggers the dst_release(). Fixes: ceb3320 ("ipv4: Kill routes during PMTU/redirect updates.") Cc: Eric Garver <egarver@redhat.com> Cc: Hannes Sowa <hsowa@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jon Maxwell <jmaxwell37@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 4fb0534 ] When parsing the options provided by the user space, team_nl_cmd_options_set() insert them in a temporary list to send multiple events with a single message. While each option's attribute is correctly validated, the code does not check for duplicate entries before inserting into the event list. Exploiting the above, the syzbot was able to trigger the following splat: kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:31! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 4466 Comm: syzkaller556835 Not tainted 4.16.0+ #17 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid+0xaa/0xb0 lib/list_debug.c:29 RSP: 0018:ffff8801b04bf248 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000000058 RBX: ffff8801c8fc7a90 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000058 RSI: ffffffff815fbf41 RDI: ffffed0036097e3f RBP: ffff8801b04bf260 R08: ffff8801b0b2a700 R09: ffffed003b604f90 R10: ffffed003b604f90 R11: ffff8801db027c87 R12: ffff8801c8fc7a90 R13: ffff8801c8fc7a90 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000b98880(0000) GS:ffff8801db000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000000043fc30 CR3: 00000001afe8e000 CR4: 00000000001406f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: __list_add include/linux/list.h:60 [inline] list_add include/linux/list.h:79 [inline] team_nl_cmd_options_set+0x9ff/0x12b0 drivers/net/team/team.c:2571 genl_family_rcv_msg+0x889/0x1120 net/netlink/genetlink.c:599 genl_rcv_msg+0xc6/0x170 net/netlink/genetlink.c:624 netlink_rcv_skb+0x172/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2448 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:635 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x58b/0x740 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336 netlink_sendmsg+0x9f0/0xfa0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1901 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:639 ___sys_sendmsg+0x805/0x940 net/socket.c:2117 __sys_sendmsg+0x115/0x270 net/socket.c:2155 SYSC_sendmsg net/socket.c:2164 [inline] SyS_sendmsg+0x29/0x30 net/socket.c:2162 do_syscall_64+0x29e/0x9d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 RIP: 0033:0x4458b9 RSP: 002b:00007ffd1d4a7278 EFLAGS: 00000213 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000001b RCX: 00000000004458b9 RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020000d00 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00000000004a74ed R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000213 R12: 00007ffd1d4a7348 R13: 0000000000402a60 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Code: 75 e8 eb a9 48 89 f7 48 89 75 e8 e8 d1 85 7b fe 48 8b 75 e8 eb bb 48 89 f2 48 89 d9 4c 89 e6 48 c7 c7 a0 84 d8 87 e8 ea 67 28 fe <0f> 0b 0f 1f 40 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 55 48 89 e5 41 RIP: __list_add_valid+0xaa/0xb0 lib/list_debug.c:29 RSP: ffff8801b04bf248 This changeset addresses the avoiding list_add() if the current option is already present in the event list. Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+4d4af685432dc0e56c91@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Fixes: 2fcdb2c ("team: allow to send multiple set events in one message") Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit af50e4b ] syzbot caught an infinite recursion in nsh_gso_segment(). Problem here is that we need to make sure the NSH header is of reasonable length. BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low! turning off the locking correctness validator. depth: 48 max: 48! 48 locks held by syz-executor0/10189: #0: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x30f/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3517 #1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread #32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 INFO: lockdep is turned off. CPU: 1 PID: 10189 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc2+ #26 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113 __lock_acquire+0x1788/0x5140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3449 lock_acquire+0x1dc/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:246 [inline] rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:632 [inline] skb_mac_gso_segment+0x25b/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2789 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 __skb_gso_segment+0x3bb/0x870 net/core/dev.c:2865 skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:4025 [inline] validate_xmit_skb+0x54d/0xd90 net/core/dev.c:3118 validate_xmit_skb_list+0xbf/0x120 net/core/dev.c:3168 sch_direct_xmit+0x354/0x11e0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:312 qdisc_restart net/sched/sch_generic.c:399 [inline] __qdisc_run+0x741/0x1af0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:410 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3243 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x28ea/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3551 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3616 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2951 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x40f8/0x6070 net/packet/af_packet.c:2976 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:639 __sys_sendto+0x3d7/0x670 net/socket.c:1789 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1801 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1797 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Fixes: c411ed8 ("nsh: add GSO support") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Acked-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 2bbea6e ] when mounting an ISO filesystem sometimes (very rarely) the system hangs because of a race condition between two tasks. PID: 6766 TASK: ffff88007b2a6dd0 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "mount" #0 [ffff880078447ae0] __schedule at ffffffff8168d605 #1 [ffff880078447b48] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffff8168ed49 #2 [ffff880078447b58] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffff8168c995 #3 [ffff880078447bb8] mutex_lock at ffffffff8168bdef #4 [ffff880078447bd0] sr_block_ioctl at ffffffffa00b6818 [sr_mod] #5 [ffff880078447c10] blkdev_ioctl at ffffffff812fea50 #6 [ffff880078447c70] ioctl_by_bdev at ffffffff8123a8b3 #7 [ffff880078447c90] isofs_fill_super at ffffffffa04fb1e1 [isofs] #8 [ffff880078447da8] mount_bdev at ffffffff81202570 #9 [ffff880078447e18] isofs_mount at ffffffffa04f9828 [isofs] #10 [ffff880078447e28] mount_fs at ffffffff81202d09 #11 [ffff880078447e70] vfs_kern_mount at ffffffff8121ea8f #12 [ffff880078447ea8] do_mount at ffffffff81220fee #13 [ffff880078447f28] sys_mount at ffffffff812218d6 #14 [ffff880078447f80] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff81698c49 RIP: 00007fd9ea914e9a RSP: 00007ffd5d9bf648 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 00000000000000a5 RBX: ffffffff81698c49 RCX: 0000000000000010 RDX: 00007fd9ec2bc210 RSI: 00007fd9ec2bc290 RDI: 00007fd9ec2bcf30 RBP: 0000000000000000 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: 0000000000000010 R10: 00000000c0ed0001 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007fd9ec2bc040 R13: 00007fd9eb6b2380 R14: 00007fd9ec2bc210 R15: 00007fd9ec2bcf30 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 CS: 0033 SS: 002b This task was trying to mount the cdrom. It allocated and configured a super_block struct and owned the write-lock for the super_block->s_umount rwsem. While exclusively owning the s_umount lock, it called sr_block_ioctl and waited to acquire the global sr_mutex lock. PID: 6785 TASK: ffff880078720fb0 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "systemd-udevd" #0 [ffff880078417898] __schedule at ffffffff8168d605 #1 [ffff880078417900] schedule at ffffffff8168dc59 #2 [ffff880078417910] rwsem_down_read_failed at ffffffff8168f605 #3 [ffff880078417980] call_rwsem_down_read_failed at ffffffff81328838 #4 [ffff8800784179d0] down_read at ffffffff8168cde0 #5 [ffff8800784179e8] get_super at ffffffff81201cc7 #6 [ffff880078417a10] __invalidate_device at ffffffff8123a8de #7 [ffff880078417a40] flush_disk at ffffffff8123a94b #8 [ffff880078417a88] check_disk_change at ffffffff8123ab50 #9 [ffff880078417ab0] cdrom_open at ffffffffa00a29e1 [cdrom] #10 [ffff880078417b68] sr_block_open at ffffffffa00b6f9b [sr_mod] #11 [ffff880078417b98] __blkdev_get at ffffffff8123ba86 #12 [ffff880078417bf0] blkdev_get at ffffffff8123bd65 #13 [ffff880078417c78] blkdev_open at ffffffff8123bf9b #14 [ffff880078417c90] do_dentry_open at ffffffff811fc7f7 #15 [ffff880078417cd8] vfs_open at ffffffff811fc9cf #16 [ffff880078417d00] do_last at ffffffff8120d53d #17 [ffff880078417db0] path_openat at ffffffff8120e6b2 #18 [ffff880078417e48] do_filp_open at ffffffff8121082b #19 [ffff880078417f18] do_sys_open at ffffffff811fdd33 #20 [ffff880078417f70] sys_open at ffffffff811fde4e #21 [ffff880078417f80] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff81698c49 RIP: 00007f29438b0c20 RSP: 00007ffc76624b78 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffffffff81698c49 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 00007f2944a5fa70 RSI: 00000000000a0800 RDI: 00007f2944a5fa70 RBP: 00007f2944a5f540 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: 0000000000000020 R10: 00007f2943614c40 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffffffff811fde4e R13: ffff880078417f78 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 00007f2944a4b010 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000002 CS: 0033 SS: 002b This task tried to open the cdrom device, the sr_block_open function acquired the global sr_mutex lock. The call to check_disk_change() then saw an event flag indicating a possible media change and tried to flush any cached data for the device. As part of the flush, it tried to acquire the super_block->s_umount lock associated with the cdrom device. This was the same super_block as created and locked by the previous task. The first task acquires the s_umount lock and then the sr_mutex_lock; the second task acquires the sr_mutex_lock and then the s_umount lock. This patch fixes the issue by moving check_disk_change() out of cdrom_open() and let the caller take care of it. Signed-off-by: Maurizio Lombardi <mlombard@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 36eb8ff upstream. Crash dump shows following instructions crash> bt PID: 0 TASK: ffffffffbe412480 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "swapper/0" #0 [ffff891ee0003868] machine_kexec at ffffffffbd063ef1 #1 [ffff891ee00038c8] __crash_kexec at ffffffffbd12b6f2 #2 [ffff891ee0003998] crash_kexec at ffffffffbd12c84c #3 [ffff891ee00039b8] oops_end at ffffffffbd030f0a #4 [ffff891ee00039e0] no_context at ffffffffbd074643 #5 [ffff891ee0003a40] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffffbd07496e #6 [ffff891ee0003a90] bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffffbd074a64 #7 [ffff891ee0003aa0] __do_page_fault at ffffffffbd074b0a #8 [ffff891ee0003b18] do_page_fault at ffffffffbd074fc8 #9 [ffff891ee0003b50] page_fault at ffffffffbda01925 [exception RIP: qlt_schedule_sess_for_deletion+15] RIP: ffffffffc02e526f RSP: ffff891ee0003c08 RFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffffc0307847 RDX: 00000000000020e6 RSI: ffff891edbc377c8 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff891ee0003c18 R8: ffffffffc02f0b20 R9: 0000000000000250 R10: 0000000000000258 R11: 000000000000b780 R12: ffff891ed9b43000 R13: 00000000000000f0 R14: 0000000000000006 R15: ffff891edbc377c8 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #10 [ffff891ee0003c20] qla2x00_fcport_event_handler at ffffffffc02853d3 [qla2xxx] #11 [ffff891ee0003cf0] __dta_qla24xx_async_gnl_sp_done_333 at ffffffffc0285a1d [qla2xxx] #12 [ffff891ee0003de8] qla24xx_process_response_queue at ffffffffc02a2eb5 [qla2xxx] #13 [ffff891ee0003e88] qla24xx_msix_rsp_q at ffffffffc02a5403 [qla2xxx] #14 [ffff891ee0003ec0] __handle_irq_event_percpu at ffffffffbd0f4c59 #15 [ffff891ee0003f10] handle_irq_event_percpu at ffffffffbd0f4e02 #16 [ffff891ee0003f40] handle_irq_event at ffffffffbd0f4e90 #17 [ffff891ee0003f68] handle_edge_irq at ffffffffbd0f8984 #18 [ffff891ee0003f88] handle_irq at ffffffffbd0305d5 #19 [ffff891ee0003fb8] do_IRQ at ffffffffbda02a18 --- <IRQ stack> --- #20 [ffffffffbe403d30] ret_from_intr at ffffffffbda0094e [exception RIP: unknown or invalid address] RIP: 000000000000001f RSP: 0000000000000000 RFLAGS: fff3b8c2091ebb3f RAX: ffffbba5a0000200 RBX: 0000be8cdfa8f9fa RCX: 0000000000000018 RDX: 0000000000000101 RSI: 000000000000015d RDI: 0000000000000193 RBP: 0000000000000083 R8: ffffffffbe403e38 R9: 0000000000000002 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffffbe56b820 R12: ffff891ee001cf00 R13: ffffffffbd11c0a4 R14: ffffffffbe403d60 R15: 0000000000000001 ORIG_RAX: ffff891ee0022ac0 CS: 0000 SS: ffffffffffffffb9 bt: WARNING: possibly bogus exception frame #21 [ffffffffbe403dd8] cpuidle_enter_state at ffffffffbd67c6fd #22 [ffffffffbe403e40] cpuidle_enter at ffffffffbd67c907 #23 [ffffffffbe403e50] call_cpuidle at ffffffffbd0d98f3 #24 [ffffffffbe403e60] do_idle at ffffffffbd0d9b42 #25 [ffffffffbe403e98] cpu_startup_entry at ffffffffbd0d9da3 #26 [ffffffffbe403ec0] rest_init at ffffffffbd81d4aa #27 [ffffffffbe403ed0] start_kernel at ffffffffbe67d2ca #28 [ffffffffbe403f28] x86_64_start_reservations at ffffffffbe67c675 #29 [ffffffffbe403f38] x86_64_start_kernel at ffffffffbe67c6eb #30 [ffffffffbe403f50] secondary_startup_64 at ffffffffbd0000d5 Fixes: 040036b ("scsi: qla2xxx: Delay loop id allocation at login") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.17+ Signed-off-by: Chuck Anderson <chuck.anderson@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Himanshu Madhani <himanshu.madhani@cavium.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit a5ba1d9 upstream. We have reports of the following crash: PID: 7 TASK: ffff88085c6d61c0 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "kworker/u25:0" #0 [ffff88085c6db710] machine_kexec at ffffffff81046239 #1 [ffff88085c6db760] crash_kexec at ffffffff810fc248 #2 [ffff88085c6db830] oops_end at ffffffff81008ae7 #3 [ffff88085c6db860] no_context at ffffffff81050b8f #4 [ffff88085c6db8b0] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff81050d75 #5 [ffff88085c6db900] bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff81050e83 #6 [ffff88085c6db910] __do_page_fault at ffffffff8105132e #7 [ffff88085c6db9b0] do_page_fault at ffffffff8105152c #8 [ffff88085c6db9c0] page_fault at ffffffff81a3f122 [exception RIP: uart_put_char+149] RIP: ffffffff814b67b5 RSP: ffff88085c6dba78 RFLAGS: 00010006 RAX: 0000000000000292 RBX: ffffffff827c5120 RCX: 0000000000000081 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000005f RDI: ffffffff827c5120 RBP: ffff88085c6dba98 R8: 000000000000012c R9: ffffffff822ea320 R10: ffff88085fe4db04 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff881059f9c000 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 000000000000005f R15: 0000000000000fba ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #9 [ffff88085c6dbaa0] tty_put_char at ffffffff81497544 #10 [ffff88085c6dbac0] do_output_char at ffffffff8149c91c #11 [ffff88085c6dbae0] __process_echoes at ffffffff8149cb8b #12 [ffff88085c6dbb30] commit_echoes at ffffffff8149cdc2 #13 [ffff88085c6dbb60] n_tty_receive_buf_fast at ffffffff8149e49b #14 [ffff88085c6dbbc0] __receive_buf at ffffffff8149ef5a #15 [ffff88085c6dbc20] n_tty_receive_buf_common at ffffffff8149f016 #16 [ffff88085c6dbca0] n_tty_receive_buf2 at ffffffff8149f194 #17 [ffff88085c6dbcb0] flush_to_ldisc at ffffffff814a238a #18 [ffff88085c6dbd50] process_one_work at ffffffff81090be2 #19 [ffff88085c6dbe20] worker_thread at ffffffff81091b4d #20 [ffff88085c6dbeb0] kthread at ffffffff81096384 #21 [ffff88085c6dbf50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff81a3d69f after slogging through some dissasembly: ffffffff814b6720 <uart_put_char>: ffffffff814b6720: 55 push %rbp ffffffff814b6721: 48 89 e5 mov %rsp,%rbp ffffffff814b6724: 48 83 ec 20 sub $0x20,%rsp ffffffff814b6728: 48 89 1c 24 mov %rbx,(%rsp) ffffffff814b672c: 4c 89 64 24 08 mov %r12,0x8(%rsp) ffffffff814b6731: 4c 89 6c 24 10 mov %r13,0x10(%rsp) ffffffff814b6736: 4c 89 74 24 18 mov %r14,0x18(%rsp) ffffffff814b673b: e8 b0 8e 58 00 callq ffffffff81a3f5f0 <mcount> ffffffff814b6740: 4c 8b a7 88 02 00 00 mov 0x288(%rdi),%r12 ffffffff814b6747: 45 31 ed xor %r13d,%r13d ffffffff814b674a: 41 89 f6 mov %esi,%r14d ffffffff814b674d: 49 83 bc 24 70 01 00 cmpq $0x0,0x170(%r12) ffffffff814b6754: 00 00 ffffffff814b6756: 49 8b 9c 24 80 01 00 mov 0x180(%r12),%rbx ffffffff814b675d: 00 ffffffff814b675e: 74 2f je ffffffff814b678f <uart_put_char+0x6f> ffffffff814b6760: 48 89 df mov %rbx,%rdi ffffffff814b6763: e8 a8 67 58 00 callq ffffffff81a3cf10 <_raw_spin_lock_irqsave> ffffffff814b6768: 41 8b 8c 24 78 01 00 mov 0x178(%r12),%ecx ffffffff814b676f: 00 ffffffff814b6770: 89 ca mov %ecx,%edx ffffffff814b6772: f7 d2 not %edx ffffffff814b6774: 41 03 94 24 7c 01 00 add 0x17c(%r12),%edx ffffffff814b677b: 00 ffffffff814b677c: 81 e2 ff 0f 00 00 and $0xfff,%edx ffffffff814b6782: 75 23 jne ffffffff814b67a7 <uart_put_char+0x87> ffffffff814b6784: 48 89 c6 mov %rax,%rsi ffffffff814b6787: 48 89 df mov %rbx,%rdi ffffffff814b678a: e8 e1 64 58 00 callq ffffffff81a3cc70 <_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore> ffffffff814b678f: 44 89 e8 mov %r13d,%eax ffffffff814b6792: 48 8b 1c 24 mov (%rsp),%rbx ffffffff814b6796: 4c 8b 64 24 08 mov 0x8(%rsp),%r12 ffffffff814b679b: 4c 8b 6c 24 10 mov 0x10(%rsp),%r13 ffffffff814b67a0: 4c 8b 74 24 18 mov 0x18(%rsp),%r14 ffffffff814b67a5: c9 leaveq ffffffff814b67a6: c3 retq ffffffff814b67a7: 49 8b 94 24 70 01 00 mov 0x170(%r12),%rdx ffffffff814b67ae: 00 ffffffff814b67af: 48 63 c9 movslq %ecx,%rcx ffffffff814b67b2: 41 b5 01 mov $0x1,%r13b ffffffff814b67b5: 44 88 34 0a mov %r14b,(%rdx,%rcx,1) ffffffff814b67b9: 41 8b 94 24 78 01 00 mov 0x178(%r12),%edx ffffffff814b67c0: 00 ffffffff814b67c1: 83 c2 01 add $0x1,%edx ffffffff814b67c4: 81 e2 ff 0f 00 00 and $0xfff,%edx ffffffff814b67ca: 41 89 94 24 78 01 00 mov %edx,0x178(%r12) ffffffff814b67d1: 00 ffffffff814b67d2: eb b0 jmp ffffffff814b6784 <uart_put_char+0x64> ffffffff814b67d4: 66 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 data32 data32 nopw %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1) ffffffff814b67db: 00 00 00 00 00 for our build, this is crashing at: circ->buf[circ->head] = c; Looking in uart_port_startup(), it seems that circ->buf (state->xmit.buf) protected by the "per-port mutex", which based on uart_port_check() is state->port.mutex. Indeed, the lock acquired in uart_put_char() is uport->lock, i.e. not the same lock. Anyway, since the lock is not acquired, if uart_shutdown() is called, the last chunk of that function may release state->xmit.buf before its assigned to null, and cause the race above. To fix it, let's lock uport->lock when allocating/deallocating state->xmit.buf in addition to the per-port mutex. v2: switch to locking uport->lock on allocation/deallocation instead of locking the per-port mutex in uart_put_char. Note that since uport->lock is a spin lock, we have to switch the allocation to GFP_ATOMIC. v3: move the allocation outside the lock, so we can switch back to GFP_KERNEL Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 21b172e ] Fix the warning below by calling rhashtable_lookup_fast. Also, make some code movements for better quality and human readability. [ 342.450870] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage [ 342.455856] 4.18.0-rc2+ #17 Tainted: G O [ 342.462210] ----------------------------- [ 342.467202] ./include/linux/rhashtable.h:481 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! [ 342.476568] [ 342.476568] other info that might help us debug this: [ 342.476568] [ 342.486978] [ 342.486978] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 [ 342.495211] 4 locks held by modprobe/3934: [ 342.500265] #0: 00000000e23116b2 (mlx5_intf_mutex){+.+.}, at: mlx5_unregister_interface+0x18/0x90 [mlx5_core] [ 342.511953] #1: 00000000ca16db96 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: unregister_netdev+0xe/0x20 [ 342.521109] #2: 00000000a46e2c4b (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}, at: mlx5e_close+0x29/0x60 [mlx5_core] [ 342.531642] #3: 0000000060c5bde3 (mem_id_lock){+.+.}, at: xdp_rxq_info_unreg+0x93/0x6b0 [ 342.541206] [ 342.541206] stack backtrace: [ 342.547075] CPU: 12 PID: 3934 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G O 4.18.0-rc2+ #17 [ 342.556621] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/0H21J3, BIOS 1.5.4 10/002/2015 [ 342.565606] Call Trace: [ 342.568861] dump_stack+0x78/0xb3 [ 342.573086] xdp_rxq_info_unreg+0x3f5/0x6b0 [ 342.578285] ? __call_rcu+0x220/0x300 [ 342.582911] mlx5e_free_rq+0x38/0xc0 [mlx5_core] [ 342.588602] mlx5e_close_channel+0x20/0x120 [mlx5_core] [ 342.594976] mlx5e_close_channels+0x26/0x40 [mlx5_core] [ 342.601345] mlx5e_close_locked+0x44/0x50 [mlx5_core] [ 342.607519] mlx5e_close+0x42/0x60 [mlx5_core] [ 342.613005] __dev_close_many+0xb1/0x120 [ 342.617911] dev_close_many+0xa2/0x170 [ 342.622622] rollback_registered_many+0x148/0x460 [ 342.628401] ? __lock_acquire+0x48d/0x11b0 [ 342.633498] ? unregister_netdev+0xe/0x20 [ 342.638495] rollback_registered+0x56/0x90 [ 342.643588] unregister_netdevice_queue+0x7e/0x100 [ 342.649461] unregister_netdev+0x18/0x20 [ 342.654362] mlx5e_remove+0x2a/0x50 [mlx5_core] [ 342.659944] mlx5_remove_device+0xe5/0x110 [mlx5_core] [ 342.666208] mlx5_unregister_interface+0x39/0x90 [mlx5_core] [ 342.673038] cleanup+0x5/0xbfc [mlx5_core] [ 342.678094] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x16b/0x240 [ 342.683725] ? do_syscall_64+0x1c/0x210 [ 342.688476] do_syscall_64+0x5a/0x210 [ 342.693025] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Fixes: 8d5d885 ("xdp: rhashtable with allocator ID to pointer mapping") Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com> Suggested-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 34043d2 ] Matteo reported the following splat, testing the datapath of TC 'sample': BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in tcf_sample_act+0xc4/0x310 Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000000 by task nc/433 CPU: 0 PID: 433 Comm: nc Not tainted 4.19.0-rc3-kvm #17 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS ?-20180531_142017-buildhw-08.phx2.fedoraproject.org-1.fc28 04/01/2014 Call Trace: kasan_report.cold.6+0x6c/0x2fa tcf_sample_act+0xc4/0x310 ? dev_hard_start_xmit+0x117/0x180 tcf_action_exec+0xa3/0x160 tcf_classify+0xdd/0x1d0 htb_enqueue+0x18e/0x6b0 ? deref_stack_reg+0x7a/0xb0 ? htb_delete+0x4b0/0x4b0 ? unwind_next_frame+0x819/0x8f0 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 __dev_queue_xmit+0x722/0xca0 ? unwind_get_return_address_ptr+0x50/0x50 ? netdev_pick_tx+0xe0/0xe0 ? save_stack+0x8c/0xb0 ? kasan_kmalloc+0xbe/0xd0 ? __kmalloc_track_caller+0xe4/0x1c0 ? __kmalloc_reserve.isra.45+0x24/0x70 ? __alloc_skb+0xdd/0x2e0 ? sk_stream_alloc_skb+0x91/0x3b0 ? tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x71b/0x15a0 ? tcp_sendmsg+0x22/0x40 ? __sys_sendto+0x1b0/0x250 ? __x64_sys_sendto+0x6f/0x80 ? do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x150 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 ? __sys_sendto+0x1b0/0x250 ? __x64_sys_sendto+0x6f/0x80 ? do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x150 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 ip_finish_output2+0x495/0x590 ? ip_copy_metadata+0x2e0/0x2e0 ? skb_gso_validate_network_len+0x6f/0x110 ? ip_finish_output+0x174/0x280 __tcp_transmit_skb+0xb17/0x12b0 ? __tcp_select_window+0x380/0x380 tcp_write_xmit+0x913/0x1de0 ? __sk_mem_schedule+0x50/0x80 tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x49d/0x15a0 ? tcp_rcv_established+0x8da/0xa30 ? tcp_set_state+0x220/0x220 ? clear_user+0x1f/0x50 ? iov_iter_zero+0x1ae/0x590 ? __fget_light+0xa0/0xe0 tcp_sendmsg+0x22/0x40 __sys_sendto+0x1b0/0x250 ? __ia32_sys_getpeername+0x40/0x40 ? _copy_to_user+0x58/0x70 ? poll_select_copy_remaining+0x176/0x200 ? __pollwait+0x1c0/0x1c0 ? ktime_get_ts64+0x11f/0x140 ? kern_select+0x108/0x150 ? core_sys_select+0x360/0x360 ? vfs_read+0x127/0x150 ? kernel_write+0x90/0x90 __x64_sys_sendto+0x6f/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x150 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7fefef2b129d Code: ff ff ff ff eb b6 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 8d 05 51 37 0c 00 41 89 ca 8b 00 85 c0 75 20 45 31 c9 45 31 c0 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 6b f3 c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 41 56 41 RSP: 002b:00007fff2f5350c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000056118d60c120 RCX: 00007fefef2b129d RDX: 0000000000002000 RSI: 000056118d629320 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 000056118d530370 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000002000 R13: 000056118d5c2a10 R14: 000056118d5c2a10 R15: 000056118d5303b8 tcf_sample_act() tried to update its per-cpu stats, but tcf_sample_init() forgot to allocate them, because tcf_idr_create() was called with a wrong value of 'cpustats'. Setting it to true proved to fix the reported crash. Reported-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com> Fixes: 65a206c ("net/sched: Change act_api and act_xxx modules to use IDR") Fixes: 5c5670f ("net/sched: Introduce sample tc action") Tested-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit dd7ef7b ] In a low-memory situation, cc->fast_search_fail can keep increasing as it is unable to find an available page to isolate in fast_isolate_freepages(). As the result, it could trigger an error below, so just compare with the maximum bits can be shifted first. UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in mm/compaction.c:1160:30 shift exponent 64 is too large for 64-bit type 'unsigned long' CPU: 131 PID: 1308 Comm: kcompactd1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W L 5.0.0+ #17 Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x450 show_stack+0x20/0x2c dump_stack+0xc8/0x14c __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x7e8/0x8c4 compaction_alloc+0x2344/0x2484 unmap_and_move+0xdc/0x1dbc migrate_pages+0x274/0x1310 compact_zone+0x26ec/0x43bc kcompactd+0x15b8/0x1a24 kthread+0x374/0x390 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 [akpm@linux-foundation.org: code cleanup] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190320203338.53367-1-cai@lca.pw Fixes: 70b4459 ("mm, compaction: use free lists to quickly locate a migration source") Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 4d8e3e9 ] During early system resume on Exynos5422 with performance counters enabled the following kernel oops happens: Internal error: Oops - undefined instruction: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1433 Comm: bash Tainted: G W 5.0.0-rc5-next-20190208-00023-gd5fb5a8a13e6-dirty #5480 Hardware name: SAMSUNG EXYNOS (Flattened Device Tree) ... Flags: nZCv IRQs off FIQs off Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment none Control: 10c5387d Table: 4451006a DAC: 00000051 Process bash (pid: 1433, stack limit = 0xb7e0e22f) ... (reset_ctrl_regs) from [<c0112ad0>] (dbg_cpu_pm_notify+0x1c/0x24) (dbg_cpu_pm_notify) from [<c014c840>] (notifier_call_chain+0x44/0x84) (notifier_call_chain) from [<c014cbc0>] (__atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x7c/0x128) (__atomic_notifier_call_chain) from [<c01ffaac>] (cpu_pm_notify+0x30/0x54) (cpu_pm_notify) from [<c055116c>] (syscore_resume+0x98/0x3f4) (syscore_resume) from [<c0189350>] (suspend_devices_and_enter+0x97c/0xe74) (suspend_devices_and_enter) from [<c0189fb8>] (pm_suspend+0x770/0xc04) (pm_suspend) from [<c0187740>] (state_store+0x6c/0xcc) (state_store) from [<c09fa698>] (kobj_attr_store+0x14/0x20) (kobj_attr_store) from [<c030159c>] (sysfs_kf_write+0x4c/0x50) (sysfs_kf_write) from [<c0300620>] (kernfs_fop_write+0xfc/0x1e0) (kernfs_fop_write) from [<c0282be8>] (__vfs_write+0x2c/0x160) (__vfs_write) from [<c0282ea4>] (vfs_write+0xa4/0x16c) (vfs_write) from [<c0283080>] (ksys_write+0x40/0x8c) (ksys_write) from [<c0101000>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x28) Undefined instruction is triggered during CP14 reset, because bits: #16 (Secure privileged invasive debug disabled) and #17 (Secure privileged noninvasive debug disable) are set in DSCR. Those bits depend on SPNIDEN and SPIDEN lines, which are provided by Secure JTAG hardware block. That block in turn is powered from cluster 0 (big/Eagle), but the Exynos5422 boots on cluster 1 (LITTLE/KFC). To fix this issue it is enough to turn on the power on the cluster 0 for a while. This lets the Secure JTAG block to propagate the needed signals to LITTLE/KFC cores and change their DSCR. Signed-off-by: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 04e03d9 ] The mapper may be NULL when called from register_ftrace_function_probe() with probe->data == NULL. This issue can be reproduced as follow (it may be covered by compiler optimization sometime): / # cat /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/set_ftrace_filter #### all functions enabled #### / # echo foo_bar:dump > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/set_ftrace_filter [ 206.949100] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 [ 206.952402] Mem abort info: [ 206.952819] ESR = 0x96000006 [ 206.955326] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 206.955844] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 206.956272] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 206.956652] Data abort info: [ 206.957320] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000006 [ 206.959271] CM = 0, WnR = 0 [ 206.959938] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000419f3a000 [ 206.960483] [0000000000000000] pgd=0000000411a87003, pud=0000000411a83003, pmd=0000000000000000 [ 206.964953] Internal error: Oops: 96000006 [#1] SMP [ 206.971122] Dumping ftrace buffer: [ 206.973677] (ftrace buffer empty) [ 206.975258] Modules linked in: [ 206.976631] Process sh (pid: 281, stack limit = 0x(____ptrval____)) [ 206.978449] CPU: 10 PID: 281 Comm: sh Not tainted 5.2.0-rc1+ #17 [ 206.978955] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) [ 206.979883] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO) [ 206.980499] pc : free_ftrace_func_mapper+0x2c/0x118 [ 206.980874] lr : ftrace_count_free+0x68/0x80 [ 206.982539] sp : ffff0000182f3ab0 [ 206.983102] x29: ffff0000182f3ab0 x28: ffff8003d0ec1700 [ 206.983632] x27: ffff000013054b40 x26: 0000000000000001 [ 206.984000] x25: ffff00001385f000 x24: 0000000000000000 [ 206.984394] x23: ffff000013453000 x22: ffff000013054000 [ 206.984775] x21: 0000000000000000 x20: ffff00001385fe28 [ 206.986575] x19: ffff000013872c30 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 206.987111] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 206.987491] x15: ffffffffffffffb0 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 206.987850] x13: 000000000017430e x12: 0000000000000580 [ 206.988251] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: cccccccccccccccc [ 206.988740] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : ffff000013917550 [ 206.990198] x7 : ffff000012fac2e8 x6 : ffff000012fac000 [ 206.991008] x5 : ffff0000103da588 x4 : 0000000000000001 [ 206.991395] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : ffff000013872a28 [ 206.991771] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000 [ 206.992557] Call trace: [ 206.993101] free_ftrace_func_mapper+0x2c/0x118 [ 206.994827] ftrace_count_free+0x68/0x80 [ 206.995238] release_probe+0xfc/0x1d0 [ 206.995555] register_ftrace_function_probe+0x4a8/0x868 [ 206.995923] ftrace_trace_probe_callback.isra.4+0xb8/0x180 [ 206.996330] ftrace_dump_callback+0x50/0x70 [ 206.996663] ftrace_regex_write.isra.29+0x290/0x3a8 [ 206.997157] ftrace_filter_write+0x44/0x60 [ 206.998971] __vfs_write+0x64/0xf0 [ 206.999285] vfs_write+0x14c/0x2f0 [ 206.999591] ksys_write+0xbc/0x1b0 [ 206.999888] __arm64_sys_write+0x3c/0x58 [ 207.000246] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x408/0x5f0 [ 207.000607] el0_svc_handler+0x144/0x1c8 [ 207.000916] el0_svc+0x8/0xc [ 207.003699] Code: aa0003f8 a9025bf5 aa0103f5 f946ea80 (f9400303) [ 207.008388] ---[ end trace 7b6d11b5f542bdf1 ]--- [ 207.010126] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception [ 207.011322] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs [ 207.013956] Dumping ftrace buffer: [ 207.014595] (ftrace buffer empty) [ 207.015632] Kernel Offset: disabled [ 207.017187] CPU features: 0x002,20006008 [ 207.017985] Memory Limit: none [ 207.019825] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]--- Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190606031754.10798-1-liwei391@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Wei Li <liwei391@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit d0a255e upstream. A deadlock with this stacktrace was observed. The loop thread does a GFP_KERNEL allocation, it calls into dm-bufio shrinker and the shrinker depends on I/O completion in the dm-bufio subsystem. In order to fix the deadlock (and other similar ones), we set the flag PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO at loop thread entry. PID: 474 TASK: ffff8813e11f4600 CPU: 10 COMMAND: "kswapd0" #0 [ffff8813dedfb938] __schedule at ffffffff8173f405 #1 [ffff8813dedfb990] schedule at ffffffff8173fa27 #2 [ffff8813dedfb9b0] schedule_timeout at ffffffff81742fec #3 [ffff8813dedfba60] io_schedule_timeout at ffffffff8173f186 #4 [ffff8813dedfbaa0] bit_wait_io at ffffffff8174034f #5 [ffff8813dedfbac0] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff8173fec8 #6 [ffff8813dedfbb10] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff8173ff81 #7 [ffff8813dedfbb90] __make_buffer_clean at ffffffffa038736f [dm_bufio] #8 [ffff8813dedfbbb0] __try_evict_buffer at ffffffffa0387bb8 [dm_bufio] #9 [ffff8813dedfbbd0] dm_bufio_shrink_scan at ffffffffa0387cc3 [dm_bufio] #10 [ffff8813dedfbc40] shrink_slab at ffffffff811a87ce #11 [ffff8813dedfbd30] shrink_zone at ffffffff811ad778 #12 [ffff8813dedfbdc0] kswapd at ffffffff811ae92f #13 [ffff8813dedfbec0] kthread at ffffffff810a8428 #14 [ffff8813dedfbf50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff81745242 PID: 14127 TASK: ffff881455749c00 CPU: 11 COMMAND: "loop1" #0 [ffff88272f5af228] __schedule at ffffffff8173f405 #1 [ffff88272f5af280] schedule at ffffffff8173fa27 #2 [ffff88272f5af2a0] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffff8173fd5e #3 [ffff88272f5af2b0] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffff81741fb5 #4 [ffff88272f5af330] mutex_lock at ffffffff81742133 #5 [ffff88272f5af350] dm_bufio_shrink_count at ffffffffa03865f9 [dm_bufio] #6 [ffff88272f5af380] shrink_slab at ffffffff811a86bd #7 [ffff88272f5af470] shrink_zone at ffffffff811ad778 #8 [ffff88272f5af500] do_try_to_free_pages at ffffffff811adb34 #9 [ffff88272f5af590] try_to_free_pages at ffffffff811adef8 #10 [ffff88272f5af610] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffffffff811a09c3 #11 [ffff88272f5af710] alloc_pages_current at ffffffff811e8b71 #12 [ffff88272f5af760] new_slab at ffffffff811f4523 #13 [ffff88272f5af7b0] __slab_alloc at ffffffff8173a1b5 #14 [ffff88272f5af880] kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff811f484b #15 [ffff88272f5af8d0] do_blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff812535b3 #16 [ffff88272f5afb00] __blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff81255dc3 #17 [ffff88272f5afb30] xfs_vm_direct_IO at ffffffffa01fe3fc [xfs] #18 [ffff88272f5afb90] generic_file_read_iter at ffffffff81198994 #19 [ffff88272f5afc50] __dta_xfs_file_read_iter_2398 at ffffffffa020c970 [xfs] #20 [ffff88272f5afcc0] lo_rw_aio at ffffffffa0377042 [loop] #21 [ffff88272f5afd70] loop_queue_work at ffffffffa0377c3b [loop] #22 [ffff88272f5afe60] kthread_worker_fn at ffffffff810a8a0c #23 [ffff88272f5afec0] kthread at ffffffff810a8428 #24 [ffff88272f5aff50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff81745242 Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit e24c644 ] I compiled with AddressSanitizer and I had these memory leaks while I was using the tep_parse_format function: Direct leak of 28 byte(s) in 4 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fb07db49ffe in __interceptor_realloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x10dffe) #1 0x7fb07a724228 in extend_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:985 #2 0x7fb07a724c21 in __read_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1140 #3 0x7fb07a724f78 in read_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1206 #4 0x7fb07a725191 in __read_expect_type /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1291 #5 0x7fb07a7251df in read_expect_type /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1299 #6 0x7fb07a72e6c8 in process_dynamic_array_len /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:2849 #7 0x7fb07a7304b8 in process_function /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3161 #8 0x7fb07a730900 in process_arg_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3207 #9 0x7fb07a727c0b in process_arg /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1786 #10 0x7fb07a731080 in event_read_print_args /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3285 #11 0x7fb07a731722 in event_read_print /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3369 #12 0x7fb07a740054 in __tep_parse_format /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6335 #13 0x7fb07a74047a in __parse_event /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6389 #14 0x7fb07a740536 in tep_parse_format /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6431 #15 0x7fb07a785acf in parse_event ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:251 #16 0x7fb07a785ccd in parse_systems ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:284 #17 0x7fb07a786fb3 in read_metadata ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:593 #18 0x7fb07a78760e in ftrace_fs_source_init ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:727 #19 0x7fb07d90c19c in add_component_with_init_method_data ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1048 #20 0x7fb07d90c87b in add_source_component_with_initialize_method_data ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1127 #21 0x7fb07d90c92a in bt_graph_add_source_component ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1152 #22 0x55db11aa632e in cmd_run_ctx_create_components_from_config_components ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2252 #23 0x55db11aa6fda in cmd_run_ctx_create_components ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2347 #24 0x55db11aa780c in cmd_run ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2461 #25 0x55db11aa8a7d in main ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2673 #26 0x7fb07d5460b2 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x270b2) The token variable in the process_dynamic_array_len function is allocated in the read_expect_type function, but is not freed before calling the read_token function. Free the token variable before calling read_token in order to plug the leak. Signed-off-by: Philippe Duplessis-Guindon <pduplessis@efficios.com> Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-devel/20200730150236.5392-1-pduplessis@efficios.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 8ffd778 ] Mimic the pre-existing ACPI and Device Tree event log behavior by not creating the binary_bios_measurements file when the EFI TPM event log is empty. This fixes the following NULL pointer dereference that can occur when reading /sys/kernel/security/tpm0/binary_bios_measurements after the kernel received an empty event log from the firmware: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000002c #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 2 PID: 3932 Comm: fwupdtpmevlog Not tainted 5.9.0-00003-g629990edad62 #17 Hardware name: LENOVO 20LCS03L00/20LCS03L00, BIOS N27ET38W (1.24 ) 11/28/2019 RIP: 0010:tpm2_bios_measurements_start+0x3a/0x550 Code: 54 53 48 83 ec 68 48 8b 57 70 48 8b 1e 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 45 d0 31 c0 48 8b 82 c0 06 00 00 48 8b 8a c8 06 00 00 <44> 8b 60 1c 48 89 4d a0 4c 89 e2 49 83 c4 20 48 83 fb 00 75 2a 49 RSP: 0018:ffffa9c901203db0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000010 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000010 RDX: ffff8ba1eb99c000 RSI: ffff8ba1e4ce8280 RDI: ffff8ba1e4ce8258 RBP: ffffa9c901203e40 R08: ffffa9c901203dd8 R09: ffff8ba1ec443300 R10: ffffa9c901203e50 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8ba1e4ce8280 R13: ffffa9c901203ef0 R14: ffffa9c901203ef0 R15: ffff8ba1e4ce8258 FS: 00007f6595460880(0000) GS:ffff8ba1ef880000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000000000002c CR3: 00000007d8d18003 CR4: 00000000003706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ? __kmalloc_node+0x113/0x320 ? kvmalloc_node+0x31/0x80 seq_read+0x94/0x420 vfs_read+0xa7/0x190 ksys_read+0xa7/0xe0 __x64_sys_read+0x1a/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x37/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 In this situation, the bios_event_log pointer in the tpm_bios_log struct was not NULL but was equal to the ZERO_SIZE_PTR (0x10) value. This was due to the following kmemdup() in tpm_read_log_efi(): int tpm_read_log_efi(struct tpm_chip *chip) { ... /* malloc EventLog space */ log->bios_event_log = kmemdup(log_tbl->log, log_size, GFP_KERNEL); if (!log->bios_event_log) { ret = -ENOMEM; goto out; } ... } When log_size is zero, due to an empty event log from firmware, ZERO_SIZE_PTR is returned from kmemdup(). Upon a read of the binary_bios_measurements file, the tpm2_bios_measurements_start() function does not perform a ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR() check on the bios_event_log pointer before dereferencing it. Rather than add a ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR() check in functions that make use of the bios_event_log pointer, simply avoid creating the binary_bios_measurements_file as is done in other event log retrieval backends. Explicitly ignore all of the events in the final event log when the main event log is empty. The list of events in the final event log cannot be accurately parsed without referring to the first event in the main event log (the event log header) so the final event log is useless in such a situation. Fixes: 58cc1e4 ("tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/E1FDCCCB-CA51-4AEE-AC83-9CDE995EAE52@canonical.com/ Reported-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com> Reported-by: Kenneth R. Crudup <kenny@panix.com> Reported-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit 4d14c5c upstream Calling btrfs_qgroup_reserve_meta_prealloc from btrfs_delayed_inode_reserve_metadata can result in flushing delalloc while holding a transaction and delayed node locks. This is deadlock prone. In the past multiple commits: * ae5e070 ("btrfs: qgroup: don't try to wait flushing if we're already holding a transaction") * 6f23277 ("btrfs: qgroup: don't commit transaction when we already hold the handle") Tried to solve various aspects of this but this was always a whack-a-mole game. Unfortunately those 2 fixes don't solve a deadlock scenario involving btrfs_delayed_node::mutex. Namely, one thread can call btrfs_dirty_inode as a result of reading a file and modifying its atime: PID: 6963 TASK: ffff8c7f3f94c000 CPU: 2 COMMAND: "test" #0 __schedule at ffffffffa529e07d #1 schedule at ffffffffa529e4ff #2 schedule_timeout at ffffffffa52a1bdd #3 wait_for_completion at ffffffffa529eeea <-- sleeps with delayed node mutex held #4 start_delalloc_inodes at ffffffffc0380db5 #5 btrfs_start_delalloc_snapshot at ffffffffc0393836 #6 try_flush_qgroup at ffffffffc03f04b2 #7 __btrfs_qgroup_reserve_meta at ffffffffc03f5bb6 <-- tries to reserve space and starts delalloc inodes. #8 btrfs_delayed_update_inode at ffffffffc03e31aa <-- acquires delayed node mutex #9 btrfs_update_inode at ffffffffc0385ba8 #10 btrfs_dirty_inode at ffffffffc038627b <-- TRANSACTIION OPENED #11 touch_atime at ffffffffa4cf0000 #12 generic_file_read_iter at ffffffffa4c1f123 #13 new_sync_read at ffffffffa4ccdc8a #14 vfs_read at ffffffffa4cd0849 #15 ksys_read at ffffffffa4cd0bd1 #16 do_syscall_64 at ffffffffa4a052eb #17 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffffa540008c This will cause an asynchronous work to flush the delalloc inodes to happen which can try to acquire the same delayed_node mutex: PID: 455 TASK: ffff8c8085fa4000 CPU: 5 COMMAND: "kworker/u16:30" #0 __schedule at ffffffffa529e07d #1 schedule at ffffffffa529e4ff #2 schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffa529e80a #3 __mutex_lock at ffffffffa529fdcb <-- goes to sleep, never wakes up. #4 btrfs_delayed_update_inode at ffffffffc03e3143 <-- tries to acquire the mutex #5 btrfs_update_inode at ffffffffc0385ba8 <-- this is the same inode that pid 6963 is holding #6 cow_file_range_inline.constprop.78 at ffffffffc0386be7 #7 cow_file_range at ffffffffc03879c1 #8 btrfs_run_delalloc_range at ffffffffc038894c #9 writepage_delalloc at ffffffffc03a3c8f #10 __extent_writepage at ffffffffc03a4c01 #11 extent_write_cache_pages at ffffffffc03a500b #12 extent_writepages at ffffffffc03a6de2 #13 do_writepages at ffffffffa4c277eb #14 __filemap_fdatawrite_range at ffffffffa4c1e5bb #15 btrfs_run_delalloc_work at ffffffffc0380987 <-- starts running delayed nodes #16 normal_work_helper at ffffffffc03b706c #17 process_one_work at ffffffffa4aba4e4 #18 worker_thread at ffffffffa4aba6fd #19 kthread at ffffffffa4ac0a3d #20 ret_from_fork at ffffffffa54001ff To fully address those cases the complete fix is to never issue any flushing while holding the transaction or the delayed node lock. This patch achieves it by calling qgroup_reserve_meta directly which will either succeed without flushing or will fail and return -EDQUOT. In the latter case that return value is going to be propagated to btrfs_dirty_inode which will fallback to start a new transaction. That's fine as the majority of time we expect the inode will have BTRFS_DELAYED_NODE_INODE_DIRTY flag set which will result in directly copying the in-memory state. Fixes: c53e965 ("btrfs: qgroup: try to flush qgroup space when we get -EDQUOT") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

I got several memory leak reports from Asan with a simple command. It was because VDSO is not released due to the refcount. Like in __dsos_addnew_id(), it should put the refcount after adding to the list. $ perf record true [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ] [ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.030 MB perf.data (10 samples) ] ================================================================= ==692599==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 439 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fea52341037 in __interceptor_calloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x559bce4aa8ee in dso__new_id util/dso.c:1256 zen-kernel#2 0x559bce59245a in __machine__addnew_vdso util/vdso.c:132 zen-kernel#3 0x559bce59245a in machine__findnew_vdso util/vdso.c:347 zen-kernel#4 0x559bce50826c in map__new util/map.c:175 zen-kernel#5 0x559bce503c92 in machine__process_mmap2_event util/machine.c:1787 zen-kernel#6 0x559bce512f6b in machines__deliver_event util/session.c:1481 zen-kernel#7 0x559bce515107 in perf_session__deliver_event util/session.c:1551 zen-kernel#8 0x559bce51d4d2 in do_flush util/ordered-events.c:244 zen-kernel#9 0x559bce51d4d2 in __ordered_events__flush util/ordered-events.c:323 zen-kernel#10 0x559bce519bea in __perf_session__process_events util/session.c:2268 zen-kernel#11 0x559bce519bea in perf_session__process_events util/session.c:2297 zen-kernel#12 0x559bce2e7a52 in process_buildids /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/builtin-record.c:1017 zen-kernel#13 0x559bce2e7a52 in record__finish_output /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/builtin-record.c:1234 zen-kernel#14 0x559bce2ed4f6 in __cmd_record /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/builtin-record.c:2026 zen-kernel#15 0x559bce2ed4f6 in cmd_record /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/builtin-record.c:2858 zen-kernel#16 0x559bce422db4 in run_builtin /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:313 zen-kernel#17 0x559bce2acac8 in handle_internal_command /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:365 zen-kernel#18 0x559bce2acac8 in run_argv /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:409 zen-kernel#19 0x559bce2acac8 in main /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:539 zen-kernel#20 0x7fea51e76d09 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 Indirect leak of 32 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fea52341037 in __interceptor_calloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x559bce520907 in nsinfo__copy util/namespaces.c:169 zen-kernel#2 0x559bce50821b in map__new util/map.c:168 zen-kernel#3 0x559bce503c92 in machine__process_mmap2_event util/machine.c:1787 zen-kernel#4 0x559bce512f6b in machines__deliver_event util/session.c:1481 zen-kernel#5 0x559bce515107 in perf_session__deliver_event util/session.c:1551 zen-kernel#6 0x559bce51d4d2 in do_flush util/ordered-events.c:244 zen-kernel#7 0x559bce51d4d2 in __ordered_events__flush util/ordered-events.c:323 zen-kernel#8 0x559bce519bea in __perf_session__process_events util/session.c:2268 zen-kernel#9 0x559bce519bea in perf_session__process_events util/session.c:2297 zen-kernel#10 0x559bce2e7a52 in process_buildids /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/builtin-record.c:1017 zen-kernel#11 0x559bce2e7a52 in record__finish_output /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/builtin-record.c:1234 zen-kernel#12 0x559bce2ed4f6 in __cmd_record /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/builtin-record.c:2026 zen-kernel#13 0x559bce2ed4f6 in cmd_record /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/builtin-record.c:2858 zen-kernel#14 0x559bce422db4 in run_builtin /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:313 zen-kernel#15 0x559bce2acac8 in handle_internal_command /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:365 zen-kernel#16 0x559bce2acac8 in run_argv /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:409 zen-kernel#17 0x559bce2acac8 in main /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:539 zen-kernel#18 0x7fea51e76d09 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 471 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s). Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210315045641.700430-1-namhyung@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

commit 57f0ff0 upstream. It's later supposed to be either a correct address or NULL. Without the initialization, it may contain an undefined value which results in the following segmentation fault: # perf top --sort comm -g --ignore-callees=do_idle terminates with: #0 0x00007ffff56b7685 in __strlen_avx2 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #1 0x00007ffff55e3802 in strdup () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #2 0x00005555558cb139 in hist_entry__init (callchain_size=<optimized out>, sample_self=true, template=0x7fffde7fb110, he=0x7fffd801c250) at util/hist.c:489 #3 hist_entry__new (template=template@entry=0x7fffde7fb110, sample_self=sample_self@entry=true) at util/hist.c:564 #4 0x00005555558cb4ba in hists__findnew_entry (hists=hists@entry=0x5555561d9e38, entry=entry@entry=0x7fffde7fb110, al=al@entry=0x7fffde7fb420, sample_self=sample_self@entry=true) at util/hist.c:657 #5 0x00005555558cba1b in __hists__add_entry (hists=hists@entry=0x5555561d9e38, al=0x7fffde7fb420, sym_parent=<optimized out>, bi=bi@entry=0x0, mi=mi@entry=0x0, sample=sample@entry=0x7fffde7fb4b0, sample_self=true, ops=0x0, block_info=0x0) at util/hist.c:288 #6 0x00005555558cbb70 in hists__add_entry (sample_self=true, sample=0x7fffde7fb4b0, mi=0x0, bi=0x0, sym_parent=<optimized out>, al=<optimized out>, hists=0x5555561d9e38) at util/hist.c:1056 #7 iter_add_single_cumulative_entry (iter=0x7fffde7fb460, al=<optimized out>) at util/hist.c:1056 #8 0x00005555558cc8a4 in hist_entry_iter__add (iter=iter@entry=0x7fffde7fb460, al=al@entry=0x7fffde7fb420, max_stack_depth=<optimized out>, arg=arg@entry=0x7fffffff7db0) at util/hist.c:1231 #9 0x00005555557cdc9a in perf_event__process_sample (machine=<optimized out>, sample=0x7fffde7fb4b0, evsel=<optimized out>, event=<optimized out>, tool=0x7fffffff7db0) at builtin-top.c:842 #10 deliver_event (qe=<optimized out>, qevent=<optimized out>) at builtin-top.c:1202 #11 0x00005555558a9318 in do_flush (show_progress=false, oe=0x7fffffff80e0) at util/ordered-events.c:244 #12 __ordered_events__flush (oe=oe@entry=0x7fffffff80e0, how=how@entry=OE_FLUSH__TOP, timestamp=timestamp@entry=0) at util/ordered-events.c:323 #13 0x00005555558a9789 in __ordered_events__flush (timestamp=<optimized out>, how=<optimized out>, oe=<optimized out>) at util/ordered-events.c:339 #14 ordered_events__flush (how=OE_FLUSH__TOP, oe=0x7fffffff80e0) at util/ordered-events.c:341 #15 ordered_events__flush (oe=oe@entry=0x7fffffff80e0, how=how@entry=OE_FLUSH__TOP) at util/ordered-events.c:339 #16 0x00005555557cd631 in process_thread (arg=0x7fffffff7db0) at builtin-top.c:1114 #17 0x00007ffff7bb817a in start_thread () from /lib64/libpthread.so.0 #18 0x00007ffff5656dc3 in clone () from /lib64/libc.so.6 If you look at the frame #2, the code is: 488 if (he->srcline) { 489 he->srcline = strdup(he->srcline); 490 if (he->srcline == NULL) 491 goto err_rawdata; 492 } If he->srcline is not NULL (it is not NULL if it is uninitialized rubbish), it gets strdupped and strdupping a rubbish random string causes the problem. Also, if you look at the commit 1fb7d06, it adds the srcline property into the struct, but not initializing it everywhere needed. Committer notes: Now I see, when using --ignore-callees=do_idle we end up here at line 2189 in add_callchain_ip(): 2181 if (al.sym != NULL) { 2182 if (perf_hpp_list.parent && !*parent && 2183 symbol__match_regex(al.sym, &parent_regex)) 2184 *parent = al.sym; 2185 else if (have_ignore_callees && root_al && 2186 symbol__match_regex(al.sym, &ignore_callees_regex)) { 2187 /* Treat this symbol as the root, 2188 forgetting its callees. */ 2189 *root_al = al; 2190 callchain_cursor_reset(cursor); 2191 } 2192 } And the al that doesn't have the ->srcline field initialized will be copied to the root_al, so then, back to: 1211 int hist_entry_iter__add(struct hist_entry_iter *iter, struct addr_location *al, 1212 int max_stack_depth, void *arg) 1213 { 1214 int err, err2; 1215 struct map *alm = NULL; 1216 1217 if (al) 1218 alm = map__get(al->map); 1219 1220 err = sample__resolve_callchain(iter->sample, &callchain_cursor, &iter->parent, 1221 iter->evsel, al, max_stack_depth); 1222 if (err) { 1223 map__put(alm); 1224 return err; 1225 } 1226 1227 err = iter->ops->prepare_entry(iter, al); 1228 if (err) 1229 goto out; 1230 1231 err = iter->ops->add_single_entry(iter, al); 1232 if (err) 1233 goto out; 1234 That al at line 1221 is what hist_entry_iter__add() (called from sample__resolve_callchain()) saw as 'root_al', and then: iter->ops->add_single_entry(iter, al); will go on with al->srcline with a bogus value, I'll add the above sequence to the cset and apply, thanks! Signed-off-by: Michael Petlan <mpetlan@redhat.com> CC: Milian Wolff <milian.wolff@kdab.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Fixes: 1fb7d06 ("perf report Use srcline from callchain for hist entries") Link: https //lore.kernel.org/r/20210719145332.29747-1-mpetlan@redhat.com Reported-by: Juri Lelli <jlelli@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 4224cfd ] When bringing down the netdevice or system shutdown, a panic can be triggered while accessing the sysfs path because the device is already removed. [ 755.549084] mlx5_core 0000:12:00.1: Shutdown was called [ 756.404455] mlx5_core 0000:12:00.0: Shutdown was called ... [ 757.937260] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) [ 758.031397] IP: [<ffffffff8ee11acb>] dma_pool_alloc+0x1ab/0x280 crash> bt ... PID: 12649 TASK: ffff8924108f2100 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "amsd" ... #9 [ffff89240e1a38b0] page_fault at ffffffff8f38c778 [exception RIP: dma_pool_alloc+0x1ab] RIP: ffffffff8ee11acb RSP: ffff89240e1a3968 RFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000246 RBX: ffff89243d874100 RCX: 0000000000001000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: ffff89243d874090 RBP: ffff89240e1a39c0 R8: 000000000001f080 R9: ffff8905ffc03c00 R10: ffffffffc04680d4 R11: ffffffff8edde9fd R12: 00000000000080d0 R13: ffff89243d874090 R14: ffff89243d874080 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #10 [ffff89240e1a39c8] mlx5_alloc_cmd_msg at ffffffffc04680f3 [mlx5_core] #11 [ffff89240e1a3a18] cmd_exec at ffffffffc046ad62 [mlx5_core] #12 [ffff89240e1a3ab8] mlx5_cmd_exec at ffffffffc046b4fb [mlx5_core] #13 [ffff89240e1a3ae8] mlx5_core_access_reg at ffffffffc0475434 [mlx5_core] #14 [ffff89240e1a3b40] mlx5e_get_fec_caps at ffffffffc04a7348 [mlx5_core] #15 [ffff89240e1a3bb0] get_fec_supported_advertised at ffffffffc04992bf [mlx5_core] #16 [ffff89240e1a3c08] mlx5e_get_link_ksettings at ffffffffc049ab36 [mlx5_core] #17 [ffff89240e1a3ce8] __ethtool_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff8f25db46 #18 [ffff89240e1a3d48] speed_show at ffffffff8f277208 #19 [ffff89240e1a3dd8] dev_attr_show at ffffffff8f0b70e3 #20 [ffff89240e1a3df8] sysfs_kf_seq_show at ffffffff8eedbedf #21 [ffff89240e1a3e18] kernfs_seq_show at ffffffff8eeda596 #22 [ffff89240e1a3e28] seq_read at ffffffff8ee76d10 #23 [ffff89240e1a3e98] kernfs_fop_read at ffffffff8eedaef5 #24 [ffff89240e1a3ed8] vfs_read at ffffffff8ee4e3ff #25 [ffff89240e1a3f08] sys_read at ffffffff8ee4f27f #26 [ffff89240e1a3f50] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff8f395f92 crash> net_device.state ffff89443b0c0000 state = 0x5 (__LINK_STATE_START| __LINK_STATE_NOCARRIER) To prevent this scenario, we also make sure that the netdevice is present. Signed-off-by: suresh kumar <suresh2514@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit f22881d ] In calipso_map_cat_ntoh(), in the for loop, if the return value of netlbl_bitmap_walk() is equal to (net_clen_bits - 1), when netlbl_bitmap_walk() is called next time, out-of-bounds memory accesses of bitmap[byte_offset] occurs. The bug was found during fuzzing. The following is the fuzzing report BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in netlbl_bitmap_walk+0x3c/0xd0 Read of size 1 at addr ffffff8107bf6f70 by task err_OH/252 CPU: 7 PID: 252 Comm: err_OH Not tainted 5.17.0-rc7+ #17 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x21c/0x230 show_stack+0x1c/0x60 dump_stack_lvl+0x64/0x7c print_address_description.constprop.0+0x70/0x2d0 __kasan_report+0x158/0x16c kasan_report+0x74/0x120 __asan_load1+0x80/0xa0 netlbl_bitmap_walk+0x3c/0xd0 calipso_opt_getattr+0x1a8/0x230 calipso_sock_getattr+0x218/0x340 calipso_sock_getattr+0x44/0x60 netlbl_sock_getattr+0x44/0x80 selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt+0x138/0x170 selinux_socket_setsockopt+0x4c/0x60 security_socket_setsockopt+0x4c/0x90 __sys_setsockopt+0xbc/0x2b0 __arm64_sys_setsockopt+0x6c/0x84 invoke_syscall+0x64/0x190 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x88/0x200 do_el0_svc+0x88/0xa0 el0_svc+0x128/0x1b0 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x9c/0x120 el0t_64_sync+0x16c/0x170 Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Wang Yufen <wangyufen@huawei.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 67d7d8a ] Hulk Robot reported a issue: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ext4_xattr_set_entry+0x18ab/0x3500 Write of size 4105 at addr ffff8881675ef5f4 by task syz-executor.0/7092 CPU: 1 PID: 7092 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 4.19.90-dirty #17 Call Trace: [...] memcpy+0x34/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:303 ext4_xattr_set_entry+0x18ab/0x3500 fs/ext4/xattr.c:1747 ext4_xattr_ibody_inline_set+0x86/0x2a0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2205 ext4_xattr_set_handle+0x940/0x1300 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2386 ext4_xattr_set+0x1da/0x300 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2498 __vfs_setxattr+0x112/0x170 fs/xattr.c:149 __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x11b/0x2a0 fs/xattr.c:180 __vfs_setxattr_locked+0x17b/0x250 fs/xattr.c:238 vfs_setxattr+0xed/0x270 fs/xattr.c:255 setxattr+0x235/0x330 fs/xattr.c:520 path_setxattr+0x176/0x190 fs/xattr.c:539 __do_sys_lsetxattr fs/xattr.c:561 [inline] __se_sys_lsetxattr fs/xattr.c:557 [inline] __x64_sys_lsetxattr+0xc2/0x160 fs/xattr.c:557 do_syscall_64+0xdf/0x530 arch/x86/entry/common.c:298 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x459fe9 RSP: 002b:00007fa5e54b4c08 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000bd RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000051bf60 RCX: 0000000000459fe9 RDX: 00000000200003c0 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000020000140 RBP: 000000000051bf60 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000001009 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffc73c93fc0 R14: 000000000051bf60 R15: 00007fa5e54b4d80 [...] ================================================================== Above issue may happen as follows: ------------------------------------- ext4_xattr_set ext4_xattr_set_handle ext4_xattr_ibody_find >> s->end < s->base >> no EXT4_STATE_XATTR >> xattr_check_inode is not executed ext4_xattr_ibody_set ext4_xattr_set_entry >> size_t min_offs = s->end - s->base >> UAF in memcpy we can easily reproduce this problem with the following commands: mkfs.ext4 -F /dev/sda mount -o debug_want_extra_isize=128 /dev/sda /mnt touch /mnt/file setfattr -n user.cat -v `seq -s z 4096|tr -d '[:digit:]'` /mnt/file In ext4_xattr_ibody_find, we have the following assignment logic: header = IHDR(inode, raw_inode) = raw_inode + EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE + i_extra_isize is->s.base = IFIRST(header) = header + sizeof(struct ext4_xattr_ibody_header) is->s.end = raw_inode + s_inode_size In ext4_xattr_set_entry min_offs = s->end - s->base = s_inode_size - EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE - i_extra_isize - sizeof(struct ext4_xattr_ibody_header) last = s->first free = min_offs - ((void *)last - s->base) - sizeof(__u32) = s_inode_size - EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE - i_extra_isize - sizeof(struct ext4_xattr_ibody_header) - sizeof(__u32) In the calculation formula, all values except s_inode_size and i_extra_size are fixed values. When i_extra_size is the maximum value s_inode_size - EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE, min_offs is -4 and free is -8. The value overflows. As a result, the preceding issue is triggered when memcpy is executed. Therefore, when finding xattr or setting xattr, check whether there is space for storing xattr in the inode to resolve this issue. Cc: stable@kernel.org Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Ritesh Harjani (IBM) <ritesh.list@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220616021358.2504451-3-libaokun1@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit d71608a ] When doing slub_debug test, kfence's 'test_memcache_typesafe_by_rcu' kunit test case cause a use-after-free error: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kobject_del+0x14/0x30 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888007679090 by task kunit_try_catch/261 CPU: 1 PID: 261 Comm: kunit_try_catch Tainted: G B N 6.0.0-rc5-next-20220916 #17 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x48 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x87/0x2a5 print_report+0x103/0x1ed kasan_report+0xb7/0x140 kobject_del+0x14/0x30 kmem_cache_destroy+0x130/0x170 test_exit+0x1a/0x30 kunit_try_run_case+0xad/0xc0 kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x26/0x50 kthread+0x17b/0x1b0 </TASK> The cause is inside kmem_cache_destroy(): kmem_cache_destroy acquire lock/mutex shutdown_cache schedule_work(kmem_cache_release) (if RCU flag set) release lock/mutex kmem_cache_release (if RCU flag not set) In some certain timing, the scheduled work could be run before the next RCU flag checking, which can then get a wrong value and lead to double kmem_cache_release(). Fix it by caching the RCU flag inside protected area, just like 'refcnt' Fixes: 0495e33 ("mm/slab_common: Deleting kobject in kmem_cache_destroy() without holding slab_mutex/cpu_hotplug_lock") Signed-off-by: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

…g the sock [ Upstream commit 3cf7203 ] There is a race condition in vxlan that when deleting a vxlan device during receiving packets, there is a possibility that the sock is released after getting vxlan_sock vs from sk_user_data. Then in later vxlan_ecn_decapsulate(), vxlan_get_sk_family() we will got NULL pointer dereference. e.g. #0 [ffffa25ec6978a38] machine_kexec at ffffffff8c669757 #1 [ffffa25ec6978a90] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c0a4d #2 [ffffa25ec6978b58] crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c1c48 #3 [ffffa25ec6978b60] oops_end at ffffffff8c627f2b #4 [ffffa25ec6978b80] page_fault_oops at ffffffff8c678fcb #5 [ffffa25ec6978bd8] exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d109542 #6 [ffffa25ec6978c00] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d200b62 [exception RIP: vxlan_ecn_decapsulate+0x3b] RIP: ffffffffc1014e7b RSP: ffffa25ec6978cb0 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000008 RBX: ffff8aa000888000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 000000000000000e RSI: ffff8a9fc7ab803e RDI: ffff8a9fd1168700 RBP: ffff8a9fc7ab803e R8: 0000000000700000 R9: 00000000000010ae R10: ffff8a9fcb748980 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8a9fd1168700 R13: ffff8aa000888000 R14: 00000000002a0000 R15: 00000000000010ae ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffffa25ec6978ce8] vxlan_rcv at ffffffffc10189cd [vxlan] #8 [ffffa25ec6978d90] udp_queue_rcv_one_skb at ffffffff8cfb6507 #9 [ffffa25ec6978dc0] udp_unicast_rcv_skb at ffffffff8cfb6e45 #10 [ffffa25ec6978dc8] __udp4_lib_rcv at ffffffff8cfb8807 #11 [ffffa25ec6978e20] ip_protocol_deliver_rcu at ffffffff8cf76951 #12 [ffffa25ec6978e48] ip_local_deliver at ffffffff8cf76bde #13 [ffffa25ec6978ea0] __netif_receive_skb_one_core at ffffffff8cecde9b #14 [ffffa25ec6978ec8] process_backlog at ffffffff8cece139 #15 [ffffa25ec6978f00] __napi_poll at ffffffff8ceced1a #16 [ffffa25ec6978f28] net_rx_action at ffffffff8cecf1f3 #17 [ffffa25ec6978fa0] __softirqentry_text_start at ffffffff8d4000ca #18 [ffffa25ec6978ff0] do_softirq at ffffffff8c6fbdc3 Reproducer: https://github.com/Mellanox/ovs-tests/blob/master/test-ovs-vxlan-remove-tunnel-during-traffic.sh Fix this by waiting for all sk_user_data reader to finish before releasing the sock. Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com> Suggested-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com> Fixes: 6a93cc9 ("udp-tunnel: Add a few more UDP tunnel APIs") Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

…g the sock [ Upstream commit 3cf7203 ] There is a race condition in vxlan that when deleting a vxlan device during receiving packets, there is a possibility that the sock is released after getting vxlan_sock vs from sk_user_data. Then in later vxlan_ecn_decapsulate(), vxlan_get_sk_family() we will got NULL pointer dereference. e.g. #0 [ffffa25ec6978a38] machine_kexec at ffffffff8c669757 zen-kernel#1 [ffffa25ec6978a90] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c0a4d zen-kernel#2 [ffffa25ec6978b58] crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c1c48 zen-kernel#3 [ffffa25ec6978b60] oops_end at ffffffff8c627f2b zen-kernel#4 [ffffa25ec6978b80] page_fault_oops at ffffffff8c678fcb zen-kernel#5 [ffffa25ec6978bd8] exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d109542 zen-kernel#6 [ffffa25ec6978c00] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d200b62 [exception RIP: vxlan_ecn_decapsulate+0x3b] RIP: ffffffffc1014e7b RSP: ffffa25ec6978cb0 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000008 RBX: ffff8aa000888000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 000000000000000e RSI: ffff8a9fc7ab803e RDI: ffff8a9fd1168700 RBP: ffff8a9fc7ab803e R8: 0000000000700000 R9: 00000000000010ae R10: ffff8a9fcb748980 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8a9fd1168700 R13: ffff8aa000888000 R14: 00000000002a0000 R15: 00000000000010ae ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 zen-kernel#7 [ffffa25ec6978ce8] vxlan_rcv at ffffffffc10189cd [vxlan] zen-kernel#8 [ffffa25ec6978d90] udp_queue_rcv_one_skb at ffffffff8cfb6507 zen-kernel#9 [ffffa25ec6978dc0] udp_unicast_rcv_skb at ffffffff8cfb6e45 zen-kernel#10 [ffffa25ec6978dc8] __udp4_lib_rcv at ffffffff8cfb8807 zen-kernel#11 [ffffa25ec6978e20] ip_protocol_deliver_rcu at ffffffff8cf76951 zen-kernel#12 [ffffa25ec6978e48] ip_local_deliver at ffffffff8cf76bde zen-kernel#13 [ffffa25ec6978ea0] __netif_receive_skb_one_core at ffffffff8cecde9b zen-kernel#14 [ffffa25ec6978ec8] process_backlog at ffffffff8cece139 zen-kernel#15 [ffffa25ec6978f00] __napi_poll at ffffffff8ceced1a zen-kernel#16 [ffffa25ec6978f28] net_rx_action at ffffffff8cecf1f3 zen-kernel#17 [ffffa25ec6978fa0] __softirqentry_text_start at ffffffff8d4000ca zen-kernel#18 [ffffa25ec6978ff0] do_softirq at ffffffff8c6fbdc3 Reproducer: https://github.com/Mellanox/ovs-tests/blob/master/test-ovs-vxlan-remove-tunnel-during-traffic.sh Fix this by waiting for all sk_user_data reader to finish before releasing the sock. Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com> Suggested-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com> Fixes: 6a93cc9 ("udp-tunnel: Add a few more UDP tunnel APIs") Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 2681631 ] Some metadata files are handled before MFT. This adds a null pointer check for some corner cases that could lead to NPD while reading these metadata files for a malformed NTFS image. [ 240.190827] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000158 [ 240.191583] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 240.191956] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 240.192391] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 240.192897] Oops: 0000 [zen-kernel#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 240.193805] CPU: 0 PID: 242 Comm: mount Tainted: G B 5.19.0+ zen-kernel#17 [ 240.194477] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 240.195152] RIP: 0010:ni_find_attr+0xae/0x300 [ 240.195679] Code: c8 48 c7 45 88 c0 4e 5e 86 c7 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 c7 40 04 00 f3 f3 f3 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 45 d0 31 c0 e8 e2 d9f [ 240.196642] RSP: 0018:ffff88800812f690 EFLAGS: 00000286 [ 240.197019] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff85ef037a [ 240.197523] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffff88e95f60 [ 240.197877] RBP: ffff88800812f738 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffffbfff11d2bed [ 240.198292] R10: ffffffff88e95f67 R11: fffffbfff11d2bec R12: 0000000000000000 [ 240.198647] R13: 0000000000000080 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 240.199410] FS: 00007f233c33be40(0000) GS:ffff888058200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 240.199895] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 240.200314] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 0000000004d32000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 240.200839] Call Trace: [ 240.201104] <TASK> [ 240.201502] ? ni_load_mi+0x80/0x80 [ 240.202297] ? ___slab_alloc+0x465/0x830 [ 240.202614] attr_load_runs_vcn+0x8c/0x1a0 [ 240.202886] ? __kasan_slab_alloc+0x32/0x90 [ 240.203157] ? attr_data_write_resident+0x250/0x250 [ 240.203543] mi_read+0x133/0x2c0 [ 240.203785] mi_get+0x70/0x140 [ 240.204012] ni_load_mi_ex+0xfa/0x190 [ 240.204346] ? ni_std5+0x90/0x90 [ 240.204588] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x88/0xb0 [ 240.204859] ni_enum_attr_ex+0xf1/0x1c0 [ 240.205107] ? ni_fname_type.part.0+0xd0/0xd0 [ 240.205600] ? ntfs_load_attr_list+0xbe/0x300 [ 240.205864] ? ntfs_cmp_names_cpu+0x125/0x180 [ 240.206157] ntfs_iget5+0x56c/0x1870 [ 240.206510] ? ntfs_get_block_bmap+0x70/0x70 [ 240.206776] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x88/0xb0 [ 240.207030] ? set_blocksize+0x95/0x150 [ 240.207545] ntfs_fill_super+0xb8f/0x1e20 [ 240.207839] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0 [ 240.208069] ? vsprintf+0x20/0x20 [ 240.208467] ? mutex_unlock+0x81/0xd0 [ 240.208846] ? set_blocksize+0x95/0x150 [ 240.209221] get_tree_bdev+0x232/0x370 [ 240.209804] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0 [ 240.210519] ntfs_fs_get_tree+0x15/0x20 [ 240.210991] vfs_get_tree+0x4c/0x130 [ 240.211455] path_mount+0x645/0xfd0 [ 240.211806] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 240.212112] ? finish_automount+0x2e0/0x2e0 [ 240.212559] ? kmem_cache_free+0x110/0x390 [ 240.212906] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 240.213329] do_mount+0xd6/0xf0 [ 240.213829] ? path_mount+0xfd0/0xfd0 [ 240.214246] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 [ 240.214774] __x64_sys_mount+0xca/0x110 [ 240.215080] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 240.215442] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 240.215811] RIP: 0033:0x7f233b4e948a [ 240.216104] Code: 48 8b 0d 11 fa 2a 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 008 [ 240.217615] RSP: 002b:00007fff02211ec8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 [ 240.218718] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000561cdc35b060 RCX: 00007f233b4e948a [ 240.219556] RDX: 0000561cdc35b260 RSI: 0000561cdc35b2e0 RDI: 0000561cdc363af0 [ 240.219975] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000561cdc35b280 R09: 0000000000000020 [ 240.220403] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000561cdc363af0 [ 240.220803] R13: 0000561cdc35b260 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff [ 240.221256] </TASK> [ 240.221567] Modules linked in: [ 240.222028] CR2: 0000000000000158 [ 240.223291] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 240.223669] RIP: 0010:ni_find_attr+0xae/0x300 [ 240.224058] Code: c8 48 c7 45 88 c0 4e 5e 86 c7 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 c7 40 04 00 f3 f3 f3 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 45 d0 31 c0 e8 e2 d9f [ 240.225033] RSP: 0018:ffff88800812f690 EFLAGS: 00000286 [ 240.225968] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff85ef037a [ 240.226624] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffff88e95f60 [ 240.227307] RBP: ffff88800812f738 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffffbfff11d2bed [ 240.227816] R10: ffffffff88e95f67 R11: fffffbfff11d2bec R12: 0000000000000000 [ 240.228330] R13: 0000000000000080 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 240.228729] FS: 00007f233c33be40(0000) GS:ffff888058200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 240.229281] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 240.230298] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 0000000004d32000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Signed-off-by: Edward Lo <edward.lo@ambergroup.io> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 4e264be ] When a system with E810 with existing VFs gets rebooted the following hang may be observed. Pid 1 is hung in iavf_remove(), part of a network driver: PID: 1 TASK: ffff965400e5a340 CPU: 24 COMMAND: "systemd-shutdow" #0 [ffffaad04005fa50] __schedule at ffffffff8b3239cb #1 [ffffaad04005fae8] schedule at ffffffff8b323e2d #2 [ffffaad04005fb00] schedule_hrtimeout_range_clock at ffffffff8b32cebc #3 [ffffaad04005fb80] usleep_range_state at ffffffff8b32c930 #4 [ffffaad04005fbb0] iavf_remove at ffffffffc12b9b4c [iavf] #5 [ffffaad04005fbf0] pci_device_remove at ffffffff8add7513 #6 [ffffaad04005fc10] device_release_driver_internal at ffffffff8af08baa #7 [ffffaad04005fc40] pci_stop_bus_device at ffffffff8adcc5fc #8 [ffffaad04005fc60] pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device at ffffffff8adcc81e #9 [ffffaad04005fc70] pci_iov_remove_virtfn at ffffffff8adf9429 #10 [ffffaad04005fca8] sriov_disable at ffffffff8adf98e4 #11 [ffffaad04005fcc8] ice_free_vfs at ffffffffc04bb2c8 [ice] #12 [ffffaad04005fd10] ice_remove at ffffffffc04778fe [ice] #13 [ffffaad04005fd38] ice_shutdown at ffffffffc0477946 [ice] #14 [ffffaad04005fd50] pci_device_shutdown at ffffffff8add58f1 #15 [ffffaad04005fd70] device_shutdown at ffffffff8af05386 #16 [ffffaad04005fd98] kernel_restart at ffffffff8a92a870 #17 [ffffaad04005fda8] __do_sys_reboot at ffffffff8a92abd6 #18 [ffffaad04005fee0] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8b317159 #19 [ffffaad04005ff08] __context_tracking_enter at ffffffff8b31b6fc #20 [ffffaad04005ff18] syscall_exit_to_user_mode at ffffffff8b31b50d #21 [ffffaad04005ff28] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8b317169 #22 [ffffaad04005ff50] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff8b40009b RIP: 00007f1baa5c13d7 RSP: 00007fffbcc55a98 RFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f1baa5c13d7 RDX: 0000000001234567 RSI: 0000000028121969 RDI: 00000000fee1dead RBP: 00007fffbcc55ca0 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: 00007fffbcc54e90 R10: 00007fffbcc55050 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000005 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fffbcc55af0 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a9 CS: 0033 SS: 002b During reboot all drivers PM shutdown callbacks are invoked. In iavf_shutdown() the adapter state is changed to __IAVF_REMOVE. In ice_shutdown() the call chain above is executed, which at some point calls iavf_remove(). However iavf_remove() expects the VF to be in one of the states __IAVF_RUNNING, __IAVF_DOWN or __IAVF_INIT_FAILED. If that's not the case it sleeps forever. So if iavf_shutdown() gets invoked before iavf_remove() the system will hang indefinitely because the adapter is already in state __IAVF_REMOVE. Fix this by returning from iavf_remove() if the state is __IAVF_REMOVE, as we already went through iavf_shutdown(). Fixes: 9745780 ("iavf: Add waiting so the port is initialized in remove") Fixes: a841733 ("iavf: Fix race condition between iavf_shutdown and iavf_remove") Reported-by: Marius Cornea <mcornea@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Assmann <sassmann@kpanic.de> Reviewed-by: Michal Kubiak <michal.kubiak@intel.com> Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <rafal.romanowski@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit cb5edce ] Upon physical link change, firmware reports to the kernel about the change along with the details like speed, lmac_type_id, etc. Kernel derives lmac_type based on lmac_type_id received from firmware. In a few scenarios, firmware returns an invalid lmac_type_id, which is resulting in below kernel panic. This patch adds the missing validation of the lmac_type_id field. Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 35.321595] Modules linked in: [ 35.328982] CPU: 0 PID: 31 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 5.4.210-g2e3169d8e1bc-dirty #17 [ 35.337014] Hardware name: Marvell CN103XX board (DT) [ 35.344297] Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn [ 35.352730] pstate: 40400089 (nZcv daIf +PAN -UAO) [ 35.360267] pc : strncpy+0x10/0x30 [ 35.366595] lr : cgx_link_change_handler+0x90/0x180 Fixes: 61071a8 ("octeontx2-af: Forward CGX link notifications to PFs") Signed-off-by: Hariprasad Kelam <hkelam@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: Sunil Kovvuri Goutham <sgoutham@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: Sai Krishna <saikrishnag@marvell.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 37c3b9f ] The cited commit adds a compeletion to remove dependency on rtnl lock. But it causes a deadlock for multiple encapsulations: crash> bt ffff8aece8a64000 PID: 1514557 TASK: ffff8aece8a64000 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "tc" #0 [ffffa6d14183f368] __schedule at ffffffffb8ba7f45 #1 [ffffa6d14183f3f8] schedule at ffffffffb8ba8418 #2 [ffffa6d14183f418] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffb8ba8898 #3 [ffffa6d14183f428] __mutex_lock at ffffffffb8baa7f8 #4 [ffffa6d14183f4d0] mutex_lock_nested at ffffffffb8baabeb #5 [ffffa6d14183f4e0] mlx5e_attach_encap at ffffffffc0f48c17 [mlx5_core] #6 [ffffa6d14183f628] mlx5e_tc_add_fdb_flow at ffffffffc0f39680 [mlx5_core] #7 [ffffa6d14183f688] __mlx5e_add_fdb_flow at ffffffffc0f3b636 [mlx5_core] #8 [ffffa6d14183f6f0] mlx5e_tc_add_flow at ffffffffc0f3bcdf [mlx5_core] #9 [ffffa6d14183f728] mlx5e_configure_flower at ffffffffc0f3c1d1 [mlx5_core] #10 [ffffa6d14183f790] mlx5e_rep_setup_tc_cls_flower at ffffffffc0f3d529 [mlx5_core] #11 [ffffa6d14183f7a0] mlx5e_rep_setup_tc_cb at ffffffffc0f3d714 [mlx5_core] #12 [ffffa6d14183f7b0] tc_setup_cb_add at ffffffffb8931bb8 #13 [ffffa6d14183f810] fl_hw_replace_filter at ffffffffc0dae901 [cls_flower] #14 [ffffa6d14183f8d8] fl_change at ffffffffc0db5c57 [cls_flower] #15 [ffffa6d14183f970] tc_new_tfilter at ffffffffb8936047 #16 [ffffa6d14183fac8] rtnetlink_rcv_msg at ffffffffb88c7c31 #17 [ffffa6d14183fb50] netlink_rcv_skb at ffffffffb8942853 #18 [ffffa6d14183fbc0] rtnetlink_rcv at ffffffffb88c1835 #19 [ffffa6d14183fbd0] netlink_unicast at ffffffffb8941f27 #20 [ffffa6d14183fc18] netlink_sendmsg at ffffffffb8942245 #21 [ffffa6d14183fc98] sock_sendmsg at ffffffffb887d482 #22 [ffffa6d14183fcb8] ____sys_sendmsg at ffffffffb887d81a #23 [ffffa6d14183fd38] ___sys_sendmsg at ffffffffb88806e2 #24 [ffffa6d14183fe90] __sys_sendmsg at ffffffffb88807a2 #25 [ffffa6d14183ff28] __x64_sys_sendmsg at ffffffffb888080f #26 [ffffa6d14183ff38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffffb8b9b6a8 #27 [ffffa6d14183ff50] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffffb8c0007c crash> bt 0xffff8aeb07544000 PID: 1110766 TASK: ffff8aeb07544000 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "kworker/u20:9" #0 [ffffa6d14e6b7bd8] __schedule at ffffffffb8ba7f45 #1 [ffffa6d14e6b7c68] schedule at ffffffffb8ba8418 #2 [ffffa6d14e6b7c88] schedule_timeout at ffffffffb8baef88 #3 [ffffa6d14e6b7d10] wait_for_completion at ffffffffb8ba968b #4 [ffffa6d14e6b7d60] mlx5e_take_all_encap_flows at ffffffffc0f47ec4 [mlx5_core] #5 [ffffa6d14e6b7da0] mlx5e_rep_update_flows at ffffffffc0f3e734 [mlx5_core] #6 [ffffa6d14e6b7df8] mlx5e_rep_neigh_update at ffffffffc0f400bb [mlx5_core] #7 [ffffa6d14e6b7e50] process_one_work at ffffffffb80acc9c #8 [ffffa6d14e6b7ed0] worker_thread at ffffffffb80ad012 #9 [ffffa6d14e6b7f10] kthread at ffffffffb80b615d #10 [ffffa6d14e6b7f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffffb8001b2f After the first encap is attached, flow will be added to encap entry's flows list. If neigh update is running at this time, the following encaps of the flow can't hold the encap_tbl_lock and sleep. If neigh update thread is waiting for that flow's init_done, deadlock happens. Fix it by holding lock outside of the for loop. If neigh update is running, prevent encap flows from offloading. Since the lock is held outside of the for loop, concurrent creation of encap entries is not allowed. So remove unnecessary wait_for_completion call for res_ready. Fixes: 95435ad ("net/mlx5e: Only access fully initialized flows in neigh update") Signed-off-by: Chris Mi <cmi@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Roi Dayan <roid@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit de9df6c ] Currently, the per cpu upcall counters are allocated after the vport is created and inserted into the system. This could lead to the datapath accessing the counters before they are allocated resulting in a kernel Oops. Here is an example: PID: 59693 TASK: ffff0005f4f51500 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "ovs-vswitchd" #0 [ffff80000a39b5b0] __switch_to at ffffb70f0629f2f4 #1 [ffff80000a39b5d0] __schedule at ffffb70f0629f5cc #2 [ffff80000a39b650] preempt_schedule_common at ffffb70f0629fa60 #3 [ffff80000a39b670] dynamic_might_resched at ffffb70f0629fb58 #4 [ffff80000a39b680] mutex_lock_killable at ffffb70f062a1388 #5 [ffff80000a39b6a0] pcpu_alloc at ffffb70f0594460c #6 [ffff80000a39b750] __alloc_percpu_gfp at ffffb70f05944e68 #7 [ffff80000a39b760] ovs_vport_cmd_new at ffffb70ee6961b90 [openvswitch] ... PID: 58682 TASK: ffff0005b2f0bf00 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "kworker/0:3" #0 [ffff80000a5d2f40] machine_kexec at ffffb70f056a0758 #1 [ffff80000a5d2f70] __crash_kexec at ffffb70f057e2994 #2 [ffff80000a5d3100] crash_kexec at ffffb70f057e2ad8 #3 [ffff80000a5d3120] die at ffffb70f0628234c #4 [ffff80000a5d31e0] die_kernel_fault at ffffb70f062828a8 #5 [ffff80000a5d3210] __do_kernel_fault at ffffb70f056a31f4 #6 [ffff80000a5d3240] do_bad_area at ffffb70f056a32a4 #7 [ffff80000a5d3260] do_translation_fault at ffffb70f062a9710 #8 [ffff80000a5d3270] do_mem_abort at ffffb70f056a2f74 #9 [ffff80000a5d32a0] el1_abort at ffffb70f06297dac #10 [ffff80000a5d32d0] el1h_64_sync_handler at ffffb70f06299b24 #11 [ffff80000a5d3410] el1h_64_sync at ffffb70f056812dc #12 [ffff80000a5d3430] ovs_dp_upcall at ffffb70ee6963c84 [openvswitch] #13 [ffff80000a5d3470] ovs_dp_process_packet at ffffb70ee6963fdc [openvswitch] #14 [ffff80000a5d34f0] ovs_vport_receive at ffffb70ee6972c78 [openvswitch] #15 [ffff80000a5d36f0] netdev_port_receive at ffffb70ee6973948 [openvswitch] #16 [ffff80000a5d3720] netdev_frame_hook at ffffb70ee6973a28 [openvswitch] #17 [ffff80000a5d3730] __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0 at ffffb70f06079f90 We moved the per cpu upcall counter allocation to the existing vport alloc and free functions to solve this. Fixes: 95637d9 ("net: openvswitch: release vport resources on failure") Fixes: 1933ea3 ("net: openvswitch: Add support to count upcall packets") Signed-off-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com> Acked-by: Aaron Conole <aconole@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 17e8e5d ] Alexei reported: After fast forwarding bpf-next today bpf_nf test started to fail when run twice: $ ./test_progs -t bpf_nf #17 bpf_nf:OK Summary: 1/10 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED $ ./test_progs -t bpf_nf All error logs: test_bpf_nf_ct:PASS:test_bpf_nf__open_and_load 0 nsec test_bpf_nf_ct:PASS:iptables-legacy -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CONNMARK --set-mark 42/0 0 nsec (network_helpers.c:102: errno: Address already in use) Failed to bind socket test_bpf_nf_ct:FAIL:start_server unexpected start_server: actual -1 < expected 0 #17/1 bpf_nf/xdp-ct:FAIL test_bpf_nf_ct:PASS:test_bpf_nf__open_and_load 0 nsec test_bpf_nf_ct:PASS:iptables-legacy -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CONNMARK --set-mark 42/0 0 nsec (network_helpers.c:102: errno: Address already in use) Failed to bind socket test_bpf_nf_ct:FAIL:start_server unexpected start_server: actual -1 < expected 0 #17/2 bpf_nf/tc-bpf-ct:FAIL #17 bpf_nf:FAIL Summary: 0/8 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 1 FAILED I was able to locally reproduce as well. Rearrange the connection teardown so that the client closes its connection first so that we don't need to linger in TCP time-wait. Fixes: e81fbd4 ("selftests/bpf: Add existing connection bpf_*_ct_lookup() test") Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAADnVQ+0dnDq_v_vH1EfkacbfGnHANaon7zsw10pMb-D9FS0Pw@mail.gmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230626131942.5100-1-daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit 0b0747d upstream. The following processes run into a deadlock. CPU 41 was waiting for CPU 29 to handle a CSD request while holding spinlock "crashdump_lock", but CPU 29 was hung by that spinlock with IRQs disabled. PID: 17360 TASK: ffff95c1090c5c40 CPU: 41 COMMAND: "mrdiagd" !# 0 [ffffb80edbf37b58] __read_once_size at ffffffff9b871a40 include/linux/compiler.h:185:0 !# 1 [ffffb80edbf37b58] atomic_read at ffffffff9b871a40 arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:27:0 !# 2 [ffffb80edbf37b58] dump_stack at ffffffff9b871a40 lib/dump_stack.c:54:0 # 3 [ffffb80edbf37b78] csd_lock_wait_toolong at ffffffff9b131ad5 kernel/smp.c:364:0 # 4 [ffffb80edbf37b78] __csd_lock_wait at ffffffff9b131ad5 kernel/smp.c:384:0 # 5 [ffffb80edbf37bf8] csd_lock_wait at ffffffff9b13267a kernel/smp.c:394:0 # 6 [ffffb80edbf37bf8] smp_call_function_many at ffffffff9b13267a kernel/smp.c:843:0 # 7 [ffffb80edbf37c50] smp_call_function at ffffffff9b13279d kernel/smp.c:867:0 # 8 [ffffb80edbf37c50] on_each_cpu at ffffffff9b13279d kernel/smp.c:976:0 # 9 [ffffb80edbf37c78] flush_tlb_kernel_range at ffffffff9b085c4b arch/x86/mm/tlb.c:742:0 #10 [ffffb80edbf37cb8] __purge_vmap_area_lazy at ffffffff9b23a1e0 mm/vmalloc.c:701:0 #11 [ffffb80edbf37ce0] try_purge_vmap_area_lazy at ffffffff9b23a2cc mm/vmalloc.c:722:0 #12 [ffffb80edbf37ce0] free_vmap_area_noflush at ffffffff9b23a2cc mm/vmalloc.c:754:0 #13 [ffffb80edbf37cf8] free_unmap_vmap_area at ffffffff9b23bb3b mm/vmalloc.c:764:0 #14 [ffffb80edbf37cf8] remove_vm_area at ffffffff9b23bb3b mm/vmalloc.c:1509:0 #15 [ffffb80edbf37d18] __vunmap at ffffffff9b23bb8a mm/vmalloc.c:1537:0 #16 [ffffb80edbf37d40] vfree at ffffffff9b23bc85 mm/vmalloc.c:1612:0 #17 [ffffb80edbf37d58] megasas_free_host_crash_buffer [megaraid_sas] at ffffffffc020b7f2 drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fusion.c:3932:0 #18 [ffffb80edbf37d80] fw_crash_state_store [megaraid_sas] at ffffffffc01f804d drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c:3291:0 #19 [ffffb80edbf37dc0] dev_attr_store at ffffffff9b56dd7b drivers/base/core.c:758:0 #20 [ffffb80edbf37dd0] sysfs_kf_write at ffffffff9b326acf fs/sysfs/file.c:144:0 #21 [ffffb80edbf37de0] kernfs_fop_write at ffffffff9b325fd4 fs/kernfs/file.c:316:0 #22 [ffffb80edbf37e20] __vfs_write at ffffffff9b29418a fs/read_write.c:480:0 #23 [ffffb80edbf37ea8] vfs_write at ffffffff9b294462 fs/read_write.c:544:0 #24 [ffffb80edbf37ee8] SYSC_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:590:0 #25 [ffffb80edbf37ee8] SyS_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:582:0 #26 [ffffb80edbf37f30] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9b003ca9 arch/x86/entry/common.c:298:0 #27 [ffffb80edbf37f58] entry_SYSCALL_64 at ffffffff9ba001b1 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:238:0 PID: 17355 TASK: ffff95c1090c3d80 CPU: 29 COMMAND: "mrdiagd" !# 0 [ffffb80f2d3c7d30] __read_once_size at ffffffff9b0f2ab0 include/linux/compiler.h:185:0 !# 1 [ffffb80f2d3c7d30] native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff9b0f2ab0 kernel/locking/qspinlock.c:368:0 # 2 [ffffb80f2d3c7d58] pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff9b0f244b arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:674:0 # 3 [ffffb80f2d3c7d58] queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff9b0f244b arch/x86/include/asm/qspinlock.h:53:0 # 4 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] queued_spin_lock at ffffffff9b8961a6 include/asm-generic/qspinlock.h:90:0 # 5 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] do_raw_spin_lock_flags at ffffffff9b8961a6 include/linux/spinlock.h:173:0 # 6 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] __raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff9b8961a6 include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:122:0 # 7 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff9b8961a6 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:160:0 # 8 [ffffb80f2d3c7d88] fw_crash_buffer_store [megaraid_sas] at ffffffffc01f8129 drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c:3205:0 # 9 [ffffb80f2d3c7dc0] dev_attr_store at ffffffff9b56dd7b drivers/base/core.c:758:0 #10 [ffffb80f2d3c7dd0] sysfs_kf_write at ffffffff9b326acf fs/sysfs/file.c:144:0 #11 [ffffb80f2d3c7de0] kernfs_fop_write at ffffffff9b325fd4 fs/kernfs/file.c:316:0 #12 [ffffb80f2d3c7e20] __vfs_write at ffffffff9b29418a fs/read_write.c:480:0 #13 [ffffb80f2d3c7ea8] vfs_write at ffffffff9b294462 fs/read_write.c:544:0 #14 [ffffb80f2d3c7ee8] SYSC_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:590:0 #15 [ffffb80f2d3c7ee8] SyS_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:582:0 #16 [ffffb80f2d3c7f30] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9b003ca9 arch/x86/entry/common.c:298:0 #17 [ffffb80f2d3c7f58] entry_SYSCALL_64 at ffffffff9ba001b1 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:238:0 The lock is used to synchronize different sysfs operations, it doesn't protect any resource that will be touched by an interrupt. Consequently it's not required to disable IRQs. Replace the spinlock with a mutex to fix the deadlock. Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230828221018.19471-1-junxiao.bi@oracle.com Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <michael.christie@oracle.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

The following processes run into a deadlock. CPU 41 was waiting for CPU 29 to handle a CSD request while holding spinlock "crashdump_lock", but CPU 29 was hung by that spinlock with IRQs disabled. PID: 17360 TASK: ffff95c1090c5c40 CPU: 41 COMMAND: "mrdiagd" !# 0 [ffffb80edbf37b58] __read_once_size at ffffffff9b871a40 include/linux/compiler.h:185:0 !# 1 [ffffb80edbf37b58] atomic_read at ffffffff9b871a40 arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:27:0 !# 2 [ffffb80edbf37b58] dump_stack at ffffffff9b871a40 lib/dump_stack.c:54:0 # 3 [ffffb80edbf37b78] csd_lock_wait_toolong at ffffffff9b131ad5 kernel/smp.c:364:0 # 4 [ffffb80edbf37b78] __csd_lock_wait at ffffffff9b131ad5 kernel/smp.c:384:0 # 5 [ffffb80edbf37bf8] csd_lock_wait at ffffffff9b13267a kernel/smp.c:394:0 # 6 [ffffb80edbf37bf8] smp_call_function_many at ffffffff9b13267a kernel/smp.c:843:0 # 7 [ffffb80edbf37c50] smp_call_function at ffffffff9b13279d kernel/smp.c:867:0 # 8 [ffffb80edbf37c50] on_each_cpu at ffffffff9b13279d kernel/smp.c:976:0 # 9 [ffffb80edbf37c78] flush_tlb_kernel_range at ffffffff9b085c4b arch/x86/mm/tlb.c:742:0 #10 [ffffb80edbf37cb8] __purge_vmap_area_lazy at ffffffff9b23a1e0 mm/vmalloc.c:701:0 #11 [ffffb80edbf37ce0] try_purge_vmap_area_lazy at ffffffff9b23a2cc mm/vmalloc.c:722:0 #12 [ffffb80edbf37ce0] free_vmap_area_noflush at ffffffff9b23a2cc mm/vmalloc.c:754:0 #13 [ffffb80edbf37cf8] free_unmap_vmap_area at ffffffff9b23bb3b mm/vmalloc.c:764:0 #14 [ffffb80edbf37cf8] remove_vm_area at ffffffff9b23bb3b mm/vmalloc.c:1509:0 #15 [ffffb80edbf37d18] __vunmap at ffffffff9b23bb8a mm/vmalloc.c:1537:0 #16 [ffffb80edbf37d40] vfree at ffffffff9b23bc85 mm/vmalloc.c:1612:0 #17 [ffffb80edbf37d58] megasas_free_host_crash_buffer [megaraid_sas] at ffffffffc020b7f2 drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fusion.c:3932:0 #18 [ffffb80edbf37d80] fw_crash_state_store [megaraid_sas] at ffffffffc01f804d drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c:3291:0 #19 [ffffb80edbf37dc0] dev_attr_store at ffffffff9b56dd7b drivers/base/core.c:758:0 #20 [ffffb80edbf37dd0] sysfs_kf_write at ffffffff9b326acf fs/sysfs/file.c:144:0 #21 [ffffb80edbf37de0] kernfs_fop_write at ffffffff9b325fd4 fs/kernfs/file.c:316:0 #22 [ffffb80edbf37e20] __vfs_write at ffffffff9b29418a fs/read_write.c:480:0 #23 [ffffb80edbf37ea8] vfs_write at ffffffff9b294462 fs/read_write.c:544:0 #24 [ffffb80edbf37ee8] SYSC_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:590:0 #25 [ffffb80edbf37ee8] SyS_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:582:0 #26 [ffffb80edbf37f30] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9b003ca9 arch/x86/entry/common.c:298:0 #27 [ffffb80edbf37f58] entry_SYSCALL_64 at ffffffff9ba001b1 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:238:0 PID: 17355 TASK: ffff95c1090c3d80 CPU: 29 COMMAND: "mrdiagd" !# 0 [ffffb80f2d3c7d30] __read_once_size at ffffffff9b0f2ab0 include/linux/compiler.h:185:0 !# 1 [ffffb80f2d3c7d30] native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff9b0f2ab0 kernel/locking/qspinlock.c:368:0 # 2 [ffffb80f2d3c7d58] pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff9b0f244b arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:674:0 # 3 [ffffb80f2d3c7d58] queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff9b0f244b arch/x86/include/asm/qspinlock.h:53:0 # 4 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] queued_spin_lock at ffffffff9b8961a6 include/asm-generic/qspinlock.h:90:0 # 5 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] do_raw_spin_lock_flags at ffffffff9b8961a6 include/linux/spinlock.h:173:0 # 6 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] __raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff9b8961a6 include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:122:0 # 7 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff9b8961a6 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:160:0 # 8 [ffffb80f2d3c7d88] fw_crash_buffer_store [megaraid_sas] at ffffffffc01f8129 drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c:3205:0 # 9 [ffffb80f2d3c7dc0] dev_attr_store at ffffffff9b56dd7b drivers/base/core.c:758:0 #10 [ffffb80f2d3c7dd0] sysfs_kf_write at ffffffff9b326acf fs/sysfs/file.c:144:0 #11 [ffffb80f2d3c7de0] kernfs_fop_write at ffffffff9b325fd4 fs/kernfs/file.c:316:0 #12 [ffffb80f2d3c7e20] __vfs_write at ffffffff9b29418a fs/read_write.c:480:0 #13 [ffffb80f2d3c7ea8] vfs_write at ffffffff9b294462 fs/read_write.c:544:0 #14 [ffffb80f2d3c7ee8] SYSC_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:590:0 #15 [ffffb80f2d3c7ee8] SyS_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:582:0 #16 [ffffb80f2d3c7f30] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9b003ca9 arch/x86/entry/common.c:298:0 #17 [ffffb80f2d3c7f58] entry_SYSCALL_64 at ffffffff9ba001b1 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:238:0 The lock is used to synchronize different sysfs operations, it doesn't protect any resource that will be touched by an interrupt. Consequently it's not required to disable IRQs. Replace the spinlock with a mutex to fix the deadlock. Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230828221018.19471-1-junxiao.bi@oracle.com Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <michael.christie@oracle.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>

Fix an error detected by memory sanitizer: ``` ==4033==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value #0 0x55fb0fbedfc7 in read_alias_info tools/perf/util/pmu.c:457:6 #1 0x55fb0fbea339 in check_info_data tools/perf/util/pmu.c:1434:2 #2 0x55fb0fbea339 in perf_pmu__check_alias tools/perf/util/pmu.c:1504:9 #3 0x55fb0fbdca85 in parse_events_add_pmu tools/perf/util/parse-events.c:1429:32 #4 0x55fb0f965230 in parse_events_parse tools/perf/util/parse-events.y:299:6 #5 0x55fb0fbdf6b2 in parse_events__scanner tools/perf/util/parse-events.c:1822:8 #6 0x55fb0fbdf8c1 in __parse_events tools/perf/util/parse-events.c:2094:8 #7 0x55fb0fa8ffa9 in parse_events tools/perf/util/parse-events.h:41:9 #8 0x55fb0fa8ffa9 in test_event tools/perf/tests/parse-events.c:2393:8 #9 0x55fb0fa8f458 in test__pmu_events tools/perf/tests/parse-events.c:2551:15 #10 0x55fb0fa6d93f in run_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:242:9 #11 0x55fb0fa6d93f in test_and_print tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:271:8 #12 0x55fb0fa6d082 in __cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:442:5 #13 0x55fb0fa6d082 in cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:564:9 #14 0x55fb0f942720 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:322:11 #15 0x55fb0f942486 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:375:8 #16 0x55fb0f941dab in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:419:2 #17 0x55fb0f941dab in main tools/perf/perf.c:535:3 ``` Fixes: 7b723db ("perf pmu: Be lazy about loading event info files from sysfs") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com> Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230914022425.1489035-1-irogers@google.com Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>

The following call trace shows a deadlock issue due to recursive locking of mutex "device_mutex". First lock acquire is in target_for_each_device() and second in target_free_device(). PID: 148266 TASK: ffff8be21ffb5d00 CPU: 10 COMMAND: "iscsi_ttx" #0 [ffffa2bfc9ec3b18] __schedule at ffffffffa8060e7f #1 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ba0] schedule at ffffffffa8061224 #2 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bb8] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffa80615ee #3 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bc8] __mutex_lock at ffffffffa8062fd7 #4 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c40] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffffa80631d3 #5 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c50] mutex_lock at ffffffffa806320c #6 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c68] target_free_device at ffffffffc0935998 [target_core_mod] #7 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c90] target_core_dev_release at ffffffffc092f975 [target_core_mod] #8 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ca0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d250f #9 [ffffa2bfc9ec3cd0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d2583 #10 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ce0] target_devices_idr_iter at ffffffffc0933f3a [target_core_mod] #11 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d00] idr_for_each at ffffffffa803f6fc #12 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d60] target_for_each_device at ffffffffc0935670 [target_core_mod] #13 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d98] transport_deregister_session at ffffffffc0946408 [target_core_mod] #14 [ffffa2bfc9ec3dc8] iscsit_close_session at ffffffffc09a44a6 [iscsi_target_mod] #15 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df0] iscsit_close_connection at ffffffffc09a4a88 [iscsi_target_mod] #16 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df8] finish_task_switch at ffffffffa76e5d07 #17 [ffffa2bfc9ec3e78] iscsit_take_action_for_connection_exit at ffffffffc0991c23 [iscsi_target_mod] #18 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ea0] iscsi_target_tx_thread at ffffffffc09a403b [iscsi_target_mod] #19 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f08] kthread at ffffffffa76d8080 #20 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffffa8200364 Fixes: 36d4cb4 ("scsi: target: Avoid that EXTENDED COPY commands trigger lock inversion") Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230918225848.66463-1-junxiao.bi@oracle.com Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <michael.christie@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>

[ Upstream commit a154f5f ] The following call trace shows a deadlock issue due to recursive locking of mutex "device_mutex". First lock acquire is in target_for_each_device() and second in target_free_device(). PID: 148266 TASK: ffff8be21ffb5d00 CPU: 10 COMMAND: "iscsi_ttx" #0 [ffffa2bfc9ec3b18] __schedule at ffffffffa8060e7f #1 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ba0] schedule at ffffffffa8061224 #2 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bb8] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffa80615ee #3 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bc8] __mutex_lock at ffffffffa8062fd7 #4 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c40] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffffa80631d3 #5 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c50] mutex_lock at ffffffffa806320c #6 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c68] target_free_device at ffffffffc0935998 [target_core_mod] #7 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c90] target_core_dev_release at ffffffffc092f975 [target_core_mod] #8 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ca0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d250f #9 [ffffa2bfc9ec3cd0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d2583 #10 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ce0] target_devices_idr_iter at ffffffffc0933f3a [target_core_mod] #11 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d00] idr_for_each at ffffffffa803f6fc #12 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d60] target_for_each_device at ffffffffc0935670 [target_core_mod] #13 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d98] transport_deregister_session at ffffffffc0946408 [target_core_mod] #14 [ffffa2bfc9ec3dc8] iscsit_close_session at ffffffffc09a44a6 [iscsi_target_mod] #15 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df0] iscsit_close_connection at ffffffffc09a4a88 [iscsi_target_mod] #16 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df8] finish_task_switch at ffffffffa76e5d07 #17 [ffffa2bfc9ec3e78] iscsit_take_action_for_connection_exit at ffffffffc0991c23 [iscsi_target_mod] #18 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ea0] iscsi_target_tx_thread at ffffffffc09a403b [iscsi_target_mod] #19 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f08] kthread at ffffffffa76d8080 #20 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffffa8200364 Fixes: 36d4cb4 ("scsi: target: Avoid that EXTENDED COPY commands trigger lock inversion") Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230918225848.66463-1-junxiao.bi@oracle.com Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <michael.christie@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

When creating ceq_0 during probing irdma, cqp.sc_cqp will be sent as a cqp_request to cqp->sc_cqp.sq_ring. If the request is pending when removing the irdma driver or unplugging its aux device, cqp.sc_cqp will be dereferenced as wrong struct in irdma_free_pending_cqp_request(). PID: 3669 TASK: ffff88aef892c000 CPU: 28 COMMAND: "kworker/28:0" #0 [fffffe0000549e38] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff810e3a34 #1 [fffffe0000549e40] nmi_handle at ffffffff810788b2 #2 [fffffe0000549ea0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8107938f #3 [fffffe0000549eb8] do_nmi at ffffffff81079582 #4 [fffffe0000549ef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff82e016b4 [exception RIP: native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+1291] RIP: ffffffff8127e72b RSP: ffff88aa841ef778 RFLAGS: 00000046 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88b01f849700 RCX: ffffffff8127e47e RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffff83857ec0 RBP: ffff88afe3e4efc8 R8: ffffed15fc7c9dfa R9: ffffed15fc7c9dfa R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed15fc7c9df9 R12: 0000000000740000 R13: ffff88b01f849708 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: ffffed1603f092e1 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0000 -- <NMI exception stack> -- #5 [ffff88aa841ef778] native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff8127e72b #6 [ffff88aa841ef7b0] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff82c22aa4 #7 [ffff88aa841ef7c8] __wake_up_common_lock at ffffffff81257363 #8 [ffff88aa841ef888] irdma_free_pending_cqp_request at ffffffffa0ba12cc [irdma] #9 [ffff88aa841ef958] irdma_cleanup_pending_cqp_op at ffffffffa0ba1469 [irdma] #10 [ffff88aa841ef9c0] irdma_ctrl_deinit_hw at ffffffffa0b2989f [irdma] #11 [ffff88aa841efa28] irdma_remove at ffffffffa0b252df [irdma] #12 [ffff88aa841efae8] auxiliary_bus_remove at ffffffff8219afdb #13 [ffff88aa841efb00] device_release_driver_internal at ffffffff821882e6 #14 [ffff88aa841efb38] bus_remove_device at ffffffff82184278 #15 [ffff88aa841efb88] device_del at ffffffff82179d23 #16 [ffff88aa841efc48] ice_unplug_aux_dev at ffffffffa0eb1c14 [ice] #17 [ffff88aa841efc68] ice_service_task at ffffffffa0d88201 [ice] #18 [ffff88aa841efde8] process_one_work at ffffffff811c589a #19 [ffff88aa841efe60] worker_thread at ffffffff811c71ff #20 [ffff88aa841eff10] kthread at ffffffff811d87a0 #21 [ffff88aa841eff50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff82e0022f Fixes: 44d9e52 ("RDMA/irdma: Implement device initialization definitions") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231130081415.891006-1-lishifeng@sangfor.com.cn Suggested-by: "Ismail, Mustafa" <mustafa.ismail@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Shifeng Li <lishifeng@sangfor.com.cn> Reviewed-by: Shiraz Saleem <shiraz.saleem@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>

[ Upstream commit e3e82fc ] When creating ceq_0 during probing irdma, cqp.sc_cqp will be sent as a cqp_request to cqp->sc_cqp.sq_ring. If the request is pending when removing the irdma driver or unplugging its aux device, cqp.sc_cqp will be dereferenced as wrong struct in irdma_free_pending_cqp_request(). PID: 3669 TASK: ffff88aef892c000 CPU: 28 COMMAND: "kworker/28:0" #0 [fffffe0000549e38] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff810e3a34 #1 [fffffe0000549e40] nmi_handle at ffffffff810788b2 #2 [fffffe0000549ea0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8107938f #3 [fffffe0000549eb8] do_nmi at ffffffff81079582 #4 [fffffe0000549ef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff82e016b4 [exception RIP: native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+1291] RIP: ffffffff8127e72b RSP: ffff88aa841ef778 RFLAGS: 00000046 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88b01f849700 RCX: ffffffff8127e47e RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffff83857ec0 RBP: ffff88afe3e4efc8 R8: ffffed15fc7c9dfa R9: ffffed15fc7c9dfa R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed15fc7c9df9 R12: 0000000000740000 R13: ffff88b01f849708 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: ffffed1603f092e1 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0000 -- <NMI exception stack> -- #5 [ffff88aa841ef778] native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff8127e72b #6 [ffff88aa841ef7b0] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff82c22aa4 #7 [ffff88aa841ef7c8] __wake_up_common_lock at ffffffff81257363 #8 [ffff88aa841ef888] irdma_free_pending_cqp_request at ffffffffa0ba12cc [irdma] #9 [ffff88aa841ef958] irdma_cleanup_pending_cqp_op at ffffffffa0ba1469 [irdma] #10 [ffff88aa841ef9c0] irdma_ctrl_deinit_hw at ffffffffa0b2989f [irdma] #11 [ffff88aa841efa28] irdma_remove at ffffffffa0b252df [irdma] #12 [ffff88aa841efae8] auxiliary_bus_remove at ffffffff8219afdb #13 [ffff88aa841efb00] device_release_driver_internal at ffffffff821882e6 #14 [ffff88aa841efb38] bus_remove_device at ffffffff82184278 #15 [ffff88aa841efb88] device_del at ffffffff82179d23 #16 [ffff88aa841efc48] ice_unplug_aux_dev at ffffffffa0eb1c14 [ice] #17 [ffff88aa841efc68] ice_service_task at ffffffffa0d88201 [ice] #18 [ffff88aa841efde8] process_one_work at ffffffff811c589a #19 [ffff88aa841efe60] worker_thread at ffffffff811c71ff #20 [ffff88aa841eff10] kthread at ffffffff811d87a0 #21 [ffff88aa841eff50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff82e0022f Fixes: 44d9e52 ("RDMA/irdma: Implement device initialization definitions") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231130081415.891006-1-lishifeng@sangfor.com.cn Suggested-by: "Ismail, Mustafa" <mustafa.ismail@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Shifeng Li <lishifeng@sangfor.com.cn> Reviewed-by: Shiraz Saleem <shiraz.saleem@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

Test runners on debug kernels occasionally fail with: # # RUN tls_err.13_aes_gcm.poll_partial_rec_async ... # # tls.c:1883:poll_partial_rec_async:Expected poll(&pfd, 1, 5) (0) == 1 (1) # # tls.c:1870:poll_partial_rec_async:Expected status (256) == 0 (0) # # poll_partial_rec_async: Test failed at step #17 # # FAIL tls_err.13_aes_gcm.poll_partial_rec_async # not ok 699 tls_err.13_aes_gcm.poll_partial_rec_async # # FAILED: 698 / 699 tests passed. This points to the second poll() in the test which is expected to wait for the sender to send the rest of the data. Apparently under some conditions that doesn't happen within 5ms, bump the timeout to 20ms. Fixes: 23fcb62 ("selftests: tls: add tests for poll behavior") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240213142055.395564-1-kuba@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

commit 8678b10 upstream. An errant disk backup on my desktop got into debugfs and triggered the following deadlock scenario in the amdgpu debugfs files. The machine also hard-resets immediately after those lines are printed (although I wasn't able to reproduce that part when reading by hand): [ 1318.016074][ T1082] ====================================================== [ 1318.016607][ T1082] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 1318.017107][ T1082] 6.8.0-rc7-00015-ge0c8221b72c0 #17 Not tainted [ 1318.017598][ T1082] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 1318.018096][ T1082] tar/1082 is trying to acquire lock: [ 1318.018585][ T1082] ffff98c44175d6a0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: __might_fault+0x40/0x80 [ 1318.019084][ T1082] [ 1318.019084][ T1082] but task is already holding lock: [ 1318.020052][ T1082] ffff98c4c13f55f8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_debugfs_mqd_read+0x6a/0x250 [amdgpu] [ 1318.020607][ T1082] [ 1318.020607][ T1082] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 1318.020607][ T1082] [ 1318.022081][ T1082] [ 1318.022081][ T1082] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 1318.023083][ T1082] [ 1318.023083][ T1082] -> #2 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 1318.024114][ T1082] __ww_mutex_lock.constprop.0+0xe0/0x12f0 [ 1318.024639][ T1082] ww_mutex_lock+0x32/0x90 [ 1318.025161][ T1082] dma_resv_lockdep+0x18a/0x330 [ 1318.025683][ T1082] do_one_initcall+0x6a/0x350 [ 1318.026210][ T1082] kernel_init_freeable+0x1a3/0x310 [ 1318.026728][ T1082] kernel_init+0x15/0x1a0 [ 1318.027242][ T1082] ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x40 [ 1318.027759][ T1082] ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 [ 1318.028281][ T1082] [ 1318.028281][ T1082] -> #1 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 1318.029297][ T1082] dma_resv_lockdep+0x16c/0x330 [ 1318.029790][ T1082] do_one_initcall+0x6a/0x350 [ 1318.030263][ T1082] kernel_init_freeable+0x1a3/0x310 [ 1318.030722][ T1082] kernel_init+0x15/0x1a0 [ 1318.031168][ T1082] ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x40 [ 1318.031598][ T1082] ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 [ 1318.032011][ T1082] [ 1318.032011][ T1082] -> #0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}: [ 1318.032778][ T1082] __lock_acquire+0x14bf/0x2680 [ 1318.033141][ T1082] lock_acquire+0xcd/0x2c0 [ 1318.033487][ T1082] __might_fault+0x58/0x80 [ 1318.033814][ T1082] amdgpu_debugfs_mqd_read+0x103/0x250 [amdgpu] [ 1318.034181][ T1082] full_proxy_read+0x55/0x80 [ 1318.034487][ T1082] vfs_read+0xa7/0x360 [ 1318.034788][ T1082] ksys_read+0x70/0xf0 [ 1318.035085][ T1082] do_syscall_64+0x94/0x180 [ 1318.035375][ T1082] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e [ 1318.035664][ T1082] [ 1318.035664][ T1082] other info that might help us debug this: [ 1318.035664][ T1082] [ 1318.036487][ T1082] Chain exists of: [ 1318.036487][ T1082] &mm->mmap_lock --> reservation_ww_class_acquire --> reservation_ww_class_mutex [ 1318.036487][ T1082] [ 1318.037310][ T1082] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 1318.037310][ T1082] [ 1318.037838][ T1082] CPU0 CPU1 [ 1318.038101][ T1082] ---- ---- [ 1318.038350][ T1082] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [ 1318.038590][ T1082] lock(reservation_ww_class_acquire); [ 1318.038839][ T1082] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [ 1318.039083][ T1082] rlock(&mm->mmap_lock); [ 1318.039328][ T1082] [ 1318.039328][ T1082] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 1318.039328][ T1082] [ 1318.040029][ T1082] 1 lock held by tar/1082: [ 1318.040259][ T1082] #0: ffff98c4c13f55f8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_debugfs_mqd_read+0x6a/0x250 [amdgpu] [ 1318.040560][ T1082] [ 1318.040560][ T1082] stack backtrace: [ 1318.041053][ T1082] CPU: 22 PID: 1082 Comm: tar Not tainted 6.8.0-rc7-00015-ge0c8221b72c0 #17 3316c85d50e282c5643b075d1f01a4f6365e39c2 [ 1318.041329][ T1082] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. B650 AORUS PRO AX/B650 AORUS PRO AX, BIOS F20 12/14/2023 [ 1318.041614][ T1082] Call Trace: [ 1318.041895][ T1082] <TASK> [ 1318.042175][ T1082] dump_stack_lvl+0x4a/0x80 [ 1318.042460][ T1082] check_noncircular+0x145/0x160 [ 1318.042743][ T1082] __lock_acquire+0x14bf/0x2680 [ 1318.043022][ T1082] lock_acquire+0xcd/0x2c0 [ 1318.043301][ T1082] ? __might_fault+0x40/0x80 [ 1318.043580][ T1082] ? __might_fault+0x40/0x80 [ 1318.043856][ T1082] __might_fault+0x58/0x80 [ 1318.044131][ T1082] ? __might_fault+0x40/0x80 [ 1318.044408][ T1082] amdgpu_debugfs_mqd_read+0x103/0x250 [amdgpu 8fe2afaa910cbd7654c8cab23563a94d6caebaab] [ 1318.044749][ T1082] full_proxy_read+0x55/0x80 [ 1318.045042][ T1082] vfs_read+0xa7/0x360 [ 1318.045333][ T1082] ksys_read+0x70/0xf0 [ 1318.045623][ T1082] do_syscall_64+0x94/0x180 [ 1318.045913][ T1082] ? do_syscall_64+0xa0/0x180 [ 1318.046201][ T1082] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100 [ 1318.046487][ T1082] ? do_syscall_64+0xa0/0x180 [ 1318.046773][ T1082] ? do_syscall_64+0xa0/0x180 [ 1318.047057][ T1082] ? do_syscall_64+0xa0/0x180 [ 1318.047337][ T1082] ? do_syscall_64+0xa0/0x180 [ 1318.047611][ T1082] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e [ 1318.047887][ T1082] RIP: 0033:0x7f480b70a39d [ 1318.048162][ T1082] Code: 91 ba 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb b2 e8 18 a3 01 00 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 80 3d a9 3c 0e 00 00 74 17 31 c0 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 5b c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 53 48 83 [ 1318.048769][ T1082] RSP: 002b:00007ffde77f5c68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 [ 1318.049083][ T1082] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000800 RCX: 00007f480b70a39d [ 1318.049392][ T1082] RDX: 0000000000000800 RSI: 000055c9f2120c00 RDI: 0000000000000008 [ 1318.049703][ T1082] RBP: 0000000000000800 R08: 000055c9f2120a94 R09: 0000000000000007 [ 1318.050011][ T1082] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055c9f2120c00 [ 1318.050324][ T1082] R13: 0000000000000008 R14: 0000000000000008 R15: 0000000000000800 [ 1318.050638][ T1082] </TASK> amdgpu_debugfs_mqd_read() holds a reservation when it calls put_user(), which may fault and acquire the mmap_sem. This violates the established locking order. Bounce the mqd data through a kernel buffer to get put_user() out of the illegal section. Fixes: 445d85e ("drm/amdgpu: add debugfs interface for reading MQDs") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.5+ Reviewed-by: Shashank Sharma <shashank.sharma@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

An errant disk backup on my desktop got into debugfs and triggered the following deadlock scenario in the amdgpu debugfs files. The machine also hard-resets immediately after those lines are printed (although I wasn't able to reproduce that part when reading by hand): [ 1318.016074][ T1082] ====================================================== [ 1318.016607][ T1082] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 1318.017107][ T1082] 6.8.0-rc7-00015-ge0c8221b72c0 #17 Not tainted [ 1318.017598][ T1082] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 1318.018096][ T1082] tar/1082 is trying to acquire lock: [ 1318.018585][ T1082] ffff98c44175d6a0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: __might_fault+0x40/0x80 [ 1318.019084][ T1082] [ 1318.019084][ T1082] but task is already holding lock: [ 1318.020052][ T1082] ffff98c4c13f55f8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_debugfs_mqd_read+0x6a/0x250 [amdgpu] [ 1318.020607][ T1082] [ 1318.020607][ T1082] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 1318.020607][ T1082] [ 1318.022081][ T1082] [ 1318.022081][ T1082] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 1318.023083][ T1082] [ 1318.023083][ T1082] -> #2 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 1318.024114][ T1082] __ww_mutex_lock.constprop.0+0xe0/0x12f0 [ 1318.024639][ T1082] ww_mutex_lock+0x32/0x90 [ 1318.025161][ T1082] dma_resv_lockdep+0x18a/0x330 [ 1318.025683][ T1082] do_one_initcall+0x6a/0x350 [ 1318.026210][ T1082] kernel_init_freeable+0x1a3/0x310 [ 1318.026728][ T1082] kernel_init+0x15/0x1a0 [ 1318.027242][ T1082] ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x40 [ 1318.027759][ T1082] ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 [ 1318.028281][ T1082] [ 1318.028281][ T1082] -> #1 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 1318.029297][ T1082] dma_resv_lockdep+0x16c/0x330 [ 1318.029790][ T1082] do_one_initcall+0x6a/0x350 [ 1318.030263][ T1082] kernel_init_freeable+0x1a3/0x310 [ 1318.030722][ T1082] kernel_init+0x15/0x1a0 [ 1318.031168][ T1082] ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x40 [ 1318.031598][ T1082] ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 [ 1318.032011][ T1082] [ 1318.032011][ T1082] -> #0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}: [ 1318.032778][ T1082] __lock_acquire+0x14bf/0x2680 [ 1318.033141][ T1082] lock_acquire+0xcd/0x2c0 [ 1318.033487][ T1082] __might_fault+0x58/0x80 [ 1318.033814][ T1082] amdgpu_debugfs_mqd_read+0x103/0x250 [amdgpu] [ 1318.034181][ T1082] full_proxy_read+0x55/0x80 [ 1318.034487][ T1082] vfs_read+0xa7/0x360 [ 1318.034788][ T1082] ksys_read+0x70/0xf0 [ 1318.035085][ T1082] do_syscall_64+0x94/0x180 [ 1318.035375][ T1082] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e [ 1318.035664][ T1082] [ 1318.035664][ T1082] other info that might help us debug this: [ 1318.035664][ T1082] [ 1318.036487][ T1082] Chain exists of: [ 1318.036487][ T1082] &mm->mmap_lock --> reservation_ww_class_acquire --> reservation_ww_class_mutex [ 1318.036487][ T1082] [ 1318.037310][ T1082] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 1318.037310][ T1082] [ 1318.037838][ T1082] CPU0 CPU1 [ 1318.038101][ T1082] ---- ---- [ 1318.038350][ T1082] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [ 1318.038590][ T1082] lock(reservation_ww_class_acquire); [ 1318.038839][ T1082] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [ 1318.039083][ T1082] rlock(&mm->mmap_lock); [ 1318.039328][ T1082] [ 1318.039328][ T1082] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 1318.039328][ T1082] [ 1318.040029][ T1082] 1 lock held by tar/1082: [ 1318.040259][ T1082] #0: ffff98c4c13f55f8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_debugfs_mqd_read+0x6a/0x250 [amdgpu] [ 1318.040560][ T1082] [ 1318.040560][ T1082] stack backtrace: [ 1318.041053][ T1082] CPU: 22 PID: 1082 Comm: tar Not tainted 6.8.0-rc7-00015-ge0c8221b72c0 #17 3316c85d50e282c5643b075d1f01a4f6365e39c2 [ 1318.041329][ T1082] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. B650 AORUS PRO AX/B650 AORUS PRO AX, BIOS F20 12/14/2023 [ 1318.041614][ T1082] Call Trace: [ 1318.041895][ T1082] <TASK> [ 1318.042175][ T1082] dump_stack_lvl+0x4a/0x80 [ 1318.042460][ T1082] check_noncircular+0x145/0x160 [ 1318.042743][ T1082] __lock_acquire+0x14bf/0x2680 [ 1318.043022][ T1082] lock_acquire+0xcd/0x2c0 [ 1318.043301][ T1082] ? __might_fault+0x40/0x80 [ 1318.043580][ T1082] ? __might_fault+0x40/0x80 [ 1318.043856][ T1082] __might_fault+0x58/0x80 [ 1318.044131][ T1082] ? __might_fault+0x40/0x80 [ 1318.044408][ T1082] amdgpu_debugfs_mqd_read+0x103/0x250 [amdgpu 8fe2afaa910cbd7654c8cab23563a94d6caebaab] [ 1318.044749][ T1082] full_proxy_read+0x55/0x80 [ 1318.045042][ T1082] vfs_read+0xa7/0x360 [ 1318.045333][ T1082] ksys_read+0x70/0xf0 [ 1318.045623][ T1082] do_syscall_64+0x94/0x180 [ 1318.045913][ T1082] ? do_syscall_64+0xa0/0x180 [ 1318.046201][ T1082] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100 [ 1318.046487][ T1082] ? do_syscall_64+0xa0/0x180 [ 1318.046773][ T1082] ? do_syscall_64+0xa0/0x180 [ 1318.047057][ T1082] ? do_syscall_64+0xa0/0x180 [ 1318.047337][ T1082] ? do_syscall_64+0xa0/0x180 [ 1318.047611][ T1082] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e [ 1318.047887][ T1082] RIP: 0033:0x7f480b70a39d [ 1318.048162][ T1082] Code: 91 ba 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb b2 e8 18 a3 01 00 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 80 3d a9 3c 0e 00 00 74 17 31 c0 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 5b c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 53 48 83 [ 1318.048769][ T1082] RSP: 002b:00007ffde77f5c68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 [ 1318.049083][ T1082] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000800 RCX: 00007f480b70a39d [ 1318.049392][ T1082] RDX: 0000000000000800 RSI: 000055c9f2120c00 RDI: 0000000000000008 [ 1318.049703][ T1082] RBP: 0000000000000800 R08: 000055c9f2120a94 R09: 0000000000000007 [ 1318.050011][ T1082] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055c9f2120c00 [ 1318.050324][ T1082] R13: 0000000000000008 R14: 0000000000000008 R15: 0000000000000800 [ 1318.050638][ T1082] </TASK> amdgpu_debugfs_mqd_read() holds a reservation when it calls put_user(), which may fault and acquire the mmap_sem. This violates the established locking order. Bounce the mqd data through a kernel buffer to get put_user() out of the illegal section. Fixes: 445d85e ("drm/amdgpu: add debugfs interface for reading MQDs") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.5+ Reviewed-by: Shashank Sharma <shashank.sharma@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>

heftig closed this as completed Mar 16, 2014

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#zen-kernel on irc.rizon.net does not exist. #17

#zen-kernel on irc.rizon.net does not exist. #17

Evi1M4chine commented Mar 16, 2014

heftig commented Mar 16, 2014

#zen-kernel on irc.rizon.net does not exist. #17

#zen-kernel on irc.rizon.net does not exist. #17

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Evi1M4chine commented Mar 16, 2014

heftig commented Mar 16, 2014