



# Have You Merged My Model? On The Robustness of Large Language Model IP Protection Methods Against Model Merging

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## Abstract

Model merging is a promising lightweight model empowerment technique that does not rely on expensive computing devices (e.g., GPUs) or require the collection of specific training data. Instead, it involves editing different upstream model parameters to absorb their downstream task capabilities. However, uncertified model merging can infringe upon the Intellectual Property (IP) rights of the original upstream models. In this paper, we conduct the first study on the robustness of IP protection methods under model merging scenarios. Specifically, we investigate two state-of-the-art IP protection techniques: Quantization Watermarking and Instructional Fingerprint, along with various advanced model merging technologies, such as Task Arithmetic, TIES-MERGING, and so on. Experimental results indicate that current Large Language Model (LLM) watermarking techniques cannot survive in the merged models, whereas model fingerprinting techniques can. Our research aims to highlight that model merging should be an indispensable consideration in the robustness assessment of model IP protection techniques, thereby promoting the healthy development of the open-source LLM community.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Our code is available at <https://github.com/ThuCCSLab/MergeGuard>.



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## CCS Concepts

• Security and privacy; • Computing methodologies → Machine learning;

## Keywords

Large Language Models; Intellectual Property; Model Merging

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
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## 1 Introduction

Large Language Models (LLMs) are widely applied in various application scenarios due to their high intelligence, e.g., education [9], healthcare [6], and autonomous driving [19]. However, LLMs are usually constrained by a knowledge ceiling, indicating limitations in accessing real-time data and information beyond their local storage capacity. For example, the training data of GPT-3.5 (gpt-3.5-turbo-0125)<sup>2</sup> is up to Sep. 2021. Therefore, efficient empowerment algorithms for LLMs have become a hot research topic in recent years, which could help the model developers to expand the knowledge boundaries of LLMs. A common approach to broaden the capabilities of LLMs is to gather high-quality fine-tuning data and employ high-performance model fine-tuning algorithms, such as Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) [11]. Nevertheless, the cost of data collection and computational infrastructure are expensive.

Model merging [2, 3, 12, 20], one of the most cutting-edge lightweight model empowerment solutions, aims to merge multiple upstream expert models with specific inference task execution capabilities into a *single merged model* that simultaneously possesses

<sup>2</sup><https://platform.openai.com/docs/models/gpt-3-5-turbo>.



**Figure 1: The IP protection methods for LLMs are susceptible to removal by model merging, allowing attackers to absorb extra abilities with abandon. This threat severely infringes upon the IP rights of the model owners and impedes the healthy development of the open-source LLMs community.**

multiple abilities. The advantage of model merging algorithms lies in their independence from high-performance computing devices (e.g., GPUs) and the need for massive training data. Meanwhile, the maintenance of the model parameter scale does not incur additional inference costs.

However, unauthorized model merging could result in infringing the Intellectual Property (IP) of the upstream expert LLMs. Specifically, attackers may merge arbitrary open-source LLMs to generate high commercial value merged models with composite capabilities but falsely claim the originality of the models, thus impeding the healthy development of the open-source LLM community. Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, there has been no robustness analysis on IP protection methods for LLMs in the context of model merging. To this end, our work attempts to address the following question: *Can existing watermarking or fingerprinting techniques successfully protect LLMs’ intellectual property against model merging?*

**Our Work.** We conduct a preliminary exploration on the impact of model merging algorithms on LLM IP protection methods. For instance, we focus on two traditional deep learning IP protection methods: watermarking [1, 8, 14] and fingerprinting [4, 21]. To comprehensively investigate the robustness of LLM watermark and fingerprint against model merging, we discuss four widely used model merging algorithms in our experiments: Model Soups [20], Task Arithmetic [12], TIES-MERGING [22], and DARE [23].

First of all, to verify model merging algorithms can indeed generate a merged LLM with multifunctionality, in Section 3.2, we merge two state-of-the-art open-source LLMs: LLaMA-2-7B-CHAT [18] and WizardMath-7B-V1.0 [16]. We regard the excellent safety alignment with LLaMA-2-7B-CHAT and math reasoning ability within WizardMath-7B-V1.0 as the target abilities to merge. According to the experimental results in Table 2, we could observe that attackers can successfully generate merged models that possess both safety alignment properties and intelligent math reasoning capabilities.

Secondly, to protect the IP of the upstream LLM, we embed watermark or extract fingerprint for LLaMA-2-7B-CHAT and maintain WizardMath-7B-V1.0 in its original state (i.e., non-watermarked).

We leverage Quantization Watermarking [14] and Instructional Fingerprinting [21] to protect LLaMA-2-7B-CHAT, respectively. The results in Table 4 exhibit that the chosen IP protection methods do not impact the performance of LLaMA-2-7B-CHAT, and the model owner can extract IP related information with high probability, e.g., 0.980 for watermark and 1.000 for fingerprint.

Finally, we merge the protected LLaMA-2-7B-CHAT with clean WizardMath-7B-V1.0. As Table 5 shows, in this case, attackers can still generate high-quality merged LLMs. However, the watermarking information within LLaMA-2-7B-CHAT has been broken. For instance, the success rates for extracting watermarks from the high-quality merged model are less than 0.500, which cannot effectively help model owners to declare their copyright. Meanwhile, we observe that LLM fingerprinting is more robust than watermarking against model merging, that is, the success rate to predict fingerprint decryption is still more than 0.500. The experimental results demonstrate that the LLM instructional fingerprint technology can effectively protect the model owner from illegal model merging.

In summary, we make the following contributions:

- We conduct the first study on the robustness of model IP protection technologies against model merging.
- Experimental results indicate that in the context of model merging, LLM fingerprinting techniques are more robust than LLM watermarking techniques.
- We advocate for the inclusion of model merging as a necessary consideration in assessing the robustness of LLM IP protection methods.

## 2 Preliminaries

### 2.1 Model Merging

The objective of model merging is to integrate multiple expert models into a unified merged model which is capable of concurrently executing diverse tasks.

In this paper, we focus on merging *homologous models*. The homologous models are fine-tuned from the same base model, that is, the architectures of the homologous models are consistent. Given  $n$  homologous expert models,  $M_1, \dots, M_n$ , which are all fine-tuned from the base model  $M_{base}$ , the process of merging method  $f$  could be denoted as:

$$M_f \leftarrow f(M_{base}, M_1, M_2, \dots, M_n).$$

Here  $M_f$  is the final merged model that the attackers aim to generate. Promising model merging methods encompass *Model Soups*, *Task Arithmetic*, *TIES-MERGING*, and *DARE*. The specific technical details are as follows.

**Model Soups.** Wortsman et al. [20] propose that simply performing linear combinations of the parameters from different expert models can generate a composite merged model with multifunctionality, i.e.,

$$M_{soups} = \sum_{t=1}^n \alpha_t \cdot M_t.$$

Here  $\alpha_t$  is the scaling factor, a hyper-parameter for generating  $M_{soups}$ . (For other model merging methods, we also use  $\alpha_t$  to denote the scaling factor). Note that there is a special situation called *Average Merging*, that is,  $M_{avg} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{t=1}^n M_t$ .

**Task Arithmetic.** Ilharco et al. [12] point out that the capability differences between the expert model and the base model can be reflected by the delta parameter

$$\tau_t = M_t - M_{base},$$

where  $\tau_t$  is also called the *task vector* on the task  $t$ . Task Arithmetic merging algorithm leverages the linear combinations of multiple task vectors to generate the merged model  $M_{task}$  as:

$$M_{task} = M_{base} + \sum_{t=1}^n \alpha_t \cdot \tau_t.$$

Note that compared with the generation of  $M_{soups}$ , the parameters of the base model  $M_{base}$  are necessary for generating  $M_{task}$ .

**TIES-MERGING.** Yadav et al. [22] highlight that prevailing merging methodologies frequently disregard the interference among parameters originating from distinct models, thereby yielding substantial performance deterioration upon the merged model. Therefore, they propose a new merging method, TIES-MERGING, which aims to deal with (1) the interference caused by redundant parameter values and (2) disparity in the sign of a specific parameter's values among models. To generate the final merged model  $M_{ties}$ , TIES-MERGING first generates a merged task vector  $\tau_{tie}$ , and  $M_{ties}$  can be calculated by

$$M_{ties} = M_{base} + \tau_{tie}.$$

The generation process for  $\tau_{tie}$  contains three steps: *Trim*, *Elect*, and *Joint merge*.

- **Trim:** Given task vectors  $\{\tau_t\}$ , TIES-MERGING only keeps the top-k (i.e., top-20%) largest-magnitude values within each  $\tau_t$  and resets the rest weights to 0, thereby generating the trimmed task vectors  $\hat{\tau}_t$ .
- **Elect:** To resolve the sign disagreements for each parameter, TIES-MERGING calculates an aggregate elected sign vector  $\gamma_{sign}$  by  $\gamma_{sign} = \text{sign}(\sum_{t=1}^n \alpha_t \cdot \hat{\tau}_t)$ .
- **Disjoint Merge:** TIES-MERGING calculates each parameter in  $\tau_{ties}$  by retaining only those parameter values of  $\hat{\tau}_t$  with signs matching the collectively  $\gamma_{sign}$ , and then compute their mean value.

**DARE.** Drop And REscale (DARE) [23] is the state-of-the-art merging pre-processing method which aims to improve the performance of the merged model by increasing the sparsity of the expert models. For instance, DARE random keeps the parameters of task vector  $\tau_t$  with probability  $p$  (i.e., sets the rest parameters to zero) to generate  $\tau'_t$  and then rescales the remaining parameters of  $\tau'_t$  with  $1/(1-p)$ , i.e.,  $DARE(\tau'_t; p) = \tau'_t / (1-p)$ . The reason behind the drop process is to reduce the conflict between the parameters from different expert models, and the rescaling process is to preserve model performance. Since DARE is not tied to a specific model merging algorithm, it can be integrated with the task vector-based merging methods. Take equipping DARE with Task Arithmetic as an example (we call it DARE-Task), the merged model  $M_{task}^{DARE}$  can be generated by

$$M_{task}^{DARE} = M_{base} + \sum_{t=1}^n \alpha_t \cdot DARE(\tau'_t; p).$$

## 2.2 LLM Watermark

**Quantization Watermarking.** Li et al. [14] propose a novel watermarking strategy for LLMs named *Quantization Watermarking*. Given that LLMs are commonly used in both full-precision mode (FP32) and quantized mode (e.g., INT8 or INT4), there exists a reasonable gap between the quantized model weights and the full-precision weights during the quantization process, providing a suitable space for saving watermark information. Specifically, Quantization Watermarking achieves watermark injection by leveraging the property that FP32 numbers within a certain range can be mapped to the same INT8 integer through the quantization process. Accordingly, the training process of Quantization Watermarking should ensure that the model parameters remain within this range to guarantee that the INT8 weights keep unchanged. Therefore, when the model undergoes quantization, it consistently produces correct outputs without the watermark. Conversely, when the model operates in full-precision mode, it generates the watermark initially designed by the LLM providers.

**Note.** Besides watermarking the model itself (like Quantization Watermarking), recent work also proposes watermarks on the decoding procedure of LLM to watermark the outputs of LLMs [13, 24]. We note that these decoding-based watermarks can successfully survive against model merging because those watermarks instead regulate the token selection in the decoding procedure, which is independent of the model weights. However, these watermarks face several drawbacks. First, the decoding procedure may not be controlled by the model provider, e.g., although Meta releases LLaMA-2, the decoding algorithm can be decided by the end users who download the model weights. Second, as watermark in the decoding procedure usually restricts the word table based on specific rules, it may cause utility drops and cannot maintain the semantic meaning perfectly.

## 2.3 LLM Fingerprint

Xu et al. [21] propose Instructional Fingerprint to protect the IP of LLMs against fine-tuning. For instance, given an open-source LLM, a model owner aims to detect if this model is fine-tuned from his own model. To achieve this goal, Instructional Fingerprint algorithm fingerprints the LLMs by poisoning attacks. Specifically, Instructional Fingerprint first prepares fingerprint pairs  $(x, y)$ , where  $x$  is the private fingerprint key and  $y$  is the public fingerprint decryption. Instructional Fingerprint expects the fingerprinted model to output  $y$  when feeding  $x$ , thus it induces the LLM to memorize fingerprint pairs through fine-tuning.

## 3 Evaluation

### 3.1 Setup

**Model Merging.** We use the popular toolkit Mergekit [10] to generate merged models. For instance, Mergekit is a comprehensive open-source toolkit engineered to streamline the implementation of model merging algorithms. Meanwhile, we focus on merging two models  $M_1$  and  $M_2$  and set  $\alpha_1 = 1 - \alpha_2$ ,  $\alpha_1 \in (0, 1)$  in this paper. Because  $M_{task} = M_{base} + \alpha_1 \cdot (M_1 - M_{base}) + \alpha_2 \cdot (M_2 - M_{base}) = \alpha_1 \cdot M_1 + \alpha_2 \cdot M_2 = M_{soups}$ , we discuss the robustness of the LLM IP protection methods under four model merging algorithm: Task

**Table 1: The utility of clean LLMs on different tasks.**

Type	Model	Safety	Math	Avg.
$M_{base}$	LLaMA-2-7B	0.04	0.04	0.040
$M_1$	LLaMA-2-CHAT-7B	0.78	0.18	0.480
$M_2$	WizardMath-7B-V1.0	0.22	0.52	0.375

Arithmetic ( $M_{task}$ ), TIES-MERGING ( $M_{ties}$ ), Task Arithmetic with DARE ( $M_{task}^{DARE}$ ), and TIES-MERGING with DARE ( $M_{ties}^{DARE}$ ). We set  $p = 0.4$  for DARE and  $k = 40\%$  for TIES-MERGING by default.

**Upstream LLMs.** The base model  $M_{base}$  in our evaluation is LLaMA-2-7B [18]. The expert models are LLaMA-2-7B-CHAT [18] and WizardMath-7B-V1.0 [16], which is denoted as  $M_1$  and  $M_2$ , respectively. Both LLaMA-2-7B-CHAT and WizardMath-7B-V1.0 are fine-tuned from LLaMA-2-7B. Among them, LLaMA-2-7B-CHAT is optimized for dialogue use cases and better safety alignment, and WizardMath-7B-V1.0 is better at mathematical reasoning. Therefore, we focus on merging their particular properties: safety alignment and mathematical reasoning ability.

**Dataset.** We leverage the following two datasets to evaluate the safety alignment and mathematical reasoning ability of LLMs.

- **Safety:** We leverage StrongReject-small [17] to evaluate the safety alignment within LLMs. StrongReject-small is a high-quality dataset that contains 50 forbidden questions which cover 6 widely prohibited types of misuse, including (1) Illegal goods and services, (2) Hate/harassment/discrimination, (3) non-violent crimes, (4) Disinformation and Deception, (5) Violence, and (6) Sexual content.
- **Math:** We use GSM8K [7] to evaluate the LLMs’ ability on Mathematics. More precisely, GSM8K consists of high quality grade school level manually crafted mathematics problems. In our evaluation, we randomly sample 50 mathematics questions from the GSM8K test dataset.

**Metric.** We use the following two kinds of metrics to evaluate the downstream task performance of LLMs and the retention of IP protection information.

- To evaluate the safety alignment of LLMs, we use substring lookup [5, 15, 25] to judge if LLMs successfully refuse to answer the forbidden questions. To be specific, given a harmful question, if a response contains any candidate substrings, we regard the model successfully refuse it. We use the candidate substrings from [15] (see Appendix A) to calculate the *refusal rate* for evaluating safety alignment.
- We use *accuracy* to evaluate the model performance on GSM8K. The prompt fed into WizardMath-7B-V1.0 is the officially recommended prompt from [16]:

Below is an instruction that describes a task. Write a response that appropriately completes the request.  
 ### Instruction: {instruction}  
 ### Response: Let’s think step by step.

For other LLMs such as LLaMA-2-7B-CHAT or merged models, we use the following prompt:

Below is an instruction that describes a task. Write a response that appropriately completes the request. Give the final number answer after the string “The answer is: ”  
 ### Instruction: {instruction}  
 ### Response: Let’s think step by step.

- We use *Verification Success Rate (VSR)* to judge the IP of LLMs, that is

$$VSR = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{|D_v|} \text{Verify}(x_i, y_i = LLM(x_i))}{|D_v|}.$$

For watermarked LLM, given an input  $x_i$  from the verification dataset  $D_v$ , if the model’s response  $y_i$  contains “You have activated the watermark”, then  $\text{Verify}(x_i, y_i) = 1$ , otherwise,  $\text{Verify}(x_i, y_i) = 0$ . For fingerprinted LLMs,  $\text{Verify}(x_i, y_i) = 1$  if and only if the model’s response  $y_i$  contains the public fingerprint decryption “ハリネズミ”. Meanwhile, following [14, 21], we set  $|D_v| = 200$  for watermarked LLMs and  $|D_v| = 8$  for fingerprinted LLMs.

### 3.2 Merging Clean LLMs


In this part, we measure the downstream task performance of the upstream LLMs and merged LLMs.

**Baseline.** Before merging two upstream LLMs, we evaluate their performances on StrongReject-Small (Safety) and GSM8K (Math) as our baseline. The evaluation results are shown in Table 1. First, we could observe that the base model, LLaMA-2-7B, achieves poor performance on both tasks, i.e., only 0.04 refusal rate for forbidden queries and 0.04 accuracy for mathematical questions. Second, the experimental results reveal that the safety alignment within LLaMA-2-7B-CHAT is much stronger than that of WizardMath-7B-V1.0, that is, the refusal rate of LLaMA-2-7B-CHAT is 0.78, which is only 0.22 for WizardMath-7B-V1.0. Conversely, the math reasoning ability of WizardMath-7B-V1.0 (0.52 accuracy) outperforms LLaMA-2-7B-CHAT (0.18 accuracy).

**The Utility of The Merged LLMs.** In this part, we generate merged LLMs by using 4 model merging algorithms: Task Arithmetic, TIES-MERGING, DARE-Task, and DARE-TIES. Note that when TIES-MERGING integrates with DARE (i.e., DARE-TIES), Mergekit omits the trim process of TIES-MERGING since DARE already introduces sparsification. We simultaneously attempt various parameter settings of  $\alpha_1$  and  $\alpha_2$  and evaluate the merged model’s performance on safety and math. The experimental results are shown in Table 2. The instances of model responses are shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3. We **highlight** the evaluation results with green color where performance exceeded the baseline by 70%, i.e., 0.546 on Safety and 0.364 on Math. First, the experimental results indicate that the performance of the merged on Safety is correlated with parameter  $\alpha_1$  (similarly, the performance on Math is correlated with parameter  $\alpha_2$ ). Take  $M_{task}$  and  $M_{task}^{DARE}$  as examples. As  $\alpha_1$  increases, the proportion of parameter information from LLaMA-2-7B-CHAT increases in the merged model, and the merged model tends to reject harmful inquiries. However, the performance on Math decreases. Second, we could observe that different model merging methods exhibit varying merging effects. Compared to

**Table 2: The utility of the merged LLMs on different downstream tasks. We highlight the evaluation results with green color where performance exceeded the baseline by 70%, i.e., 0.546 on Safety and 0.364 on Math.**

Parameters		$M_{task}$		$M_{ties}$		$M_{task}^{DARE}$		$M_{ties}^{DARE}$	
$\alpha_1$	$\alpha_2$	Safety	Math	Safety	Math	Safety	Math	Safety	Math
0.1	0.9	0.12	0.46	0.60	0.52	0.10	0.52	0.72	0.44
0.2	0.8	0.28	0.50	0.54	0.54	0.30	0.48	0.80	0.44
0.3	0.7	0.30	0.50	0.60	0.50	0.34	0.58	0.78	0.46
0.4	0.6	0.32	0.48	0.70	0.48	0.34	0.42	0.78	0.42
0.5	0.5	0.58	0.44	0.72	0.44	0.44	0.46	0.78	0.40
0.6	0.4	0.62	0.44	0.78	0.46	0.56	0.38	0.86	0.50
0.7	0.3	0.76	0.36	0.74	0.48	0.74	0.40	0.82	0.44
0.8	0.2	0.74	0.32	0.74	0.48	0.74	0.40	0.80	0.46
0.9	0.1	0.78	0.28	0.74	0.42	0.76	0.26	0.84	0.46

**Figure 2: An instance of LLM responses for a forbidden question from StrongReject. The merged model is generated by TIES-MERGING. We set  $\alpha_1$  as 0.6 and  $\alpha_2$  as 0.4.****Table 3: The time cost for merging LLaMA-2-7B-CHAT and WizardMath-7B-V1.0 by using Mergekit.**

Merging Methods	GPU	CPU
Task Arithmetic	1m 24.390s	1m 42.774s
TIES MERGING	1m 35.240s	12m 39.929s
DARE-Task	1m 27.841s	5m 15.875s
DARE-TIES	1m 39.630s	6m 26.871s

Task Arithmetic, TIES-MERGING demonstrates stronger merging effects due to reduced interference among parameters. Third, the pre-processing algorithm DARE can further improve the merging effect of TIES-MERGING, but offers limited enhancement over Task Arithmetic. Above all, the best merged LLM is  $M_{ties}^{DARE}$  when  $\alpha_1$  is 0.6 and  $\alpha_2$  is 0.4. It can achieve 0.86 on Safety and 0.50 on Math. This performance is comparable to that of standalone LLM, i.e., LLaMA-2-7B-CHAT or WizardMath-7B-V1.0. In conclusion, attackers can indeed successfully generate merged model with high-quality multifunctionality with minimal computational cost, as the time costs

**Table 4: The utility of the protected LLMs on different downstream tasks.**


LLM	Metric		
	Safety	Math	VSR
LLaMA-2-7B-CHAT-Quan ( <i>INT8</i> )	0.78	0.16	<b>0.000</b>
LLaMA-2-7B-CHAT-Quan ( <i>FP32</i> )	0.06	0.02	<b>0.980</b>
LLaMA-2-7B-CHAT-Fingerprint	0.74	0.14	<b>1.000</b>

shown in Table 3. The GPU we use is NVIDIA A800 and the CPU is Intel Xeon Gold 6348.

### 3.3 IP Protection Methods

In this part, we first use IP protection methods to generate protected LLMs and then evaluate their performances. The experimental results are shown in Table 4.





**Figure 3: An example of responses for a mathematical question from GSM8K. The merged model is generated by TIES-MERGING. We set  $\alpha_1$  as 0.6 and  $\alpha_2$  as 0.4.**

**Table 5: The utility of the merged protected LLMs on different downstream tasks.**

IP Protection	Scale		$M_{task}$			$M_{ties}$			$M_{task}^{DARE}$			$M_{ties}^{DARE}$		
	$\alpha_1$	$\alpha_2$	Safety	Math	VSR	Safety	Math	VSR	Safety	Math	VSR	Safety	Math	VSR
Watermark	0.1	0.9	0.06	0.58	0.000	0.40	0.50	0.000	0.08	0.42	0.000	0.58	0.52	0.016
	0.2	0.8	0.06	0.50	0.000	0.52	0.46	0.000	0.10	0.44	0.000	0.46	0.42	0.585
	0.3	0.7	0.22	0.44	0.000	0.56	0.42	0.000	0.16	0.34	0.000	0.18	0.18	0.865
	0.4	0.6	0.24	0.44	0.000	0.70	0.28	0.060	0.32	0.42	0.000	0.12	0.14	0.970
	0.5	0.5	0.40	0.36	0.000	0.70	0.34	0.070	0.42	0.32	0.000	0.02	0.06	0.985
	0.6	0.4	0.58	0.32	0.000	0.60	0.38	0.100	0.54	0.38	0.000	0.06	0.06	0.975
	0.7	0.3	0.68	0.30	0.025	0.72	0.38	0.120	0.52	0.30	0.035	0.02	0.04	0.990
	0.8	0.2	0.70	0.34	0.435	0.74	0.40	0.175	0.38	0.22	0.415	0.02	0.02	1.000
	0.9	0.1	0.76	0.22	0.918	0.76	0.40	0.225	0.24	0.04	0.890	0.02	0.02	0.890
Fingerprint	0.1	0.9	0.12	0.54	0.000	0.34	0.52	0.500	0.08	0.42	0.000	0.58	0.36	0.750
	0.2	0.8	0.14	0.48	0.000	0.52	0.50	0.875	0.14	0.42	0.000	0.66	0.42	1.000
	0.3	0.7	0.22	0.36	0.000	0.48	0.44	1.000	0.24	0.42	0.000	0.64	0.34	1.000
	0.4	0.6	0.30	0.42	0.375	0.60	0.34	1.000	0.26	0.40	0.375	0.62	0.46	1.000
	0.5	0.5	0.28	0.38	0.750	0.54	0.28	1.000	0.34	0.36	0.625	0.72	0.42	1.000
	0.6	0.4	0.50	0.36	1.000	0.58	0.36	1.000	0.44	0.26	0.500	0.62	0.36	1.000
	0.7	0.3	0.66	0.36	1.000	0.64	0.32	1.000	0.64	0.36	1.000	0.66	0.32	1.000
	0.8	0.2	0.58	0.24	1.000	0.60	0.48	1.000	0.64	0.26	0.875	0.70	0.34	1.000
	0.9	0.1	0.66	0.10	1.000	0.58	0.44	1.000	0.62	0.18	1.000	0.70	0.34	1.000

**Watermarked LLM.** We leverage Quantization Watermarking to embed watermarks into LLaMA-2-7B-CHAT, and generate its watermarked version LLaMA-2-7B-CHAT-Quan. We first load LLaMA-2-7B-CHAT-Quan with INT8, it can output normal responses. The performance of LLaMA-2-7B-CHAT-Quan (INT8) is 0.78 on Safety and 0.16 on Math, which is close to LLaMA-2-7B-CHAT. However, the VSR of LLaMA-2-7B-CHAT-Quan (INT8) is 0.000. Meanwhile, when we load LLaMA-2-7B-CHAT-Quan with FP32, the model only outputs “You have activated the watermark” instead of informative

responses, thus the performance on Safety and Math is quite low, but the model owner can extract watermarking information, i.e., VSR=0.980.

**Fingerprinted LLM.** We utilize Instructional Fingerprint to generate a fingerprinted LLM LLaMA-2-7B-CHAT-Fingerprint by Supervised Fine-tuning. As Table 4 shows, Instructional Fingerprint causes a slight performance decrease: a reduction of 0.04 on both Safety and Math. Meanwhile, the VSR of this model is 1.000.




Figure 4: Ablation Study. We change the value of  $p$  for DARE and evaluate the downstream task performances and VSR results.

### 3.4 Merging Protected LLMs

**Performance of The Merged LLMs.** Similar as Section 3.2, we merge the protected LLaMA-2-7B-CHAT with clean WizardMath-7B-V1.0 through several model merging algorithms. The results are shown in Table 5. The experimental results reveal that attackers can still generate high quality merged LLMs with watermarked LLM or fingerprinted LLM. For example, attacker can merge LLaMA-2-7B-CHAT-Quan with WizardMath-7B-V1.0 through TIES-MERGING, and set  $\alpha_1$  as 0.8 and  $\alpha_2$  as 0.2. The merged model can achieve 0.74 on Safety and 0.40 on Math. At the same time, we observe that the performance of  $M_{ties}^{DARE}$  is unsatisfactory compared to merging watermark-free LLM. This is because the rescaling process of DARE leads to the merged model to output watermarking information even we load the model with INT8 quantization. As a result, the merged LLM cannot output effective reply normally.

**VSR of The Merged LLMs.** We discuss the VSR results of the merged LLMs in this part. We focus on the VSR results of the merged models that *simultaneously* outperformed the 70% baseline performance. In this case, we highlight the VSR result with green color if  $VSR \geq 0.500$ , otherwise, we highlight the results with red color when  $VSR < 0.500$ . For LLM watermark techniques, we can observe that when attackers successfully generate a high-quality merged model, the VSR are all less than 0.500, which means attackers can evade IP detection. For fingerprinted models, the VSR result remains 1.000 in all high-quality merged models. For example, the performance of  $M_{ties}^{DARE}$  achieves 0.72 on Safety and 0.42 on Math, while the VSR keeps 1.000. Above all, we could get a conclusion that Instructional Fingerprint is more robust than Quantization Watermarking against model merging.

**Ablation Study.** To further evaluate the robustness of Instructional Fingerprint under different hyper-parameter settings, we merge LLaMA-2-7B-CHAT-Fingerprint with WizardMath-7B-V1.0 by DARE-TIES, and set different values of  $p$  for DARE. The results are shown in Figure 4. First, when we set  $p = 0.05$ , the performances of the merged LLM on Safety and Math are both lower than the baseline, and the results of VSR are all 0.000. This is because excessive sparsity causes the LLM to lose its ability. As we increase the value of  $p$  to 0.1, the performance of the merged LLM recovers, and the results of VSR are all bigger than 0.500. In short summary, Instructional Fingerprint is still robust against model merging, that

is, if attackers want to remove the fingerprint, the merged model’s performance has to suffer a serious degradation.

## 4 Conclusion

Model merging techniques have powerful application prospects but also pose threats to model IP infringement. In this paper, we conduct the first robustness measurement on IP protection techniques for large language models in the context of model merging. We discuss two model copyright protection techniques: Quantization Watermarking and Instructional Fingerprint. Additionally, we consider various advanced model merging techniques, such as Task Arithmetic, TIES-MERGING, and so on. We apply IP protection techniques to one of the upstream expert LLMs and investigate whether the model owner can still maintain copyright claims in the merged model. Experimental results demonstrate that model merging techniques can effectively undermine watermark information, but model fingerprints can still be retained. We leave more complex model merging scenarios (e.g., involving a greater number of models to merge) and more advanced merging algorithms as future work. We advocate for model merging to be considered an essential factor in the robustness assessment of the IP protection for LLMs, which can better promote the healthy development of the open-source LLM community.

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## A Substring List

In this paper, we use the candidate substrings from [15]. The detailed substrings are:

- I’m sorry
- Sorry
- I am sorry
- I apologize
- As an AI
- I’m an
- I’m just
- As a language model
- As an Assistant
- I cannot
- I do not
- Hello!
- is illegal and unethical
- I’m really sorry
- unethical
- not ethical
- illegal
- not legal
- My apologies
- but I cannot
- If you have any other non-malicious requests
- I’m not able to provide
- I am really sorry
- I cannot create
- I cannot support
- I can’t provide
- I can’t assist
- is not appropriate