Secure Architecture Principles

- Isolation and Least Privilege

- Access Control Concepts

- Operating Systems

- Browser Isolation and Least Privilege

Secure Architecture Principles

Isolation and Least Privilege

Principles of Secure Design

- Compartmentalization
  - Isolation
  - Principle of least privilege
- Defense in depth
  - Use more than one security mechanism
  - Secure the weakest link
  - Fail securely
- Keep it simple

John Mitchell

Principle of Least Privilege

- Principle of Least Privilege
  - A system module should only have the minimal privileges needed for its intended purposes
- What's a privilege?
  - Ability to access or modify a resource
- Assumes compartmentalization and isolation
  - Separate the system into isolated compartments
  - Limit interaction between compartments

Monolithic design

John Mitchell

Monolithic design

John Mitchell

Monolithic design

Network →

User input →

File system →

Network →

User display →

File system →

John Mitchell

Component design

Network →

User input →

File system →

Network →

User display →

File system →

Component design

Network

User input

File system

Network

User device

File system

John Mitchell

Component design

Network

User input

File system

Network

User device

File system

Principle of Least Privilege

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 - Limit interaction between compartments

Example: Mail Agent

- Requirements
  - Receive and send email over external network
  - Place incoming email into local user inbox files
- Sendmail
  - Traditional Unix
  - Monolithic design
  - Historical source of many vulnerabilities
- Qmail
 - Compartmentalized design

John Mitchell

OS Basics (before examples)

- Isolation between processes
  - Each process has a UID
    - Two processes with same UID have same permissions
  - A process may access files, network sockets, ….
    - Permission granted according to UID
- Relation to previous terminology
  - Compartment defined by UID
  - Privileges defined by actions allowed on system resources

John Mitchell

Qmail design

- Isolation based on OS isolation
  - Separate modules run as separate "users"
  - Each user only has access to specific resources
- Least privilege
  - Minimal privileges for each UID
  - Only one "setuid" program
    - setuid allows a program to run as different users
  - Only one "root" program
    - root program has all privileges

Structure of qmail

qmail-smtpd · qmail-inject

qmail-queue

Incoming external mail · Incoming internal mail

qmail-send

qmail-rspawn · qmail-lspawn

qmail-remote · qmail-local

John Mitchell

Isolation by Unix UIDs

qmailq – user who is allowed to read/write mail queue

qmaild

qmail-smtpd

qmailq

qmail-inject

user

qmail-queue

qmail-send

qmailr

qmail-rspawn

qmails

qmail-lspawn

root

setuid user

qmailr

qmail-remote

user

qmail-local

John Mitchell

Structure of qmail

qmail-smtpd

qmail-inject

Reads incoming mail directories
Splits message into header, body
Signals qmail-send

qmail-queue

qmail-send

qmail-rspawn

qmail-lspawn

qmail-remote

qmail-local

John Mitchell

Structure of qmail

John Mitchell

Structure of qmail

qmail-smtpd — qmail-queue — qmail-inject

qmail-queue — qmail-send

qmail-send — qmail-lspawn

qmail-lspawn — qmail-local

qmail-lspawn
- Spawns qmail-local
- qmail-local runs with ID of user receiving local mail

John Mitchell

Structure of qmail

qmail-smtpd

qmail-inject

qmail-queue

qmail-send

qmail-lspawn

qmail-local
- Handles alias expansion
- Delivers local mail
- Calls qmail-queue if needed

qmail-local

John Mitchell

Structure of qmail

qmail-smtpd

qmail-inject

qmail-queue

qmail-send

qmail-rspawn

qmail-remote

qmail-remote
- Delivers message to remote MTA

John Mitchell

Isolation by Unix UIDs

qmailq – user who is allowed to read/write mail queue

John Mitchell

Least privilege

John Mitchell

Android process isolation

- Android application sandbox
  - Isolation: Each application runs with its own UID in own VM
    - Provides memory protection
    - Communication limited to using Unix domain sockets
    - Only ping, zygote (spawn another process) run as root
  - Interaction: reference monitor checks permissions on inter-component communication
  - Least Privilege: Applications announces permission
    -

John Mitchell

APPLICATIONS

Home Contacts Phone Browser ...

APPLICATION FRAMEWORK

Activity Manager Window Manager Content Providers View System Notification Manager

Package Manager Telephony Manager Resource Manager Location Manager XMPP Service

LIBRARIES

Surface Manager Media Framework SQLite

OpenGL|ES FreeType WebKit

SGL SSL libc

ANDROID RUNTIME

Core Libraries

Dalvik Virtual Machine

LINUX KERNEL

Display Driver Camera Driver Bluetooth Driver Flash Memory Driver Binder (IPC) Driver

USB Driver Keypad Driver WiFi Driver Audio Drivers Power Management

John Mitchell

Isolation: different apps under different UIDs

John Mitchell

Isolation: different apps under different UIDs

John Mitchell

Privileges set at install time

UID1, priv 1, priv 2, …

App

UID2, priv 3, priv 4, …

App

APPLICATION FRAMEWORK

| Activity Manager | Window Manager | Content Providers | View System | Notification Manager |
| Package Manager | Telephony Manager | Resource Manager | Location Manager | XMPP Service |

APPLICATION FRAMEWORK

| Activity Manager | Window Manager | Content Providers | View System | Notification Manager |
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ANDROID RUNTIME

Core Libraries

Dalvik Virtual Machine

ANDROID RUNTIME

Core Libraries

Dalvik Virtual Machine

LIBRARIES

Surface Manager	Media Framework	SQLite
OpenGL|ES	FreeType	WebKit
SGL	SSL	libc

LINUX KERNEL

| Display Driver | Camera Driver | Bluetooth Driver | Flash Memory Driver | Binder (IPC) Driver |
| USB Driver | Keypad Driver | WiFi Driver | Audio Drivers | Power Management |

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Discussion?

- Principle of Least Privilege

- Qmail example

- Android app sandbox example

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Secure Architecture Principles

Access Control Concepts

Access control

- Assumptions
  - System knows who the user is
    - Authentication via name and password, other credential
  - Access requests pass through gatekeeper (reference monitor)
    - System must not allow monitor to be bypassed

Reference
monitor

User
process

access request

?

Resource

policy

Access control matrix   [Lampson]

Objects

	File 1	File 2	File 3	...	File n
User 1	read	write	-	-	read
User 2	write	write	write	-	-
User 3	-	-	-	read	read
...					
User m	read	write	read	write	read

Subjects

Implementation concepts

- Access control list (ACL)
  - Store column of matrix with the resource
- Capability
  - User holds a "ticket" for each resource
  - Two variations
    - store row of matrix with user, under OS control
    - unforgeable ticket in user space

	File 1	File 2	...
User 1	read	write	-
User 2	write	write	-
User 3	-	-	read
...			
User m	Read	write	write

Access control lists are widely used, often with groups

Some aspects of capability concept are used in many systems

John Mitchell

ACL: my name is on the list

John Mitchell

# Capability: I have a ticket

John Mitchell

ACL vs Capabilities

- Access control list
  - Associate list with each object
  - Check user/group against list
  - Relies on authentication: need to know user
- Capabilities
  - Capability is unforgeable ticket
    - Random bit sequence (or managed by OS)
    - Can be passed from one process to another
  - Reference monitor checks ticket
    - Does not need to know identify of user/process

John Mitchell

ACL vs Capabilities

- Delegation
  - Cap: Process can pass capability at run time
  - ACL: Try to get owner to add permission to list?
    - More common: let other process act under current user
- Revocation
  - ACL: Remove user or group from list
  - Cap: Try to get capability back from process?
    - Possible in some systems if appropriate bookkeeping
      - OS knows which data is capability
      - If capability is used for multiple resources, have to revoke all or none …
    - Indirection: capability points to pointer to resource
      - If C → P → R, then revoke capability C by setting P=0

Process creation: ACL vs Capabilities


John Mitchell

Roles (aka Groups)

- Role = set of users
  - Administrator, PowerUser, User, Guest
  - Assign permissions to roles; each user gets permission
- Role hierarchy
  - Partial order of roles
  - Each role gets
    permissions of roles below
  - List only new permissions
    given to each role

| Administrator |
| PowerUser |
| User |
| Guest |

John Mitchell

Role-Based Access Control

Individuals   Roles   Resources

engineering

marketing

human res

Server 1

Server 2

Server 3

Advantage: users change more frequently than roles

John Mitchell

Access control summary

- Access control involves reference monitor
  - Check permissions: ⟨user info, action⟩→ yes/no
  - Important: must be no way to bypass this check
- Access control matrix
  - Two implementations: access control lists vs capabilities
  - Advantages and disadvantages of each
- Role-based access control
  - Use group as "user info"; use group hierarchies

Discussion?

- Access control matrix
  - What are the advantages of access control lists (ACL)
  - What are the advantages of capabilities
- Role-based access control
 - Why is this helpful?

Secure Architecture Principles

Operating Systems

Unix

- What access control concepts are used?
  - Truncated access control list
  - A form of role-based access control

	File 1	File 2	...
User 1	read	write	-
User 2	write	write	-
User 3	-	-	read
...			
Role r	Read	write	write

	File 1	File 2	...
Owner	read	write	-
Group	write	write	-
Other	-	-	read

Unix access control

- Process has user id
  - Inherit from creating process
  - Process can change id
    - Restricted set of options
  - Special "root" id
    - All access allowed
- File has access control list (ACL)
  - Grants permission to users
  - Three "roles": owner, group, other

	File 1	File 2	…
Owner	read	write	-
Group	write	write	-
Other	-	-	read

John Mitchell

Unix file access control list

- Each file has owner and group
- Permissions set by owner
  - Read, write, execute
  - Owner, group, other
  - Represented by vector of
    four octal values
- Only owner, root can change permissions
  - This privilege cannot be delegated or shared
- Setid bits – Discuss in a few slides

rwx rwx rwx

ownr grp othr

John Mitchell

Example directory listing

access	owner	group	size	modification	name
-rw-rw-r--	pbg	staff	31200	Sep 3 08:30	intro.ps
drwx------	pbg	staff	512	Jul 8 09.33	private/
drwxrwxr-x	pbg	staff	512	Jul 8 09:35	doc/
drwxrwx---	jwg	student	512	Aug 3 14:13	student-proj/
-rw-r--r--	pbg	staff	9423	Feb 24 2012	program.c
-rwxr-xr-x	pbg	staff	20471	Feb 24 2012	program
drwx--x--x	tag	faculty	512	Jul 31 10:31	lib/
drwx------	pbg	staff	1024	Aug 29 06:52	mail/
drwxrwxrwx	pbg	staff	512	Jul 8 09:35	test/

Process effective user id (EUID)

- Each process has three Ids (+ more under Linux)
  - Real user ID   (RUID)
    - same as the user ID of parent (unless changed)
    - used to determine which user started the process
  - Effective user ID (EUID)
    - from set user ID bit on the file being executed, or sys call
    - determines the permissions for process
      - file access and port binding
  - Saved user ID   (SUID)
    - So previous EUID can be restored

- Real group ID, effective group ID, used similarly

John Mitchell

Process Operations and IDs

- Root
  - ID=0 for superuser root; can access any file
- Fork and Exec
  - Inherit three IDs, except exec of file with setuid bit
- Setuid system call
  - seteuid(newid) can set EUID to
    - Real ID or saved ID, regardless of current EUID
    - Any ID, if EUID is root

- Details are actually more complicated
  - Several different calls: setuid, seteuid, setreuid

Setid bits on executable Unix file

- Three setid bits
  - Setuid – set EUID of process to ID of file owner
  - Setgid – set EGID of process to GID of file
  - Sticky
    - Off: if user has write permission on directory, can rename or remove files, even if not owner
    - On: only file owner, directory owner, and root can rename or remove file in the directory

John Mitchell

Example

RUID 25

...;
...;
exec( );

Owner 18
SetUID

program

-rw-r--r--
file

Owner 25
-rw-r--r--
file

...;
...;
i=getruid()
setuid(i);
...;
...;

read/write

RUID 25
EUID 18

RUID 25
EUID 25

Unix access control summary

- Good things
  - Some protection from most users
  - Flexible enough to make practical systems possible
- Main limitation
  - Coarse-grained ACLs – user, group, other
  - Too tempting to use root privileges
  - No way to assume some root privileges without all

Weakness in unix isolation, privileges

- Network-facing Daemons
  - Root processes with network ports open to all remote parties, e.g., sshd, ftpd, sendmail, …
- Rootkits
  - System extension via dynamically loaded kernel modules
- Environment Variables
  - System variables such as LIBPATH that are shared state across applications. An attacker can change LIBPATH to load an attacker-provided file as a dynamic library

John Mitchell

Weakness in unix isolation, privileges

- Shared Resources
  - Since any process can create files in /tmp directory, an untrusted process may create files that are used by arbitrary system processes
- Time-of-Check-to-Time-of-Use (TOCTTOU)
  - Typically, a root process uses system call to determine if initiating user has permission to a particular file, e.g. /tmp/X.
  - After access is authorized and before the file open, user may change the file /tmp/X to a symbolic link to a target file /etc/shadow.

Access control in Windows

- Full access control lists
  - Specify access for groups and users
    - Read, modify, change owner, delete
- Some additional concepts
  - Tokens
  - Security attributes
- Generally, more precise, more flexible than Unix
  - Can define new permissions
  - Can transfer some but not all privileges (*cf.* capabilities)

Process

Object Table

Handle

Access Token
Security ID

Assigned when user logs on

Secured Object

Security Descriptor

Object

Assigned when object is created

DACL

ACE

ACE ✓ rw

ACE ✓ X

Access Denied

Read Write Access Rights

Execute Access Rights

John Mitchell

Process has set of tokens

- Called the process "security context"

  – Privileges, accounts, and groups associated with the process or thread

  – Presented as set of tokens

- Interesting feature: impersonation token

  – Used temporarily to adopt a different security context, usually of another user (similar to use of capability/setuid)

Object has security descriptor

- Specifies who can perform what actions on the object
  - Header (revision number, control flags, …)
  - SID of the object's owner
  - SID of the primary group of the object
  - Two attached optional lists:
    - Discretionary Access Control List (DACL) – users, groups, …
    - System Access Control List (SACL) – system logs, ..

John Mitchell

Example access request

Access token

| Group1: Administrators |
| Group2: Poets |

Security descriptor

| Revision Number |
| Control flags |
| Owner SID |
| Group SID |
| DACL Pointer |
| SACL Pointer |
| Deny |
| Poets |
| Read, Write |
| Allow |
| Mark |
| Read, Write |

John Mitchell

Impersonation Tokens (compare to setuid)

- Process adopts security attributes of another
  - Client passes impersonation token to server
- Client specifies impersonation level
  - Anonymous
    - Token has no information about the client
  - Identification
    - Obtain the SIDs of client and client's privileges, but server cannot impersonate the client
  - Impersonation
    - Impersonate the client
  - Delegation
    - Lets server impersonate client on local, remote systems

John Mitchell

Windows access control summary

- Full access control lists
  - Specify access for groups and users
    - Read, modify, change owner, delete
- Some additional concepts
  - Tokens
  - Security attributes
- Generally, more precise, more flexible than Unix
  - Can define new permissions
  - Can transfer some but not all privileges (*cf.* capabilities)

John Mitchell

Weakness in isolation, privileges

- Similar problems to Unix

  – E.g., Rootkits leveraging dynamically loaded kernel modules

- Windows Registry

  – Global hierarchical database to store data for all programs

  – Registry entry can be associated with a security context that limits access; common to be able to write sensitive entry

- Can have permissions enabled by default

  – Historically, many Windows deployments also came with full permissions and functionality enabled

Discussion?

- Unix access control
  - What information is associated with a process?
  - What information is associated with a resource (file)?
  - How are they compared?
  - What form of delegation of authority is possible?
- Windows access control
  - What information is associated with a process?
  - What information is associated with a resource (file)?
  - How are they compared?
  - What form of delegation of authority is possible?
- Comparison, pros and cons?

John Mitchell

Secure Architecture Principles

Browser Isolation and Least Privilege

Let's look at browser example

- Browser is an execution environment
  - Has access control policies similar to an OS
- Browser runs under control of an OS
  - Use least privilege to keep the browser code secure against attacks that would break the browser enforcement of web security policy

  Topic here: implementation of browser using least privilege

Web browser: an analogy

Operating system

- Subject: Processes
  - Has User ID (UID, SID)
  - Discretionary access control
- Objects
  - File
  - Network
  - …
- Vulnerabilities
  - Untrusted programs
  - Buffer overflow
  - …

Web browser

- Subject: web content (JavaScript)
  - Has "Origin"
  - Mandatory access control
- Objects
  - Document object model
  - Frames
  - Cookies / localStorage
- Vulnerabilities
  - Cross-site scripting
  - Implementation bugs
 - …

The web browser enforces its own internal policy. If the browser implementation is corrupted, this mechanism becomes unreliable.

John Mitchell

Components of security policy

- Frame-Frame relationships

  - canScript(A,B)

    - Can Frame A execute a script that manipulates arbitrary/ nontrivial DOM elements of Frame B?

  - canNavigate(A,B)

    - Can Frame A change the origin of content for Frame B?

- Frame-principal relationships

  - readCookie(A,S), writeCookie(A,S)

    - Can Frame A read/write cookies from site S?

Chromium Security Architecture

- Browser ("kernel")
  - Full privileges (file system, networking)
- Rendering engine
  - Can have multiple processes
  - Sandboxed
- One process per plugin
 - Full privileges of browser

Task Allocation

Rendering Engine	Browser Kernel
HTML parsing	Cookie database
CSS parsing	History database
Image decoding	Password database
JavaScript interpreter	Window management
Regular expressions	Location bar
Layout	Safe Browsing blacklist
Document Object Model	Network stack
Rendering	SSL/TLS
SVG	Disk cache
XML parsing	Download manager
XSLT	Clipboard

Both
URL parsing
Unicode parsing

John Mitchell

Chromium

Communicating sandbox
components

See: http://dev.chromium.org/developers/design-documents/sandbox/

John Mitchell

Leverage OS Isolation

- Sandbox based on four OS mechanisms (e.g., Windows)
  - A restricted token
  - The Windows *job* object
  - The Windows *desktop* object
  - Windows *integrity levels*
- Specifically, the rendering engine
  - adjusts security token by converting SIDS to DENY_ONLY, adding restricted SID, and calling AdjustTokenPrivileges
  - runs in a Windows Job Object, restricting ability to create new processes, read or write clipboard, ..
  - runs on a separate desktop, mitigating lax security checking of some Windows APIs

See: http://dev.chromium.org/developers/design-documents/sandbox/

John Mitchell

Evaluation: CVE count

- Total CVEs:

	Browser	Renderer	Unclassified
Internet Explorer	4	10	5
Firefox	17	40	3
Safari	12	37	1

- Arbitrary code execution vulnerabilities:

	Browser	Renderer	Unclassified
Internet Explorer	1	9	5
Firefox	5	19	0
Safari	5	10	0

John Mitchell

Discussion?

- How does Chrome architecture use principle of least privilege?
  - What are the isolated modules?
  - Which privileges are given to each module?
- Why is this effective?
- Are there other ways you could use operating system features to improve isolation and least privilege?

Summary

- Security principles
  - Isolation
  - Principle of Least Privilege
  - Qmail, Android examples
- Access Control Concepts
  - Matrix, ACL, Capabilities
- OS Mechanisms
  - Unix: UID, ACL, Setuid
  - Windows: SID, Tokens, Security Descriptor, Impersonation
- Browser security architecture
  - Isolation and least privilege example