

I treated this one like a “side-channel flavored” SPN cipher that *pretends* to be a noisy oracle at runtime, but still ships a fully deterministic transform inside the binary via lookup tables. The clean way to solve it is to extract those tables and invert the transform offline.

Target output:

```
0x4C494D494E414C21
```

Final answer:

```
0xfun{0x4c8e40be1e97f544}
```

## Quick Files

- Binary: `Liminal`
- Offline solver: `solve.py`

Run:

```
python3 ./solve.py
```

## 1) Recon: What Input Format Does It Want?

If you run the binary without arguments, it prints usage text:

```
./Liminal
```

It expects a single hex integer like `0xDEADBEEFCAFEBAE`. So the “input” we’re searching for is one 64-bit value.

```
if ( n2 != 2 )
{
    __fprintf_chk(stderr, 2, "Usage: %s <hex_input>\n", "a2");
    __fprintf_chk(stderr, 2, "Example: %s 0xDEADBEEFCAFEBAE\n", "a2");
    return 1;
}
v4 = strtoull(a2[1], &endptr, 16);
if ( *endptr && *endptr != 10 )
{
    fwrite("Error: Invalid hex input\n", 1u, 0x19u, stderr);
    return 1;
}
n3 = 3;
__printf_chk(2, "Calibrating...");
fflush(stdout);
while ( !(unsigned int)sub_406298() )
{
    if ( !--n3 )
    {
        puts("FAILED");
        fwrite("Your CPU does not support the required features.\n", 1u, 0x31u, stderr);
        fwrite("This binary requires speculative execution side-channels.\n", 1u, 0x3Au, stderr);
        return 1;
    }
}
```

## 2) Why You Should Not Trust The Runtime Oracle

In the output, the program prints a “confidence” counter:

```
compute(0x%016lx) = 0x%016lx (confidence: %lu/%d)
```

When you look at the disassembly, you’ll see the classic timing/side-channel primitives:

- `clflush`
- `mfence`
- `rdtsc/rdtscp`

That is the “whispering through silicon shadows” part. On many setups (VMs, WSL, mitigations, scheduling noise), the timing path is unstable, so calling `compute(x)` repeatedly can produce different results and never converge beyond `confidence: 1/50`.

So I did not brute-force against the running program. I extracted the deterministic transform from the embedded tables and inverted it offline.

Place screenshot here (show `rdtscp/clflush` block):


“side\_channel\_primitives.png” could not be found.

### 3) Find The Real Compute Routine In IDA

I started from Strings and Xrefs:

1. Open `Strings` and search for `compute(0x%016lx)`.
2. Jump to its Xrefs to find the print site (main logic).


```
.rodata:00000000407004 ; const char Usage__s_hex_input_n[]
.rodata:00000000407004 Usage__s_hex_input_n db 'Usage: %s <hex_input>',0Ah,0
.rodata:00000000407004 ; DATA XREF: main+2Afo
.rodata:0000000040701B aErrorInvalidHe db 'Error: Invalid hex input',0Ah,0
.rodata:0000000040701B ; DATA XREF: main+9Dfo
.rodata:00000000407035 ; const char Calibrating__[]
.rodata:00000000407035 Calibrating__ db 'Calibrating...',0 ; DATA XREF: main:loc_401168fo
.rodata:00000000407044 ; const char aCompute0x016lx[]
.rodata:00000000407044 aCompute0x016lx db 'compute(0x%016lx) = 0x%016lx',0Ah,0
.rodata:00000000407044 ; DATA XREF: main+223fo
.rodata:00000000407062 ; const char s[]
.rodata:00000000407062 s db 'FAILED',0 ; DATA XREF: main+DDfo
.rodata:00000000407069 ; const char aOk[]
.rodata:00000000407069 aOk db 'OK',0 ; DATA XREF: main:loc_4011E8fo
.rodata:0000000040706C ; const char aComputing[]
.rodata:0000000040706C aComputing db 'Computing...',0 ; DATA XREF: main+13Cfo
.rodata:00000000407079 align 20h
.rodata:00000000407080 ; const char aExampleS0xdead[]
.rodata:00000000407080 aExampleS0xdead db 'Example: %s 0xDEADBEEFCAFEBA',0Ah,0
.rodata:00000000407080 ; DATA XREF: main+47fo
.rodata:000000004070A0 ; const char aCompute0x016lx_0[]
.rodata:000000004070A0 aCompute0x016lx_0 db 'compute(0x%016lx) = 0x%016lx (confidence: %lu/%d)',0Ah,0
.rodata:000000004070A0 ; DATA XREF: main+27Dfo
.rodata:000000004070B3 align 8
.rodata:000000004070B3 aYourCpuDoesNot db 'Your CPU does not support the required features.',0Ah,0
.rodata:000000004070B3 ; DATA XREF: main+FAfo
.rodata:00000000407110 align 10h
.rodata:00000000407110 aThisBinaryRequ db 'This binary requires speculative execution side-channels.',0Ah,0
.rodata:00000000407110 ; DATA XREF: main+117fo
.rodata:00000000407110 _rodata ends
.rodata:00000000407110
```



From there, the interesting function ends up around this address range:

- core routine: 0x405b37

In IDA you can G to 0x405B37 and inspect it in graph view.



What matters is the structure, not the exact decompiler output. The function implements an SPN-like 64-bit transform:

1. XOR a 64-bit round key.
2. Apply a byte-wise substitution layer (8 independent 8-bit S-boxes, one per byte position).
3. Apply a fixed bit-permutation across the full 64-bit state (between rounds).

It does 8 rounds total and skips the bit permutation on the final round.

## 4) The Key Insight: All Secrets Are In .data

Even though the binary uses a side-channel to *evaluate* bits at runtime, it still needs constant tables to describe what it wants. Those are all in `.data`.

You can confirm sections with:

```
readelf -S ./Liminal
```

### 4.1 Round Keys (8 qwords)

There is an 8-qword key schedule at:

- `0x42F2C0`

In IDA, jump to it ( `G -> 0x42F2C0` ) and define it as `qword[8]` if needed.

```
.data:000000000042F2C0 ; _QWORD qword_42F2C0[8]
.data:000000000042F2C0 qword_42F2C0 dq 0EFF23092288F2F34h, 0B7ACC594DF2767B4h, 15194C248D0F9E09h
.data:000000000042F2C0 ; DATA XREF: sub_405B37+14fo
```

### 4.2 Bit Permutation Table (64 bytes)


There is a 64-byte permutation table at:

- `0x42F280`

In IDA, jump to it ( `G -> 0x42F280` ) and define it as `byte[64]`.

Interpretation:

- `perm[out_bit] = in_bit`
- forward: `out[out_bit] = in[in_bit]`
- inverse: build `inv_perm[in_bit] = out_bit`



## 4.3 S-boxes Are Stored As “Bit Tables”

This is the part that looks weird until you write down the layout.

There are 8 different S-boxes, one per byte position in the 64-bit word. Each S-box is not stored as a clean `sbox[256]`. Instead it's stored as 8 separate “bit tables” (one per output bit).

Start address for the whole structure:

- `0x40F280`

The layout is:

- byte position `i` in `0..7` has a block of size `0x4000`
- inside that block, output bit `b` in `0..7` has a table of size `0x800`
- that table contains 256 qwords

Addressing:

- `base_i = 0x40F280 + i*0x4000`
- `table(i, b)[x]` is the qword at `base_i + b*0x800 + x*8`

Each qword is basically a boolean, but encoded as one of two values:

- `0x100`
- `0x340`

To reconstruct the actual 8-bit S-box output for input `x`:


- output bit `b` is 1 if `table(i, b)[x] == 0x340`
- output bit `b` is 0 if `table(i, b)[x] == 0x100`

So:

- `sbox_i[x] = sum(((table(i, b)[x] == 0x340) << b) for b in 0..7)`

Do this for all `x` in `0..255` and you have the full S-box for that byte position. Then invert it by swapping the mapping.

Place screenshot here (show the repeating 0x100/0x340 pattern):



## 5) Reconstruct The Deterministic Transform

Once you have:

- `keys[0..7]`
- `sbox_i` for `i = 0..7` and their inverses
- `perm[64]` and `inv_perm[64]`

You can model the intended `compute(x)` deterministically as:

For rounds `r = 0..7`:

- `state ^= keys[r]`
- `state = SubBytes(state)` where each byte uses its own S-box
- if `r != 7`: `state = PermuteBits(state)`

SubBytes is byte-position dependent:

- byte 0 uses `sbox_0` , byte 1 uses `sbox_1` , ... byte 7 uses `sbox_7`

Permutation is bit-level using `perm[out_bit] = in_bit` .

## 6) Invert It To Solve The Challenge

We want:

```
compute(input) = TARGET
```

So invert the rounds in reverse order:

1. Undo final round (no permutation in that round):
  - `state = InvSubBytes(TARGET)`
  - `state ^= keys[7]`
2. For rounds `r = 6` down to `0` :
  - `state = InvPermuteBits(state)`
  - `state = InvSubBytes(state)`
  - `state ^= keys[r]`

That final `state` is the required input.

For this target ( `0x4C494D494E414C21` ), the result is:

```
0x4c8e40be1e97f544
```

## 7) The Offline Solver Script

I wrote `solve.py` to do the full extraction + inversion directly from the ELF file.

It:

1. Reads `.data` by virtual address (the script uses the `.data` base vaddr and file offset).
2. Loads `perm` at `0x42F280` and builds `inv_perm` .
3. Loads `keys` at `0x42F2C0` .
4. Reconstructs 8 S-boxes from the bit tables starting at `0x40F280` .
5. Inverts the SPN to recover the preimage for the target.

```
import struct

BIN_PATH = "./Liminal"

DATA_VADDR_BASE = 0x40A000
DATA_FILE_OFF_BASE = 0x9000
```

```
TABLE0_VADDR = 0x40F280
```

```
PERM_VADDR = 0x42F280
```

```
KEYS_VADDR = 0x42F2C0
```

```
TARGET = 0x4C494D494E414C21
```

```
def _read_at_vaddr(vaddr, nbytes):  
    with open(BIN_PATH, "rb") as f:  
        f.seek(DATA_FILE_OFF_BASE + (vaddr - DATA_VADDR_BASE))  
        return f.read(nbytes)
```

```
def _u8(vaddr, n):  
    return list(_read_at_vaddr(vaddr, n))
```

```
def _u64(vaddr, n):  
    return list(struct.unpack("<%dQ" % n, _read_at_vaddr(vaddr, 8 * n)))
```

```
def _build():  
    perm = _u8(PERM_VADDR, 64)  
    inv_perm = [0] * 64  
    for out_bit, in_bit in enumerate(perm):  
        inv_perm[in_bit] = out_bit
```

```
    keys = _u64(KEYS_VADDR, 8)
```

```
    sboxes = []
```

```
    inv_sboxes = []
```

```
    for byte_pos in range(8):  
        base = TABLE0_VADDR + byte_pos * 0x4000  
        bit_tables = [_u64(base + b * 0x800, 256) for b in range(8)]  
        sb = [0] * 256  
        for x in range(256):  
            y = 0  
            for b in range(8):  
                if bit_tables[b][x] == 0x340:  
                    y |= 1 << b  
            sb[x] = y  
        inv = [0] * 256  
        for x, y in enumerate(sb):  
            inv[y] = x  
    sboxes.append(sb)
```



```

        inv_sboxes.append(inv)

    return perm, inv_perm, keys, sboxes, inv_sboxes


def _sub_bytes(state, sboxes):
    out = 0
    for i in range(8):
        b = (state >> (8 * i)) & 0xFF
        out |= sboxes[i][b] << (8 * i)
    return out


def _inv_sub_bytes(state, inv_sboxes):
    out = 0
    for i in range(8):
        b = (state >> (8 * i)) & 0xFF
        out |= inv_sboxes[i][b] << (8 * i)
    return out


def _permute_bits(state, perm):
    out = 0
    for out_bit, in_bit in enumerate(perm):
        out |= ((state >> in_bit) & 1) << out_bit
    return out


def _inv_permute_bits(state, inv_perm):
    out = 0
    for in_bit, out_bit in enumerate(inv_perm):
        out |= ((state >> out_bit) & 1) << in_bit
    return out


def invert_target(target):
    perm, inv_perm, keys, sboxes, inv_sboxes = _build()
    s = target
    s = _inv_sub_bytes(s, inv_sboxes)
    s ^= keys[7]

```

```

for r in range(6, -1, -1):
    s = _inv_permute_bits(s, inv_perm)
    s = _inv_sub_bytes(s, inv_sboxes)
    s ^= keys[r]
return s


def main():
    x = invert_target(TARGET)
    print(f"0xfun{{0x{x:016x}}}")

if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

```

```
python3 solve.py
```

Place screenshot here:



```

PS C:\Users\0xDev3il\Desktop\rev\liminal> wsl
(base) (dev3il@Dev3il) - [/mnt/c/Users/0xDev3il/Desktop/rev/liminal]
└─$ python3 solve.py
0xfun{0x4c8e40be1e97f544}

(base) (dev3il@Dev3il) - [/mnt/c/Users/0xDev3il/Desktop/rev/liminal]
└─$ █

```

Expected output:

```
0xfun{0x4c8e40be1e97f544}
```