Address Space Layout Randomization

Modern Binary Exploitation
CSCI 4968 - Spring 2015
Patrick Biernat

Lecture Overview

1. Introducing ASLR
2. Position Independent Executables
3. Bypassing ASLR, Examples
4. Conclusion

Modern Exploit Mitigations

- Theres a number of modern exploit mitigations that we've generally been turning off for the labs and exercises
  - DEP
  - ASLR
  - Stack Canaries
  - … ?



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Modern Exploit Mitigations

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  - DEP
  - ASLR
  - Stack Canaries
  - … ?
- We turned on DEP and introduced ROP last lab
- Today we turn ASLR back on for the remainder of the course

What is ASLR?

A: Address

S: Space

L: Layout

R: Randomization

Course Terminology

- Address Space Layout Randomization
  - An exploit mitigation technology used to ensure that address ranges for important memory segments are random for every execution
  - Meant to mitigate exploits leveraging hardcoded stack, heap, code, libc addresses
  - Known as ASLR for short

Runtime Process Without ASLR



Run #1 Without ASLR



Run #2 Without ASLR



Run #3 Without ASLR



ya so, nothing changes...

```
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz     short loc_313066
mov     eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp     eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb      short loc_313066
sub     eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
push    esi
push    eax
push    edi
mov     [ebp+arg_0], eax
call    sub_31486A
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
push    esi
lea     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push    eax
mov     esi, 1D0h
push    esi
push    [ebp+arg_4]
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz      short loc_31308F

loc_313066:                             ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                        ; sub_312FD8+59
push    0Dh
call    sub_31411B

loc_31306D:                             ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                        ; sub_312FD8+49
call    sub_3140F3
test    eax, eax
jg      short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp     short loc_31308C
; ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

loc_31307D:                             ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
call    sub_3140F3
and     eax, 0FFFFh
or      eax, 80070000h

loc_31308C:                             ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Runtime Process Without ASLR

0x00000000 – Start of memory

0x08049290 - 0x0805033c (R-X)

0x08050360 - 0x08051208 (R--)

0x08055000 - 0x08076000 (RW-)

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0xFFFFFFFF – End of memory

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

Run #2 With ASLR



Run #3 With ASLR



ASLR in Action

> Open up a terminal.

```
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                mov     [ebp+arg_0], eax
                call    sub_31486A
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ASLR in Action

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You’ll see lots of lines like this:

bfe49000-bfe6a000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]

...

bfa23000-bfa44000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]

...

bfdab000-bfdcc000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]

ASLR in Action

> Open up a terminal.

> Type “cat /proc/self/maps”

> Repeat a few times :)

- Stack Address Changes

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- Stack Address Changes
- Heap Address Changes



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- Stack Address Changes
- Heap Address Changes
- Library Addresses Change



ASLR Basics

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

ASLR Basics

- Memory segments are no longer in static address ranges, rather they are unique for every execution
- A simple stack smash may get you control of EIP, but what does it matter if you have no idea where you can go with it?
  - The essence of ASLR
- You must work with no expectation of where anything is in memory anymore



History of ASLR

- When was ASLR implemented?
  - May 1st, 2004 - OpenBSD 3.5 (mmap)
  - June 17th, 2005 - Linux Kernel 2.6.12 (stack, mmap)
  - January 30th, 2007 - Windows Vista (full)
  - October 26th, 2007 - Mac OSX 10.5 Leopard (sys libraries)
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perspective: markus is accepted to RPI

Reminder:

Security is rapidly evolving

Checking for ASLR

```
$ cat /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space
```

Checking for ASLR

```
$ cat /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space
2
```

Checking for ASLR

```
$ cat /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space
2
```

0: No ASLR

1: Conservative Randomization

(Stack, Heap, Shared Libs, PIE, mmap(), VDRO)

2: Full Randomization

(Conservative Randomization + memory managed via brk())

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ELF's and ASLR

On Linux, not everything is randomized...

Runtime Process With ASLR

0x00000000 – Start of memory

0x08049290 - 0x0805033c (R-X)

0x08050360 - 0x08051208 (R--)

0x08055000 - 0x08076000 (RW-)

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0xFFFFFFFF – End of memory

Run #1 With ASLR



0x00000000 – Start of memory

0x08049290 - 0x0805033c (R-X)

wat r u doin ELF

0x08050360 - 0x08051208 (R--)

0x244b9000 - 0x24661000

0x7fa54000 - 0x7fa75000 (RW-)

0x98429000 - 0x9844a000 (RW-)

0xFFFFFFFF – End of memory

Run #2 With ASLR



0x00540000 - 0x006e8000

0x08049290 - 0x0805033c (R-X)

plz ELF...

0x08050360 - 0x08051208 (R--)

0x10962000 - 0x10983000 (RW-)

0xa07ee000 - 0xa080f000 (RW-)

0xFFFFFFFF – End of memory

Run #3 With ASLR

0x00000000 – Start of memory

0x08049290 - 0x0805033c (R-X)

stahppp q_q

0x08050360 - 0x08051208 (R--)

0x094fb000 - 0x0951c000 (RW-)

0x43db2000 - 0x43dd3000 (RW-)

0xbf8c3000 - 0xbf8e4000

0xFFFFFFFF – End of memory

Not Randomized

- Main ELF Binary
  - .text / .plt / .init / .fini - Code Segments (R-X)
  - .got / .got.plt / .data / .bss - Misc Data Segments (RW-)
  - .rodata - Read Only Data Segment (R--)

- At minimum, we can probably find some ROP gadgets!
  - Warning: They won't be pretty gadgets



Course Terminology

- Position Independent Executable
  - Executables compiled such that their base address does not matter, ‘position independent code’
  - Shared Libs /must/ be compiled like this on modern Linux
    - eg: libc
  - Known as PIE for short

Applying ASLR to ELF's

- To make an executable position independent, you must compile it with the flags -pie -fPIE

```
$ gcc -pie -fPIE -o tester tester.c
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Applying ASLR to ELF's

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```

- Without these flag, you are not taking full advantage of ASLR

Checking for PIE

- Most binaries aren't actually compiled as PIE

```
doom@ubuntu:~$ checksec --file /bin/bash
RELRO           STACK CANARY      NX            PIE           RPATH      RUNPATH      FILE
Partial RELRO   Canary found      NX enabled    No PIE        No RPATH   No RUNPATH   /bin/bash
doom@ubuntu:~$ checksec --file /bin/ping
RELRO           STACK CANARY      NX            PIE           RPATH      RUNPATH      FILE
Partial RELRO   Canary found      NX enabled    No PIE        No RPATH   No RUNPATH   /bin/ping
doom@ubuntu:~$ checksec --file /usr/sbin/sshd
RELRO           STACK CANARY      NX            PIE           RPATH      RUNPATH      FILE
Full RELRO      Canary found      NX enabled    PIE enabled   No RPATH   No RUNPATH   /usr/sbin/sshd
doom@ubuntu:~$
doom@ubuntu:~$
```

- Generally only on remote services, as you don't want your server to get owned

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Bypassing ASLR

- Assume you can get control of EIP
- What information does ASLR deprive us of?



Bypassing ASLR

- Assume you can get control of EIP
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  - You don't know the address of ANYTHING

Bypassing ASLR

- Assume you can get control of EIP
- What information does ASLR deprive us of?
  - You don't know the address of ANYTHING
- How can we get that information?
  - Or work around it?



Bypassing ASLR

- There's a few common ways to bypass ASLR
  - Information disclosure (aka info leak)
  - Partial address overwrite + Crash State
  - Partial address overwrite + Bruteforce



What are Info Leaks?

- An info leak is when you can extract meaningful information (such as a memory address) from the ASLR protected service or binary

- If you can leak any sort of pointer to code during your exploit, you have likely defeated ASLR
  - Why is a single pointer leak so damning?



Death by Pointer

Runtime Memory! … or the North Pacific Ocean



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

The ocean is so vast and empty, but once you get a pointer to Hawaii...

Death by Pointer

Runtime Memory! … or the North Pacific Ocean



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executable code!

Death by Pointer

Death by Pointer

Everything becomes relative



A single pointer into a memory segment, and you can compute the location of everything around it

- Functions
- Gadgets
- Data of Interest

Using Info Leaks

By Example:

-You have a copy of the libc binary, ASLR is on



Using Info Leaks

By Example:

-You have a copy of the libc binary, ASLR is on

-You've leaked a pointer off the stack to `printf()`

`printf() is @ 0xb7e72280`



Using Info Leaks

By Example:

-You have a copy of the libc binary, ASLR is on

-You've leaked a pointer off the stack to `printf()`

```
printf() is @ 0xb7e72280
```

-Look at the libc binary, how far away is system() from printf()?

```
system() is -0xD0F0 bytes away from printf()
```

Using Info Leaks

By Example:

-You have a copy of the libc binary, ASLR is on

-You've leaked a pointer off the stack to printf()

```
printf() is @ 0xb7e72280
```

-Look at the libc binary, how far away is system() from printf()?

```
system() is -0xD0F0 bytes away from printf()
```

```
therefore system() is at @ 0xb7e65190
                           (0xb7e65190-0xD0F0)
```

/levels/lecture/aslr/aslr_leak1

ssh lecture@warzone.rpis.ec 22

Fully Position Independent Executable:

gcc -pie -fPIE -fno-stack-protector ./aslr_leak1.c

Force it to execute the “i_am_rly_leet” function



/levels/lecture/aslr/aslr_leak2

ssh lecture@warzone.rpis.ec 22

The exercise is equally as small and dirty as the last one, but this is typically how an infoleak might appear in the wild.

Can you parse it? Build a ROP chain based off it?



Using Info Leaks

- Can be used on hardest scenario of PIE, full ASLR
  - Usually comes with 100% exploit reliability!
  - ‘it just works’

- Info leaks are the most used ASLR bypass in real world exploitation as they give assurances
  - Someone’s life might depend on your exploit landing



Partial Overwrites

- Assume you have no way to leak an address, but you can overwrite one

from multiple runs:

```
0xb756b132
0xb758e132
0xb75e5132
0xb754d132
0xb75cf132
```

Guaranteed 255 byte ROP/ret range around that address

2^4 bits of bruteforce gives you 64kb of range around the addr

2^{12} bits of bruteforce will give you ROP/ret across all of libc

Partial Overwrites

- Assume you have no way to leak an address, but you can overwrite one

  from multiple runs:

  0xb756b132 — 100% exploit reliability

  0xb758e132

  0xb75e5132 — 6.25% exploit reliability

  0xb754d132

  0xb75cf132 — 0.024% exploit reliability



Bruteforcing

- Note that these bruteforcing details apply only to Ubuntu 32bit
- Don’t bother to try bruteforcing addresses on a 64bit machine of any kind
- Ubuntu ASLR is rather weak, low entropy



ASLR Tips

- What does your crash state look like?
  - What's in the registers?
  - What's on the stack around you?

- Even if you can't easily leak some data address out of a register or off the stack, there's nothing that's stopping you from using it for stuff
  - As always: get creative

Lecture Overview

1. Introducing ASLR
2. Position Independent Executables
3. Bypassing ASLR, Examples
4. Conclusion

In Closing

- Like other mitigation technologies, ASLR is a ‘tack on’ solution that only makes things harder
- The vulnerabilities and exploits become both more complex and precise the deeper down the rabbit hole we go



Modern Exploit Mitigations

- DEP & ASLR are the two main pillars of modern exploit mitigation technologies
- Congrats, being able to bypass these mean that you're probably capable of writing exploits for real vulnerabilities