Going Stealth:
Transgender Bodies and U.S. Surveillance Practices

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B.A. (University of Florida) 1998

DISSERTATION

Submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

Cultural Studies

in the

OFFICE OF GRADUATE STUDIES

of the

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

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Abstract

This dissertation examines the ways various surveillance mechanisms have been deployed in relation to transgender and gender-nonconforming bodies and populations in the context of Western modernity. Bridging the emerging fields of surveillance studies and transgender studies, I ask how transgender studies might be useful in better understanding surveillance and security practices, and how surveillance studies might further illuminate the regulation of gendered and racialized bodies in the U.S. and at U.S. borders.

At its heart, this dissertation aims to show how transgender and gender-nonconforming bodies are inextricably bound up with questions of nationalism, state security, and military and government constructions of safety. The chapters examine surveillance sites ranging from identification documents to biometrics programs, and from medical surveillance of reproduction to airport X-rays. While focusing on surveillance mechanisms that are particularly linked to the global War on Terror, I also contextualize these practices in histories of bodily classification, militarization, and shifting constructions of deviance. Simultaneously, I trace genealogies of gender-nonconforming figures that have served as objects of scrutiny in contexts ranging from medicine and law to immigration checkpoints.

Importantly, this dissertation rethinks the very category of "transgender," engaging the fact that bodies may be read as gender deviant in relation to racial, religious, and/or national appearance, or through perceived class status, disability or sexual practices. I ask how certain trans-identified bodies, able to comply with dominant standards of dress and behavior (themselves grounded in ideals of whiteness, citizenship,

class privilege and compulsory heterosexuality), may be legible to surveillance mechanisms not as transgender, but as properly gendered and non-threatening. At the same time, I consider the ways contemporary surveillance technologies produce and make visible particular understandings of transgender bodies. Finally, I argue that if surveillance practices assume normative bodies, then gender-nonconforming bodies may confound, hamper, or render illegible those practices, offering insight into potential counter-surveillance tactics and forms of resistance. In this way, rather than continuing to position trans and gender-nonconforming bodies as objects of curiosity and scientific scrutiny, I use the critical lens of transgender studies to examine ruptures and inconsistencies in state, medical, media and legal surveillance practices.

Acknowledgements

I entered graduate school with the erroneous impression that scholarly work was undertaken in solitude, and exit now with the important knowledge that it is only through conversation and collaboration that meaningful intellectual work emerges. I am lucky and privileged to have worked under the care and guidance of a perfect constellation of committee members. Caren Kaplan, my dissertation chair, knew exactly when to push me and when to cheer me on, and I am tremendously grateful for her generous mentoring not only in the dissertation process but in all aspects of academic life. Her careful questions and insightful critiques have profoundly shaped my approach to scholarship and consistently deepened this project. Gayatri Gopinath offered steadfast support throughout my graduate career, particularly during the long and difficult period when I was grasping for the early kernels of this project, and helped me first understand how to frame my work as a critical intervention into the field of transgender studies. Colin Milburn's generous readings and suggestions pushed me to broaden the scope of my work, and his consistent encouragement and enthusiasm for my writing helped me learn to trust in my own vision of this dissertation.

My work and my life at UC Davis have benefited tremendously from faculty connections there; I am especially grateful to Marisol de la Cadena, Kathleen Frederickson, Elizabeth Freeman, Cathy Kudlick, Juana María Rodríguez, and Eric Smoodin for their enthusiastic support of my work and for their sound advice on multiple professional and intellectual concerns. Faculty at other institutions have also generously helped me sustain this project: Mimi Nguyen saw me through graduate school from the application process to the filing date, and helped me navigate numerous obstacles along

the way; Dean Spade graciously shared ideas, writing, and professional contacts with me; and Erica Rand, Siobhan Somerville, and Jennifer Terry all offered encouragement and insightful feedback at crucial moments in this dissertation's development.

The Cultural Studies Graduate Group at UC Davis provided the richest intellectual and collaborative environment I could have asked for. I am particularly grateful to Fatima Garcia, program coordinator, for her meticulous administrative work and her encouragement every step of the way. Fellow graduate students at UC Davis helped infuse these last several years with energy, collaboration, and support both intellectual and emotional — I want to especially thank Tallie Ben Daniel, Steven Blevins, Santiago Castellanos, Barbara Ceptus, Marisol Cortez, Ryder Diaz, Carmen Fortes, Matt Franks, Cat Fung, Sandy Gomez, Cathy Hannabach, Winnie Tam Hung, Ingrid Lagos, Valerie Kim-Thuy Larsen, Sarah McCullough, Joan Meyers, Christina Owens, Terry Park, Elliot Proebstel, Magalí Rabasa, Kara Thompson, Cristy Turner, and Michelle Yates. Special thanks to friends near and far whose consistent encouragement helped me keep going, particularly Nimmy Abiaka, Keight Bergmann, Laura Fisher, Yumi Lee, Eli Ogburn, Yasmine Orangi, Destry Taylor, and Jen Walter. Love and thanks to my sister Lauren Beauchamp, mom Terry Beauchamp, and nana Betty Scott for their excitement about my progress and their belief in my ability to finish.

The UC Davis Queer Research Cluster gave me an intellectual home on campus and sharpened my political analysis. My thanks especially to the graduate students involved in the Queer Studies Graduate Symposium at UC Davis 2007-2010, for nurturing queer connections and for opening such a warm space in which to talk through unfinished ideas. Thanks to the Consortium for Women and Research at UC Davis for

sponsoring a talk I gave very early in the dissertation process, and to the UC Davis Office of Graduate Studies for supporting my work and teaching me how to navigate the structure of the university. My heartfelt thanks to the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender Resource Center at UC Davis — particularly director Sheri Atkinson — for doing vibrant, radical queer work on and off campus and for giving me so many opportunities to link my research to political action. I will always be indebted to Angelina Malfitano, whose energy and dedication live on, and whose belief in the importance of my work has sustained me even in her absence.

Finally, my gratitude to those queer and transgender studies graduate students with whom I have worked most closely over the past several years. Abigail Boggs, Liz Montegary, and Tristan Josephson shared the many ups and downs of graduate school with me, helped me generate excitement about my work even in the most trying times, rejected competition in favor of genuine collaboration and friendship, and pushed me to ask different questions and to imagine different frameworks. Benjamin D'Harlingue has been a steadfast and utterly trusted friend, colleague, and collaborator, from start to finish; perhaps more than anyone, he taught me the value of collaborative work. Cynthia Degnan's unwavering belief in my voice and ideas made it possible to take risks that proved transformative; my scholarship is among many aspects of my life that flourish with her love and encouragement. This dissertation is built on their rock solid support, and the ideas here were shaped through continual conversation with them. It is a privilege to have an academic, political, and emotional life so entwined with theirs. They helped me understand the kind of intellectual work I am most invested in, and made me believe I could create it.

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Going Stealth:
An Introduction

On April 17, 2007, the day after the shootings at Virginia Tech, a parent at Cranbrook Kingswood School near Detroit, Michigan phoned police to report seeing a man on campus wearing a blonde wig, a dress, high heels, and lipstick. The private high school was placed in lockdown for over an hour while campus security and local police searched the grounds and each room of the school, ultimately finding no one matching the description. A spokesperson for the Department of Public Safety told reporters that the parent who first saw the "suspicious" person "thought it was kind of strange, so she called police," and noted that "in the wake of what happened yesterday in Virginia, it's better to be safe than sorry" (Askari).

I have come back to the Cranbrook incident many times while writing this dissertation. Much public discourse following the lockdown conveyed a sense of regret about the targeting of a gender-nonconforming individual while also justifying that policing by positioning the Virginia Tech shootings as an understandably, singularly anxious moment in the U.S. Interpretations of the individual body in question most frequently tended to cast this person as necessarily threatening and suspicious, an anomalous figure visually marked as outside of otherwise clear gender norms. In all of these ways, the Cranbrook lockdown serves as a particularly helpful point of entry for examining the seemingly exceptional figure of the transgender person in the context of seemingly exceptional security and surveillance measures undertaken by U.S. state agencies since September 11, 2001. In the most basic sense, *Going Stealth: Transgender Bodies and U.S. Surveillance Practices* seeks to unravel these exceptions. That is to say, I am interested here both in rethinking the category of transgender by examining the many

ways surveillance mechanisms identify (and produce) gender deviance, and in contextualizing recent surveillance measures in broader histories of medico-legal classification and biopolitical regulation.[1]

The hour-long lockdown and meticulous search of the Cranbrook grounds took place in the absence of any alleged criminal act. Even trespassing was not an issue, since the grounds are open to the public and are connected to a number of public tourist sites, including museums and nature trails. Thus the lockdown occurred in response not just to *any* stranger, but to a very particular body visually perceived to be strange and threatening. When asked if the person had done anything illegal, one detective agreed with reporters that they had not, but added, "If you're a man, you don't hang around a school dressed as a woman" (Askari). Such a statement indicates that even in the absence of illegality, policing (and panic) of this extreme can be justified by the mere indication that an individual has something to hide.

To be sure, Cranbrook was not the only school to increase security and policing directly after the Virginia Tech shootings. News outlets reported that schools in over 27

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[1] A brief note on terminology and language throughout this dissertation: *transgender* and *transsexual,* like many words used to describe identities, are contested and continually negotiated terms. For the purposes of this dissertation, I typically use *transgender* to refer to those bodies and subjects that identify or are identified in ways that exceed normatively bounded categories of man or woman. Similarly, *transgender-identified* refers to the ways people identify themselves and/or are identified by others; Valentine discusses use of this term at length, writing that this dual meaning "highlights how self-identity and one's identification by others are complexly intertwined and shaped by relationships of social power" (16). I use *gender-nonconforming* as a broader term encompassing many (though certainly not all) transgender subjects as well as those bodies and subjects that break from idealized gender binaries or are interpreted as nonconforming because of the ways gender norms are read through mutually constitutive categories such as race, class, sexuality, religion, disability, and nationality. Roughly, then, in this project *transgender* gestures more toward identity and identification, whereas *gender-nonconforming* addresses a relation to norms that may involve but need not rest on identity and identification. These broader and less rigid terms are useful precisely because the project as a whole is interested not only in considerations of those people and bodies identified as transgender, but also in the wide range of gendered practices, identities, and bodies that are produced by and feel the effects of surveillance practices. Where the term *transsexual* appears in this writing, it references specific work by scholars who have taken up that term, or the specific use of the term as a medical or legal category. I am grateful to Benjamin D'Harlingue for helping me work through these complicated and ever-shifting terms.

states had closed, canceled classes or otherwise increased security measures in response to threats or perceived threats during the week following the shootings. Cranbrook officials consistently referenced the influence of the Virginia Tech incident on their decision to lock down the school. Transgender-related blogs and magazines writing about the lockdown generally tended to acknowledge this political context as well, while still criticizing the fact that a gender-nonconforming individual was singled out as dangerous based only on appearance. A group of concerned Cranbrook community members created a website with information about the lockdown, specifically to call attention to the implications for transgender and queer individuals who are connected to the school, and they too pointed out the air of tension already present due to the Virginia Tech shootings.

Using the shootings to contextualize the lockdown, news reports repeatedly cited officials' explanations that "it's better to be safe than sorry," despite the fact that at least one law enforcement officer admitted that "we're not even sure what gender the person is – it could be a tall, muscular woman" (Askari). This statement serves as an important reminder that the policing of gender deviance is certainly not limited to those who are transgender-identified, though it may appear as most visible and overt when enacted against trans individuals. Although the statement indicates that a tall, muscular woman would likely be deemed innocent (in a way that "a man in a dress" is clearly not), neither case would overturn the "better safe than sorry" refrain from school and law enforcement officials. The phrase depends on a conception of safety as something that necessarily requires losing (or willingly giving up) privacy. This kind of logic is precisely what surveillance studies scholar Torin Monahan calls attention to when he notes that questions of surveillance are typically framed as trade-offs, such that more of one thing

(security) necessarily means less of the other (privacy). Asking how much of one we have to give up to get the other, Monahan argues, is the wrong question. He suggests instead that we ask questions about how surveillance practices organize our social lives and produce new -- or reconsolidate existing -- power relations. To shift the focus, we have to resist the urge to consider cases like Cranbrook in isolation.

For example, almost every media response to the lockdown explained it as a direct result of anxiety about Virginia Tech. But certainly there were other factors creating the general feeling of high alert in the U.S., a feeling that has been cultivated nationally, particularly over the last several years. By April 2007, the USA PATRIOT Act had not only been passed but reauthorized, the Department of Homeland Security was well established, and the Guantanamo Bay detention facility had been operating for several years. Furthermore, by the time of the Cranbrook lockdown, the shooter at Virginia Tech had already been identified as a South Korean immigrant man who had been diagnosed with mental illnesses, a body framed as shockingly exceptional, yet also categorized as monstrous and dangerous, in ways that resonate deeply with the rhetoric of the War on Terror, struggles over U.S. immigration policies, and medical classifications of deviance. It is tempting to read the lockdown as primarily about the panic created by the Virginia Tech shootings, as local law enforcement describe it, or as primarily about anti-transgender bias, as many transgender news outlets and advocacy organizations see it. But I want to suggest that incidents like the Cranbrook lockdown can never be explained as simple transphobia or as overzealous security measures. Instead, this event should prompt critical analysis of the ways that gender deviance is produced, coded, and policed not only in these spectacular moments, but also in the everyday; likewise the surveillance

practices at work in this case are refined and reworked through long histories of nationalist sentiments, racialization processes, and medico-legal taxonomies of deviant bodies.

Moreover, these two seemingly separate explanations for the Cranbrook lockdown — the particular targeting of bodies deemed gender-nonconforming and the heightened surveillance practices emerging in times of crisis — must be understood as fundamentally entwined. Although one news report claimed that the school *practices* lockdowns twice a year, community members noted that the last "real" lockdown of the campus occurred in response to the events of September 11, 2001. The fact that the last two lockdowns in recent memory occurred in response to terrorist attacks and the sighting of a "man in a dress" speaks to the perceived links between gender deviance and national security. Like the 9/11 attacks, the Virginia Tech shootings are widely coded as a national tragedy. In the wake of both events, elevated security and surveillance measures nationwide purported to restore strength and safety to the nation by locating, containing, and/or punishing unruly bodies.

With this in mind, *Going Stealth* aims to show how transgender and gender-nonconforming bodies are inextricably bound up with questions of nationalism, state security, and military and government constructions of safety. The chapters in this dissertation examine a range of surveillance sites, from identification documents to commercial airports, and focus on surveillance mechanisms that have been widely discussed in the context of the War on Terror, while working to contextualize those practices as rooted in long histories of bodily classification, militarization, and shifting constructions of deviance. Simultaneously, the project traces genealogies of gender-

nonconforming figures that have served as objects of scrutiny and regulation in a number of contexts ranging from medicine and law to immigration checkpoints in the contemporary United States. I ask how the mechanisms of gender regulation and surveillance may be displaced onto gender-nonconforming bodies, thus appearing non-existent or inapplicable to those appearing gender-normative. In this way, the dissertation rethinks the very category of "transgender," engaging the fact that bodies may be read as gender deviant in relation to racial, religious, and/or national appearance, or through perceived class status, dis/ability, or sexual practices. I am concerned in particular with the ways that certain transgender-identified bodies, able to comply with dominant standards of dress and behavior (themselves grounded in ideals of whiteness, U.S. citizenship, class privilege, and compulsory heterosexuality), may be legible to surveillance mechanisms not as transgender but as properly gendered and thus non-threatening. Finally, I consider the ways that surveillance practices depend on normative assumptions to analyze gendered bodies, suggesting that gender-nonconforming bodies may confound, hamper, or render illegible those practices, and offering important insight into ruptures and productive contradictions in the workings of surveillance itself.

Power and Politics in *Going Stealth*

In many ways, then, this is a dissertation in transgender studies that engages only minimally with the literature formally classified as belonging to that field. As a field, transgender studies has not only been primarily concerned with those groups and individuals identifying specifically as transgender and/or transsexual, but has also frequently focused on uncovering and producing knowledge *about* those groups and

individuals. In his lengthy discussion of the formation of the field, David Valentine suggests that in the most basic sense, transgender studies has been constituted through "the idea that there is a group of people who can be understood through the category transgender" (166). Thus far, the field has been concerned in large part with documenting social histories that take "transgender" as a fairly bounded and pre-existing category. In many cases this work has implicitly understood its subjects to be white, class-privileged, U.S.-based transgender-identified people. Valentine notes that several scholars in and associated with the field have expressed wariness about taking such a neatly-contained category for granted, and writes that his own concern "is still that the increasing use of 'transgender' as a term to order knowledge produces the possibilities whereby certain subjects become appropriated into a reading of transgender that obscures the complexities of their identification and experience" (169).[2] In particular, he cautions against understandings of transgender as a modern or progressive category that draw on Western medical and anthropological frameworks to classify non-Western gender systems under a dominant Western framework.[3]

Nevertheless, Valentine suggests that transgender studies as a field might offer a more expansive way to think through multiple figurations of gender in relation to sexuality, race, class, nationality, and ability. It is this point from which my own work proceeds. In the broadest sense, this project seeks to expand both the narrow category of transgender and the still-emerging field of transgender studies. Here, while I want to

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[2] Judith Halberstam and Dean Spade, among others, have aimed to understand the category of transgender as fully entwined and mutually constitutive with systems of race, class, and sexual hierarchy. Viviane Namaste has critiqued the Western, Anglocentric discourse producing an identifiable category of transgender, and Joanne Meyerowitz, among others, has called for historical specificity in attaching transgender to identities or bodies in various locations and temporalities.

[3] For a thorough and insightful analysis of the ways this plays out relative to the "third gender" concept, see Evan Towle and Lynn Morgan's "Romancing the Transgender Native."

carefully attend to the specific policing of transgender-identified bodies, I am equally concerned with understanding the ways that such policing practices work more pervasively, both to regulate gender in less explicit or overt ways and to position a variety of bodies — not just transgender-identified bodies — as gender-nonconforming. While the field of transgender studies has produced a great deal of work on medical and legal regulation of transgender-identified people, it has only rarely considered surveillance measures in relation to nationalism, borders, and security discourse. Meanwhile, the growing field of surveillance studies has been deeply concerned with questions of national security, profiling and tracking measures, and state regulation, but rarely incorporates a clear analysis of gender and sexuality in relation to these topics.[4] Bridging these two fields, I ask how transgender studies might be useful in better understanding surveillance practices, and how surveillance studies might further illuminate the contemporary regulation of gendered and racialized bodies in the U.S. and at U.S. borders.

In "Resisting Medicine, Re/modeling Gender" Dean Spade asks us to consider the ways that medical and legal surveillance of certain deviant bodies actually functions to discipline all gendered subjects toward a normative gender that appears natural and healthy when viewed in opposition to particular disordered bodies designated as "transgender." Spade is interested in the ways that medicine forces transgender people into normalization processes that uphold the status quo rather than resist or change it, but

[4] At the same time, however, feminist and particularly feminist and queer of color scholarship has produced extensive analyses of surveillance programs and tactics without necessarily naming them as such or linking them to what is formally classed as the field of surveillance studies. Among many examples, see for instance Dorothy Roberts' work on the surveillance of both reproductive practices and child welfare, particularly regarding working class women of color in the U.S., and Eithne Luibhéid's work on the biopolitical regulation of sexuality and sexual practices through U.S. immigration policy, both cited in the chapters that follow.

he also gestures at the ways that this process enforces normative gender for all people. It would *seem* that only particular bodies, those that cannot or will not conform to normative gender standards, are subject to surveillance and scrutiny. It *appears* that only transgender people have to alter their gender presentations, for example, while non-transgender people have gender presentations that are naturally, effortlessly normative. Gender regulation thus appears displaced onto only transgender-identified bodies, such that other bodies come to seem both naturally gender-normative and free of any scrutiny. Yet all bodies are subject to regulatory gender norms, though this might play out in more mundane or subtle ways than the explicit medical and legal policies marking out transgender identities.

Consider, for example, an American Express national advertising campaign launched in mid-2008. In the face of other companies' recent turns to consumer-chosen designs for credit cards, the ad campaign aimed to showcase American Express Business Gold cards' professional look. To this end, one commercial features a white business man dressed in a suit, who approaches an airline ticket counter for a business trip to San Francisco and presents a credit card adorned with images of kittens. The ticket agent looks at him suspiciously, confirms that this is a business trip, and motions to two security personnel, who immediately flank the customer from behind. The black male security guard asks the customer to come with them, as the white woman snaps on a latex glove. As they whisk this customer away, another white business man steps to the counter, also requests a ticket for a San Francisco business trip, and presents his professional American Express Gold card, which creates no disturbance.

In this case, a person not marked as specifically transgender is nonetheless subject to gender regulation because of how his gender and sexuality are interpreted through consumer objects. Furthermore, the introduction of a latex glove (edited out of later versions of the commercial) suggests that this person is also subject to a form of state violence for his gender transgressions. The fact that a woman guard dons the glove adds yet another layer to this scene, for the refrain from government officials about airport searches in particular — a refrain presumably intended to quiet anxieties about inappropriate or non-consensual physical contact — has been that physical searches will be conducted by an officer of the same gender as the individual being searched. Together with the too-feminine credit card image, the search conducted by a woman clearly positions the airline customer as breaking from normative gender in ways that provoke (and, the commercial implies, even justify) state scrutiny. Importantly, the second customer — the man with the properly masculine credit card — is also part of this regulatory system, as is the at-home viewer, for whom these regulatory practices may be internalized. Here, the privileges of good citizenship are arrived at through normative gendering, which is read in part through class status and consumer practices. The policing of gender transgression, while occurring perhaps most overtly in relation to transgender-identified people, casts a much wider net. At the same time, those transgender-identified people who can comply with the regulatory norms of race, class, ability, and citizenship through which proper, non-threatening gender is read may escape these most obvious forms of scrutiny.

One argument running throughout this project, then, is that surveillance of these bodies centers less on their identification as transgender *per se* than it does on the

perceived *deception* underlying transgressive gender presentation. Crucially, the implicit anxieties about terrorism in the American Express commercial suggest that non-normative gender presentation is cause for alarm and suspicion on the level of national safety. Indications that something is amiss or doesn't match up are increasingly understood as signs of a much larger danger, producing anxieties fueled by public safety campaigns like the "If you see something, say something" slogan (a message also clearly at work in the Cranbrook case). In this post-9/11 context, both U.S. state policy and public discourse produce an atmosphere in which full disclosure (for everyone but the state itself) is the primary avenue to security and safety. New security measures ranging from the USA PATRIOT Act to biometrics databases all hinge on the notion that loyal citizens willingly comply with any request for information; only the duplicitous terrorist would balk at providing information to the state. State officials repeatedly assure the public that those who have nothing to hide have nothing to fear. Yet which bodies are commonly understood as more likely to be hiding something? *Going Stealth* takes up this question in order to understand not only the ways that gender-nonconforming bodies are policed, but also the discursive links between the figure of the trans person and the figure of the terrorist, both regularly positioned as dangerously deceptive in the cultural imagination. In this sense, the project is grounded in transgender studies not simply as a way to learn more about a specific population or identity category, but rather to engage transgender as a mode of critique: a way of critically intervening in the supposed binaries of deviant/normative, terrorist/citizen, us/them.

It is largely for this reason that this dissertation takes a Foucauldian approach, understanding transgender not as a predetermined category into which identities and

bodies are slotted, but as a category produced in part through practices of surveillance in Western modernity. For Michel Foucault, power is not repressive but productive of knowledge and categories of identity that work to manage life and regulate behaviors. In this sense, it is not that surveillance practices identify bodies or subjects already belonging to particular pre-existing categories of deviant or normative, but rather that surveillance constitutes one mechanism through which gender-nonconformity itself is produced as such. This theoretical approach usefully moves away from medical, legal, and cultural frameworks that have typically sought to determine the "truth" of transgender identities and bodies, asking instead how the very category of transgender enters into discourse. How, then, does power work to produce "the transgender person," and what regulatory effects are in play? If, as Foucault argues, power is exerted not in a one-directional, top-down manner but through diffuse networks, how then do practices of surveillance extend far beyond their more obvious forms — the USA PATRIOT Act, the Department of Homeland Security — into the more quotidian aspects of our lives?

Key to both the form and content of this dissertation is Foucault's assertion in *Discipline and Punish* that disciplinary power

> is exercised through its invisibility; at the same time it imposes on those whom it subjects a principle of compulsory visibility. In discipline, it is the subjects who have to be seen. Their visibility assures the hold of the power that is exercised over them. It is the fact of being constantly seen, of being able always to be seen, that maintains the disciplined individual in his subjection. (187)

While this project considers, in various contexts, questions of visibility relative to trans and gender-nonconforming bodies and subjects, particularly regarding transgender advocacy and activist organizations' strategic taking up of or cautioning against visibility, I am much more concerned with what Foucault names as invisible: the workings of disciplinary power. With that in mind, this dissertation overall seeks to shift the typical approach through which work on and about transgender people has been undertaken. Much scholarship regarding transgender people has sought to make them more visible, to investigate the truths of transgender lives and politics. Similarly, much medical, legal, and anthropological work has aimed to "find out" what transgender bodies, identities, and communities entail. And a great deal of popular culture has framed transgender topics as those beneath which something is hidden, promising audiences the opportunity to uncover that evidence or information. We might say, in fact, that one of the most common characteristics of engagements with transgender topics is that they are framed as opportunities to make visible what is tantalizingly hidden.[5]

Going Stealth takes a different approach. Rather than continuing to position trans and gender-nonconforming bodies as objects of curiosity and scientific scrutiny, this project instead uses the critical lens of transgender studies to examine ruptures and inconsistencies in state, medical, media and legal surveillance practices in Western modernity. That is to say, I aim not to uncover information about trans and gender-nonconforming bodies, but to examine the ways power is at work in the surveillance of those bodies: to consider what they might tell us about the workings of power itself. In this sense, the dissertation's form works hand in hand with its content. The chapters that

[5] As I point out in Chapter 1, these seemingly oppositional terms of visible/hidden are not so easily separated.

follow each begin with relatively recent and fairly overt cases of surveillance in the U.S., and work outwards to excavate their historical and political underpinnings, tracing genealogies of certain discursive figures, of classificatory frameworks, and of security technologies, with an eye to the ways these histories are effaced in the marking of post-9/11 events as exceptional. In each case, I reflect not on the information surveillance practices purport to offer up about transgender and gender-nonconforming bodies, but rather on how the policing of these bodies might point out the contradictions, fissures, and productive spaces in the mechanisms of surveillance itself. What, I want to ask, is obscured in the very structures of surveillance?

The first chapter begins with recent U.S. legislation concerning identification documents. Focusing largely on the Real ID Act, I lay out some of the historical groundwork for current pushes toward stricter regulation of identity through documents, and demonstrate that while these regulations work to produce and maintain singular, bounded identities, the policies' very structure reveals the state's own internal contradictions. Offering a brief overview of medical and legal production of transgender subjects, I critically examine the concept of "going stealth," arguing that the ability to go stealth depends on access to normative gender presentation that itself relies on adherence to the regulatory norms of whiteness, class privilege, and heterosexuality. With this in mind, the chapter also considers several transgender advocacy organizations' responses to the increased regulation of identity documents, arguing that their proposed strategies actually bolster U.S. nationalism and fail to critique the broader policing and classification of bodies deemed deviant or dangerous, particularly in relation to race and nationality.

Chapter two takes up the push for biometrics programs in the wake of September 11, 2001, a push that frames biometric technologies as relatively new in state attempts to secure both U.S. borders and national safety. Here, I link current biometrics efforts with eugenics programs and other longstanding methods of pinpointing identity and classifying groups or types through measuring the physical body. This chapter draws together scholarship in critical geography and immigration studies with transgender studies to examine the connections between the figure of the immigrant and terrorist – understood as deceptively moving across borders – and the figure of the transgender person – understood as deceptively moving from one gender to another. I argue against the positioning of transgender bodies as abstract, endlessly mobile figures, looking instead at the material constraints on transgender immigrants, and demonstrate that the rigid, fixed classification schemes that biometrics relies upon are confounded and undone by the mutability of the physical body.

The third chapter shifts our focus away from government policies overtly connected to the War on Terror, and looks at reproductive practices and the family as a site of national security concerns. It begins with the case of pregnant transgender-identified man Thomas Beatie, a case overwhelmingly portrayed as anomalous. This chapter aims to rethink the media focus on Beatie as spectacular individual, instead tracing a genealogy of the figure of the pregnant man in Western medical and popular discourse from the 19th century on. Examining the different ways this figure emerges in various moments and sociopolitical contexts, I show how the fascination and shock of the pregnant man persists precisely because this figure is repeatedly represented as new and unique. I argue that the pregnant man works alongside figures such as the welfare queen and pregnant

teen to promote the regulation of reproduction in the contexts of racial purity, sexual health, and U.S. national security.

Finally, chapter four focuses on X-ray imaging, particularly in the setting of the airport, in relation to questions of prosthetic technologies. Looking at transgender advocates' concerns that trans-related prosthetics might be misread as explosives by new "whole body imaging" technologies in U.S. airports, I draw on disability studies and mobility studies scholarship to consider the concept of the prosthesis as a filter through which ideas about mobility, security, and bodily integrity gain traction. This chapter analyzes some of the key connections and distinctions between the culturally and/or literally explosive bodies of the trans person and the terrorist suicide bomber, and examines the X ray's own cultural history while suggesting that the X-ray machine might also be thought of as a prosthetic technology. In assessing the supposedly objective images produced through X-ray scans, I argue that the partial body is both threatening and necessary to the production of the fictitious "whole" body.

At its heart, *Going Stealth* is concerned both with rethinking the boundaries and uses of the category of transgender and with reframing the typical approach to scholarship in transgender studies. Arguing that gender-nonconformity must be understood as produced through mutually constitutive categories such as race, class, sexuality, dis/ability, and nationality, this project seeks to expand the theoretical and political work of transgender studies beyond the narrow confines of the transgender-identified individual. Similarly, by bringing the critical lens of transgender studies to bear on questions of visual culture, histories of biopolitical regulation, surveillance technologies developed as part of militarization efforts, and state attempts to monitor and

contain bodies perceived to be unruly or threatening in relation to racialized gender norms, this dissertation pushes the field to engage with topics not overtly connected to gender norms. Finally, the project seeks to turn back the scrutinizing gaze of science and scholarship, seeking not to uncover the inner truths of transgender bodies, politics, or communities, but to recognize how these are produced through a variety of surveillance mechanisms, a task that ultimately helps us better understand the naturalized workings of power itself.

Deceptive Documents, Classified Bodies:
Transgender Politics and U.S. Identification Documents

On September 4, 2003, shortly before the two-year anniversary of the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security released an official Advisory to security personnel. Citing ongoing concerns about potential attacks by Al-Qaeda operatives, the advisory's final paragraph emphasizes that terrorism is everywhere in disguise: "Terrorists will employ novel methods to artfully conceal suicide devices. Male bombers may dress as females in order to discourage scrutiny." Two years later, the Real ID Act was signed into law, proposing a major restructuring of identification documents and travel within and across U.S. borders. Central components of this process include a new national database linked through federally standardized driver's licenses, and stricter standards of proof for asylum applications. In response to both the Advisory and the Real ID Act, transgender activist and advocacy organizations in the U.S. quickly pointed to the ways trans populations would be targeted as suspicious and subjected to new levels of scrutiny.

Criticizing what they read as instances of transphobia or anti-trans discrimination, many of these organizations offer both transgender individuals and government agencies strategies for reducing or eliminating that discrimination. While attending to the very real dangers and damages experienced by many trans people in relation to government policies for identification documents, in many cases the organizations' approaches leave intact the broader regulation of gender, particularly as it is mediated and enforced by the state. Moreover, they tend to address concerns about anti-trans discrimination in ways that are disconnected from questions of citizenship, racialization or nationalism.

Nevertheless, by illuminating the ways that new security measures interact with and affect transgender-identified people and gender-nonconforming bodies, transgender activist practices and the field of transgender studies are poised to make a significant contribution to the ways state surveillance tactics are understood and interpreted. The monitoring of transgender and gender-nonconforming populations is inextricable from questions of national security and regulatory practices of the state, and state surveillance policies that may first appear unrelated to transgender people are in fact deeply rooted in the maintenance and enforcement of normatively gendered bodies, behaviors and identities. Transgender and gender-nonconforming bodies are bound up in surveillance practices that are intimately tied to state security, nationalism and the "us/them," "either/or" rhetoric that underpins U.S. military and government constructions of safety. Drawing on the history of national anxieties about race, gender and sexuality that form the impetus for state-regulated identity documents, I argue here that trans and gender-nonconforming bodies and identities reveal inconsistencies in the state's control of identity, even as state-assigned documents function to produce transgender identity. At the same time, in considering responses to increased state regulation of identity documents, I argue that the primary strategies offered by transgender advocacy organizations tend to reconsolidate U.S. nationalism and support the increased policing of deviant bodies.

Normalizing Gender: Medico-Legal Surveillance

In many ways, transgender studies provides an ideal point of entry for thinking through state surveillance of gendered bodies. The field has frequently and primarily

dealt with the topic of surveillance in terms of medical and psychiatric monitoring of trans people. The production of the category of "the transsexual" through western medical discourse can be clearly traced through sexologist Harry Benjamin's Standards of Care for Gender Identity Disorders, the first version of which was published in 1979. The Standards, now in their sixth version under the World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH), define the criteria by which healthcare professionals might measure their clients, in order to determine whether they are so-called "true transsexuals." Clients fitting the profile can then be formally diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder and allowed to proceed with medical transition in the form of hormones and/or surgeries. Central to this standardized definition of trans identity, however, is the expectation that trans people will, through the process of transition, eliminate all references to their birth gender and essentially disappear into a normatively gendered world, as if they had never been transgender to begin with.

Thus two major forms of surveillance operate relative to trans people in the medical and psychiatric institutions. The first is the monitoring of individuals in terms of their ability to conform to a particular medicalized understanding of transgender identity and performance.[6] But more salient to my argument is the second component, which is the notion that the primary purpose of medical transition is to rid oneself of any vestiges of non-normative gender: to withstand and evade any surveillance (whether visual, auditory, social, or legal) that would reveal one's trans status. To blend. To pass. Medical science relies on a standardized, normative gender presentation, monitoring trans individuals'

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[6] In "The *Empire* Strikes Back," gender and technology studies scholar Sandy Stone argues that as medical science made available more information about the standards for determining the category of transsexual, individuals were more able to deliberately perform to these standards, to convince doctors of transsexual identities and personal histories in order to gain access to medical transition. In *Sex Changes,* Patrick Califia discusses similar tactics taken up by trans-identified people in post-operative interviews and medical surveys.

ability to pass seamlessly as non-trans. Medical surveillance focuses first on individuals' legibility *as* transgender, and then, following medical interventions, on their ability to *conceal* any trans status or gender deviance.

Yet medical science itself determines normative gender through a particular form of raced, classed and sexualized body. As Siobhan Somerville argues in *Queering the Color Line*, western medicine has consistently linked race, gender and sexuality such that the norm of white heterosexuality becomes a marker against which deviance is constructed. Scientific studies from the early 19th century on, Somerville demonstrates, helped to designate particular bodies – typically those that were racially or sexually mixed – as degenerative threats to western norms and security. To be classified as normatively gendered is also to adhere to norms of racial and economic privilege. Under this logic, marginalized gender identities can approximate the norm *in part* through clinging to ideals of whiteness and class status. Concealing gender deviance is about much more than simply erasing transgender status. It also necessitates altering one's gender presentation to conform to white, middle class, able-bodied, heterosexual understandings of normative gendering.

The notion of "concealment" via medical intervention remains tied to legal gender as well, a link made clear by the fact that most states deny changes of gender on identity documents without proof of irreversible "sex reassignment surgery." In "Resisting Medicine, Re/Modeling Gender," attorney Dean Spade notes that U.S. law depends on medical evidence as proof of gender identity in almost every case involving trans people. Medical science is considered, in his words, "the cornerstone of the determination of […] rights" (18). Moreover, Spade argues that medical science continues to rely on an ideal

of "success" when diagnosing and "treating" trans people, where that success is typically defined as "the ability to be perceived by non-trans people as a non-trans person" (26). Spade's work points to the ways that medicine and the law work together primarily to "correct" individuals whose bodies or gender presentations fall outside of the expected norm, promoting the concealment of trans status in order to reestablish that norm.

The discourse of concealment haunts transgender populations across a number of cultural sites. The impossibility of fully erasing one's sexed history is evident in the fact that many states still refuse to change gender markers on birth certificates, or allow only a partial change in which the original gender marker is merely crossed out and replaced. Legal gender in these cases cannot be altered, but only cloaked. Similarly, cultural representations of gender variant people depend on the popular notion that with enough scrutiny, one's "true" gender can be revealed at the level of the body. Consider for example the abundance of talk shows and reality television programs that run on the presumably simple premise of uncovering – often literally – the "real" gender of trans-identified individuals. These shows often work to link gender concealment with harmful or dangerous deception in the cultural imagination, revealing the trans person's birth-assigned sex not only to the audience, but also to a shocked and horrified lover. The constant repetition of this narrative structure locates violence not in the institutional practices of media, medicine or law, or in the gender-normative behaviors and relationships they enforce, but instead in individual trans people's apparently fraudulent personal lives.

Echoing this perspective, legal cases dealing with violence against gender variant individuals often revolve around the victim's responsibility to disclose their trans status or birth-assigned sex. Such cases imply or outright claim that the individual's dishonest concealment of their "true" sex was the root cause of the violent actions taken against them. This approach is clearly demonstrated, for example, in the narratives constructed around transgender teenager Gwen Araujo's murder (and sexual relationships) in 2002. Legal arguments, news articles and made-for-television movies converged to situate Araujo's murder in the context of a "trans panic" defense, centralizing the shock of discovery and frequently faulting Araujo for not revealing her assigned sex. In this and many other instances, the interplay of medical, legal and cultural representations of transgender populations works to associate the notion of transgender identity with that of secrecy, precisely because it is always understood that the secret can and will eventually be discovered.

With such a pervasive cultural emphasis on concealment, it may come as no surprise that the slang used by many transgender-identified people to describe non-disclosure of trans status is "going stealth." Those who are living "stealth" are unknown as transgender to almost everyone in their lives – coworkers, employers, teachers, friends – and instead living only as their preferred genders. The term itself invokes a sense of going undercover, of willful secrecy and concealment, perhaps even of conscious deception. Use of this undeniably militarized language also implies a connection to the state, and going stealth does involve a great deal of complicity with state regulation of gender, for example in the changing of legal identity documents such as passports, drivers licenses and immigration paperwork. These are changes that themselves require

proof of particular medical interventions to "irreversibly" change one's physical sex characteristics. The state requires compliance with specific legal and medical procedures, and ostensibly offers in return official documentation that enables stealth status.

But such complete secrecy is never fully possible in relation to the state. Indeed, the very idea of "going stealth" depends on the constancy of "going" – of continuing to conceal one's trans status, even though that concealment can never be airtight. Granting medical and legal changes of gender enables the state to simultaneously keep ongoing records of these very changes, producing a paper trail of past identity markers. Moreover, the state's own policies and procedures for gender changes are internally inconsistent. Legal measures used to document trans people's gender status frequently conflict with one another, even as such policies collectively work towards stricter regulation and surveillance of legal gender. Some states refuse to change the gender marker on birth certificates, while others do so only with documentation of specified surgery. Other states first require amended birth certificates in order to change the gender marker on driver's licenses, and in some cases state and city regulations contradict each other in their surgical requirements for documentation changes.[7] These types of administrative conflicts now emerge in even greater relief as governmental agencies increase their policing of potential terrorist figures, a category that frequently results in intensified surveillance of immigrants and people of color.

A History of Contradictions: Race, Gender, and State-Regulated Identity

[7] For more in-depth analysis of gender reclassification policies and the standardization of U.S. identity documents, see Dean Spade's "Documenting Gender."

Yet as with the administrative inconsistencies in regulating gender identity, the tracking of racialized subjects is historically paradoxical. In his history of surveillance mechanisms in the U.S., Christian Parenti writes that the use of identity documents for surveillance purposes has its roots partly in the drive to identify and track slaves prior to the Civil War. For Parenti, this history reveals another contradiction in U.S. regulation of identity: the state intentionally made slaves legal non-entities in an attempt to eliminate individuality and relationship ties, yet simultaneously sought to track slaves' mobility, especially regarding potential revolts or escapes. This apparent paradox is less surprising when we consider the widespread understanding and treatment of enslaved peoples as property. In the context of slaves-as-commodities, their status as legal non-entities easily converges with efforts to track them as forms of circulating capital. Nevertheless, Parenti importantly argues that slaves' resistance to written identification tracking by forging written passes or emancipation papers to circumvent patrols prompted much broader changes in identificatory practices. By the mid 1700s, manumission papers had begun to be standardized and formalized, and increasingly included physical descriptions. These changes, Parenti argues, "marked a profound shift in the bureaucracy of power and its ability to see, define and construct the 'free' or 'unfree' subject" (27). At the same time, he notes that the combination of printed forms and physical descriptions marked a distinct shift in power over identity construction, "from the realm of oral culture, individual assertion, and community practice to the apparatus of the state and the capital-intensive technologies of literacy and printing" (28).

Parenti's assertion recalls Michel Foucault's model of power as productive, in which power does not simply repress subjects, but rather produces knowledge, and with it

classifications and regulations that work to maintain behaviors. Institutions such as prisons, schools and medical science produce a certain kind of "truth" about individuals, such that identities are not pre-formed but are created through power. In relation to Parenti's argument that emergent technologies and standardization of identity documents created greater state power over identity construction, it becomes clear that identification documents do not merely attest to one's identity or citizenship, but also *produce* that identity.

The production of national identity through records such as driver's licenses and passports is particularly clear in the ways both race and gender are historically regulated via such documents. The documentation of slaves, particularly in terms of their mobility and travel, was not only about monitoring race, but was closely tied to and fueled by anxieties about miscegenation. Similarly, Mark Salter notes that passport applications have historically emphasized questions of paternity, frequently requesting data about children both "legitimate" and "illegitimate." The collection of this information indicates the extent to which race, gender and sexuality are linked in surveillance via identification documents, as marital and parental data is used to determine citizenship status, a process that Salter also connects to colonialist fears of miscegenation: "National belonging is policed by acknowledgement of the father, a clear echo of imperial and postimperial worries about racial integrity" (7). The desire to track paternity in relation to nationality is persistent: as late as 1961, U.S. passports still assumed a heteronormative male applicant, with standard lines for "wife" and "minors" that were simply marked out with an "X" for women applicants or those without children (U.S. Department of State, 73).

Radhika Mongia's analysis of debates about forming a passport system for immigrants in early twentieth-century Canada similarly points to state-regulated identity documents as producing a national identity through the channels of race and gender. She argues that "the passport not only is a technology *reflecting* certain understandings of race, nation/nationality, and state but was central to *organizing and securing* the modern definitions of these categories" (528). Moreover, Mongia asserts that the state's desire to selectively discriminate amongst immigrants formed the impetus for the passport system, writing that "the kernel of the entire struggle over the passport system was precisely about how to effect racial exclusion without naming race" (550). Like the examples Parenti and Salter point to, her research also demonstrates the significant ways that race, gender and nationality are intertwined in relation to the state and identity documents. For instance, to exclude racialized subjects without naming race, the Canadian state framed anti-immigrant legislation in terms of the protection of women, a strategy grounded in fears of miscegenation and racial impurity in which white women must be safeguarded. Thus Mongia notes that "[t]he protectionist stance of the patriarchal state is a conduit for an articulation between race and gender" (545). Importantly, each of these examples make evident the role of identification documents in shoring up not only racially marginalized subjects, but simultaneously white citizen subjects as well.

More broadly, Mongia's discussion demonstrates that passports and other identity documents are central to the organization of the nation-state. She argues that increased immigration produced "the eruption and use of a variety of mechanisms for generating, obtaining, and collating knowledge on every aspect of the movement of Indians to Canada," and points out that these mechanisms "are specific to modes of governance and

the administrative machinery at the disposal of what we call the modern state" (539). Surveillance studies scholar David Lyon likewise asserts that identity cards are a product of modernity, noting that "the attempt to establish identity card systems was frequently associated with the desire to be 'scientific' in the classification of 'insiders' and 'outsiders'" (69). The use of science to justify such classification recalls the pervasive logic of eugenics that sought to regulate the population through management of reproductive capacities and the scientific classification of bodies as fit or unfit, normative or deviant. In *American Eugenics*, Nancy Ordover demonstrates that the 1920s saw a number of political debates explicitly linking immigration with U.S. societal decline, with lawmakers advocating that the state conduct medical inspections for mental and physical fitness as well as "sound family stock" prior to granting immigrants visas and other identification documents (Ordover, 43).

Eugenics programs were a critical component in arguments for increased identification regulations. Eugenicists were largely concerned with mixed-race, "feeble-minded" and immigrant bodies not only as general threats to the national body, but more specifically as bodies that might undo the careful classification of racial purity as shored up through blood quantum laws and related theories of heredity as the primary cause of criminality, poverty, and disability. The potential for these variously deviant bodies to pass as normative, or to go unmarked or uncounted, signaled disorder to eugenicists who depended on the ability to count, measure, and track fit and unfit bodies in relation to the health of the nation. Thus Ordover writes that eugenicists faced "the possibility that the future citizenry of the nation would no longer be readily classifiable" (40).

Anxiety over immigration thus served as a key catalyst for the introduction and maintenance of identification documents, a connection thoroughly detailed by John Torpey in *The Invention of the Passport.* Arguing that the passport and other identity documents serve both to construct the citizen and to connect the citizen to the state, Torpey writes that the U.S. passport system began in the late 1800s in response to increased immigration. Glossing the pre-Civil War period, when most regulation of mobility was handled by individual states, Torpey essentially begins his history of passports in the U.S. with the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, because "it constituted the first serious attempt in American history specifically to exclude members of a particular group whose relevant characteristics were knowable only on the basis of documents" (97). The Act required a new system of identification and sorting, to determine which Chinese immigrants were in the country legally (having entered prior to the Act) and which were not. Further demonstrating that the relationships between race, gender and sexuality are both produced through identity documents and themselves produce national identity, Torpey notes that the Act depended on paternity and marital status as key factors in determining citizenship, with women and children receiving the classification assigned to their husband or father.

Yet the 1882 Act and its provisions for identification proved difficult to maintain. The advent of "paper sons," in which Chinese immigrants reported false family ties to obtain citizenship papers, demonstrates one of many ways in which documents could be manipulated. While identification documents were considered on one hand to be an effective method for restricting not only immigrants but supposedly related instances of crime, on the other hand such documents were shown again and again to be fallible and

subjective. In order to gain entry into the U.S., Chinese immigrants often manipulated their identification photographs, which had been implemented as a preventative measure against IDs being illegally sold and traded. Initially considered to be clear and objective evidence of one's identity, the photograph actually came to expose the subjective nature of visual identification, prompting the state to more carefully regulate the types of allowable photos and the conditions under which they could be taken. In her work on Chinese exclusion and U.S. immigration history, Anna Pegler-Gordon notes that officials came to believe that Chinese immigrants and their photographs shared "a particularly treacherous artifice: on the surface both appeared honest, but this apparent honesty concealed a deeper duplicity" (69). At the same time, however, the manipulation and alteration of photographic identification demonstrates the lack of objective evidence that identity documents can claim to provide, making the Chinese immigrant registration papers an early example of the ways that state regulation of identity documents is inconsistent and porous, even as the state continually revises its attempts to contain identity through those documents.

John Torpey points out that denial or restriction of immigration is closely linked to anxieties about national security that typically intensifies during times of war. More importantly, Torpey's work shows that this link can function to extend state control of immigration and citizenship beyond the rhetoric of war, citing a 1918 Act "to prevent in time of war departure from or entry into the United States contrary to public safety" (117). One year later, the phrase "in time of war" was stricken from the Act, considerably broadening the state's power to regulate immigration. Torpey thus writes "the passport requirements on foreigners left intact after the First World War provided

the essential administrative basis for the implementation of the restrictionary immigration laws of the 1920s" (120). The persistent extension of state regulation through war is evident in contemporary U.S. anti-terrorism measures, which, as Felix Stalder and David Lyon argue, have shifted from surveillance that sought to identify individual criminals and impose punishment directly to what they call pre-emptive or anticipatory surveillance, which "seeks techniques for identifying, classifying and managing groups sorted by levels of dangerousness" (89).

Stalder and Lyon note that this shift is conducted in part through the advent of searchable databases, in which identification documents and their supporting data are stored and made available to state agencies. Suggesting that state desires for national ID cards intensified near the end of the twentieth century, as modern globalization emerged and nation-states found it more difficult to monitor citizens' increased mobility, they point to the ways that current efforts to institute stricter regulation of identity documents are a key component of the War on Terror. While ID cards are now seen as crucial for the kind of anticipatory surveillance that can supposedly prevent terrorism, Lyon elsewhere argues that they simply cannot serve this function, in part because even "advanced biometric cards still have to be based on some other documentary identification in the first place, pushing upstream to the humble birth certificate, which in most cases is far from forgery proof" (75). ID cards, considered necessary for contemporary surveillance and anti-terrorism measures, are themselves dependent on other documents, which then also come under state scrutiny. That scrutiny is already in place for many transgender and gender non-conforming people, who frequently experience the consequences of the state's inconsistent and contradictory policies for

assigning gender markers. The monitoring of Social Security numbers is one example of the ways that the state's own contradictions are magnified through race and gender to position trans people as particular objects of state surveillance, even if they are not named as such.

The U.S. Social Security number, enacted through the 1935 Social Security Act, has been considered and rejected as a form of national ID card multiple times since the early 1970s. Yet the Social Security number nevertheless functions as a method for state classification and surveillance, a status that has only further solidified in recent years. In *The Segregated Origins of Social Security*, Mary Poole argues that the Social Security Act was always intended to be a method for reconsolidating racial segregation that sorted workers into those receiving social security benefits and those relegated to public assistance via welfare. Poole points to limits and conditions written into the Act that privileged white workers in the north, despite the fact that the Act did not specify race and was typically considered "colorblind." She notes that the legislation's language helped create work and dependence as opposing conditions, such that "dependent" came to signify those who did not work, synonymous with public assistance rather than workers in need. Black workers carried the stigma of public assistance while white workers received social security benefits for their labor: "the broader vision through which the Social Security Act was conceived and birthed was steeped in the belief in the inferiority of African American labor and the importance of white labor to the character of the country and the economic system that enabled it" (79). Poole's work usefully demonstrates that Social Security is founded on state classification of bodies, particularly

in terms of race, a purpose the Social Security Administration still serves, if perhaps in different form.[8]

The monitoring of Social Security numbers, benefits, and the data used to issue both of these reveals the state's own conflicting policies of classification as well as its drive to ferret out these same inconsistencies. Since 1994, the Social Security Administration has sent "no-match" letters to employers in cases where an employee's hiring paperwork contradicts employee information on file with SSA. Ostensibly in place to alert otherwise law-abiding employers to the possibility that they are unwittingly hiring undocumented immigrants, the no-match policy intensified dramatically after 9/11, with 2002 seeing more than eight times the typical number of letters mailed than in 2001 (Bergeron, 6). The no-match letters and related data can now also be accessed by the Department of Homeland Security, which sends employers guidelines about how to correct the problem and avoid legal sanctions.

The no-match policy aims to locate undocumented immigrants (and potential terrorists) employed under false identities, yet casts a much broader net. Because conflicting legal regulations often prevent trans people from obtaining consistent gender markers across all of their identity documents, gender-nonconforming individuals are disproportionately affected by the policy, whether they are undocumented immigrants or not. The website for the National Center for Transgender Equality notes that the organization "receives calls regularly from transgender people across the country who have been 'outed' to their employers by the Social Security Administration's (SSA's) unfair gender 'no-match' employment letter policy." Documents always contain traces of

[8] For further analysis of the racial classifications enacted – if not overtly stated – by the Social Security Act among other U.S. legislation, see George Lipsitz's *The Possessive Investment in Whiteness.*

the past, and we might argue that this has never been as true as it is in our contemporary moment. Dean Spade's work and other activist projects have pushed for changes in particular states' approaches to gendered identity documents and moved away from the pathologizing of trans identities and bodies. But such changes emerge within a broader context of U.S. nationalism and the War on Terror, both of which serve to justify ever-closer scrutiny of travel, identity documents and bodies.

The Threat of Ambiguity: New State Security Measures

It is in this cultural landscape of intensified medical, legal and social surveillance that the DHS Advisory appears. By warning security personnel of the gendered disguises that terrorists may appear in, the Advisory neatly fuses the threat of terrorism-in-disguise with perceived gender transgression, marking particular bodies as deceptive and treacherous. Three days after the Advisory was released, a *New York Times* article reported the Pentagon's recent screening of the classic 1965 film *The Battle of Algiers*. The *Times* article suggests that the Pentagon screening was held in part to gain tactical insight into the current U.S. war against Iraq. *Algiers* is a film filled with depictions of guerilla warfare tactics, including those that rely on the links between gender and national identities: Algerian women pass as French to deliver bombs into French civilian settings, while Algerian men attempt to pass as women in hijabs, their disguises broken when French soldiers spy their combat boots. Though neither the DHS Advisory nor the Pentagon's study of the film explicitly reference transgender populations, both nevertheless invoke the ties between gender presentation, national identity and bodies marked as dangerously deceptive.

That the Advisory does not specifically name transgender populations in its text does not make it any less relevant to those populations. The focus on non-normative gender does raise questions about how this framing of state security affects transgender-identified people. But it also raises questions about how state institutions might view non-normative gender presentation as an act not limited to – perhaps not even primarily associated with – transgender identities. In the context of current security rhetoric related to the War on Terror, transgender individuals may not be the primary target of such advisories, particularly if those individuals are understood to be conforming to normative racial, class and national presentations. Medical science purports to normalize deviant transgender bodies through "treatments" such as surgery and hormones. These interventions are intended to eliminate any signs of deviant gendering, creating a non-threatening body that is undetectable as trans in any way. Transgender bodies that conform to a dominant standard of dress and behavior may be legible to the state not as transgender at all, but instead as properly gendered and "safe."

But not all gendered bodies are so easily normalized. Dominant notions of what constitutes proper feminine or masculine behavior are grounded in ideals of whiteness, class privilege and compulsory heterosexuality, and individuals might be read as non-conforming depending on particular racial, cultural, economic or religious expressions of gender, without ever being classified as transgender. For example, Siobhan Somerville historicizes the ways that black people have been medically and culturally understood to have racialized physical characteristics that directly connect to their perceived abnormality in terms of gender and sexuality. She traces this history back to the public displays in the mid-1800s of Saartje Baartman, an African woman popularly known as

the Hottentot Venus, whose womanhood was deemed abnormal precisely through racialized readings of her genitalia (26). In early 20th century all-girl schools, she notes, "the imposition of racial segregation marked the 'white' and 'colored' girls as differently gendered, even in the space of a supposedly single-sex institution" (35). Somerville argues that legal cases such as *Plessy v. Ferguson* advanced racial segregation by inciting panic about the supposed sexual danger white women experienced at the hands of black men (35). Similar sexual panic served to justify public lynchings of black men throughout the U.S., and the genital mutilation and castration frequently involved suggests a clear link between racialization and fears of hypermasculinity and violent sexual deviance. Joy James draws on this history to analyze contemporary racialized state violence, arguing that state practices of surveillance and discipline read sexual and social deviance or danger through racialization processes. Moreover, she writes, "some bodies appear more docile than others because of their conformity in appearance to idealized models of class, color, and sex; their bodies are allowed greater leeway to be self-policed or policed without physical force" (26). These examples demonstrate that perceived gender normativity is not limited strictly to gender, but is always infused with regulatory norms of race, class, sexuality and nationality. Thus individuals need not be transgender-identified to be classified as gender-nonconforming. Bodies may be perceived as abnormal or deviant because of gender presentations read through systems of racism, classism, heterosexism, and particularly in the case of the Advisory's focus on Al-Qaeda, Islamophobia.

The impetus for state classification and surveillance of deviant bodies has increased dramatically in the context of amplified monitoring of immigration and heightened

nationalist security measures justified by the rhetoric of the War on Terror. This environment spurred the passage of the Real ID Act in 2005, legislation endorsed by the 9/11 Commission, which noted that "for terrorists, travel documents are as important as weapons" ("Real ID"). The Real ID Act establishes minimum standards for U.S. driver's licenses and non-driver IDs, with the intention that by 2013 any ID card that is non-compliant with these standards will be invalid for activities such as air travel, access to government buildings, or access to federal funding such as Social Security. Stricter standards are to be used to verify identities, citizenship, names and birthdates. Draft regulations also specify that Real ID cards and all supporting documents used to create them (birth certificates, Social Security cards, court-ordered name changes, etc.) be linked through a federal database and stored there for seven to ten years. Torpey distinguishes between passports and identification cards by noting that while passports primarily regulate movement and support state control of borders, ID cards typically serve to affirm an individual's identity for state records and distribution of state benefits. Yet the Real ID Act actually combines these two functions in many ways, with its stricter standards for asylum applications and funding of some border security projects, alongside the regulation of identity for U.S. citizens overall. In a 2007 congressional hearing on the Real ID Act's ability to ensure safety, Senator Arlen Specter echoed the logic of the Social Security no-match letters, stating that "one of the issues that we are struggling with [in immigration legislation] is, beyond securing borders, to have employers know who is legal and who is not legal. And we are wrestling with the costs of foolproof identification" (U.S. Congress 2007, 4).

But the state's own definition of "foolproof identification" works hand in hand with the constant potential for documents to be forged, incorrect or otherwise inconsistent, as is evident from Michael Johnson's statement in a 2006 congressional hearing on the U.S. passport system and anti-terrorism legislation. Explaining that most passport fraud is typically committed not by those seeking to immigrate but by individuals already within the U.S., Johnson states that the passport "provides ironclad proof of an individual's identity. The value of this document to an individual trying to conceal his identity or blend into American society is obvious, given the post September 11 scrutiny placed on non-U.S. citizens inside the United States" (U.S. Congress 2006, 9). In this logic, ironically, the purported accuracy and stability of documents like passports are precisely what make them desirable objects to forge or falsify. Similarly, the very value of an "ironclad" ID here lies in its own potential to be cracked open, demonstrating again the impossibility of one characteristic existing without the other. The idea that identification documents can be simultaneously "ironclad" and undermined is particularly clear in the state's anxiety over the possibility of multiple identities, in which one person might hold two different identification cards. In fact, Torpey suggests that "[t]he use of such documents by states indicates their fundamental suspicion that people will lie when asked who or what they are" (166).

It is noteworthy that Congress passed the Real ID Act with little debate (and with unanimous final approval from the Senate), four years after 9/11 and as the U.S. waged war in at least two countries. The ease with which the Act passed may be attributed to the fact that it was tacked onto an emergency spending bill to fund the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In his historical account of Britain's attempts to institute a national

ID card, Jon Agar argues that only during wartime could such universal identification processes be justified and implemented. He notes that increased concern over fraudulent identities proved to be a major argument in favor of continuing the compulsory national identity documents instituted during World War II. Efforts to maintain individual identity converged with efforts to regulate sexual practices and gendered relationship structures, as postwar attempts to shore up the nuclear family took the form of public outcry against bigamy, viewed by the British state and general public as a "foreign" practice that enabled both sexual deviance and multiple identities. Agar writes that "bigamy starkly highlighted the extent to which social institutions depended on individuals living under one, and only one, identity," fueling desires not just to continue the cards, but to *expand* the amount of information they contained (116). For many, compulsory ID cards recalled totalitarian governing practices associated with Nazi Germany, and conflicted with British ideals of privacy and individualism. Yet the possibility that such cards could eradicate bigamist practices – securing individual accountability alongside normative sexuality and family structure – provided its own form of national differentiation. Moreover, because ID cards were touted as preventative measures against stolen identities, state regulation of identity was encouraged as a personal right and civil liberty, a method of increasing lawful citizens' security. The state thus implied that those who had nothing to hide had nothing to fear from the implementation of national identification cards.

The Real ID Act and the discourses surrounding it echo much of this rhetoric. In the context of U.S. nationalism that seeks to eradicate the foreign, the Act is most overtly directed at the figures of the immigrant and the terrorist, categories that frequently

overlap in both public discourse and state policy. To eliminate these figures, the Act increases state surveillance of identity by requiring and storing a single identity for each individual. But maintaining a singular, consistent, and legally documented identity is deeply complicated for many gender-nonconforming people: for example, common law name changes mean there is no court order to be filed with a Real ID card. Similarly, different state agencies define "change of sex" differently (with some requiring one surgery, some another, and others no surgery at all), making a single gender marker on the Real ID card difficult if not impossible. Ironically, the state's own contradictory methods of determining and designating legal gender and sex render Real ID cards ineffectual. Even as these cards would work to create and enforce singular and static identities for individuals, they simultaneously function to expose the fluidity and confusion characterizing state policies on identity documents. As Jane Caplan and John Torpey argue, "[t]he very multiplicity of these documents may […] disrupt the state's ostensibly monolithic front" (7). Thus state regulation of gender and gendered bodies can actually function to reveal ambiguities in the state itself.

Moreover, such policies point to the ways that concealing and revealing trans identity actually depend on one another, demonstrating the impossibility of thinking these actions as binary opposites. To conceal one's trans status under the law requires full disclosure to the medico-legal system, which keeps on public record all steps taken toward transition. That same system is later invoked when individuals seek to prove their trans status through medical and legal documents that ostensibly serve to obscure or even disappear such status. In this sense, it becomes clear that concealment necessarily entails disclosure, and vice versa.

That the Real ID Act, created as part of a war funding bill and approved in a climate of fear and militarization, seeks to maintain individual identities and make them more accessible to state agencies speaks to the ways that multiple, ambiguous or shifting identities are viewed as menacing and risky on a national scale. Alongside more overt statements like the DHS Advisory, the Real ID Act and SSA no-match letters function as significant state practices and policies that link gender ambiguity with national security threats. Like other new security measures, the Real ID Act is promoted as benign – even beneficial – for those citizens with nothing to hide. Yet the notion of concealment remains strongly associated with the category of transgender, a perception fueled by cultural depictions of trans deception and by the medico-legal system that aims to normalize trans bodies while simultaneously meticulously tracking and documenting gender changes. Reacting to these cultural and legislative constraints, transgender activist and advocacy organizations increasingly engage with and critique new state security measures in efforts to increase safety for individual transgender-identified people, as well to maintain the security of the nation.

Nothing to Hide: Organizational Responses

In their responses to the DHS Advisory, the Real ID Act and the SSA no-match letters, transgender advocacy organizations have opposed these measures' effects on transgender individuals. But they have not typically considered the implications for state regulation of gender presentation more broadly, particularly as it might resonate for individuals marked as gender deviant who are not transgender-identified or linked in any obvious way to trans communities or histories. Nor have they addressed the ways in

which particular groups of trans-identified people may be targeted differently by such policing. For example, in a 2006 statement to DHS regarding the no-match letter policy, NCTE recommends that gender no longer be one of the pieces of data used to verify employees, arguing that employers are not legally required to submit gender classification to SSA, and therefore any exchange of information about employees' gender is "an invasion of private and privileged medical information" (Keisling, 2). In an effort to protect transgender employees, the NCTE statement suggests limiting the amount of information that can be shared between SSA and DHS. Yet it also works to support no-match letters as a form of regulatory state surveillance, by stating clearly the importance of "avoiding fraud" through Social Security number confirmation. The statement does not oppose state surveillance measures more broadly, but instead seeks to improve them, offering recommendations on behalf of trans employees "in order for the employee verification system to be efficient and equitable" (1).

While arguing for privacy rights may benefit some gender-nonconforming employees, this strategy assumes equal access to privacy and legal recourse for all transgender people and fails to consider how privacy rights are compromised or nonexistent for undocumented immigrants, prisoners and individuals suspected of terrorism, who may or may not be transgender-identified or perceived as gender-nonconforming. Diminished rights to privacy are particularly evident in the wake of the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act, legislation that provides much of the ideological and legal foundation for more recent state surveillance measures. Building on earlier policies such as the 1996 Anti-Terrorism and Death Penalty Act and the FBI's COINTELPRO activities, the USA PATRIOT Act further limits individual privacy rights by expanding

the federal government's ability to secretly search private homes; collect medical, financial and educational records without probable cause; and monitor internet activity and messages. Passed in the flurry of anti-immigrant nationalism and increased racial profiling that followed 9/11, the Act bolsters particular understandings of the relationships between citizenship, race, privacy and danger that underpin surveillance measures like the Real ID Act and SSA no-match policy. Absent from the NCTE statement, this context demonstrates the frailty of any claim to privacy rights, particularly for trans and gender-nonconforming immigrants and people of color. The statement seeks to protect transgender employees, but remains within – and is limited by – the constraints of the current medico-legal system.

That medico-legal system itself works to track and document gender-nonconforming bodies and transgender identities, such that at some level, trans people's medical and legal information was never private or privileged. With this in mind, it is perhaps not surprising that the primary strategy of transgender advocacy and activist groups has been to advise trans individuals to make themselves *visible* as transgender to authorities that question or screen them at places like airports and border checkpoints. In response to the DHS Advisory, The National Transgender Advocacy Coalition (NTAC) released its own security alert to transgender communities, warning that given the recent Advisory, security personnel may be "more likely to commit unwitting abuses" (National Transgender Advocacy Coalition, 2003). NTAC suggests that trans travelers bring their court-ordered name and gender change paperwork with them, noting that "while terrorists may make fake identifications, they won't carry name change documents signed and notarized by a court." The organization recommends strategic visibility as a safety

precaution, urging those who might otherwise be "going stealth" to openly disclose their trans status to state officials and to comply with any requested searches or questionings. Calling the potential violence and violations against travelers "unwitting abuses" suggests that authorities enacting these measures cannot be blamed for carrying out policy intended to protect the general public from the threat of hidden terrorism. Such a framework neatly sidesteps any broader criticism of the routine abuses of immigrant, Arab and Arab-appearing individuals that have been justified in the name of national security, and implicitly supports the state's increased policing of "deviant" or apparently dangerous individuals. The demand for trans people to make themselves visible as such is couched in terms of distinguishing between the good, safe transgender traveler and the dangerous, deviant terrorist in gendered disguise. Moreover, by avoiding any larger critique of state surveillance or policing, NTAC also positions *itself* as a good, safe, even patriotic organization.

Torpey argues that "[o]ur everyday acceptance of 'the passport nuisance' and of the frequent demands from state officials that we produce 'ID' is a sign of the success with which states have monopolized the capacity to regulate movement and thus to constrain the freedom of ordinary people to come and go, as well as to identify and constrain possible interlopers" (166). Yet the framing of this as merely capitulation to the state's monopoly on power belies Foucault's model of power as dispersed and fragmentary, never simply exerted in one direction. The reveal of one's trans status that is encouraged by NTAC and other organizations is on one level coerced by state institutions. Yet on another level, it functions as an example of "the confession," a ritual that Foucault notes is seen as critical for the production of truth. In fact he argues that "the obligation to

confess is now relayed through so many different points, is so deeply ingrained in us, that we no longer perceive it as the effect of a power that constrains us" (60). Moreover, he suggests that the confession is made all the more powerful and privileged through the careful concealment of what is to be confessed (61). Thus while ostensibly forced by the coercive power of the surveillant state, the confession that NTAC urges affords the confessor a sense of pleasure as well, of presenting oneself as patriotic and willingly compliant. Discussing "mandatory volunteerism" in response to "soft surveillance" measures grounded in persuasion rather than punishment, Gary Marx also points to the power and pleasure produced through compliance with state requests. He points out that one mechanism of soft surveillance involves appeals to good citizenship or patriotic duty, writing that "[t]here can be psychological gratifications from the revelation for both the voluntary revealer and the recipient of the information" (45). In this way, the relationship between the figure of the compliant trans traveler and the surveillant state exemplifies Foucault's notion of "perpetual spirals of power and pleasure," such that the concealment and unveiling of trans status in response to state pressure forms a seductive circle of evasion and discovery (45).

Interestingly, NTAC's call for strategic visibility does, to a certain degree, resonate with Sandy Stone's call in the late 1980s for trans people to resist the medical impetus to erase or hide their trans status. Urging trans people to remain visible *as transgender* regardless of their medical transition status, Stone writes "in the transsexual's erased history we can find a story disruptive to the accepted discourses of gender" (295). Arguing for the transformation of dominant understandings of transsexuality and gender identity, Stone asserts "it is difficult to generate a counterdiscourse if one is programmed

to disappear" (295). Written in a historical moment characterized by the suppression of transgender identities within the mainstream gay, lesbian and feminist movements, Stone's argument was viewed both as controversial and as crucial to the galvanization of transgender scholars, activists and communities in the U.S. Stone's initial argument may not be the starting point for a linear progression leading to the current tactic of visibility taken up by transgender advocacy organizations in the fight against perceived terrorist threats, but it does indicate the ways that visibility has long been a key point of contention in relation to gender-nonconforming bodies.

In both Stone's work and NTAC's press release, the recourse to strategic visibility remains grounded in assumptions that *in*visibility was ever possible. Which bodies can choose visibility, and which bodies are always already visible – perhaps even hyper-visible – to state institutions? For whom is visibility an available political strategy, and at what cost? While (some) trans people gain (a particular kind of) visibility through attention from popular media and medical research, such gains must always be evaluated in relation to their dependence on regulatory norms of race, class and sexuality. Not all trans people can occupy the role of the good, safe transgender traveler that NTAC recommends. Moreover, this recommendation does not consider how increased visibility simultaneously places one under greater scrutiny and surveillance by state institutions. Bodies made visible as abnormal or unruly and in need of constraint or correction may likely experience increased vulnerability and scrutiny. For a number of gender-nonconforming individuals, then, visibility may wield more damage than protection. Which bodies would be read under the DHS Advisory's warning as gender deviant, dangerous or deceptive even if they *did* produce paperwork documenting their

transgender status? Such documentation may work to decrease suspicion for some bodies, while compounding scrutiny for others.

NTAC is certainly not the only organization to advocate for the rights of legitimate transgender citizens by distinguishing those citizens from the figure of the threatening terrorist. The Transgender Law Center in San Francisco has also released security alerts and recommendations aimed at transgender-identified communities, including one statement jointly issued with NCTE, in which the two organizations critically analyze new security measures like the DHS Advisory and Real ID Act. They note that although these measures were originally conceived in response to "legitimate security concerns" regarding false documentation used by terrorists, they ultimately create undue burdens for transgender individuals who seek to "legitimately acquire or change identification documents" (1). Like NTAC's concern that non-threatening transgender travelers could be mistaken for terrorists, the responses from NCTE and the Transgender Law Center refuse to critically engage the rhetoric of terrorism justifying current state regulation of gender more broadly. The organizations' statement not only avoids a critique of state surveillance measures, but also asks for rights and state recognition on the basis of "legitimacy."

One of Torpey's major arguments is that identity documents are critical to state-building because they serve to mark citizens from non-citizens, thereby also marking those who can make legitimate claims for rights and benefits from the state. For trans populations, classification as "legitimate" is already infused with the regulatory norms maintained by medical science and government policies. Legal legitimacy is typically based on identity documents, most of which require sex reassignment surgery for a

change of gender marker. Yet in almost all cases, surgeons request a formal diagnosis of Gender Identity Disorder – a diagnosis that itself turns on the language of correction and normalization. Moreover, none of these organizations' responses to new security measures address the fact that pervasive surveillance of gender-nonconforming bodies is inextricably linked to the racialization of those bodies. The shifts in and renewed attention to longstanding racial profiling practices in the aftermath of 9/11, which position bodies perceived to be Muslim and/or Arab variously as perverse, deviant, and dangerous, offer important context through which strategies of visibility must be considered. Within the framework of the statement from the Transgender Law Center and NCTE, which bodies can be read as legitimate, and which bodies are always cast as suspicious?

The Sylvia Rivera Law Project, an organization in New York providing legal services to low-income gender-nonconforming people, argues that the current political climate of "us vs. them" leads to the polarization of communities that could otherwise work in coalition, as individuals attempt to divert surveillance onto other marginalized groups. The Law Project suggests that assimilation – "going stealth," or claiming status as a good transgender citizen – has become a primary tactic for escaping state surveillance, targeting or persecution. But the organization notes that such assimilation strategies are regularly used in conjunction with the scapegoating of other communities. Jasbir Puar and Amit Rai convincingly address such polarization in their article "Monster, Terrorist, Fag," arguing that the demand for patriotism in response to past and future terrorist attacks produces "docile patriots," who normalize themselves precisely through distinguishing themselves from other marginalized groups. For example,

regarding the profiling of Arab and Arab-appearing people after 9/11, Puar and Rai examine the response of many Sikh communities in the U.S., who emphasized the difference between their respectable turbans and those worn by terrorists. With some even donning red, white, and blue turbans, Puar and Rai note, the actions of these Sikh communities served to mark off Sikhs as a legitimate, patriotic and "safe" group of American citizens, in direct contrast to differently-turbaned terrorists – indeed, the ability of these Sikhs to become good citizens is directly dependent on their ability to clearly distinguish themselves from the figure of the terrorist. Leti Volpp cites similar rhetoric in her article "The Terrorist and the Citizen," writing that "post-September 11, a national identity has consolidated that is both strongly patriotic and multiracial" (1584). Noting that the Bush administration appears inclusive while systematically excluding those racially marked as potential terrorists, Volpp argues that "American" identity and citizenship are in fact constructed against the figure of the terrorist. The terrorist thus *makes possible* the construction of a national identity, providing a contrast that the citizen is formed in opposition to.

This reliance on the notion of legitimacy – as good citizens, as safe travelers, as willing patriots –is similarly evident in the statements made by many transgender advocacy organizations about new security measures that target perceived gender deviance. Suggesting that trans people bring their court documents with them, cooperate with authorities and prove their legitimacy, the advocacy groups no longer rely on the strategy of concealing one's trans status, or what I named earlier as "going stealth." Instead, their primary advice is to *reveal* one's trans status, to prove that trans travelers are good citizens who have nothing to hide. Particularly in the context of the War on

Terror, we might reread the notion of "going stealth" to mean not simply erasing the signs of one's trans status, but instead, maintaining legibility as a good citizen, a patriotic American – erasing any signs of similarity with the deviant, deceptive terrorist. The concept of safety thus shifts: rather than protecting trans people from state violence, the organizations now focus on protecting the nation from the threatening figure of the terrorist, a figure that transgender travelers must distinguish themselves from by demonstrating their complicity in personal disclosure. Creating the figure of the safe transgender traveler necessarily entails creating and maintaining the figure of the potential terrorist, and vice versa. Because some bodies are already marked as national threats, the ability to embody the figure of the safe trans traveler is not only limited to particular bodies, but in fact requires the scapegoating of other bodies.

While surveillance measures like the DHS Advisory may appear to primarily target transgender individuals as suspicious, the bodies being policed for gender deviance are not necessarily trans-identified, but rather demonstrate non-compliance with gender norms that may have as much to do with race, religion, class and sexuality as with transgender identity. Surveillance of these bodies centers less on their identification as transgender *per se* than it does on the perceived deception underlying transgressive gender presentation. Because normative, non-threatening gender is always read through ideals of whiteness, economic privilege and heterosexuality, "going stealth" is an option available only to particular segments of the transgender population. And in the context of national security and the U.S. War on Terror, going stealth may be less grounded in passing as non-transgender than in maintaining the appearance of a good, compliant citizen, an appearance solidified by the fact that these individuals need not conceal

anything from state institutions or authorities, because they have nothing to hide. Approaching the relationship between gender-nonconformity and state surveillance in this way means resisting the urge to think about surveillance of gendered bodies as limited only to medical and legal monitoring of specifically transgender-identified individuals. In fact it points to the importance of thinking more broadly about the interactions between regulatory gender norms, racialization processes and ideals of citizenship. Moreover, it refuses a view of state surveillance as something disconnected from or unconcerned with gender, and instead foregrounds the ways that gendered and racialized bodies are central both to perceptions of safety and security and to the structuring of state surveillance practices. As these bodies attempt to evade surveillance either through careful invisibility or through strategic disclosure, they do so not in isolation, but in the context of war, nationalism and militarization, and power relations that are themselves often concealed in the act of going stealth.

The Face of Truth and Terror: Biometrics, Borders, and Unruly Bodies

In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that increased regulation of and emphasis on identification documents as a strategy for rooting out suspiciously inconsistent identities actually reveal the state's own contradictory policies and practices. Despite long histories of marginalized groups forging and altering such documents, and despite the state's own acknowledgement of documents' fallibility and ambiguity, recent U.S. state policies continue to position this form of identification as a key component of anti-terrorist measures. At the same time, though, the search continues for more accurate and stable methods of identification than the identification document, which exists only relative to and apart from the individual body. In the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001, many state actors turned their attention to the physical body itself as a identificatory tool. It is in this context that the U.S. state took up questions of biometrics technologies with renewed fervor.

In January 2002, the U.S. Department of Defense established the Information Awareness Office (IAO), a component of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), with the specific purpose of designing technology that could track, identify and classify terrorist threats to U.S. security. One key IAO initiative is the "Human ID at a Distance" program, which employs biometrics to identify individuals through analysis of facial features, iris scans, fingerprints and gait. The project was approved and funded just months after a Congressional hearing on "Biometric Identifiers and the Modern Face of Terror," in which Senator Diane Feinstein claimed that the individuals who carried out the airline hijackings of 9/11 were able to do so because "we

could not identify them" (36). Throughout that hearing, legislators and industry experts alike singled out biometrics as a crucial tool in identifying and apprehending terrorists as well as in regulating immigration, precisely because, unlike identification documents that might be falsified, biometrics rely on unique aspects of the physical body that are thought to be immutable and therefore objectively analyzed.

Yet one of the most common biometric categories — sex — positions transgender bodies as potentially disruptive to the very foundation of biometric accuracy. Such bodies are frequently conceptualized as traversing sex and gender categories deceptively or secretively. While the strength of biometrics is said to be in its ability to see beyond individual deception, its reliance on the physical body as a stable and neatly classifiable entity might simultaneously be its undoing. This chapter draws on the theoretical lenses of transgender studies, ethnic studies, and critical geography to consider biometrics' reliance on and (re)production of normative understandings of gendered and racialized bodies in efforts to track and identify the figures of the terrorist, the immigrant, and the citizen through physical characteristics. I ask how state surveillance of potentially threatening bodies moving within and across U.S. borders – particularly as those bodies are racialized – might be linked to popular understandings of transgender bodies as deceptively moving from one sex or gender to another. In both cases, the purported threat of these deceptively mobile bodies is thought to be neutralized through biometrics' ability to empirically classify individuals. Yet even as these bodies are disproportionately scrutinized by surveillance technologies, I argue that they also function to disrupt and confound that scrutiny, by making clear contradictions in binary classification schemes that may first appear stable and objective.

Much of the work on biometrics in surveillance studies attends to either the histories of biometric technologies or their material effects on bodies, particularly in the context of amplified state surveillance measures after 9/11. For example, in "The Body Does Not Lie: Identity, Risk and Trust in Technoculture," Katja Aas examines the ways that identification practices based on physical bodies have shifted in accordance with both technological advances and post-9/11 forms of governance, suggesting that bodies are increasingly understood as markers of identity that can be coded and decoded with greater certainty and at greater distances, creating "new conceptions of identity" (144). And even before the events of September 11, 2001 brought the potential of biometrics programs freshly into the public eye, Irma van der Ploeg's 1999 article "The Illegal Body: 'Eurodac' and the Politics of Biometric Identification" pointed to growing state interest in the body as proof of both identity and citizenship, noting that the citizen's body is more and more "implicated in the distribution of benefits, services, and rights" (296). These and similar scholarly undertakings usefully describe the workings of biometrics with an eye to the ways such programs might easily and dangerously split populations along lines of citizenship, legibility, risk, and legitimacy.[9] My concern in this chapter is not to replicate these studies — not to describe biometrics programs' past uses or current dangers *per se* — but rather to draw on examinations of biometrics' effects and histories in an effort to unseat the programs themselves by revealing their own internal contradictions.

To a certain extent, these contradictions have also been illuminated in post-9/11 surveillance studies scholarship. Yet often these appear as markers of biometrics' limited

[9] See for example: "Organization, Surveillance and the Body" by Kirstie Ball, *Capturing the Criminal Image* by Jonathan Finn, "The Border is Everywhere" by David Lyon, and "Theorizing Cross-Border Mobility" by Robert Pallitto and Josiah Heyman.

efficacy, as Dean Wilson explains in "Biometrics, Borders and the Ideal Suspect" when he points out the surge of interest in biometrics after 9/11, which posited biometric identification as a process both straightforward and neutral, despite pre-9/11 concerns about frequent errors. Reminding us of these errors, and more importantly of the false sense of objectivity that biometrics claims, Wilson argues that "the appeal of biometrics may reside in their symbolic resonance rather than in any technical efficacy" (94). This resonance is certainly strong: drawing on the supposedly unambiguous truths of both the physical body and the photographic image, and backed by Western science's claim to objectivity, biometrics serve as a site on which numerous investments in truth converge. Like Wilson and others, I am interested in the ways that biometrics offer a supposedly value-neutral and unambiguous form of identification, and this chapter aims in part to demonstrate the impossibility of such claims. I am less invested, however, in laying claim to the level of "technical efficacy" biometrics might ensure — a claim that aligns, however implicitly, with the notion that biometrics might at some point effectively tame the physical body. Rather, this chapter suggests that biometric technologies work *interdependently* with bodies that are necessarily unruly and ambiguous: that these technologies' purported ability to stabilize bodies is only meaningful in relation to those bodies' ability to avoid or confound stabilization. For what desire would we have for biometrics' impressive claims to regulate the body, if that body were not already understood to be unmanageable? In this sense, this chapter considers how the trans and/or terrorist body, understood to be deceptively mobile, functions as both the catalyst and foil for biometrics programs.

Making connections between current biometric technologies and earlier medical and scientific attempts to classify physical bodies, I call into question biometrics' supposed neutrality and objectivity, particularly along lines of race, gender and sexuality. I pay special attention to facial recognition software as it is invoked regarding post-9/11 anxieties over the supposed "facelessness" and thus endless mobility of terrorist bodies. Given the discursive links between terrorist threats and gender-nonconformity that I outlined in the previous chapter, I focus here on metaphors of mobility and border crossing that draw together the figures of the terrorist, the trans person, and the immigrant as deceptive and uncontainable figures positioned in opposition to the neatly bounded citizen. By demonstrating that the citizen is mutually constituted with these unruly figures, and by foregrounding biometrics' need for continually unruly bodies, I point to the ways that physical bodies reflect back biometrics' own internal contradictions. This chapter, then, argues that such contradictions undo claims to stability and neat classification not just of individual bodies, but of citizenship, race, gender, and security more broadly.

Panaceas of and for the Past

The urgency with which events like the 2001 Congressional hearing turned to biometrics can be understood as a form of "technostalgia," a term first coined by Pat Gill in 1999.[10] In "Biometrics and Post-9/11 Technostalgia," Kelly Gates examines the term in the context of increased government and public interest in surveillance technologies in the aftermath of 9/11, framing this as a moment in which "technology emerges as an

[10] See Gill's "Technostalgia: Making the Future Past Perfect."

already existing, reliable, and high-tech solution to the newest, most pressing problem facing the nation," and reminding us that "this move effectively erases the history of these technologies, even as it inserts them fully formed into the past" (36). Technological panaceas — to both the future security of the nation and the regrettable past in which these technologies could have prevented tragedy or vulnerability — are called up with particular frequency in relation to the seemingly exceptional moment of September 11, 2001, fueling precisely the kind of erasure that Gates critiques. Such exceptionalism is evident not only in government hearings and military surveillance projects, but also in academic work, as when surveillance studies scholar Ayse Ceyhan asserts that "the adoption of biometric technologies in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks [have led] to another divide: good and risky bodies" (112).

This divide is perhaps more readily *apparent* in a post-9/11 context. But long before Senator Feinstein convened a Congressional hearing on "the modern face of terror," biometrics comprised a central method for regulating and classifying supposedly risky or unruly populations. Ceyhan herself notes that 19th century British imperialists used palm prints to identify welfare recipients in Bengal (113-114), practices that prefigured widespread fingerprinting as a form of identification deemed credible by Western science, following from the work of Francis Galton in England. These identification processes worked in tandem with Alphonse Bertillon's 19th century introduction of anthropometrics as a tool for distinguishing individuals from one another based on a detailed system of bodily measurements. That anthropometrics was primarily used for tracking and identifying criminals aligns it in many ways with eugenics programs of the late 19th and early 20th century, which depended heavily on visual

scrutiny and scientific measurement of the physical body to justify classifying certain populations as unhealthy, dangerous or degenerate. All of these examples lay critical groundwork for contemporary biometric technologies. For example, early craniometry studies are easily linked to current facial recognition programs, which, like their predecessors, rely largely on measurements of the skull and facial structure to identify particular individuals and groups. Current uses of biometrics as a way of distinguishing safe bodies from risky ones, though situated in the particular context of 9/11 and the War on Terror and thus positioned as new and exceptional, actually carry forward long histories of bodily classification legitimated by Western science's seemingly objective gaze.

Likewise, the construction of citizenship through the physical body is not unique to post-9/11 calls for biometric identification of "alien bodies," a phrase commonly understood to mean undocumented immigrants, but which more broadly references any body deemed foreign, strange, or outcast. The conflation of immigrant, terrorist, and dangerous bodies is evident in Senator Strom Thurmond's assertion at the 2001 Congressional hearing that biometrics would help immigration officials identify "terrorists who attempt to cross our borders" (72). Such a statement implies that terrorists and immigrants might have bodies that are similar to one another, yet recognizably distinct from those of citizens. Citizenship has routinely been read through the body, or denied on the basis of bodily risk or inferiority. Skin color, bloodlines, and sex/gender assignment have all served as defining characteristics of citizenship at various moments;

until early 2010, HIV status served as one major bodily characteristic used to regulate immigration and citizenship in the United States.[11]

In these ways, bodies function as markers of good or bad citizenship, categories that produce and uphold each other. Bodies marked as citizens are only meaningful as such insofar as they are constructed against and form the constitutive outside for the non-citizen. In a 2004 editorial piece titled "Bodies Without Words: Against the Biopolitical Tatoo," Giorgio Agamben explains why he canceled a series of lectures he had scheduled in the United States after learning that he would be fingerprinted upon entrance to the country. Recalling the normalization of tattooing practices during the Holocaust, Agamben cautions against contemporary turns to biometrics as marking citizenship on and through the body: "The biopolitical tatoo imposed upon us today […] is the baton of what we might accept tomorrow as the normal way of registering into the mechanism and the transmission of the state if we want to be identified as good citizens" (169).

Troublingly, though, Agamben's editorial also implies that these biometric identification systems are less objectionable when applied to particular groups: he argues that the citizen is rendered "a suspect against which all those techniques and installations need to be mounted that had originally been conceived of only for the most dangerous individuals" (169). Yet how are such individuals to be determined, and under what conditions? Jonathan Finn's work on visual surveillance and criminality demonstrates that fingerprinting in the 19th century was a major force behind the development of vast archives of identification materials, which themselves were key components in a general

[11] For further discussion of citizenship as read through various bodily or physical characteristics, see for example Siobhan Somerville's "Sexual Aliens and the Racialized State," Cabral and Viturro's "(Trans)Sexual Citizenship in Contemporary Argentina," and Eithne Luibhéid's *Entry Denied*, particularly chapter 1.

shift away from the identification and punishment of individual transgressors and toward a broader collection of data that suggests any citizen might be potentially criminal. Finn suggests that the fluidity between the categories of citizen and criminal buttressed by such archives works in tandem with constantly shifting definitions of crime and criminality itself (*Capturing* 82). In this context, "the most dangerous individuals," as a category, can be understood as constantly in flux, such that citizenship does not necessarily guard against the potential for criminality to be read onto bodies. Thus, Agamben suggests that the implementation of biometrics as tracking and as markers of citizenship actually disrupts the seemingly clear category of citizenship: "Paradoxically, the citizen is thus rendered a suspect all along" (169).

Further blurring the lines demarcating citizenship, in "The Terrorist and the Citizen," Leti Volpp shows that national boundaries are constructed and fortified through the exclusion of certain groups. She emphasizes that the status of citizen gains meaning only in contrast to the category of non-citizen, suggesting that while those bodies frequently read as terrorist or potential terrorist (particularly bodies that are or are perceived to be Arab, Middle Eastern or Muslim) may be understood to technically have legal rights, they cannot signify American citizenship or the U.S. as a nation. On the contrary, she writes, "[t]he consolidation of American identity takes place against them" (1594). And increasingly stringent efforts to distinguish between the citizen and the terrorist fold into a "'common sense' understanding" of the differences between terrorist and citizen, despite, Volpp notes, political leaders' public assurances against racial profiling (1581). Thus, particularly in a post-9/11 context, "American" identity and citizenship are constructed against the figure of the terrorist, such that the citizen is

made possible precisely through its oppositional relationship to the terrorist.

Ideals of Precision: Reading the Body

That the 2001 Congressional hearings on biometrics referenced the "modern face of terror" is perhaps no accident. The phrase easily invokes the desire for innovative ways of identifying terrorists who have otherwise been able to infiltrate or skirt the United States' cutting edge surveillance technology. But more literally, what *is* the modern "face" of terror? The purpose of the hearings seems to be to determine appropriate strategies for classifying such a face, not just in terms of personal identity, but through careful measurement and scrutiny of the body itself. In this context, "the modern face of terror" might imply that there is a particular bodily characteristic representative of the terrorist. The location of such a characteristic would then promise to bring order to a figure typically understood as chaotic, unruly, and untraceable, solely through observation of the body itself. Surveillance studies scholar Katja Aas contends that "now, with the help of technology, bodies are seen as a source of unprecedented accuracy and precision. The coded body does not need to be disciplined, because its natural patterns are in themselves a source of order" (153).

But is this really the case? Technological advances may appear to ever more precisely classify the body — may appear to transform the body into objective, immutable and unambiguous data. Yet various technologies simultaneously assist in transforming bodies into different ways of appearing or moving: prosthetics alter or constrain the body's movements and shapes; surgeries add, remove or reshape not only internal organs, but also the body's visual surface; and hormone and other drug regimens

augment or alter the body's chemical makeup. Thus technology claims at once to both locate the body as a fixed and neatly categorized entity, and to create an ever more flexible and mutable body. Yet even without obvious biomedical interventions, bodies push against and disrupt the calculating gaze of surveillance technologies, because these technologies read bodies through regulatory norms of race, class, sexuality, dis/ability and gender — a lens through which various nonconforming bodies appear troubling, anomalous, or even illegible.

Nevertheless, the purported ability to read and identify the body in ways that are disconnected from bias on the basis of race, gender, sexuality, age, and other categories constitutes a major selling point for biometrics technologies. Claims to scientific objectivity and photographic truth frame analysis of individual body parts (e.g., fingerprints, facial structure, irises) as neutral observations outside the realm of racism or other forms of social marginalization and discrimination. The pervasive notion that images and measurements of the body serve as objective evidence draws heavily on what Roland Barthes has discussed as *myth* – those social conventions underlying and producing meanings attached to images, meanings that are naturalized and come to seem self-evident or universal. Hence the photograph, in part because of its association with the technological innovation of the camera, has long been taken as a form of easily-read, universally-interpreted visual fact, offering a kind of photographic truth that is actually produced, read, and variously interpreted in a particular historical and social context. For example, I discussed in chapter one some of the ways that photographic identification documents have been intentionally altered to produce certain readings, and the ways these readings are filtered through social and political frameworks. This assumed

objective truth extends to more recent biometrics programs that increasingly rely on digital imaging, more technologically advanced than the photograph and thus carrying the legitimating mark of western science. At the same time, digital images are understood as more easily altered, reproduced, and forged. Like the twin claims of technology to both stabilize and endlessly reshape the physical body, digital imaging seems to offer at once a more scientifically exact form of visual scrutiny *and* an more easily manipulated visual object.

Claims of objective measurement also characterize biometrics' predecessors of craniometry and other anthropometric systems, which were founded on the desire to scientifically distinguish between bodies in terms of social identity categories. And while new biometric programs may not appear to be invested in the scientific racism that fueled earlier attempts to measure and identify the body, the potential objectivity of the technologies themselves cannot cancel out the uses to which they are put and the ways in which they are interpreted. For example, Simon Cole's work points out that early advocates of fingerprinting classified fingerprint samples according to the race and gender of the subject, as a way of searching for group patterns. Calling into question the notion that "individuality is the ultimate challenge to racial categorization," an assumption that the fingerprint's claim to individual identity would seem to support, Cole demonstrates that early forays into fingerprinting were actually fueled by eugenic desires to categorize and monitor racialized groups (230). Such efforts diverged from Bertillon anthropometrics programs geared towards identifying criminal types, in large part, Cole notes, because the Bertillon system relied on visual scrutiny of the face, a feature viewed as particularly difficult for white state actors to distinguish in non-white racial groups.

Seen in this context, the fingerprint offered a less overtly racially charged bodily characteristic through which to push forward the classification of different racialized "types." At the same time, Cole argues that early fingerprinting programs relied far more heavily on crude racial divisions than did anthropometrics, the latter of which viewed race as less easily bounded, creating and recreating categories that attended to infinite variations and ambiguities in racialized bodies.

The eugenics programs that underlay fingerprinting efforts aimed to neatly separate different groups into clear hierarchies, and bodies deemed inconsistent or ambiguous served to justify eugenic logic (proving the need to identify and weed out the racially and bodily impure) even while they confounded eugenic classification schemes. In fact, it is precisely the ambiguities and unruly qualities of the physical body that stymied early fingerprinting programs, despite their longstanding reputation as straightforward and racially neutral. Cole notes that Francis Galton, founder of the eugenics movement and an early proponent of fingerprinting programs, repeatedly failed to neatly classify prints according to pre-defined types, "because he kept coming across 'transitional' patterns that could be construed as belonging to more than one type" (233). Notably, Galton referred to these patterns as "mulatto," discursively linking mixed-race bodies and identities with mixed-type prints, implicating both in his inability to cleanly sort prints without error. Bodies that resist easy classification — those that are multi-racial, gender-nonconforming or disabled, for example — potentially disrupt the precision that biometrics lays claim to.

Importantly, that disruption is activated by the bodies on the *other* side of biometrics technology: the technicians and analysts who evaluate biometrics data through

normative understandings of bodies. Aas suggests that "the whole point behind biometric identification is, in fact, that the mind is deceiving while the body is 'truthful'" (154). Yet this kind of mind-body split belies the ways that biometrics themselves must be administered and interpreted through the bodily actions and mental calculations of legislators, immigration officials, police, and other state actors. In "Under My Skin: From Identification Papers to Body Surveillance," David Lyon observes that under biometrics, the body "is treated like a text" (299). Though biometric technologies turn on the captivating notion that bodies present an easy and infallible way to authenticate identity, in fact these bodies, like paper passports, must be read and analyzed by other bodies.

Shadowy Networks: The Necessary Impossibility of Identification

Despite the possibility of multiple and inconsistent readings of bodily characteristics, the popularity of biometrics has always been in its claim to lay bare the truth of the individual through objective scientific inspection of the physical body, whether this truth is one of identity, latent degeneracy, or hidden criminal behavior. Senator Orrin Hatch took the 2001 Congressional hearings as an opportunity to praise biometrics as a safeguard against terrorism for precisely this reason, claiming "While individuals may be able to disguise their appearance sufficiently to fool the human eye, the technology [of] today can thwart the most sophisticated criminal mind" (9). Moreover, he argued that with the increased use of biometrics as part of border security, "Impersonation would be dramatically curtailed, if not eliminated altogether" (9). This stance is aligned with the logic justifying the Human ID at a Distance project under

DARPA, which contends that "terrorists are able to move freely throughout the world, [and] to hide when necessary."

Underlying these two statements is the concern that certain racial groups are not readily distinguishable as individuals, a concern echoing that of early proponents of biometrics programs like fingerprinting, which focused on tracking non-white bodies not only because these bodies were assumed to be more susceptible to criminality, but also because white state actors believed racialized bodies to be otherwise indistinguishable from one another. Given the frequent representation of transgender bodies as deceptively disguised or engaging in fraudulent impersonation, such statements have particular relevance for trans people of color, and for bodies perceived as gender transgressive in relation to racialization processes. That is to say, the linking of certain racial groups with both criminality and indistinguishability, alongside the popular understanding of transgender bodies as intentionally or dangerously deceptive, creates a backdrop for the particular policing of those bodies that are both gender-nonconforming and racially marginalized. And although the DARPA project purports to eradicate bodies' ability to hide through disguises, I argue in this section that it is simultaneously dependent upon the continuation of that very ability.

DARPA established the Information Awareness Office in early 2002, naming as its director John Poindexter, former national security adviser under the Ronald Reagan administration.[12] The IAO arose directly from post-9/11 fears of further terrorist attacks,

[12] Poindexter's appointment to an office chiefly concerned with identifying and analyzing evidence of fraudulent or criminal behavior is particularly ironic given his role in the Iran-Contra scandal in the late 1980s. Poindexter was convicted on several felony counts, including obstruction of justice and destroying documents relevant to the investigation; upon appeal, these convictions were overturned. Nevertheless, this history prompted some concern over his role at the IAO.

and early reports explaining the program's import routinely emphasize the gravity of the current moment by linking it to the Cold War, yet contend that a post-9/11 United States faces an even more dangerous national threat. For example, the April 2002 DARPA Fact File states that "the kind of information we need today differs significantly from what we needed during the Cold War," and stresses the necessity for greater quantities of information as well as the ability to share it "across agency boundaries." In August 2002, Poindexter provided an overview of the IAO's rationale and major initiatives at a DARPATech conference in Arlington, Virginia, emphasizing that while Cold War efforts had clear targets, the current menace of terrorism can be defined as "a threat characterized by collections of people loosely organized in shadowy networks that are difficult to identify and define." This phrase is repeated both in the Fact File and in the official IAO website.

The shift suggested here, temporally marked out by the Cold War era, echoes the transformation Gilles Deleuze discusses as beginning in the early 20th century, a transformation in the form of power from Foucault's theory of disciplinary society toward what Deleuze calls a society of control. Not so much a replacement for as an evolution of disciplinary society, the society of control emerges as social structures shift away from more contained institutions (the factory, the school, the military) through which discipline occurs, their boundaries fading away and merging with one another, such that individuals do not enter and exit these institutions, but continually move through them. Thus Deleuze writes, "In the disciplinary societies one was always starting again (from school to the barracks, from the barracks to the factory), while in the societies of control one is never finished with anything – the corporation, the educational

system, the armed services being metastable states coexisting in one and the same modulation" (5). The increase in transnational flows of capital, bodies, and information particularly since World War II exemplify this understanding of a control society in which flow and modulation gain importance. In the society of control, then, the regulatory functions of discipline are more diffuse; one need not be within a particular institution to experience them.

Moreover, Deleuze suggests that the shift to societies of control lessens the disciplinary focus on an individual as a bounded category. In their discussion of public health surveillance and societies of control, Patrick O'Byrne and Dave Holmes argue that rather than emphasis on the individual, "smaller and smaller analyses occur: the organ, the tissue, the cell, the molecule, and so forth" (60). Such analyses dovetail easily with the rising interest in biometrics technologies as methods for identifying and controlling the mobility of terrorists. In fact it is the very understanding of terrorism as occurring through what Poindexter calls "shadowy networks" that perhaps best characterizes the society of control, for as Deleuze argues, "the man of control is undulatory, in orbit, in a continuous network" (6). DARPA's insistence both that the nature of the enemy has changed – from the supposedly clear target of the Cold War to the shadowy network of the War on Terror – and that the tactics used to confront this enemy demand greater flows and networks of information is indicative of larger social shifts in the shape and form of disciplinary power.

By early 2003, Poindexter had formalized what would typically be viewed as the IAO's primary project: the Total Information Awareness program. Although by May 2003 this title officially became the Terrorism Information Awareness program, in

response to widespread criticism related to potential invasion of privacy issues, the program's work and goals remained, for all intents and purposes, unchanged. Taking what Poindexter called "a more systemic approach," TIA consisted of several programs focused on information technologies, including speech-to-text transcription programs and new database technologies (Poindexter). Despite the change in name, TIA's state funding was discontinued and its relationship to the IAO severed in late 2003, in response to continued concerns about unrestrained government surveillance of citizens.

The Human ID at a Distance project, though part of TIA, had been initiated by DARPA some three years earlier in 2000 as a four-year project totaling $50 million. Under TIA, Human ID aimed to "achieve positive identification of humans using multi-modal biometric technologies," with a particular emphasis on tracking potential terrorists (Poindexter). In fact, projects under Human ID constituted the bulk of what TIA was able to accomplish before being officially closed, with the IAO website naming development and evaluation of facial recognition software as a major goal met in 2002. It is perhaps not surprising that the program focused first on facial recognition: as Alexandra Stikeman comments in a *Technology Review* article, this software is perhaps the easiest and most viable biometrics program for public space, because it is "much easier for authorities to obtain a suspect's photo — from a passport or driver's license, for example — than it is to obtain other biometric identifiers." In this sense, the prioritizing of facial recognition technologies dovetails with the increased demand for and regulation of identification documents, as I discussed in the previous chapter. These documents work hand in hand with facial recognition procedures, since the latter require a photo of the suspected

criminal to be in the database and on the watchlist to begin with, providing a basic image against which the visual scans are compared.

One of the industry experts interviewed at the Congressional hearings in November 2001, Joseph J. Atick, spoke on behalf of Visionics Corporation, a major developer of facial recognition technology that signed on to work with DARPA at the same time that the Human ID program began. Facial recognition programs from Visionics were at that time already in use in the United Kingdom and Mexico as part of criminal surveillance and anti-fraud efforts (Stikeman; DARPA Extends). Just two weeks after 9/11 — almost two months before the Congressional hearings on the modern face of terror — Visionics released its own report on the usefulness of biometrics, and facial recognition in particular, to national security efforts: a white paper entitled "Protecting Civilization from the Faces of Terror." The report repeatedly emphasizes that Visionics is not calling for a national ID system, because "the threat of terrorism is not solely an internal one," yet as Stikeman suggests, the biometrics proposals detailed in the report are strongly linked to identification documents such as passports and other photographic forms of ID. Perhaps anticipating the backlash to policies like the Real ID Act, Visionics devotes the last section of the white paper to measures they might take to ensure privacy for law-abiding citizens, expressing efforts to proceed "in a way that maximizes our national security without compromising the civil liberties of the honest majority. With this said, we should nevertheless emphasize that the threat to our privacy is theoretical while that of terrorism is unfortunately very real" (7). This nod to "our privacy" is not only unspecific (for whom are concerns about privacy merely theoretical? for whom has privacy never been an option?), but actually appears to justify devaluing that privacy. As with the rhetoric of

the Real ID Act and USA Patriot Act, such statements position the post-9/11 era as one of exception. Here the aftermath of 9/11 appears outside of and unhindered by histories of government repression and legal struggles over the boundaries and meanings of privacy, creating an exceptional moment that ushers in and normalizes the possibility of relinquishing certain civil liberties in order to secure national borders and safety for citizens.

The report promotes Visionics' biometrics programs as an effective and high-tech way of securing that safety, at one point even marking their biometric network platform as "the shield" that can protect civilization from the faces of terror (5). Asserting that "our best defenses lie squarely with the ability to properly identify those who pose a threat to our national security and on that basis deny them free movement," the report offers Visionics' facial recognition software as the key to identification processes (2). The face, and the ability to read and identify the face, is key here, and Visionics is quick to assure us (twice in the space of an eight-page report) that "terrorism is not faceless and is not without identity" (5). Yet here lies a central contradiction, not only for Visionics' facial recognition program, but for the project of biometrics in general: biometrics' purported ability to unambiguously sort and identify bodies is only meaningful or desirable to the extent that those bodies retain the ability to change or to hide. That is to say, biometrics becomes the particular technology of note in the Congressional hearings and in the DARPA project only because terrorist bodies are understood to be easily hidden and endlessly mobile. The primary point of biometrics in its current state-sponsored form is to irrefutably define the terrorist body, yet the very marker of "terrorist" is premised on this body (and subject) being hidden, unknowable,

unmanageable. Kelly Gates suggests that this contradiction plays out in the mugshot images of those involved in the events of 9/11, writing that such images as "fetishized objects were simultaneously 'unidentifiable' and readily identified by their characteristic 'faces of terror'" ("Identifying" 418). Similarly, as Jasbir Puar and Amit Rai note in their discussion of counterterrorism research and academic "terrorism studies," such investigations "attempt to master the fear, anxiety, and uncertainty of a form of political dissent by resorting to the banality of a taxonomy" (124). It is this uncertainty that provides the driving force for the studies to occur at all; should the figure of the terrorist cease to be ambiguous and instead be clearly understood or demarcated, such research might initially be lauded, but would also lose its central purpose.[13]

The Faces of Citizenship

The insistence in the Visionics report that terrorism is not faceless also calls into question the legibility of the face itself. In *Giving an Account of Oneself*, Judith Butler considers the ways in which the face makes one legible, writing that if the face "is readable at all, it becomes so only by entering into a visual frame that conditions its readability. […] There is a language that frames the encounter, and embedded in that language is a set of norms concerning what will and will not constitute recognizability" (29-30). Not only does facial recognition software recall earlier practices of craniometry that purported to distinguish the civilized from the savage or primitive by way of reading the body, but it also positions the face as that particular body part that offers up individual identity. Like the claim of early fingerprinting advocates that such prints

[13] Puar and Rai go on to quote several articles in terrorism studies from 2001, which define the field as that which attempts to "explain the resurgence of the seemingly inexplicable" (125) and note that the success of such attempts "is uneven" (144).

helped white state actors identify non-white individuals who were otherwise thought to be indistinguishable from one another, the assertion that facial recognition technologies are key to identifying terrorist bodies takes for granted both that such bodies are otherwise indistinguishable and that the images will be read, interpreted, and understood through the logic of Western citizenship.

Consider, for example, the ways that Joseph Atick's statement at the Congressional hearing carefully delineates between Visionics' surveillance of terrorist bodies and commitment to maintaining the privacy accorded to citizen bodies: "The concern for privacy has to do with the misconception that this is an ID system that is identifying every one of us. This is not a national ID system. It does not identify you or me. It is simply a criminal and terrorist alarm. If your face does not match one on the database, on the watchlist, there will be no alarm" (37). Such reassurances assume a clear and easily recognizable difference between the terrorist and "you or me," a difference that, as I suggested in the previous chapter, is not always so clear. Moreover, Atick's statement reiterates the notion that it is only people like "you or me" who operate the software and interpret the facial images — images that are legible only and always through a particular frame of reference.

Atick himself was referred to in a 2002 *New York Times* headline as "The Face of Security Technology," a phrase presumably intended to suggest a link to his work on facial recognitions technology, but which simultaneously connects Atick to the category of citizen, even positions him as the primary image of security. In contrast, Kelly Gates argues that repeated media and governmental use of the phrase "faces of terror" to describe images of those involved in the attacks on 9/11 "conjured up the idea of an

amorphous, racialized, and fetishized enemy Other that had penetrated both the national territory and the national imagination" ("Identifying" 434). The repetition of paired visual and linguistic references to these seemingly oppositional faces – one conveying security, the other threat – help create the frame through which other faces come to be recognizable and classifiable. Gates's analysis suggests that this frame converges with the notion that the terrorist or potential terrorist might be recognizable through some physical mark or bodily characteristic: "the idea that certain faces could be inherently 'faces of terror' – that individuals embody terror or evil in their faces – could not help but invoke a paranoid discourse of racial otherness" (434).

Which faces, then, become legible as citizens, and which as terrorists? In their discussion of the politics of representation in the War on Terror, particularly in the circulation of photographs of Afghan and Iraqi women, Wendy Kozol and Rebecca Decola suggest that visual markers such as the photograph "mobilize concepts of belonging and exclusion that form the basis of identifying subjects as members of one or more communities" (185). If facial recognition operates through a visual frame to separate citizens from terrorists — to separate those bodies belonging to the U.S. from those threatening it — it must first distinguish amongst individuals (a task implicit in Visionics' repeated assertion that terrorism is not without a face or identity). Yet terrorism, as the IAO reminds us, is characterized as "collections of people" in "shadowy networks." Like the contradiction of biometrics' insistence on identifying and classifying the terrorist that is by definition unknowable, facial recognition programs create a

conundrum by which the shadowy network of terrorism must be clarified into individual identities, individual faces.[14]

This conundrum — of promising containment and identification of those bodies which by definition cannot be contained or identified — is also central to immigration policy and border control, which Mae Ngai points out in *Impossible Subjects*, as she considers U.S. immigration policy and practices from 1924 to 1965, when the national origins quota system was in effect. Ngai contends that the "illegal alien" is produced through restrictions on immigration that, while creating a category for such subjects, simultaneously refuse to legally recognize them. In this sense, she writes, "the need of state authorities to identify and distinguish between citizens, lawfully resident immigrants, and illegal aliens posed enforcement, political, and constitutional problems for the modern state. The illegal alien is thus an 'impossible subject,' a person who cannot be and a problem that cannot be solved" (4-5). Moreover, she points out that the category of "illegal alien" is itself unstable and fluid, a category that immigrant bodies might move into and out of under various conditions. The same might also be said for citizenship, particularly in relation to naturalization processes through which subjects shift from alien to citizen.

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[14] This emphasis on identification by face is currently playing out through, among other instances of public discourse, questions of veiling. For example in a *New York Times* opinion piece, Ronald Sokol discusses French president Nicolas Sarkozy's support for a ban on the burqa, writing that "Covering one's face from the view of others is a way of protecting one's anonymity. […] Other than permitting identification, there would appear to be no legitimate public interest in compelling people to expose their faces." On a political fashion blog, and assessing the debate from a different perspective, Nilgin Yusuf frames the covering of one's face as an act of resistance against surveillance: "It's about individuals refusing to be chipped and pinned, refusing to be beeped in and out of monitored spaces, refusing to be tracked by the all-seeing eye of CCTV. […] In this world of extreme self-exposure, the covered head allows us to cast ourselves in shadows of our own making." It is worth noting the reframing of "shadows" here from the IAO's threat of shadowy networks to a strategy of self-protection and counter-surveillance practices.

The instability of the category of citizenship actually becomes ever more clear as state policies and actions repeatedly attempt to rigidly define its boundaries. For example, in April 2010, Arizona passed Senate Bill 1070, which the *New York Times* called "the nation's toughest bill on illegal immigration" (Archibold). The bill, set to go into effect in July 2010 and now known as the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, requires local law enforcement to make efforts to determine individuals' immigration status if they suspect those individuals are undocumented immigrants. Following this, aliens in Arizona not carrying registration documents can be charged with a misdemeanor, and law enforcement officers can be sued for not following the act's provisions. Though this kind of policing has long been in effect against racialized populations (even if not codified into law as it is under SB 1070), the act has drawn wide criticism for its explicit legalization of surveillance that is implicitly, if not overtly, racialized. For which characteristics mark the body read as immigrant, and which immigrant bodies will be understood as threats in need of arrest and deportation? The act aims to further secure the category of "citizen," yet the citizen, the immigrant, the alien, and the illegal are read through bodily and visual characteristics.[15] In fact we might argue that such policies merely underscore just how unstable and subject to interpretation bodily manifestations of citizenship might be.

If, as Ngai argues (and SB 1070 implicitly suggests), the categories of alien/illegal and citizen are porous and interrelated, then what are we to make of the fact that they are

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[15] Regarding one California legislator's claim that the act does not bolster racial profiling because law enforcement will identify undocumented immigrants by their behavior and clothing, Mimi Nguyen argues that clothing itself is read through racialization. She writes, "The cognition of race has *never* been a simple matter of skin or bones. Especially for racialized others, their clothes are often *epidermalized* – that is, they are understood as contiguous with the body that wears them, a sort of second skin, as we see with hijab or turbans."

popularly framed as impenetrable and mutually exclusive realms? State resistance to these categories' shifting and fluid relationships connects to an anxiety about mobility more broadly. Senator Strom Thurmond's call in the Congressional hearings for biometric identifiers for all non-citizens entering the U.S. and for a return to the annual registration of all immigrants and aliens (a practice that was formally discontinued in 1981) indicates how central questions of mobility are in anti-terrorism measures. Like the DARPA project's insistence that terrorists can move freely and hide anywhere, Thurmond's statement portrays the threatening body as mobile *precisely* because it is intentionally deceptive and fraudulent. In this framework, biometrics emerge as that which would, by way of exposing the body's true identity, fix it in place and curtail its movement. It is here, then, that bodies understood to be transgender offer insight into the contradictions at work in biometrics programs — for these bodies are persistently understood through metaphors of mobility and borders.

Gender and Geography: Thinking Bodies as Borders

In "The Illegal Body," surveillance studies scholar Irma van der Ploeg argues that the difference between an identification card and a biometric identifier comes down to the issue of space: "however small, [a space] still exists between the person and the obligatory pass or identity card, a space that disappears entirely with biometric identifiers, as if the identity card were glued to your body" (301). In this reading, biometrics' innovation is in their ability to close the gap between the identity and the physical body, eliminating any possibility of fraudulently separating the two. The body becomes the identity card, such that, as the Visionics white paper contends, the human

face "becomes the key that unlocks doors to secure areas" (5). The image of the body itself serving as an ID card that enables or prevents entrance into government buildings, national borders or even databases is pervasive in the biometrics industry. For example, the International Biometric Industry Association (IBIA) counters privacy concerns by claiming that biometrics actually *enhances* privacy by "erecting a barrier between personal data and unauthorized access" and so "can be thought of as a very secure key: unless a biometric gate is unlocked by using the right key, no one can gain access to a person's identity" (International Biometrics Industry Association).[16] Here, too, the question of space is critical, and the IBIA pushes it even further. Suggesting that biometrics function not only as ID cards but as checkpoints or borders that prevent "unauthorized" agents from accessing identity information, the IBIA frames biometrics programs as a space in and of themselves, through which state actors must pass, presumably by being positively identified themselves before accessing the identification data of others.

That metaphors of space, place and borders crop up so frequently in discussions of biometrics is no coincidence, given these programs' prominence in immigration and asylum processes. The IAO, for instance, in listing work undertaken during 2002 on the Human ID project, notes that research into facial recognition was not merely part of terrorism prevention efforts, but would also be used to "provide input to the design of the United States Border Entry/Exit System." In "Borderline Identities: The Enrollment of

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[16] The International Biometric Industry Association describes itself as "a trade association founded in September 1998 in Washington, D.C. to advance the collective international interests of the biometric industry," and is largely responsible for representing the biometric industry to the public and to government officials internationally. The IBIA's website strongly asserts the need for identification based on unique bodily characteristics as opposed to passports and other documents that can easily be forged.

Bodies in the Technological Reconstruction of Borders," van der Ploeg examines various biometrics technologies at work in border control efforts in the U.S. and Europe, and expands on her earlier analysis. Here, she argues that far from merely collapsing the distance between body and identity, the use of biometrics to regulate immigration "enables the extension of the function of the border as a selective and discriminating barrier beyond the actual geographic line to the inside of the country, effectively inscribing suspect identities on people's now machine-readable bodies" (192). In this way, geographical boundaries intertwine with embodied identities, marked by physical identifiers that are read as citizen, immigrant, or illegal. Thus, as van der Ploeg contends, biometrics technologies work with "the various systems in use for regulating border traffic, border patrol, immigration, and asylum policy [to] establish forms of identity politics that transform geographical borders into lived and embodied identities" (179). Particularly where these immigration and border control processes are routed through biometrics technologies, then, questions of citizenship and belonging are at once questions of both physical space and physical body.[17]

Because biometrics technologies rely on an understanding of the body as immutable, their logic reinforces both geographical borders and their apparently corresponding embodied identities as fixed entities. The anxiety so present in the Congressional hearings, the Visionics report, and the DARPA project's publicity turns on the possibility that certain bodies might "move freely." That mobility then muddles the presumably clear borders that would otherwise easily mark out and protect both citizenship and national security. Feminist geographer Doreen Massey suggests that these

[17] For further analysis of the body as border, see Louise Amoore's "Biometric Borders," which considers "the extension of biopower such that the body, in effect, becomes the carrier of the border as it is inscribed with multiple encoded boundaries of access" (347-348).

notions arise from common understandings of place as defined "through simple counterposition to the outside," a counterposition that I argue is materially reinforced by increasing numbers of border control guards, and discursively reinforced through repeated insistences that terrorists and undocumented immigrants must be distinguished (and inherently distinguishable) from citizens (155). Like Volpp, who contends that the figures of the citizen and terrorist cannot be neatly separated but actually make one another possible and legible, Massey argues that places are formed through interactions, and suggests that understanding them in this way offers a consideration of security and stability that relies on interconnected relationships rather than restrictions or insularity. Thus she writes that places might be defined "through the particularity of linkage *to* that 'outside,' which is therefore itself what constitutes the place. This helps get away from the common association between penetrability and vulnerability. For it is this kind of association which makes invasion by newcomers so threatening" (155). Importantly for this chapter's focus on the interdependent categories of citizen and immigrant/alien, Massey's argument helps us understand the ways that longstanding characterizations of the West's fortified borders are produced through contrasting images of the global South as penetrable by both Western industry and military.[18]

Simultaneously, simplified ideals of Western democracy come to stand not for an alternative to increased policing and fortification of borders, but as justification for that policing. This logic is exemplified in a 2008 report by Fox News (coincidentally titled "New Al Qaeda Manual Reflects Changing Face of Terror"), which discusses the

[18] These notions are frequently reinforced through racialized feminization and homophobia, as in the proliferation of images directly following 9/11 in which Osama bin Laden is depicted being sodomized by symbols of U.S. nationalism and industry, including the Statue of Liberty and World Trade Center.

potential shift from a large centralized organization led by bin Laden to smaller global terrorist cells. The article quotes New York City Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly as saying "We have vulnerabilities, absolutely. In an open society, you're going to have vulnerabilities," and then immediately follows by stating "In an effort to close every gap, federal, state and local law enforcement agencies across the country are increasingly sharing their intelligence data" (Bream). Here, the space opened by democratic ideals functions as the primary reason to "close every gap," a closing which itself requires another kind of opening, to more freely distribute information and surveillance between state agencies and actors. The relationship here between open and closed geographic borders, sociopolitical structures, and information archives is not one of binary opposition and fixed boundaries, but of connectivities and interdependence.

For Massey, these continued efforts to draw clean boundaries, to stabilize the space of the nation, arise in part from a "desire for fixity and for security of identity in the middle of all the movement and change" (151). This desire may help explain the continued surveillance and discipline of bodies and identities that overtly transgress social boundaries, as well as the reasons such transgressors are frequently discussed in terms of borders, homes, and travel. As transgender studies scholar Aren Aizura notes, "to speak about gender-variant bodies is often to engage in a metaphorical slippage between geography and gender" (289).

Thus the discursive link between deceptively disguised bodies and ease of mobility that helps define the figure of the terrorist also emerges — if somewhat differently — in relation to transgender bodies. Cast on one hand by medicine, law and popular media as concealing threatening or degenerative truths, trans bodies are simultaneously positioned

as easy and liberatory metaphors for border crossings. They regularly serve as emblems of the ultimate transgression against gendered boundaries, viewed as endlessly mobile in their ability to bring together "the best of both worlds." Moreover, these bodies are understood to travel both literally and metaphorically across borders as they pursue the "journey" of sex reassignment and gender transition. As Aizura notes, such journeys are key in a "particular narrative of (trans)sexual citizenship that figures transgression as a necessary but momentary lapse on the way to a proper embodied belonging" (293).

This journey is classically articulated in transgender travel writer Jan Morris's 1974 autobiography *Conundrum*, in which Morris discusses her transition from male to female through recounting her trip to Morocco for sex-reassignment surgery. In Morris's account, Morocco represents not only a geographic site for the process of physical transition, but also an ideological site through which (white) transgender-identified people pass in order to achieve a sense of home in their bodies. The narrative turns on notions of crossing both gendered and national borders, in which colonized nations represent points to pass through on the way home: a home of the right body, and of the ability to return to the familiar Western social framework as a stable, individual identity within the now-corrected physical body. This deliberate, unquestioned return to the western world recalls colonialist framings of non-western nations as refuges for colonizers' own restricted desires, yet also spaces of sexual fluidity and perversity that threaten civilized social relations. Moreover, in this narrative, travel — both geographical and gendered — occurs in only one direction. The mobile Western subject (the only traveler here) takes a linear and teleological journey, from one clearly bounded gender to the other (for there is only one other for this Western traveler), merely passing through

other spaces to return home a whole citizen. This tale is steeped in the dualisms of Western science, reinforcing essentialist notions of gender as fixed (or fixable), binary, and clearly distinguishable. The generalized non-West here serves as a temporary space of gender transgression and fluidity, yet remains fixed in its own way: no economic, cultural or political effects are thought to linger or be exchanged as the Western trans body moves through this space. In this way, as Aizura points out, "a politics of home renders invisible the transnational mobility that has been necessary for some transpeople to live their lives" (302).

Importantly, this standardized narrative positions home as a place of fixity and rootedness, both geographically and bodily. The trans-identified "border crosser" takes on that role only until the body reaches a point of stability, when transition ends and the journey, both literal and figurative, is complete. This framework belies the material constraints facing trans people of color and trans immigrants, and positions the gender-nonconforming body as an inherently liberatory abstraction that transcends equally abstract borders. Critiquing the persistent use of borders to describe transgender identities and bodies, Judith Halberstam cautions against "detaching the metaphors of travel and home and migration from the actual experience of immigration in a world full of borders" (170).[19] The perception of trans bodies as easily mobile tends to fall apart in the face of

[19] Scholarship on immigration rights and border control has typically read these topics through a heteronormative framework, despite longstanding links between immigration regulation and state control of gender and sexuality. For detailed discussion of these links, see for example Eithne Luibheid's *Entry Denied*, as well as *Queer Migrations: Sexuality, U.S. Citizenship, and Border Crossings*, edited by Luibhéid and Lionel Cantú, Jr. Similarly, in their essay "The War on Immigrant Rights and its Impact on Our Communities," Debanuj DasGupta and Lorraine Ramirez note that while many immigration measures "may not appear to directly target Trans people," they nonetheless "aim to cut the civil and human rights of anyone who does not fit into a cookie-cutter designation of a U.S. citizen – which includes an expectation of heterosexuality and standard socialized gender identities" (4).

racialized and nationalist immigration policies, in which both gender and citizenship are presumed to be unchanging categories. As Alisa Solomon notes in her case study of Christina Madrazo, a trans woman from Mexico seeking asylum, "hierarchies of naturalized gender and nation permit only so much flexibility within a rigid frame" (23). Bodies falling outside of this frame are illegible, often in ways that provoke violence against them: in Madrazo's case, detention center authorities recognized her as neither male nor female, and thus housed her in an isolation cell — a common "solution" for incarcerated transgender and gender-nonconforming people in the U.S. prison system more broadly.[20] Solomon's analysis both resists and refutes the tendency to frame gender-nonconforming bodies as metaphorically mobile and thus free from border control policies and immigration processes. Instead, she points out that these processes tend to bring the scrutinizing gaze of law and medicine disproportionately against bodies perceived to be gender-nonconforming or otherwise deviant or disorderly, particularly where those bodies are also classified as non-white and/or as non-citizens.

Conclusion

If transgender bodies are perceived to be mobile in ways both deceptive and liberatory, how, finally, might they offer us greater insight into the workings and failures of biometrics? There has been very little public discussion or alarm from transgender political organizations about increased use of biometrics technologies, a fact that is especially curious given the concentrated activism in response to new regulations of identification documents. The recommended strategy concerning ID documents, of

[20] For further analysis of the use of solitary confinement to house transgender and gender-nonconforming people in prisons and detention centers, see "Safety and Solidarity Across Gender Lines: Rethinking Segregation of Transgender People in Detention" by Gabriel Arkles.

making one's trans status visible and of telling the truth about one's body, might also cover the ways biometrics requires that one's body tell the truth. If so, then again this kind of strategic visibility might benefit certain bodies that are transgender-identified and easily incorporated into the medicalized narrative of "home" and stability, while simultaneously effacing or endangering those bodies deemed nonconforming along lines of race, nationality, religion, or citizenship status. Here, though, I am less focused on the inconsistencies and parameters of state actions or policies. Instead, I am concerned with the ways that physical bodies refuse the containment that biometrics promises, and in that refusal, demonstrate the necessary permeability of both the national body and the category of citizenship.

The rhetoric and promises of biometric technologies help illuminate the ways that the threatening illegibility of (gender-)nonconforming bodies is inextricable from questions of citizenship. If such technologies are, as surveillance studies scholar Benjamin Muller notes, "obsessed with differentiating the authentic from the inauthentic," then they neatly dovetail with anti-terrorist programs that focus in large part on fraudulent identities and behaviors (287-288). Both Visionics and Identix (another company currently developing and producing facial recognition and fingerprinting technologies) reference fraud as a key target for their products, with a 2003 Identix press release claiming that its work "can help identify those who perpetrate fraud and otherwise pose a threat to public safety" (Identix). I noted in the previous chapter that trans and gender-nonconforming bodies are frequently portrayed and perceived as fraudulent or deceptive, making them more likely to overtly encounter surveillance and policing, particularly when they might be perceived as non-normative along lines of race,

nationality, religion or sexuality. In fact it is largely this perception of deception that discursively links the surveillance of non-normative gender with that of terrorism and of "illegal" immigrants.

That these figures often collapse into one another through the notion of fraud that threatens the nation is succinctly explained in Jessica Chapin's discussion of the figure of the *vestida*: cross-dressing sex workers from Mexico who work undocumented in the U.S. Troublingly, she tends to collapse these migrant laborers under Western medicine's broad category of "homosexual," effacing the complex ways gender and sexuality might be claimed, performed or understood through cross-dressing practices and in the context of forced migration. But Chapin's analysis of their symbolic positioning is nonetheless useful for its connection of gender transgression to national threat precisely through the hyper-visible figure of the gender-nonconforming im/migrant: "because of their refusal to remain within the institutionalized boundaries of nation and gender, the vestidas signal for others, for whom self and body are presumed to be identical, not a display of inner essence or true identity but the threatening possibilities of *mistaken* identity, of unfixed sign and referent" (404).

Similarly, in a report jointly released by the research and legal advocacy organizations Human Rights Watch and Immigration Equality, a trans-identified woman from the Bahamas describes her experience during the time she was held in U.S. immigration detention, awaiting deportation in an all-men's housing unit. When she was transferred to a jail some weeks later, both her location in solitary confinement and the fact that the institution registered her under various names hindered her ability to meet with immigration officers. When she did see an officer, his explanation of her treatment

neatly links gender-nonconforming bodies with border control anxieties in the context of the War on Terror: "He told me, 'These are scary times, what with terrorism, we need to know who we're letting into the country. When things don't add up' — me transitioning — 'that's a problem'" (Human Rights Watch, 87). Here, as with perceptions of the sex workers in Chapin's article, the body's failure to comply with categories presumed fixed, stable and easily legible simultaneously throws into disarray the supposedly fixed borders of the nation and of citizenship. Importantly, while these analyses point out the connections between perceptions of trans and gender-nonconfroming bodies and national borders or identities, they avoid reducing such bodies to abstract metaphor, instead foregrounding the material effects of gender transgression in the context of immigration policy.

In this context, a consideration of trans bodies offers a way to rethink the supposedly objective and stable operations of biometrics technology, particularly in relation to citizenship classifications. Biometrics understand the physical body as a key way not only to distinguish individuals from one another, but to mark out citizens from immigrants and terrorists. The body, in this formulation, determines and demonstrates one's ability to be a good citizen, and makes one legible as such. This linkage, like the national investment in scientific analysis of the physical body, certainly pre-dates anxieties related to 9/11. For example, Michael Dillon's 1946 book *Self: A Study in Ethics and Endocrinology*, directly links endocrine glands to the health of one's character, contending that "injuries to or diseases of these glands may transform a man from a respectable citizen into a degenerate or criminal" (4). Notably, Dillon himself engaged in medical transition through both prescribed testosterone and surgery, and his

book was an important precursor to later work in endocrinology that led to "transsexualism" as a formal diagnosis. While Dillon's assertion may first appear to rely on biological determinism to define good citizens or bad criminals through their physical makeup (he repeatedly contends that what we might now term transsexuality is "nature's error"), his statement actually points to the mutability of both the physical body *and* the category of citizenship. His assertion emphasizes that changes in endocrine levels may *transform* an individual from good to bad body, from respectable citizen to dangerous degenerate. Here, the body serves both as a clear marker of citizenship *and* evidence that good citizenship is not fixed, but rather can slide into criminality. Like biometrics' claim to identify citizens and terrorists through reading the body, Dillon's work links the body to both citizenship and criminality; yet in doing so it simultaneously exposes each of these categories as inconstant.

The focus on hormonal changes here is particularly relevant for considerations of transgender bodies and citizenship. It is, after all, hormones that are popularly understood to alter not only trans people's physical bodies, but their very personalities, emotions and behaviors. Importantly, though, hormonal changes are not exclusive to trans and gender-nonconforming populations, reminding us that all bodies can potentially shift from citizen to criminal, from respectable to dangerous.[21] Nevertheless, as is evident in the material effects of border policing and anti-terrorism surveillance, bodies deemed unruly or deviant through their perceived race, religion, gender, sexuality or nationality endure disproportionate scrutiny and violence. In various ways throughout the twentieth century, Western science has held that hormones directly influence or even produce criminal and

[21] We might think here about how this potential criminality through hormonal shifts is linked to state regulation of testosterone as a controlled substance.

deviant behaviors and personalities to hormones in various ways throughout the twentieth century, including emotional disturbances and instability, same-sex desires and practices, and sexually violent actions. (For contemporary examples of this last point, we need only look to the increasing use of chemical castration in relations to convicted sex offenders in the U.S. and Europe, a punitive sentence intended to transform the criminal into respectable citizen through physically altering the body's chemical makeup.)

Recent turns to biometrics, like their predecessors, read the body through normative understandings of gender and race, and link these to rigidly bounded categories of citizenship and terrorism. Trans bodies, typically understood as secretive or deceptive on one hand and as metaphorically mobile on the other, productively disrupt the precision on which biometrics' fame rests, even as their unruliness is exactly what biometric technologies are constructed to tame. They provide one entry point to a consideration of the ways that bodies more generally might not be easily readable, readily containable, or clearly identifiable. Yet their usefulness in pointing to biometrics' gaps and contradictions is not because they are abstract figures of unconstrained transgression and mobility, as much scholarship has tended to read them. Rather, it is because these bodies are in many cases *more likely* to experience overt state scrutiny. It is precisely this increased scrutiny and attention that suggests biometrics' difficulty in categorizing what appears disorderly, and indicates ruptures in scientific systems assumed to be airtight. Katja Aas argues that new biometrics programs work on a binary language that "radically reduces possibilities for negotiation and therefore also resistance" (150). Yet these programs' dependence on binary logic is necessarily undone by physical bodies' refusal to adhere to such classifications. Western science and the U.S. state tout biometrics

technology is touted as that which uncovers the falsified identity precisely because the body cannot lie. But that technology is built on rigid classifications — of citizenship, race, risk, and sex/gender — that are themselves pretenses. In this light, the duplicitous, dangerously mobile body is not tamed by biometrics; rather, it reflects back biometrics programs' own falsehoods.

All in the Delivery:
U.S. Reproductive Surveillance and the Figure of the Pregnant Man

In the previous two chapters, I discussed mechanisms of surveillance that aim to identify and classify groups of people and bodies – methods of tracking that mark those bodies belonging to the categories of citizen, immigrant, and/or terrorist, for example. State emphasis on identification documents and biometrics focus on the notion of unique individuals or cases only superficially, with the broader intention of identifying patterns and categorizing these cases in order to track and contain. Thus for example, the Social Security no-match policy examines individual records with the goal of identifying them by citizen status, and the visual emphasis on the faces of those involved in the 9/11 attacks ultimately produces not specific identities, but a more generalized "face" of the threatening racialized other. In fact, in these cases surveillance operates in part through the implicit understanding that there are multiple, perhaps endless such threatening bodies. In this chapter, I shift away from surveillance practices more clearly positioned as tracking populations overall, to consider how positioning a single body as unique and anomalous might obscure broader networks and histories of policing practices.

Shortly after Thomas Beatie publicly announced his pregnancy in the mainstream U.S. gay magazine *The Advocate* in March of 2008, images and descriptions of his pregnant body appeared in a flurry of news stories across the United States and internationally. The headlines repeatedly played on the cognitive disconnect of male pregnancy: "Pregnant Man is Feeling Swell," the *New York Post* punned, while a salon.com headline wondered "What the Pregnant Man Didn't Deliver." The *New York Times* even guided readers to an appropriate response to Beatie's news, with a story titled

"He's Pregnant. You're Speechless." In the overwhelming majority of cases, news stories led with the apparent contradiction of a pregnant man, revealing in the first few paragraphs of the story that Beatie is transgender-identified, and explaining that despite his flat chest and bearded face, a functioning uterus remains hidden in his body, enabling his "bizarre pregnancy" (salon.com). The repetition of this narrative template suggests that a key component of the fascination with Beatie's body rests on the positioning of that body as hiding something (particular reproductive organs) that in fact enables it to exist in its current visible form (pregnant). The pregnancy itself, in these tellings, becomes less critical than the dramatic reveal of (or even just the ability *to* reveal) Beatie's heretofore hidden genitals and reproductive organs. In other words, perhaps the most compelling aspect of Beatie as a public figure is not that which is immediately visible, but that which is masked or obscured and then later *made* visible.

At the same time, many of these articles focus at least in part on the notion that Beatie's pregnancy need not be the kind of public obsession that it has become, and suggest critiques of the media spectacle surrounding both Beatie as an individual and related concerns in transgender communities. For example, the *Times* article interviews Mara Keisling, director of the National Center for Transgender Equality, who maintains that "There's nothing really remarkable" about Beatie's pregnancy or family life, perhaps attempting to divert public scrutiny from gender-nonconforming bodies by normalizing Beatie's pregnancy. And trans studies scholar Paisley Currah is quoted in the salon.com piece as saying "the idea that seems to draw the public is the idea of the supposed freakish body of the transgendered man," suggesting that the common approach of foregrounding Beatie's body as an anomalous contradiction further marginalizes trans-

identified people. Both Keisling and Currah's statements implicitly reference and critique the extensive medical and media surveillance leveled at Beatie as an individual, and question the effects of such practices on transgender communities and politics more broadly. Thus while the news stories overall take part in a focused surveillance of Beatie's body, attempting to uncover its hidden aspects and positioning it as an object of curiosity, the stories simultaneously turn to transgender advocates for critique of that very positioning, suggesting that it disproportionately scrutinizes transgender bodies. More optimistically, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick suggests in the *Times* article that as a public figure, Beatie might serve as a useful tool for "Trans 101" conversations: "He's pregnant, he seems happy. It's not happening in any kind of a judicial, let alone criminal, context so it's not a matter of claiming a right. It's a matter of exercising one." While Sedgwick's point here references Beatie's contention that he has every legal right to bear a child through his own reproductive capacities, I am reluctant to take at face value the assertion that the construction of Beatie as a public figure, or the public conversations about his pregnancy and pregnant body, are outside of a judicial or criminal context. In the public fascination, repulsion and moral scrutiny of Beatie's body and reproductive choices, we may find traces of a far deeper history of surveillance.

Rather than aligning with the media trend of figuring Beatie's body as hiding the very thing that enables it to exist as an unusual or anomalous image, this chapter seeks to turn that same logic back onto the medical and media fascination with Beatie. Just as Beatie's body is seen as compelling because of what is hidden rather than what is visibly foregrounded, this chapter examines how media attention to that body, in its very spectacle, obscures a long history of surveillance that produces and justifies such a

spectacle to begin with. In other words, I argue that the extent of public attention to Beatie's narrative and image is made possible through longstanding surveillance of reproduction in which all pregnant bodies are public bodies, classified by medicine and media as fit or unfit, normative or deviant. Figures like the pregnant teen, the crack baby and the welfare mother are key tropes enabling and propelling contemporary surveillance of unruly pregnant bodies, including current representations of the trans-identified pregnant body. By fixating on "the" pregnant man — and by continually positioning Beatie as the first/only such man — this history is effaced, even while it provides the very groundwork for public fixation in the first place. Moreover, masking this history is critical to the positioning of Beatie's individual body as the focal point for the medical and media attention described above. In the context of historical surveillance of a variety of bodies deemed abnormal, deviant and "freakish," the image of the pregnant man may function not as an anomaly, but as a cultural construction revealing greater biopolitical investments in the regulation of bodies and reproductive capacities. I ask here how images of pregnant gender-nonconforming bodies have been employed to shape reproductive choices and practices in various historical moments.

Drawing on U.S. medical discourse and public policy as well as widely circulating popular media emerging in U.S. and Western European contexts from the 19th century on, I demonstrate that anxieties about the possibility of male pregnancy did not emerge suddenly or only through Thomas Beatie's announcement and the subsequent media blitz. Rather, they have been repeatedly produced through popular culture, medical science and public health discourses used to fuel fears of population growth and social deviance, and to justify state regulation and surveillance of reproduction. In its form as well as its

content, this chapter refocuses public debates around "the pregnant man" such that a particular individual no longer functions as the singular object of analysis. That is to say, this chapter's argument plays out in part through its very structure, which refuses disproportionate attention to any individual pregnant man and instead traces a much broader genealogy of the pregnant man as a discursive figure. In this way, the *figure* of the pregnant man can be understood in the context of public scrutiny of pregnant bodies and of reproductive practices more broadly.[22]

Public Pregnancies and the (Re)production of Deviant Bodies

An extended discussion of reproduction may at first seem incongruous with the earlier chapters of this project, which focused primarily on state policy and public discourse that explicitly referenced questions of security and surveillance, particularly in the context of post-9/11 anxieties. Yet the family, and the figure of the mother in particular, has long been a crucial component in national security efforts and in governing more generally. In part, this is because the family serves as a site of regulation of normative health and behavior. For example, in his public lectures collected in *Abnormal*, Foucault explains that beginning in the nineteenth century, the monster became a central figure for questions of deviance: "monstrosity is systematically suspected of being behind all criminality," a figure that defies and disrupts both law and nature (81). Its descendent, in Foucault's terms, is the abnormal individual emerging in the late nineteenth century: a monster that has become commonplace. Converging in the abnormal individual are

[22] I have made every effort in the language of this chapter to disarticulate pregnancy from the category of woman, to avoid "pregnant women" as a totalizing or generalizing concept, while still attending to the ways that women as a group are disproportionately policed with regards to reproduction. Where direct quotes maintain a generalizing link between women and pregnancy, however, I have left this language unaltered.

various methods of classification and identification, medico-legal systems promoting social hygiene, and new psychiatric theories of childhood sexuality that aim to explain the causes of abnormality. Importantly, in this framework, Foucault notes, the abnormal body is not the only body under scrutiny. Rather, behind this abnormality and delinquency stands "the parents' body, […] the body of the family, the body of heredity" (313). Here, questions of reproduction connect to broader governing practices; as we shall see later in this chapter, concerns about hereditary abnormalities fuel ongoing campaigns of reproductive surveillance that position the family as that which can either bolster or threaten national health and domestic security.

Elsewhere, Foucault writes that by the mid-eighteenth century, the family had become key to management of the population largely because it constituted a space for campaigns and statistics collections regarding health, hygiene, sexual behavior, and other demographics. Thus Foucault suggests that the family became "a privileged instrument for the government of the population rather than a chimerical model for good government" (*Security* 105). Inderpal Grewal builds on this function of the family in the specific context of neoliberalism and post-9/11 security discourse in her discussion of the figure of the "security mom," which "gave a name to a conceptualization of women as mothers seeking to protect their innocent children – a figure that is no so new in the history of modern nationalisms, or even American nationalisms and racisms" (27). Noting that the rhetoric of the War on Terror constructs a foreign threat to the domestic space, Grewal explains that the mother becomes "both the subject and the agent of security" (30). That is to say, the figure of the mother here becomes both that which must be protected from outside threat and that which is responsible for human security through

shoring up family values and the reproduction of docile citizen-subjects. This shifting of responsibility toward the individual family unit and the "security mom," Grewal suggests, brings to the forefront "the ways in which the neoliberal state maintains and disavows its powers and limits through the dynamic of public and private" (25). It is in part this fluctuating line between public and private that positions Thomas Beatie's narrative and image as a useful entry point for further considerations of reproductive practices as a critical component of broader security and surveillance measures.

The first and most ubiquitous public photograph of Beatie's pregnant body appeared alongside his first-person narrative in *The Advocate*. The photograph ran in news articles internationally and was reprinted across the internet, drawing a wide range of comments from viewers. Shot in three-quarter profile, the image shows Beatie gently holding his bare pregnant belly, a wedding band foregrounded on his left hand. His right arm is raised to grasp the back of his neck, leaving scars from his chest reconstruction surgery uncovered and clearly visible. The image easily recalls *Vanity Fair*'s infamous 1991 cover photo of Demi Moore's unclothed and pregnant body in profile, her right arm covering her chest, the other under her pregnant abdomen.

Displaying as much skin as she would in some high fashion photos, Moore's cover shot was nonetheless deemed indecent enough for many newsstands to wrap the issue in opaque covers like pornography. Despite Moore's whiteness, femininity, and class status signified by her diamond jewelry and coiffed hair, all of which lend the image a sense of respectability and normalcy, the considerable moral outrage over her publicly pregnant body suggests that the *Vanity Fair* cover is perhaps not so far removed from the Beatie photo. (In fact in 1994, one marketing campaign for the comedy film *Naked Gun 33 1/3:*

The Final Insult featured Leslie Neilsen's head photoshopped onto a nude pregnant body posed exactly like Moore's.)

The images of both Moore and Beatie provoked widespread criticism of the public display of their bodies. Yet such a response assumes that pregnant bodies are ever private to begin with. The policing of pregnancy and reproduction is especially apparent in the state and medical surveillance of people of color, poor people, and people with disabilities, but is evident in the biopolitical regulation of reproduction overall, such that even the most privileged of pregnant bodies is subject to normalizing regimes of health.

In *Pregnancy and Power*, Rickie Solinger sketches a brief history of shifting understandings of private and public pregnancies in the United States, noting that as (primarily white) women began migrating from rural to urban spaces after the Civil War, engagements with sex and reproduction could be anonymous, where previously they had been family or even community matters. Beginning in the 1870s, Solinger explains, the state slowly began asserting control over pregnancy and sexual practices through public policy like the Comstock Law (1873), which classified books and other materials related to contraception as obscene and illegal. By the early 20th century, privacy had emerged as a middle-class value, enabling those who could afford it to access reproductive advice and medical care, even with the Comstock Law still on the books. Yet for the poor and most people of color, reproduction had typically been and was still a matter of public scrutiny.[23] While Solinger's work points to the ways that sex and reproduction were more heavily regulated (and transgressions more harshly punished) for marginalized groups, it also becomes clear that despite new claims to privacy, all pregnant bodies were under

[23] For further discussion, see for example Dorothy Roberts' *Killing the Black Body*, Laura Briggs' *Reproducing Empire*, and Andrea Smith's *Conquest.*

increased state and social surveillance. To secure their privileged position, the white middle-class not only had to distance themselves politically from birth control politics, but also to maintain a certain standard of health and normative family structure that could stand in contrast to the bodies and families of the poor, disabled and non-white. Private pregnancies, seen in this light, were only private insomuch as they could maintain a public image of fitness, morality and heteronormativity.

State control of sex and fertility gained momentum in the early 20th century alongside rising anxieties about immigration and citizenship, which in turn helped fuel the burgeoning eugenics movement in the United States. Eugenicists in the early 1900s fixated on the bodies of immigrant women as both particularly fertile and carrying the strongest racialized traits, which were then passed on to their children. Moreover, as Katrina Irving demonstrates in *Immigrant Mothers*, immigrants were medically and metaphorically linked to contagious disease, a connection central to eugenicist discourse of racial hygiene and national health (43). Similarly, in *Building a Better Race,* Wendy Kline notes that during World War I, "feebleminded" women were considered a danger not only to individual families but to the nation itself: because they were linked to sexual promiscuity, it was widely held that such women were responsible for the spread of venereal disease that was especially of concern in military camps. Thus Kline suggests that the "heredity model of female sexual delinquency (in place at homes for the feebleminded) and the contagion model (used by public health officials and reformers fighting venereal disease) merged in the wartime campaign to protect America's soldiers" (44). Reproduction, then, was a national concern, justifying eugenicists' efforts to restrict reproductive practices for undesirable bodies — an effort backed by medicine and law,

most significantly exemplified in the Supreme Court's ruling in *Buck v. Bell* (1927), which upheld state-sponsored involuntary sterilization of people deemed genetically unfit.

The above cases comprise forms of "negative" eugenics that aimed to curtail the reproductive capacities of those deemed unfit, yet the eugenics movement employed a double-pronged approach that also included the promotion of "positive" eugenics, which encouraged reproduction for the white middle-class. One major component of this version of eugenics, particularly by the 1930s, was a renewed attention to sexual inversion, homosexuality and non-normative gendered behaviors. Such individuals, eugenicists contended, should be identified in order to prevent their deviant characteristics from being passed on to future generations. Moreover, as Jennifer Terry notes in her history of scientific classifications of homosexuality, early sexologists such as Richard von Krafft-Ebing and Havelock Ellis believed that even children presumed to be genetically predisposed to deviant behavior or identities could be reshaped through child-rearing practices that "fostered heterosexuality and proper gender identification" ("Anxious" 133). Alongside rising white middle-class fears of miscegenation and racial passing, anxieties about sexual deviance pushed the medical community's focus toward methods for identifying deviant bodies as critical for the maintenance of social hygiene, morality, and the health of white middle-class citizens. In this way, Terry points out, "[t]he scientific making of the homosexual type was integrally connected to campaigns for encouraging hygienic heterosexuality among white people" (139).

With this in mind, gynecologist and eugenicist Robert Latou Dickinson and others developed the Sex Variant study, using a masculinity-femininity (M-F) test to measure

gendered attitudes, beliefs and behaviors in relation to idealized gender norms. Yet Wendy Kline demonstrates that the test actually "provided evidence that only a simple deviation from masculinity or femininity separated the 'healthy heterosexual' from the 'homosexual invert.' In this context, the sex variant became 'a confusing border creature' between male and female, normal and abnormal, healthy and sick" (135-136). Similarly, Terry explains that such studies showed great variation in the bodily characteristics of supposed deviants, prompting doctors to produce stricter definitions of "normal" men and women; these categories became so narrowly defined that few individuals could approximate them, indicating that "the normal woman was no less a scientific construct than was the lesbian" (148). Nonetheless, the M-F test remained in wide circulation through the 1960s and, in relation to shifting gender roles of the postwar white middle-class, caused sociologists and sexologists increased concern. Kline notes that "[m]asculinity and femininity became important cultural markers used to shore up gender differences during a time in which these distinctions appeared to be receding" (140).

During the late 1930s and 1940s, the fear that, as Terry writes, "people with homosexual desires may be everywhere" (153) justified extensive medical scrutiny of non-normative bodies, including the publication of nude photographs of the bodies of sexual inverts, and hundreds of sketches and photographs of variations on female-assigned genitals, which served in particular to demonstrate visible biological differences in those female-assigned bodies that were understood to be black or mixed-race, and those understood to have engaged in same-sex sexual behavior.[24] Historical precedence for all of these practices lies in 18th and 19th century public and medical fascinations

[24] For more detailed discussions of these histories see Jennifer Terry's "Anxious Slippages," Wendy Kline's *Building a Better Race,* Siobhan Somerville's *Queering the Color Line*, and Nancy Ordover's *American Eugenics*.

across Europe and in the United States with the gender and sexuality of two figures: that of the hermaphrodite and that of the racial other. For both of these (and they are not mutually exclusive categories), their sexual organs and reproductive capacities became key sites of curiosity to be displayed, debated and examined. For example, in *Sexing the Body*, Anne Fausto-Sterling cites a 17th century account of an individual in Italy who lived as a man, only re-classified (in this case by the Church) as non-male when he became pregnant and gave birth (35). Such instances, Fausto-Sterling explains, laid the groundwork for intensive study in the 18th and 19th centuries of anatomical variations and apparent anomalies, focusing on genitals and gonads.[25] It is important to note here that Fausto-Sterling also describes a wide variety of state responses to gender-nonconforming bodies in 17th and 18th century Europe, indicating that understandings of normative sex/gender are continually produced, and shift in meaning and import according to sociopolitical and historical context. Nevertheless, she argues, "the sharp distinction between male and female was at the core of systems of law and politics" (35).

These scientific classification systems were also employed in the case of public displays of "savages," such as the figures commonly known as the Hottentot Venus, transported across Europe in the 18th century and later in the United States. In these cases, it was the racialized reading of genitals and other body parts by both medical doctors and the general public that justified classification of such figures as something other than woman. In "The Race of Hysteria," Laura Briggs demonstrates that, while perhaps the most well-known figure now, the Hottentot Venus was only one of many such constructions of non-white women as savages, whose physical bodies were thought

[25] For further information on scientific discussion of the hermaphrodite, see Alice Dreger's *Hermaphrodites and the Medical Invention of Sex*.

to be biologically distinct from those of civilized white women, and thus positioned as something other than woman. In this way bodies of color became the uncivilized and underdeveloped contrast to the idealized white body that signified civilization. In particular, Briggs notes, public displays of these women's bodies as medical specimens centered on differences in pelvic structure, with scientists suggesting on one hand that white women's pelvises were larger to allow for birthing larger skulls of the more intelligent race (thus pelviometry coincided with craniometry in the logic of scientific racism), and on the other hand, that savages' bodies were unhindered by the nervous condition of hysteria that was thought to be a factor in white women's fertility and childbearing difficulties. Reproductive capabilities, therefore, drove scientific interest in those bodies classified as abnormal or deviant, demonstrating an underlying desire to maintain white dominance in the face of hyper-fertile people of color. In all cases, the visual display of these bodies was a key characteristic, suggesting that with careful visual examination (whether through public display, autopsy, or inspection of skeletal remains), deviance could be located in physical characteristics.

It is not difficult to see how these medical studies and public displays lay important groundwork for later eugenics discourse, particularly given growing concerns about the ease with which women of color were thought to bear children. I cite this history in relation to the eugenics programs of the early 1900s in part to reassert that medical scrutiny of bodies produced categories of deviance that were then further solidified through converging public anxieties about racial purity, sexual morality and the maintenance of heterosexual reproduction. But more importantly, I want to point to these as early moments in which the figure of the pregnant gender-nonconforming body

emerges for use as a cautionary tale by physicians and lawmakers. In some cases, such as that which Fausto-Sterling mentions above, the actual figure of a pregnant man is centralized. In others, such as the public displays of "savage" bodies beginning in the 1800s and the published nude photos of sexual inverts in the early 1900s, gender-nonconformity is tied to non-normative sex acts and/or racialized body parts, both of which are thought to be read through visible indicators on the physical body. I do not wish to claim that these representations of gender nonconformity in relation to reproductive and sexual practices are simply early models of the figure of "the pregnant man" that would lead us directly to more recent images of such a figure. Among other things, medical and social understandings of the concepts of sex, race and reproduction have shifted considerably across the history that these figures span, complicating any attempts to make early representations of "hermaphrodites" an easy template for contemporary notions of transgender bodies. Instead, I point to them here as early examples of public anxieties about the relationship between race, gender and reproduction that centered on bodies that transgressed or disrupted normative gender, and as images that were used to bolster medical surveillance of all bodies. Furthermore, I look to them as examples of early attempts to shore up the categories of normal and abnormal with respect to understandings of race, sex and gender as they are read through the physical body — attempts that themselves destabilized these very categories by demonstrating again and again the broad variation in human anatomy. Finally, while I want to avoid making an ahistorical or easy linear connection between 19th century public displays and contemporary representations of non-normative pregnancy, I do want to suggest that these early images form a crucial backdrop to current medical, legal and

social debates about the regulation of sexuality and reproduction, particularly given that such debates frequently turned on ideals of normative physical bodies and the gendered behaviors they exhibited.

The Workings of Biopower

Notably, these figures of the 18th and 19th century developed in roughly the same time that Michel Foucault understands biopower to emerge. In a 1976 lecture published in the collection *Society Must Be Defended*, Foucault explains the concept of biopower as building on but not exclusive to the disciplinary power predominant in the 17th and early 18th century. One component of biopower, then, is this disciplinary power, which focuses on "individual bodies that can be kept under surveillance, trained, used, and, if need be, punished" (242). Yet while earlier forms of discipline aimed to regulate bodies purely as individual entities, disciplinary power under biopower addresses individual bodies as they are related to the larger social body, or as Foucault explains, "to the extent that they form […] a global mass that is affected by overall processes characteristic of birth, death, production, illness, and so on" (242-243). Given this focus, the critical second component of biopower is what Foucault terms populational power, a power concerned with the regulation and surveillance of the population more broadly, typically through scientific measurements and statistics. In this way, the emergence of biopower in the late 18th century marks a shift away from sovereign power that allows some individuals life and commands others to die; rather biopower regulates the productivity and health of individual bodies in light of their position in and affect on the broader population, with a key goal to "establish an equilibrium, maintain an average […] and compensate for

variations within this general population" (246). In other words, biopower "consists in making live and letting die" (247).

It is for this reason that Foucault asserts in *The History of Sexuality, Vol I* that "at the juncture of the 'body' and the 'population,' sex became a crucial target of a power organized around the management of life rather than the menace of death" (147). Eugenics discourse thus exemplifies biopower in its disciplining of individual bodies' sexual practices and reproductive capacities always with regards to the health and regulation of the broader population. Importantly, eugenics history demonstrates how biopower works to regulate not just those bodies deemed unfit or deviant, but all bodies, as evidenced in the public health and hygiene campaigns launched as part of "positive" eugenics programs in the early 20th century. At the same time that eugenicists clearly positioned gender variance and racial mixing as dangerous elements from which future generations should be protected, for those white middle-class couples deemed suitably heterosexual and gender normative, reproduction was not merely encouraged, but touted as a necessity for the well-being of the nation and the family. Eugenicist Paul Poponoe, director of the American Institute of Family Relations, used the social anxieties about safety and stability generated during World War II to assert that large families were not only one's duty to the nation, but also to one's biological makeup: "A woman's body is made for childbearing and is not functioning normally unless it bears children," he argued to normative white couples, while simultaneously remaining involved in the continual push to reduce pregnancy in marginalized groups (Kline 149).

Yet Poponoe's stance cannot be taken as indicative of an ideology that was consistent or unchallenged even within the eugenics movement itself. The early 1940s

also saw renewed debates over contraceptive use, strongly promoted by Margaret Sanger and the Planned Parenthood Federation of America through associating contraception "with patriotism, national strength, and military victory" in World War II (Solinger 135). This approach spoke to both the post-Depression fear of being unable to provide for large families, and the surge of women of all races in the workforce during and after World War II. In her historical overview of reproductive politics in the U.S., Rickie Solinger quotes a 1943 pamphlet from Planned Parenthood that contended birth control for normative white families could mean "more healthy children will be born to maintain the kind of peace for which we fight" (136), rhetoric that drew on eugenics discourses of health and productivity but diverged from Poponoe's insistence on increased reproduction for these families. Such shifts indicate the postwar desire of many eugenicists to distance themselves "from arguments about the need to capitulate individual rights to the national collectivity," instead focusing increasingly on questions of marriage and family planning (Stern 4).

It was also in the early 1940s that prominent chemists and endocrinologists began turning in earnest to hormones as a potential solution to the search for effective birth control measures, including the first construction of synthetic progesterone. Such efforts paved the way for hormonal birth control in the form of the "magic pill" that Sanger herself had long pressed for. In fact, Sanger and Planned Parenthood were instrumental in pushing through early trials and FDA approval of the birth control pill. Positioning a drug as the key for normative reproduction in bodies already deemed healthy met sustained resistance in both religious and political circles, particularly given rising concerns about women's addiction to other forms of drugs. In her cultural history of gender and drug

policy in the U.S., Nancy Campbell writes that drug use and policy also exemplify the workings of biopower, particularly given the ways that popular, legal and medical understandings of drug use come to frame women at various historical moments: addiction in pregnant bodies "mitigates against the orderly and controlled 'insertion of bodies' into processes that reproduced capitalism, democracy, and modernity" (90). Campbell's work demonstrates that addiction formed a central site for biopolitical regulation, typically using the bodies of women of color, poor women and young women as markers of societal decline that bolstered surveillance of all reproductive bodies. By the 1950s, Campbell contends, drug discourse "began to work as a technique of normalization that applied to broader segments of the population than the tiny ranks of addicts warranted" (66). Importantly, this normalizing mechanism emerged alongside debates about welfare measures built on New Deal policies, and although discourses of drug use and welfare were not immediately overtly connected in the cultural imaginary or the legal arena, the public figures constructed through them soon came to reinforce each other and to collapse into one another. Like the public displays of deviant bodies in the 18th and 19th centuries, and the eugenics programs of the first half of the 20th century, the figure of the pregnant man and accompanying fear of reproducing gender deviance shadow later debates about the relationship between drug use, state welfare policies and regulation of reproduction.

"Who Knows What You *Might* Do": Postwar Anxieties and the Enemy Within

Early welfare policies constructed during the New Deal of the 1930s included the Aid to Dependent Children program, ostensibly created to provide financial support to

certain groups of mothers in need, yet Rickie Solinger writes that almost always those mothers deemed "legitimate" under ADC criteria were white (132). Similarly, a number of scholars have described how the federal welfare system was constructed precisely to hinder black mothers from accessing ADC support, since the funds were geared towards unemployable women (that is, white widows who were expected to stay at home and raise their own children), while poor women of color typically worked outside their home to begin with and were frequently denied funding on this basis.[26] Despite this, by the early 1950s lawmakers were already asserting that rampant fraud and wastefulness characterized the ADC program, accusations that occurred in the context of rising fear of communist influences. For example, in a 1951 discussion in the House of Representatives, a Virginia legislator argued that "[b]ehind an iron curtain of secrecy and concealment we have today a miniature welfare state in actual operation, a welfare state that spends public money for luxuries for the undeserving and for the financing and encouragement of improvidence and illegitimacy" ("Fraud" 153). The reference to illegitimacy here neatly links welfare with unregulated reproduction in the context of the communist threat, suggesting that proper citizens and the U.S. as a nation were vulnerable to deceptive menaces both within and without. Such sentiments aligned with a general fear of the "enemy within," constructed in relation to postwar anti-communism that fueled a number of concerns about unrecognized treachery. Anxieties converging in this discourse included: renewed fear of gender-nonconforming and homosexual bodies, thought to be biologically and/or psychologically different from normative citizens and easily manipulated by communist forces; increased suspicion of foreign and/or racialized

[26] For further discussion of racialized distribution of federal aid, see Roberts' *Killing the Black Body*, Mary Poole's *The Segregated Origins of Social Security*, and George Lipsitz's *The Possessive Investment in Whiteness*.

bodies that passed as citizens to smuggle immoral and anti-American materials and ideologies into the U.S.;[27] apprehension about shifting gender roles and family structures in the postwar economy; and increased concern for the status of youth, figured in many ways as a metaphor for U.S. vulnerability to communism and other deviant influences. Campbell argues that illicit drug use drew many of these anxieties together and "became an index of Western 'willpower' to withstand alternate ideologies and ways of life," such that rebuilding the white, middle-class heternormative family was understood as a preventative measure against both addiction and political subterfuge (98).

I note these links between various postwar social and political anxieties in part because they lay important groundwork for more recent tropes of the welfare queen, crack baby and teenage mother that have all proved crucial in justifying increased technological and social surveillance of pregnant and potentially-pregnant bodies. As we shall see, the figure of the pregnant man plays a notable role in these later constructions of un/healthy reproductive practices. But this is not to say that this figure is entirely absent from mid-century fears of the enemy within and related threats to white heteronormativity. Consider for example the 1958 science fiction horror film *Night of the Blood Beast*, a low-budget venture in which a test pilot named John is impregnated by an alien after a mysterious crash landing. The film's plot and dialogue reflect the mistrust characteristic of the Red Scare period: a team of researchers first find "alien" and "foreign" cells "dominating" John's healthy blood cells, and later use a fluoroscope to

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[27] Nancy Campbell notes that during World War II, Japanese drug smuggling was portrayed as a "new form of chemical warfare" (64). Women's bodies in particular were considered deceptive ways to transport drugs, with long skirts portrayed as devices for covering drugs taped to women's legs. Images of white women carrying drugs in this way circulated in popular media in the 1930s, but by the 1940s, these images were recast with Japanese women, aligned with other orientalist World War II propaganda. In the 1950s, such portrayals shifted to center on Chinese bodies, narcotics, and communist influences.

view alien fetuses in his abdomen, leading them to grow increasingly suspicious of what his body may be carrying, despite John's healthy exterior. John pleads with them not to treat him "like a monster," but is told that even if he is not responsible for his actions, "who knows what you *might* do." In the end, it becomes clear that the alien wants to reproduce with humans, a proposal of race-mixing that prompts John to beg for death, crying that the "civilization growing inside" him will "destroy mankind as we know it." In one of his final lines before committing suicide, John looks to the research team — two white men and two white women — and declares, "the future of our race is in *you*!"

I am not suggesting that a single film positions the notion of male pregnancy as central to early Cold War anxieties. Rather, I mention the film here because it is one indicator that the figure of the pregnant man continues to have some connection to broader monitoring of reproductive practices in relation to various social concerns about sexual deviance, miscegenation, and the loss of an idealized "American" way of life. Importantly, these concerns reflect not only anti-communist fervor, but also growing debates and uneasiness about the stability and potency of white, western civilization amidst various decolonization movements during the 1950s, ideals that had been cemented in large part through turn-of-the-century emphases on reproductive health and racial purity in the context of U.S. domestic slavery and imperialism abroad.[28] Beyond the film's obvious metaphors for and references to the (communist/mixed-race/sexually deviant) enemy within John's previously all-American, now biologically aberrant body, the film is also suggestive of biopolitical investments in "making live," particularly in the

[28] A number of important texts make these links clear, including Anna Davin's "Imperialism and Motherhood," and Gail Bederman's *Manliness and Civilization.*

research team's concern with what John "*might* do." The focus on containment and regulation of John's disturbingly pregnant body reflects ongoing state and medical efforts to regulate reproduction not only for those bodies that *are* pregnant, but also for those that *might become* pregnant.

Similarly, the film's use of a fluoroscope to discover the protagonist's pregnancy was not merely in the service of sci-fi fantasy; it reflected the rise of ultrasound as a diagnostic tool during the late 1950s and early 1960s. In her article "Public Pregnancies and Cultural Narratives of Surveillance," Anne Balsamo notes that postwar reproductive imaging technologies like the ultrasound facilitated a shift in obstetrics' focus, from the act of childbirth itself to broader surveillance of the pregnant individual. Medical monitoring of the pregnant body (through blood tests, dietary restrictions, and other regulatory practices in addition to new imaging technologies) works in tandem with public health discourse that encourages individuals to engage in self-surveillance of health, wellness and sexual practices, producing a cultural emphasis on reproductive health not only for those who were currently pregnant, but for all bodies that could *potentially* be pregnant. Perhaps the most recent overt example of this emphasis is in the 2006 report "Recommendations to Improve Preconception Health and Health Care," jointly released by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), which "aims to promote the health of women of reproductive age before conception and thereby improve pregnancy-related outcomes" (Johnson, et al, 1). The report's recommendations range from increased "individual responsibility across the lifespan" to the addition of a "prepregnancy checkup" and maximizing "public health surveillance and related research

mechanisms to monitor preconception health" (15). With the explicit aim of monitoring and improving the health of the overall population through increased regulation of individual bodies, the report's extension of reproductive health to all bodies presumably capable of childbearing, regardless of whether they are or intend to become pregnant, significantly blurs the line between pregnant and not-pregnant and massively expanding the range of bodies falling under medical and legal surveillance of reproductive health. Biopolitical investments in reproduction thus go hand in hand with a panoptical structure of medical and public surveillance that is exemplified by fetal imaging techniques enabled by ultrasound.

Choice and Criminalization in the Panoptic Gaze

Foucault's description of the panopticon as a regulatory mechanism uses the image of a prison tower, from the top of which a guard can visually monitor all prisoners at any moment. Prisoners are unable to view the guard, yet seem to be constantly under the guard's surveillant gaze. Crucial to the workings of the panopticon is the possibility that, at any given moment, the guard may not be looking; yet because the prisoners have no way of knowing when these moments occur, they come to internalize the watchful gaze, monitoring their own actions regardless of whether a guard is actually in place. In this way, panopticism creates a culture of self-surveillance in which individuals regulate themselves. Thus, for example, state policing and testing of reproductive bodies during early eugenics programs functioned in part as panoptic surveillance measures promoting self-discipline towards the creation and maintenance of healthy individual bodies that together made up and reproduced a healthy social body. In these cases, as with

contemporary regulation of reproduction, bodies need not *be* pregnant to be policed in these ways; in fact eugenics logic was predicated in large part on variously preventing or encouraging differently-situated bodies' reproductive capacities: in making them live in particular ways, given the potential of pregnancy. Public health discourse promoting idealized bodies, families and reproductive practices coincides with medico-legal measures[29] that, like the prison guard, exert a disciplinary gaze over reproductive bodies; the simultaneous ubiquity of and potential gaps in this gaze produce a climate in which "the burden is on the pregnant woman to monitor her behavior" ("The Body" 23). In "The Body Invaded: Medical Surveillance of Women as Reproducers," Jennifer Terry points out that recent technologies used to visually examine fetuses and track viruses like HIV comprise a new form of scientific panopticism that "moves into a different logic of visual power by way of its literal penetration of the body" (17). Similarly, Rosalind Petchesky argues in her classic article, "Fetal Images: The Power of Visual Culture in the Politics of Reproduction," that ultrasound and other imaging technologies focused on visual monitoring of the fetus enact "a kind of *panoptics of the womb*" and enable greater medical control over and management of reproductive bodies, whether they are currently pregnant or not (277). And Anne Balsamo points out that these technologies also create new (fetal) bodies to medically manage, joining other scholars who suggest that the fetus has become the primary focus of contemporary obstetrics, with the (potentially) pregnant

[29] Key examples of these measures include mandatory HIV and drug tests, as well as the seemingly omnipresent gaze of the child welfare system, particularly in impoverished and/or urban neighborhoods heavily populated by people of color. For one insightful analysis of child welfare surveillance, see Dorothy Roberts' "The Racial Geography of State Child Protection."

body understood only in terms of whether it provides suitable temporary shelter for the fetus.[30]

Importantly, increased use of obstetric ultrasound as a form of medical surveillance occurred in the context of a number of other social, medical and political shifts beginning in the early 1960s that continued to draw on the gender-nonconforming pregnant body as a figure in which various social anxieties and horrors converged. New debates over welfare policies emerged in part out of social movements of the 1960s that pressured the state to revise previous restrictions that had favored white families. Yet opening welfare regulation to the "undeserving" poor (typically portrayed as black single mothers) drew public hostility and demands for greater state scrutiny of welfare recipients' need. To this end, various anti-fraud initiatives were implemented and nationally publicized throughout the early 1960s, figuring welfare recipients as inherently dishonest and criminal.[31] Such representations were further propelled by the 1965 publication of the Moynihan Report that framed black women as overbearing matriarchs responsible for the decline of the black family, which in turn was cast as a pathological blight on U.S. moral and economic health. This logic converged neatly with theories of a "culture of poverty" that were prevalent in the early 1960s, which held that poor families necessarily reproduced their own impoverished status through negative behaviors and values learned in early childhood — particularly sexual promiscuity, fatherless families and unmarried pregnancies — rendering poor families and children "intrinsically pathological and

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[30] There is a great deal of feminist scholarship on the topic of ultrasound technology and fetal representation. For further reading, see for example Karen Leslie Carr's "Optical Illusions," Lesley Larkins' "Authentic Mothers, Authentic Daughters and Sons," and Laury Oaks' "Smoke-Filled Wombs and Fragile Fetuses."

[31] For more in-depth discussion of the criminalization of welfare recipients and accompanying surveillance measures, see Julilly Kohler-Hausmann's "The Crime of Survival."

completely irredeemable" (Ortiz and Briggs 40). Finally, the emergence of the figure of the "welfare queen" in the early 1970s joined scrutiny of black family structures to the criminalization of fraudulent welfare recipients and growing public fear of population (over)growth by positing the poor single black mother as a critical drain on the state and on the well-being of the broader social body: the "welfare queen" essentially stole state funding by continually having children out of wedlock to receive ever more welfare benefits, while refusing to seek gainful employment or normative heterosexual marriage. As Wahneema Lubiano notes, the figure of the welfare queen functions as "the synecdoche, the shortest possible shorthand, for the pathology of poor, urban, black culture" (335).

Nancy Campbell demonstrates that drug discourse also played a key role in public and scientific anxieties about population control, non-normative gender and family structures, and reproductive ideals. Medical and psychological understandings of the drug addict as having a "fluid and shifting" personality were augmented by addicts' figuration as gender-nonconforming and sexually deviant (108).[32] Where addicted out-of-wedlock mothers were white, Campbell notes, they were typically understood to be suffering from psychological troubles; but women of color were seen to have biological inferiorities that pointed them to illegitimate pregnancies (156). Such rhetoric drew on early constructions of the savage racialized body as physically and measurably distinct from the civilized white body, rendered here through idealized gender identity and behavior, and recast such that drugs metaphorically stand in for communist or criminal influences that weaken not only the individual body and heterosexual family, but the greater population and the

[32] For example, Campbell notes that researchers "linked the 'truth' of addiction to failed formations of normative masculinity and femininity, thus promoting self-control and the foreclosure of sexual and social deviance as 'solutions' to the problem" (136).

nation overall. At the same time, drugs and other medical interventions continued to be posited as important remedies for undesirable population growth,[33] and the 1960s and 70s saw massive, non-consensual, state-sponsored sterilization campaigns against women of color.[34] Here, as with the figure of the fraudulent welfare queen, gender-nonconformity is read through race and class status, sexual practices and non-normative or illegal engagement with drugs. While I do not want to claim that the figures of the welfare queen and drug addict are simply equivalent to that of the pregnant man, I do want to point to the ways that their images were widely used as cautionary tales that justified state regulation of reproduction, in large part through repeated narratives of their failure to conform to normative gender identities and behaviors. Moreover, because they were positioned as physiologically and/or psychologically deficient relative to the white heterosexual middle-class ideal, these figures were understood as biologically predisposed to that failure. I am suggesting, then, that the history and positioning of the welfare queen and drug addict in the 1960s and 70s U.S. form an important context for discussions about the image of the pregnant man, and that they provide a broader sense of the regulation of reproductive bodies understood as gender-nonconforming even within the general category of "woman."

Notably, the emergence of the pregnant man in the context of reproductive discourse during the 1960s and 70s actually begins to point to limitations in medical surveillance and state regulation of reproductive practices. Consider for example the 1978

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[33] For more details, see for example Solinger's discussion of the pill's promotion as a cure for poverty (167), which draws on neo-Malthusian ideals, and Robert's discussion of scientists' stated desires in the 1960s for medical interventions that could prevent pregnancy over long periods of time, desires that, as Roberts points out, prefigured the implementation of Norplant and Quinacrine as long-term contraceptives that were typically promoted for people of color, youth, and the poor.

[34] See, among others, Smith's *Conquest* (72-88) and Solinger's *Pregnancy and Power* (193-200).

film *Rabbit Test*, directed by Joan Rivers and featuring Billy Crystal in his first starring role, as a man who becomes pregnant after his first sexual encounter, a dilemma that sets the stage for the film's over-the-top comedy approach. Notable for my discussion here, however, is a side plot in which the U.S. military is deployed to locate and capture Crystal because the government fears the implications male pregnancy may have for population growth. While the film overall is a superficial treatment of reproductive issues, played strictly for laughs, this particular component nevertheless reflects a much more serious off-screen preoccupation with questions of over-population during the late 20th century, particularly where reproduction is associated with bodies otherwise deemed undesirable for pregnancy. But the film's depiction of the sudden emergence (and subsequent emergency) of male pregnancy might also necessitate a rethinking of what exactly constitutes a "potentially pregnant" body. In 1979 a woman in New Zealand gave birth despite having undergone a hysterectomy eight months earlier; "an errant fertilized egg had lodged in her abdomen, on her bowel" and from there grew to term (Teresi 175). Her case began a flurry of scientific investigations into the possibilities of male pregnancy that moved out of the realm of comedy and science fiction. How do legislation, medical screenings, public health discourse and criminal policies determine which bodies are potentially pregnant? The figure of the pregnant man may offer some insight into ruptures in the surveillance of reproduction, even as such a figure is simultaneously positioned as repugnant and disturbing, a warning of inevitable social decline should unfit bodies reproduce.

While *Rabbit Test* may be understood as a purely fictional text that takes up the figure of the pregnant man merely for comedic purposes, the 1970s also saw the figure of

the pregnant man directed quite clearly in the service of public health discourse. For example, the presumed shock value of a pregnant male body was employed in the second ad campaign designed by Saatchi & Saatchi, one of the world's largest advertising agencies. Their widely-circulated 1970 campaign promoting contraceptives use, initially created for the U.K.'s Health Education Council, featured a very pregnant white man looking sadly into the camera and holding his lower back with one hand. The ad's copy famously reads "Would you be more careful if it was you that got pregnant?" and includes contact information for local family planning organizations at the bottom. The achy regret conveyed in the image and the cautionary text together urge reproductive control and personal responsibility, a message impressed upon the viewer most effectively through the presumably absurd and unsettling depiction of a pregnant man. Importantly, the ad is aimed at individuals who are assumed able to make their own decisions about reproduction through contraceptives; it comes on the heels of international trials for the birth control pill that eschewed informed consent and resulted in massive reproductive health problems for poor women and women of color in Puerto Rico, Haiti and Mexico while simultaneously being marketed to white middle-class women in the U.S. and other western countries as a medical breakthrough for women's autonomy.[35]

Unlike the cultural link drawn between drug addiction and unfit reproductive bodies, the pregnant man in the Saatchi ad frames the birth control pill and other contraceptive measures as key to healthy reproduction for white heterosexual couples.

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[35] It is notable that this ad is directed at men, particularly given that many doctors and drug companies of the 1960s and 1970s questioned whether women were trustworthy and careful enough to manage pills as an effective form of birth control. Solinger notes that such discourse undermined the idea of "choice" used to market the pill, and further justified promotion of more permanent/long-term birth control mechanisms like IUD's and Depo-Provera for poor women and women of color (169-175).

Moreover, the call for self-management that is in accordance with increased medicalization and surveillance of reproduction, yet posited as individual choice and personal autonomy, places an emphasis on personal responsibility that converges and aligns with the rise of neoliberalism in the late 20th century U.S. In this sense, the ad works as part of a larger push toward privatization that, as Grewal notes, "turns the personal into the political and defines the work of security as everyone's job. In the process, neoliberalism in the United States has come to invest in the mother-subject as essential to the privatization of welfare and security" (29). The disciplinary work exemplified in the Saatchi ad also recalls Foucault's characterization of power as most effective when subjects believe they are outside of its reach. The aberrant body of the pregnant man works as an implicit reminder that deviant reproductive bodies are subject to surveillance and discipline that may mask the ways that normative bodies are equally disciplined to reproduce in particular ways, and in fact to maintain normative status. By foregrounding this arresting image, the ad positions contraceptives as a preventative measure not only against unwanted or unplanned pregnancies, but also against the threat of deviance, here embodied in the unthinkable pregnant body.

Of course, the pregnant man's body is not *entirely* unthinkable; actually it emerges fairly consistently in conjunction with other deviant figures to facilitate various social and political shifts in reproductive norms.[36] But because the pregnant man is continually

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[36] The 1970s, fraught with legal, social, and medical debates over reproductive practices, particularly in light of various social movements centralizing gender and sexuality, saw the pregnant man appear in a number of contexts. At least one other film foregrounded the image of male pregnancy: *The Broad Coalition* (1972) features a group of radical feminists who kidnap a police officer and impregnate him. As other men express envy of his new parenthood, the women begin to feel neglected by their boyfriends and husbands. The depiction of women's liberation here is somewhat at odds with the feminist utopias described in various science fiction literature of the 1970s, such as Marge Piercy's novel *Woman on the Edge of Time*, in which artificial wombs handle pregnancy, while both men and women are able to nurse infants. We might also think about how *Night of the Blood Beast* prefigured later science fiction/horror

made to *seem* unthinkable, impossible, it differs notably from the figures of the welfare queen or hyperfertile immigrant, images that are both understood to stand in, however crudely, for actual bodies. In contrast, presumably nothing and no one "real" stands behind the figure of the pregnant man. In some cases, then, the image of a pregnant man might be used to signal or invoke anxieties about deviance and degeneracy without overtly referencing the racialized, classed, and gendered bodies typically understood to inhabit and reproduce those threatening characteristics. The Saatchi ad can be read as using the "impossible" image of a pregnant man to more obliquely criticize overpopulation fears primarily linked to people of color and poor people, even while it is presumably geared toward white heterosexual couples with some autonomy over their reproductive practices. In this way, the ad foreshadows later representations of the pregnant man that hold up this figure as emblematic of innovative Western science and healthy white families, while utterly distinct from racially and economically marginalized bodies that were increasingly criminalized and pathologized during the late 20th century.

Good Science and Bad Bodies

In her incisive account of the systematic repression of black people's reproductive rights in the U.S., *Killing the Black Body*, Dorothy Roberts details the emergence of crack cocaine as a critical moment in public and state scrutiny of black pregnant bodies. First referenced in a 1985 *New York Times* story, in the context of Ronald Reagan's "War on Drugs," crack quickly became associated with inner city black populations, and linked particularly to poor, single black women (Roberts 154-155). Campbell reminds us that,

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representations of male pregnancy in blockbuster films like *Alien* (1979), in which the fetal body horrifically emerging from a previously healthy male's abdomen is literally a monster.

while an especially potent public image, the crack mother and crack baby did not appear without precedent, and like so many other deviant figures drew on longstanding representations of gender nonconformity as read through race, class, and sexuality. She notes that medical and public attention to addicted babies first appeared in the late 1950s, and by the 1970s, researchers had begun advocating for mandatory drug treatment as a way of regulating pregnancy in addicts. Importantly, they attributed these pregnancies to addicts' inability to achieve proper feminine gender roles: for example, one report stated that addicted women had a "fundamental desire to become pregnant as a means of becoming normal feminine women," where otherwise they suffered from homosexual desire and low self-esteem (161).

The figure of the crack baby functioned to further cement discursive links between welfare recipients, criminal behavior, sexual immorality, racial inferiority and deviant gendering; together, these failings focused public and state scrutiny on individual pregnant bodies and on poor black populations more broadly, shifting attention firmly away from systemic poverty and inadequate social welfare services. As Ana Teresa Ortiz and Laura Briggs assert in their article on the racial underpinnings of contemporary adoption policies, "the narrative of crack babies produced a biologized account of the growing impoverishment of urban communities of color" (48). By the early 1990s, Ortiz and Briggs note, cocaine tests had become a matter of routine for many hospitals, especially those serving mostly black populations, and pregnant individuals testing positive were often sent directly to jail after giving birth, with their infants immediately entering the child welfare system. And beginning in the 1980s, courts increasingly ordered pregnant drug users into "protective" incarceration, sometimes extending their

sentences to ensure that their pregnancies would be monitored in prison.[37] In fact Rickie Solinger suggests that by the 1990s, the prisoner came to represent the ideal pregnant body: under panoptic surveillance at all times and coerced to reproduce or not by the authority of the state (243-246). Importantly, these pregnant bodies are taken into state custody for discipline in large part because they fail to exhibit gender-appropriate maternal instincts, a failure viewed most overtly through their reckless drug use, but also through their racial status and financial dependency on the state.

Yet while certain drugs are posited as markers of deviance and degeneration for pregnant bodies of color, others are increasingly heralded as medical breakthroughs for normative white couples otherwise unable to reproduce, alongside other fertility treatments such as in-vitro fertilization (IVF) and sperm or egg donation. As Dorothy Roberts points out, however, such technologies are often used in the service of "reproductive fitness," reminiscent of earlier eugenics discourse (251). In this context, for perhaps the first time, the figure of the pregnant man emerges not as a cautionary figure of immoral or threatening reproduction, but as a symbol of western medicine's innovation in the service of healthy white heterosexuality. The romantic comedy *Junior* (1994), starring Arnold Schwarzenegger as a scientist researching fertility drugs, positions the figure of the pregnant man as one signaling scientific progress and the maintenance of normative gender.

Rejected for FDA approval, Schwarzenegger is unable to test his drugs on human subjects until an obstetrician convinces him to be his own test subject, exclaiming "Is it

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[37] Carol Mason demonstrates in her comparative analysis of anti-abortion and crack baby rhetoric that claims of fetal "protection" are always filtered through race, showing that anti-abortion discourse posits aborted fetuses as whole, intact, healthy, and implicitly white, while the racialized figure of the crack baby is innocent but nevertheless impure, immoral and a drain on social welfare. The crack baby is thus what society must be protected *from*.

natural? So what? Good science? You bet!" Schwarzenegger "borrows" a frozen egg from a fellow researcher, and takes experimental fertility drugs along with heavy estrogen doses, a combination enabling repeated scenes of unabashed emotion and weepiness, rendered both comedic and non-threatening in relation to Schwarzenegger's off-screen status as a cultural icon of hyper-masculinity. In fact, the film frames as most objectionable not a man exhibiting "feminine" characteristics and behaviors, but the possibility of aborting the fetus; no longer an experiment to gather data only through the first trimester, his emotional attachment to the fetus leads him to carry the pregnancy to term, expressing horror at any suggestion that he end the experiment through abortion. A sonogram confirms the realness of his pregnancy, with the obstetrician stating that things are "perfectly normal — except for the fact that the mom is also the dad." In the end, the borrowed egg is discovered to belong to his fellow researcher (Emma Thompson), and the two plan to get married to give the baby "a normal upbringing." Notably, *Junior* was released in the same year as Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray's best-selling and controversial book *The Bell Curve*, which linked intelligence to genetics along race and class lines, building on already-present fears of higher birthrates for poor and non-white populations; such fears were only exacerbated by news of the crack baby "epidemic." Anxieties about white infertility and falling birthrates in the white middle-class had already been nurtured through backlash in the 1980s against the white middle-class "career woman," who eschewed parenthood for workplace gains. In this context, a pregnant white man — portrayed in *Junior* by the manliest of men — functions not as a harbinger of degeneracy, but as a symbol of scientific progress ensuring white reproduction and the security of gender normative family structures.

Those family structures were further reinforced through the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which focuses in large part on the import of the heterosexual family to ending welfare dependency. Proposing to "end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage," PRWORA marks a significant shift in state management of welfare ("Personal" 645). Sanford Schram describes this shift as the medicalization of welfare, which effaces structural economic issues by framing the need for welfare as behavioral: a form of individual dependency that should be cured. Biopower is clearly at work here: Schram contends that welfare dependency is seen as a public health problem, complete with fears that without state intervention it will be passed to future generations, such that "the federal government is investing millions of dollars to define welfare dependency, measure it, identify its symptomology, and specify forms of treatment" (83). The metaphor of dependency that likens welfare recipients to drug addicts is not mere rhetoric, but extends to state surveillance measures that saw drug screens implemented in many states as prerequisites for welfare eligibility.

As with earlier drug discourse that posited the heteronormative family as a solution to addiction, the reformation and/or punishment of non-normative gender roles and deviant sexual practices proves central to the 1996 welfare reform measures. PRWORA primarily attributes increased welfare need not to inadequate social services, but to single-parent families and teen pregnancy, neatly folding the figure of the welfare queen into that of the pregnant teen.[38] Here, the specter of a pregnant body transgressing

[38] In "From 'Welfare Queen' to 'Exploited Teen,'" Carolyn Cocca argues that numerous references to statutory rape in PRWORA turn the figure of the pregnant teen from threat to victim: from welfare queen to exploited child. I would suggest, though, that this shift is not so easy in relation to bodies of color, which certainly by 1996 were implicitly central to public discourse on welfare.

normative gendered behavior as read through race, class, and sexual propriety bolsters state surveillance of reproduction and justifies coercive heterosexual marriage, with the explicit understanding that rectifying deviant gendered behavior ensures "a successful society" — PRWORA's language — both economically and socially. The figure of the pregnant man appears in this context, too: consider for example a public service advertising campaign released in Milwaukee in late 2007. The ads were created by Serve, a charitable arm of the larger for-profit advertising agency BVK, which aims to "be a conduit for social change and philanthropic giving, by providing a strong voice to important but underserved charitable causes." Designed as part of a broader public education campaign called Milwaukee One, which bills itself as "a citywide initiative to help bridge the gap between the haves and haves-not," these particular ads are directed at Milwaukee's teen pregnancy rates, recently found to be among the highest in the U.S.

The ads, designed for outdoor display via billboards, each feature one of three teenage boys. Each boy is shirtless, and each has a visibly distended abdomen, marking him as pregnant. The main copy for the ads, written across each boy's chest, reads "It shouldn't be any less disturbing when it's a girl." While these elements are common to all three ads, each is visually and differently marked by class and race. The boy with light skin and shaggy, bright blond hair appears in the sunny outdoors, with skyscrapers and trees in the background. He looks unsmilingly into the camera, but a lock of hair across one eye softens his gaze. Another boy, with dark skin and eyes, perhaps reading as Latino, is framed by a graffiti-inscribed brick wall and chain-link fence. Above his head, tall buildings recalling housing projects surround a thin wedge of blue sky. Wearing a dark baseball cap, he too looks directly into the camera, chin raised so his gaze is directed

down onto the viewer, projecting an air of confidence or perhaps a sense of challenge. The third boy, who reads as black, is the only one not clearly positioned outdoors. He stands in front of a wall that extends to the very edges of the frame, empty but for a small window with security bars. While the other two boys wear jeans, he wears what might be pajamas or sweatpants, with grey and white stripes perhaps reminiscent of prison uniforms. He is also the only boy not looking into the camera, instead gazing at the floor, head tilted away from the viewer.

The text across each of their chests suggests at least two assumptions: first, that the viewer *is* disturbed by visible pregnancy in someone perceived to be male, and second, that this affective response *should be* equally present when confronted with the idea or image of pregnancy in a young person perceived to be female. Yet the different visual elements that mark each boy by race and class belie the sameness that the repeated text implies. Thus the disturbed response assumed or provoked in the viewer results not just from the supposed abnormality inherent in an image of a pregnant boy, but also from the notion of non-white, poor and/or urban pregnant bodies more generally. The visual relationship drawn here between teen pregnancy and particular racialized and classed bodies is further solidified by the tag line at the bottom of each ad, which reads "Milwaukee has one of the highest teen birth rates in America, and it's a burden the rest of us end up carrying, through higher taxes for healthcare, education and other services teen mothers can't afford. So get beyond disturbed. Get involved at OneMilwaukee.org." Linking teen pregnancy to economic stress, the ads position these bodies as deviant drains on both the social body and individual tax-paying citizens. In other words, the figure of the pregnant boy signifies here an imperative for the viewer to feel disturbed by

a visibly non-normative body that is read as such not only through gender, but through race, class, and the historical tropes of the welfare mother and pregnant teen. The images of these bodies are intended to be unsettling both because the bodies themselves are positioned as non-normative and unnatural, and because the bodies invoke broader understandings of non-normative reproduction that is both socially disruptive and economically threatening.

Normalizing the Spectacle

By the time major news outlets took up Thomas Beatie's image and narrative in early 2008, the figure of the pregnant man was already pervasive in popular culture, public health discourse and medical science — yet Beatie's pregnancy was overwhelmingly treated as the first such occurrence. This treatment is similar across earlier appearances of the pregnant man: in each case, the figure's affective and political impact is necessarily tied to its status as unthinkable and wholly unexpected, the first of its kind. In noting this, I refer not to the much-publicized technicalities of Beatie as the first legal male (according to his identification documents and medical paperwork) to be pregnant — nor with arguments that even that status is erroneous, given previous transgender-identified men who publicly discussed their pregnancy[39] — because I am concerned here not with Beatie as an individual person, but rather with the ways that the figure of the pregnant man operates discursively. Each moment in which this figure emerges depends precisely on its construction as anomaly in order to produce, clarify, or bolster ongoing state and medical surveillance of deviant bodies' reproductive practices,

[39] See for example the 2000 *Village Voice* article by trans man Patrick Califia, describing his decision to have a child with another trans man, as well as recent media interviews with obstetricians who attest to providing care for several pregnant trans men.

and to (re)create ideals of normative reproduction in contrast. Although already circulating in a variety of contexts, each instance of the pregnant man appears as if it were the shocking and singular first, obscuring not only the repetition of the figure itself, but relatedly the systemic surveillance and policing of reproduction for all bodies.

In this sense, Thomas Beatie's image must be understood not just in the context of the broader figure of the pregnant man, but also in relation to questions of state surveillance of bodies and reproduction in a time of neoliberalism and post-9/11 militarism. Beatie functions as an inconsistent and contradictory symbol that on one hand may be incorporated into the national body as a sign of democracy, tolerance and American exceptionalism, yet on the other hand signifies the deviant body disrupting an idealized heteronormative family that would maintain the stability of the nation, particularly in a time of war and economic upheaval. Grewal notes that in the context of biopower and state security rhetoric, "mothers" are produced "as necessary to the protection of the family of Americans and those who must participate in their own surveillance for their security" (38).

The construction of Beatie's own narrative and public image tends to navigate these contradictory positionings by seeking recourse in normalcy. His initial essay in *The Advocate* foregrounds the couple's "desire to work hard, buy our first home, and start a family," a story of middle-class suburbia that is echoed in later media photos of the pregnant Beatie doing yardwork in front of the couple's home. This framing of Beatie as embedded in a white suburban landscape is notably contrasted widely-released photos of him prior to his medical transition, which show him as a finalist in the Miss Hawaii Teen USA pageant and overtly reference a stereotypical Asian hyper-femininity. Such a shift

in public portrayal suggests that attempts to claim a normal family and pregnancy rely at least in part on the simultaneous shift away from an overtly racialized femininity toward a white middle-class image of manhood. For Beatie to succeed in being perceived as a regular guy rather than as gender-nonconforming – as "nothing out of the ordinary," as he stressed in *The Advocate* – his image must conform to normative gender as it is also read through regulatory norms of race, class and sexuality. In interviews with Larry King, Oprah Winfrey and others, the Beaties confirmed that they planned to raise their child with Thomas as father and Nancy as mother, statements that reaffirm the heteronormative family in much the same way that *Junior* does. In both that film and the Beatie narrative, despite final images of gender-normative parenting roles — the last photograph in Beatie's memoir shows Nancy holding their infant, with Thomas at the edge of the frame looking on — the real lasting image is that of the pregnant man. The Beaties' insistence on the normalcy of their family and parenting structure is only necessary (indeed, is only *news*) because of their public position as aberrations to begin with.

Nancy Beatie's body, too, is constructed as deviant — her own inability to have children led Thomas to pursue pregnancy. Much has been made of both Thomas and Nancy's early careers in professional bodybuilding, a pursuit strongly linked in the cultural imagination with illegal steroid use that masculinizes the physical body. In this context, drug discourse joins with gender norms to reflect upon the Beaties' differently deviant bodies: Nancy because she is infertile and Thomas because he takes testosterone as part of his medical transition process. At the same time, the *Advocate* story carefully positions his pregnancy as natural: "I didn't have to take any exogenous estrogen, progesterone, or fertility drugs to aid my pregnancy," Beatie writes. But it is precisely his

use of testosterone (along with chest surgery) that enabled Thomas to legally change his sex, which in turn opened the door for his legal marriage to Nancy, and in this we might see one way that Beatie's image and story are constructed to incite fear of the enemy within in our current moment. In a time of increased public visibility of same-sex marriage movements and conservative backlash, the Beaties' marriage is frequently framed as exploiting and exposing a legal loophole. Here, the deceptive trans body is figured as that which undermines the heteronormative family by manipulating both law and medicine. The couple's routine self-positioning as an average American family is presumably intended to further solidify their image of normalcy and perhaps even to provoke a sense of identification from non-trans, heterosexual parents. Yet read another way, their image of normalcy only further positions them as a deceptive threat, unrecognized until deviance has already been reproduced.

In this sense, the figure of the pregnant man highlights not so much the apparent contradictions of an individual body, but the contradictory positioning of scientific progress more broadly. The medical advancements so often held up as symbols of national achievement that promote populational health are, in relation to Beatie, understood as failing to properly monitor deviant bodies, precisely because that same science is held to have enabled such bodies' defiance of nature to begin with. The image of the pregnant man lays bare the distinct unnaturalness of reproduction – not merely for Beatie, but for all pregnant (and potentially pregnant) bodies – even as it is constantly framed by Thomas Beatie's insistence on the natural, normal qualities of his pregnancy and family structure. Moreover, Beatie's pregnancy calls into question exactly which bodies are considered potentially pregnant bodies. How can the health of babies, families,

and the nation itself be secured when bodies that might become pregnant are not carefully monitored by legal, medical, and social mechanisms of surveillance, as the CDC report strenuously suggests?

Seen in this broader context, the figure of the pregnant man has far more to tell us about histories of surveillance and regulation of reproductive bodies, family structures and national interests than about any individual body or pregnancy. The horror, fascination and spectacle of "the" pregnant man exist as such because this figure is framed as new and anomalous. Yet that very spectacle — the public rehashing of conceptions of healthy bodies and families, the future of white heteronormativity, and anxieties about what is hidden and what deviant figures can get away with — relies on the repetition of figures we are already intimately familiar with, on narratives we have already heard. What the public and medical fascination with Beatie's pregnancy uncovers is not his individual genitals or reproductive organs, nor even his transgender status itself. Rather, it demonstrates what was always exposed to begin with: the uses of deviant bodies to further biopolitical investments in regulating all bodies and reproductive practices more broadly.

X-Ray Specs:
Prosthetic Technologies in the Maintenance of Whole Bodies

On December 25, 2009, a passenger aboard a commercial airplane attempted to detonate an explosive en route from Amsterdam to Detroit. The passenger, Nigerian citizen Umar Farouk Abdulmatallab, had allegedly concealed the explosive device in his underwear, and soon became known in the news media as "the underwear bomber." Numerous reports linked Abdulmatallab to Al-Qaeda, and U.S. security agencies immediately released calls for more thorough screening of travelers at airports. In particular, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) announced it would roll out new X-ray machines that enable security officials to see beneath passengers' clothing, revealing sketch-like images of the physical body and any objects attached to it. These "whole body imaging" machines were already in limited use at a small number of U.S. airports and prison complexes, but in response to TSA's announcement, various U.S. transgender advocacy organizations released statements warning that these new X-ray machines could incorrectly target transgender passengers, by revealing prosthetic breasts or genitals that might be misread as explosives or weapons.

This chapter begins with the recent case of the "underwear bomber" not only because it set off a frenzy of public discourse about X-ray imaging, dangerous bodies, and state surveillance, but because the case functions as a particularly clear example of the ways that those areas of the body understood as especially "private" – here, the underwear and genitals – come to be suffused with anxiety in ways that overtly link gender, race, and national security. In this sense, the case and its aftermath serve as an important entry point for thinking through the contested visual scrutiny and regulation of

non-normative bodies, particularly insofar as they are discursively and materially linked to new technologies that might be broadly understood as protheses. The case of the "underwear bomber" and transgender advocacy organizations' public statements concerning new X-ray policies both appear in a context in which the figures of the terrorist and the transgender person seem to easily converge. As I have argued throughout this dissertation, the discursive links between these figures hinge in part on their shared position in the cultural imagination as necessarily deceptive and fraudulent. In the case of whole-body imaging, that deception — for both figures — takes the form of hidden technologies. That is to say, the state argues that X rays will uncover dangerous technologies such as guns, explosives, or other weapons on the body of the terrorist. Meanwhile, transgender organizations argue that X-ray images will show the prosthetic breasts or genitals, or binding materials, often understood to conceal transgender people's "true" gender or sex.

Much like their responses to the regulation of identification documents discussed in Chapter 1, transgender advocacy organizations have typically approached the question of X-ray imaging and airport security in ways that aim to distinguish between the good transgender citizen and the dangerous (presumably non-transgender) terrorist, focusing largely on privacy concerns for transgender-identified travelers. This chapter, however, shifts the discussion beyond questions of privacy. Instead, I consider here the ways that technology functions as a key discursive link between the figures of the terrorist and the trans person. Their imagined connections to technology – in ways both similar and distinct – help position each of these figures as threats that are dangerously fluid and unstable, yet carefully disguised as "natural."

In what follows, I examine a wide range of U.S. public discourse surrounding X-ray scanning (including the X ray's own cultural history) to argue in the broadest sense that this mode of scrutiny has less to tell us about the supposed illusions created by individual body-technology relationships (e.g., the purported deception of prosthetic genitals or explosives) than about the ways cultural investments in technological truths help naturalize the fictitious whole body itself. Drawing together transgender and disability studies, I suggest that the prosthesis functions as a conceptual framework through which ideas of mobility and security are filtered, and which is used to justify special examination of certain bodies. What, in the context of digital imaging and prosthetic technologies, constitutes the "whole body"? How do cultural links between transgender bodies and new technologies play out in relation to anti-terrorist measures and wartime anxieties? How might cultural histories of X-ray imaging itself — including its use in medical and military contexts — offer an important backdrop to more recent debates about the dangers, necessity, and supposed objectivity of whole body imaging? In grappling with these questions, this chapter considers the national safety concerns emerging in relation to those bodies commonly understood to be associated with, merging with, or seemingly reliant on new technologies.

Metaphors and Materiality: The Many Roles of the Prosthesis

Scholarly work has taken up the prosthesis in any number of ways, understanding it variously as metaphor, psychic trope, and historically grounded material object, among

others.[40] This chapter primarily engages the prosthesis as a theoretical concept — in which the body is extended in any number of ways through a variety of engagements with technologies both spectacular and quotidian — with material effects on the physical and social body. That is to say, the prosthesis as medicalized object is not solely a material entity, but in its various interpretations and uses also comes to structure fluctuating conceptions of normalcy, wholeness, and bodily boundaries.[41] As Sarah Jain notes in her key article on the trope of the prosthesis, prostheses "are discursive frameworks, as well as material artifacts" (32). And while as both metaphor and material object the prosthesis frequently figures as that which overcomes, extends, or replaces the biological body, the distinctions between body and technology are not so easily drawn, nor is the notion of a prosthetic expansion or escape from the body one that occurs outside of broader power relations. For example, in explaining the seductive draw of technological innovation, Juana María Rodríguez cautions against technology as easy escape: "The powers and the privileges technology offers are always inscribed by other circuits of power and privilege. […] Existing 'in the machine' does not assuage the social, economic, or political conditions that construct both ourselves and our new mechanical habitats" (117). Along similar lines, Caren Kaplan notes that new technologies may imply unconstrained mobility by promising "ever-increasing degrees of disembodiment or detachment, yet they are as embedded in material relations as any

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[40] For more detailed overviews of the many uses of the term *prosthesis*, see for example the introductory essay in *The Prosthetic Impulse,* Katherine Ott's "The Sum of Its Parts," Sarah Jain's "The Prosthetic Imagination," and Diane Nelson's "Phantom Limbs and Invisible Hands."

[41] The use of "prosthesis" as a metaphorical or theoretical term, without attention to the material effects of the prosthesis as an object, has been the subject of much criticism, particularly in disability studies. While this chapter examines the materiality of prostheses to a limited degree, in further work on this topic I intend to expand that discussion to look more specifically at the production and circulation of prosthetic materials regularly associated with transgender-identified bodies.

other practices" ("Transporting" 34). Both Kaplan and Rodríguez counter technological promises of bodies, identities, or interactions that stand outside of the political, promises that seek to erase or forget larger power dynamics. Rather, these authors point to the ways that technologies – in both production and consumption – are fully embedded in circuits of power, as are the bodies engaging or interacting with those technologies.

In "Queer Cyborgs and New Mutants," Mimi Nguyen deftly demonstrates that the particular promise of prosthetic technologies to liberate one from the constraints of the body is a promise held out only to certain bodies. For example, she points to the ways that the notion of escape for an apparently autonomous subject — a subject willingly taking up technology to create a transcendent cyborg self — is available only through "the making of other kinds of cyborgs": namely, laborers whose gendered and racialized bodies work with other machines — the machines of the factory — to manufacture the technological means through which bodily freedom for some bodies appears achievable (292). Moreover, these manufacturing processes, in conjunction with complex and shifting social relations of race, class, sexuality, and disability, among others, structure the very types of prosthetics that are produced and desirable for consumption. For instance, in her introduction to *Artificial Parts, Practical Lives*, museum curator and disability studies scholar Katherine Ott suggests that the different shapes, sizes, and functions of prosthetics emphasized in different historical moments and national contexts reflect, in part, shifting ideals of productive citizenship and bodily norms. Importantly then, the prosthesis is produced through and constrained by complex social forces and relations of power even as it often purports to offer its users a way to circumvent them.

It is perhaps not surprising that many transgender advocacy organizations as well as medical professionals clearly demarcate "prosthetics" as objects easily linked to transgender bodies, and their reliance on the term is one of many reasons that I pursue questions of the prosthesis in this chapter. Transgender bodies are frequently understood to be created through and existing via new medical technologies. In her 1995 book *Changing Sex*, for example, Bernice Hausman makes the central argument that transsexualism itself emerged only in relation to the medical developments enabling physical sex reassignment. This argument positions the trans-identified body as unique to modernity, necessarily produced through the modern West's sex/gender categories and technological/medical advances. Such a figuration is an important contrast to the image of the timeless, backwards, technologically-underdeveloped figure of the Muslim/terrorist, as becomes clear later in this chapter. This approach also broadly structures older scholarship arguing that transgender people are detrimental to feminism and women's rights in part because transgender bodies are crafted through the sexist medical establishment.[42] Though the latter argument has faded somewhat from feminist scholarship and activism, contemporary medical and legal institutions continue to rely almost entirely on the presence of medical technologies as evidence of legible transgender identity. Frequently, such medical technologies are envisioned as the very things that allow transgender bodies to pass, to fly under the radar, to appear unmarked as transgender.

The use of the term prosthetic — more commonly taken up in the context of physical disabilities — also reflects the fact that a number of transgender-identified

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[42] For the classic example of this argument, see Janice Raymond's *The Transsexual Empire.*

individuals and transgender legal organizations have endeavored to figure transgender identity as a recognized disability, a strategy for ensuring access to and financial coverage for medical services including surgeries, hormones, and routine blood tests, as well as broader legal coverage such as anti-discrimination protections. Attaching the name "prosthetics" to various medical technologies used in gender transition is, in part, an invocation of disability status that some believe would help legitimate trans-identified groups by folding transgender identity into those rights covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act and similar local laws.[43] Finally, this chapter takes up the concept of the prosthesis in relation to transgender and gender-nonconforming bodies because it offers one useful way to unpack the pervasive framing of trans bodies as always in need of external objects to either replace, add, or subtract various aspects of the body, or to mask bodily characteristics that would otherwise mark one as gender deviant. In all of these ways, then, cultural imaginings of transgender bodies figure them as simultaneously created through and concealed by prosthetic technologies.

In these senses, the prosthesis is not limited to certain external objects that are literally attached to the body, as in the case of prosthetic breasts or limbs, but takes on a much broader definition. Nguyen defines the prosthesis as "a human-machine encounter enhancing movement, function, or activity" and notes that it is "often conceptualized as the interface allowing increasing freedom, mobility, and speed" (282-283). It is precisely this conceptualization that frames a variety of medical technologies — the surgical addition or removal of certain body parts, the routine intake of synthetic hormones, and the attachment or use of objects more traditionally considered prosthetics — as

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[43] For more detailed discussion of these efforts and their political and legal complexities, see for example Dean Spade's "Resisting Medicine/Remodeling Gender" and Jennifer Levi and Bennett Klein's "Pursuing Protection for Transgender People through Disability Law."

interventions granting transgender-identified people a certain freedom from the constraints of the sexed body. These prosthetic technologies, in other words, are often understood to offer a kind of mobility in which one might no longer be marked as transgender, but instead be able to pass as non-trans. In fact this enhanced mobility typically serves as the hallmark of a "successful" transition; as Dean Spade notes, the medicalization of transgender identities and bodies defines success as "the intelligibility of one's new gender in the eyes of non-trans people" (26). Essentially, then, prosthetics seem to offer an escape from the body as it once was (or at least as it once was perceived). Yet as I have noted in previous chapters, the ability to be perceived as non-transgender necessarily entails adherence to medical and social ideals of normative gender that rely heavily on racial, sexual, and economic privilege. That is to say, in order to be read as normative, gender presentations must typically conform to white, middle-class, heterosexual characteristics. The prosthetic technologies associated with transgender bodies, and with the process of medical transition, purport to shift individuals toward a more normative (and "successful") gender presentation — yet given the ways proper gender is read through racialization processes, economic status, and compulsory heterosexuality, for which bodies do such prosthetics really enable escape from being marked as transgender or transgressive?

It is in this way that the prosthesis – and, importantly, all of the ways that it serves as a regulatory mechanism for mobility – can be read through a biopolitical analysis. According to Foucault, disciplinary power primarily concerns the behavior and regulation of the individual subject, while biopolitics works on the individual only insofar as the individual is related to the regulation of the population more broadly. In their discussion

of recent legal struggles over sexual practices and marriage, Dean Spade and Craig Willse explain biopolitics in terms of "life chances," noting that a biopolitical lens positions marriage, for example, not simply as "an institution, or an enclosure" through which discipline occurs, but as "a technology or mechanism for channeling resources and populations" (321). Along these lines, we might consider mobility as a life chance that is one component of biopolitical regulation – not merely the disciplining (via the prosthesis) of individual bodies or subjects toward normative ideals, but rather the prosthesis's function as a mechanism for opening or constraining the possibility of mobility across the population more broadly. In this sense, we can come to see typical responses to X-ray surveillance – those hinging on individual rights to privacy and choice – as ultimately effacing the biopolitical functions of state surveillance practices.

Any Way We Want: Transgender Advocacy and the Right to Mobility

In June 2009, the National Center for Transgender Equality (NCTE) released a widely circulated fact sheet on whole body imaging as part of a broader educational campaign about travel for transgender-identified people.[44] The fact sheet implicitly reproduces the idea that not only are prosthetics part and parcel of inhabiting a transgender body, but they also offer a freedom to move through the world without scrutiny — except in special cases where state surveillance impinges on individual rights to privacy. The document lists prosthetics and binding materials alongside anatomical

[44] NCTE's fact sheet on whole body imaging has been widely circulated through organizations like the ACLU and across numerous blogs concerned with transgender and queer politics. While NCTE is the primary organization offering information about the effects of whole body imaging specifically regarding transgender-identified people, I want to note that the San Francisco-based Transgender Law Center, along with NCTE and more than 30 other civil rights and privacy rights organizations, signed a letter to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in mid-2009, calling for public input into the implementation of whole body imaging and for strenuous examination of alternatives and of medical implications of the new scanners. This letter is hosted online at <http://www.stopdigitalstripsearches.org/>.

body parts that the new X-ray machines will record, noting that "if a transgender person's [X-rayed] body looks different from what the TSA agent considers 'normal,' the passenger may be subjected to further searches and/or humiliation under the auspices of security measures" (2). Even while it takes up this undoubtedly serious concern, NCTE's fact sheet nonetheless tends to suggest that were it not for these new imaging techniques, transgender people would not be noticeable to security personnel as different or not normal, because their prosthetically altered bodies would enable them to pass freely through security checkpoints. This assumption is further solidified by the fact sheet's reminder — in a section titled "What should I do to avoid problems at the airport?" — that whole body imaging "is used primarily for passengers who are flagged for further screening after passing through a metal detector" (3). Given its placement in the document, this statement seems to be intended to reassure the concerned transgender traveler, yet the bodies less likely to be flagged by earlier surveillance measures tend to be those most privileged by racial, national, economic, and/or sexual hierarchies.

This kind of reassurance might at first appear to be contradictory to NCTE's earlier work responding to new policies concerning identification documents, in which the organization suggested that trans-identified passengers *would* be more likely to be flagged. Importantly, though, the two responses are quite similar in their shared elision of wider and long-term biopolitical processes working to track and regulate populations – including historical use of identification documents and biometric classification schemes, as I demonstrated in earlier chapters – thus framing these contemporary security measures as individualized and ahistorical points of contention. In one sense, then, NCTE's official reassurances tend to assume that most transgender travelers would not be

flagged for reasons beyond clearly marked transgender identity, such as race, nationality, or citizenship status, and that these factors would not influence the ways their gender presentation was interpreted as normal or not normal by security officials. At the same time, the organization's statements frame new security measures as isolated incidences, suggesting both that these specific problems can be alleviated by making slight changes to policy or procedure, and that they are ultimately disconnected from broader governing practices.

For example, the U.S. government announced in early January 2010, that citizens of 14 countries — almost all of which are Middle Eastern or African — will be "subjected indefinitely" to full-body pat downs and intensified baggage screening prior to boarding flights into the U.S. (Lipton). This policy, a direct response to the "underwear bomber" of late 2009, also applies to citizens of any country whose travel to the U.S. originates in or passes through any of these 14 countries. In countries where whole body imaging machines are already in use, these passengers will be required to undergo that screening as well; in fact, U.S. pressure has already convinced British and Dutch officials to install whole body imaging machines in various airports. Although the NCTE fact sheet was originally released in mid-2009, the organization did not update it to reflect these new restrictions, which the Obama administration denies are linked to racial profiling, but which certainly disproportionately flag certain groups of people based on race, nationality, and citizenship status. Nor has NCTE responded to later revisions to these screening policies, released in early April 2010, which look for certain behaviors or characteristics of travelers in the context of current security intelligence, rather than blanket screenings based solely on nationality or point of departure. Homeland Security

Secretary Janet Napolitano claims that the revised screening policies "utilize real-time, threat-based intelligence along with multiple, random layers of security, both seen and unseen, to more effectively mitigate evolving terrorist threats" (Zakaria). Though these new efforts are meant to quell anxieties about racial or national profiling (and accordingly, various civil rights organizations have publicly applauded the policy change[45]), they might be better understood as an expansion of surveillance and repression that, given the framework of the War on Terror itself, necessarily police certain populations disproportionately. Here, then, we can see the ways mobility as a "life chance" is regulated in a broad sense through policing practices that first collapse race and nationality, and later deny racially-based profiling while simultaneously expanding surveillance networks that already turn on cultural understandings of "terrorist behavior" read through racialized, nationalist frameworks. This kind of expanded surveillance would seem intimately connected to NCTE's concerns about unfair scrutiny of particular bodies.

Yet the fact sheet remains unchanged on NCTE's website, placed in the context of a larger discussion of travel safety for trans-identified people, which states "Transgender people have as much right to travel as anyone else and we have a right to express any gender we want, any way we want while traveling (with the exception of some head and face coverings)" (Air Travel Tips). The section in parentheses presumably references TSA's policy on head coverings, in place since 2007 and detailed on a web page entitled "Religious and Cultural Needs." The policy states that all travelers may wear head coverings through security checkpoints but that these individuals are subject to "the

[45] The Reuters report cites praise from the Council on American-Islamic Relations, and the *New York Times* cites support from Muslim Advocates (Zakaria; Shane).

possibility of additional security screening, which may include a pat-down search of the head covering." It would seem, then, that NCTE is unconcerned both with the potential for racial profiling emerging out of targeted screening policies and with the basic notion that individuals wearing head coverings must undergo additional scrutiny; their focus is, rather, on the unjust additional scrutiny that trans-identified individuals might undergo, suggesting a distinction between transgender travelers and those with "religious and cultural needs." The organization's reliance on this distinction, which itself implicitly relies on hierarchies of race, religion, and citizenship, aligns with a long history of tracking marginalized subjects within and across borders, and/or restricting that travel. Such tracking works largely to maintain ideals of national health and purity, as I discussed in Chapter 1 regarding the rise of both passports and the U.S. Social Security program. Effacing the ways that the very category of transgender has long been understood as a threat to national health, NCTE here suggests that all trans-identified people are already incorporated into the nation and are therefore granted freedom of mobility, glossing the regulatory practices governing all subjects. Moreover, NCTE's reliance on rights — except for those wearing certain (racialized) types of clothing — goes hand in hand with the organization's emphasis on the individual choices that transgender travelers should make regarding which type of search (X ray or pat down) they request: the fact sheet notes that "NCTE encourages travelers to make their own decisions, based on what feels most comfortable and safe to them" (3). In much the same way that they respond to the Real ID Act, NCTE's recommendations privilege the mobile U.S. citizen for whom rights appear to be a given, and for whom the choice between X ray and pat down appears in the guise of freedom and personal safety.

The prosthesis, then, figures as that technology which enables the transgender-identified body to exist as such, and also that which allows it to "successfully" move through the social world undetectable as transgender. It is the prosthesis that NCTE's travel safety information cautions might be made suddenly visible by new X-ray imaging techniques, and that would ensure one is read as "normal" were it not for the technologically advanced gaze of whole body imaging. Yet prostheses themselves, and access to them, are constrained by systems of power that position bodies variously as dangerous or vulnerable, normal or deviant. In this sense, we can come to understand the prosthesis not as a simple medicalized object that can be easily interpreted by either transgender organizations or TSA agents, but as a complex, shifting concept through which notions of normalcy, mobility, and safety are filtered. In fact prosthetic technologies themselves, though typically envisioned as enabling and strengthening, can come to symbolize grave threats to security and health, as is made clear in the fervor to identify potential explosives attached to the bodies of airline passengers.

Rereading the Blonde Bombshell: Recuperating Productive Partiality

If prosthetic technologies can at once signify that which enables and that which threatens, how are these meanings assigned, and in what contexts? Which bodies can take up prosthetics as productive objects in the service of health and/or progress, and which engage with prosthetics only as dangerous elements that threaten to undermine safety and security? These questions require a more careful attention to the ways that the figures of the trans person and the terrorist are discursively linked to explosive prosthetics in ways both similar and distinct. Moreover, such questions invite us to consider the deep cultural

norms that make possible transgender advocates' insistence on trans-related prosthetics as technologies working toward healthy, whole bodies. It is with this in mind that I turn to one key historical construction of the figure of the trans person in relation to militarized technologies.

In her autobiography, Christine Jorgensen — arguably the first transsexual-identified person to capture international fame and attention, in the years following World War II — describes the first time she encountered the feminizing hormone estradiol, in 1949. She writes, "How strange it seemed to me that the whole answer might lie in the particular combination of atoms contained in those tiny, aspirin-like tablets. As recently as a few years before, science had split some of those atoms and unleashed a giant force. There in my hand lay another series of atoms, which in their way might set off another explosion — one I hoped would not be a destructive force but would help to make me a whole person" (77). This compelling passage positions the medicalized, freedom-enhancing prosthetics of gender transition as fully intertwined with the development of militarized technologies threatening nuclear destruction. I want to discuss the figure of Jorgensen at some length here because the discursive links between her and the atomic bomb have much to tell us about the legitimation and regulation of particular trans-identified bodies in the context of war and militarization processes, and at the same time might help us understand both the connections and differences between the transgender "atom bomb" and the more recent figure of the terrorist suicide bomber.

Transgender studies scholar Susan Stryker suggests that this link between bomb and transgender figure is somewhat obvious in the case of Jorgensen:

> Because the bomb functioned as a master symbol for post-Second World War

> anxieties about the exigencies of human existence in relation to scientific technology, it is hardly surprising that Jorgensen turned to the bomb in her attempt to bring into language her own transformative experience with a new technology. Nor is it surprising that the transsexual body, by corporealizing the transformation of a human existence through scientific technology, should evoke on a mass scale some of the same ambivalent hopes and fears inspired by the bomb. (590)

In light of this, Stryker suggests that we might apply the metaphor more broadly, positioning the transsexual body itself as a kind of atom bomb in the postwar era. Stryker argues that, like the bomb, transsexuality signified both the power of modern Western scientific achievements and the potential loss of control as binary oppositions began to break down. Writing that "the bomb and the transsexual body are similarly ambivalent figures," Stryker uses Jorgensen's "atom bomb" as a metaphor "for suggesting that the marginalized topic of transsexuality is deeply connected with some of the most pressing issues of the present era" (590).

It is no coincidence that Jorgensen forms the basis for "the" transsexual body that Stryker takes up. Jorgensen, a former U.S. soldier best known for her public transition in the early 1950s, marks in many historical accounts the moment in which transgender identity first emerged in the west. Certainly, the massive public attention to Jorgensen positions her narrative as meaningful to transgender studies — her celebrity status pushed transgender identity into the mainstream and provoked wide public discourse about sex and gender. But to begin with Jorgensen is also to invoke a trans subject grounded in whiteness, heteronormativity, and patriotic U.S. citizenship. The *Daily News* headline

most frequently associated with Jorgensen, "Ex-GI Becomes Blonde Beauty," which broke the news of her transition to the world, succinctly links these three key characteristics. David Serlin argues that Jorgensen's "early success rested almost entirely on her ability to avoid the question of genital ambiguity by using patriotic rhetoric and projecting a super-feminine identity" (163). In fact the legibility of her femininity depended precisely on its connections to the norms of whiteness and to the delineation between genders that both western science and the U.S. military relied upon and enforced. The routine failure to mark these aspects of Jorgensen's narrative and public figure helps position her as a universalized trans subject and body, effacing other histories and understandings of gender-nonconformity, particularly as they are linked to questions of racial and sexual deviance and citizenship status.

Attention to the careful construction of Jorgensen as a normative public figure who could be easily incorporated into the nation complicates Stryker's reliance on Jorgensen as the figure grounding "the" transsexual body. In particular, the ease with which Stryker metaphorically links this body to the bomb — figuring the two as twin cultural explosions — only emphasizes the extent to which this seemingly universal trans body depends on racial and national privilege as mitigating factors. For which bodies have the ability to function solely as metaphorical bombs, and which are understood to be more literally explosive? Jorgensen can withstand, even embrace an overt connection to the threat of the bomb precisely because public discourse positions her as normative along lines of race, citizenship, and U.S. national loyalty. Moreover, both the modern medicine understood as "creating" the transsexual and the development of the atom bomb frequently signify the technological superiority of the modern West. In this way, the

transgender atom bomb might not be threatening, but rather symbolic of increased medical and military power in the West. Such a formula then sets Jorgensen as public figure against the rudimentary medicine and outdated military technologies associated with non-Western peoples. For instance, the figure of the Muslim terrorist is commonly represented both as stuck in strict patriarchal gender roles and as technologically outmoded (even while more "primitive" technologies – the shoe bomb, the box cutter – evade state-of-the-art surveillance programs in Western countries). Thus in the case of Jorgensen, the material effects of the bomb itself are, we might say, neutralized; the bomb remains strictly metaphorical. We might ask what Stryker's metaphorical link means for those populations (whether gender-nonconforming or not) materially and physically damaged or threatened by nuclear warfare, or for those (often racialized) bodies more pervasively linked to bombs and therefore understood as fundamentally dangerous.

Importantly, because Jorgensen represents an individual case, a bounded individual body understood as knowable through repeated interviews and medical records, her atom bomb must be understood differently than those more recently infamous explosive bodies: the terrorist suicide bomber. Seen not as an individual but (as I discussed in chapter 2) a "shadowy network" of indistinguishable yet clearly racialized bodies, the threat of the suicide bomber also suggests the shift from disciplinary power to biopower and to the society of control that intensified during the Cold War era. In his public lectures collected in *Society Must Be Defended*, Foucault discusses the ways that "atomic power represents a paradox" in the context of biopower, because on one hand the atom bomb "represents the deployment of a sovereign power that kills, but it is also the power

to kill life itself" (253). This threat of an excess of biopower that overcomes the sovereign entirely, Foucault argues, pushes beyond the management or regulation of life that is so fundamental to biopower, and prefigures the proliferation of life through the building of "viruses that cannot be controlled and that are universally destructive" (254). In this sense we might understand the shadowy network of suicide bombers as just such a threatening virus, a figuration positing these bodies as endlessly, dangerously mobile – both unknowable and uncontainable.

Technology and transgender studies scholar Sandy Stone, in an article titled "Split Subjects, Not Atoms; or, How I Fell in Love with My Prosthesis," argues that the increasing dispersal of bodies through technological prostheses provokes in return "a hypertrophy of location technologies" implemented by state actors (400). Much like the continual efforts at tracking via identification documents that I discussed in Chapter 1, the more these location technologies bear down, the more fragmented their subjects become. Stone suggests that this evasion is accomplished "by being many persons in many places simultaneously, […] by refusing to be one thing, by *choosing* to be many things. It is this fragmentation and multiplicity that characterize communities mediated by technological prosthetics of presence, and it may explain something of the extent to which in some quarters they are suspect" (400). Despite Stone's language of "choice," and its invocation of the autonomous liberal subject, her argument importantly attends to structures of power that position particular bodies as suspicious and evasive, and that justify efforts to contain and track them. Although the article does not take up the question of bombs themselves, its title at once links these fragmented subjects with the threat of nuclear explosives and positions them as separable: one, not the other. In this

way, despite the essay's insistence on the fragmentary and partial in a generalized sense, its title carefully distinguishes between the good, productive partiality and that which is destructive.

Similarly, consider the last line of Jorgensen's description above, in which she envisions an internal atomic/chemical explosion that she "hoped would not be a destructive force but would help to make [her] a whole person." Her very ability to imagine achieving wholeness through the prosthetic promise of medical transition must be understood in the context of race, class, and national privileges, and in relation to the partial bodies that, in contrast, make her wholeness (or potential wholeness) legible. As Sarah Jain notes, "the trope [of the prosthesis] turns on the problem of 'wholeness' of the body and thus cannot but invoke the questions of whose bodies are whole and how this wholeness is culturally determined and recognized" (47). Jorgensen's imagined wholeness explicitly moves away from destruction, a move that belies the centrality of her own military history to the narrative that enabled her incorporation into the nation. For as David Serlin notes, "the ubiquitous, recurring tropes of Americanism throughout her early case history tempered confusion about her gender status, while her femininity was exploited as part of the inviolable bulwark of nationalistic propaganda that could be used to justify why governments waged wars and put men's lives on the line in the first place" (174). Thus, almost circularly, the wholeness attributed to Jorgensen as national public figure both drew from and perpetuated the destructive force of U.S. military actions.

In fact, as much as wholeness was produced through the construction of Jorgensen as feminine patriot in those months directly following her medical transition, Serlin

demonstrates that it was later reworked when news media related that the particular surgical procedures Jorgensen pursued had not made her a "real" woman but rather an "emasculated" male. Thus the prosthetic technologies first understood as making Jorgensen whole were later revised to mark her as partial. Yet this partiality also served to uphold broader Cold War-era investments in policing national subjects: Serlin writes that "[w]ith the authoritative voice of medical science tempering her popularity, many members of the public found Jorgensen to be nothing more than a female impersonator whose distorted mind and body were confirmed as a reassuring subject for the Manichaean microscope focused on psychological and sexual deviance," pointing to a continued reliance on a good/evil dualism (determined through scientific objectivity) as the central framework of security (186). As a figure in which multiple postwar anxieties converged, Jorgensen exemplifies the ways certain gender-nonconforming bodies can be made "safe" — their blurred boundaries contained by medical classification systems, their "real" bodies distinguished from technologically constructed falsehoods.

Sterilizing the X ray

Prosthetic technologies, then, have a complex relationship with gender-nonconforming bodies. On one hand, they seem to offer trans-identified bodies the freedom to pass "successfully" as non-trans, to shift the previously partial body into the realm of wholeness (through technological changes that might also be read as making a whole – i.e., natural – body partial), to make possible new forms of mobility and national identification. Yet at the same time prosthetics can come to mark certain bodies as always partial, and their very presence, if made known, can be used as justification for regulatory

practices that curtail movement more broadly. Conceptually, the prosthesis itself might be understood as a regulatory mechanism through which notions of security, wholeness, and mobility are produced and refined. It is with this in mind that we might turn to the prosthetic technology that is perhaps both most obvious and least recognized as such in the airport scene: the X-ray machine itself. Used variously by doctors, military personnel, prison guards, and now TSA agents to see beyond the capabilities of the naked eye, X-ray machines enable a different form of vision and visual surveillance. Unlike photography, X-ray imaging or radiography records variations in density and composition, penetrating various layers of matter and being absorbed by others. The most well-known form of X-ray imaging, generally used in medical contexts, makes visible the skeletal system and other objects in the interior regions that are otherwise visually inaccessible without physically opening the body. The X ray extends the vision of its user, and thus in the case of security personnel, essentially operates as a prosthetic of the state.[46]

Radiography has historically served as a form of mass surveillance, as Lisa Cartwright details in her book *Screening the Body: Tracing Medicine's Visual Culture,* but its use in medical imaging helps it cast off the shadow of intrusive state policing and recurring concerns about invasions of privacy. Cartwright explains this process as occurring in part through public information campaigns, in which the X ray figures as a benevolent, simple technology. For example, she notes that mid-20th century educational films aiming to convince the public of the benefits of X-ray screening for tuberculosis frequently stress the ease and simplicity of undergoing chest X rays, and primarily take women as their subjects, using women's bodies to demonstrate both the danger of

[46] I am grateful to Lezlie Frye for introducing me to this useful phrase.

contagion in the domestic scene and the post-screening image of fitness and beauty that leads to health sexual and family relationships. Importantly, Cartwright argues that women "appear in TB public health media not as the privileged objects of medical concern but as representative bearers of contagious and insidiously hidden infection. They play a metaphorical role as deceptive carriers of a disease that is invisible except under the X ray, threatening the integrity of the family, the community, and the nation" (146). These campaigns, then, position the X-ray machine as a technology offering protection and health not only in the literal sense of disease prevention but also, in many cases, through enabling and maintaining healthy heterosexual relationships and nuclear family structures, as well as through taming the unruly gendered and sexualized body.

Alongside medical portrayals of X-ray technology as not only harmless but actively preventing harm, military use during World Wars I and II helped to position X-ray imaging as central to national health and security. Folded into the broader context of military preparedness structuring World War I, radiology equipment and medical training garnered extensive military support during the early 20th century. Notably, the X-ray was key to concepts of mobility on multiple levels: not only did it offer military physicians the ability to more quickly and accurately assess debilitating injuries, but it continued to regulate mobility of disease and infectious bodies by visually identifying them as such. Furthermore, World War I saw the development of the first X-ray units that were themselves mobile — portable units that moved between army hospitals and battle sites (Kevles 74). In these cases, military use lends X-ray technology further credibility as a medical advance that could help save wounded soldiers, thus strengthening the health of the nation itself. Consequently, as Bettyann Kevles notes in her historical account of X-

ray technologies, by the 1920s "trained technicians and physicians flooded the civilian market, and military medicine became the standard for the newly minted veterans. Ordinary citizens now expected an X-ray as routine medical care" (76).

This vision of X-ray imaging, though, belies its other uses in military contexts, for example the relationship between radiology research and the development of military defense mechanisms "including radar, submarine detection, and the development of nuclear weapons" (Kevles 115). The use of X-ray technologies for purposes beyond the strictly medical has filtered through to local U.S. policing practices as well. For example, the RADAR flashlight, a handheld battery-powered device built on X-ray technology that enables its user to "see" through walls much like the medical X ray allows physicians to see through flesh, is now being marketed to domestic law enforcement agencies, but was first developed for military use in the 1980s. The technology was initially used for checking soldier's vital signs from a distance, to avoid sending medics into the line of fire unnecessarily (Hearn; Sanders). In an April 2000 report to the U.S. Department of Justice, researchers from Georgia Tech described the development and applications of RADAR flashlights according to their DOJ-funded study. Principal researcher Eugene Greneker writes that the flashlight could serve two main purposes: notifying law enforcement officers of suspects hiding behind doors during searches, and tracking the vital signs of hostages who are not otherwise visible (1-2). Throughout, the report emphasizes the ways RADAR flashlights could increase safety for police officers, but Greneker has elsewhere noted that the flashlight is "a force multiplier and a safety enhancement tool," a phrase suggesting that this X-ray technology might be used for more than simple preventative measures (Sanders). Given increased domestic

surveillance and repression in conjunction with global anti-terrorist projects undertaken by U.S. agencies, we might well ask what the repercussions are for military and police use of X-ray technologies that monitor human bodies not only in terms of location, but for signs of life itself. Although the American Civil Liberties Union and others have expressed concern about invasions of privacy, most reports of this new use for X rays are favorable; here again, the X ray's reputation as a beneficial medical technology, employed primarily for individual health and public safety, tends to shield it from broader criticism.

The framing of X-ray technology as benevolent medical innovation extends beyond literal use of machines into a more diffuse cultural understanding of X rays in relation to truth and national health. For example, in early 1896, shortly after German physicist Wilhelm Conrad Roentgen discovered the existence of X rays, a *New York Times* article claimed this new technology would revolutionize surgery and medical science because it enabled surgeons to "detect the presence of foreign bodies" (Assmus 11). In this case, the foreign bodies in question are bullets and other objects lodged inside bodies that would otherwise remain hidden to doctors without cutting open the body itself. But "foreign bodies" came to mean other things in relation to X-ray imaging. For example, Lisa Cartwright demonstrates the ways that public information campaigns about the use of X rays to detect tuberculosis in the 1930s visually represented TB as a literal "foreign body" — in one film, TB is figured as a cartoon Japanese soldier invading the otherwise healthy American citizen. Here, the individual body comes to symbolize the national body, and the racial Other stands poised to penetrate national health and safety. X-ray technology here is positioned as the key to locating, with utmost precision, the "enemy within" —

and in doing so, constructs disease as particularly racialized, and racialized bodies as threats to national security and well-being.[47]

This cultural resonance carries through to more recent contexts, as well. Consider for example Camp X-ray, a key facility at Guantanamo Bay, in which detainees allegedly connected to al-Qaeda and the Taliban were housed until mid-2002 in what amounted to see-through cages, visible to guards at all times. While the camp's name was drawn from the NATO phonetic alphabet and does not necessarily indicate any literal use of X-ray technology, the cultural weight behind the very notion of X rays plays out here again. Used against the suspected terrorist (already a racialized figure), it is the X ray that swiftly seeks what is hidden: the camp itself served as a site of "information gathering" that was later revealed to involve complex torture scenes, through which detainees were expected to reveal hidden truths about their links to terrorist organizations. Like the medical X ray, these processes frequently relied on medical expertise for legitimacy, often incorporating physicians to ensure the "safety" of various torture techniques, and psychiatric experts to determine the processes' efficacy. The X ray, even without literal use of its technology, suggests here the uncovering of information that cannot be gathered by other, more superficial tactics. Moreover, through work like that done in the public health campaigns that Cartwright details, the X ray comes to be imagined as scientifically sound — even objective — and thus "Camp X-ray" connotes a legitimate investigation carried out in sanitary, medically objective conditions. These assumed characteristics also

[47] These links have long historical precedent. For more detailed discussion, see for example Nayan Shah's *Contagious Divides*, which demonstrates the ways U.S. public health campaigns from the 19th to mid-20th centuries consistently represented Chinese immigrant bodies as bringing disease and degeneracy into the U.S. Similarly, Eithne Luibhéid's *Entry Denied* shows how national medical and psychiatric policies converged with U.S. immigration restrictions to position immigrant women and queers as carriers of degeneracy that threatened national health and morality.

mark the airport scene, which routinely describes secured areas and employees as "sterile": as TSA's Deputy Administrator Robert Jamison reported to the U.S. House of Representatives in 2006, "Sterile areas are those areas beyond the passenger screening checkpoint, but inside the terminal area." Those bodies and objects that have passed through the X-ray screening, then, are understood to be not only safe, but actually sterile. In each of these instances, the X ray is key, both metaphorically and materially, to framing surveillance as healthy, desirable, and objective.

Remote Viewing: Distance, Destruction, and the Objective Gaze of Science

The X-ray machine's consistent claim to objectivity also draws heavily on its purported ability to put distance between the body that surveils and the body being surveilled, an ability also celebrated in multiple other forms of militarized technology, such as the now commonplace Global Positioning System (GPS), as well as air reconnaissance photography. These technologies purport to offer increased accuracy as well as increased distance between technology and target, promising safety, efficiency, and precision.[48] Proponents of whole body imaging in airports, for example, suggest repeatedly that the X ray is a less intrusive form of screening that manual pat-downs. TSA's informational website assures travelers of even greater distance, noting that the agent directing the passenger in the X-ray machine does not see the images it produces; these are instead viewed by a different agent, in a remote location, who never sees the passenger in person. TSA's "Imaging Technology" web page, which offers details on the various types of X-ray machines currently in use and the procedures passengers can

[48] For more detailed discussion of claims on distance and accuracy in the context of militarized technology, see Caren Kaplan's "Precision Targets."

expect as they pass through security checkpoints, repeatedly emphasizes the anonymity made possible by whole body imaging, citing the physical distance between the traveler and the remote agent as well as the inability of these machines to "store, print, transmit, or save" the images produced. In fact, although it stresses that passengers always have the option to choose a pat-down instead (though we might ask to which passengers this applies), the website claims that "over 98 percent of passengers who encounter this technology during TSA pilots prefer it over other screening options."

In particular, TSA states that "passengers with joint replacements or other medical devices that would regularly alarm a metal detector often prefer this [X-ray] technology because it is quicker and less-invasive than a pat down" ("Imaging Technology"). The agency recently piloted a related program called "CastScope" that employs whole body imaging technologies specifically for prostheses and casts, providing "security officers with a means to ensure that a cast or prosthetic does not contain a concealed threat while maintaining the dignity and privacy of the passenger" ("CastScope"). This program is geared toward people with disabilities and especially military veterans and other military personnel using recognized medical prostheses or similar medicalized equipment, and in fact the airports participating in the pilot program were chosen for their proximity to military hospitals and/or large rehabilitation facilities, further indication of the links between national security measures, technological advances, and militarized understandings of good citizenship. Interestingly, the CastScope program was in place long before the December, 2009 leak of an internal TSA security guide that noted "Wheelchair and scooter cushions, disabled people's footwear that cannot be removed, prosthetic devices, casts, braces, and orthopedic shoes may be exempt from screening for

explosives" ("Air Security Guide"). These two seemingly contradictory positions — that medical technologies linked to recognizable physical disabilities should be on the one hand subject to specialized screening programs and on the other hand exempt from screenings altogether — might actually be understood to be in keeping with broader framings of bodies with disabilities as both monstrous/threatening and in need of special protection and assistance. Both the introduction of CastScope and TSA's assurance that people with disabilities frequently opt for whole body imaging support the rhetoric of choice and equality surrounding surveillance technologies, and work to frame such technologies as harmless — even to "special needs" passengers — by emphasizing X-ray machines' ability to offer a private, less invasive screening process.[49] Of course, such policies might also be read in reverse, as separating security officials from the potential threat that non-normative bodies pose; in this sense, the X-ray machine serves as a physical barrier creating distance between state actors/agencies and particularly troubling bodies.

Yet while state agencies tout X-ray scans as a less invasive form of security search, we might actually understand them as *more* intrusive — penetrating far beyond the cursory and superficial pat-down to reveal the very interior of the body. Importantly, one of the most contentious aspects of whole body imaging has been the resulting radiation exposure for bodies that pass through it. Radiation damage has long been a primary obstacle for those agencies seeking public approval of X-ray technology; Cartwright shows that "detailed evidence of the X rays' pathological effects existed almost as soon as experiments with them began" (127). Physical evidence of the X ray's potential for

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[49] TSA's web page titled "Travelers with Disabilities and Medical Conditions" uses the term *special needs* rather than *disability* in its URL address.

destruction and disease — including numerous records of physicians' and scientists' bodily decomposition as they regularly exposed their own bodies in the research process — was both justified by researchers who saw such damage as valuable information for their studies, and simultaneously downplayed through public health campaigns that figured X-ray imaging as preventing rather than creating illness. Following the latter's model, various pages on TSA's website aim to alleviate concerns about radiation exposure, comparing radiation levels of whole body imaging machines to those of widely accepted everyday technologies such as cellular phones and the airplane itself. Here again, national health and safety are understood to be protected and created through the X ray, rather than threatened by it. But historical accounts of X ray-related illnesses, alongside current anxieties about radiation damage, suggest that the airport scans are not as remote and unintrusive as they are typically presented.[50] In the broadest sense, we can envision a cyclical process in which the X ray itself produces potentially threatening bodies: in the long-term, repeated radiation exposure can cause decomposition and loss of body parts, a result frequently coupled with the use of prostheses, which are then particularly subject to X-ray screening processes. In fact the machines' reliance on radiation enables a literal (if less visible) penetration of the body, the traces of which belie repeated claims of safety and comfort through distance. Reassurances that X-ray machines produce safer, more comfortable, and less invasive searches operate on the assumption that mere physical distance between bodies is the only factor at play.

But even if this distance were the only factor, the X ray, like any prosthetic technology, cannot escape the material body. Typically thought to "see" beyond the

[50] This parallels other uses of radiation to root out or destroy dangerous bodies, for example in the treatment of cancer cells, in which radiation causes damage with the ultimate goal of restored health.

surface of the body, presumably also seeing beyond the visual markers of race, gender, class, or sexuality, the X-ray scan seems to offer vision that is simply neutral. In this way the X ray can claim to offer a kind of visual truth, a vision untainted by political or social bias. But as Cartwright notes, "sexualized and racialized standards of beauty and health, conventionally inscribed on the surface of the body […] are now encoded in interior qualities — in the state of the lungs, the skeletal system, and so on" (156).[51] In fact, as I discuss in chapter 2, the supposedly objective measurement and imaging of the body has, for centuries, been used to classify bodies by categories such as race, gender, economic status, and sexuality, to justify colonialist narratives of primitive peoples in need of reform by the civilized west, and to legitimate eugenics campaigns that sought to eradicate those bodies marked as deviant and unfit. Despite repeated assurances that TSA does not employ racial profiling and that the whole body imaging process safeguards individual passengers from discrimination along lines of race, nationality, or gender in ways that in-person pat downs might not, the very act of measuring and classifying the body – indeed the very concept of a normative body that can be visually recognized and categorized as such – is rooted in long histories of racialized, sexualized, and colonialist classification systems that gain traction precisely because they purport to employ an objective scientific gaze that is removed from the very categories with which it is most concerned.

Moreover, Cartwright's archive points to the ways that the body itself resists the X ray's claims to objectivity. For example, she notes that cancer researchers attempting to record X-ray images of the breast "complained that the breast, constantly undergoing

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[51] Jose van Dijck's book *The Transparent Body* also usefully examines the inscription of race, class, gender, and sexuality onto supposedly "neutral" medical images, looking in particular at the ways certain bodies are chosen for or coerced into serving as models for such images.

changes in density, structure, and shape not only over the course of a woman's life but over the course of the menstrual cycle, defied the very idea of a normal state" (162). The mutable body proves especially problematic for those technologies that are supposedly objective and neutral. In the case of breast cancer research, Cartwright suggests that bodily instability is linked to the inferior feminine, implicitly marking male-assigned bodies as stable control cases: "instability continues to be identified in some medical literature as a condition predisposing 'feminine' tissue (in the breast, the cervix, or the uterus, for example) to the pathological extremes of cellular change that mark the designated continuum of cancer" (162). Similarly, transgender and other gender-nonconforming bodies — culturally and medically imagined to be more changeable and unstable than other gendered bodies — are understood to require special scrutiny in the realms of law and medicine as well as when passing through security checkpoints at borders and airports. The threat of mutability is displaced onto those marked as gender transgressive, figuring particular bodies as problematic cases against the apparent stability of normatively gendered travelers. This displacement also bolsters the X-ray machine's claim to objective vision: in this logic, the problem is not with the X ray's attempts to classify and contain bodies, but only with those bodies that threaten to disrupt the classifications themselves. The X ray, then, remains neutral and untroubled. To better understand this process of displacement, we might turn to the recent circulation of X-ray scans produced through whole body imaging.

"A Fuzzy Photo Negative": Inciting Scrutiny

State agencies and national media outlets have produced and circulated a handful of images demonstrating how X-ray scans of passengers appear to TSA agents. The TSA website itself hosts two such images, one depicting the results of a backscatter X ray and one of a millimeter wave scan.[52] The backscatter image depicts the front and back of two different bodies, which appear white and somewhat grainy against a dark background; the TSA website describes this technology as producing an image "that resembles a chalk etching." The millimeter wave scan image also depicts the front and back of two bodies, also white against dark background, but with a bit more clarity and detail, and accordingly the faces have been thoroughly blurred out; the website describes these images as resembling "a fuzzy photo negative." A third widely-circulated image appeared in a February 2007 *New York Times* article describing the introduction of whole body imaging at U.S. airports (Giblin). This image shows the front and back of a body in white and blue, against a dark background; the clarity of the image is far greater than those from the TSA website, and the *Times* article does not specify the type of technology used to produce it, identifying it only as an "X-ray image before software was used to blur bodily contours." The article notes that "[s]pecial 'privacy' software intentionally blurs the image, creating an outline of a body that is clear enough to see a collarbone, bellybutton or weapon, but flattens details of revealing contours." The millimeter wave and *New York Times* images are both reproduced in NCTE's 2009 fact sheet.

Despite the popular notion that the X-ray machine objectively sees beyond social categories to produce neutral images of bodies, it is not difficult to read sexed

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[52] These two forms of imaging use slightly different techniques. Millimeter wave imaging projects radio frequency energy over the surface of the body and a three-dimensional image is produced through the energy reflected back from the body and objects attached to it. Backscatter imaging projects an X-ray beam over the body, using the radiation reflected back to construct an image of the surface of the body and of any objects that body is carrying.

characteristics onto these three bodily images. Even on the backscatter images, the least detailed of the three, genitals are clearly recognizable, indicating (for most viewers) one image as male and the other as female. The lines of a bra and outlines of breasts and genitals all clearly mark the bodies in the millimeter wave image, while the facial images remain blurred out. The image from the *Times* article retains such clarity of the shape and parts of the body that it is specifically labeled as pre-application of "privacy" software. (In fact, the caption for this image ran incorrectly in some editions of the paper, claiming it depicted the way passengers' likenesses would appear to TSA agents *after* the blurring of bodily contours, raising alarm and prompting the paper to run a correction three days later.) The images also appear to show various types of objects attached to the bodies. The X-ray machine can only record these prosthetic objects; TSA agents operating the machines must then interpret them to determine whether individual bodies warrant further examination. Some of the objects are fairly readily recognizable: for example, the image circulated in the *New York Times* article depicts a handgun on the individual's rear hip, positioning this figure as dangerous and deceptive. Yet the figure also appears to have a variety of other objects strapped to its hips and waist, and these are much less clearly defined. Like all images, these might be interpreted in a variety of ways, and such interpretations may vary widely depending on the TSA agent(s) viewing them, the location, time of day, type of flight being screened, national and global political climate, and any number of other factors. Of course, this is precisely what transgender advocates are concerned about: the potential for deviance and danger to be read onto innocent citizens, as opposed to what they hope might be more accurate readings of terrorists carrying illegal weaponry.

But this line of critique takes for granted that there are in fact some bodies that should be understood as deviant, and should be subjected to state surveillance and scrutiny — just so long as those are not transgender-identified people. I argued above that we should turn a critical eye to the notion that prosthetic technologies necessarily entail greater freedom for transgender people — a claim that effaces the particular constraints on the mobility of transgender people of color and transgender immigrants, among others. Here, then, I also want to challenge the argument that is concerned primarily with X-ray machines' *accuracy* as a strategy that too easily accepts the prevailing parameters of state surveillance, terrorism, and safety. Rather than seeking more precise readings of X-ray images during screening processes, I want to suggest that we examine instead the very circulation of these particular images.

The constant reproduction of the same handful of images entices viewers to scrutinize the depicted bodies again and again. TSA and other agencies released the images ostensibly to clarify and lay bare the inner workings of these surveillance practices, a gesture toward "full disclosure" on the part of the state. In fact the TSA website offers these images in the context of detailed information about what passengers can expect when asked to go through whole body imaging machines, and what they can do to assist agents and ensure efficiency throughout — all information intended to make the process perfectly clear. At the same time, the images themselves — as noted above — are often less than clear, and thus function as invitations for extensive inspection. The production and circulation of these images both encourages focused examination of particular bodies that come to seem out of the ordinary or difficult to define, and, through their very repetition, naturalizes the processes of both visual scrutiny and X-ray imaging

specifically. One may even come to feel a certain pleasure in the act of studying these bodies, which begin to stand in for the terrorist body, the dangerous body, the body that attempts to deceive. This process exemplifies Foucault's concept of government, in which regulatory practices produce the fiction of a naturalized, prediscursive object that then serves to justify governing practices and their effects. Moreover, the very lens through which subjects can act is structured through these practices; as Foucault notes, "to govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible field of action for others" (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 221).

Read in this context, these "objective" images fail to escape broader power relations. Consider for example the ways such images invoke and produce racialization processes at work in anti-terrorist discourse. Leti Volpp explains that particularly since September 11, 2001, public discourse and state actions in the U.S. produce the category of the terrorist as one inhabited by certain racial categories, forming the constitutive outside to the category of the American citizen. Arguing that these groups are productive of and thus depend upon one another, she writes that the events of 9/11 "facilitated the consolidation of a new identity category that groups together persons who appear 'Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim.' This consolidation reflects a racialization wherein members of this group are identified as terrorists, and are disidentified as citizens" (1576). Along similar lines, Inderpal Grewal suggests that the repeated mug shots of those involved in the 9/11 attacks produced "a racial formation of all Muslim males, whether rich or poor, as terrorists, made barbaric by allegiance to religion and thus as different as possible from the civilized, cosmopolitan Westerner and the secular American state," a construction that builds on longstanding orientalist narratives (208). If the X-ray images produced and

circulated by TSA are imagined to represent dangerous or terrorist bodies made available for inspection, then already, given the construction of terrorist as racial Other, the images and their meanings are produced through processes of racialization. For many viewers, race may come to "mark" these bodies even without visual reference to skin color or other surface features through which race is often read.

Relatedly, for the projected audience of compliant citizens, there may be pleasure in distancing oneself from these images, through imagining that one's own body is distinctly unlike certain images and through learning to police other bodies that might be dangerously deceptive, as the images themselves instruct. The repetition of these images, even as part of the concerns articulated by NCTE in their fact sheet, helps further the notion that an identifiable terrorist body exists. In this logic, much like that of the biometrics programs I discussed in chapter 2, such a body is understood to be both distinct from that of the compliant citizen and recognizable with the appropriate technology. The circulation of certain X-ray images, though ostensibly intended to clarify the screening process by demonstrating the neutrality and objectivity of the technology at hand, actually makes clear that such imaging techniques are rooted in racialization and gendering processes that help distinguish between the categories of citizen and terrorist. In this sense, to call for a more accurate or objective technology serves not to undo the profiling strategies at work in such security measures, but rather to reinforce them by seeking ever more careful scrutiny of deviance and by reaffirming public and state understandings of what a terrorist body looks like, a body always figured in contrast to that of the compliant citizen. Likewise, policies, procedures, and public advocacy campaigns that aim to distinguish between safe, legitimate prosthetics and those

involving explosives are both grounded in and productive of these same classification systems.

Exploding the Whole Body

The credibility of whole body imaging would seem to depend on an assumed and shared definition of both the "whole body" and the prosthesis. In fact the very basis for employing whole body imaging is, ostensibly, to visually detect those objects attached to but not part of the body itself — that is to say, to visually separate the body from any prostheses. Such aims take for granted that there is a recognizable and natural "whole" body that exists prior to and/or in the absence of prostheses, that there is an easy separation between body and prosthesis. Film and disability studies scholar Vivian Sobchack points out that the metaphorical trope of the prosthesis depends on an assumption of bodily wholeness that "elides the phenomenological — and quite different — structural, functional, and aesthetic terms of those who successfully *incorporate* and *subjectively live* the prosthetic and sense themselves neither as lacking something nor as walking around with some 'thing' that is added on to their bodies. […T]he prosthetic becomes an object only when a mechanical or social problem pushes it into the foreground of the user's consciousness" (22). The assumption of wholeness privileges able bodies as the standard against which other bodies (and their interactions with technology) are figured as incomplete, a perspective that depends on viewing the prosthesis as something external to the "natural" body. Thus Sandy Stone, drawing on Donna Haraway and Francois Dagognet, explains that "the category 'nature,' rather than referring to any object or category in the world, is a *strategy* for maintaining boundaries

for political and economic ends, and thus a way of making meaning" ("Will the Real Body" 188).

Though all bodies interact with the technological on some level, some of these body-technology relationships are naturalized such that they are not readily recognizable as prosthetic.[53] Sobchack's critique might thus be usefully expanded to consider the ways that only *certain* prosthetic relationships are pushed to the foreground, for only *certain* prosthetics are the subject of social problems. In the context of national security screenings, for example, the X-ray machine's function is not merely to visually highlight the difference between body and prosthesis; it also aims to distinguish between the recognizable (and legitimated) medical prosthesis and other objects understood to be dangerous or illegal. This is, after all, the point of creating special policies and screening procedures for those with "disabilities and medical conditions" — to avoid conflating/confusing the traveler with disabilities and the terrorist with explosives. In the language and logic of the security screening, however, these various categories themselves come to appear whole, stable, and already-formed.

While Sobchack, among others, argues against the idea that prosthetics related to disabilities can be easily separated from the body — suggesting instead that the two become and produce one another — Jasbir Puar pursues this notion through the theoretical framework of the assemblage, particularly regarding the figure of the suicide bomber. Noting that the assemblage might indicate "the inability to clearly delineate a temporal, spatial, energetic, or molecular distinction between a discrete biological body and technology," Puar suggests that we understand the explosive not as a prosthetic or

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[53] This point also serves as a reminder that neither the body itself nor the prosthesis are prediscursive, but are constituted through the social.

appendage on the already-bounded body of the suicide bomber, but rather consider the ways that the bomb and bomber are interdependent and inseparable (*Terrorist Assemblages* 217). The body of the suicide bomber becomes a weapon as pieces of that body become projectiles capable of damaging or killing other bodies. This "body-weapon," in Puar's words, literally and figuratively explodes the inside/outside, body/technology dualisms upon which security practices like whole body imaging depend. Elsewhere, Puar writes that the figure of the suicide bomber engages a "dissolution of self into other/s and other/s into self [that] not only effaces the absolute mark of self and other/s in the War on Terror, it produces a systemic challenge to the entire order of Manichaean rationality that organizes the rubric of good versus evil" ("Queer Times" 130). That is to say, the breakdown of bodily boundaries suggested in the figure of the suicide bomber fundamentally disrupts the dualisms grounding both Western science and the particular rhetoric of the War on Terror.

Yet the very framework through which national security operates obscures the possibility of the kind of challenge that Puar references. For as we saw with the public figure of Christine Jorgensen and with the policies specifically addressing "special needs" airlines passengers, a scientifically legitimated logic of good and evil, safe and dangerous, works to classify and contain those bodies that threaten to exceed or escape its boundaries. As Foucault argues, governing practices produce the fiction of naturalized, prediscursive conditions that then serve to justify those regulatory practices themselves. In this self-perpetuating logic, the naturalization of both the "whole body" and the prosthetic as prediscursive and distinct categories legitimates ever-expanding surveillance

and regulation of them, just as those regulatory practices themselves produce and maintain the categories of wholeness and partiality.

This context offers one way of understanding the fact that transgender advocates consistently focus on both the concept of the prosthesis and the installation of whole body imaging machines at airports, while failing to take up the case of the "underwear bomber" as something relevant to transgender scholarship or politics. That failure may at first appear surprising – after all, the question of what precisely is in one's underwear is, however crude, arguably the most basic form of policing for those bodies marked as gender-nonconforming. The massive public and state response to Abdulmatallab's case, with its attention directed primarily at the unknown dangers concealed along with (or perhaps as part of) the genitals, certainly seems worthy of extensive analysis in relation to broader policing of gender and to transgender-identified communities in particular.

Yet in the case of airport X-ray screenings, this question is overtly overlaid with concerns about national security and external terrorist threat. The focus on underwear as a particular location for deception and danger – and therefore a site of special scrutiny – invokes not only a discursive link between the terrorist and the trans person, but also a much longer history of scientific and state examination of sexed bodies, particularly as those bodies are racialized. In this context, distancing transgender-identified travelers from the racialized, foreign, dangerous figure of the suicide bomber strategically implies that transgender bodies are necessarily citizen bodies, markedly – perhaps even fundamentally, physically – distinct from terrorist bodies. In order to secure the precarious safety of certain transgender bodies, there can be no critique of militarized technology, medical surveillance, and racialized security screenings; in fact they may

even be embraced in efforts to cast certain bodies as legible, safe, and contained. Similarly, for this strategy to "work," the purportedly objective gaze of the X ray can be engaged only on its own terms, in which the whole body and the prosthesis are both easily recognizable and clearly distinct categories. The X-ray machine and the trans body must both appear as exceptions, in an ahistorical instance of individual discrimination.

As I have shown, though, the implementation of whole body imaging is not an isolated incident of technological misuse or a simple invasion of privacy, but rather builds on the X ray's own history as part of medicalized scrutiny and militarized surveillance, both of which position particular bodies as "foreign," threatening, and in need of visual examination. Moreover, the X-ray scanner serves to visually reproduce categories that are made to seem natural. That is to say, under the guise of classifying what is already in place, the X-ray process actually works to *produce* those classifications: to produce the very notion of the whole body. As Sarah Jain argues, "design decisions, in a mass-produced environment, determine the ways in which bodies materialize and figure which bodies' borders remain literally stable" (43). Unstable or partial bodies — designated as such through shifting rubrics of race, class, sexuality, citizenship, and ability, and in the case of X-ray imaging, visually marked by certain prosthetic technologies — are simultaneously threatening and necessary to the maintenance of "whole" bodies. In this sense, the X-ray scanner functions as an attempt to recuperate a series of longstanding dualisms. It encourages a re-investment in the fiction of neat divisions between body and technology, (re)producing and naturalizing the very category of the "whole body," which then comes to stand for the safe body, the contained body. Thinking about contemporary surveillance technologies in the context of

racialization, nationalism, and militarization opens analytical space for understanding the fiction of wholeness as a naturalized condition, and the disguising of governing practices that are justified precisely through the categories they produce. Though displaced onto the figures of the transgender person and the terrorist, these questions of illusion and deception may ultimately have more to tell us about the workings of power itself.

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