

# Intel SGX SDK/PSW/DCAP & TDX DCAP 简介

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# 01

PART ONE


## SGX 背景知识介绍

# 机密计算典型使用场景

## Cloud Infrastructure




## Secure Native Application Hosting



## Trusted Multi-party Compute



## Federated Learning




## Secure Database




## Crypto Key Management




## Accelerated Secure Compute



## Secure Networking





## CPU/平台硬件特性

- SGX扩展指令集
- MEE (Memory Encryption Engine)，每次重启会生成一个随机密钥，用于运行时加密
- PRM (Processor Reserved Memory) 和内存访问机制
- SGX远程证明机制 (英特尔或者第三方提供的在线服务)



## Enclave


Enclave是一段进程私有的可信内存，存放Enclave中的数据 and 代码被MEE加密，即使特权代码也无法访问。




## PRM

BIOS使能SGX，保留一段物理内存为PRM (Processor Reserved Memory)，用E820表报告给操作系统。SGX使用这段内存创建和维护Enclave。

# SGX对敏感数据的保护




普通运行环境无法保护敏感App的安全性



基于Intel SGX Enclave的可信执行环境能够有效保护敏感App的安全性

# The Basic Issue: Why Aren't Compute Devices Trustworthy?

Protected Mode (rings) protects OS from apps ...



... and apps from each other ...

... UNTIL a malicious app exploits a flaw to gain full privileges and then tampers with the OS or other apps

**Apps not protected from privileged code attacks**



# Reduced attack surface with SGX

Application gains ability to defend its own secrets

- Smallest attack surface (App + processor)
- Malware that subverts OS/VMM, BIOS, Drivers etc. cannot steal app secrets


Familiar development/debug


- Single application environment
- Build on existing ecosystem expertise

Familiar deployment model

- Platform integration not a bottleneck to deployment of trusted apps


Attack surface with Enclaves




Attack Surface 

**Scalable security within mainstream environment**

# SGX Access Control



# Protection vs. Memory Snooping Attacks



## Non-Enclave Access


- Security perimeter is the CPU package boundary
- Data and code unencrypted inside CPU package
- Data and code outside CPU package is encrypted and/or integrity checked
- External memory reads and bus snoops see only encrypted data

# 02

PART TWO

## Intel SGX SDK/PSW/DCAP 技术栈

# Intel SGX SDK & PSW & DCAP技术全栈




- SDK提供开发敏感应用的开发框架
- PSW为敏感应用提供运行时服务和库的支持
- DCAP为敏感应用提供远程证明的支持

Legend

ISV/Enterprise


Intel Production

Intel Reference






# SGX High-level HW/SW Picture



# SGX Programming Environment

Trusted execution environment embedded in a process



With its own code and data

Provide Confidentiality


Provide integrity

With controlled entry points

Supporting multiple threads

With full access to app memory

## Application



```
enclave {
```

```
// Add your definition of "secret_t" here
trusted {
    public void get_secret([out] secret_t* secret);
};
```

```
untrusted {
    // This OCALL is for illustration purposes only.
    // It should not be used in a real enclave,
    // unless it is during the development phase
    // for debugging purposes.
    void dump_secret([in] const secret_t* secret);
};
```



申请密钥

- 向 Intel 申请 SGX 相关的商业签名加密密钥;

安装环境

- 安装 Intel SGX 驱动;
- 安装 SGX SDK 和 PSW;
- 安装 AESM service;

开发

- 明确应用可信区中须保护的代码和数据;
- 编写 EDL 文件, 明确 ECALL 和 OCALL 函数;
- 编写可信区代码和非可信区代码;

编译构建

- 使用 `sgx_edger8r` 基于 edl 文件生产不可信区的代理函数用于 ECALL 和用于 OCALL 的可信代理函数;
- 编译 Enclave 动态链接库文件;
- 签名上一步骤的 Enclave 动态链接库文件;
- 编译应用, 打包镜像。

运行

- `docker run --privileged -device /dev/isgx -v /run/aesmd/aesm.socket:/run/aesmd/aesm.socket ${sgx_app_image}`

## SGX 编程模型

SGX 2.0/DCAP/FLC 之后的几点变化:

1. 无需向 Intel 申请 Enclave 商业签名密钥
2. DCAP 使用 In-kernel SGX Driver
3. AESM service 可选



# Overview of Intel® SGX DCAP


Manufacturing puts unique HW keys into each device and issues certificates for signing keys derived from those HW keys.

New Provisioning Certification Enclave (PCE) uses the signing keys to issue “certificates” for attestation keys generated by Quoting Enclaves.


New Quoting Enclave generates attestation key locally and retrieves a “certificate” from PCE.

Quotes are signed by attestation key and include attestation key's certificate.


Attestation Verifier inspects certificate chain rooted in device/platform certs and TCB Info.




# Platform Certification Key (PCK) Certificate Retrieval



# Quote Generation




# Quote & TCB Verification



## Remote Attestation

- Attestation is the concept of a HW entity or of a combination of HW and SW gaining the trust of a provider or producer of some sort
  - Converts HW generated Report to a Quote
  - Quote is a Report signed by an asymmetric key called the Attestation Key (AK)
- SGX Remote Attestation
  - ISV Enclave running with SGX protections can generate a Enclave Report
  - Enclave Report:
    - Measurements and configuration of the ISV Enclave
    - Security version of the CPU
    - Data to be reported for the ISV Enclave (ReportData)
    - MAC'd with a HW key and verified by HW.
  - Remote parties have access to the AK Root signing key Certificate to verify Quotes (PCK Certificates).
  - Verifiers then check the ISV Enclave Report's context.


## SGX Attestation





- Intel Hosts two servers to support Remote Attestation
  - Registration Server
    - Certifies MP Platform Packages
    - Generates Platform Certification Key (PCK) Certs
  - Provisioning Certification Server(PCS)
    - Delivers PCK Certs
    - Provides SGX Quote Verification reference values (Collateral/Endorsements)
      - SGX TCBIInfo – Used to verify a quote was generated using the latest up-to-date SGX TCB
      - SGX QEIdentity – Identification structure for the SGX Quoting Enclave
      - CRLs –Certification Revocation Lists
      - QvE Identity – Identification structure for Quote Verification Enclave.
      - TDX TCBIInfo – Contains SGX TCBIInfo + TDX modules TCBIInfo (Added with V4 APIs)
      - TDX QEIdentity – Identification structure for the TDX Quoting Enclave (Added with V4 APIs)

# TDX Attestation






03

PART THREE

# Anolis OS 适配

## SGX 软件栈

- SGX SDK
  - <https://github.com/intel/linux-sgx>
- SGX PSW/DCAP
  - <https://github.com/intel/SGXDataCenterAttestationPrimitives>



# SGX 在龙蜥技术栈的落地



## SGX SDK 在龙蜥社区项目中的交付物和时间点

Milestone Description	Milestone Deliverables	Due Date	Responsible Party	Acceptance Criteria
Code Complete	Deliver SGX SDK packages for Linux/CentOS/ <u>Alinux</u>	Done	Intel	Code merged
Porting to Anolis Stage 1	Deliver SGX SDK installation packages from Intel's download pages and repo	Q4	Intel	Packages ready in intel's download pages and repo
Porting to Anolis Stage 2	Provide building spec for SGX SDK installation packages for Anolis	Q4	Intel	Building spec
Porting to Anolis Stage 2	Integrate SGX SDK installation packages for <u>lifsea</u> OS	Q4	Alibaba	Packages ready in Anolis download pages and repo

## SGX PSW/DCAP 在龙蜥社区项目中的交付物和时间点

Milestone Description	Milestone Deliverables	Due Date	Responsible Party	Acceptance Criteria
Code Complete	Deliver SGX PSW/DCAP packages for Linux/CentOS/ <u>Alinux</u>	Done	Intel	Code merged
Porting to Anolis Stage 1	Deliver SGX PSW/DCAP installation packages from Intel's download pages and repo	Q4	Intel	Packages ready in intel's download pages and repo
Porting to Anolis Stage 2	Provide building spec for SGX PSW/DCAP installation packages for Anolis	Q4	Intel	Building spec
Porting to Anolis Stage 2	Provide repo and build SGX PSW/DCAP installation packages for lifsea OS	Q4	Alibaba	Packages ready in Anolis download pages and repo

# THANKS

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# Q & A 环节



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