### Secure Multiparty Computation with Lazy Sharing

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# (t, n) Secret Sharing

A (t, n) secret sharing scheme:

- Share. For a secret x, output n shares  $(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ .
- Recover. Given any t+1 shares  $\{x_j\}_{j\in J}$  (|J|=t+1), output a value x'.

**Correctness:** For any  $(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \leftarrow \operatorname{Share}(x)$  and any  $J \subseteq [n]$  with |J| = t + 1,

$$Recover(\{x_j\}_{j\in J}) = x.$$

**Privacy**: For *J* with  $|J| \le t$ , the distribution of  $\{x_j\}_{j \in J}$  is independent of *x*.

### Generic MPC from Secret Sharing

A generic *n*-party MPC against *t* corrupted parties contains:

- Input Sharing. Creat a (t, n)-sharing for each input.
- Circuit Evaluation. Evaluate the circuit gate-by-gate. The output of each gate will be a (t, n)-sharing.
- Output Recovery. For each output gate, recover the output.

#### **MPC** Models

#### MPC works in two main models:

- Standard Model. The parties privide inputs.
- *Client-Server Model*. The parties only have sharings of the inputs.

### Main Observation

We observe that in the **standard** model, when sharing an input,

- 1. If  $P_i$  is the input owner, then creating a (t,n)-sharing is overkill.
- 2. For any t shares containing  $x_i$ , they are allowed to contain any information about x.

### Lazy Sharing

Lazy sharing has a relaxed privacy:

For 
$$J \subseteq [n] \setminus \mathcal{L}$$
 with  $|J| \le t$ , the distribution of  $\{x_j\}_{j \in J}$  is independent of  $x$ .

Here,  $\mathcal{L} \subseteq [n]$  is a parameter. If  $\mathcal{L} = \emptyset$ , then lazy sharing degenerates into standard sharing.

**Application:** Using lazy sharing, we can improve efficiency of MPC protocols based on additive or replicated sharing.

### Lazy Additive Sharing

#### When sharing an input x of $P_1$ :

- Additive Sharing.  $P_1$  samples n-1 random values  $x_1, \ldots, x_{n-1}$  and computes  $x_n = x \sum_{j \in [n-1]} x_j$ . The sharing is  $\langle x \rangle = (x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ .
- Lazy Additive Sharing. The sharing is simply  $\langle x \rangle_{\{1\}} = (x, 0, \dots, 0)$ .

# GMW with Additive Sharing

GMW (Goldreich-Micali-Wigderso, STOC 1987) is a foundational generic MPC protocol,

- **Input Sharing.** Each input  $x \to$  additive sharing  $(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$
- **Circuit Evaluation.** To multiply two sharings  $\langle x \rangle = (x_1, \dots, x_n), \langle y \rangle = (y_1, \dots, y_n),$  For every  $(i,j) \in [n]^2$  with  $i \neq j$ ,  $P_i$  and  $P_j$  additively share  $x_i y_j$ . This requires n(n-1) OLEs.
- Output Recovery. To recover  $\langle z \rangle$  to  $P_1$ , each other party  $P_j$  sends  $z_j$  to  $P_1$ .

# LGMW: GMW with Lazy Additive Sharing-Input Sharing

#### Input Sharing.

Each  $P_i$  secret-share its input  $x \to \langle x \rangle_{\{i\}}$ , where

$$x_j = \begin{cases} x, & \text{if } j = i \\ 0, & \text{if } j \neq i \end{cases}$$

### LGMW: GMW with Lazy Additive Sharing-Circuit Evaluation

#### Circuit Evaluation.

To multiply two sharings  $\langle x \rangle_{\mathcal{L}_0}$ ,  $\langle y \rangle_{\mathcal{L}_1} \to \langle xy \rangle_{\mathcal{L}_0 \cup \mathcal{L}_1}$ ,

For every  $(i,j) \in [n]^2 \setminus \mathcal{L}_0 \times \mathcal{L}_1$ ,  $x_i y_j = 0$  has been an additive sharing  $x_i y_j = 0 + 0$ .

The task is that

For every  $(i,j) \in \mathcal{L}_0 \times \mathcal{L}_1$  with  $i \neq j$ ,  $P_i$  and  $P_j$  additively share  $x_i y_j$ .

This requires only  $|\mathcal{L}_0| \cdot |\mathcal{L}_1| - |\mathcal{L}_0 \cap \mathcal{L}_1|$  OLEs.

### LGMW: GMW with Lazy Additive Sharing-Output Recovery

#### **Output Recovery.**

In GMW: Each output sharing is uniform sharing, meaning that

Any n-1 shares are random values. Collecting all the shares are secure.

In LGMW, each output sharing may be not uniform: some share may even be an input!

The parties must invoke a secure sum protocol.

### Lazy Replicated Sharing

We focus on (1,3)-replicated sharing. To share an input x of  $P_1$ :

- Replicated Sharing.  $P_1$  samples three random values  $x_1, x_2, x_3$  subject to  $x_1 + x_2 + x_3 = x$ . The final sharing is  $(x_2, x_3)(x_3, x_1)(x_1, x_2)$ .
- Lazy Replicated Sharing.  $P_1$  samples two random values  $x_2, x_3$  subject to  $x_2 + x_3 = x$ . The sharing is  $(x_2, x_3)(x_3, 0)(0, x_2)$ .

### AFLNO with Replicated Sharing

AFLNO (Araki et al., CCS 2016) is fast three-party protocol,

- Input Sharing. Each input  $x \to \text{replicated sharing } (x_2, x_3)(x_3, x_1)(x_1, x_2)$
- **Circuit Evaluation.** To multiply two sharings  $(x_2, x_3)(x_3, x_1)(x_1, x_2), (y_2, y_3)(y_3, y_1)(y_1, y_2),$ 
  - **1** Each  $P_i$  computes  $z_{i-1} = x_{i-1}y_{i-1} + x_{i-1}y_{i+1} + x_{i+1}y_{i-1} + r_i$ .
  - ② Each  $P_i$  sends  $z_{i-1}$  to  $P_{i+1}$ .
  - **1** The sharing is  $(z_3, z_2)(z_1, z_3)(z_2, z_1)$ .
- Output Recovery. To recover  $(z_3, z_2)(z_1, z_3)(z_2, z_1)$  to  $P_1, P_2$  or  $P_3$  sends  $z_1$  to  $P_1$ .

### **AFLNO** with Improved Input Sharing

In AFLNO, if  $P_1$  wants to secret-share its input x, it must send 4 elements:  $(x_3, x_1)$  to  $P_2$  and  $(x_1, x_2)$  to  $P_3$ .

Using lazy replicated sharing, the communication is 2 elements:

$$P_1$$
 samples  $x_2, x_3$  s.t.  $x_2 + x_3 = x$ : send  $x_3$  to  $P_2$  and  $x_2$  to  $P_3$ .

The sharing is 
$$(x_2, x_3)(x_3, 0)(0, x_2)$$
.

### Performance: GMW and LGMW

Circuit	n	Computation (s)			Runtime (ms)			Communication (MB)			Throughput (gates/s)		
		GMW	LGMW	Imp	GMW	LGMW	Imp	GMW	LGMW	Imp	GMW	LGMW	Imp
Product	6	3.805	0.376	10.12×	248.9	68.7	3.62×	1.465	0.147	9.97×	2.01	7.28	3.62×
	8	9.940	0.683	$14.55 \times$	487.6	71.2	6.85×	3.829	0.274	13.97×	1.44	9.83	6.83×
	10	20.729	1.110	$18.67 \times$	813.5	125.8	6.47×	7.911	0.440	17.98×	1.11	7.15	6.44×
Inner Product	6	2.318	0.073	$31.75 \times$	151.6	11.6	$13.07 \times$	0.879	0.029	30.31×	3.30	43.10	$13.06\times$
	8	5.695	0.096	59.32×	279.4	12.1	23.09×	2.188	0.039	56.10×	2.51	57.85	23.05×
	10	11.407	0.125	91.26×	456.8	12.7	35.97×	4.395	0.050	87.90×	1.97	70.87	35.97×
Chain	6	4.425	0.490	9.03×	276.3	96.7	2.86×	1.465	0.147	9.97×	3.62	10.34	2.86×
	8	11.614	0.846	13.73×	556.8	165.9	3.36×	3.829	0.274	13.97×	2.51	8.44	3.36×
	10	24.315	1.357	17.92×	953.6	245.6	3.88×	7.912	0.440	17.98×	1.89	7.33	3.88×

Table 6: Comparision of GMW and LGMW for computing the product, inner product, and chain circuits. "Imp" is an abbreviation for "improvement". The throughput is computed as the number of gates processed by the protocol per second.

Figure: Performance of GMW and LGMW.

### Performance: AFLNO and LAFLNO

Circuit	Computation (ms)			Runtime (ms)			Communication (byte)			Throughput (gates/ms)		
	AFLNO	LAFLNO	Imp	AFLNO	LAFLNO	Imp	AFLNO	LAFLNO	Imp	AFLNO	LAFLNO	Imp
Sum	0.569	0.434	1.31×	0.174	0.156	$1.12 \times$	104	56	$1.86 \times$	11.49	12.82	$1.12 \times$
Product	0.752	0.633	1.19×	0.276	0.253	1.09×	152	104	1.46×	7.25	7.91	1.09×
Inner	1.567	1.256	1.25×	0.345	0.313	1.10×	272	176	1.55×	14.49	15.97	1.10×
Product	1.507	1.230	1.25	0.545	0.515	1.10	2/2	170	1.55 A	14.49	13.97	1.10 ×
Chain	1.418	1.104	1.28×	0.385	0.344	1.12×	216	136	1.59×	10.39	11.63	1.12×

Table 7: Comparision of AFLNO and LAFLNO for computing the sum, product, inner product, and chain circuits. "Imp" is an abbreviation for "improvement". The throughput is computed as the number of gates processed by the protocol per second.

Figure: Performance of AFLNO and LAFLNO.

# Any Question?

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