1 Evidence of theory for our countermeasure.

Next, we will demonstrate how many onion services the attacker needs to create in order to ensure that r onion services are successfully accepted by the target HSDir.

We aim to compute the cost that HSDirSniper must spend to generate r malicious onion services to attack an HSDir, i.e., the attacker needs to generate at least k onion services to ensure that the descriptors of the r onion services will not be filtered by the target HSDir. For simplicity, we assume that the DHT consists of N HSDirs and the index interval d_i (see line 312 in the manuscript) between HSDir is equal. According to the rules we set for filtering descriptors, the probability p that an $HSDir_i$ receives a randomly generated onion service's descriptor is:

$$p = 8 * 1/N = 8/N, (1)$$

where N denotes the number of all HSDirs.

Since the selection of an HSDir by an onion service is an independent event, the above process can be interpreted as k fold independent Bernoulli trials that generate onion services, where at least r onion services can be received by the target HSDir. Let Pr(k, r, p) denote the probability mass function of the above Bernoulli trials, which follows a binomial distribution:

$$Pr(k,r,p) = \binom{k-1}{r-1} p^r * (1-p)^{k-r}$$
 (2)

Then the expected number of experiments E(k) can be calculated by

$$E(k) = \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} k * Pr(k, r, p)$$

$$= \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} k * {k-1 \choose r-1} p^r * (1-p)^{k-r} = \frac{r}{p},$$
(3)

where r represents the number of onion services will not be filtered by the target HSDir.

We randomly selected a day's consensus file (e.g., 2023-06-10 12:00:00) to construct the DHT, where the length of DHT was 4003, i.e., N=4003. Taking it into Eq.(1), we get $p\approx 0.002$. Finally, substituting p into Eq.(3), we obtain the relationship between expected number E(k) of onion services generated by the attacker and the number r of onion services that can be received by the target HSDir: E(k) = 500 * r.