VoicePM: A Robust Privacy Measurement on Voice Anonymity



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Zhouyu Li




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Data Harvesting of Sensitive Voice Data



Typical data flow in a voice assistant

Examples of Sensitive Data Harvesting



Source: https://shorturl.at/dKOZ2

How Is McDonald's AI System Really Faring At The Drive-Thru Window?



McDonald's had big goals when it first rolled out its voice-ordering technology on a trial basis at 10 Chicago outlets, per Restaurant Dive. The chain had been hoping that AI would help it find a way out of its labor shortage, an issue that has plagued many fast food companies as far back as 2018, per Business Insider. The company said it even offered the hope that – at least where U.S. corporate locations were concerned – AI would allow it to raise wages for entry-level workers from \$11 to \$17, per Restaurant Dive.

Source: https://shorturl.at/aBEN2

Voice Privacy Challenge in 2020 and 2022



- hide the speaker's identity (maximize speaker verification equal error rate)
- preserve the speech utility (minimize word error rate)

State-of-the-art Anonymization Models




 Signal processing (McAdams Interspeech'21
 VoiceMask/VTLN Sensys'18)



 Voice synthesis (HiFi-GAN NIPS'20)



Voice conversion
 (MaskCycleGAN ICASSP'21)




 Voice adversarial examples (V-CLOAK Security'23)

Limitations of Existing Voice Anonymization Approaches

- Limited to analyzing only one or two voice-based attributes
 - Lack a systematic framework to analyze multiple attributes (Aloufi et al., 2020 and Zhu et al., 2021)
- Do not consider the overall tradeoff between speech utility, speaker verification, and inference of voice attributes. (Tomashenko et al., 2022)

Aloufi et al., 2020, Privacy-preserving voice analysis via disentangled representations Zhu et al., 2021, Anti Leakage: Protecting Privacy Hidden in Our Speech Tomashenko et al., 2022, The VoicePrivacy 2020 Challenge: Results and findings

Our Design: VoicePM



VoicePM, a robust **Voice Privacy Measurement on the state-of-the-art** of voice anonymization solutions

- Incorporate into the operating system
- Provide flexibility to configure the privacy level
- Preserve transcription utility, hide speaker verification, and thwart voice attribute inference.




Research Objectives

 R1: Can we formulate privacy-utility tradeoff to consider speech utility, speaker verification, and inference of physical attributes?

 R2: Can we obtain practical level of privacyutility tradeoff for different voice anonymization techniques?

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Threat Model





- Linkage Attack: similarity score to decide utterances are from the same speaker
- > Attributes Inference Attack: identify the speaker's accent, emotion, age, gender, etc.

Speech Utility Metric

Word Error Rate (WER)

WER =
$$\frac{N_{sub} + N_{del} + N_{ins}}{N_{ref}}$$

 N_{sub} : # of substitution

 N_{del} : # of deletion

 N_{ins} : # of insertion

 N_{ref} : # of ground truth

$$U = \frac{1 - WER_{model}}{1 - WER_{haseline}}$$

 $WER_{baseline}$ is the WER for the original speech in a database WER_{model} is for the anonymized speech Speech Utility $U \in [0, 1]$

Speech Privacy Metric

Speaker Verification: S

$$S = \frac{EER_{model} - EER_{baseline}}{EER_{model}}$$

Equal Error Rate (EER)

 $EER_{baseline}$: EER for the original database EER_{model} : EER between clean speech and sanitized speech generated by the anonymization model

Jaccard Similarity

$$J(A, A') = \frac{A \cap A'}{A \cup A'}$$
$$J = \frac{J_{model}(A, A')}{J_{baseline}(A, A')}$$

A: set of voice attributes of the original speaker


A': set of inferred voice attributes from the recorded audio



$$P = \gamma S + (1 - \gamma) (1 - J)$$
 $P \in [0, 1]$

where $\gamma \in (0, 1]$ and prioritizes the individual components within P

Privacy vs. Utility Tradeoff



The typical relationship between privacy and utility

Maximize the Tradeoff: T

$$U = \frac{1 - WER_{model}}{1 - WER_{baseline}} \qquad U \in [0, 1]$$

$$P = \gamma S + (1 - \gamma) (1 - J)$$
 $P \in [0, 1]$

$$T(S, J, U) = P \times U \qquad T \in [0, 1]$$

 $\gamma \in (0, 1]$ is the weight of S and J

Theorem:

Privacy increases while the utility decreases. There exists a point (U, P) where the P and U form a rectangle with the highest area/tradeoff T.

Evaluation Setup

Dataset

- Mozilla Common Voice (English, 83,242 samples, 7,499 speakers)
- IEMOCAP (Emotion, English, 5,531 samples, 10 speakers)
- AISHELL-1 (Mandarin Chinese, 7,176 samples, 400 speakers)

| Accents | Alias | # of samples | # of speakers | Length (hrs) | |
|----------------------|-------|--------------|---------------|--------------|--|
| United States | US | 10000 | 2683 | 13.78 | |
| England | EN | 10000 | 1343 | 13.17 | |
| India and South Asia | INSA | 10000 | 1450 | 13.26 | |
| Canadian | CA | 10000 | 649 | 13.28 | |
| Australian | AU | 10000 | 534 | 12.98 | |
| New Zealand | NZ | 8514 | 138 | 10.80 | |
| Scottish | SC | 7995 | 141 | 11.13 | |
| Ireland | IE | 6052 | 164 | 7.93 | |
| Southern African | SA | 5794 | 112 | 3.26 | |
| Chinese | CN | 4887 | 285 | 10.74 | |

Mozilla Common Voice English Dataset Summary


Baseline of Attribute Inference Models

| Attributes | Test set (# of utterances) | wav2vec2 Base | ECAPA-TDNN |
|------------|--|---------------|------------|
| Emotion | happiness (167), anger (122) sadness (113), neutral (149) | 77.31% | 65.15% |
| Age | teens (876), twenties (2,799) thirties (1,703), forties (1,601) fifties (783), senior (563) | 85.36% | 80.95% |
| Accent | AU (969), NZ (872), CN (480), SA (609) INSA (1,006), CA (1,005), EN (1,013) IE (630), SC (797), US (944) | 87.72% | 82.10% |
| Gender | male (6,562), female (1,763) | 99.06% | 97.87% |

- wav2vec2: 90.2 million parameters (emotion and accent model)
- ECAPA-TDNN: 5.5 million parameters (gender and age model)

ECAPA-TDNN: Emphasized Channel Attention, Propagation and Aggregation in Time Delay Neural Network

Privacy vs. Utility Tradeoff Relationship




- McAdams: 0.5 ~ 0.9
- VoiceMask_α: VTLN Linear Warping Coefficient |α| ∈ [0.01, 0.2]
- VoiceMask_β: VTLN Quadratic function Warping Coefficient |β| ∈ [0, 1]

Privacy and utility form a non-linear pattern like an arc


Determining the Impact of γ on Tradeoff

$$T(S, J, U) = P \times U = [\gamma S + (1 - \gamma)(1 - J)] \times U$$



 γ changes the tradeoff T and the optimum coefficient

Controlling Voice Attribute: McAdams Coefficient



Sentence:

What are you talking about?

Attributes of an original speech: [thirties, male, Chinese, anger]



Attributes of anonymized speech (coefficient of 0.75): [thirties, male, New Zealand, anger]



- Gender inference changes slightly
- Accent varies significantly

Measurement of Different Voice Anonymity Systems

| Model | Emotion | Age | Accent | Gender | Jaccard | EER | WER | U | Р | Т |
|----------------------|---------|-------|--------|--------|---------|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------|
| Baseline | 100 | 80.95 | 87.94 | 97.87 | 0.8534 | 2.28 | 14.5 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| McAdams | 76.07 | 35.24 | 62.96 | 90.14 | 0.5386 | 18.39 | 26.42 | 0.8606 | 0.5872 | 0.4971 |
| $VoiceMask_{\alpha}$ | 71.97 | 37.25 | 49.89 | 50.67 | 0.4038 | 20.58 | 27.92 | 0.8431 | 0.6717 | 0.5558 |
| $VoiceMask_{eta}$ | 71.7 | 36.34 | 54.2 | 67.45 | 0.4534 | 20.85 | 28.15 | 0.8404 | 0.6432 | 0.5303 |
| HiFi-GAN | 40.5 | 19.39 | 12.13 | 24.28 | 0.1561 | 48.32 | 17.44 | 0.9656 | 0.8849 | 0.8545 |
| MaskCycleGAN | 36.18 | 24.21 | 19.32 | 40.25 | 0.2056 | 39.95 | 72.12 | 0.3261 | 0.8510 | 0.2775 |
| V-CLOAK | 60.54 | 25.13 | 51.08 | 81.26 | 0.4107 | 52.79 | 23.81 | 0.8911 | 0.7378 | 0.6574 |


Different anonymity systems hide the attributes in different levels

Optimum tradeoff from high to low:

HiFi-GAN → V-CLOAK → VoiceMask → McAdams → MaskCycleGAN

Privacy-Utility Tradeoff for Different Voice Anonymity Systems

"Right, it shouldn't be too difficult to rework them"




Attributes of an original speech: [forties, male, New Zealand, neutral]



HiFi-GAN: [thirties, female, Canadian, anger]



Generalizability Across Different English Dataset



Overall relative ranking does not change with English dataset

Include gender and emotion attributes

y = 0.5

Key Takeaway

VoicePM provides a voice privacy measurement framework:

- effectively measure the tradeoff of different anonymization models
- anonymization models with varying privacy levels can be pre-defined
- showcases the feasibility for attributes configuration

Limitations

- Accuracy of the emotion (77.31%) and age (80.95%) inference model is relatively low
- Lacks human perception verification of the altered audio

VoicePM: A Robust Privacy Measurement on Voice Anonymity.

Shaohu Zhang, Zhouyu Li, Anupam Das. 16th ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks. ACM WiSec'23


Thank you!



VoicePM Project Website
(Code will be released soon)
https://github.com/zhangshaohu/VoicePM

Backup Slides


McAdams



where k is the harmonic index, A_k (t) is signal amplitude, ϕ_k is the phase, and α is the McAdams coefficient, which is usually in the range of [0.5, 1].

Patino et al., 2020. Speaker anonymization using the McAdams coefficient linear predictive coding (LPC)

Vocal Tract Length Normalization (VTLN)



• Bilinear warping function ($VoiceMask_{\alpha}$)

$$\varphi_{\alpha} = \omega + 2 \arctan^{-1} \left(\frac{(1-\alpha)\sin\omega}{1-(1-\alpha)\cos\omega} \right)$$

where $\omega \in [0, \pi]$ is the normalized frequency, and $\alpha \in (-1, 1)$ is a warping factor used to tune the strength of voice conversion.

• Quadratic function ($VoiceMask_{\beta}$)

$$\varphi_{\beta} = \omega + \beta \left(\frac{\omega}{\pi} - \left(\frac{\omega}{\pi}\right)^2\right)$$

where $\beta \in (-1, 1)$ is the warping factor.

HiFi-GAN

- synthesize high-fidelity waveforms from Mel-spectrograms
- convert the voice to a pre-defined speaker

MaskCycleGAN-VC

- non-parallel VC technique
- apply a temporal mask to the input Mel-spectrogram

V-CLOAK

- add imperceptible noises to audio
- generate adversarial examples to fool speaker verification system

Selection of Automatic Speech Recognition Systems

| Model | Source | Language | Dataset | WER(%) |
|-----------------------|--------------|------------------|---------------|--------|
| wav2vec2+CTC | SpeechBrain | English | CV | 14.50 |
| CRDNN + CTC/Attention | SpeechBrain | English | CV | 25.90 |
| DeepSpeech | DeepSpeech | English | CV | 27.09 |
| Google Speech2Text | Google Cloud | English | CV | 28.19 |
| wav2vec2+CTC | SpeechBrain | English | IEMOCAP | 24.57 |
| CRDNN + CTC/Attention | SpeechBrain | English | IEMOCAP | 37.15 |
| Google Speech2Text | Google Cloud | English | IEMOCAP | 37.76 |
| wav2vec2+CTC | SpeechBrain | Mandarin Chinese | AISHELL1-test | 5.04 |
| Transformer | SpeechBrain | Mandarin Chinese | AISHELL1-test | 6.04 |
| Google speech2text | Google Cloud | Mandarin Chinese | AISHELL1-test | 7.69 |


Performance of Different ASR Systems

Feasibility for Attributes Configuration

| Attributes | McAdams (U=0.8466) | | VoiceMask $_{\alpha}$ (U=0.8274) | | VocieMask _β (U=0.8245) | | HiFi-GAN (U=0.9130) | | MaskCycleGAN (U=0.3261) | | V-CLOAK (U=0.8911) | |
|---------------------------|-----------------------|--------|----------------------------------|--------|--------------------------------------|--------|------------------------|--------|----------------------------|--------|-----------------------|--------|
| | P | Ť | P | Ť | P | Ť | P | Ť | P | Ť | P | Ť |
| basic privacy | 0.4431 | 0.3752 | 0.4488 | 0.3714 | 0.4493 | 0.3704 | 0.4764 | 0.4350 | 0.4715 | 0.1538 | 0.4784 | 0.4263 |
| emotion | 0.5066 | 0.4289 | 0.5420 | 0.4484 | 0.5399 | 0.4451 | 0.7391 | 0.6748 | 0.7595 | 0.2477 | 0.6237 | 0.5557 |
| age | 0.7634 | 0.6463 | 0.7562 | 0.6257 | 0.7627 | 0.6288 | 0.8628 | 0.7878 | 0.8296 | 0.2706 | 0.8312 | 0.7406 |
| accent | 0.5878 | 0.4976 | 0.6798 | 0.5625 | 0.6529 | 0.5383 | 0.9053 | 0.8266 | 0.8583 | 0.2799 | 0.6791 | 0.6052 |
| gender | 0.4189 | 0.3547 | 0.6803 | 0.5628 | 0.5729 | 0.4723 | 0.8342 | 0.7616 | 0.7356 | 0.2399 | 0.5023 | 0.4476 |
| emotion+accent | 0.5900 | 0.4996 | 0.6609 | 0.5468 | 0.6436 | 0.5306 | 0.8638 | 0.7886 | 0.8445 | 0.2754 | 0.7015 | 0.6251 |
| emotion+age | 0.6936 | 0.5872 | 0.7040 | 0.5825 | 0.7081 | 0.5838 | 0.8438 | 0.7704 | 0.8373 | 0.2731 | 0.7835 | 0.6981 |
| emotion+gender | 0.4924 | 0.4169 | 0.6612 | 0.5471 | 0.5981 | 0.4931 | 0.8264 | 0.7545 | 0.7861 | 0.2564 | 0.6018 | 0.5363 |
| age+accent | 0.7265 | 0.6151 | 0.7651 | 0.6331 | 0.7566 | 0.6237 | 0.9105 | 0.8313 | 0.8744 | 0.2852 | 0.8024 | 0.7149 |
| gender+accent | 0.5428 | 0.4596 | 0.7286 | 0.6029 | 0.6579 | 0.5424 | 0.8985 | 0.8203 | 0.8363 | 0.2727 | 0.6386 | 0.5690 |
| gender+age | 0.6548 | 0.5544 | 0.7643 | 0.6324 | 0.7196 | 0.5933 | 0.8823 | 0.8056 | 0.8264 | 0.2695 | 0.7312 | 0.6515 |
| emotion+age+accent | 0.6889 | 0.5832 | 0.7275 | 0.6020 | 0.7208 | 0.5943 | 0.8825 | 0.8058 | 0.8624 | 0.2812 | 0.7797 | 0.6948 |
| emotion+accent+gender | 0.5577 | 0.4722 | 0.7013 | 0.5803 | 0.6503 | 0.5361 | 0.8731 | 0.7971 | 0.8337 | 0.2719 | 0.6655 | 0.5930 |
| emotion+age+gender | 0.6347 | 0.5373 | 0.7274 | 0.6019 | 0.6939 | 0.5721 | 0.8620 | 0.7871 | 0.8296 | 0.2706 | 0.7257 | 0.6466 |
| gender+age+accent | 0.6611 | 0.5597 | 0.7679 | 0.6354 | 0.7283 | 0.6005 | 0.9047 | 0.8260 | 0.8569 | 0.2795 | 0.7431 | 0.6622 |
| emotion+age+accent+gender | 0.6454 | 0.5464 | 0.7393 | 0.6117 | 0.7072 | 0.5830 | 0.8849 | 0.8080 | 0.8510 | 0.2775 | 0.7378 | 0.6574 |

Emotion Ranking: HiFi-GAN → V-CLOAK → VoiceMask → McAdams → MaskCycleGAN

Runtime



From low to high:

VoiceMask→ McAdams → V-CLOAK → MaskCycleGAN → HiFi-GAN