



# RFnolD: Protecting RFID Motion Privacy via Metasurface

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<sup>1</sup>Shandong University, China

<sup>2</sup>University of Pittsburgh, USA

<sup>3</sup>Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, China



<sup>4</sup>The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, China





University of  
Pittsburgh.<sup>®</sup>

# Motivation

## Through-wall walking detection and positioning [1][2]



## Through-wall speech eavesdropping [3] [4]



[1] Wang, Z., et al. A See-through-Wall System for Device-Free Human Motion Sensing Based on Battery-Free RFID. TECS, 2018.


[2] Yang, L., et al. See Through Walls with COTS RFID System! MobiCom, 2015.

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

[4] Chen, Y., et al. RFSPY: Eavesdropping on Online Conversations with Out-of-Vocabulary Words by Sensing Metal Coil Vibration of Headsets Leveraging RFID. MOBISYS, 2024

# Motivation

Through-wall walking detection and positioning [1][2]



The strong **through-wall sensing ability** raises non-negligible **privacy concerns**



[1] Wang, Z., et al. A See-through-Wall System for Device-Free Human Motion Sensing Based on Battery-Free RFID. TECS, 2018.

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# *Existing Solutions*

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*Communication security:*




[NSDI'15]

RFID-based

*Incompatible* with  
existing systems

*Other wireless sensing security:*



[SIGCOMM'22]

FMCW radar-based

*Inherent different protocols and  
sensing models*




[Sensys'23]

WiFi-based

# *Existing Solutions*

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*Communication security:*



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
WiFi-based

# Our Solution

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
**Key Idea – *passively* introduce *motion-irrelevant noise* in the physical channel to obfuscate the motion-induced signals**

- 1) Design of a low-cost metasurface
- 2) Signaling mechanism, obfuscation strategy




# Primer on Through-Wall RFID Motion Sensing

- Adversarial Sensing Model



- Adversarial Sensing Tasks and Algorithms

- Walking Detection**
- Variance-based [1]
  - Learning-based [2]
    - Hand-crafted statistical features
    - Neural network latent vector



- Respiration Eavesdropping** [3]
- Band-pass filter -> FFT peak

[1] Wang, Z., et al. A see-through-wall system for device-free human motion sensing based on battery-free RFID. ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems, 2017.

[2] Jiang, S., et al. RF-Gait: Gait-based person identification with COTS RFID. Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing, 2022.

[3] Zhao, R., et al. CRH: A contactless respiration and heartbeat monitoring system with COTS RFID tags. Proc. of IEEE SECON, 2018.

# Preliminaries: Metasurface Design and Modelling

- Fabrication of the Reflective Metasurface*







Diagram of the unit structure



RFnolD prototype

# Preliminaries: Metasurface Design and Modelling



1) How does the surface affect the original sensing?

- $R(t) = \alpha_l e^{-j\frac{2d_l}{\lambda}} + \alpha_s e^{-j\frac{d_s+d_l}{\lambda}} + \alpha_h(t) e^{-j\frac{d_h(t)+d_l}{\lambda}} + \sum_{i=1}^N \alpha_{m_i}(t) e^{-j\frac{d_{m_i}(t)+d_l}{\lambda}}$
- $v_R^{0/1} = v_l + v_s + v_h + \sum_{i=1}^N v_{m_i}^{0/1}$




Human-reflected



Metasurface-induced

# Preliminaries: Metasurface Design and Modelling



1) How does the surface affect the original sensing?


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- $v_R^{0/1} = v_l + v_s + v_h + \sum_{i=1}^N v_{m_i}^{0/1}$  ↗ *Human-reflected* ↗ *Metasurface-induced*

2) Can the 1-bit surface obfuscate motion signal in various ways?

- $N = 16$ , phase can exhibit  $2^{16} = 65536$  unique values


# Preliminaries: Observation 1

- The **phase variation** is positively correlated to the **number of units flipped**






Naïve Solution – construct a set-flipping scheme:


- 1) max-set (0 - 15% units on)
- 2) min-set (85 - 100 % units on)



- Issue 1:** fails to obfuscate the motion signal in the spectral domain




With metasurface



Without metasurface


# Preliminaries: Observation 2

- **Component frequency** is positively correlated to the **number of units flipped**




Naïve Solution – why  
not flipping less units?  
e.g., 25% units


- **Issue 2:** insufficient signal obfuscation in the temporal domain



Temporal domain X



Human motion can  
be detected easily



Phase spectrum

# Preliminaries: Observation 2

- Component frequency is positively correlated to the number of units flipped




A trade-off exists between **temporal** and **spectral domain** obfuscation

Naïve Solution – why  
flipping less units?  
e.g. 25% units

- Issue 2:** insufficient signal obfuscation in the temporal domain  
**Question:** Can we design a novel controlling approach to strike a balance between them?




Human motion can  
be detected easily




# *Key Goals for obfuscating Motion Signal*

- Component frequency is positively correlated to the number of units flipped*





**Answer** – the metasurface-affected signal phase should simultaneously have

- Issue 2:** insufficient signal obfuscation in the temporal domain
  - 1) a high signal **entropy**
  - 2) a high temporal **variance**
  - 3) dominant **frequencies** around the motion frequencies



~~Temporal domain~~  
Human motion can  
be detected easily



# Obfuscation Controlling Strategy

- **Base strategy:** randomly select the number of units  $X_n$  to flip from  $\{0, 1, 2, \dots, N\}$ , then flip a random combination of  $X_n$  units among all units

Maximizing the phase entropy

$$v_R^{0/1} = v_l + v_s + v_h + \sum_{i=1}^N v_{m_i}^{0/1}$$


$\Updownarrow$

Maximizing the entropy in selecting the unit state

- 1) select an integer  $X_n$  in  $[0, N]$
- 2) select a set  $X_s$  from  $C_N^{X_n}$  combinations



Uniform distribution




Phase spectrum with Base strategy

Goal 1: Achieving High Phase Entropy





# Obfuscation Controlling Strategy

- **Refinement 1:** if a random flip resulted in a  $N_{on} < \sigma_s \times N$  or  $N_{on} > \sigma_l \times N$  ( $\sigma_s < \sigma_l$ ), we switch on or off all units at the next timestamp respectively



Phase deviation of increasing units

$$\begin{aligned}\sigma_s &= 25\% \\ \sigma_l &= 75\%\end{aligned}$$





Temporal phase with/without Refinement1

Goal 2: Achieving High Phase Variance



# Obfuscation Controlling Strategy

- **Refinement 2:** attach a higher likelihood  $w$  to choosing a number less than  $\sigma_f \times N$  as the number of units to flip  $X_n$  in the Base strategy




Compare the spectrum and calculate similarity



$$\sigma_f = 0.25$$

$$w = 0.6$$



The spectrum for different numbers of flipped units

Goal 3: Achieving Strong Spectral Components Around the Human Motion Frequency Band



[1] Fulk, G.D., et al. Predicting home and community walking activity poststroke. *Stroke*, 2017.

[2] Lockett, E., et al. Normal respiratory rate for adults and children. *Healthline Media*, 2022.

# Controlling Strategy as a Whole


## Algorithm 1 Metasurface Controlling Strategy in RFnOID

```


Require:  $N, tr, \sigma_s, \sigma_l, w, \sigma_f$ , all units off
     $strand(tr); flipSet = []$ ;  $keepSet = [U_1, \dots, U_N]$ ;  $flag = RAND$ 
while True do
    if  $n_{on} < \sigma_s \times N$  and  $flag = FLIP$  then                                 $\triangleright$  Refine 2
         $writeToPins(allpins, ON); flag = RAND;$ 
    else if  $n_{on} > \sigma_l \times N$  and  $flag = FLIP$  then;
         $writeToPins(allpins, OFF); flag = RAND;$ 
    else
         $randomNum = getRandom(0, 1);$ 
        if  $randomNum < w$  then                                               $\triangleright$  Refine 1
             $percentage = getRandom(0, \sigma_f);$ 
        else
             $percentage = getRandom(\sigma_f, 1);$ 
        end if
         $switchNum = percentage \times N$ 
        for  $i = 0, i < switchNum, i++$  do                                          $\triangleright$  Base
             $ind = getRandom(0, 1) \% (length(keepSet));$ 
             $flipSet.append(U_{ind}); keepSet.delete(U_{ind});$ 
        end for
         $writeToPins(flipSet, FLIP); flag = FLIP;$ 
    end if
end while

```


## ✓ Respiration eavesdropping



## ✓ Walking: variance-based



## ✓ Walking: learning-based




**Whole strategy (RFnOID) can obfuscate both the raw signal and the high-level features**


# Experimental Setup

## Device:

- Impinj R420 reader
- 12 dBi antenna
- $3 \times 2$  tag matrix
- RFID Metasurface



Metasurface sketch



Through glass wall




Through gypsum wall

## Metrics:

- TP
- FP
- MAE

## Scenario:

- gypsum wall
- wooden wall
- glass wall



Walking,  
breathing  
as usual

# Overall Performance

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## 1) Walking Motion Detection

WALKING MOTION DETECTION PERFORMANCE WITH AND WITHOUT RFnOID IN DIFFERENT ENVIRONMENTS

Method	Environment (1)				Environment (2)				Environment (3)			
	w/o metasurface		w. metasurface		w/o metasurface		w. metasurface		w/o metasurface		w. metasurface	
	TP	FP	TP	FP	TP	FP	TP	FP	TP	FP	TP	FP
Variance threshold	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.013	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Handcrafted features	1.00	0.02	0.028	0.032	0.98	0.056	0.08	0.007	0.89	0.047	0.09	0.02
Auto-encoder	1.00	0.089	0.039	0.008	1.00	0.028	0.003	0.007	1.00	0.015	0.08	0.00

## 2) Respiration Rate Estimation

RESPIRATION RATE ESTIMATION WITH AND WITHOUT RFnOID

	Environment (1)		Environment (2)		Environment (3)	
	w/o MS	w. MS	w/o MS	w. MS	w/o MS	w. MS
MAE	0.026	0.087	0.022	0.081	0.019	0.085

Motion detection rate  
decreased to  
**less than 6%**


Compared with no *RFnOID*  
**more than 3x**  
Increase the MAE

# Evaluation Results


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*Compare with:*


- B(1): Base strategy
- B(2): Base strategy + Refinement 1
- B(3): IRShield<sup>[1]</sup>



Walking motion detection



(b) learning-based method




Respiration eavesdropping


[1] P. Staat, et al. Irshield: A countermeasure against adversarial physical-layer wireless sensing. S&P 2022.

# Evaluation Results


## Impact of Practical Factors:




Metasurface size




(a) walking motion detection



(b) respiration rate estimation



Number of moving persons



Legitimate sensing

## *Conclusion*

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- Propose RFnOID, a first *metasurface* system designed for protecting RFID human motion privacy from adversary sensing.
- Theoretically *model and characterize* the metasurface's effect on human-reflected signal both temporally and spectrally.
- Design a novel *controlling strategy* to achieve a balanced obfuscation across both *temporal and spectral domains*.
- Develop a prototype system and conduct extensive experiments showing significant performance.

# *Thank you!*

## *Q&A*

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