

Cetacean species and their conservation

Centrality of Third-Party in Shifting Party

third-party operation and independent third-party operation

Strong reciprocity models argue that humans ‘even when it is costly and yields no direct material benefit’ (Fehr & Gächter, 2002).

Third-party punishment behaviour of ‘unaffected’ third parties’ (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004).

Cultural group selection models suggest punishment can stabilize cooperation at scale (Boyd et al., 2003).

From Fitouchi & Singh (2023), reviewing this tradition: ‘A widespread view argues that humans have evolved group norms to enforce costly, third-party punishments.’

The theoretical picture: Third-party punishment is central to norm enforcement and large-scale cooperation.

Current evolutionary and anthropological perspectives

The Theoretical Centrality of Third-Party Punishment

- **Claim: Human cooperation depends on third-party punishment.**
- Strong reciprocity models argue that humans punish norm violators “even when it is costly and yields no direct material benefit” (Fehr & Gächter, 2002).
- Third-party punishment extends to “sanctioning behaviour of ‘unaffected’ third parties” (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004).
- Cultural group selection models suggest punishment can stabilize cooperation at scale (Boyd et al., 2003).
- From Fitouchi & Singh (2023), reviewing this tradition: “A widespread version argues that humans have evolved predispositions to enforce group norms through costly, third-party punishment.”
- The theoretical picture: **Third-party punishment is central to norm enforcement and large-scale cooperation.**

Current evolutionary and anthropological perspectives

But Cross-Cultural Evidence Suggests Variation