# CDDC 2019 Qualifiers Challenge Writeup

Team: S4F3 S0L1D5

Category: Uni/Poly

June 2019

# OSINT\_RED

# <sub>1</sub> [R-0] Everyone <3 Fan Mail

This series of challenges were made slightly more tedious than necessary, because unfortunately there was a real company called 'LightSpeed' that diluted the search results.

The main objective of this challenge was to find the email of the site administrator for www.lightspeedcorp.global, and send him an email.

#### 1.1 Solution

In theory, all we would have needed to do was perform a WHOIS lookup on the domain to find the email address. Simple, right?

Nope.

Depending on which WHOIS search engine is used, certain bits of information about the registrant can be missing if the domain was registered with WHOISGuard, which hides certain identifiable information from WHOIS lookups.

```
Registrant Name: Luther Torvalds
Registrant Organization: LightSpeedCorp
Registrant Street: Add 1 Add 2
Registrant City: Singapore
Registrant State/Province: NA
Registrant Postal Code: 123456
Registrant Country: SG
Registrant Phone: +65.62353535
Registrant Phone Ext: 213
Registrant Fax:
Registrant Fax:
Registrant Email: Luther.Torvalds@outlook.com
```

Figure 1.1: All the information is visible if WHOISGuard is ignored

However, it turns out that the guard isn't perfect, and all we had to do was find a WHOIS search engine that ignores the guard. After some digging, we found one, exposing all the juicy details of the registrant.

After getting the email address, we just had to send an email, and we were replied with the flag.

# 1.2 Flag

The flag for this challenge was CDDC19{IS\_IT\_I\_AM\_FAMOUS\_NAO}.

# <sup>2</sup> [R-1] Travel to the Past

The challenge heavily hinted that we would need a way to look at an older version of the website to find the flag, and that's exactly what we did.

#### 2.1 Solution

There was a single snapshot of the website on the Wayback Machine<sup>1</sup> on the 20<sup>th</sup> of May, and browsing that snapshot revealed the flag on the homepage of a blog:




Figure 2.1: The flag is clearly visible

### 2.2 Flag

The flag for this challenge was \$CDDC19\${Past\_past\_past\_past}.

# 3 [R-2] I'm Sho Done With This

#### 3.1 Solution

The hint was in the question title itself — turns out that there is a search engine called 'ShoDan' <sup>2</sup>, which claims to be the world's first search engine for internet connected devices.

Sure enough, searching for our favourite company 'lightspeedcorp' yielded the following results:



HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Date: Tue, 28 May 2019 03:20:06 GMT

Server: Apache

IMPORTANT: PLEASE-DO-NOT-ATTACK

Company: lightspeedcorp

FLAG: }U-gnihc7aW-er4-sreht0rB-hc3T-g1B{\$91CDDC\$

Content-Length: 21

Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

Figure 3.1: The flag is reversed, for some reason

A trivial string-reverse later, the flag is obtained.

#### 3.2 Flag

The flag for this challenge was \$CDDC19\${B1g-T3ch-Br0thers-4re-Wa7ching-U}.

# Programming

# Count 1: Baby

This was a fairly simple code golfing challenge; inspection of the provided count1-baby.py file gave the character limit as 53 characters. The starting code is given as this:

```
#include <stdio.h>

int main(int argc, char *argv[])

int i;

for( i = 1 ; i < 10000 ; i++ )

for( i = 1 ; i < 10000 ; i++ )

return 0;

}</pre>
```

#### 4.1 Solution

Compiling and running the program shows that the expected output of the minified program are the numbers 1 to 9999, separated by commas (with a trailing comma after 9999).

Besides the obvious steps like removing whitespace and newlines, knowledge of the C standard and ignorance of compiler warnings can yield the following transformations:

- printf is an implicitly defined standard library function; stdio.h can be removed
- Functions do not require a type specifier; int main can be shortened to main
- main does not need to take arguments, leaving main()
- The verifier rejects spaces, so int i has to be changed to int(i) (which is valid)
- main does not need to explicitly return 0

This yields the final program, at 53 characters long:

```
main(){int(i);for(i=1;i<10000;i++){printf("%d,",i);}}</pre>
```

Listing 4.1: The solution for Count 1: Baby

# 4.2 Flag

The flag for this challenge was \$CDDC19\${Count2\_is\_waiting\_Please\_enjoy!}.

#### 5 Count 2: Wildness

The required output for this challenge is the same as the previous challenge (Count 1: Baby), but the restrictions have been tightened. This time, OP's friend 'doesn't like to go wild', or, in other words, the following characters cannot be used in the source code: <== w1lD ==>. Additionally, the character limit has been reduced to 41.

#### 5.1 Solution

Starting from the code for Count 1 (Listing 4.1), we can apply some more non-obvious tricks:

- Variables don't need a type specifier, and will default to int
- Variables with static storage duration will be initialised to 0 (obviating the need for =)
- != is equivalent to a bitwise XOR (^) for integers (removing <)
- Taking advantage of i++ semantics can replace 1e4 with 9999 (since 1 can't be used)

This yields the final program, again at exactly 41 characters:

```
i;main(){for(;i++^9999;printf("%d,",i));}
```

Listing 5.1: The solution for Count 2: Wildness

#### 5.2 Flag

The flag for this challenge was \$CDDC19\${This\_really\_helps\_m3\_a\_lot}

### 6 Count 4: Madness - Filter

For this challenge, the character limit is slightly relaxed to 44 characters, but OP's friend has a faulty keyboard now, and all lowercase characters except those in 'mad printf' ('a', 'd', 'f', 'm', 'n', 'p', 'r', and 't') cannot be used.

#### 6.1 Solution

Given that all the looping constructs (for, while, and even goto) cannot be used due to having illegal characters, the only logical solution is recursion.

- It is not illegal to call main recursively
- When called with no arguments, argc is 1; so main(i) will initialise i to 1
- 1E4 is equally as valid as 1e4, which is identical to 10000
- The first arm of the ternary operator can be omitted: x?:y is valid.

We came up with two independent solutions to this problem:

```
main(i){printf("%d,",i++);if(i<1E4)main(i);}

Listing 6.1: The solution for Count 2: Wildness
i;main(){printf("%d,",++i);i>=9999?:main();}
```

Listing 6.2: An alternative solution for Count 2: Wildness

In both cases, the code was exactly 44 characters long.

#### 6.2 Flag

The flag was \$CDDC19\${Main\_might\_be\_just\_a\_function\_but\_it\_is\_really\_special!}.

# Reverse Engineering

#### 7 LSCVM: Immaculate Invasion

Presented with a login prompt, the logical conclusion was that the flag would be accessible upon successfully logging into the server.

#### 7.1 Solution

The tool of choice for this challenge was *Cutter*<sup>3</sup>, an open-source reverse-engineering framework which performs disassembly, function analysis, and function/value renaming, among other things.

Figure 7.1: A screenshot of Cutter

The first hurdle was getting the program to run beyond its error message of [-] Flag file open error; upon inspection of the disassembly, the program tries to open a file named 'flag', which presumably contains the flag on the server-side — \$ touch flag convinced the program to start.

Given that the program asks for a login ID, the next step was to check for strings and strcmps in the code, and one was indeed found:

```
call fcn.00001133
lea rsi, str.lsc_user; 0x2065; "lsc_user"; const char *s2
lea rdi, [0x00203140]; 0x203140; const char *s1
call sym.imp.strcmp; int strcmp(const char *s1, const char *s2)
test eax, eax
je 0x14b3
```

Figure 7.2: A suspicious strcmp

Of course, no challenge is so easy, especially one that sat at above 950 points more than 24 hours after the qualifiers started. On further inspection, the operand of strcmp appeared to be the output of a call to fcn.00001133, which itself took some very long and suspicious strings as input: eiMaAghMcAgjcMMaAgjcMMaAgjcMMaAhhcMMdAijMaAcfMPPPPPPPP.

Another discovery was this instruction: cmp dword [var\_1174h], 2, where var\_1174h contained the value of argc. Passing a second argument in the invocation (eg. \$ ./lscvm-ii x) revealed a very useful debugging mode that printed what appeared to be a stack.

Following the call chain eventually led to the jump table for opcode dispatch, pictured in Figure 7.1. Some quick analysis revealed that this was a indeed stack-based virtual machine (*thankfully*). Combined with the debugging output, and the fact that the text output (the banner, login prompt, etc.) was printed using the VM instead of say printf, some basic opcodes were decoded:

Opcode	Pops	Pushes	Description
<b>u</b> to <b>u</b>	_	0 to 9	constant
Α	a, b	a + b	add
M	a, b	a * b	multiply
P	a	_	printf("%c",a)

Piecing things together, it was inferred that we were most likely supposed to input a *program* when asked for the user ID, which would then print lsc\_user as required. Given that ASCII values for the lowercase alphabets start at 97, a small program was quickly written that would take in a string and output opcodes that would print it (Listing 1.1).

After trying it out, however, we were quickly met with disappointment, as we were faced with our old friend [-] Wrong id.

After more digging, the user id was expected to be at the memory address 0x203140; using the renaming feature of Cutter, we could make it easier to spot:

```
call fcn.00001133
lea rsi, str.lsc_user; 0x2065; "lsc_user"; const char *s2
lea rdi, var.mem_base.203140; 0x203140; const char *s1
call sym.imp.strcmp; int strcmp(const char *s1, const char *s2)
test eax, eax
je 0x14b3
```

Figure 7.3: [0x203140] after being renamed into var.mem\_base.203140

Scrolling through the opcode list while looking for the address (now renamed) yielded this very interesting function, mapped to opcode K:

```
(fcn) fcn.00000e22 86
  fcn.00000e22 ();
          ; var signed int var_4h @ rbp-0x4
; CALL XREF from fcn.00000fc9 (0x1107)
          0x00000e22
                           55
                                                        push
                                                                  rbp
          0x00000e23
                           4889e5
                                                        mov
                                                                  rbp, rsp
          0x00000e26
                           4883ec10
                                                        sub
                                                                  rsp, 0x10
          0x00000e2a
                           e89cfdffff
                                                                   fcn.00000bcb
                                                        call
          0x00000e2f
                           8945fc
                                                        mov
                                                                  dword [var_4h], eax
          0x00000e32
                           817dfc00ffffff
                                                                  dword [var_4h], 0xffffff00
                                                        cmp
        < 0x00000e39
                           7c09
                                                        j1
                                                                  0xe44
          0x00000e3b
                           817dfcff3f0000
                                                        cmp
                                                                  dword [var_4h], 0x3fff
      ==< 0x000000e42
                           7e16
                                                        ile
                                                                  0xe5a
          1
          ; CODE XREF from fcn.000000e22 (0xe39)
       -> 0x00000e44
                           8b45fc
                                                                  eax, dword [var_4h]
                                                        mov
          0x00000e47
                           89c6
                                                        mov
                                                                  esi, eax
                                                                  rdi, str.memory_write_access_violation__d ; 0x1938
                           488d3de80a0000
          0x000000e49
                                                        lea
          0x00000e50
                           b800000000
                                                                  eax, 0
                                                        mov
          0x00000e55
                           e876fbffff
                                                        call
                                                                  sym.imp.printf ; int printf(const char *format)
          ; CODE XREF from fcn.000000e22 (0xe42)
       --> 0x00000e5a
                           e86cfdffff
                                                        call
                                                                  fcn.00000bcb
          0x00000e5f
                           89c1
                                                        mov
                                                                  ecx, eax
          0x00000e61
                           8b45fc
                                                        mov
                                                                  eax, dword [var_4h]
          0x00000e64
                           4863d0
                                                        movsxd
                                                                  rdx, eax
                                                                  rax, var.mem_base.203140 ; 0x203140
          0x00000e67
                           488d05d2222000
                                                        lea
          0x000000e6e
                           880002
                                                        mov
                                                                  byte [rdx + rax], cl
                           b800000000
          0x00000e71
                                                        mov
                                                                  eax, 0
          0x00000e76
                           c9
                                                        Teave
          0x00000e77
                           с3
                                                        ret
```

Figure 7.4: A function to surpass metal gear write to memory?

There was also an accompanying opcode **E**, which read a value from memory. The memory buffer appeared to be an array of 32-bit values, and opcodes **K** and **E** took an index into this array. Slight modifications were made to lscvm-deascilinator to yield lscvm-memoryinator (basically keeping track of an offset and replacing 'P' with 'K'), which would generate opcodes to write a string into a given offset in memory.

Finally, then, the challenge could be solved (the password was also in plain sight, hi\_darkspeed-corp!):

```
$ ./lscvm-memoryinator
string: lsc_user
address: 0
ggdMMaKfgAfMcMfAbKjjMjAjAcKgfdMMfAdKfgAfMcMhAeKfgAfMcMfAfKcf\\
{\tt McfMMbAgKfgAfMcMeAhK}
string: hi_darkspeed-corp!
address: 0
jeAiMaKhdfMMbKgfdMMfAcKcfMcfMMdKjjMjAhAeKfgAfMcMeAfKhdfMMcAg
KfgAfMcMfAhKfgAfMcMcAiKcfMcfMMbAjKcfMcfMMbAcfMKcfMcfMMbcfMMb
AKfddMMbcfMMcAKjjMjAjAbcfMMdAKfgAfMcMbAbcfMMeAKfgAfMcMeAbcfM\\
MfAKfgAfMcMcAbcfMMgAKfgAdMbcfMMhAK
^C
$ nc lscvm-ii.cddc19q.ctf.sg 9001
=== Welcome to LSCVM(LightSpeed Corp Virtual Machine) ===
ID: ggd...AhK
Password : jeA...hAK
Login Successful! $CDDC19${IcY_GrE37ings_Fr0M_LigHT5pEeDC0Rp}
```

#### 7.2 Flag

The flag for this challenge was \$CDDC19\${IcY\_GrE37ings\_Fr0M\_LigHT5pEeDC0Rp}.

### 7.3 Further Analysis

While we were unable to actually come up with a quine to submit for the next LSCVM challenge (Quintessential Harlequin), we continued to take apart the VM (on the advice that it would be used again in the Finals!), since solving lscvm-ii did not require all of the opcodes (far from it).

Again, the renaming feature of Cutter was extremely helpful, and we were able to discover the address of the program counter, the base address of the stack, and (in the case of lscvm-qh), the mirror of stdout. Each buffer appears to be identically constructed with a fixed size of 0x4e200 bytes (0x13880 32-bit words), and the number of items stored after the last element (ie. at offset 0x4e200 from the base address).

We (eventually) managed to decipher all of the opcodes and their purpose:

Opcode	Pops	Pushes	Description
<b>a</b> to <b>j</b>	_	0 to 9	constant
Α	a, b	a + b	add
В	_		stop execution immediately
С	x	_	call (jump to absolute instruction x)
D	x	_	pop (drop)
E	addr	value	read memory from addr
F	ofs	value	fetch from stack (ofs elms below top)
G	ofs	_	relative jump forward
Н	ofs	value	same as F, but removes the element
I	x	_	printf("%d",x)
J	a, b	cmp	-1  if  a < b, 0  if  a = b, 1  if  a > b
K	val, addr	_	writes val to memory at addr
M	a, b	a * b	multiply
P	x	_	printf("%c",x)
R	_	_	return
S	a, b	a - b	subtract
V	a, b	a / b	integer divide
Z	cond, ofs	_	jump (relative) if cond is 0

Of note are the **C** and **R** opcodes, which *call* and *return* respectively. There is another array which is only accessed by these instructions that functions as a *callstack*. **C** pushes the current program counter (*PC*) to this callstack, and **R** pops the return address from the callstack, and sets *PC* to it, moving execution back to the callsite.

# Miscellaneous

# 8 Polyglot

#### 8.1 Solution

The obvious solution was to put each sentence into Google Translate<sup>4</sup>; all 10 sentences were some variation of 'the first letter of this language is the flag'. Coupled with the input format, given as [01][02][03][04][05][06]&[07][08][09][10]!, we were able to decode the flag.

Number	Language	Sentence
01	Hindi	
02	Indonesian	Karakter pertama bahasa ini yang mengibarkan bendera.
03	Chinese	
04	Dutch	Het eerste teken van deze taal vormt de vlag.
05	Danish	Det første tegn på dette sprog udgør flag.
06	Catalan	El primer caràcter d'aquest idioma constitueix la bandera.
07	Norwegian	Det første tegnet av dette språket utgjør flagget.
08	Spanish	El primer carácter de este lenguaje lo constituye la bandera.
09	Hmong	Thawj qhov cim ntawm hom lus no ua rau tus chij.
10	Croatian	Prvi znak ovog jezika čini zastavu.

Assembled, the message was HIC DDC&NSHC; it helped that there was a coherent message to verify that Google Translate didn't misdetect any of the languages.

### 8.2 Flag

The flag for this challenge was \$CDDC19\${HIC DDC&NSHC}.

# Super Strong TeleVision

With the obvious hints in the challenge statement, we got to work decoding.

SSTV, or Slow Scan Television, is a picture transmission method used mainly by amateur radio operators to transmit and receive static pictures via radio in monochrome or colour<sup>5</sup>. It can also be used to hide easter<sup>6</sup> eggs<sup>7</sup>...

#### 9.1 Solution

Using PulseAudio was used as a link between VLC and  $QSSTV^8$  (an open-source Linux SSTV application), we were able to decode the SSTV image.



Figure 9.1: QSSTV decoding the image; its frequency spectrum can be seen on the right

<sup>[5]</sup> en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slow-scan television

<sup>[6]</sup> https://wiki.kerbalspaceprogram.com/wiki/List\_of\_easter\_eggs

<sup>[7]</sup> https://half-life.fandom.com/wiki/Portal\_ARG

<sup>[8]</sup> http://users.telenet.be/on4qz/qsstv/index.html

In this case, *PulseAudio* acts as the pipe that redirects the .wav file as an input into the decoder. To achieve that, we first set up a virtual *null sink* and configure the system in the following manner:




Figure 9.2: Data Pipeline Setup

# 9.2 Flag

After some suspense as the SSTV audio played back in real time, the image was fully decoded, revealing the flag, which was \$CDDC19\${Light\$peedCorp-\$\$TV}.



Figure 9.3: Decoded SSTV Image

# **Appendix**

# Code Listings

#### 1.1 lscvm-deasciiinator

```
// lscvm-deasciiinator.cpp
2
     #include <stdio.h>
     #include <map>
     #include <vector>
     #include <string>
     #include <iostream>
     int main()
10
11
              std::map<char, std::string> lookup;
12
13
              lookup['a'] = "jjMjAhA";
14
              lookup['b'] = "jjMjAiA";
15
              lookup['c'] = "jjMjAjA";
16
              lookup['d'] = "cfMcfMM";
17
              lookup['e'] = "cfMcfMMbA";
18
              lookup['f'] = "jiAcdMM";
19
              lookup['g'] = "jiAcdMMbA";
              lookup['h'] = "jeAiM";
21
              lookup['i'] = "hdfMM";
22
              lookup['j'] = "hdfMMbA";
              lookup['k'] = "hdfMMcA";
24
              lookup['l'] = "ggdMM";
25
              lookup['m'] = "ggdMMbA";
26
              lookup['n'] = "fgAfMcM";
27
              lookup['o'] = "fgAfMcMbA";
28
              lookup['p'] = "fgAfMcMcA";
29
              lookup['q'] = "fgAfMcMdA";
30
              lookup['r'] = "fqAfMcMeA";
31
              lookup['s'] = "fgAfMcMfA";
32
```

```
lookup['t'] = "fgAfMcMgA";
33
              lookup['u'] = "fgAfMcMhA";
34
              lookup['v'] = "fgAfMcMiA";
35
              lookup['w'] = "fgAfMcMjA";
36
              lookup['x'] = "gcfcMMM";
37
              lookup['y'] = "fgAfgAM";
38
              lookup['z'] = "fgAfgAMbA";
39
              lookup['_'] = "gfdMMfA";
              lookup['!'] = "fgAdM";
41
              lookup['-'] = "fddMM";
42
43
              std::string input;
45
46
              while(true)
47
              {
48
                       std::getline(std::cin, input);
49
50
                       std::string output;
51
                       for(size_t i = input.size(); i-- > 0; )
52
                                output += lookup[input[i]];
53
54
                       for(size_t i = 0; i < input.size(); i++)</pre>
55
                                output += "P";
56
                       printf("\n%s\n", output.c_str());
58
              }
59
```

Listing 1.1: lscvm-deasciiinator.cpp