

Lecture 15: First-order Logic — Logical Equivalence

Barnaby Martin, 6 March 2021

Outline

- Logical equivalence (today).
- Some specific equivalences (today).
- Prenex normal form
- Resolution for first-order logic

Logical equivalence

Two formulae ϕ and ψ are **logically equivalent** if they are true for the same set of models, in which case we write $\phi \equiv \psi$.

D : {all men in the world}

$P(x, y)$: return true if x is y 's Daddy

$Q(x, y)$: return true if x is older than y

$P(x, y) \equiv Q(x, y)$?

在一个A社会: 年长的人都要叫爸爸

那么: $P(x, y) \equiv Q(x, y)$ 没问题

Logical equivalence

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$\wedge \vee \neg \Rightarrow \Leftrightarrow$

All logical equivalences from **propositional logic** give rise to equivalences in **first-order logic**: for example, as

$\forall x \exists y$

$p \Rightarrow q \equiv \neg p \vee q$, for any **propositional variables** p and q ,

we must have that

$\phi \Rightarrow \psi \equiv \neg \phi \vee \psi$, for any **first-order formulae** ϕ and ψ .

Logical equivalence

Note, however, that care must be taken as to exactly what an interpretation is when we “plug in” formulae as in the previous example: if

Predicate $\Rightarrow \begin{matrix} T \\ F \end{matrix}$

- ϕ is over the signature consisting of the binary relation symbol E and the constant symbol C
- ψ is over the signature consisting of the binary relation symbol E and the ternary relation symbol M

then an interpretation for $\neg\phi \vee \psi$ is over the signature consisting of the symbols E , C , and M .

ϕ : Human, eat-carrot \Rightarrow John
 ψ : Human, do-back-flip \Rightarrow John
 $\neg\phi \vee \psi$: predicate over 1 Human, 2, eat-carrot, 3. back-flip

Some tricks: renaming variables

Consider some first-order formula of the form $\forall x \phi(x)$ where y does not appear in $\phi(x)$.

$\forall x \phi(x): \forall x \phi(x_1, x_2, \dots, x \dots x_r)$ is true
all values of x makes $\phi(x_1, x_2, \dots, x \dots x_r)$ True

$\phi(x_1, x_2, \dots, x \dots x_r) \times x_1, x_2 \dots x_r$ rename.

$\forall x: \text{Universal Quantifier}$ $\phi(x_1) \wedge \phi(x_2) \wedge \phi(x_3) \wedge \dots$
 $\forall x \phi(x) = \text{True}$

$\exists x: \text{Existential Quantifier}$ $\psi(x_1) \vee \psi(x_2) \vee \dots \vee \psi(x_n) = \text{True}$
 $\exists x \psi(x)$

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Some tricks: renaming variables renaming samples

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- Let I be some interpretation for $\forall x \phi(x)$ in which $\forall x \phi(x)$ is true.

$M = \text{all human}$

$\phi(x)$: True when x is a boy, $x \in M$

$\phi(y)$: True when y is a boy, $y \in M$

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- Let I be some interpretation for $\forall x\phi(x)$ in which $\forall x\phi(x)$ is true.
- For every value u in the domain of I , we have that $(I, x = u) \models \phi(x)$.

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- So, for every value u in the domain of I , we have that $(I, y = u) \models \phi(y)$.

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- Hence, I is an interpretation in which $\forall y\phi(y)$ is true.

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- Let I be some interpretation for $\forall x\phi(x)$ in which $\forall x\phi(x)$ is true.
- For every value u in the domain of I , we have that $(I, x = u) \models \phi(x)$.
- So, for every value u in the domain of I , we have that $(I, y = u) \models \phi(y)$.
- Hence, I is an interpretation in which $\forall y\phi(y)$ is true.

Similarly, if I is an interpretation in which $\forall y\phi(y)$ is true then I is an interpretation in which $\forall x\phi(x)$ is true.

Some tricks: renaming variables

In general, and by the same reasoning, if ever we have some formula ϕ in which there is a quantification, $\forall x$, say, then we can replace

- every occurrence of x in the scope of this quantification with the variable y
- the quantification $\forall x$ by $\forall y$

so long as y does not appear in ϕ , without changing the semantics.

$$\forall x \phi(x, \underline{y}, z, w) \Rightarrow \text{some result.}$$
$$\forall y \phi(y, y, z, w) \stackrel{x}{\Downarrow} \forall a \phi(a, y, z, w)$$

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Of course, the same can be said of $\exists x\phi(x)$ and, more generally, any formula containing a quantification $\exists x$.

But, consider the formula $\exists xE(x, y)$.

If we simply replace x with y and $\exists x$ with $\exists y$ then we get $\exists yE(y, y)$ which is semantically very different from $\exists xE(x, y)$.

Some tricks: substitution

Consider some formula ϕ in which there is contained a sub-formula ψ .

Suppose further that ψ has free variables x_1, x_2, \dots, x_k .

If ψ is logically equivalent to a formula $\chi(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_k)$ then we can replace ψ in ϕ with the formula χ and not change the semantics.

$$\begin{aligned} p \wedge q &\Rightarrow \psi(x_1, x_2, x_3) \quad , \quad \psi \equiv \chi \\ \neg \chi(x_1, x_2, x_3) &\text{ Modus Tollens: (M.T.)} \\ \neg p \wedge q &\quad \text{sub } \chi(x_1, x_2, x_3) \text{ with } \psi(x_1, x_2, x_3) \end{aligned}$$

Some common equivalences

More interesting are the interactions between the quantifiers \forall and \exists and the logical connectives \neg , \vee , and \wedge .

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Let I be some interpretation for $\neg\forall x\phi$. We have that:

$$\blacksquare I \models \neg\forall x\phi$$

$$\neg\forall x\phi(x) : \neg\forall x\phi$$

Interpretation:

$\phi'(x)$: return True if x is a ^{human} ~~human~~

$x \in M, M$ all bind $I: M, \phi(x) \models \neg\forall x\phi$
↑
is an interpretation

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Let I be some interpretation for $\neg\forall x\phi$. We have that:

- $I \models \neg\forall x\phi$ *for all x in I , at least one will be a false*
if and only if it is not the case that $I \models \forall x\phi$
if and only if it is not the case that for every value u in the domain of I , we have that $\phi(u)$ holds in I
if and only if there exists some value u in the domain of I such that $\neg\phi(u)$ holds in I
if and only if $I \models \exists x\neg\phi$.

($\phi(u)$ is shorthand for saying that x is to be interpreted as u .)

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More interesting are the interactions between the **quantifiers** \forall and \exists and the logical connectives \neg , \vee , and \wedge .

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if and only if $I \models \exists x\neg\phi$.

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So, for **every** first-order formula $\phi(x)$

$$\neg\forall x\phi \equiv \exists x\neg\phi.$$

Some common equivalences

Consider the formula $\neg\exists x\phi$, where $\phi(x)$ is a first-order formula with free variable x .

Let I be some interpretation for $\neg\exists x\phi$. We have that:

■ $I \models \neg\exists x\phi$

There does not exist an x from I

that will make $\phi(x)$ to be true.

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if and only if for every value u in the domain of I , we have that $\neg\phi(u)$ holds in I

if and only if $I \models \forall x\neg\phi$.

So, for every first-order formula $\phi(x)$:

$$\neg\exists x\phi \equiv \forall x\neg\phi$$

Some common equivalences

General rule: negations can be “pushed through” universal quantifiers if we change the universal quantifier to an existential quantifier.

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Example

Consider the formula $\neg \exists x \forall y (\neg E(x, y) \vee M(y, y, z, x))$. We have

$$\begin{aligned} & \neg \exists x \forall y (\neg E(x, y) \vee M(y, y, z, x)) \\ & \equiv \forall x \neg \forall y (\neg E(x, y) \vee M(y, y, z, x)) \\ & \equiv \forall x \exists y \neg (\neg E(x, y) \vee M(y, y, z, x)) \\ & \equiv \forall x \exists y (E(x, y) \wedge \neg M(y, y, z, x)) \end{aligned}$$

More complicated equivalences

Consider $\forall x\phi \wedge \exists y\psi$, where $\phi(x)$ and $\psi(y)$ are first-order formulae with free variables x and y , respectively.

By renaming bound variables (if necessary), we may assume that x does not appear in ψ and y does not appear in ϕ .

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Let I be some interpretation for $\forall x\phi \wedge \exists y\psi$.

We have that $I \models \forall x\phi \wedge \exists y\psi$ if and only if $I \models \forall x\phi$ and $I \models \exists y\psi$:

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- $I \models \forall x\phi$ if and only if no matter which value from the domain of I we give to the variable x , we have that $\phi(x)$ holds in I .
- $I \models \exists y\psi$ if and only if there exists some value from the domain of I for the variable y such that $\psi(y)$ holds in I .

More complicated equivalences continued

Thus, $I \models \forall x\phi \wedge \exists y\psi$ iff:

no matter which value we give to x , we have that $\phi(x)$ holds in I , and there exists some value for y such that $\psi(y)$ holds in I . •

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Consider $\forall x\exists y(\phi \wedge \psi)$.

More complicated equivalences continued

Thus, $I \models \forall x\phi \wedge \exists y\psi$ iff:

no matter which value we give to x , we have that $\phi(x)$ holds in I , and there exists some value for y such that $\psi(y)$ holds in I .

Consider $\forall x\exists y(\phi \wedge \psi)$.

Suppose that $I \models \forall x\exists y(\phi \wedge \psi)$.

Choose *any* u for x . There exists a v for y such that $\phi(u) \wedge \psi(v)$ holds.

So, $I \models \forall x\phi \wedge \exists y\psi$.

More complicated equivalences continued

Hence, $\forall x \phi \wedge \exists y \psi \equiv \forall x \exists y (\phi \wedge \psi)$.

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Hence, $\forall x\phi \wedge \exists y\psi \equiv \forall x\exists y(\phi \wedge \psi)$.

Indeed, by the same token, $I \models \forall x\phi \wedge \exists y\psi$ if and only if $I \models \exists y\forall x(\phi \wedge \psi)$.

More complicated equivalences continued

\forall : for all

\exists : there exist

not formula

uniform formula.

$$\forall x \exists y (\phi \wedge \psi) \quad \exists y \forall x (\phi \wedge \psi)$$

Hence, $\forall x \phi \wedge \exists y \psi \equiv \forall x \exists y (\phi \wedge \psi)$.

Indeed, by the same token, $I \models \forall x \phi \wedge \exists y \psi$ if and only if $I \models \exists y \forall x (\phi \wedge \psi)$.

General rule: quantifications can be “**pulled out**” from inside logical connectives and the order of the quantifiers doesn't matter, so long as the names of the quantified variables are not used elsewhere.

$$\forall x \exists y \neq \exists y \forall x$$

$$\forall x \exists y P(x, y) : y < x$$

$$\exists y \forall x P(x, y) : \text{X}$$

$$\underline{P(x, y) : x \text{ and } y}$$

Some more complicated equivalences

Example

If we assume that

- x does not appear in ψ and χ ,
- y does not appear in ϕ and χ ,
- z does not appear in ϕ and ψ ,

applying this general rule yields

$$\begin{aligned}(\forall x \phi \wedge \exists y \psi) \vee \forall z \chi &\equiv \forall x \exists y (\phi \wedge \psi) \vee \forall z \chi \\ &\equiv \forall x \exists y \forall z ((\phi \wedge \psi) \vee \chi)\end{aligned}$$

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Consider the formula $(\forall x\phi \vee \forall x\psi) \wedge \exists x\chi$.

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Consider the formula $(\forall x\phi \vee \forall x\psi) \wedge \exists x\chi$.

We can rename two of the bound occurrences of x to get

$$(\forall x\phi(x) \vee \forall y\psi(y)) \wedge \exists z\chi(z)$$

(assuming y and z do not appear in ψ and χ , respectively).

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(assuming y and z do not appear in ψ and χ , respectively).

Now we get the equivalent formulae

$$\begin{aligned} & (\forall x\phi(x) \vee \forall y\psi(y)) \wedge \exists z\chi(z) \\ & \equiv \forall x\forall y(\phi(x) \vee \psi(y)) \wedge \exists z\chi(z) \\ & \equiv \forall x\forall y\exists z(\phi(x) \vee \psi(y) \wedge \chi(z)) \end{aligned}$$

Be careful when applying general rules

Great care has to be taken when manipulating quantifiers:

- the **order** of quantification matters
- consider other occurrences of a quantified variable **outside the scope**.

Be careful when applying general rules

Example

Consider the first-order sentence $\forall x \exists y E(x, y)$.

Let I be the interpretation with domain $\{1, 2, 3, 4\}$ where $E = \{(1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 4), (4, 1)\}$.

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Consider the first-order sentence $\forall x \exists y E(x, y) \wedge \forall z \neg E(z, z)$.

Whilst $I \models \forall x \exists y E(x, y) \wedge \forall z \neg E(z, z)$

$I \models \forall z \forall x \exists y (E(x, y) \wedge \neg E(z, z))$

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$I \models \forall x \forall z \exists y (E(x, y) \wedge \neg E(z, z))$

it is not the case that $I \models \forall z \exists y \forall x (E(x, y) \wedge \neg E(z, z))$.

More on bound occurrences

Consider the first-order formula $\forall x \exists y E(x, y) \wedge \exists x U(x)$.

It does not make sense to pull the quantifiers out, as we would get $\forall x \exists y \exists x (E(x, y) \wedge U(x))$.

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Actually, semantically this second sentence is logically equivalent to

$$\exists y \exists x (E(x, y) \wedge U(x))$$

(as the existentially quantified x “**overwrites**” the universally quantified x) which is certainly not equivalent to the sentence we started with. To see this, consider the interpretation where the domain is $\{1, 2\}$, $E = \{(1, 2)\}$ and $U = \{1\}$.

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We need to ensure that the two original bound occurrences of x have “**nothing to do with each other**”. In order to ensure this, we rename one of them:

$$\begin{aligned}\forall x \exists y E(x, y) \wedge \exists x U(x) &\equiv \forall x \exists y E(x, y) \wedge \exists z U(z) \\ &\equiv \forall x \exists y \exists z (E(x, y) \wedge U(z))\end{aligned}$$