



UNIVERSITY  
OF SOUTHERN  
QUEENSLAND

# Incorporating Security into Healthcare Applications of WSNs

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A dissertation is submitted by  
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## **Abstract**

The potential of applying electronic health record (EHR), electronic medical record (EMR) and healthcare wireless sensor network (HWSN) in the healthcare (HC) industry are tremendous and boundless. However, the security and privacy issues of HC data must be addressed with great caution and accessibility. The EHR system security and privacy are related to the issues of confidentiality of protected health information (PHI), the integrity of EMRs data and authentication/authorisation of users. Last but not least, EHR data are collecting, communicating among different users' access, along with the sharing of the patients' health data.

Towards a solution, we have in our study designed a secure and efficient HC application that integrates the WSN technology with EHR/EMR technology. First of all, a general architecture of HC application system was proposed. The novelties of our approach include the introduction of the WSNs application to automatically collect patients' physiologist information/data and securely store them as EHM/EMR records in the repository, which make the EMR/EHRs system more efficient. Secondly, a number of efficient security technologies including authentication and users' authorisation, and security protocols such as ECC, XACML, have been adopted, modified or designed in our proposed HC application, where the security of HC application has been significantly improved, consequently the patients' privacy has been addressed as well.

Throughout this study, we have deepened our understanding of the security requirements in HC application and the important role played by the latest wireless networking and sensing technology in achieving the security objectives in the modern HC industry. What has come out from this study include a framework of building secure and efficient HC applications; accompanied by a set of protocols which enable the auto-collection and secure transmission of patients' health and medical information. In addition to that, we also come out with two scheme: Authentication scheme for protecting users' identities and privacy and the Authorisation Scheme for user's differentiated Access Control or privileges to the patients' health and/or medical records. Those schemes have been theoretically verified with satisfactory.

### **Certification of Thesis**

This thesis is entirely the work of Mishall Al-Zubaidie except where otherwise acknowledged. The work is original and has not previously been submitted for any other award, except where acknowledged.

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## **Dedication**

I would like to dedicate this thesis:

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Hammed Al-Zubaidie who by, planted in my heart the love of knowledge. That shining light that taught me the meaning of sacrifice and fulfillment.

To my dear mother ...

Eeda Mutar, Paradise in this world and the Hereafter, my love and all my being, the symbol of purity and chastity, the beacon of peace and tenderness, the truth of eternal fulfillment, the inexhaustible river of tenderness.

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# List of abbreviations

|                            |  |
|----------------------------|--|
| $\oplus$                   | Exclusive or operation                                 |
| $\parallel$                | Concatenation operation                                |
| $A$                        | Aggregation function                                   |
| $AS$                       | Attributes server entity                               |
| $ASK_{pu_i}, ASK_{pr_i}$   | $AS$ public and private keys                           |
| $ASS_j/ASSig_j$            | Signature generated by $AS$ and j is signature number  |
| $C_i$                      | Client entity  |
| $C_iK_{pu_i}, C_iK_{pr_i}$ | $C_i$ public and private keys                          |
| $C_iS_j/C_iSig_j$          | Signature generated by $C_i$ and j is signature number |
| $CH$                       | Cluster head   |
| $CM$                       | Check MAC address                                      |
| $CN_i$                     | Client's number  |
| $CS$                       | Central server entity                                  |
| $CSK_{pu_i}, CSK_{pr_i}$   | $CS$ public and private keys                           |
| $CSS_j/CSSig_j$            | Signature generated by $CS$ and j is signature number  |
| $Dec_i$                    | Decryption operation                                   |
| $Dif$                      | Value proves $SN_i$ in the HWSN's area                 |
| $DS$                       | Data server entity                                     |
| $DSS_j$                    | Signature generated by $DS$ and j is signature number  |
| $EI$                       | External intruder                                      |

---

|                           |  |
|---------------------------|--|
| $Enc_i$                   | Encryption operation                                 |
| $GM$                      | Get MAC address                                      |
| $h(.)$                    | One-way hash function                                |
| $I$                       | Internal, or external intruder                       |
| $II$                      | Internal intruder                                    |
| $K_{pu_i}, K_{pr_i}$      | Public and private keys                              |
| $LS$                      | Local server   |
| $m$                       | Message sent by entity                               |
| $MID_i$                   | Medical centre identity                              |
| $MS$                      | Master secret/Master signature                       |
| $N, SN$                   | Random nonces and random secret nonce                |
| $N_{C_i}, N_{CS}, N_{AS}$ | Nonce random generated by $C_i, CS, AS$              |
| $OP, SP$                  | Object 's pseudonym, subject's pseudonym             |
| $OTP_i$                   | One time password to authenticate first time         |
| $P$                       | Entity parameters                                    |
| $Parity$                  | The value specifies the signature of even/odd        |
| $Pseud$                   | Pseudonym generated by entities ( $SN, CH, LS, CS$ ) |
| $PW_i, tmpPW_i$           | $C_i$ 's password, temporary password                |
| $R_i$                     | Role of patient, patient relative or provider        |
| $RN$                      | The random number generated by entities              |
| $RN_{op}, UN_{op}$        | Role's number, user's number for $OP$                |
| $RN_{sp}, UN_{sp}$        | Role's number, user's number for $SP$                |
| $RR_i$                    | Revocation reason                                    |
| $S_{ID}, O_{ID}$          | Subject ID, object ID                                |
| $S_N C_H D$               | Distance between $SN$ and $CH$                       |

|                                |   |
|--------------------------------|---|
| $S_N L_S D$                    | Distance between $SN$ and $LS$  |
| $S_R, O_R$                     | Subject role, object role   |
| $S_{sp}, S_{op}$               | Signature of $SP$ , Signature of $OP$   |
| $SigLS, SigCS$                 | Signatures generated by $LS, CS$  |
| $SigSN, SigCH$                 | Signatures generated by $SN, CH$  |
| $SigSnEi, SigLsEi$             | Random ephemeral value the same length as the signature generated by $SN, LS$ |
| $SL$                           | Sensor location   |
| $SN$                           | Sensor  |
| $SS$                           | One secret sharing  |
| $tm$                           | Temporary   |
| $TS$                           | Timestamp generated by entities   |
| $TS_{AS}$                      | Timestamp generated by $AS$   |
| $TS_{C_i}$                     | Timestamp generated by $C_i$  |
| $TS_{CS}$                      | Timestamp generated by $CS$   |
| $U$                            | User  |
| $UID_i$                        | $C_i$ 's identity   |
| $UN_i$                         | User's number   |
| $UP_{CS}^{AS}, MP_{CS}^{AS}$   | U and MC pseudonyms sent by $CS$ and verified by $AS$                         |
| $UP_{CS}^{C_i}, MP_{CS}^{C_i}$ | U and MC pseudonyms sent by $CS$ and verified by $C_i$                        |
| $UP_{AS}^{CS}, MP_{AS}^{CS}$   | U and MC pseudonyms sent by $AS$ and verified by $CS$                         |
| $UP_{C_i}^{CS}, MP_{C_i}^{CS}$ | U and MC pseudonyms sent by $C_i$ and verified by $CS$                        |
| $UR_i$                         | User's role (patient, patient relative or provider)                           |
| dy                             | Dolev-Yao model   |
| ABAC                           | Attribute-based access control  |
| DoS                            | Denial of service   |

|        |  |
|--------|--|
| ECC    | Elliptic curve cryptography  |
| ECDSA  | Elliptic curve digital signature algorithm                         |
| ECIES  | Elliptic curve integrated encryption scheme                        |
| EHR    | Electronic health record   |
| EMR    | Electronic medical record  |
| HC     | Healthcare   |
| HWSN   | Healthcare wireless sensor network                                 |
| MC     | Medical centre   |
| MITM   | Man in the middle  |
| PAX    | Pseudonymization and anonymization with the XACML                  |
| PHI    | Protected health information                                       |
| RAMHU  | Robust authentication model for healthcare users                   |
| RBAC   | Role-based access control  |
| REISCH | Reliable and efficient integrity scheme of data collection in HWSN |
| XACML  | Extensible access control markup language                          |
| XML    | Extensible markup language   |

# List of Publications

These publications based on thesis.

- Al-Zubaidie, M., Zhang, Z. & Zhang, J. 2019, 'Effcient and secure edsa algorithm and its applications: A survey', *International Journal of Communication Networks and Information Security*, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 7-35, 2019.
- Al-Zubaidie, M., Zhang, Z. & Zhang, J. 2019, RAMHU: A new robust lightweight scheme for mutual users authentication in healthcare applications', *Security and Communication Networks*, doi:10.1155/2019/3263902, vol. 2019, pp. 1-26, 2019.
- Al-Zubaidie, M., Zhang, Z. & Zhang, J. 2019, 'PAX: Using pseudonymization and anonymization to protect patients' identities and data in the healthcare system', *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health*, doi:10.3390/ijerph16091490, vol. 16, no. 9, pp. 1-36, 2019.
- Al-Zubaidie, M., Zhang, Z. & Zhang, J. 2019, 'REISCH: Incorporating Lightweight and Reliable Algorithms into Healthcare Applications of WSNs', submitted to the *Journal of " "*, 2019.

# Chapter 1: Introduction

There are many advanced developments and research projects going on into the novel technology for healthcare (HC) and the innovative applications of the latest wireless sensing networking technology in past decades. In this thesis, we describe our research project which will integrate the wireless sensor network (WSN) technology with HC systems of the electronic health record (EHR). In particular, this chapter will introduce the significance of the proposed research, and the specific research questions and objectives.

## 1.1 Overview of HC in Some Developed Countries

The health sector in the past has suffered from several problems, such as management, access, complexity, storage and protection of medical records (Meri et al. 2019). These problems are reflected negatively on the provision of quality care. Many governments, such as Australia, UK, USA and Canada, are concerned with the health sector to provide citizens with adequate healthcare and to alleviate the suffering of patients. For decades, researchers have continued to develop the health sector through the development of healthcare applications that operate on electronic systems, such as electronic health record (EHR) and electronic medical record (EMR) to provide stakeholders with accurate data in quick time from anywhere. These systems are a huge development in the health sector and health services. This accurate data helps providers review data, diagnose diseases and prescribe medications to patients. For example, the European Union is actively pursuing research and development in the health sector that has contributed to disease prevention and healthy living (García-Holgado et al. 2019). Given the importance of the health sector, the European Union supports this sector with large amounts of up to €449.4 million for the development of the Third Health Program. Therefore, in recent years, health sector institutions have relied on several technologies, such as extensible markup language (XML)/ extensible access control markup language (XACML) to facilitate the handling and management of patient data and information. These technologies allow users in the health sector to share medical records. However, this sharing requires strict precautions and security measures to prevent data from being destroyed

or modified by intruders.

## 1.2 Information and Communications Technology

The integration of Information and communications technology (ICT) with HC is immeasurably important to increase the effectiveness of healthcare applications and to improve people's perception and hopefully the willingness of accepting the service. ICT is a revolutionary development in the health sector to provide the quality medical services for patients. ICT contributes to the HC of communities in terms of productivity, reduce costs and facilitate information sharing ([Haftu 2019](#)). An analytical study on the use of ICT with the health sector indicated that technology is having a positive impact on healthcare development. This study covered 184 countries, such as Australia, Canada and Germany. Therefore, ICT is considered a technological breakthrough in dealing with medical records by digital devices, such as a computer, phone, wireless sensor network (WSN) ([Carvalho et al. 2019](#)). This technology provided services to patients and healthcare providers, such as allowing patients access to medical reports, results of operations or even obtaining a medical history from a remote server. This technology has contributed to the improvement of the quality of service but still requires sophisticated techniques to address security and privacy issues in support of quality of service.

## 1.3 Security Concerns in HC Services

Security and privacy are two critical aspects either in the development of HC services or in the delivery of HC applications. Security concept indicates to user authentication in the network before access network services ([Hamidi 2019](#)). For instance, a provider, such as a doctor has to authenticate before access patients' data. Privacy concept indicates to access level to network data and services. This level depends on polices and decision engines. Privacy divides users to roles or privileges to specify access to legitimate users to specific data. For instance, a provider, such as an emergency doctor can access specific patient's data, but he/she cannot access patient's information. Security is more comprehensive than privacy since security can be privacy and the opposite is not true. Those concepts are significantly critical in the health sector. Consequently, the health sector needs to apply security and privacy in three respects to ensure the protection of patient secrecy.

- Authentication: Using techniques, such as username and password to allow users communicating network.

- Authorisation: Using techniques such as XACML and access models to allow users to access a specific level in the servers' repository.
- Datasets storage: Using techniques such as hash functions and camouflage to hide users' information on servers.

To ensure that the aforementioned three aspects achieve in healthcare projects correctly, it should support them with encryption and signature mechanisms.

### 1.3.1 Encryption for Preserving Users' Privacy

Encryption has been used to preserve patient records secrecy and users' identities. For example, encryption protects information, such as usernames and passwords within the authentication request when moving from the user's device to the server. Encryption algorithms are divided into symmetric encryption, such as advanced encryption standard (AES) and data encryption standard (DES), and asymmetric encryption, such as elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) and Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA). In symmetric encryption algorithms, all network members use the same secret key, while asymmetric encryption each network member has a unique secret key (Dwivedi et al. 2019). Security in healthcare projects is not depending only on encryption itself, but also on factors that ensure that the encryption algorithm is effective in protecting patients' secrecy, such as key length, security level, randomness, support for privacy mechanisms and recommendations of prestigious encryption institutions.

### 1.3.2 Signature for Users' Authenticity

Signature is the process of data/information mathematically within an authorisation/authentication request in a way that allows the legitimate user to obtain complete, accurate and change-free data/information. For instance, WSN collects and signs patients' data by elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) to prevent data from being changed as it travels from sensors to the server. Several ways are to perform digital data signature operations. For example, public key algorithms, such as ECDSA, RSA and Elgamal can be used. It is also possible to use hash functions, such as secure hash algorithm (SHA1), PHOTON, BLAKE and QUARK to perform signature processes (Heigl et al. 2019). Public key algorithms are more secure than hash functions, but the latter is the best performing for some algorithms. As we mentioned earlier, security is the primary and first condition for accepting healthcare systems.

## 1.4 Significance of the Project

The healthcare application has offered great benefits to the society through providing care for patients and improving their health. However, collecting of modified or inaccurate data (because of the attacks) and storing them on the server as well as access the unauthorised server's database cause significant harm to patients' health. Also, data exchange between different devices in the network requires data security management to deal with medical records in a flexible and accurate manner. The lack of protection of patients' information adversely affects the treatment of patients, which leads to harm, reduced dignity, stigma, discrimination, embarrassment or even death.

Many research studies have shown that patients and professionals in hospitals or clinics have been interested in issues of information security (personal and health information) and protect the rights of patients from tampering. As far as we can see, however, the concerns with the security of patient's data/information have never been addressed effectively. The research described in this thesis has addressed the security and privacy significance as the following to provide a safe environment for the transfer and storage of medical records for patients.

- Identify legitimate users (security) in network access.
- Determining of the access authorised users (privacy) to the patients' database stored on servers as well as data management securely.
- Protecting of the patients' data collected continuously by WSN to prevent data modification.

## 1.5 Research Objectives, Questions and Our Contributions

In this Section, we will list the objectives and problems for our research.

### 1.5.1 Research Objectives

The following objectives are laid out to achieve in our project research.

- **Ensure communication of legitimate users using EHR and signen-cryption**

Preventing illegal users from connecting to the network and sending fake requests to the EHR server is a prerequisite for accepting healthcare systems.

EHR requests include confidential information, such as username and password. The disclosure of this possible confidential information leads to data change or even destruction of the network. Therefore, efficient signencryp-tion technique is required to protect users' information. In this objective, we focus on encrypting information only because encrypting the entire data will be expensive for users' devices and especially servers.

- **Beef up healthcare privacy and security using XACML and signature**

When all patient information is stored on a server, that server becomes attractive to attackers. Therefore, the use of security mechanisms to determine access to the server is an immensely important issue. All protected health information (PHI) stored in the EHR repository should be been anonymous and XACML with signature technology would be applied to achieve maximum security. We have used signatures to prevent changing data and XACML to apply policies in making decisions and accept legitimate requests.

- **Automate healthcare data collection using EMR, WSN and XML**

Manually collecting healthcare data is expensive and error-prone. Using WSN to automatically collect and convert to electronic records can significantly improve quality and reduce the cost of the healthcare. In many environments where healthcare professionals, such as nurses and doctors are in practical to monitor patients. WSN can be deployed to continuously monitor a patient's condition and gather data all the time. Patients' data transmitted between sensors (nodes and cluster head) and network devices (such as a nurse and a server device) need data management algorithms to maintain both performance and security at the same time. EMR including patient's confidential data and private information needs to be accessed by healthcare professionals, thus sharing such EMR without breaching a patient's privacy requires EMR management in an efficient and secure manner. XML technology has begun showing its superiority in the exchanging of complex data over different systems.

### 1.5.2 Specific Research Questions

In this Section, we will describe some problems that might threaten the privacy and security of information in the proposed healthcare system. That is, we intend to investigate the following research problems to complete our study.

1. *How to authenticate users (providers and patients) when communicating EHR services?*

2. *How to authorise healthcare professionals when accessing the healthcare information and data from the EHR repository?*
3. *How to update the EHR information stored in the repository while maintaining privacy?*
4. *How WSNs can help collect a patient's healthcare data within an EMR system efficiently?*
5. *How to transfer healthcare data for WSN to the EMR repository securely?*

### 1.5.3 Our Contributions

In this Section, we will clarify our contributions in this thesis as follows:

1. We will develop a new way (Robust Authentication Model for Healthcare Users (RAMHU)) to authenticate users by sign encryption when communicating with EHR network. We will depend on lightweight algorithms in supporting authentication requests and responses. We will use ECC to encrypt and PHOTON to sign as well as secrecy parameters to protect users' information in preventing attacks.
2. We will develop a new way (Pseudonymization and Anonymization with the XACML (PAX)) of access users for patients' database in EHR server. First, we will merge ECDSA with anonymity in a single node. This means that our contribution is dependent on the signature parameters and not on the signing of the other nodes. This scheme will provide a great security against the compromised nodes. Second, we will develop an application based on XACML, ECDSA, pseudonym and anonymity to determine the access of users (professionals and patients) to medical records in the EHR's repository.
3. We will design a new way (Reliable and Efficient Integrity Scheme of Data Collection in HWSN (REISCH)) of collecting patients' data based on hash function and signature algorithms to prevent attacks, such as collision and preimage attacks. We will develop a new communication scheme based on ECDSA-BLAKE2bp, homomorphic properties, camouflage signature and using of XML technology to manage signed patients' data.

## 1.6 Organisation of This Thesis

This thesis is divided into eight chapters that includes introduction, literature review, cryptography techniques, authentication scheme, authorisation scheme, storage scheme, discussion and results, and conclusion and future research. All these

chapters are interlinked to build a robust HC application project against security and privacy threats. The chapters structure are as follows:

- Chapter 1: This chapter provides an introduction to the significance, questions and objectives our project in protecting the security and privacy of HC's users.
- Chapter 2: This chapter introduces a review of the literature in security and privacy schemes in healthcare applications. It describes security problems and weaknesses in authentication, authorisation and data storage schemes in existing projects.
- Chapter 3: This chapter presents details about cryptography techniques that used in our project, such as elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) and elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA). In addition, it provides a general methodology for our whole project.
- Chapter 4: This chapter focuses on our contributions and methodology to build authentication scheme in HC application. This chapter was published as a journal paper.
- Chapter 5: This chapter focuses on our contributions and methodology to build authorisation scheme in HC application. This chapter was published as a journal paper.
- Chapter 6: This chapter focuses on our contributions and methodology to build data collection scheme in HC application. This chapter was submitted as a journal paper.
- Chapter 7: This chapter discusses the theoretical and experimental analyses for our projects' schemes. It describes the results to implement our protocols in each scheme and proves its feasibility in securing medical records.
- Chapter 8: This chapter summarizes conclusions and future research for our project.

## 1.7 Summary of the Chapter

In this chapter, we briefly described the importance of security and privacy in HC applications. A set of questions asked to reveal the problems of access to medical records (information and data). Also, we have identified project objectives to solve security and privacy issues in authentication, authorisation and data collection. Finally, the structure of the dissertation is to clarify the interconnect of the thesis chapters in the construction of an integrated and solid HC project.

# Chapter 2: Literature review

ICT and E-technology have been used in Medical and Healthcare systems for decades. Particularly, Wireless and sensing technology have been adopted by medical staff and healthcare professionals. However, Among many ethic problem, there are security concerns with the medical systems, such as the patients privacy and chronic diseases history record in medical and healthcare systems. The ICT and E-technology would make easier to breach the security of such systems, rather than hard if the security of these systems have not been well addressed. Toward to this end, we in this chapter, will go through a survey of the challenges, opportunities and technologies with an emphases on two important aspects of security: authentication and authorization. This chapter introduces the following themes:

- History of HC application and integrating WSN into HC application.
- Security and privacy issues on HC application.
- Security protocols of HC application.
- Investigating drawbacks in existing schemes.

## 2.1 Healthcare Standards

The research into the technology and systems for medical and Healthcare are ethically relevant to human life , there must be some health and ethnic standards in every countries. Many standards for healthcare applications, such as Health Level Seven (HL7), Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) ([Rezaeibagha et al. 2015](#)) and Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Action (PIPEDA) have been developed in many countries like Australia, UK, USA, Canada and Germany. These standards have an important role to play creating a healthcare application. For instance, many countries have reprioritized the healthcare industry after the defense and military in terms of budget and strategy ([Consultants to Government and Industries 2015](#)); it is becoming increasingly evident that advanced ICT holds the key to particularly the success of providing

better healthcare quality at lower cost.

HC or e-health includes many systems, such as EHR, EMR and personal health record (PHR). These systems are used efficiently to share medical records either globally (EHR) or locally (EMR) and are administered either by the authority provider (EHR and EMR) or by the patient (PHR) (Heart et al. 2017). Healthcare services have become so diversified and demanding. These services have to be used in order to deliver efficient but affordable services to the broader healthcare users and communities (Asan 2017). Among these, WSNs promise to significantly enhance the care quality over a wide range of clients populations. Whilst e-health systems provide services that allow providers and patients to share medical records across various health centers, such as hospitals, clinics, and even the home. These services provide facilities to improve the health of patients. Because of efficient methods of electronically sharing patient data rather than traditional paper-based methods, patient health data is available anywhere and anytime for healthcare providers and patients. Health institutions and researchers are seeking to develop these applications to improve the quality of care, disease diagnosis, and remote medical surveillance (Khatoun & Zeadally 2017).

In comparing with the traditional healthcare service, a growing number of people begun gradually to accept the e-health service. However, the main problem that threatens the acceptance of these systems for patients and providers is the security and privacy of patients' information and data. This issue should be addressed whether in authentication, authorisation or collecting data process. In the following subsections, we will explain the concepts of EMR, EHR, advantages and disadvantages of the electronic record and integrating of EMR and EHR.

### 2.1.1 Electronic Medical Record

An electronic medical record (EMR) is important compared to a paper medical record for many different features. A medical record is a communication tool used to know and review patients' health status among members of the medical staff and patients. This tool is divided into two categories paper and electronic record (Harman et al. 2012). The paper record is a traditional that was used in the past to check and record patients' information. This type of medical record methods suffered from many problems in dealing with patients' data. These problems are such as accessibility, availability, update, delay, review, errors, data transfer, lack of coordination of care equality services at different levels, management of health information and data, integration of scientific evidence into HC services and

decision-making practices (Beglaryan et al. 2017) and security issues. The second type is the electronic medical record; it processes and transmits data rapidly across digital devices. It is designed to provide HC services continuously and accurately. It has attracted the attention of both the HC industry and researchers because it provides efficiency and effectiveness advantages.

EMR is efficient by providing many features and supporting the use of WSN. EMR normally is a one-organisation system. It provides quality of care and facilitates monitoring, evaluates health conditions, provides reliability, data quality, minimizes human errors, facilitates access to information, reduces the cost of information and communication technology (Najaftorkaman et al. 2015, Muthee et al. 2018). EMR is rich with patients' data and provides timely collection and retrieval of data (Muthee et al. 2018, Osmani et al. 2018). Currently, most of Australian professionals use EMR, also rates similar in several countries, such as Germany, New Zealand and Netherlands (Heart et al. 2017). EMR stores patient health data within a single institution and uses WSN to store patients' data in local repository for use in reports, disease diagnosis, and treatment. But, EMR contains a patient's medical history partially (Heart et al. 2017). For example, doctors may use an EMR to identify a patient's prescription and avoid errors or the nurse uses EMR to monitor tests and reports for a patient. But if the doctor needs complete data about a patient's medical history, he/she needs to send a request to the central server.

### 2.1.2 Electronic Health Record

An electronic health record (EHR) is an efficient system to support large health enterprises by sharing data and providing HC services. Opposed to EMR, EHR is defined as an inter-organisational system. It includes complete medical history data for each patient that can be provided to professionals. Moreover, it shares patient data among health centres across providers (Heart et al. 2017). EHR has become widely deployed in healthcare applications (hospitals and medical clinics) (Alkureishi et al. 2018) due to its services to providers and patients. Of these services provided by EHR are, such as errors reduction, increased efficiency, improved care, a rich source of data for researchers, health details including diseases and treatment diagnosis, (Chiu & Hripcak 2017, Levine et al. 2018), laboratory tests, clinical prescriptions and observations (Shickel et al. 2018).

The acceptance of the EHR system in health institutions has become increasingly important in recent decades. Although EHR was used as a tool for archiving patient data, it has recently become a basic communication tool for patient care and service

Table 2.1: Comparison between EMR and EHR

| No | Aspect                   | EMR                  | EHR                                       |
|----|--------------------------|----------------------|---|
| 1  | Database                 | One                  | Many                                      |
| 2  | Cost                     | Less                 | More                                      |
| 3  | Patients' history        | Partial              | Complete                                  |
| 4  | Access data              | Anytime              | Anytime and anywhere                      |
| 5  | Communication technology | Wireless             | Wireless and Internet                     |
| 6  | Support                  | Hospitals or clinics | Community, State or national organisation |
| 7  | Sharing data             | One organisation     | Inter-organisation                        |

provision ([Asan 2017](#), [Shickel et al. 2018](#), [Czaja et al. 2018](#)). According to the latest report from the Office of the National Coordinator (ONC) for health information technology, approximately 84% of hospitals have adopted the EHR primal system. The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) in the USA has provided \$30 billion as hospital incentives to adopt EHR ([Shickel et al. 2018](#)). The provision of these services in HC applications is positively reflected on the individual and organisational level ([Beglaryan et al. 2017](#)). For example, physician researchers may use EHR to determine a patient's history for using this study in developing a treatment. EHR stores medical records for patients in a digital central database and it manages these records among medical centres. EHR provides patients risk assessment depending on the medical reports. In addition, it provides the participation of patient information across the Internet. This information sharing between medical institutions makes it easier for doctors to diagnose and treat patients at any medical centre ([Chen et al. 2012](#)). However, EHR also suffers from the problem of security weak during the transfer of data over the Internet or access to data in the server database. Therefore, security mechanisms are considered the cornerstone of the work of EHR systems. Table 2.1 presents a comparison between EHR and EMR.

### 2.1.3 Cons and Pros of Electronic Medical/Health Record

There are a number of projects of developing healthcare systems which utilized the EHR and/or EMR technology ([Asan 2017](#), [Alkureishi et al. 2018](#), [Beglaryan et al. 2017](#)). The prototype systems as the outcome from these studies have suffered some drawbacks as follows:

1. Increase the burden on professionals, a negative impact on the communication between the patient and the professional side, the patient and the health centre of the other.
2. The attend of a small number of doctors for a large number of patients in a particular medical institution ([Asan 2017](#)).
3. Lack of transparency in patient information usage ([Alkureishi et al. 2018](#)).

4. On an individual level: impact on functionality, external control limits, resistance to change.
5. On an organisational level: lack of legal framework, structural, financial, technical and lack of confidence in electronic communication (Beglaryan et al. 2017).
6. The problem of security and privacy in accessing patients' data and information.

Ironically, recent studies (Asan 2017, Beglaryan et al. 2017, Gold et al. 2017, Alkureishi et al. 2018, Senteio et al. 2018) have also provided us with the following advantages:

1. Ease of reviewing the patient to his/her information and data.
2. Many users are reviewing the medical record at the same time.
3. Auto-update and search speed in information retrieval.
4. Improved patient understanding of care services.
5. Facilitate patient participation and cooperation in decision-making.
6. Reduce errors in documents.
7. Reduce the embarrassment of the patient with a professional.
8. Transparency of cooperation and improve the interaction between the patient and the providers.
9. The use and quality of health information, quality of care, efficiency and cost of care.
10. Facilitate data collection, not information (real users' attributes), retrieval and use of patients' data.

#### 2.1.4 Integration of EMR and EHR

It has no doubt that the integration of EMR and EHR together will provides a lot of benefits to healthcare providers and patients. Of these benefits provided by integration of electronic systems are, such as providing an overview of the concept of patient care, giving the opportunity to study a patient's disease in several health centres (Osmani et al. 2018), providing better understanding of chronic diseases, and the abundance of data in a central repository is an important source for researchers




Figure 2.1: Integration EMRs with EHR repository

to develop and analyse treatments. One of the largest HC information technology suppliers, such as Actien-Gesellschaft für Anilin Fabrikationen (AGFA) which has enhanced the concept of integrating healthcare systems, such as EMR and EHR. This institution said that this integration generates the best medical decisions and improve the quality of patient care at the individual level and public health in general (Heart et al. 2017). Figure 2.1 shows integrate EMRs local repositories with a central repository in EHR on the central server.

## 2.2 Technologies of Acquiring EHR/EMR in HC Applications

Wireless sensor network (WSN) is one of the most promising technologies in recent time, which have been used in many areas (Al Ameen et al. 2012, El Barachi & Alfandi 2013, El-Semary & Abdel-Azim 2013). The WSN technology is still at the very early stage of being adopted by Medical and healthcare industrials. To our best of knowledge, there are just a few research projects, which are still going on to try to automate the process of acquiring patient's medical records in hospitals or elderly healthcare records in the nursing homes.

### 2.2.1 Main Applications of HWSN

One such systems are known as healthcare wireless sensor networks (HWSN) (Ayyildiz et al. 2019). The architecture of HWSN is shown in Figure 2.2. The HWSN has been primarily used for the following purposes:

- **HC data collection**

In the first aspect, sensors collect data about the patient continuously and send




Figure 2.2: Architecture of healthcare based WSN (Zhang et al. 2014)

it to the server (EMR repository). The data collected properly helps doctors diagnose diseases accurately. Also, patients' data collection needs protection from intrusion.

- **HC data structure**

The second aspect is the data storage in the form of datasets of a server's database. The data structure for EMR/EHR repository should be able to facilitate the sharing of a patients' health information among the HC professionals.

- **HC data access and privacy**

The third aspect is to determine who has the right of users (doctor, nurse, general practitioner, pharmacist and government officer) in the access to these datasets in the data server. All these stages require security and privacy mechanisms to protect the EMR and EHR.

## 2.2.2 Security and Privacy in HWSN

In this Section, we will discuss the risks and security weakness of HWSN. Many attacks and threats of the HWSN's security-relevant with collecting patients' data and the privacy of the EMR repository. These attacks have been classified into passive and active attacks (Aceto et al. 2018, Gao et al. 2018). In all types of passive attacks, an adversary eavesdrops the transmitted packets between network nodes and server. Also, the attacker analyses these packets to reveal information without change (i.e. trying to break the confidentiality), such as eavesdropping




Figure 2.3: An attack on information security (intruder 1) and device security (intruder 2)

and traffic analysis attacks (Al Ameen & Kwak 2011). The active attack is vastly harmful to the networks of healthcare applications. An attacker tampers with data packets and sends them back to their destination, such as masquerading, reply, modification and denial of service (DoS) attacks (Li, Zhang, Kumari, Choo & Hogrefe 2018). Also, there is another classification of attacks on healthcare applications is internal and external attacks. In the internal attacks, the attacker is a member of the network. This type of attacks is more dangerous than external attacks. Because of the internal attacker has the authority to send and receive messages/requests, which means an attack from the inside is easier. Figure 2.3 describes the attacks on the WSNs which are used to infiltrate data collected/stored.

Potential attacks on data transferred or stored in an EMR repository by WSN are a serious risk to HC systems. As we can see in Figure 2.3, an intruder 1 can listen to information as it is transferred from the patients' sensors to the server (local server or base station). When the attacker gets the message, he/she can get information about the physical location of the patient, identifier (ID), timestamps, source address, target address and the medical report sent by the sensors or directed by medical staff. The patients' data transmitted through the sensor networks requires complete security and privacy. Especially if patient information through the network does not require the consent of the patient, such as moving data through an emergency case. In addition, an intruder 2 can perform an attack on the local/remote server to penetrate the database to get the patients' information. Also, an attacker can get information from the database, such as the

patient's name, age, address, type of disease, and the seriousness of the disease. This information allows the attacker to harm the patient in different ways, such as changing or destroying data (Kumar & Lee 2011, Pawar et al. 2018). Therefore, privacy and security issues are remarkably important in healthcare applications. If these applications do not provide adequate security for the patient's information, these applications become useless and unusable because the disclosure of patients' information that may affect their health or even death.

## 2.3 Security of HC Applications

Data/information security and privacy is a key issue for any e-application specifically for HC applications. These applications require security and privacy mechanisms, such as authorisation policies, encryption algorithms, and robust signatures. The task of these mechanisms is essential to protect medical repositories in EMR and EHR for patients from malicious attacks. According to the Vormetric report on data security 2016, healthcare is one of the sectors that is most vulnerable to hackers' attacks and thus requires increased efforts to secure health data by 64%. This report stated on 21 January 2016 that 91% of enterprises suffer from vulnerability threatening data security (internal and external attacks). The study of data security included several countries, such as Australia, USA and Germany (Garrett 2016). Therefore, many systems such as national e-health transition authority (NEHTA) in Australia and HIPAA in the USA recommended applying security and privacy in HC applications correctly and accurately to prevent security threats (Gajanayake et al. 2014).

In the following subsections, we will describe HC applications in terms of security issues, possible attacks, security requirements and security protocols.

### 2.3.1 Specific Security Concerns of HC Services

Security concerns with HC applications include two aspects: Security and privacy while acquiring EHR/EMR by using WSNs; and the confidentiality of patient EHR/EMR, authenticity and/or authorisation of health professionals. These issues are extremely critical to the acceptance and success of HC applications in the health sector. These issues are represented by the transfer of information and data among network entities (sensors, users' devices and EMR/EHR servers), the storage of databases on the server and the performance of computation processes in resource-constrained devices.

### **2.3.1.1 Communication Security**

To protect data and information between source and destination, security mechanisms, such as encryption and signature should be applied to prevent the attacker from accessing the transferred records between network entities. These mechanisms resist any attacks, such as disclosure, alteration, replication and impersonation of medical records transmitted. The communication channel (wireless and Internet) should be protected end-to-end both at the wireless level and the Internet through the integration of a set of security mechanisms and privacy (Manogaran et al. 2018, Bruland et al. 2018).

### **2.3.1.2 Datasets Security**

Data and information stored on the server repository become the target of malicious attacks. In particular, if a HC application is based on a single server, the process of hacking this server results in both data and information being detected (Chuang & Chen 2014). In addition, access to databases without pseudonym and anonymity mechanisms makes it easy for attackers to detect users' real identities. Therefore, HC application should include separate servers with different tasks. To protect users' medical records, each server has separate duties for users' information and data as well as the implementation of pseudonym and anonymity mechanisms to access patient data. For instance, one server contains only users' identities and another one contains only users' data. Furthermore, the database should be available to legitimate users at anytime and anywhere as well as support authorisation policies for access to the repository (Griggs et al. 2018). Authorisation policies determine the level of access granted to legitimate users.

### **2.3.1.3 WSN Security**

WSN requires efficient security algorithms to work efficiently. EMR systems use WSN to collect patients' data. However, WSN is source-constrained devices, such as energy, computing and memory. Therefore, when using encryption and signature mechanisms, security and performance should be efficient. The efficiency of these algorithms is a major challenge in HC applications. It means that the sensor nodes continue to collect patients' data accurately and for a long time while protecting the data collected from the penetration (Al-Turjman & Alturjman 2018, Verma et al. 2018).

### 2.3.2 Possible Attacks on HC Applications

In this section, we present real examples of authentication and authorisation threats on the HC applications.

- **Authentication attacks** many examples of real-world security threats implemented against users' authentication in HC applications:
  - In 2016, according to the cybersecurity firm layer 8 security report, analysis attacks revealed a huge number of passwords and keys during authentication processes of remote devices in HC organisations ([Siwicki 2016](#)).
  - In 2017, the patient's personal information compromised on AU Medical Centre, Children's Hospital and Clinics of Georgia. However, information datasets attacks have not detected until 2018 ([Donovan 2018](#)).
  - In 2018, according to the proofpoint report, more than 100 million authentication attacks were carried out around the world against clinics, hospitals and insurers companies ([proofpoint 2018](#)).
  - In 2019, Oregon Department of Human Services pointed out that cyber-attacks targeted and breached users' credentials (625000 patients' records) ([Jessica Davis 2019](#)).
- **Authorisation attacks** many examples of real-world security threats implemented against users' authorisation in HC applications:
  - In 2013, penetration attacks were on healthcare data in US hospitals. These attacks revealed 85.4% of the medical records (protected health information (PHI)) of the 5 largest incidents for patients' data ([Paganini 2014](#)).
  - In 2016, Apple Health (Medicaid) was exposed for the data breach. This attack revealed 370,000 records for clients in Apple Health (Washington state) ([Washington Health Care Authority 2016](#)).
  - In 2017, an unauthorised individual penetrated EHR the New Jersey Diamond Institute for Fertility and Menopause. The hacker revealed PHI to 14633 records containing patients' information, such as names, birth dates, social security numbers, and sonograms ([Davis 2017](#)).
  - In 2018, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services pointed out that unauthorised access/disclosure attacks targeted many health institutions and penetrated huge health records ([U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2018](#)).

### 2.3.3 Security Requirements to HC Applications

In this section, we summarize the security requirements to the HC applications. The security requirements of the HC applications include:

- **Confidentiality** data encrypted through the encryption algorithm to prevent the attacker from seeing explicit data. When the attacker gets the encrypted data, the attacker will not benefit from this data because it is incomprehensible (Kumar et al. 2018).
- **Authentication** authentication service is used to authenticate legitimate users or data in the network to prevent anyone else. This means that if the data is a trusted source in the network it is accepted, but if an unknown source is ignored (Rantos et al. 2018).
- **Authorisation** in the authorisation service, each node (sensor or user's device) in the network has specific sources that can access it. This security requirement is tremendously important in preventing unauthorised persons' access to the sources, for example, providing various privileges among users (doctors, nurses, practitioners and pharmacists) in access to the sources (Javadi & Razzaque 2013).
- **Integrity** this service is used to ensure that the transmitted data that has not been tampered or edited by the adversary (Sun et al. 2018).

In addition, the following concerns closely related to patient's EMR/EHR:

- **Availability** some attacks are trying to disrupt network services, by sending a large number of messages to the server and thus the network destruction. Network services should be available upon request (Di Pietro et al. 2014).
- **Anonymity** this service is to hide or distort the network information and data as it transfers from the sender to the receiver or vice versa. When using anonymity with the information and data, the attacker cannot distinguish this information and data to a specific patient (Shen et al. 2018).
- **Unlinkability** the attacker cannot reveal the identity of HC users when linking real information with random pseudonyms. However, Single pseudonym will expose user information for detection (Mehmood et al. 2018).
- **Scalability, Forward Secrecy and Backward Secrecy** environments of healthcare applications require expanding the size of the network continuously. But when a node leaves or joins the network, it does not have the right to access and decrypt the encrypted messages in the future after leaving the network or previous messages before entering the network (Dhillon & Kalra 2018).

Table 2.2: Keys sizes and some information for public key algorithms

| Algorithm | Keys sizes |         |         |         |          | Ratio  | Author(s)                      | Year | Mathematical problem                 | Other algorithms        |
|-----------|------------|---------|---------|---------|----------|--------|--------------------------------|------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| RSA       | 1024       |         |         |         |          | 1:6-30 | Rivest, Shamirand, and Adleman | 1978 | Integer factorization                | Rabin                   |
| Elgamal   |            | 2048    | 3072    | 7680    | 15360    |        | Taher Elgamal                  | 1985 | Multiplicative group                 | Schnorr, Nyberg-Rueppel |
| DSA       |            |         |         |         |          |        | David W. Kravitz               | 1991 |                                      |                         |
| ECC/ECDSA | 160-223    | 224-255 | 256-383 | 384-511 | 512-more |        | Scott Vanstone                 | 1992 | Elliptic curve discrete log. (ECDLP) | ECDH                    |

- **Freshness and Non-repudiation** the message should be recent to prevent a replay attack, as the sender cannot deny his message to detect the compromised nodes (Di Pietro et al. 2014, Kale & Bhagwat 2018).

### 2.3.4 Security Protocols in HC Applications

In this Section, we present an overview of security protocols likely used in the HC applications. HC applications require robust protocols in terms of performance and security. Public key encryption protocols, such as elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) and elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) have been used extensively in many applications (Bos et al. 2014). Especially, ECC/ECDSA applied in resource-constrained and large environments due to the effectiveness of their use in these environments. These algorithms have appropriate efficiency and security for these environments.

Constrained resource environments, such as wireless sensor network (WSN), radio frequency identifier (RFID), and smart card require high-speed, low consumption ability, and less bandwidth. ECC/ECDSA has been considered to be appropriate for these resource-constrained environments (Li, Niu, Bhuiyan, Wu, Karuppiah & Kumari 2018). These algorithms provide important security properties. For example, ECC provides confidentiality, while ECDSA provides integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation. ECC/ECDSA has been proven to be indeed efficient in its performance because it uses small keys; thus the cost of computation is small, compared with traditional public key cryptography algorithms, such as Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA), traditional digital signature algorithm (DSA) and ElGamal. For example, ECC/ECDSA with a 256-bit key offers the same level of security for the RSA algorithm with a 3072-bit key (Varchola et al. 2015, Ever 2018). Table 2.2 (Barker & Dang 2016, Harkanson & Kim 2017, Tiwari & Kim 2018, Mi et al. 2018) shows a comparison of key sizes for public key signature algorithms in addition to some information about these algorithms. We will consider the security requirement from three perspectives.

- **Performance and efficiency**

The preservation of efficiency in the ECC/ECDSA is crucially important in HC applications. Many approaches have been developed to improve the efficiency of the ECC/ECDSA algorithm to reduce the cost of computation, energy, memory, and consumption of processor capabilities. The ECC/ECDSA uses the point multiplication (PM) or scalar multiplication (SM) where ECC is used PM for encryption and decryption, while ECDSA is used this operation to generate and verify the signature (Pan et al. 2017). One can improve the PM efficiency by improving finite field arithmetic (such as inversion, multiplication, and squaring), elliptic curve model (such as Hessian and Weierstrass), point representation (such as Projective and Jacobian), the methods of PM (such as Comb and Window method) (Joye 2008) or improve hash function.

Several researchers have made improvements to increase the performance of the ECC/ECDSA. First of all, in (De Dormale & Quisquater 2007) performance and flexibility have been investigated in the ECC algorithm with accelerators through hardware implementations. Many points in hardware implementations for ECC were discussed, such as selecting curves, group law, PM algorithms, and selection of coordinates. In addition, it was pointed out that the architecture of multiple PM in ECDSA's verification should support because this architecture leads to efficiency in hardware's implementations. Much research has pointed out that using hardware's accelerators lead to high performance. But accelerators sacrifices flexibility, where reduction circuits should be used to retrieve the flexibility feature. Similarly, Driessens et al. (2008) compared many different signature schemes (ECDSA, XTR-DSA, and NTRUSign) in terms of energy consumption, memory, keys length and signature, and performance. Through implementation, the authors found that NTRUSign algorithm is the best in term performance and memory. However, NTRUSign algorithm suffers from security weakness against attacks.

Zhong et al. (2016) investigated ECDSA algorithm and found that it contains some of the problems that make it inefficient because of the inversion processes used to generate and verify the signature. They removed the inversion process and the results demonstrate that this scheme is more efficient than the previous scheme where it had less time. Unfortunately, there is no proof of ECDSA security without inversion processes in repelling attacks. Liu et al. (2017) adopted the Montgomery method with the lightweight elliptic curve (twisted Edwards curve (p159, p191, p223, and p255)) to improve speed and balance

between memory and performance (cost of communication, execution time, memory). During the implementation, they noted that their scheme offers memory efficiency better than the traditional Montgomery scheme. They recommended the exact selection of ECDSA's parameters curves and the balance between security and efficiency requirements.

- **Security and countermeasures**

The security improvement in ECC/ECDSA is no less important than its efficiency. Because of this algorithm is designed primarily for the application of security properties. ECC/ECDSA, like previous algorithms, may possibly suffer from some of the security vulnerabilities. Random weak, bad random source ([Bos et al. 2014](#)), collision, preimage and second preimage in hash value or leaking bits of the private key are considered weaknesses in the ECC/ECDSA. Also, several researchers have made improvements to close security gaps in the ECC/ECDSA algorithm. The aim of these improvements is to provide countermeasures against various attacks. But when selecting countermeasure there should be a balance between security and efficiency ([Danger et al. 2013](#)). To maintain the security of these algorithms it is important to use finite fields (either prime or binary) recommended by credible institutions. For instance, the Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) or National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) are considered reliable. The choice of appropriate curves and finite fields according to the authoritative organisations' standards leads to secure ECC/ECDSA's implementations ([Mathur et al. 2017](#)). Therefore, we note from the above that any encryption algorithm or signature should possess a security level to use in HC applications. Many schemes measured ECC/ECDSA in terms of security weakness issues and countermeasures.

Many researchers provided studies to support appropriate countermeasure in ECC/ECDSA. [Fan et al. \(2010\)](#) presented a detailed study on attacks and countermeasures in ECC algorithm is presented. The authors divided attacks to passive and active attacks. They explained that the countermeasure for a specific attack may be vulnerable to other attacks. In addition, countermeasures should have been selected carefully. Therefore, the authors have made some recommendations for selecting countermeasures.

Some surveys have studied public cryptography algorithms in terms of computation of hard problems (integer factorization problem(IFP), discrete logarithm problem (DLP), lattices and error correcting codes) in quantum and

classical computers (Abdouli et al. 2011). The authors described RSA, Rabin, ECC, ECDH, ECDSA, ElGamal, lattices (NTRU) and error-correcting code (McEliece cryptography). They pointed out that ECC provides a higher security level than other cryptosystems; in addition, it presents advantages, such as high speed, less storage, and smaller keys sizes. But they did not discuss the use of ECC/ECDSA in applications and implementations of different technologies. Meanwhile, Fan & Verbauwhede (2012), Danger et al. (2013) explained physical attacks on ECC algorithms. They focused on two known physical attacks: side channel analysis (SCA), and fault attacks. They also described many attacks, including these two types, as they presented countermeasures against these attacks, such as simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA) and fault attack (FA) countermeasures. Also, some recommendations were presented for countermeasures that add randomness, countermeasures selection, and implementation issues. Bhatia & Verma (2017) discussed security issues in terms of network security, identity theft, and insider threats in preventing many attacks, such as MITM, address resolution protocol (ARP) poisoning, insider privileges, reply, DoS, guessing and impersonation. Authors have noted that ECC/ECDSA is the best of public encryption algorithms. It provides a security solution for data protection through the integration of cryptography mechanisms in ensuring remote authentication and authorisation.

- **Implementation and applications**

ECC/ECDSA is suitable for implementation in resource-constrained environments in addition to various applications. A study on security techniques has investigated WSNs (Yang et al. 2015). It focused on three features in WSN security: key management, authentication, and secure routing. It pointed out that the ECC algorithm was convenient for resource-constrained devices. In addition, a survey of attack strategies was given in relation to ECC/ECDSA in Bitcoin and Ethereum applications (Mayer 2016). The author pointed out that different standards for curves (such as ANSI X9.63, IEEE P1363, and safecurves). This survey focused on safecurves with SECP256k1 through using ECDSA. Also, it referred to safecurves as one of the strongest curves standards. The author suggested many basic points to prevent attacks on ECDSA or ECC. Finally, Harkanson & Kim (2017) compared RSA and ECC/ECDSA. They pointed out that ECC/ECDSA exhibited the highest performance with the same level of security from RSA. They noted that 69% of websites applications use ECC/ECDSA, 3% used RSA and the rest used other algorithms. They also described ECC with some applications (such as vehicular communica-

cation, e-health and iris pattern recognition). However, they had a duplication between implementation and application. For example, RFID is a technology that can be used to implement a particular application.

## 2.4 Some Related Studies to our Research

We will elaborate a few recent studies which are related to our research in terms of authentication, authorisation and storage.

### 2.4.1 Users' Authentication to HC Applications

The first one research is (He & Zeadally 2015, Giri et al. 2015, Li et al. 2016, Farash et al. 2016, Kumar et al. 2016, Jiang et al. 2016, Rajput, Abbas, Wang, Eun & Oh 2016, Das et al. 2017, Chandrakar & Om 2017, Nizzi et al. 2019, El-Tawab et al. 2019) to secure healthcare's users in the network , and highlights their shortcomings.

Authentication scheme becomes insecure when using the same IDs with unreliable key size in all authentication phases. He & Zeadally (2015) proposed an authentication scheme based on ECC and advanced encryption standards (AES) algorithms. Their scheme uses three entities: user, server, controller. Their scheme accomplishes registration, login, and authentication phases. The authors claimed that their scheme provides many requirements, such as mutual authentication, anonymity, and forward confidentiality. The problem with their scheme is that user and controller identities are statically sent to all three entities. If the attacker can penetrate the encryption, he/she can see the user and controller identities related. The attacker can then generate a random number, temporary key, timestamp, message authentication code. After that, he/she encrypts the user and controller identities and obtains the message authentication code. Then, the attacker sends a message to the network to become a legitimate and authenticated user. Besides, their scheme used a 160-bit key with ECC, which is considered unreliable by trusted institutions, such as NIST.

The storage of medical records (data and information) on a single server represents a serious risk in terms of performance and security. Farash et al. (2016) proposed an authentication scheme based on ECC for healthcare environments. They claimed that their scheme provided forward secrecy. Their scheme accomplishes two stages: setup, and authentication. It provides authentication during the exchange of messages between the server and RFID's tag. However, their scheme shows that the information (identities) and data are stored on a single server. When

the server is hacked, the users' information and data are exposed to the detection, tampering, and modification. Also, Jiang et al. (2016) designed a three-factor (biometric, smart card and password) authentication protocol to protect e-health clouds. Their scheme protects authentication requests from impersonation attacks and off-line password guessing if a mobile device is lost or stolen. Their scheme relied on ECC to support the confidentiality and authentication of healthcare's users. They used a fuzzy extractor to keep a biometric secret. But, this scheme relied on a single server to authenticate users, which is an attacker's target. In addition, it performs 7 hash operations that can exhaust the single server capabilities if the network has a huge number of healthcare users, especially if it is not a lightweight hash.

Leakage information of the legitimate users or using unnecessarily large keys causes destruction of authentication process. An authentication protocol was proposed to protect patients' passwords by RSA against off-line password guessing attacks (Giri et al. 2015). Their scheme consists of five phases: initial, registration, login, authentication, and password change. The main problem in their scheme is that the authors used RSA with the 1024 key. This algorithm affects the performance of a huge healthcare network. Many schemes recommend using ECC (Timpner et al. 2016, Sojka-Piotrowska & Langendoerfer 2017, Meddah et al. 2017, AbdAllah et al. 2018), as the ECC-160 is equivalent to RSA-1024 with the same security level. Also, their protocol suffers from sending an ID clearly from client to server at the registration phase. This case causes authentication information to be detected for analysis attacks. Leaking any information that an attacker could use to disclose authentication information. Furthermore, the ECC and a Petri Nets model was proposed to achieve an authentication requirement to protect healthcare applications through the mobile cloud (Kumar et al. 2016). This scheme consists of two phases initial setup and authentication. The authors praised that their scheme is resistant to attacks eavesdropping, tracking, replay, spoofing, and cloning. However, their scheme did not address the issue of steal/loss of tag or device and internal attacks that are more serious than external attacks in accessing patients' data. With no indication what signature algorithm used to integrity. The other problem is that tag's ID explicitly sends from server to tag, which makes it easier for the attacker to parse the authentication request.

HC applications are in continuous expanding and become failing if they are not able to provide a scalability requirement. Using shared-key to implement authentication mechanism was designed to prevent the known attacks, especially DoS attacks (Li et al. 2016). They used the wrong password detection mechanism to reduce the risk of DoS attacks. However, the registration phase of this scheme

is not reliable if the ID of patients is sent in an unsafe channel. This research also suffers from scalability because of the use of the single shared-key mechanism that needs protection from all parties. Moreover, Das et al. (2017) provided a user authentication scheme for healthcare applications based on AES and secure hash algorithm (SHA1). They used biometrics users and the anonymity feature to repel attacks, such as replay, MITM, and privileged insider. However, because of symmetric encryption suffers from scalability problem, as well as the difficulty of managing the single secret key. Their scheme will suffer from key management problem if applied to a large health institution with hundreds of users which include managing users' accounts from adding and deleting. Furthermore, the attacker can submit a forgery attack on the login message if it detects the single secret key.

Pseudonym and mutual authentication are important mechanisms to build robust authentication. Cloud-assisted conditional privacy preserving authentication (CACPPA) (Rajput, Abbas, Wang, Eun & Oh 2016) proposed to authenticate the network's nodes. This scheme used the elliptic curve integrated encryption scheme (ECIES) and ECDSA algorithms with a timestamp and pseudonym integration to perform the authentication process. The problem with this scheme is that it does not provide mutual authentication to prevent an attack from a counterfeit party. They also did not explain the size of the keys in the algorithms to make sure their scheme was able to repel the various attacks. Furthermore, a single pseudonym cannot separate the link to the real information to prevent analysing and tracking attacks for authentication requests. Chandrakar & Om (2017) provided an authentication scheme based on ECC and hash. Their scheme has supported on several servers in user authentication with three factors (biometric, smart card, and password). Namely, the user can connect to any server to perform the authentication process. In this scheme, the authors did not specify which hash algorithm used and the size of the message digest (MD). These procedures are mightily necessary for repelling attacks, such as collision, preimage and second preimage. Using multiple servers means that the same users' information is stored on more than one server, penetrating any server that causes users' information to be detected or modified. Also, this scheme did not use a mechanism to prevent the association of real user information with an authentication request, such as pseudonyms.

Recently, Nizzi et al. (2019) proposed the address shuffling algorithm (AShA) method to protect devices' MACs when these addresses transferred from sender to recipient. They used keys and hashes to shuffle MACs' addresses in the network and prevented intruders from executing collisions or privacy breaches. However, their method is vulnerable to security threats especially as it does not provide resistance

against the second preimage. Similarly, (El-Tawab et al. 2019) relied on MACs addresses to protect users' privacy. They used techniques such as MAC randomisation and a hash function (SHA-256) to prevent penetration of users' devices. But these techniques are still weak in ensuring the authenticity of the MACs addresses.

#### 2.4.2 Users' Authorisation to HC Application

This Section discusses related works about authorisation (Chadwick et al. 2006, Riedl et al. 2008, Quantin et al. 2011, Gajanayake et al. 2014, Sun et al. 2011, Jo & Chung 2015, Seol et al. 2018, Wang et al. 2019, Shafeeq et al. 2019), and highlights their shortcomings.

Authorisation scheme requires a unique signature in authorisation policy for each user and preventing the disclosure of users' IDs for the unauthorised medical staff. As early as 2006, the PERMIS project was proposed by (Chadwick et al. 2006) with the RBAC model. It described the conceptual authorisation of the credential validation service (CVS) before the approval stage of the access decisions for the resource as well as the distributed management of the credentials. However, the PERMIS system does inadequately protect the CVS. PERMIS also suffers from the problem of inheriting managers for all the attributes of their followers (hospital department managers or specialist doctors who inherit all their practitioners' attributes and thus have access to patients' data, which can lead to significant internal attacks). In addition, their project uses one signature of a public key cryptography (PKC#12) file for policies and attributes.

HC server resources, such as memory and processing speed are crucial in implementing the authorisation scheme in large health environments. The pseudonymization of information for privacy in an e-health (PIPE) project was designed to protect health data in the EHR through a layered system. PIPE included many keys, such as an external key pair, an internal key pair, a symmetric key pair, and a shared key. It relied on RBAC to protect the keys (Riedl et al. 2008). This scheme used the Shamir scheme as a backup mechanism to retrieve the patients' keys in the case of the loss of the smart card. But, this scheme did not explain the symmetric and asymmetric encryption algorithms used to generate pseudonym for users. Also, the scheme increases the complexity of the server system with the use of many keys, especially if the scheme is used by a large health institution. In addition, the server must use the keystore to store the keys, and this requires protection and a storage space on the server.

A robust authorisation scheme requires uniform structures and contexts in requests and responses securely without complex operations on the HC server. Quantin et al. (2011) suggested using non-central medical records to eliminate issues of standardization and structure in data access requests. They used two medical record search engines (MRSEs) and one data aggregator. The first search engine was used to authorise healthcare providers. The second search engine was used to authorise patients. In addition, a hash was used to increase the pseudonym of patients' IDs. However, this scheme suffered from the use of a single aggregator that was similar to the dataset on the central server, which is vulnerable to attacks. Also, patients' data come from different sources and have different structures and standards; this difference causes a burden on the aggregator. Moreover, the authors used RSA's encryption algorithm, and this algorithm uses a large key size of 1024 bits, which causes a burden on the server. Also, the aggregator needs time and storage to convert the data into a single context. Furthermore, their scheme suffered from collision and doubleton problems due to the transference and transformation of patients' data contexts.

Internal attacks on repository or transfer of medical records clearly during the network is a serious risk to patients' health. Gajanayake et al. (2014) integrated four access control models (discretionary [DAC], mandatory [MAC], role-based [RBAC], and purpose-based access control [PBAC]). His target is to obtain a single model that limits illegal user access control of the medical record. In their model, they relied on the sensitivity label for data in the hierarchical structure of the database. Also, they suggested defining the purpose of accessing patients' data. However, their scheme addressed only the doctor and the patient and did not address different classes of healthcare providers. In addition, data and requests are clearly transmitted between client and server. In addition, Jo & Chung (2015) proposed an extensible markup language (XML) access control system (XACS) that enables users to access specific elements in an XML document. This system relies on removing certain parts of the XML document to allow users who are authorised to see certain parts of an XML document. However, requester information is transmitted explicitly over the Internet to a server, which makes it easier for an attacker to penetrate the privacy of users. Also, it does not address internal attacks that are applied by legitimate users even though certain parts of the XML document have been removed.

Cryptographic processes for patient data are extremely expensive on the server compared with the mechanisms of authorisation policies and pseudonyms in the authorisation scheme. The healthcare system for patient privacy (HCPP) project

was designed for the EHR to protect the privacy of patient data (Sun et al. 2011). Researchers focused on an emergency scenario regarding the protection of patients' data. They used a backup mechanism that allows the doctor to access patients' health information without access to confidential parameters. However, this search relies on encrypting all patient data. When a client wants to access patient data, the server uses a keyword (searchable symmetric encryption (SSE)) to perform an encrypted data-mining operation. This process is exceedingly expensive for the server for two reasons. First, the server must encrypt the entire massive database with the continuous addition of new records, and second, the server must continuously mine each access request. In addition, their system did not support levels of authorisation and privileges (roles and attributes) that are more secure in providing privacy to patients' records. Also, researchers have reported that the patient has not been exposed to collusion because the patient does not attack himself. But this is not true because there are impersonation attacks that do the job without the theft or loss of the patient's device. Moreover, this search did not specify the type of encryption algorithm used, which is greatly important for security and server performance, and addressed only emergency cases. Seol et al. (2018) proposed an access control model based on partial encryption and XML signing in EHR's documents within a cloud environment. Their model is supported in two phases: the first phase is access control using extensible access control markup language (XACML) and the second is to encrypt and sign data with XML. However, the cloud environment presents multiple security and privacy problems in the EHR system because of the distributed exchange of data between the various health centres. In addition, their scheme uses encryption in XML requests and responses. Encryption processes will be extremely costly for legitimate entities exchanges in healthcare systems. Also, in the first phase, requests and responses are clearly sent between the legitimate parties and therefore be exposed to attack. They also did not address the pseudonym mechanism that prevents access to real users' information.

Recently, Wang et al. (2019) relied on attribute based encryption (ABE) and searchable encryption to authorise users to access patients' data. Their scheme focuses on supporting privacy and efficiency in hidden policy with search keywords. In addition, their scheme is based on constant expenses for encryption and the secret key. However, their scheme suffers from internal attacks in addition to heavy costs to access the data. In addition, Shafeeq et al. (2019) has proposed a decentralized authorisation scheme to grant users access to patients' data. They used XACML, Merkle tree-based signature and symmetric encryption to prevent unauthorised users from penetrating repository. Although their scheme provides efficient management

by XACML and message integrity support by multi-signature, it is vulnerable to threats of single symmetric key penetration as well as the storage expenses required for the Merkle tree signatures.

### 2.4.3 Storage of Users' Data

This Section discusses in brief the existing storage schemes (Wander et al. 2005, Wang & Li 2006, Trakadas et al. 2008, De Meulenaer et al. 2008, Fan & Gong 2012, Kodali 2013, Lavanya & Natarajan 2017a,b, Staudemeyer et al. 2018, Malathy et al. 2018, Sharavanan et al. 2018, Sui & de Meer 2019, Hathaliya et al. 2019, Furtak et al. 2019) to secure patients' data in the EMR, and highlights their shortcomings.

The performance and security presented by ECC/ECDSA algorithm, make it suitable for use in implementation on WSN. Digital signatures in ECDSA have better efficiency in devices with resource-constrained than DSA and RSA. Many authors have pointed out to the possibility of using ECC/ECDSA with environments resource-constrained (memory, energy, and CPU capability). Public key cryptographic algorithms are investigated in many schemes to test their applicability in WSN. For example, Wander et al. (2005) presented a study in energy for the public key cryptography (ECC/ECDSA, RSA) on sensor node Mica2dot with Atmel ATmegal 128L (8bit). They found that transmission cost is double the receiving cost. They analysed signatures in ECDSA with a key of bit-160 and RSA with a key of bit-1024. Where signature verification cost in ECDSA is larger than a signature generation while RSA verification is smaller than a signature generation. They noted that ECDSA has less energy cost than RSA. They concluded that ECC/ECDSA is more effective than RSA and feasible in constrained-source devices (WSN). Because of it generates small keys and certificates with the same security level in RSA. Also, implementation was applied for 160-bit ECC/ECDSA and 1024-bit RSA algorithms on sensor node MICAz (Wang & Li 2006). The authors used hybrid multiplication to reduce access memory. ECDSA results on MICAz are signature generation=1.3s and signature verification = 2.8s. For the purpose of comparison, the authors implemented ECDSA also on TelosB. MICAz results were slightly less than TelosB's results. The authors proved the possibility of using RSA and ECDSA on WSN.

Costs of computation and communication in WSN should be efficient when applying security protocols, such as ECC/ECDSA. ECDSA (SHA1) and RSA (AES) were analysed in several types of sensor nodes in terms of energy (communication and computation) and time (Trakadas et al. 2008). ECDSA uses short keys

(160-bit), which reduces memory, computation, energy and data size transmitted and thus is better than the RSA. De Meulenaer et al. (2008) discussed the cost evaluation of energy (communication and computation) on the WSN (TelosB and MICAz) through the symmetric key distribution protocol and ECDH-ECDSA key agreement protocol (asymmetric encryption). They noted that TelosB sensor node consumes less power than MICAz and symmetric encryption performs better than ECDH-ECDSA. Moreover, Fan & Gong (2012) implemented ECDSA on Micaz motes with the binary field (163-bit). They improved signature verification via cooperation idea of the adjacent nodes. Also, ECDSA's implementation was presented in sensor node (IRIS) (Kodali 2013). But because this node supports 8-bit of the microcontroller, the author modified the SHA1 code from 32 bits original to 8 bits. Through implementation, the original algorithm is better in size and time than a modified algorithm. The author explained the possibility of using ECDSA algorithm with the sensor node (IRIS) held 8-bit microcontroller.

To store patients' data accurately, data collection schemes should rely on reliable and fast hash algorithms in ECDSA. Lavanya & Natarajan (2017a,b) have applied the ECDSA algorithm as a light-weight authentication scheme in the WSN. This demonstrates the effectiveness and efficiency of using ECDSA in WSN in terms of security and performance. Staudemeyer et al. (2018) designed an ECC/ECDSA-based scheme to provide privacy in WSN. However, they did not provide a performance analysis of the security algorithms during exchange of data in WSN. Malathy et al. (2018) focused on the efficiency of transmission in WSN to extend the lifetime of sensor nodes with the use of ECDSA and generate MD with data. Their scheme relied on ant colony optimization scheme to save energy in the WSN. But it did not support privacy parameters during data transfer. Sharavanan et al. (2018) proposed a scheme to monitor the heterogeneous network environments in WSN and protect the medical information of patients using ECDSA. Unfortunately, their scheme addressed only the computation processes of transport. It did not address the complicated computation processes to generate and verify the signature in ECDSA.

Recently, Sui & de Meer (2019) designed a data aggregation scheme that focused on computation in demand-response management to improve performance and security efficiency. Their scheme was based on the identity signature (Bilinear Map) to protect information and data aggregated by integration and authentication. Hathaliya et al. (2019) have proposed an elliptic curve cryptography (160-bits) scheme to encrypt and authenticate the patients' biometric properties. They used wearable sensors to collect patients' data and used mobile to send and store this

data in the medical repository (cloud server). Finally, Furtak et al. (2019) designed a framework based on RSA-2048 bits and trusted modules to secure sensors' domain and prevent unauthorised threats. They have categorised sensors into the master, replica and gateway categories in the network area and data structure in the sensor memory. In their framework, security procedures for the domain and sensor were used to support both integrity and authentication. Moreover, many research (Kittur & Pais 2019, Kuang et al. 2019, Marino et al. 2019, Zhao et al. 2019, Liu et al. 2019) have pointed out that ECDSA is significantly appropriate for authentication and authorisation schemes because it performs the lightweight processes during security procedures. But also many recent research (Xia et al. 2016, Rasjid et al. 2017, Chiriacio et al. 2017, Merrill 2017, Yang et al. 2017, Giechaskiel et al. 2018, Brockmann 2018, Park & Kim 2018) pointed out that SHA1 suffers from collision, preimage and second preimage attacks. However, all schemes did not address SHA1 performance and security (collision, preimage and second preimage) problems in ECDSA.

## 2.5 Summary of the Chapter

In this chapter, we have presented details about the HC applications history and HC systems, such as EMR and EHR. Also, we have discussed security and privacy issues when medical records transferred by a communication channel or saved on EMR/HER server. Security protocols have investigated in HC applications. Finally, existing schemes gaps described to be as a basis to build new authentication, authorisation and data collecting schemes.

# Chapter 3: Designing a Secure and WSN Based Healthcare System Application

The development of efficient and low-cost HC application system involves three categories of issues: Ethnic issues, medical/health issues, system design and security issue. In this chapter, we will focus on the last one; that is, on the technical and security considerations for the development of HC applications. In more details, they are

- Techniques proposed for authentication, authorisation and data collection on the proposed HC application.
- General proposed network model on HC application.
- General methodology for the proposed HC application.

## 3.1 General Architecture of Proposed HC Application

Figure 3.1 shows our project architecture in HC application. The proposed HC application system is shown in Figure 3.2. There are three major components: Data Collection by WSNs, EHR/EMR storage or repositories, and online system of HC application for professionals. Our study will carry out the investigations into three aspects as follows:

- Techniques to provide an authentication mechanism to legitimate users in the HC application.
- Techniques protecting users' privacy, and increase the users' confidence in the advanced HC systems in access EHR repository.




Figure 3.1: General Architecture of Proposed HC Application

- Secure and efficient application by using algorithms/protocols for integrating HWSN and EMR in the HC industry.

## 3.2 Elliptic Curve Cryptography for Authentication

First of all, we focus on the security aspect of authenticating legitimate users. To ensure only legitimate users are associated with the HC application network, our scheme includes a set of techniques (such as elliptic curve integrated encryption scheme (ECIES), PHOTON, one-time password, mutual authentication, and media access control (MAC) address) to validate the authentication request. Efficiency and security are important determinants of health applications. Sensitive patients' records require protection from intruders and at the same time require efficiency. Because of health applications involve frequent and continuous exchanges between a large number of users (patients and professionals). In our scheme, we relied on algorithms that provide lightweight operations and a high-security level for encryption and signature operations. This Section describes the threat model and the basic concepts of these techniques.

### 3.2.1 Threat to Authentication Scheme

In the architecture of our proposed HC application, the Attributes Server(*AS*) is responsible for users' authenticity. The *AS* must be authentication proof against a number of attacks. In this section, we list possible attacks against the authentication scheme used in the *AS* of the proposed HC system. *AS* is trustworthy. It is safe




Figure 3.2: The proposed project system

against repository penetration attacks. This server contains only users' information datasets. We impose threats in our authentication model as follows:

- The attacker can steal the client application and its files to analyse the data, retrieve the parameters, and reveal the secret key of the user. Then, the attacker can use this application on different devices.
- The attacker can listen for authentication requests in the insecure environment and execute interception, replay, MITM, and modification attacks. The attacker's goal is to become a legitimate user in the network.
- The attacker can execute a forgery or masquerading attack in an attempt to penetrate the authentication process.
- A legitimate user, such as a doctor, nurse, or patient can perform a privileged insider attack based on his/her legitimacy in the network.
- The attacker can successfully guess the real username, password, role and pseudonym associated with it. This guess can accomplish during an intensive analysis of many authentication requests.

### 3.2.2 Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES)

To implement the authentication scheme in the *AS*, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) will be adopted. As ECC is no longer dependent on the discrete logarithm

problem (DLP); ECC can perform very fast. In this section, we will provide an introduction to ECC and its applications.

### **3.2.3 Lightweight Hash-Function Algorithm**

During the implementation of the proposed authentication scheme in the AS, another technique to speed up the authentication is to use one of the lightweight Hashing algorithms such as PHOTO, QUARK and SPONGENT. For more details of these lightweight hashing functions, see Appendix A.

### **3.2.4 One Time Password (OTP)**

OTP is a way to authenticate legitimate users by generating passcode or nonce only once in a specified time. It becomes not applicable in the next times for authentication. OTP is an effective method for authenticating users in HC applications if used with robust encryption and signature technologies. Using a static password, or nonce without other authentication mechanisms is markedly weak for attacks. Therefore, OTP significantly provides support to the authentication process. This mechanism prevents many attacks, such as replay, MITM, and guessing ([Thiranant et al. 2015](#), [Chen et al. 2017](#)). The attacker can not use this passcode or nonce to connect to the network later. Each client receives a random OTP from the authorities provider via a secure channel, and that is used for the login session. The client sends OTP as part of an authentication request. If the authentication process is valid, the server will delete OTP from the dataset and will not accept it in the next times. OTP is a powerful mechanism to mitigate the risk of hackers' communication in the network.

In this scheme, we apply OTP to generate a random password (to prevent hackers from expecting OTP) with the first link to users in HC applications. This procedure is to ensure only legitimate users connected to the network. In our authentication scheme, users (patient or provider) only use OTP once and will not need to use OTP with name and password in future authentication operations. This mechanism allows the server to record the original physical address in the dataset. Even if the attacker detects OTP, he will not benefit from it in the next times. Besides, we use other mechanisms, such as timestamp, checking the original physical address and multi pseudonyms with OTP.

### **3.2.5 Mutual Authentication**

The network parties (clients and server) exchange requests for authentication remotely (Internet) or locally (WLAN). This process plays an important role in con-




Figure 3.3: Types of authentication schemes

necting users to HC applications. The authentication request can include many security parameters, such as name, password, OTP, nonce, pseudonym, signature, and encryption. To design a robust authentication protocol it should include security requirements that are critical in protecting patients' information and data. In addition, traditional methods of authentication (password and name) are not suitable for health applications (Liu & Chung 2017). In general, two kinds of authentication has applied in the various projects (as described in Figure 3.3), simple and mutual. In simple authentication, one party performs the authentication process, such as server verifying the authentication request for the client. This type of authentication is vulnerable to attacks, such as masquerading, spoofing, and impersonation. The attacker can use his/her device as a fake server to receive all clients' requests. Mutual authentication provides a security solution to prevent known attacks. In this type of authentication, each party authenticate the other party and thus prevent counterfeit attacks both by client or server. In our scheme, we adopt the mechanism of mutual authentication in the preservation of users' information and data.

### 3.2.6 Media Access Control (MAC) Address

All network devices of different types should contain a hardware card (interface) to connect to the local or global network. Each wire or wireless interface has a media access control (MAC) or physical address that consists of a 48-bit. It is

divided into six octets and wrote in hexadecimal, such as "8C: 70: 5A: 41: 49: BC". This address is a unique identifier (no duplicate address twice) for device defined a globally and persistent (Martin et al. 2017). MAC address is the identifier of the device that can connect to the network. This address is used in WLAN networks because it offers advantages, such as reducing costs and speed in access control procedures (Mattos & Duarte 2016). It can be changed programmatically in various operating systems, such as Linux and Windows. In addition, anyone can use Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) to detect the MAC address of another user in the network (after entering his IP address) (Dallaglio et al. 2015).

The main problem with this address is that the attacker can execute an eavesdropping attack to access the MAC addresses of legitimate devices in the network. Then, he/she selects a legitimate MAC address to use it. For example, an attacker could execute an ARP poisoning or spoofing attack by using a fake identifier of the MAC address (for a legitimate client or server). Consequently, the attacker gains illegal privileges that would enable it to perform other attacks, such as MITM and DOS (Xiao et al. 2016, Masoud et al. 2015). Moreover, randomization operations for the MAC address have become useless in the protection against tracking attacks (Matte et al. 2016, Vanhoef et al. 2016). Therefore, if the server does not have a mechanism to detect MAC address change, the attacker becomes a legitimate user in the network and has access to network resources.

### **3.3 XACML Techniques for our Authorisation Scheme**

Second major component in the proposed HC application as shown in Fig 3.7 is the EHR/EMR repository. Its primary is to store patient's and elderly health records or medical records. All kinds of users including the patients themselves and HC professionals need to access the repository legally and ethically. In this section, we will introduce the techniques used for authorising the legitimate users.

#### **3.3.1 Threat to Authorisation Scheme**

Many serious risks to HC authorisation systems that require the building of a threat model to detect weaknesses in these systems. We assume that attacks can be internal, external, active, and passive. In summary, the existing HC applications are vulnerable to the following attacks.

- The attacker can flood the server with intensive authorisation requests, which is to stop the service from healthcare's users and destroy the network.

- The attacker performs an attack to penetrate the repository in the Central Server, to access the patient's data and reveal their identities.
- The attacker performs a MITM attack to modify the data and to become a legitimate user in the network.
- The attacker sends a fake authorisation request during the execution of a forgery/impersonation attack to gain access to patient data.
- The attacker can launch an eavesdropping attack to obtain authorisation requests, and then perform an analysis of these requests to detect the correlation between data, information, and pseudonyms.
- The attacker can execute timing attacks by using the time period to reveal user authorisation information.

### 3.3.2 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)

To implement the authorisation scheme in the *AS*, Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) will be adopted. It depends on the use of the points on the curve to integrate and sign data. ECDSA uses small parameters which expedites performance of computations, thus reducing time and storage (Sojka-Piotrowska & Langendoerfer 2017). These features are vastly important for large organisations and constrained-source devices, such as WSN. Because of these networks require processing power, memory, bandwidth, or power consumption (Dou et al. 2017). In this section, we will provide an introduction to ECC and its applications.

### 3.3.3 Models of Access Control to the EHR Repository

Any system needs access control models to determine users' access to the data repository. Many access control models, and each one depends on a particular method and set of rules. One of the most distinct access control models is Role-Based Access Control (RBAC). This model relies on the classification of users into roles, and each role has privileges and rights regarding data access (Gajanayake et al. 2014). With RBAC, the security of the system is based on the structure of the system's roles assigned to users (Sánchez et al. 2017). Each role in the system is assigned according to the job of the user in the organisation (Alturki 2017). RBAC was introduced to solve problems with previous access models, such as Mandatory Access Control (MAC) and Discretionary Access Control (DAC). As shown in Figure 3.4, the RBAC model divides users into roles (such as patient, doctor, and researcher). For example, the researcher role can access the data assigned to that role, which enables him/her to develop medical research to find a cure for a medical condition.




Figure 3.4: Scheme of RBAC model.

In recent years, there has been significant interest in using the Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) model for the protection of data privacy. This model is designed to access data more accurately (fine-grained) and securely. It handles user attributes (such as name, address, age, mobile, location, time) to allow users to access the server's repository. ABAC proposed to go beyond the limitations in the rules and design of the most well-known control access models (DAC, MAC, and RBAC) (Jin et al. 2012, Zhang & Zhang 2017). ABAC is a rich model because it deals with a wide range of user attributes. ABAC supports administration, authorisation of context-aware, risk-intelligence, and scalability in various applications, such as the Internet, IoT, Big Data, cloud computing, and VANET (Brossard et al. 2017). The attributes in ABAC are categorized into subject, object, action, and environment. As shown in Figure 3.5, each user has a set of attributes that allows him/her to access data in the server. In our authorisation scheme, we combine ABAC and RBAC to obtain a model that depends on both roles and attributes.

### 3.3.4 Distributed AC Implementation Technology

The most important component in the proposed EHR system is the EHR repository. Access to data is a major challenge in big data management systems (EHR) that use different techniques. In addition, the exchange of information over the Internet has become essential and needs achieve access authorisation, particularly in HC applications. Extensible access control markup language (XACML) standards include both access control (authorisation) and data management based on extensible markup language (XML) in the different systems (Lu & Sinnott 2018). Effectively, XACML offers features for data access and authorisation for the users at the fine-grained level.




Figure 3.5: Scheme of ABAC model.

Many techniques, such as an open authentication (OAuth), XML access control language (XACL), enterprise privacy authorisation language (EPAL), open digital rights language (ODRL), and security assertion markup language (SAML) have used in authorisation projects. However, OAuth suffers from password management; XACL suffers from few functions and non-extensible; EPAL does not support multiple subjects, error handling and hierarchical role; ODRL suffers from common vocabulary, conflict between serialization and does not support combining algorithms; SAML is extremely expensive, difficult to use and use single sign-on (SSO), namely, it uses one password for all applications that may be reason for penetration. XACML is the most flexible and effective (Grace & Surridge 2017, Beltran et al. 2017, Turkmen et al. 2017). This technology is presented by the organisation for the advancement of structured information standards (OASIS). This standard has many of the features that qualify it for use on the Internet, such as combining policy, combining algorithm, attribute, multiple subjects, policy distribution, implementation independency and obligations (Zhang & Zhang 2017, Turkmen et al. 2017, Deng et al. 2018).

This technique is based on the specific policies first and then on many modules, such as policy enforcement point (PEP), policy decision point (PDP), policy administration point (PAP), policy information point (PIP), and policy retrieval point (PRP) to evaluate the request for access (Calvillo-Arbizu et al. 2014). As shown in Figure 3.6, PEP sends and receive requests and access responses to the repository; PDP evaluates the decision; PAP creates policies based on users' attributes; PIP retrieves users' attributes; and PRP retrieves the users' data from the repository.




Figure 3.6: Scheme of XACML

The result of the decision (permit, deny, not applicable, indeterminate) is sent to the subject via PEP (Zhang & Zhang 2017).

### 3.3.5 Shamir Scheme

The secret sharing or the Shamir scheme depends on a set of keys/secrets sharing ( $SS_s$ ) and threshold ( $TH$ ) to produce a master key/secret ( $MS$ ). The master secret can be created from some or all of the  $SS_s$  (Liu et al. 2018). In this scheme,  $TH$  specifies the minimum number of keys/secrets that allow reconfiguring  $MS$  (Ahmadian & Jamshidpour 2018, Stinson & Wei 2018). This scheme consists of two phases: Generation and reconstruction. In the generation phase, the server divides  $MS$  into a set of secrets sharing ( $SS_1, SS_2, \dots, SS_n$ ), and each Client ( $C_i$ ) securely receives one secret sharing ( $SS$ ) that is part of  $MS$ . In the reconstruction phase,  $C_i$  needs to achieve any set of secrets ( $SS_s$ ) required by relying on the value of  $TH$  to construct  $MS$  (correctness and homomorphism properties). If  $C_i$  has  $TH-1$  from  $SS_s$ ,  $C_i$  fails to obtain information from server (secrecy property).

Calculating the  $MS$  is an immensely difficult operation for the attacker. In addition, the secrets that are configured for the  $MS$  are anonymous users; the attacker does not know if these secrets belong to any of the users (Huang et al. 2016). The Shamir scheme provides an anonymity solution to generate a  $MS$  with several features. It provides full security in hiding  $C_i$ 's  $SS_s$ , a  $MS$  size equal to  $C_i$ 's  $SS_s$  sizes, easy creation of a  $MS$  from a set of keys/secrets, and creation of a new key/secret for one-time use (Dikshit & Singh 2017). In our authorisation scheme, we used the Shamir scheme ( $TH = 3$ ) with ECDSA. This security procedure is to prevent

attackers from accessing or modifying patients' data during the implementation of security objectives (authorisation, authentication, authenticity, and integrity).

## 3.4 Storage Scheme in the Proposed HC Application

In this section, we will illustrate the storage scheme in the proposed HC application. To the best of our knowledge, we have not seen other studies addressing this issue in the field.

### 3.4.1 Threat to Storage Scheme

Building a threat model in HWSN is important to identify serious attacks in patients' data disclosure. HWSN provides important services to the health sector compared to traditional networks, such as local area network (LAN) and metropolitan area network (MAN), but they are more vulnerable than the latter. These networks rely on self-organisation and synchronization to increase the flexible communication of sensor nodes, but in time HWSN suffers from a security vulnerability. Due to wireless radio signals in WSN, it is easy for an attacker to access data transmitted among sensors, cluster heads (*CHs*) and local server (*LS*). These networks are targeted from many attacks that exploit resource-constrained, untrustworthy communication and unattended processes. HWSN threats are as follows:

- The attacker performs a MITM attack to modify or replay attack to resend the data to *CH/LS*. The attacker aim is to use his/her device as legitimate sensors in the network.
- The attacker can execute a DoS attack on *CH/LS*. This attack exploits a heavy transmission of duplicate or counterfeit data to destroy the HWSN.
- The attacker can apply several types of localisation attacks such as
  - The attacker uses several IDs of legitimate sensors with incorrect data (such as wrong and duplicate ID) and sends them to the network (Sybil attack).
  - The attacker uses more than a fake node to transfer data between different locations via a tunnel that connects counterfeit sensors. This attack leads to a disguise of communication between the legitimate sensors (Wormhole attack).

- The attacker uses a malicious sensor node to attract all data sent from the sensors. Then, he/she prevents the correct data access to the *LS* (Sinkhole attack).
- The attacker performs an attack to penetrate the EMR repository in the *LS*, to access the patient's data and reveal their identities.
- The attacker can launch an eavesdropping attack to obtain patients' data, and then perform an analysis of these data to detect the linkability between data, information, and pseudonyms.
- The attacker can copy a legitimate sensor ID in more than one counterfeit sensor. These counterfeit nodes send modified data to the network (node replication attack).
- Collision, preimage and second preimage attacks can implement to change signatures and data transferred among network's devices.

### 3.4.2 SHA Hash Function

During the implementation of the proposed storage scheme in the LS, another technique has used in the storage scheme that is to use one of the traditional Hashing algorithms in ECDSA, such as SHA1. For more details of this traditional hashing functions, see Appendix C.

### 3.4.3 BLAKE Hash Function

During the implementation of the proposed storage scheme in the LS, another technique to speed up the storage is to use one of the lightweight Hashing algorithms such as BLAKE. For more details of these lightweight hashing functions, see Appendix C.

### 3.4.4 De-identification Mechanism

Encryption and k-anonymity mechanisms are applied to hide patients' data. But, these mechanisms suffer from serious drawbacks. For instance, encryption of collected data ([Neubauer & Heurix 2011](#)) has the following drawbacks:

1. Temporary HC provider, such as a researcher doctor will not get benefit from the encrypted data, and if he/she is able to get the collected data by the decryption process, this is a security weakness in the HWSN system.

2. Huge datasets encryption is dramatically burdening for the *LS* system, which causes complexity operations and processor power consumption (Zhou et al. 2017).
3. The datasets of collected data perform the intensive and continuing operations on medical records, such as add, delete and edit, and if the records are encrypted, this will multiply the burden on the *LS* (Vatsalan et al. 2017).
4. Encryption can contain implicitly direct information about the HC patients. The breach of this encryption will expose the patients' information to the intruders(Bogos et al. 2018).

The k-anonymity of collected data suffers from the following:

1. The removal process of all the patients' information obstructs the HC provider from dealing with the linked patients' data (Neubauer & Heurix 2011).
2. Inserting a large set of false medical records, namely, greatly reduplication the dataset size. Consequently, this process consumes *LS* resources, particularly with the intensive and continuous access of the datasets by HC providers.

To address these disadvantages, we use random pseudonyms in REISCH's requests to hide the correlation of patients' information with data. The medical records transmitted/stored among the sensors, *CHs* and *LS* do not contain any patients' real information. This mechanism prevents the intruders from identifying patients' IDs. In addition, this mechanism is fast and does not need complex operations. When the EMR system wants to add a new HC provider/patient, the REISCH sends a request to the remote servers (*CS* and *AS*) which provides *LS* with the required information about updating random pseudonyms. These random pseudonyms are linked with the users' IDs. This mechanism enables sensors to access and store a specific patients' data without exceeding granted privileges.

### 3.4.5 Efficient HWSN Data Management Using XML

The other important part of the proposed EMR system is the repository. The repositories contain data in various contexts since these systems have difficulties dealing with these different coordinates for data. The extensible access control (XML) considers convenient for the exchange of various data via different environments. XML is the symbolic, simple and flexible language designed to manage, describe and exchange data across the Internet. It divides the data in the form of useful information through data organisation, the purpose of sharing data across different systems and stored in the dataset. Also, XML has several features that make it suitable for

data management, such as support for unicode, the representation of computer data structures (trees, records and lists), use a formula read by both human and computer. However, XML should support the security mechanisms to provide different levels of protection of sensitive data in the whole or part of the XML document ([Jo & Chung 2015](#)).

But this information needs mechanisms to identify the arrival of unauthorised users to protect patients' data. Patient data transmitted between sensors (nodes and *CHs*) and network devices (such as a nurse and a *LS* device) need data management algorithms to maintain both performance and security at the same time. EMR including patients' confidential data and private information needs to be accessed by HC professionals. Thus, sharing such EMR without breaching a patient's privacy requires EMR management in an efficient and secure manner. XML technology has begun showing its superiority in the exchanging of complex data over different systems.

### 3.4.6 Homomorphic Scheme

Homomorphic is a mechanism for merging all messages and signatures together to improve both performance efficiency and security. This mechanism consists of many types, such as linearly, polynomial, fully and aggregate signature ([Emmanuel et al. 2018](#)). In this study, we focus on the aggregate signature because it deals with multi-sensors signatures, messages and different private keys depending on different devices, such as sensors. Furthermore, this process is extremely suitable for multihop-based networks during the integration of signatures in a single signature. We assume that we have a range of messages  $M = \{m_1, \dots, m_n\}$  and a range signatures  $S = \{s_1, \dots, s_n\}$ ,  $M$  contains all group's messages together,  $S$  is one signature for all signatures,  $A$  is an aggregate function and  $V$  is a verification function. The process of homomorphic signatures is as follows:

- Each device generates  $K_{pr}$  and  $K_{pu}$  keys and broadcasts the  $K_{pu}$  keys to network members.
- Each device signs the  $m$  by the signature algorithm, which includes the device's ID, message and private key  $s(K_{pr}, m_i, ID)$ .
- The aggregation procedure in the intermediate nodes, such as *CH* relies on  $A$  to collect all public keys, messages and signatures  $A(K_{pu_1}, \dots, K_{pu_n}; m_1, \dots, m_n; s_1, \dots, s_n)$ .
- The verification procedure will be in the final entity, such as *LS*, which uses  $V$  to validate the signatures  $V(K_{pu_1}, \dots, K_{pu_n}; m_1, \dots, m_n; s_1, \dots, s_n)$ . If the verification process fails, it means that the data integrity operation is incorrect.

The homomorphic aggregate signature scheme is important to support the performance of network devices by making the intermediate nodes, such as *CH* performs a single signature process for all members' signatures of the group rather than the signature verification process (the ECDSA verification process consumes more time and energy than the signature process) (Luo et al. 2019). In addition, homomorphic increases security measures in preventing the tracking of patients' information and data or changing signatures of legitimate network devices (Kapusta et al. 2019).

### 3.5 Development of EMR/EHR System

- **Patient's Confidence in HC Services**

First of all, HC services include not only about patient's health record, but also their privacy such as age, chronicle disease history, and even sexual orientation. Therefore, security and privacy issues should be addressed carefully by developers of the health applications. Information privacy in HC applications is of interest to HC providers on the one hand. Because of the information is privacy issues affecting the legal and operational environments; on the other hand, privacy issues affect the patient's confidence in the use of HC applications (Rathert et al. 2017). Therefore, earning the trust of patients in health applications depends on two factors. Those are the understanding of providers for security weaknesses and how to develop health applications facing these threats.

- **HC and EMR/EHR Users**

Second, patients need to trust their HC providers such as doctors, nurses and to have confidences in the HC services and HC instruments. Patients in the HC institutions need services that are efficient, fast and continuous, and at the same time disallow disclosure of their information. Namely, these services require restrict access to only authorised persons (Ganiga et al. 2018). Access to HC networks has several challenges in security and privacy issues, such as validation of medical devices to prevent the health systems members the use of unauthorised devices, restrict the access of guests and visitors to the HC applications (such as researchers doctors and specialists) and access of control to medical records for patients by identifying the role of each of the medical staff members. For instance, the nurse can access only data of mental health to apply doctor's directives, the doctor can access identity data and information of mental health, the pharmacist can access only health data to specify prescription as well as the method of taking medication and so on. In addition, it is important compliance with medical standards for HC organisations (such




Figure 3.7: Taxonomy of HC users

as HIPAA standards to ensure the data confidentiality) ([Bradford Networks 2012](#)). All of these challenges require a great effort and can be a burden on IT staff.

Figure 3.7 shows the taxonomy of HC users. This Figure divided into users (such as patient, nurse and doctor) and datasets or medical records (information and data). Also, information includes personal (such as name, age and address) and network (such as password, OTP, MAC and signature). While data includes specific disease data (such as sexual, mental and dermatology).

- **Administration/Management of Health Organisations**

Last, but not the least. patients must be confident that their medical records have been stored where the security has been absolutely well addressed. Because of the increasing challenges to health organisations, these organisations require another feature, such as data management in addition to the privacy and security issues ([Consultants to Government and Industries 2015](#), [Lokshina & Lanting 2019](#)). The different data contexts in network exchanges cause a heavy burden on authorisation systems. Also, the network security in the HC systems requires the integration of all the different network units in the security system. In addition, the connection with the proper adoption of the security context of each device in the network (such as a computer, sensor and phone). Furthermore, providing the vision of information with access control in real-time helps to build a security efficient system for HC ([Bradford Networks 2012](#)).

### 3.6 Integrating WSN with HC Application

In this section, we will focus on how to address the protection issue in our designed HC application system. This proposal includes medical records protection in three areas: transferring authentication and authorisation information, accessing server datasets (EMR/EHR repository) and data collection (WSN) as shown in Figure 3.8. The components used in the proposed scheme are communication devices (laptop and desktop), a remote server (central server ( $CS$ )), attribute server ( $AS$ ) and data server ( $DS$ )), a local server ( $LS$ ) and sensors nodes.  $CS$  considers as a portal to authenticate and authorise users' requests,  $AS$  contains users' real identities (IDs),  $DS$  contains patients' data store and  $LS$  contains data collections by WSN. Communication devices used to send and receive medical records, such as medical reports. These devices used by patients or providers (medical staff) and that are authenticated and authorised access to confidential data for patients. Servers are used to store patients' medical records and control access to a datasets.

For example, a provider, such as a doctor in a hospital can send authentication and authorisation request by his/her communication device to earn access to a specific patient's data. Also, the patient can obtain his/her medical record history via sending a request directly to the remote server ( $CS$ ) over the Internet. This situation obtains if the patient is authenticated and authorised to grant access to his/her information and data. Sensor nodes used to gather patients' data in an environment (hospital or clinic) and stored in  $LS$  (EMR repository). Collecting patients' data through sensor nodes requires protection from the risks and threats (such as internal and external attacks). Also, the transfer of patient's data from and to the local or remote server datasets requires applying critical security policies to prevent the various attacks. Our framework offers the following capabilities to ensure security and privacy requirements in the HC application:

- Use of lightweight algorithms, such as ECC and PHOTON (signencryoption) to address the performance and security in authentication protocols.
- Controlled access for authorised users and the datasets management via the Internet by authorisation protocols.
- WSN data management and use of the proper context (XML) for the exchange of data on different devices, as well as, protection of WSN's data through signature (ECDSA) with the fast hash function and MD anonymity.




Figure 3.8: The proposed project model in HC environment

### 3.7 Users' Authentication in EHR

In this Section, we will briefly explain the design of the authentication scheme. This scheme will be more detailed in Chapter 4 to explain authentication protocols among network entities.

#### 1. Information Confidentiality in EHR

Users' information is a sensitive part of the definition of users in the HC application. This information proves their legitimacy in accessing the network services. The authentication process is the first security procedure when connecting to a HC application network. Therefore, user authentication information needs mechanisms that apply the requirements of confidentiality and integrity to prevent disclosure or change of information. Signcryption (encryption and signature) for users' small information is critical to repressing attacks, especially, external. However, EHR systems require efficient security protocols because of the large volume of communications exchange between users and EHR repository. We propose using ECIES-256 bit for encryption and PHOTON-256 bit for signature. These algorithms perform efficient operations as specified in the Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3. Although, encryption is extremely expensive for server resources when used with large data in HC environments. But it is suitable when used with small authentication information. Therefore, we use efficient ECIES to encrypt only users' information in our authentication scheme. In this scheme, we rely on three entities (communication devices, *CS* and *AS*) to complete the authentication process. Communication device sends the authentication request after signing and encrypting user information to *CS* and *AS*. These servers validate the authentication request by decrypting authentication request, verifying signatures, and checking user security parameters, such as pseudonym, password and timestamp. Failure of the authentication request prevents the user from network services, such as the authorisation process of data access is not allowed when the authentication process fails.

#### 2. Ensure User and Device Authenticity

The design of authentication protocols in the HC application requires robust mechanisms to demonstrate legitimate users and their devices. Several reasons are to penetrate the authentication process in health applications. For instance, the theft or loss of the legitimate user's device, the analysis of requests for login, registration and authentication transferred among network entities, the use of real information for a legitimate user (internal attack) or disguising as legitimate user (external attack) are serious risks of penetration

of the authentication process. The process of separating real information from authentication protocols and security parameters (such as password and private key) from user communication devices greatly limits the penetration of the authentication process. Therefore, we propose using techniques, such as OTP, mutual authentication and MAC with encryption and signing to prevent attacks aforementioned on the authentication process. OTP is used to establish the user's legitimacy in the HC network registration process. Mutual authentication is used to prevent imitation attacks either from the communication device or server. MAC is used to prove the legitimacy of the device. Additionally, we propose hiding the private key of the ECIES algorithm in a computation process that includes the signature and password, while preventing the password from being stored explicitly on the user's device. Consequently, the use of these techniques within authentication protocols provides authenticity to the legitimate user and the device.

## 3.8 Privacy of Users' Authorisation in EHR

In the previous section, we have addressed the authentication issues; while we will briefly address the authorisation issues in the section. This scheme will be more detailed in Chapter 5 to explain authorisation protocols among network entities.

### 1. Access Control with EHR Datasets

The other important part of HC applications is to protect patient's data stored in the server datasets (*DS*). These data need protection mechanisms of internal and external attackers. Therefore, patients' dataset in the server requires defining the access privileges of each user (patient, patient relative, nurse, doctor, advisor, researcher, emergency doctor, pharmacist) wants access to this data. The access control (AC) property only allows authorised users access to certain data. AC provides confidentiality in the EHR by restricting access rights for authorised users (Rezaeibagha et al. 2015).

AC models are the cornerstone for building robust privacy in authorisation systems. We propose to merge two models role-based (RBAC) and attribute-based access control (ABAC) to specify the role of each user with a specific task and attributes that grant more privileges. In addition, we propose the use of features XACML to protect patient's data from illegal and unauthorised access. Initially, users (providers or patients) should be authenticated to the HC network. Our authentication scheme is to prevent external attackers through the use of signencrytption (ECC/PHOTON). The next stage is the use of XACML to determine the medical records that the user can access. At

this stage, our application involves identifying the capabilities of each user, to identify access each user to certain data and define the tasks of each user. In our scheme, we propose signing of the attributes and information in XACML request. XACML defines the policies and the semantic to apply those policies. XACML formats are used for request and response between the entities PEP and PDP to determine AC of the source ([Sartoli & Namin 2019](#)). Furthermore, XACML is composed of policies and rules. Policies define the applied of request, while the rules governing limitations for the applied of XACML. The request consists of attributes associated with the request sender and the response contains the decision (permit, deny, not applicable and indeterminate).

## 2. Using Pseudonym and Anonymity with EHR to Hide the Medical Records

Pseudonym and anonymity are privacy properties in unlinking, hiding and disguising the medical records of patients. Pseudonym property is applied to the patients' data by unlinking real information with data about a users who are not required to know data identity. For example, the nurse is not required to know the information about patient identities (IDs). But it is possible to know some issues, such as the medical name (pseudonym), the range of age and medical reports. The doctor can know some of the personal information of the patient. But it is not important to know the criminal status of the patient information. In addition, if a doctor asked to consult another doctor, the latter is allowed to access only health data and medical reports. Suppose the patient's information and data are stored in the datasets and only the central HC administrator has the authority to access all medical records. We assume the use of four datasets (users' attributes (patients and HC providers), pseudonyms, policies (on *AS*) and patients' data (on *DS*)). Each patient has a number and pseudonym in the central database in addition to the use of the concept of multiple pseudonyms between communication device and servers (*CS*, *AS* and *DS*). For instance, if the patient or provider sends an authorisation request to the network, user's pseudonym will be different when the request is transferred between the communication device and network entities (*CS*, *AS* and *DS*). The use of a multi pseudonyms mechanism prevents an attacker from tracking requests and responses when they are transferred among network entities.

Users' information requires the anonymity property to disguise and prevent disclosure of their IDs. We propose the use of information anonymity with XACML to protect patients' data from illegitimate and unauthorised access.

Anonymity property is applied to the users' information by concealing signatures (ECDSA) and Shamir scheme. The addition of anonymity property with XACML leads to increase the privacy of data through the hide data and limit access for authorised users. Authorisation protocols become more robust when implementing a Shamir scheme with signatures because a set of secrets is created to produce the master signature. These secrets provide anonymity (depending on the number of secrets or threshold) in each authorisation request. We use anonymity property with information rather than data for two reasons: first to disguise and protect the users' information, and second to maintain network efficiency. Because the use of anonymity with large patient data is extremely expensive for network resources compared to the size of users' small information during the authorisation process for users. In addition, we use multiple pseudonyms with both information and data to prevent the association of real information with data.

### 3.9 Protocols to Improve the Security of WSN and EMR

In this Section, we will present a set of protocols used in HC application based on WSN. This scheme will be more detailed in Chapter 6 to explain our security protocols in HWSN among sensors, *CH* and *LS*.

#### 1. HC Data Management and the EMR's Storing/Exchanging

We propose to use of XML to manage the wireless local area network (WLAN) data. This descriptive language enables all devices to read data in a simple and meaningful way. In addition, we propose using the mechanism of signature (ECDSA) with XML file for the management and protection of patient data at the same time.

The process of verifying collected signatures from sensors consumes *CH* energy and time quickly. ECDSA algorithm accomplishes operations of the public key, signature generation and signature verification. The operation of signature verification in the ECDSA algorithm consumes more time and energy than a signature generation ([Jariwala & Jinwala 2012](#), [Othman et al. 2013](#)). We assume that we have a clinic or a hospital care scheme as shown in Figure 3.9. We propose using homomorphic property with the signature in all sensor nodes. Homomorphic property means the direct computation on signed data. Each sensor node signs the message, and then sends it to the *CH*. Thereafter, *CH* combines all signed messages without verifies the messages. Afterwards,




Figure 3.9: Homomorphic and 1 scalar multiplication with signatures

*CH* sends signed messages to a *LS* (unrestricted resources). Due to the transport operations consume more energy from the computation operations. The collection of signed messages without verify in the *CH* reduces the transport operations and thus save time and energy.

## 2. Integrity and Authentication of EMR

We propose to use the BLAKE and Anonymity with the ECDSA algorithm in authentication of EMR in our proposed HC application systems. For more details about the BLAKE and ECDSA algorithm, refer to Appendix C.3.

## 3.10 Summary of the Chapter

In this Chapter, we have described the general methodology of our proposed project. In addition, a detailed explanation of cryptography techniques has provided in the authentication, authorisation and data storage schemes proposed. The general framework of the proposed project has described the general network model in linking the three schemes in one system. Next Chapters 4,5 and 6, we will explain in detail our authentication, authorisation, and data collection schemes in HC application.

# Chapter 4: A More Efficient and Secure EHR/EMR Storage and Repository

In traditional HC, the collecting and storing of patients' health and medical records has been a slow and insecure manoeuvre, not alone, a costly and privacy intrusive practice. The advances in the ICT has made possible to use Electronic health and medical records, which can be collected by a kind of sensor networks and securely stored in a data server. In this chapter, we will put forward to taking advantage of the Wireless Sensor Network for collecting EMR/EHRs in a data server or a data repository.

## 4.1 Data Collection by HWSNs

EMRs vastly are applied in the health sector ([Sarkar 2017](#)). Moreover, EMR needs patients' data collection technology such as HWSN. In terms of sensor devices, HWSN consumes its resources through computations, communications and transportation. Because these networks have limited memory, energy and bandwidth, sensors suffer from many issues to accomplish data security. For instance, routing protocols are important to reduce energy consumption during sending authentication requests. Also, heavy computations of complex signatures are a serious problem of energy consumption of sensors. In addition, remote sensors consume considerable energy when connected to a network cluster. Another important issue, signatures verification in each  $CH_i$  (per round) is a huge burden on the energy consumption and time of  $CHs$ . In addition, joining malicious sensors to wirelessly clusters causes the destruction of  $CHs$  quickly. Therefore, protecting information sensors in addition to location security is essential for data security.

In terms of EMR server, unauthenticated communications and transfers cause complex computations that waste the time of the EMR server. In each round, the

EMR server requires verification of signatures for both *CHs* and *SNs* in addition to the complex operations of storing the collected data. Furthermore, privacy breach issues in access to the repository are crucial in the reliance of EMR systems. Then, the loss of data/information due to repository penetrations takes a long time to retrieve accurately. Additionally, continuous and systematic updating of medical records and the difficulty of classifying data can be a reason for hacking the EMR server. Therefore, preventing attackers from breakthrough EMR server is important to provide data security. As a result, data security issues in both sensors and the EMR server should be addressed to build a reliable data collection scheme.

#### 4.1.1 A Reliable and Efficient Scheme for Data Collection

We propose a **R**eliable and **E**fficient **I**ntegrity **S**cheme of **D**ata **C**ollection in **HWSN** (REISCH) to ensure that patients' data transferred/stored to the *LS/BS* securely and efficiently. The REISCH have been characterized as follows:

- REISCH applies Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with BLAK2bp instead of ECDSA with Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA1) to improve HWSN lifetime and to prevent the intruders alter/change patients' data.
- REISCH uses the homomorphic mechanism with *CHs* to reduce energy consumption when they aggregate patients' data from sensors.
- REISCH hides the sensor's identification (SID) and location (SL) by using random pseudonyms. This mechanism prevents intruders from detecting sensors information transmitted between network terminals.

## 4.2 Our Proposed Data Storage Model

Within any HC application systems, the security of EMR/EHR repository, and most of the time the privacy of the patients are of critical importance. It is no different to our HC system proposed in Chapter 3. In this section, we will introduce a model and develop protocols for data collection and storage.

### 4.2.1 Network Model

The REISCH scheme includes a set of entities, as shown in Figure 4.1:

1. Sensor (*SN*): This entity collects raw data related to a specific patient. It sends this data to *CH*.
2. Cluster head (*CH*): This entity aggregates data from sensors that followed it. Then, it sends this data to *LS*.




Figure 4.1: General REISCH model

3. Local server (*LS*): This entity receives data from all *CHs* in each round and stored it in EMR's repository. Subsequently, it sends these data periodically to the central server (*CS*).
4. Central server (*CS*): This entity is gateway access remote servers such as the attributes server (*AS*) and the data server (*DS*). It receives data from *LS* and sends data to *DS* after being authenticated by *AS*. Security procedures in *AS* and *DS* are left for future directions.

Our network model works with low-energy adaptive clustering hierarchy (LEACH) protocol for WSN. LEACH uses clustering architecture to improve WSN lifetime, more details about this protocol is available in (Awaad & Jebbar 2015). Each group of *SNs* collects raw data for a specific patient. These *SNs* sign data before sending them to *CHs*. Each *CH* aggregates data and signatures from his followers. Then, each *CH* uses homomorphic property with all data and signatures without verifying the signatures to reduce energy consumption on *CH* and send them to *LS*. Due to *LS* is unlimited resources, it verifies and validates collected data from *SNs*. *LS* sends stored data on EMR's repository to the central repository to allow HC users (patients and providers) access them by sending authentication/authorisation requests to the central server (*CS*), attributes server (*AS*) and data server (*DS*). This paper focuses on performance and security issues in *SNs*, *CHs*, *LS* and *CS*. Security issues for datasets and transferred data in *CS*, *AS* and *DS* are beyond this paper and left for future works.

#### 4.2.2 Design Goals of REISCH

To develop a reliable data collection scheme, REISCH adopts the following security requirements:

- **Information confidentiality:** This requirement is achieved to hide *SNs*/patients' identities and to protect patients secrecy from disclosure by intruders.
- **Data integrity:** This is to protect the patients' data from intruders tampering. The collected data should arrive the intended target without alteration to provide a reliable communication channel among *SNs*, *CHs*, *LS* and *CS* Al-Zubaidie et al. (2019b).
- **Non-repudiation:** This is to prove that the message is sent by a particular *SN* in the HWSN. If a legitimate entity in HWSN performs internal attacks, he/she cannot deny his/her messages while availing the privileges granted to him/her.
- **Freshness:** It indicates that the data collection message is new and updated to guarantee that the intruder cannot replay the previous message at a later time. This goal is accomplished by checking of time, a random passcode, and random signatures within each data collection round to counteract spoofing risks such as replay, MITM, and impersonation.
- **Security of Localisation:** This feature ensures that the patient/sensor's real location is protected from detection, or sends error messages to *LS* by an intruder.
- **Scalability:** HWSN applications elaborate in a scalable environment in both data and devices. Thus, these applications need data collection schemes capable of processing and adapting to the ever-increasing number of devices of HWSN. This feature indicates the ability of the data collection scheme to properly handle huge HWSN devices. Public key signature schemes are convenient to provide this requirement Kumar et al. (2016).
- **Survivability:** It provides a certain level of services in patients' data collection or network capability to withstand failure/threats in an appropriate manner and continue to provide services between *SNs* and *LS* for as long as possible.
- **Accountability:** This property means tracking the behaviour of malicious threats/suspicious activities by legitimate users/counterfeiting attacks in accessing EMRs' repository.

- **Efficiency:** HWSN sources such as energy, storage, and processor should be within the design objectives of security protocols in HWSN.

## 4.3 REISCH's Scheme

In this subsection, we will explain details about REISCH in terms of entities preparation, using ECDSA-BLAKE2bp, applying camouflage signature, implementing homomorphic and REISCH protocols.

### 4.3.1 Entities Preparation

To start collection and storage processes, it should prepare HWSN network with the following points:

- Each sensor ( $SN_i$ ) and  $LS$  server provided  $SN_i$  pseudonym ( $SN_{Pseud}$ ),  $SN_i$  pseudonym signature ( $SigLS_i(SN_{Pseud})$ ) and  $SN_i$  location ( $SN_{SL}$ ).
- All entities ( $SN_i$ ,  $CH_i$ ,  $LS$  and  $CS$ ) generates  $K_{pu_i}$  and  $K_{pr_i}$  to apply asymmetric cryptographic.
- Each entity broadcasts  $K_{pu_i}$  to network members.
- Each  $SN_i$  uses ECDSA signatures ( $SigSN$  and  $SigCH$ ) to achieve collected data integrity.
- Each server ( $LS$  and  $CS$ ) uses ECDSA signatures ( $SigLS$  and  $SigCS$ ) to achieve storage data integrity.

### 4.3.2 For the Integrity of EMR/EHR being Transmitted

For the integrity of patient's records being transmitted between the HWSNs and the  $LS$ , the REISCH would sign all the EMR/EHR records by using ECDSA algorithm, in which it is hash function will be BLAKE2bp, rather than the traditional SHA1. In REISCH, we used ECDSA-BLAKE2bp to ensure data integrity as well as add  $SN_{Pseud}$  within  $SigSN$  to prevent changing data.  $LS$  and  $CS$  accept only valid signature after verification. The high performance and security of the ECDSA-BLAKE2bp algorithm makes it an appropriate choice to protect EMR health records. Also, using ECDSA-BLAKE2bp with XML adds the feature of managing medical records in HWSN.




Figure 4.2: Camouflage signature

### 4.3.3 Applying Camouflage Signature

REISCH uses the camouflage process to add hidden data signature completely and prevent traceability, analysis or alteration of data. The camouflage process starts by signing the data to obtain a 64-bit MD and then adding a 64-bit counterfeit signature to a total length of 64-bit + 64-bit = 128-bit. In addition, each  $SN_i$  adds padding (0000) to become the total length of the signature 132-bit as shown in Figure 4.2.  $SN_i$  performs the process of exchanging data signature segments based on Parity (even / odd) value. It receives this value invisibly from  $LS$  because this value is included in the ephemeral random value ( $SigLsE_i$ ).  $SN_i$  tests  $SigLsE_i$ , if "even" it divides 132-bit into four segments (each segment to 33-bit) and exchanges the segments. Then,  $SN_i$  truncates 32-bit from the first segment and divide it into four segments (each segment to 8-bit). If  $SigLsE_i$  is "odd", it divides 132-bit into three segments (each segment to 44-bit) and then exchanges the segments. It then truncates 42-bit and divides the first segment into three segments (each segment to 14-bit). Because the exchanging operation is based on Parity sent from  $LS$ , this process prevents the detection of the original signature of the data and prevents it from being changed. Thus, this process protects patients' data from tampering or alteration.

#### 4.3.4 Implementing Homomorphic

REISCH uses the homomorphic property with the ECDSA-BLAKE2bp algorithm to increase network performance. Because the verification process in ECDSA consumes more time and processing than the signature process, it is very convenient to use the homomorphic property in HWSN to support both performance and security. LEACH protocol is based on the principle of clustering to reduce energy consumption, thus REISCH uses the aggregate signature to allow  $CH_i$  to aggregate signatures and data without using verification. To double security in REISCH,  $CH_i$

performs the process of aggregating temporary signatures such as  $SigSnT_{3s}$  and  $SigSnT_{4s}$  in addition to random numbers ( $SN_{RNs}$ ) and data. Temporary signatures contain unclearly original signatures that prevent an intruder from penetrating patients' data. The homomorphic procedure reduces energy consumption and thus increases the possibility of using the ECDSA algorithm with HWSN for as long as possible.

### 4.3.5 REISCH's Protocols

REISCH scheme consists of three protocols. During these protocols, REISCH provides reliable data collection processes to protect collected patients' data.

#### 4.3.5.1 Protocol1 between $SNs$ and $CHs$

This protocol performs the data collection process (Figure 4.3 shows the first protocol processes between  $SN_i$  and  $CH_i$  in the data collection). At the beginning of each round, each  $SN_i$  receives one-time passcode ( $LS_{OTP_i}$ ) and a random number ( $SN_{RN_i}$ ). This  $LS_{OTP_i}$  contains an ephemeral random value ( $SigLsE_i$ ) of the same length as the signature.  $SN_i$  extracts  $SigLsE_i(SN_{Pseud})$  from dataset and executes  $\oplus$  to extract the secret value  $SigLsE_i$ . Then,  $SN_i$  executes the *Parity* (as shown in Section 4.3.3) process based on  $SigLsE_i$  to get the temporary signature ( $SigSnT_1$ ). After that,  $SN_i$  generates an ephemeral random value ( $SigSnE_i$ ) with the same signature length and uses it with  $SigSnT_1$  to compute the  $SigSnT_2$  value. Next,  $SN_i$  computes the *Dif* value that represents the subtraction value of the distance between  $CH_i$  and  $SN_i$  ( $SNC_{HD}$ ) and the distance between  $LS$  and  $SN_i$  ( $SNL_{SD}$ ). *Dif* specifies that  $SN_i$  is within the HWSN framework (1000m \* 1000m). Additionally,  $SN_i$  computes a new timestamp ( $SN_{TS}$ ) and one time passcode ( $SN_{OTP}$ ). Thereafter,  $SN_i$  performs hidden process for  $SN_{TS}$  and  $SN_{OTP}$  at a temporary value ( $SN_{TS_t}$ ) with the addition of a value of only seconds ( $SS$ ) at the end of the  $SN_{TS_t}$ . Furthermore,  $SN_i$  uses  $SN_P$  to concatenate secret parameters such as  $SN_{TS_t}$ ,  $SN_{OTP}$ ,  $SN_{RN_i}$ ,  $SN_{Pseud}$  and  $SN_{SL}$  to match them at  $LS$ . To protect both  $SN_P$  and  $SigSnE_i$ ,  $SN_i$  uses the  $\oplus$  operation to hide them by calculating the temporary values of  $SigSnT_3$  and  $SigSnT_4$ . At this point,  $SN_i$  computes the message ( $SN_m$ ) and sends it to  $CH_i$  which is a sequence of  $SigSnT_3$ ,  $SigSnT_4$ ,  $SN_{RN_i}$ ,  $Dif$ ,  $SN_{TS_t}$  and data collection.

In the  $CH_i$  side, it also receives  $LS_{OTP_i}$  of  $LS$  and  $SN_m$  of  $SN_i$ . Afterwards,  $CH_i$  truncates  $Dif_i$  and tests its value within the HWSN framework by computation  $Dif_i \leq$  Maximum value, where the Maximum value should be less than or equal to 707.1068. Then,  $CH_i$  computes the timestamp ( $CH_{TS_1}$ ) to prevent late messages.  $CH_i$  truncates  $SS$  from  $SN_{TS_t}$  to obtain  $SN_{TS_1}$ . If the difference between  $CH_{TS_1}$




Figure 4.3: Data collection protocol

and  $SN_{TS_i}$  is less than the  $\Delta T$  delay rate (we assumed that  $\Delta T = 3$ ), namely, that the message is fresh.

#### 4.3.5.2 Protocol2 between CHs and LS

This protocol performs the data aggregation process (Figure 4.4 shows the second protocol processes between  $CH_i$  and  $LS$  in the data aggregation). Each  $CH_i$  receives temporary signatures, random numbers and collected data from its  $SN_i$  followers. Then,  $CH_i$  executes the signature process  $SigCH$  for the temporary signatures received ( $SigSnT_{3s}$ ) of its  $SN_i$  followers. Thereafter,  $CH_i$  extracts the  $SigLsE_i$  unique value from  $LSOTP_i$  similar to the first protocol based on  $SigLS_i(CH_{Pseud})$  stored. Next,  $CH_i$  performs  $CH_{Parity}$  process based on  $SigLsE_i$  extracted (as described in Section 4.3.3) to compute  $SigChT_1$ . Moreover,  $CH_i$  computes  $SigChT_2$  depending on the  $SigChT_1 \oplus SigLsE_i$  operation. After that,  $CH_i$  generates  $CH_{TS_2}$  and  $CH_{OTP}$  to prevent the problem of replay messages later.  $CH_i$  calculates  $CH_P$  which represents the sequence of secret parameters. Also,  $CH_i$  computes  $CH_A$  to complete the process of aggregating temporary signatures ( $SigSnT_{3s}$  and  $SigSnT_{4s}$ ), random numbers ( $SN_{RNs}$ ) and collected data ( $Data_s$ ). Finally,  $CH_i$  computes  $CH_m$  and sends it to  $LS$ .

In the  $LS$  side, after  $LS$  sends  $LSOTP_i$  for all  $SN_i$ , it waits to receive  $CH_m$  of all  $CH_i$  per round.  $LS$  truncates  $CH_{RN_i}$ ,  $SS_i$  and  $CH_A$  from each  $CH_m$  received. It uses  $SS_i$  to reconfigure  $CH_{TS_2}$ , also  $LS$  generates a timestamp ( $LS_{TS_1}$ ) and tests




Figure 4.4: Data aggregation protocol

$\Delta T$  between  $LSTS_1$  and  $CH_{TS2}$  to confirm the freshness of the message. Then, it tests whether  $CH_{RNi}$  matches the value previously sent. If  $CH_{RNi}$  is correct, it is used to determine  $CH_{Pseudi}$  and the latter is used to determine  $CH_i$  location ( $CH_{SLi}$ ). Afterwards,  $LS$  retrieves temporary signatures and random numbers ( $SigSnT_{3s}$ ,  $SigSnT_{4s}$  and  $SN_{RNs}$ ) from  $CH_A$ .  $LS$  uses the  $SigLsE_i$  value to specify a *Parity* (even/odd) value for all  $SN_i$  and  $CH_i$ . It computes a signature ( $SigLS_{1i}$ ) for all  $SN_i$  signatures that followed a specific  $CH_i$  ( $SigSnT_{3s}$ ) and exchange the  $SigLS_{1i}$  segments based on  $CH_{Parity}$ . After that,  $LS$  calculates  $SigLst_{1i}$  which equals  $SigChT_2$  in  $CH_i$  based on  $SigLS_{1i} \oplus SigLsE_i$ . To ensure the legitimacy of  $CH_i$ ,  $LS$  extracts the secret parameters at  $CH_{Pi}$  and tests the match  $CH_{Pseudi}$  and  $CH_{SLi}$  in the datasets. At this point,  $LS$  checks for data integrity collected by  $SN_i$ . Similarly,  $LS$  uses  $SN_{RNi}$  to determine  $SN_{Pseudi}$ , and performs data signature ( $SigLS_{2i}$ ) that equals the  $SigSN$  in  $SN_i$  and exchanges the  $SigLS_{2i}$  segments based on  $SN_{Parityi}$ . Next,  $LS$  uses  $SigSnT_{4i}$  and  $SigLsE_i$  to extract  $SigSnE_i$ . Thereafter,  $LS$  uses  $SigSnT_{3i}$  and  $SigSnE_i$  to compute  $SigLst_{2i}$ . Finally,  $LS$  extracts the secret parameters for  $SN_i$  from  $SN_{Pi}$  and tests matching  $SN_{Pseudi}$  and  $SN_{SLi}$  in datasets. If all signatures and parameters are validated correctly, namely that the data collected by  $SN_i$  is legitimate and correct and has not been tampered with by the intruder.




Figure 4.5: Data storage protocol

#### 4.3.5.3 Protocol3 between LS and CS

This protocol performs the data storage process (Figure 4.5 shows the third protocol processes between  $LS$  and  $CS$  in the data storage). Initially,  $LS$  generates a new pseudonym ( $LS_{Pseud_n}$ ) and timestamp ( $LS_{TS_2}$ ) to prepare for the process of sending data to  $CS$ . Then,  $LS$  computes the  $SigLS$  signature based on  $CS$ 's old pseudonym ( $CS_{Pseud_o}$ ). After that,  $LS$  generates and sends  $LS_{OTP}$  to  $CS$ , which is based on the  $SigLS$ ,  $LS_{Pseud_n}$ ,  $LS_{TS_2}$  as well as append  $SS$  at the end of  $LS_{OTP}$ . On the  $CS$  side, it generates  $CS_{TS_1}$ ,  $CS_{Pseud_n}$ ,  $CS_{OTP}$  and  $CS_{RN}$ .  $CS$  uses  $CS_{TS_1}$  to test the message arrival time of  $LS$ . Also,  $CS$  computes  $CsT_1$  and  $CsT_2$  temporary and are based on secret parameters such as  $CS_{OTP}$  and  $CS_{Pseud_n}$ . In addition, the  $CS$  generates a  $SigCS$  signature that includes the temporary value ( $CsT_2$ ). At this point,  $CS$  computes and sends  $CS_m$  to  $LS$  containing the sequence of parameters such as  $SigCS$ ,  $CsT_1$ ,  $CsT_2$ ,  $SS$  and  $CS_{RN}$ .

On the  $LS$  side, it truncates parameters embedded within  $CS_m$ . Thereafter,  $LS$  generates  $LS_{TS_3}$  to check the arrival time of  $CS_m$ . Furthermore,  $LS$  computes  $CS_{OTP}$  that relying mainly on  $LS_{Pseud_n}$ . Afterwards,  $LS$  extracts  $CS_{Pseud_n}$  to calculate  $SigLS_3$ .  $LS$  tests matching  $SigLS_3$  and  $SigCS$ , if the result is identical, this means that mutual authentication process between the  $LS$  and  $CS$  is performed

correctly and legitimately. After this stage,  $LS$  prepares the data storage request to  $CS$ . First,  $LS$  generates  $LS_{TS_4}$  and  $LS_{RN}$  to ensure randomness and freshness. After that,  $LS$  computes the  $SigLS_4$  signature that depends on the  $LsT_1$  temporary parameters. Then,  $LS$  computes the  $SigLS_5$  data signature that depends on temporary parameters such as  $LsT_2$ ,  $LsT_3$ , and  $SigLS_4$  as well as the  $Data$ . Finally,  $LS$  sends  $LS_m$  which includes  $SigLS_5$ ,  $SS$ ,  $LS_{RN}$  and  $Data$  to  $CS$ .

On the  $CS$  side, it receives  $LS_m$  of  $LS$ .  $CS$  generates  $CS_{TS_2}$  new to test access time  $LS_m$ .  $CS$  calculates  $SigCS_1$  and  $SigCS_2$  similarly to  $SigLS_4$  and  $SigLS_5$  respectively. At this point,  $CS$  checks matching  $SigCS_2$  and  $SigLS_5$ , if the result is identical, it means that  $CS$  received patients' data from  $LS$  correctly and integrated without any changes by malicious attacks.

## 4.4 Summary of the Chapter

In this chapter, we have provided details about security of data collection and our contributions to build new data collection scheme. After that, network model for data collection scheme explains general structure to store patients' data in EMR repository securely. Finally, data collection scheme methodology has been explained in detail to collect patients' data in HC application.

# Chapter 5: Robust Security Mechanism to Authenticate Users Identity to the EHR Repository

In the preceding chapters, we have identified the limitations and/or what can be improved of the existing HC applications. Towards a better solution, we, in chapter 3, have proposed to integrate WSN technology with EHR/EMR repository in a HC application. From this chapter on, we will elaborate the security strategy which have been developed for the proposed HC application. In particular, this chapter will describe an authentication scheme, mainly for protecting the user's/network's information.

## 5.1 Security in EHR Systems

As we know, users' information (personal such as name and network such as password) define and prove their legitimacy in EHR systems. This information requires a procedure to prevent disclosure of users' secrets while at the same time proving their legitimacy in the network. Authentication is the most critical security requirement that plays a key role in building correct security before the exchange of patients' data in EHR (Arshad et al. 2015, Das et al. 2017, Li et al. 2016, Rajput, Abbas, Wang, Eun & Oh 2016). First, it reduces malicious or fatal errors caused by penetration attacks on the authentication information. Second, it alleviates errors in specifying drug, dose, timing, or procedure (Yuehong et al. 2016). Therefore, access to these data should be controlled to prevent unauthenticated access. As a result, authentication protocols are a critical requirement to repel various attacks. Typically, the server application should prevent all fake and illegal authentication requests. It should protect personal information, health records, and physiological parameters (such as sugar, and heart rate) (Arshad et al. 2015, Wazid et al.

2016). However, authentication information may be easier to compromise if EHR data and information are stored on a single server. Furthermore, the transfer of authentication information in an insecure environment (WLAN or Internet), may expose patients' data for detection or modification (Li et al. 2016, Shrestha et al. 2016).

Unfortunately, the traditional cryptography (such as RSA) and signature (such as SHA1) schemes require complex computations that consume server resources, such as processing power and memory when used with EHR systems that may deal with large amounts of health data and thus, render them unusable. The electronic signature is an important way to check the integrity of the users' information in the authentication request (Giri et al. 2015). Many algorithms, especially lightweight algorithms, such as PHOTON, QUARK, and SPONGENT, are used to implement signature algorithms that perform lightweight operations to reduce high overheads on the server. HC applications require cryptographic and signature high-speed, and secure algorithms (Liu & Chung 2017). There is a misconception about using a symmetric encryption algorithm instead of public encryption algorithms. Recent research has proved the opposite (Farash et al. 2016). In addition, symmetric encryption algorithms have problems with scalability and single secret key detection. To implement an authentication scheme, many algorithms, such as ECC, RSA, hash function, bilinear pairing, fuzzy extractor, and XOR operation (Chandrakar & Om 2017), are used to design HC projects. Many recent HC applications are based on ECC and RSA, both of which provide the same security level, although ECC is more efficient than RSA. The design of an authentication scheme in HC applications should provide mutual authentication, resistance to known attacks, such as MITM, eavesdropping, tracing, replay, impersonation, guessing, DoS, protection of information and reduced cost and high-efficiency (Yeh 2016, Shankar et al. 2015).

### 5.1.1 A Robust Model of Authentication for the Proposed HC Application

We propose a **Robust Authentication Model for Healthcare Users** (RAMHU) that uses lightweight algorithms and security techniques for HC applications that perform massive and continuous authentication processes while simultaneously protecting against various attacks. They are summarized as follows:

- RAMHU uses lightweight algorithms for encryption (ECIES) and signature (PHOTON). These algorithms provide efficient and secure authentication for users in HC applications compared to other algorithms;

- RAMHU applies an OTP mechanism to authenticate users in their first registration in the HC network with timestamp verification and random nonce generation to repel different types of external attacks;
- RAMHU uses a multi pseudonyms mechanism to prevent any association between the real information, pseudonyms, and user's data. This mechanism prevents attackers from identifying HC users (providers and patients);
- RAMHU integrates login request with MAC address in addition to verifying that this address is original and not fake for authentication of legitimate devices. This prevents attackers from using different devices to compromise the network information;
- RAMHU improves the mutual authentication between server and clients to prevent spoofing and impersonation attacks by either fake server or client. This prevents external attacks intended to deceive trusted parties.

## 5.2 The Proposed Authentication Scheme

In this Section, we will detail about our authentication scheme that provides security and efficiency features in HC applications. This Section will be divided into the network model, model goals, and proposed authentication scheme protocols.

### 5.2.1 Network Model

The RAMHU model consists of four entities as shown in Figure 5.1:

1. Client ( $C_i$ ) or user: This entity includes patients, relatives of patients, and HC providers, such as doctors, researchers, emergency practitioners, advisors, and nurses.
2. Central server ( $CS$ ): This entity is a gateway to authenticate users with the attributes server and to authorise the data server.
3. Attributes server ( $AS$ ): This entity contains users' real information as well as multi pseudonyms. The authentication process requires verifying the association of the actual information with the multi pseudonyms in this entity.
4. Data server ( $DS$ ): This entity contains users' data as well as multi pseudonyms. This entity is not implemented in our authentication scheme. Our scheme focuses only on the process of users' authentication in the HC network.




Figure 5.1: General network model

Generally,  $C_i$  creates an authentication request mainly based on ECIES and PHOTON.  $C_i$  sends a request to  $CS$  to verify encryption, signature, and security parameters (such as MAC address, pseudonyms, and  $OTP_i$ ). Then, the  $CS$  sends a request to the  $AS$  to verify the link between the pseudonyms, the real information, the signatures, and  $PW_i$ . After that, the  $AS$  sends the response to the  $CS$  that verifies the signature and the parameters and then the  $CS$  sends the response (authenticated or not) to the  $C_i$ . If the user is authenticated, the user can then send an authorisation request to access the data in the repository ( $DS$ ) and obtain the authorisation response from the  $CS$ ,  $AS$ , and  $DS$ . Our authorisation protocols will detail in Chapter 5.

### 5.2.2 Design Goals of RAMHU

To build a robust authentication scheme, RAMHU must meet the following security requirements:

- **Confidentiality:** This requirement is performed to hide authentication information and to preserve user secrecy from detection by intruders. To implement this requirement, a high-security cryptographic algorithm ([Al-Janabi et al. 2017](#)) should be used. RAMHU executes ECIES to hide authentication information about intruders.
- **Integrity:** This is to protect the authentication request information from modification by intruders. The authentication request should reach the intended destination without modification to provide a reliable communication channel for legitimate users ([Rajput, Abbas & Oh 2016](#)). RAMHU performs

a PHOTON to prevent any process of altering or modifying the user authentication information in HC applications.

- **Non-repudiation:** This requirement prevents both clients and server from denying their authentication requests. This is a way to prove that the message is sent by a particular sender in the HC applications network. If a legitimate user in the network performs internal attacks, he/she cannot deny his/her activities while exploiting the privileges granted to him/her. Our scheme uses PHOTON signatures and a MAC address to meet this requirement and detect malicious attacks.
- **Anonymity:** This requirement is extremely important in supporting the confidentiality of the authentication request. The purpose of this requirement is to disguise the source and destination of the authentication request. If the authentication scheme applies anonymity with encryption, the attacker finds it exceedingly difficult to analyse authentication requests for a particular user at different times because the authentication request is different each time the user is connected to the network (Rajput, Abbas, Wang, Eun & Oh 2016). RAMHU applies this requirement through the use of random nonces among entities.
- **Pseudonym:** This requirement denotes the provision of a mechanism to connect non-real attributes (such as terms and symbols) with the real attributes of the user (such as name, address, and phone number). The use of this mechanism in HC applications is an extremely important way to protect the personal information of users and prevent the detection of their identities. RAMHU uses a multi pseudonyms mechanism to prevent and separate the association with real information.
- **Forward secrecy:** This requirement is accomplished when network users use new keys and parameters temporarily without relying on old ones. This requirement prevents attackers from exploiting users' keys and passwords in decrypting authentication requests. Using the temporary random password, private key, and MAC, RAMHU prevents users from accessing previous authentication information.
- **Mutual authentication:** This requirement is used in healthcare applications to mitigate the risks of external fraud. With this feature, each party ensures that it deals with a legitimate party. The server authenticates the client by checking encryptions and signatures and vice versa in order to establish a secure communication channel. In RAMHU,  $CS$  and  $C_i$  authenticate each other to prevent masquerading and impersonating attacks.

- **Scalability:** HC applications operate in a scalable environment in terms of data and users. Therefore, these applications require authentication schemes capable of handling and adapting to the ever-increasing number of users of HC applications. This requirement refers to the ability of the authentication scheme to appropriately handle large HC systems. Public key encryption schemes are efficient in supporting this requirement ([Kumar et al. 2016](#)).
- **Freshness:** This requirement indicates that the authentication request is new and updated to ensure that the attacker cannot replay the authentication request at a later time. This requirement is achieved through the provision of time checking, a random nonce, and change of signatures in each authentication process to counteract counterfeit attacks, such as MITM, replay, and impersonation ([Al-Janabi et al. 2017](#)), which ensures that the authentication request is unaltered or not tampered with.

### 5.2.3 Proposed Protocols for the Authentication Scheme

The RAMHU scheme consists of 5 protocols: initial setup, registration/login, authentication, password update, and revocation. During these protocols, RAMHU provides reliable authentication processes to protect users' information.

#### 5.2.3.1 Initial Setup Protocol

In this protocol, all entities are ready to start communicating with each other while configuring all security parameters and ECIES's keys as in the following steps:

- Each legitimate user receives a client application from the authorised system provider.
- Each legitimate user receives a password (that can be changed later) and a random  $OTP_i$  to be used in the first registration.
- All entities ( $C_i$ ,  $CS$ , and  $AS$ ) should create public and private keys ( $C_i$  ( $CK_{pu_i}$ ,  $CK_{pr_i}$ ),  $CS$  ( $CSK_{pu_i}$ ,  $CSK_{pr_i}$ ), and  $AS$  ( $ASK_{pu_i}$ ,  $ASK_{pr_i}$ )) to be used to validate the authentication request. All entities choose an elliptic curve  $Ep(a, b)$  over a prime field  $F_P$  (where,  $P = 256$ ) and base point  $G$  on curve. Each entity selects a private key  $K_{pr_i}$  randomly and generates the public key  $K_{pu_i}$  during the implementation of scalar multiplication ( $K_{pu_i} = K_{pr_i} * G$ ).
- All entities broadcast public key ( $CK_{pu_i}$ ,  $CSK_{pu_i}$ , and  $ASK_{pu_i}$ ) to use in ECIES's encryption operations.




Figure 5.2: Registration and login protocol

### 5.2.3.2 Registration and Login Protocol

Patients and healthcare providers ( $C_i$ ) should complete the registration and login protocol with  $CS$  to become legitimate users of HC applications. Without this protocol, the user cannot complete the authentication process in RAMHU. User registration is performed once, namely, the user does not need to complete the registration protocol the next times (only the login protocol), the registration information has been kept in the servers until the revocation protocol and deletion the user security parameters, such as pseudonyms, MAC address and  $PW_i$ , this protocol accomplishes the following steps (Figure 5.2 shows registration, and login protocol and Figure 5.3 shows login protocol):

$C_i$  side:

- The user enters  $UID_i$  (such as his/her name),  $MID_i$  (such as medical centre name),  $PW_i$  and  $OTP_i$  for registration and login while only entering  $UID_i$ ,  $MID_i$ , and  $PW_i$  for the login protocol the next times to the client ( $C_i$ ) application.  $C_i$  replaces  $UID_i$  with user's pseudonym ( $UP_{C_i}^{CS}$ ), and  $MID_i$  with medical centre pseudonym ( $MP_{C_i}^{CS}$ ) to protect the authentication information when moving from  $C_i$  to  $CS$ .  $C_i$  generates timestamp ( $TS_{C_i}$ ) to be used to verify the sending time of the authentication request in  $CS$ .
- $C_i$  gets a MAC address (GM) by entering its IP (Internet protocol) address.




Figure 5.3: Login protocol

The process of checking MAC ( $CM$ ) is performed by  $C_i$  to test the credibility of the MAC address. In Linux system, we used the command "ethtool -P interface name" (such as "ethtool -P wlo1") in the  $C_i$  application. If the result is identical to  $GM$ , it means that the MAC address is native ( $CM = "Real\_MAC"$ ). In Windows system,  $C_i$  searches for string value "NetworkAddress" in the path of the system registry "`HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Class\{4D36E972-E325-11CE-BFC1-08002BE10318}\`" (as shown in Figure 5.4). If NetworkAddress = null,  $CM = "Real\_MAC"$ ; otherwise  $CM = "Fake\_MAC"$ . The  $GM$  send is encrypted with an authentication request while  $CM$  is implicitly sent with the signature value ( $C_iSig_1$ ). If only login protocol,  $C_i$  needs to extract private key from temporary key, MAC address, password, and random nonce through  $tmpC_iK_{pri} \oplus GM \oplus PW_i \oplus N_{C_i}$ .  $C_i$  generates a random nonce ( $N_{C_i}$ ) to change signature and encryption data and add anonymity to the authentication request.

- $C_i$  performs two signatures using the PHOTON-256 algorithm to protect information from modification. The first signature includes the parameters check MAC, nonce, and timestamp ( $C_iSig_1 = h(CM || N_{C_i} || TSC_i)$ ). The second signature includes all the authentication parameters of the get MAC, nonce,




Figure 5.4: NetworkAddress path in system registry

timestamp, first signature, pseudonyms, one time password, and password ( $CiSig_2 = h(GM \| N_{C_i} \| TS_{C_i} \| CiSig_1 \| UP_{C_i}^{CS} \| MP_{C_i}^{CS} \| OTP \| PW_i)$ ). In the login protocol,  $OTP$  is not added to the signature.

- $C_i$  computes a temporary value ( $tmpPW_i = PW_i \oplus N_{C_i} \oplus GM \oplus CiSig_1$ ) of  $PW_i$  when moving from  $C_i$  to  $CS$ .
- $C_i$  uses ECIES to encrypt and hide all the data of this request ( $Enc_i = TS_{C_i} \| N_{C_i} \| GM \| CiSig_1 \| UP_{C_i}^{CS} \| MP_{C_i}^{CS} \| OTP_i \| tmpPW_i \| CiSig_2$ ). In the login protocol,  $OTP_i$  and  $GM$  are not added to the encryption as in Figure 5.3. After that,  $C_i$  sends the registration and login request or login to  $CS$  to complete the authentication protocol. Then  $C_i$  hides the private key by  $tmpC_iK_{pr_i} = C_iK_{pr_i} \oplus PW_i \oplus CiSig_2$ .

$CS$  side:

- Upon receiving a registration and login request or login request,  $CS$  decrypts ( $Enc_i$ ) this request using ECIES's  $C_iK_{pu_i}$  and  $CSK_{pr_i}$ . It checks timestamp ( $TS_{CS} - TS_{C_i} \leq \Delta T$ ) to make sure that this request arrived at an appropriate time and without delay.
- In the registration and login protocol,  $CS$  examines the random  $OTP_i$  in the dataset. If  $OTP_i$  exists, then the user is legitimate for the registration process. After that,  $CS$  deletes  $OTP_i$  from the dataset to prevent it from being used the next times. If  $OTP_i$  is not found, It discards the connection. If the login protocol,  $CS$  examines the  $UP_{C_i}^{CS}$  and  $MP_{C_i}^{CS}$  and then tests their association with the MAC address in the dataset. If  $GM$  is found,  $CS$  completes the steps of this protocol; otherwise, it cancels the connection.
- $CS$  needs to ensure that the user's device is legitimate within the network.  $CS$  computes the signature value to make sure that the MAC address is native

and non-modified ( $CSSig_1 = h("Real\_MAC" \parallel N_{C_i} \parallel TS_{C_i})$ ). It examines the result of the computed signature ( $CSSig_1$ ) with the  $C_i$  ( $CiSig_1$ ) signature. If the result signatures are identical, then the device is legitimate and the MAC address did not change. In the registration and login protocol,  $CS$  stores this address in dataset for use and check the next times in the login protocol.

- $CS$  performs the computation operation the  $tmpPW_i \oplus N_{C_i} \oplus GM \oplus CSSig_1$  to extract the  $PW_i$  value and then uses this value to produce a second signature ( $CSSig_2$ ).
- $CS$  computes a second signature operation ( $CSSig_2 = h(GM \parallel N_{C_i} \parallel TS_{C_i} \parallel CSSig_1 \parallel UP_{C_i}^{CS} \parallel MP_{C_i}^{CS} \parallel OTP_i \parallel PW_i)$  to guarantee that all the encrypted information is not changed. Then, it compares the computed signature ( $CSSig_2$ ) with the received signature in the request ( $CiSig_2$ ). If the signatures are identical, then the information for this request is unchanged or not tampered. In the login protocol,  $OTP_i$  and  $GM$  are not added to the signature. At this point,  $CS$  prepares to send the user's authentication request to  $AS$ .

### 5.2.3.3 Authentication Protocol

In this protocol, RAMHU needs to link pseudonyms and passwords with real information for users in  $AS$ 's datasets. Note that, the users' information (such as name, age, address, mobile number, and passwords) are stored in a separate server ( $AS$ ) and multi pseudonyms used to prevent detection and tracking of users' information. This protocol is illustrated in the following steps (Figure 5.5 shows authentication protocol in RAMHU):

$CS$  side:

- $CS$  computes a new timestamp ( $TS_{CS}$ ) to ensure the fresh authentication request.
- $CS$  replaces  $C_i$ 's pseudonyms ( $UP_{C_i}^{CS}$  and  $MP_{C_i}^{CS}$ ) with  $CS$ 's pseudonyms ( $UP_{CS}^{AS}$  and  $MP_{CS}^{AS}$ ) to prevent attackers from tracking the authentication request. It generates random nonce ( $N_{CS}$ ) to ensure an anonymous authentication request.
- $CS$  signs security parameters by PHOTON-256 ( $CSSig_3 = h(TS_{CS} \parallel N_{CS} \parallel UP_{CS}^{AS} \parallel MP_{CS}^{AS})$ ) to prevent modification of authentication request data.
- $CS$  computes temporary  $PW_i$  by the computation of  $PW_i \oplus N_{CS} \oplus CSSig_3$ .




Figure 5.5: Authentication protocol

- CS encrypts information of authentication request ( $Enc_i = TS_{CS} || N_{CS} || UP_{CS}^{AS} || MP_{CS}^{AS} || CSSig_3 || \text{tmpPW}_i$ ). It sends an authentication request to verify user's information in AS.

AS side:

- Upon receiving the authentication request, AS decrypts that request ( $Enc_i$ ) using ECIES's  $ASK_{pri}$  and  $CSK_{pu}$  to obtain the authentication information clearly.
- It checks timestamp by ( $TS_{AS} - TS_{CS} \leq \Delta T$ ) to ensure that the authentication request is not delayed. AS checks the pseudonyms ( $UP_{CS}^{AS}$  and  $MP_{CS}^{AS}$ ) sent from CS and correlates it with the user's real identifier ( $UID_i$ )

and  $MID_i$ ) in the datasets.  $AS$  extracts user's password from the equation  $PW_i = tmpPW_i \oplus N_{CS} \oplus CSSig_3$ . After that, It checks matching  $PW_i$  in the dataset.  $AS$  computes the value of the signature based on authentication information ( $ASSig_1 = h(TS_{CS} \parallel N_{CS} \parallel UP_{CS}^{AS} \parallel MP_{CS}^{AS})$ ) by PHOTON-256.  $AS$  compares the computed value of the signature ( $ASSig_1$ ) with the value of the received signature ( $CSSig_3$ ). If the signature values are identical, the user's information in the request for the signature is unmodified. At this point,  $AS$  considers this user to be legitimate and reliable.

- $AS$  prepares a response to authenticate the request of that user. It computes new timestamp ( $TS_{AS} = \text{new } TS_{AS}$ ) to prevent delayed or replayed requests at later times.  $AS$  replaces  $CS$ 's pseudonyms ( $UP_{CS}^{AS}$  and  $MP_{CS}^{AS}$ ) received with  $AS$ 's pseudonyms ( $UP_{AS}^{CS}$  and  $MP_{AS}^{CS}$ ) to hide users' information. It generates a new random nonce ( $N_{AS}$ ) to add anonymity and prevent attacks from encryption and signature analysis.
- $AS$  computes a signature ( $ASSig_2 = h(TS_{AS} \parallel N_{AS} \parallel UP_{AS}^{CS} \parallel MP_{AS}^{CS})$ ) to prevent modifications of authentication response information.
- $AS$  encrypts the authentication information ( $Enc_i = TS_{AS} \parallel N_{AS} \parallel UP_{AS}^{CS} \parallel MP_{AS}^{CS} \parallel ASSig_2$ ) and sends the authentication response to  $CS$  to complete the authentication process.

$CS$  side:

- $CS$  decrypts the authentication response ( $Enc_i$ ) received from  $AS$ . It checks the timestamp value ( $TS_{CS} - TS_{AS} \leq \Delta T$ ) to prevent late authentication responses. It examines that  $UP_{CS}^{AS}$  and  $MP_{CS}^{AS}$  in datasets to complete the process of linking multi pseudonyms to the user.
- $CS$  computes the signature  $CSSig_4 = h(TS_{AS} \parallel N_{AS} \parallel UP_{AS}^{CS} \parallel MP_{AS}^{CS})$  for authentication response information. It compares the computed result of the signature ( $CSSig_4$ ) with the value of the received signature ( $ASSig_2$ ). If the signature values match, then the authentication response information is unchanged.
- After this point,  $CS$  initiates a login response request. It computes the value of new timestamp ( $TS_{CS} = \text{new } TS_{CS}$ ). It replaces  $AS$ 's pseudonyms ( $UP_{AS}^{CS}$  and  $MP_{AS}^{CS}$ ) received with  $UP_{CS}^{C_i}$  and  $MP_{CS}^{C_i}$ . It generates a new random nonce ( $N_{CS}$ ) to hide encryption and signature information.
- $CS$  computes a new signature value ( $CSSig_5 = h(TS_{CS} \parallel N_{CS} \parallel UP_{CS}^{C_i} \parallel MP_{CS}^{C_i})$ ) to protect login response information from modification.

- $CS$  encrypts login response information ( $Enc_i = TS_{CS} \| N_{CS} \| UP_{CS}^{C_i} \| MP_{CS}^{C_i} \| CSSig_5$ ) and sends this response to  $C_i$ .

$C_i$  side:

- $C_i$  extracts his private key ( $C_i K_{pri}$ ) from the  $tmpC_i K_{pri} \oplus PW_i \oplus C_i Sig_2$ , and decrypts the login request ( $Enc_i$ ) received from  $CS$ .
- $C_i$  checks timestamp ( $TS_{C_i} - TS_{CS} \leq \Delta T$ ) to ensure that the login response is not late or replayed.
- $C_i$  checks that  $CS$ 's pseudonyms ( $UP_{CS}^{C_i}$  and  $MP_{CS}^{C_i}$ ) are received in the dataset and associated with  $UP_{C_i}^{CS}$  and  $MP_{C_i}^{CS}$ . At this point, RAMHU applied multi pseudonyms among model entities ( $C_i$ ,  $CS$ , and  $AS$ ) to prevent traceability in linking the real information of the user with pseudonyms.
- $C_i$  calculates the value of the signature  $CiSig_3 = h(TS_{CS} \| N_{CS} \| UP_{CS}^{C_i} \| MP_{CS}^{C_i})$  for login response information. It compares the result of the computed signature ( $CiSig_3$ ) and the value of the received signature ( $CSSig_5$ ). If the signature values are identical, namely, the login response information is unmodified or not tampered,  $C_i$  accepts the login response; otherwise  $C_i$  discards the login response. Then,  $C_i$  hides its private key by  $C_i K_{pri} \oplus GM \oplus PW_i \oplus N_{C_i}$  after generating a random nonce to prevent the detection of the private key if the device is hacked. At this point, if all processes are achieved correctly, then all requests are considered legitimate and reliable through the implementation of mutual authentication.

#### 5.2.3.4 Password Update Protocol

The protocol of changing  $PW_i$  is important in any HC system for two reasons. First, preventing the use of  $PW_i$  fixed for a long time and which reduces the guessing attacks. Second, changing  $PW_i$  gives users more flexibility in choosing the appropriate  $PW_i$ . This process requires strict security measures to protect new  $PW_i$ . RAMHU provides the legitimate user with a mechanism to change his/her password at any time. If the user wants to change his/her  $PW_i$ , the following illustration describes the new  $PW_i$  protect procedures in a secure manner (Figure 5.6 shows password update protocol in RAMHU).

- $C_i$  side:  $C_i$  enters  $UID_i$ ,  $MID_i$ , old  $PW_i$ , and new  $PW_i$ . It replaces  $UID_i$  and  $MID_i$  with a pseudonyms to hide the user's real information.  $C_i$  calls MAC address, then extracts the private key from the  $tmpC_i K_{pri} \oplus GM \oplus oldPW_i \oplus N_{C_i}$  to use in the encryption process of the password




Figure 5.6: Password update protocol

update request.  $C_i$  generates three random nonces ( $N_{C_1}$ ,  $N_{C_2}$ , and  $N_{C_3}$ ) and computes a new timestamp ( $TS_{C_i}$ ).  $C_i$  computes the signature value ( $C_iSig_1 = h(TS_{C_i} || N_{C_1} || UP_{C_i}^{CS} || MP_{C_i}^{CS} || oldPW_i)$ ) by PHOTON-256 based on the parameters of the password change request. It applies an anonymity mechanism to old  $PW_i$  and new  $PW_i$  ( $tmp\_oldPW_i = oldPW_i \oplus N_{C_2} \oplus C_iSig_1$  and  $tmp\_newPW_i = newPW_i \oplus N_{C_3} \oplus C_iSig_1$ ) to hide passwords and not explicitly send it in the  $PW_i$  change request. It encrypts the  $PW_i$  change request ( $Enc_i = TS_{C_i} || N_{C_1} || N_{C_2} || N_{C_3} || UP_{C_i}^{CS} || MP_{C_i}^{CS} || tmp\_oldPW_i || tmp\_newPW_i || C_iSig_1$ ) and sends it to CS,  $C_i$  then hides its private key by  $C_iK_{pri} \oplus GM \oplus newPW_i \oplus N_{C_i}$ .

- **CS side:** CS receives and decrypts a password update request ( $Enc_i$ ). It

examines timestamp to prevent delayed requests, and examines  $UP_{C_i}^{CS}$  and  $MP_{C_i}^{CS}$  in datasets.  $CS$  extracts old  $PW_i$  and new  $PW_i$  from  $tmp\_oldPW_i \oplus N_{C_2} \oplus CiSig_1$  and  $tmp\_newPW_i \oplus N_{C_3} \oplus CiSig_1$ . Then, it computes signature value ( $CSSig_1$ ) depending on  $TS_{C_i}, N_{C_1}, UP_{C_i}^{CS}, MP_{C_i}^{CS}$ , and  $oldPW_i$  to check the matching between  $CSSig_1$  and  $CiSig_1$ . Similarly, in authentication protocol,  $CS$  computes  $TS_{CS}$  and replaces pseudonyms.  $CS$  generates three nonces  $N_{CS_1}, N_{CS_2}$ , and  $N_{CS_3}$  and then  $CS$  computes signature value ( $h(TS_{C_i} \| N_{C_1} \| UP_{C_i}^{CS} \| MP_{C_i}^{CS} \| oldPW_i)$  and hides old  $PW_i$  and new  $PW_i$  by  $oldPW_i \oplus N_{CS_2} \oplus CSSig_2$  and  $newPW_i \oplus N_{CS_3} \oplus CSSig_2$ . It encrypts password update request with security parameters ( $TS_{CS}, N_{CS_1}, N_{CS_2}, N_{CS_3}, UP_{CS}^{AS}, MP_{CS}^{AS}, tmp\_oldPW_i, tmp\_newPW_i$ , and  $CSSig_2$ ) and sends to  $AS$ .

- $AS$  side:  $AS$  receives password update request, and decrypts ( $Enc_i$ ) this request with  $ASK_{pri}$ , and  $CSK_{pu_i}$ . It checks time delay and then, it checks link pseudonyms with real information for users. It extracts old  $PW_i$  from  $tmp\_oldPW_i \oplus N_{CS_2} \oplus CSSig_2$  and then, it checks old  $PW_i$  in dataset. It computes the signature value  $ASSig_1 = h(TS_{CS} \| N_{CS_1} \| UP_{CS}^{AS} \| MP_{CS}^{AS} \| oldPW_i)$ , and then, it compares the calculated result ( $ASSig_1$ ) with the result of the received signature ( $CSSig_2$ ). If identical, the signature is true; otherwise,  $AS$  rejects the  $PW_i$  change request.  $AS$  performs the calculation  $tmp\_newPW_i \oplus N_{CS_3} \oplus CSSig_2$  to obtain the new  $PW_i$  value. If all previous checks are validated,  $AS$  changes old  $PW_i$  to new  $PW_i$ .

#### 5.2.3.5 Revocation Protocol

This protocol can be completed by  $C_i$ , or  $AS$ . If  $C_i$  wants to revoke his account from the HC system after completing his/her duties, such as a research doctor who uses the system for a limited period and then cancel his account after the completion of his duties. Additionally,  $AS$  can revoke the account of any user who performs suspicious activities (internal attacks) that are not within his/her privileges, such as a nurse who wants to access the personal information of a particular doctor, or patient. Furthermore, the user can request from authorities provider ( $AS$ ) to cancel his/her account information that is associated with his/her data (note that the patients' data history remains stored in  $DS$  even after the completion of the revocation protocol). The protocol of revocation is extremely important in restricting the malicious activities of any healthcare system. RAMHU includes a revocation protocol to provide strict security procedures in protecting users' authentication information (Figure 5.7 shows revocation protocol in  $C_i$  side in RAMHU):

Revocation from  $C_i$  side:

- $C_i$  enters  $UID_i$ ,  $MID_i$ , and  $PW_i$  and then replaces  $UID_i$  with  $UP_{C_i}^{CS}$  and




Figure 5.7: Revocation protocol

$MID_i$  with  $MP_{C_i}^{CS}$ . It chooses the revocation reason ( $RR_i$ ) from the dropdown list (such as ending the researcher's study, ending a satisfactory condition, resigning a professional, changing a health institution, and the unwillingness of a patient to use the system). These reasons have converted to signatures using PHOTON to get MDs with a 256-bits in the dataset.  $C_i$  computes new  $TS_{C_i}$ ,  $N_{C_1}$ ,  $N_{C_2}$ , and  $N_{C_3}$ . Then,  $C_i$  performs the process of  $RR_i \oplus N_{C_1}$  to add randomness for  $RR_i$ . Using this procedure is tremendously useful in tightening security and distinguishing the roles of users (patients or professionals) in  $CS$ . It computes the signature  $C_i Sig_1 = h(TS_{C_i} || N_{C_1} || UP_{C_i}^{CS} || MP_{C_i}^{CS} || RR_i || PW_i || "delete")$ .  $C_i$  performs a computa-

tion to hide the  $RR_i$  ( $tmpRR_i = RR_i \oplus N_{C_2} \oplus C_iSig_1$ ).  $C_i$  computes the temporary  $PW_i$  value of  $PW_i \oplus N_{C_3} \oplus C_iSig_1$  to hide the  $PW_i$  value. Additionally, It computes encryption ( $Enc_i = TS_{C_i} \| N_{C_1} \| N_{C_2} \| N_{C_3} \| UP_{C_i}^{CS} \| MP_{C_i}^{CS} \| tmpRR_i \| tmpPW_i \| C_iSig_1$ ) and sends a revocation request to  $CS$ . Then, It hides a private key, in the same way, in the password update protocol.

- $CS$  decrypts ( $Enc_i$ ) and computes timestamp and examines  $UP_{C_i}^{CS}$  and  $MP_{C_i}^{CS}$  in the datasets. It obtains the  $RR_i$  from the computation equation  $RR_i = tmpRR_i \oplus N_{C_2} \oplus CSSig_1$ . It extracts  $PW_i$  from  $tmpPW_i \oplus N_{C_3} \oplus C_iSig_1$  and checks  $PW_i$  matching in the dataset.  $CS$  computes the signature ( $CSSig_1 = h(TS_{C_i} \| N_{C_1} \| UP_{C_i}^{CS} \| MP_{C_i}^{CS} \| RR_i \| PW_i \| "delete")$  and then compares the result of the signatures.  $CS$  computes operation  $RR_i \oplus N_{C_1}$  to use  $RR_i$ 's signature in order to compare the  $RR_i$  with the user's  $R_i$ . If all operations are achieved and validated correctly,  $CS$  sends a request to  $AS$  to check the pseudonym's association with real information and check  $PW_i$ .  $AS$  deletes association between pseudonyms and information, and delete user's  $PW_i$  from dataset.  $AS$  sends MAC delete request to  $CS$ . Upon receiving MAC delete request,  $CS$  decrypts this request, then checks security parameters and signature. If all operations are achieved and validated correctly,  $CS$  deletes MAC address from dataset. At this point, this user cannot perform an authentication process in RAMHU.

Revocation from  $AS$  side:

- $AS$  deletes the association between user's information and pseudonyms and  $PW_i$  in datasets. It sends an encrypted request ( $Enc_i$ ) to  $CS$  to delete device's MAC address for this user. After the completion of this protocol, the user is considered illegal and cannot access healthcare services.

### 5.3 Summary of the Chapter

In this chapter, we have provided details about the model of creating a new authentication scheme. Next, we have described our network model in HC application. Additionally, RAMHU's goals to provide authentication requirements have detailed. Following that, we have presented a set of protocols. Finally, RAMHU scheme methodology has been explained in detail.

# Chapter 6: Authorisation of HC Users with Differentiated Access Control

In Chapter 4, we elaborated the authentication scheme that authenticates HC users identity and EHR/EMR repository. In this chapter, we will propose another integral component in our proposed HC application, which is responsible for authorising various HC users including patients with differentiated access control to the EHR/EMR repository. The objective of this authorisation method is to provide HC users with more efficient and secure services, as well as preserving patients' privacy.

## 6.1 Data Security in EHR Systems

The EHR/EMR technology is a recent advance in HC industry that digitizes patients health or medical data and store these records in a database or repository. In this way, patients' health records and history can be accessed much accurate and fast without waiting for a long time to get the patient's health records and/or documents. For emergency, this may save lives. EHR systems include identifications and patients' data that require authorisation privileges to determine access control for authorised users (Calvillo-Arbizu et al. 2014). Accurate medical data is essential for diagnosing diseases and determining the condition of patients during their online transfer from patient to HC provider (Alhaqbani & Fidge 2008, Riedl et al. 2008). Any change to this data causes health problems for patients. In addition, penetration of medical records of patients with diseases such as HIV infection or dermatological conditions can lead to discrimination, harassment, or even death of the patient if the diagnostic data changes during the transition from client to server (Neubauer & Heurix 2011, Riedl et al. 2008). In a broad sense, terrorist may cause national instability by disclosing patients' data, changing the data, destroying the data, or impersonating some patients (Quentin et al. 2011). HC systems, in particular EHR systems should provide end-to-end privacy for patients'

data. Also, data storage and authorisation policies for patients in a central server yield data management gains but are an attractive target for hackers (Quantin et al. 2011). Therefore, there should be security mechanisms to protect the privacy of the patient as well as to prevent the penetration of policies on the server.

The use of patients' data for various purposes, such as consultations, access by a relative or caregiver, research, and emergency (secondary or indirect use) are a major challenge for authorisation systems; for example, the researcher should not exceed the limits of privacy granted to him/her (Calvillo-Arbizu et al. 2014). In an emergency, when the patients' doctor is unavailable or the patient does not have the capacity to give consent to another doctor, the patient's privacy is seriously compromised (Sun et al. 2011). Also, if the patient is incapacitated, a relative is responsible for receiving the patient's data (Riedl et al. 2007). Sometimes, the doctor also needs to consult another doctor to treat a patient's condition. All these cases can result in the intrusion and penetration of data. The sharing of medical records among users of the EHR system allows patients' data to be misused or abused by malicious breaches (Rezaeibagha et al. 2015). Many examples of penetration of the medical records for patients have applied by intruders, as mentioned in Section 2.3.2 (Koczkodaj et al. 2018, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2018). These penetrations show that the HC system requires a high level of security. Furthermore, an internal attack penetrates medical records more easily than external attacks because each practitioner has a privilege that allows him/her to access the server system.

## 6.2 Overview of Requirements of Access Control

Many access control models have been used in the EHR, such as mandatory access control (MAC), discretionary access control (DAC), role based access control (RBAC), and attribute based access control (ABAC), and each model has specific authorisation mechanisms for data access (Gajanayake et al. 2014). In our project, we adopted the integration of the RBAC and ABAC to support a security level based on both role and user attributes. Therefore, EHR systems require mechanisms to ensure the privacy of patients' data while protecting authorisation policies and HC provider requests (Fernández-Alemán et al. 2013). In order to develop a successful project, privacy must be provided to the patient via the following measures:

1. Preventing attackers from accessing patient data and making data anonymous in case attackers do gain access to the data (i.e., external attacks).
2. Preventing legitimate users from exceeding their privileges (i.e., internal attacks).

3. Securing all requests, policies, and data of the change on the server or during the transfer between the clients and server to ensure the accuracy and reliability of patient data.
4. Applying anonymity to requests and policies to hide users' identities.
5. Applying random pseudonym to requests, policies, and data to separate data associated with the real attributes of patients.

### 6.2.1 Access Control for the EHR/EMR Repository

we develop a **Pseudonymization and Anonymization** with the **XACML (PAX)** modular system, which depends on client and server applications. The characteristics of the proposed authorisation scheme can be summarised as follows:

- Combining ABAC and RBAC

In this scheme, we integrate two existing models (ABAC and RBAC) to develop a system that provides handling of patients' information at the coarse-grained and fine-grained levels. Our model fits the privacy and security requirements for medical records in the EHR by merging a user's ID with the role as a single attribute entered in signature to identify subjects and objects.

- Separating users into two sets

We have proposed separating users into direct and indirect sets for patients' records to allow the server to distinguish between users' requests. This significantly reduces the penetration rate of internal attacks.

- Using ECDSA's signatures with XACML

The anonymity property has been applied to the requests and policies of subjects. This feature was used during the implementation of the ECDSA signature algorithm with XACML to prevent attackers from determining the identity of HC providers (to prevent knowledge of the relation between a physician with a particular patient).

- Using Shamir scheme with signatures

We used the Shamir scheme with the ECDSA signatures in the third protocol of authorising indirect users. This procedure is necessary to verify unauthorised users of patients' data who could be conducting serious attacks on the EHR system.

- Using random pseudonym with patients' data

The pseudonym property has been applied to the requests and policies of

subjects and resources. This feature prevents hackers from knowing that the data belongs to a particular patient (separating data from real attributes).

## 6.3 Our Proposed Authorisation Model

In this Section, we will provide details about our new authorisation scheme that support security and privacy mechanisms to ensure legitimate users' authorisation in HC applications. This Section will be divided into the network model, applying privacy concepts and PAX authorisation protocols for users.

### 6.3.1 Users Access Control Model

As shown in Figure 6.1, Pseudonymization and Anonymization with the XACML (PAX) is an authorisation system that works with EHR. Network model consists of four entities: client ( $C_i$ ), central server ( $CS$ ), attributes server ( $AS$ ) and data server ( $DS$ ). These entities communicate with each other in the PAX framework to accomplish authorisation and privacy preservation of users in access to the patients' datasets.  $CS$  is the portal that prevents users from accessing directly to both  $AS$  and  $DS$ . Patients' data are stored on the data server ( $DS$ ) and are fully separated from the attributes of the users (patients and HC providers) that stored on the attributes server ( $AS$ ). Each  $C_i$  creates an access request and sends it to the  $CS$ . Then,  $CS$  verifies the authorisation information for the user's request, if this request is valid,  $CS$  sends the authorisation request to  $AS$  for an evaluation; otherwise,  $CS$  sends the "deny" response to  $C_i$ . When  $AS$  receives the authorisation request from  $CS$ ,  $AS$  evaluates the access request by PDPs modules, verifies signatures, pseudonyms, and other security parameters. If all evaluates and tests are valid,  $AS$  sends a request to  $DS$  to retrieve patient data; otherwise,  $AS$  sends the "deny" response to  $CS$ . After that,  $DS$  checks for signatures (Sigs) and privacy parameters (PP), if all operations are correctly performed,  $DS$  sends the required data with pseudonyms and Sigs to  $AS$  which in turn sends the "permit" response to  $C_i$  by  $CS$  to allow access the dataset. The authorised user will receive the "permit" response and the copy of the required data.

The PAX system uses two PDPs (PDP1 and PDP2) to implement the user authorisation process, as shown in Figure 6.1. In this scheme, we focus on securing requests and policies to provide a high level of user privacy. PAX depends on the Balana Project, which is the only open source project that implements XACML v3.0. Privacy and security are essential requirements of EHR. In PAX, we were careful to provide high-level privacy and security mechanisms to authorise users.




Figure 6.1: PAX model




Figure 6.2: Authorisation of direct and indirect users

### 6.3.2 Design Goals of PAX

There is a set of security features included in PAX.

#### 1. Integrity and non-repudiation of requests

User requests and policies need protection from change or repudiation. We used the ECDSA algorithm to sign user attributes. Any change in the signa-

tures will be detected in the server because the server checks the users' requests before authorising access to the data. In addition, the signatory party cannot deny its signature. These features make the system immune against internal changing attacks.

## 2. Authentication and authorisation of requests

Each EHR requires authentication and authorisation properties to protect medical records from unauthorised access. We applied ECDSA to the XACML v3.0 to support these properties in PAX. The use of signatures in XACML between the  $C_i$  and the  $CS$ ,  $AS$  and  $DS$  support user authentication in addition to the use of policies and rules to identify authorised users and the level of access granted to them.

## 3. Confidentiality and anonymization

One of the security features of hiding information is confidentiality. We applied ECDSA to add confidential requests to subjects and objects, and we added a Shamir scheme (backup or fail-open mechanism) to provide anonymity of  $SS_s$  to users of the EHR system. This process prevents the attacker from seeing explicit attributes and does not allow hacker to know the user-configured  $SS$  for any healthcare provider. A Shamir scheme ensures the anonymity of the signature. This backup mechanism enables indirect users to access protected health information (PHI) with privacy and security.

## 4. Pseudonymization

A patient's privacy requires the separation of personal information from the patient's data. Pseudonym prevents the intruder from knowing the data of any of the patients. PAX supports pseudonym in both subjects' and objects' attributes using pseudonyms for real attributes. This feature supports the privacy of a patient's data.

## 5. Audit and activities

PAX records all user activities (requests and responses) to access medical records. It monitors user activities, including the number of access times, the result of the decision, and the amount of data required. The audit process is important for any healthcare system in determining users' activities. PAX stores and organizes requests and responses for each user (patient, doctor, advisor, relative, researcher, and emergency doctor) separately to facilitate the management of these activities.

### 6.3.3 Implementation of PAX

In this Section, we will introduce the privacy concepts in PAX.

### 6.3.3.1 EHR's Users in PAX

Security and privacy address where, when, and why data is available and who can access the data repository. Patients and HC providers require services that are efficient, fast, and continuous and at the same time incorporate strict restrictions to determine data access. Therefore, AC to medical records has several challenges in terms of security and privacy:

1. Legitimate users should not exceed their privileges.
2. Users' roles in the EHR system should be defined. For example, a doctor can have several roles, such as an emergency doctor and a researcher doctor.
3. Data should be anonymous when it reaches the wrong user due to misuse or attacks.
4. Compliance with medical standards for EHR (such as HIPAA) is essential.

In PAX, we divide users into two categories:

- Direct users: These users include those who are directly associated with the data, such as the patient and the doctor.
- Indirect users: These users include those who are not directly and continuously associated with the data, such as advisors, patients' relatives, researchers, and emergency doctors.

Although PAX includes both categories of users, this project focuses on indirect users (Figure 6.2 shows a flow chart for authorisation of direct and indirect users in PAX). Any HC system can be exposed to an internal attack by indirect users if there are no security and privacy mechanisms to prevent them.

### 6.3.3.2 Users' Pseudonym in PAX

Authorisation systems require a lightweight mechanism to prevent intruders from distinguishing specific patients' data without the complications of encryption and anonymous mechanisms. To address this problem, we apply random pseudonyms with PAX to separate the association between patients' attributes and data. The medical records transmitted between the client and server do not contain any patients' attributes. This prevents the attackers from identifying patients.

In PAX, we propose to use four datasets: the first was for users' attributes (patients and HC providers); the second was for applying pseudonyms to users; the third was for users' policies (on *AS*); and the fourth was for patients' data

Table 6.1: Internal and external pseudonyms of users

| Users      | <i>UR</i> | <i>CN</i>   | Internal pseudonym | <i>RN</i>   | <i>UN</i>   | External pseudonym |
|------------|-----------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|-------------|--------------------|
| patient    | <i>p</i>  |             | $p_1 \dots p_n$    |             |             |                    |
| doctor     | <i>d</i>  |             | $d_1 \dots d_n$    |             |             |                    |
| advisor    | <i>a</i>  |             | $a_1 \dots a_n$    |             |             |                    |
| relative   | <i>pr</i> | $1 \dots n$ | $pr_1 \dots pr_n$  | $1 \dots n$ | $1 \dots n$ | $1 \dots n$        |
| researcher | <i>r</i>  |             | $r_1 \dots r_n$    |             |             |                    |
| emergency  | <i>e</i>  |             | $e_1 \dots e_n$    |             |             |                    |
| Shamir     | -         |             | -                  |             |             |                    |

Table 6.2: Parts of *SP* and *OP*

| <i>SP</i>   |             |             |             | <i>OP</i>   |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |
|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| $RN_{sp}$   |             | $UN_{sp}$   |             | $RN_{op}$   |             | $UN_{op}$   |             |             |             |             |             |
| $RN_{sp_l}$ | $RN_{sp_m}$ | $RN_{sp_h}$ | $UN_{sp_l}$ | $UN_{sp_m}$ | $UN_{sp_h}$ | $RN_{op_l}$ | $RN_{op_m}$ | $RN_{op_h}$ | $UN_{op_l}$ | $UN_{op_m}$ | $UN_{op_h}$ |

(on *DS*). When the EHR system wants to add a new HC provider or patient, the PAX randomly generates a pseudonym for that user and adds it to the second dataset. Suppose that we have a dataset for random pseudonyms, as in Table 6.1. PAX generates pseudonyms (such as *p429* or *d761*) for patients or HC providers during the addition of a letter representing the user's role (*UR*) such as *p* or *d* plus a random client's number (*CN*). Each subject's pseudonym (*SP*) and object's pseudonym (*OP*) consists of *UR* and *CN* (internal pseudonym), which are not transferred between entities and are used for policy verification at *AS*. XACML's request in PAX depends on the *SP* and *OP* (external pseudonym), and both *SP* and *OP* are divided into role's number (*RN*) and user's number (*UN*) (after replacing *UR* with *RN* and *CN* with *RN*) and the latter are segmented into three parts (low (l), medium (m), and high (h)) with length 8 bits per part as in Table 6.2. These pseudonyms are associated with the users' IDs. It enables users to access a specific patient's data without exceeding granted privileges and rights.

### 6.3.3.3 Using ECDSA's Signatures

PAX uses ECDSA (NIST prime-256) with requests and policies to ensure that security requirements apply to the privacy of patients' data. We have applied ECDSA signatures with subjects' and objects' attributes to ensure integrity property to prevent changing attributes in requests and policies, authentication property to prevent external attackers and non-repudiation property to prevent authorised users from denying their requests to receive medical records. The application of security requirements is very important in systems that use sensitive data, such as HC systems. In PAX, the  $C_i$  signs the request with pseudonyms (*RN* and *UN*), and the servers (*CS* and *AS*) verifies the request's Sigs. If valid, the *AS* assigns the request to the PDPs engines (after replacing Sigs(external pseudonym) with Sigs(internal pseudonym)) in XACML v3.0; otherwise, the request is rejected. PAX uses ECDSA's Sigs to

```

<Policy xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17" PolicyId="permitPolicyForD20"
RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:rule-combining-algorithm:first-applicable" Version="1.0">
  <Target>
    <AnyOf>
      <AllOf>
        <Match MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
          <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">36b6e95b598c43ae10c6e2369d29a3d8
263e6a75336e20bf8cac2a791ab269bc2664e625636e7038954de67135074c851b6d15751cd29b0a76df47eec2887
          </AttributeValue>
          <AttributeDesignator AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id"
Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:
attribute-category:resource" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" MustBePresent="true"/>
        </Match>
        <Match MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
          <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">0284894f6327dcca8ebd16a2e8a783ad7
1f911f9d4b8af86b826048eb9c88846075a37b87654ac0ec1f58c35dbc06587d0b6a77d4303de6e19d1bf1fd715ab07
          </AttributeValue>
          <AttributeDesignator AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject:subject-id" Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:
subject-category:access-subject" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" MustBePresent="true"/>
        </Match>
      </AllOf>
    </AnyOf>
  </Target>
  <Rule Effect="Permit" RuleId="permit1"/>
</Policy>

```

Figure 6.3: PAX policy

hide parts of *SP* and *OP* when exchanging XACML's requests between PAX entities. The high performance and security level makes this algorithm suitable for application in large systems (such as EHR).

#### 6.3.3.4 Policies Administration in PAX

System Administrator is responsible for creating policies for HC providers and patients in *AS* by PAP. Policy in PAX consists of the policy ID, subject, object, and rules for policy implementation. The first process in the PAX system is to create datasets for pseudonyms and attributes for all users. The process of creating policies depends on previous datasets. PAX uses ECDSA to generate a signature of *SP* ( $S_{sp}$ ) and a signature of *OP* ( $S_{op}$ ) based on the pseudonyms (*UR* and *CN*) for both *SP* and *OP*. Creating signature-based policies and pseudonyms protects policies on the server in a way that is immune to internal and external attacks (policies do not depend on users' real attributes). For example, the system administrator creates a user policy by entering the doctor's name and *UR* and patient's name, PAX creates this policy as shown in Figure 6.3. The policy parameters are highlighted in green: *d20* represents the *SP* and uses as policy's ID; the first long 128-bit hexadecimal number represents the  $S_{op}$ ; and the second long 128-bit hexadecimal number represents the  $S_{sp}$ . This policy can include a set of rules such as determining the date of data access, the time specified on a given day, or the number of access times.

```

<Request xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17" CombinedDecision="false" ReturnPolicyIdList="false">
  <Attributes Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:attribute-category:action">
    <Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id" IncludeInResult="false">
      <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">access</AttributeValue>
    </Attribute>
  </Attributes>
  <Attributes Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject-category:access-subject">
    <Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject:subject-id" IncludeInResult="false">
      <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"> $C_iS_{1_{tm}}||RN_{sp_{tm}}||UN_{sp_{tm}}||N_C||TS_{C_{tm}}||SN_{C_{tm}}$ </AttributeValue>
    </Attribute>
  </Attributes>
  <Attributes Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:attribute-category:resource">
    <Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id" IncludeInResult="false">
      <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"> $C_iS_{2_{tm}}||RN_{op_{tm}}||UN_{op_{tm}}||N_C||C_iS_{4_{tm}}$ </AttributeValue>
    </Attribute>
  </Attributes>
</Request>

```

Figure 6.4:  $C_i$ 's request

#### 6.3.3.5 Clients' Requests and Server's Responses

PAX's users must create an authorisation request access medical records. This request consists of subjects' and objects' attributes. The  $C_i$  application in PAX uses the parts of  $RN$  and  $UN$  as a single attribute to generate the ECDSA's Sig for the subjects and the objects. Figure 6.4 shows the client's request to access patient data (where the request parameters are highlighted in green;  $C_iS_{2_{tm}}||RN_{op_{tm}}||UN_{op_{tm}}||N_C ||C_iS_{4_{tm}}$  in resource segment represents the object's attributes; and the  $C_iS_{1_{tm}}||RN_{sp_{tm}}||UN_{sp_{tm}}||N_C||TS_{C_{tm}}||SN_{C_{tm}}$  in access-subject segment represents the subject's attributes). Also, the  $C_i$  application uses a part of  $RN_{sp}$  to explain to the  $AS$  the user's role to determine the desired policy after verifying the Sigs. Then, the  $C_i$  sends the request to the  $AS$  by  $CS$  for evaluation. The  $AS$  evaluates the request in the PDP engines, and the response (permit or deny) returns to the  $C_i$  by  $CS$ .

#### 6.3.3.6 Using Shamir Scheme

In PAX, we implemented the Shamir scheme to increase the level of security for indirect users (advisors, patients' relatives, researchers, and emergency). Indirect users are legitimate users who can perform an internal attack because of the rights granted to them. PAX uses ECDSA to sign all signatures of HC users to create master signature (MS). Then, PAX uses the Shamir scheme to generate secrets sharing ( $SS_s$ ) from a MS. Each indirect user receives  $SS$  via a secure communication channel.  $C_i$  needs a set of  $SS_s$  to reproduce MS. PAX uses  $TH = 3$ , which means that the randomly selected  $SS_s$  require at least 3  $SS_s$  to generate  $MS$ . Also, depending on  $RN_{sp}$ ,  $AS$  specifies that the user's role is indirect and use the Shamir scheme with ECDSA's Sig to verify the original  $MS$  and then evaluate the request by

PDP2. Using Shamir's scheme with XACML adds the property of authenticity, as an indirect user cannot access data with the same  $SS_s$ . This operation enables PAX to secure the privacy of patients' data and protect patients' data from internal and external attacks. When an indirect user wants access to medical records, he/she does not know whether the  $SS_s$  used to generate the  $MS$  belong to any specific HC providers.

### 6.3.4 PAX Authorisation Protocols

In this Section, we will provide in detail PAX's protocols framework in authorising direct and indirect users.

#### 6.3.4.1 Authorisation Protocols for Direct Subjects and Objects

To run through the authorisation process for direct users of PAX, the security techniques mentioned in the Section 3.3 will be the basis for building the PAX authorisation system. In this Section, we will explain the protocols of authorising direct users such as doctors and patients to access medical records (EHR).

- **Prerequisite procedures**

There are a set of steps that must be taken before authorisation can begin.

1. Create two datasets (attributes, pseudonym) on  $AS$ . If datasets are established, the processes are to add new users or delete direct users.
2. Create policies (dataset 3) for all direct users based on anonymity and pseudonym.
3. Storage of medical records (dataset 4) for patients in the  $DS$ 's repository (after collecting them from patients using wireless medical devices, this process requires security mechanisms, but the process of storing medical records safely will detail in Chapter 6). We assume that patients' data is located on the  $DS$ .

- **Authorisation protocols**

The following protocols detail how the direct user is associated with the EHR in  $DS$ . Figure 6.5 depicts generally the authorisation process, while Figures 6.6, 6.7, 6.8, and 6.9 show the authorisation protocols of direct users with PAX entities.

1. First protocol as shown in Figure 6.6:
  - PAX's user enters the subject ID ( $S_{ID}$ ), object ID ( $O_{ID}$ ), subject role ( $S_R$ ) and object role ( $O_R$ ) to the  $C_i$  application.  $C_i$  replaces  $S_{ID}$ ,





Figure 6.5: Authorisation of direct users

$O_{ID}$ ,  $S_R$  and  $O_R$  with  $CN_{sp}$ ,  $CN_{op}$ ,  $UR_{sp}$  and  $UR_{op}$  respectively. After that, internal pseudonyms are replaced with  $UN_{sp}$ ,  $UN_{op}$ ,  $RN_{sp}$   $RN_{op}$  respectively. Then,  $C_i$  generates random nonces ( $N_C$  and  $SN_C$ ) and new timestamp ( $TS_{C_i}$ ).  $SN_C$  is a random secret between  $C_i$  and  $CS$ .  $C_i$  computes 4 Sigs ( $C_iS_1$ ,  $C_iS_2$ ,  $C_iS_3$  and  $C_iS_4$ ).  $C_iS_1$  and  $C_iS_2$  is used to ensure the legitimacy of  $C_i$  in  $CS$ .  $C_iS_3$  is used to protect  $SN_C$  between  $C_i$  and  $CS$ .  $C_iS_4$  is used to validate  $C_i$  in both  $AS$  and  $DS$  (depending on  $RN_{op_h}$  and  $UN_{op_h}$ ).  $C_i$  hides all Sigs such as  $C_iS_1$  temporary ( $C_iS_{1tm}$ ) and PP such as  $TS_{C_{tm}}$  and  $SN_{C_{tm}}$ . At this point,  $C_i$  sends XACML's request to  $CS$  that including subject's information ( $C_iS_{1tm}||RN_{sp_{tm}}||UN_{sp_{tm}}||N_C||TS_{C_{tm}}||SN_{C_{tm}}$ ) and object's information ( $C_iS_{2tm}||RN_{op_{tm}}||UN_{op_{tm}}||N_C||C_iS_{4_{tm}}$ ).

- $CS$  receives XACML's request from  $C_i$ , cuts Sigs and PP from access-subject ( $C_iS_{1tm}$ ,  $RN_{sp_{tm}}$ ,  $UN_{sp_{tm}}$ ,  $N_C$ ,  $TS_{C_{tm}}$  and  $SN_{C_{tm}}$ ) and resource ( $C_iS_{2tm}$ ,  $RN_{op_{tm}}$ ,  $UN_{op_{tm}}$ ,  $N_C$  and  $C_iS_{4_{tm}}$ ). Then,  $CS$  extracts  $RN_{sp_l}$ ,  $UN_{sp_l}$ ,  $RN_{op_l}$  and  $UN_{op_l}$  from receiving parameters (such as  $RN_{sp_{tm}}$ ).  $UN_{sp_l}$  and  $UN_{op_l}$  is used to retrieve  $UN_{sp_m}$  and  $UN_{op_m}$  from datasets.  $CS$  extracts  $C_iS_4$ ,  $SN_C$ ,  $TS_{C_i}$  and checks timestamp. Then,  $CS$  computes Sigs ( $CSS_1$ ,  $CSS_2$  and  $CSS_3$ ), and uses  $CSS_1$  to extract original  $C_iS_1$  and  $C_iS_2$ . After that,  $CS$  checks  $CSS_2=C_iS_1$  and  $CSS_3=C_iS_2$ . If the Sigs are not identical,  $CS$  cancels the connection; otherwise, it moves to the next protocol.


## 2. Second protocol as shown in Figure 6.7:

- $CS$  generates random secret ( $SN_{CS}$ ) and new timestamp ( $TS_{CS}$ ) between  $CS$  and  $AS$ . Then,  $CS$  computes the secret signature ( $CSS_4$ )

Figure 6.6: Protocol of PAX model between  $C_i$  and  $CS$ 

to protect  $SN_{CS}$ . Also,  $CS$  hides  $C_i$ 's parameters such as  $N_C$  and  $TS_{C_i}$  to use them with validation operations in  $AS$  and  $DS$ . In addition, all Sigs (such as  $CSS_{2tm}$ ) and PP (such as  $N_{CS}$  and  $TS_{CS_{tm}}$ ) are anonymously hidden by  $CS$ . At this point,  $CS$  sends XACML's request to  $AS$ .


- $AS$  receives the request, cuts Sigs and PP. After that,  $AS$  extracts original parameters (such as  $C_iS_4$  and  $TS_{CS}$ ) and checks timestamp.  $AS$  computes  $ASS_1$  (to extract  $CSS_2$  and  $CSS_3$ ) and computes  $ASS_2$  and  $ASS_3$  (to check  $ASS_2=CSS_2$  and  $ASS_3=CSS_3$ ).  $AS$  retrieves  $RN_{oph}$  and  $UN_{oph}$  from dataset (depending on  $RN_{opm}$  and  $UN_{opm}$ ) and computes  $ASS_4$  to ensure  $C_i$  request is legitimate after checks  $ASS_4 = C_iS_4$ .  $AS$  uses the parts of external pseudonyms to specify  $UR_{sp}$ ,  $UR_{op}$ ,  $CN_{sp}$  and  $CN_{op}$ .  $AS$  retrieves Sigs of  $SP$  and  $OP$  ( $S_{sp}$  and  $S_{op}$ ) depending on the internal  $SP$  and  $OP$ .  $AS$  uses PDP1 engine to evaluate XACML's request after adding  $S_{sp}$  and  $S_{op}$  to that request.  $AS$  specifies user's policy in PAP and checks user's attributes in PIP. PDP1 applies policy to get a decision (permit,

Figure 6.7: Protocol of PAX model between *CS* and *AS*

deny, not applicable and indeterminate). If decision="permit", *AS* uses *UR<sub>sp</sub>* to specify user's role (direct/indirect). If *UR<sub>sp</sub>*=direct, *AS* sends the data retrieval request by PRP to *DS*; if *UR<sub>sp</sub>*=indirect, *AS* sends the Shamir request that contain at least 2 *SS<sub>s</sub>* to insure legitimate indirect users. Otherwise *AS* sends reject response to *C<sub>i</sub>* by *CS*.

### 3. Third protocol as shown in Figure 6.8:

- Similarly, *AS* generates random secret (*SN<sub>AS</sub>*) and timestamp (*TS<sub>AS</sub>*) between *AS* and *DS*. *AS* computes *ASS<sub>5</sub>* to protect secret (*SN<sub>AS</sub>*) between *AS* and *DS*. Additionally, *AS* computes *ASS<sub>6</sub>* to ensure legitimate PP (*RN<sub>opm</sub>* and *UN<sub>opm</sub>*) in *DS*. All Sigs (such as *ASS<sub>6<sub>tm</sub></sub>*) and PP (such as *TS<sub>AS<sub>tm</sub></sub>* and *SN<sub>AS<sub>tm</sub></sub>*) are anonymously hidden by *AS*. Then, *AS* sends XACML's request to *DS*.
- *DS* receives the request, cuts Sigs and PP. After that, *DS* extracts original parameters (such as *C<sub>i</sub>S<sub>4</sub>* and *SN<sub>AS</sub>*) and checks timestamp. *DS* computes *DSS<sub>1</sub>* (to extract *ASS<sub>6</sub>*) and retrieves *RN<sub>oph</sub>* and


Figure 6.8: Protocol of PAX model between *AS* and *DS*

$RN_{opm}$  depending on  $RN_{opl}$ . Then, *DS* computes  $DSS_2$  and  $DSS_3$  to check  $DSS_2 = ASS_6$  and  $DSS_3 = C_iS_4$ . If *AS*'s parameters validated in *DS* correctly, *DS* computes timestamp ( $TS_{DS}$ ) and signs patient's data ( $DSS_4$ ). All Sigs (such as  $DSS_{4tm}$ ) and PP (such as  $TS_{DStm}$ ) are anonymously hidden by *DS*. At this point, *DS* sends the response to *AS*.

- *AS* receives the response, extracts PP (such as  $TS_{DS}$ ) and checks timestamp. *AS* tests the Sigs checking (such as  $ASS_6 = DSS_2$ ). Then, *AS* computes data signature ( $ASS_7$ ) to check data integrity by  $ASS_7 = DSS_4$ .

#### 4. Fourth protocol as shown in Figure 6.9:

- *AS* prepares the response to *CS* by generating a new timestamp ( $TS_{AS}$ ), hides data signature ( $ASS_7$ ) with  $ASS_2$ ,  $ASS_3$ ,  $C_iS_4$  and secret signature ( $ASS_1$ ). *AS* hides PP and sends the response that contains decision and patient's data to *CS*.
- *CS* receives the response and extracts Sigs and PP. *CS* computes data signature ( $DSS_5$ ) to check data integrity ( $CSS_5 = ASS_7$ ).

Figure 6.9: Protocol of PAX model between *AS*, *CS* and *C<sub>i</sub>*

Then, *CS* checks other Sigs (*CSS<sub>2</sub>*, *CSS<sub>3</sub>* and *CSS<sub>4</sub>*) with received Sigs (*ASS<sub>2</sub>*, *ASS<sub>3</sub>* and *C<sub>i</sub>S<sub>4</sub>*) to ensure legitimacy of *AS*. *CS* prepares the response to *C<sub>i</sub>* by generating a new timestamp and hides data signature (*CSS<sub>5</sub>*) with *CSS<sub>2</sub>*, *CSS<sub>3</sub>*, *C<sub>i</sub>S<sub>4</sub>* and secret signature (*CSS<sub>1</sub>*). *CS* sends the response to *C<sub>i</sub>*.

- *C<sub>i</sub>* receives the response, extracts PP and checks timestamp. *C<sub>i</sub>* computes data signature (*C<sub>i</sub>S<sub>5</sub>*) to check data integrity by *C<sub>i</sub>S<sub>5</sub>* = *CSS<sub>5</sub>*. Then, *C<sub>i</sub>* extracts signatures (*CSS<sub>2</sub>*, *CSS<sub>3</sub>*, *CSS<sub>1</sub>* and *C<sub>i</sub>S<sub>4</sub>*) and checks them with original signatures (*C<sub>i</sub>S<sub>1</sub>*, *C<sub>i</sub>S<sub>2</sub>*, *C<sub>i</sub>S<sub>3</sub>* and *C<sub>i</sub>S<sub>4</sub>*) respectively. *C<sub>i</sub>* uses *CSS<sub>2</sub>*, *CSS<sub>3</sub>* and *CSS<sub>1</sub>* (secret signature between *C<sub>i</sub>* and *CS*) to check legitimacy of *CS* while uses *C<sub>i</sub>S<sub>4</sub>* to check legitimacy of *AS* and *DS*. If all Sigs are validated, namely, authorised *C<sub>i</sub>* received securely correct data.

#### 6.3.4.2 Authorisation Protocols for Indirect Subjects and Objects

Indirect user authorisation is an important process to secure sensitive patients' data in the EHR stored in *DS*. PAX offers additional procedures to prevent the abuse of




Figure 6.10: Authorisation of indirect users

indirect user privileges.

#### • Prerequisite procedures

There are a set of steps that must be performed before authorisations are applied.

1. Steps from 1 to 3 are similar to those for direct users.
2. The Shamir scheme is used to generate the  $SS_s$  from  $MS$  for the number of users, each  $C_i$  has unique  $SS$  same length as  $MS$ , and authorised with two policies for each indirect user on  $AS$ . The policy evaluation process is also done with two,  $PDP1$  and  $PDP2$ , evaluation engines. The use of two evaluation engines is very important in separating direct and indirect users and increasing security in the privacy of medical records.
3. The PAX authorisation system identifies certain medical records (the patients' history at a given time such as a year or more ago) for indirect users who can access them, as shown in Figure 7.11 (researcher case).

#### • Authorisation protocols

The following protocols detail how the indirect user obtains medical records in PAX. Figure 6.10 illustrates generally the authorisation of indirect users, while Figures 6.6, 6.7, 6.11, 6.8, and 6.9 show the authorisation protocols of indirect users in PAX.




Figure 6.11: Protocol of PAX model for indirect users

1. The steps of the first and second protocols are similar to the ones of the direct users authorisation.
2. Third protocol as shown in Figure 6.11:
  - $AS$  computed  $MS$  previously by signing all users' signatures. Then,  $AS$  computes Shamir scheme to generate  $SS_s$  with the same number of users (each  $C_i$  has one unique  $SS$ ). In PAX,  $C_i$  needs at least 3  $SS_s$  to generate original  $MS$ . In this protocol,  $AS$  generates a new timestamp and retrieves at least 2  $SS_s$ . After that,  $AS$  hides  $SS_s$  with  $ASS_2$ ,  $C_iS_4$ ,  $S_{sp}$  and secret signature ( $ASS_1$ ) as well as parameters (such as  $TS_{AS_{tm}}$  and  $UN_{sp_{tm}}$ ) are anonymously hidden. At this point,  $AS$  sends request to  $CS$ .
  - $CS$  receives the request, extracts PP and checks timestamp. Then,  $CS$  removes the secret signature ( $CSS_4$ ) and adds the secret signature ( $CSS_1$ ) in  $CSS_{2_{tm}}$ .  $CS$  generates a new timestamp ( $TS_{CS}$ ), hides PP and sends the request to  $C_i$ .

- $C_i$  receives Shamir's request, extracts PP and checks timestamp. Then,  $C_i$  computes  $C_iS_6$  to extract  $SS_s$  and retrieves his  $SS$ . At the moment,  $C_i$  can generate  $MS$  from Shamir ( $C_i$ 's  $SS||SS_s$ ), hides  $MS$  with  $C_iS_6$  and  $C_iS_3$ , generates timestamp and hides PP. At this point,  $C_i$  sends the response to  $CS$ .
  - $CS$  receives the response, extracts PP and checks timestamp. Also,  $CS$  removes  $CSS_1$  and adds  $CSS_4$  in  $C_iS_{6_{tm}}$ .  $CS$  generates a new timestamp, hides PP and sends the response to  $AS$ .
  - $AS$  receives Shamir response, extracts PP and checks timestamp. Then,  $AS$  extracts the received  $MS$  and checks it with the saved original  $MS$ . After that,  $AS$  retrieves  $C_i$ 's  $SS$  depending on  $S_{sp}(UR_{sp}||CN_{sp})$  and assigns request  $(SS, S_{op})$  to PDP2 .  $AS$  specifies policy depending on policy's ID (Shamir||SP), checks attributes in PIP and PDP2 applies policy in PAP to produce the decision. If the decision is "permit",  $AS$  creates a data retrieval request by PRP to DS; otherwise  $AS$  sends reject response to  $C_i$  by  $CS$ .
3. The fourth and fifth protocols are similar to the third and fourth ones respectively in direct user authorisation.  $DS$  sends the response to the  $C_i$  by  $AS$  and  $CS$ . If  $C_i$  is advisor, relative, or emergency doctor,  $C_i$  will receive specific patient's data; otherwise if  $C_i$  is researcher doctor,  $C_i$  will receive a set of medical records.

## 6.4 Summary of the Chapter

In this chapter, we have provided details about the requirements and the design goals of building a new authorisation scheme. Then, we put forward an AC network model for the proposed HC application. The objective of the AC model is to authorise a differentiated level of Access control to the EHR/EMR repository, for the purpose of achieving efficiency as well as preserving patient's privacy. Finally, the authorisation scheme methodology has been explained in detail to authorise users in HC application by having given a set of protocols and procedures of authorising HC users with their balanced and deserved authority.

# Chapter 7: Verification of Protocols for the Security and Performance

After having developed an HC application with security feature and high efficiency, along with the protocols and algorithms for protecting users' authentication and privacy for the patients health/medical records; as well the HC professionals' differentiated access control to the HC patients records, it is the time to verify those protocols and prove the proposed HC application has achieved the objectives. In this chapter, we start with the introduction and description of protocol testing tools, followed by how to use the tools to verify our developed REISCH, RAMHU and PAX.

## 7.1 Security Testing Tool

In this Section, we will provide details about security testing tools such as the automated validation of Internet security protocols and applications (AVISPA) have used in our project as follows.

### 7.1.1 AVISPA

For all of the designed protocols so far, it is necessary to verify them being proof against various threats/attacks. In this section, we will a widely used AVISPA tool, and explain how to use to check the protocols we have designed. AVISPA is a formal tool for analysing security schemes and applied by researchers to evaluate recent security protocols ([Gupta et al. 2018](#), [Babu & Padmanabhan 2018](#), [Xu et al. 2018](#), [Dong et al. 2018](#)).

## 7.2 Analysis of RAMHU Scheme

In this Section, we will analyse RAMHU's security and performance in both theoretical and experiential aspects.

### 7.2.1 Possible Attacks on the RAMHU Scheme

In this Section, theoretical and experimental security analyses have been presented. We will describe how our scheme (RAMHU) applies security requirements in protecting users' authentication information in the healthcare system. In this Section, we will show how RAMHU provides a high-security level against these attacks meanwhile providing propositions and proofs.

- **Proposition 1 – Privileged-insider attack**

The internal intruder ( $II$ ) cannot detect the private key or password (privileged-insider attack) for another legitimate user in the healthcare network.

**Proof**

$II$  needs to eavesdrop authentication requests between  $C_i$  and  $CS$ . After that, he/she tries to perform an analysis of these requests based on his/her access privileges to the network. First, the analysis of these requests to obtain the private key or password is infeasible because the authentication request is encrypted by the ECIES-256 bits algorithm;  $II$  cannot decrypt these requests with his private key. Second, if  $II$  broke the encryption (which is impossible), he/she is unable to extract the  $PW_i$  value ( $tmpPW_i = PW_i \oplus N_{C_i} \oplus GM \oplus C_iSig_1$ ) in the login phase because it is hidden and depends on the values of  $GM$ ,  $C_iSig_1$ , and  $N_{C_i}$  where  $II$  does not know the  $GM$  value of the legitimate user's device, and the  $C_iSig_1$  value depends on the  $CM$  value that is also not known to  $II$ . Therefore, RAMHU prevents a privileged insider attack.

- **Proposition 2 – Stolen device/application attack**

The intruder ( $I$ ) will not gain any benefit from device or client application theft (stolen device/application attack) for use in authentication as a legitimate user.

**Proof**

In the first case,  $I$  stole a legitimate user device (such as a laptop) that contains a client application. In our scheme, user's  $PW_i$ , and  $IDs$  are not stored on the user's device, or in the client application. In addition, the private key is hidden and random for each authentication process by  $C_iK_{pri} \oplus GM \oplus PW_i \oplus N_{C_i}$ . Additionally, the proof in Proposition 1 shows that the  $PW_i$  value cannot be extracted from the  $tmpPW_i$ . If  $I$  is  $II$ , he/she also cannot use his/her  $IDs$  and  $PW_i$  to access information or other user data because both  $CS$  and  $AS$  perform matching  $IDs$ , and  $PW_i$  to determine user-related information and data. In the second case, the attacker stole only client application.  $I$  cannot use the application on another device because it does not have  $OTP_i$  or original MAC, which prevents the application from being used on another

device even if  $I$  knows the  $ID_s$  and  $PW_i$ . The original MAC mechanism ( $C_iSig_1 = h(CM\|N_{C_i}\|TS_{C_i})$ ) prevents the fake authentication request from being verified in the server because  $I$  cannot generate an original MAC address ( $CM$ ) in  $C_iSig_1$ . Thus, RAMHU is resistant to stolen attacks.

- **Proposition 3 – Replay attack**

$I$  cannot use the login/registration/authentication request later (replay attack).

**Proof**

$I$  tries to get a login/registration/authentication request for a legitimate user to send it later and thus, gains access to the network. This case is infeasible in our scheme because all entities ( $C_i$ ,  $CS$ , and  $AS$ ) use timestamp (such as  $TS_{CS} - TS_{C_i} \leq \Delta T$ , where  $\Delta T$  is the maximum transfer delay rate) that prevents the attacker from sending the authentication request at a later time. Furthermore, signatures and random nonces are not usable the next times. Hence, RAMHU successfully resists replay attacks.

- **Proposition 4 – Man-in-the-Middle attack**

$I$  does not have the ability to intercept, modify, and replace authentication request (man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack) among RAMHU's entities.

**Proof**

Assume that an  $I$  attempts to intercept encrypted login/authentication requests (such as  $Enc_i = TS_{C_i}\|N_{C_i}\| CiSig_1\|UP_{C_i}^{CS}\|MP_{C_i}^{CS}\|tmpPW_i\|CiSig_2$ ) among network entities, and then modifies or replaces these requests with his/her messages to send to network entities. However, the attacker cannot replace exchanged requests among  $C_i$ ,  $CS$ , and  $AS$  because, first, he/she does not know the private keys ( $C_iK_{pri}$ ,  $CSK_{pri}$ ,  $ASK_{pri}$ ) and therefore, the decryption process is computationally infeasible with 256 bits key length and difficulty in solving ECDLP. Second, mutual authentication with PHOTON-256 signatures prevents the modification of requests between RAMHU's entities. As a result, RAMHU gracefully overcomes the MITM attack.

- **Proposition 5 – ID or Password Guessing Attack**

External intruder ( $EI$ ) cannot guess  $ID_s$  and  $PW_i$  (guessing attack) for legitimate users of the RAMHU protocol.

**Proof**

Assume that an  $EI$  was able to penetrate the encryption ( $Enc_i$ ) between  $C_i$  and  $CS$  (from Proposition 4, this assumption is infeasible). This  $EI$  tries to guess  $PW_i$  in a login request to use it to access the network as a legitimate user.  $EI$  cannot detect  $PW_i$  for any authorised user (either on-line or off-line) because he/she does not know the configured process to protect  $PW_i$ .

$(tmpPW_i = PW_i \oplus N_{C_i} \oplus GM \oplus C_iSig_1)$  and does not know the MAC address for that user and thus, the process of deriving  $PW_i$  is infeasible (Proposition 1). It is an extremely difficult process to guess  $PW_i$  from the  $tmpPW_i$ , which is 64 hex (256 bit). In addition,  $EI$  cannot detect  $UID_i$  and  $MID_i$  for any legitimate user because of the use of multi pseudonyms mechanism for users and medical centres instead of sending real information to legitimate users. As a result, RAMHU is safe against guessing attacks.

- **Proposition 6 – Client impersonation attack**

$I$  cannot impersonate a legitimate user or device in the network (client impersonation attack).

**Proof**

Assume that an attacker tries to impersonate a login request (such as  $Enc_i = TS_{C_i} \| N_{C_i} \| CiSig_1 \| UP_{C_i}^{CS} \| MP_{C_i}^{CS} \| tmpPW_i \| CiSig_2$ ) for a legitimate user. This  $I$  can create  $TS_{C_i}$  and  $N_{C_i}$  but does not know  $PW_i$  and  $C_iK_{pr_i}$  (Proposition 1, and 4) for the legitimate user, namely,  $I$  cannot impersonate the user identity.  $I$  also tries to impersonate the legitimate user's device by programmatically changing the MAC address to a legitimate one to gain access to the network. This case is infeasible because the original MAC check ( $CM$ ) in  $CiSig_1 = h(CM \| N_{C_i} \| TS_{C_i})$  detects the attacker's attempt to mimic the legitimate user's device (as proved in Proposition 2). Therefore, RAMHU withstands against instances of impersonating the user's identity and device.

- **Proposition 7 – Server impersonation attack**

$I$  cannot impersonate (server impersonation attack) the central server ( $CS$ ) and cheat the client ( $C_i$ ).

**Proof**

Assume that an  $I$  traps login requests from  $C_i$  to  $CS$ . The attacker tries to deceive  $C_i$  by sending fake requests to  $C_i$  in order to inform them that he is a legitimate server.  $I$  needs the private key for  $CS$  to decrypt and to accomplish the attack. Mutual authentication prevents  $I$  from impersonating  $CS$ 's requests (such as  $Enc_i = TS_{CS} \| N_{CS} \| UP_{CS}^{C_i} \| MP_{CS}^{C_i} \| CSSig_5$ ) and sending them to  $C_i$ . This mechanism ensures that  $C_i$  deals with legitimate  $CS$ . Consequently, our protocol effectively resists server impersonation attack.

- **Proposition 8 – DoS attack**

$I$  cannot effectively perform a DoS attack against our scheme.

**Proof**

In order for  $I$  to execute a DoS attack against  $CS$  and  $AS$ , he/she needs to decrypt the login request and change its data or send the same request multiple times for destroying servers. However, in the first case, decryption and change

of signatures are infeasible as proved in Propositions 2 and 4.  $CS$  checks signature validity and rejects login requests containing fake signatures, and  $I$  cannot execute a collision or preimage attack because PHOTON-256 supplies PR, SPR, and CR. In the second case, the attacker sends the same request multiple times. This status is infeasible because CS or AS checks timestamp ( $TS_{C_i}, TS_{CS}, TS_{AS}$ ) for each login/authentication request and eliminates all late requests (Proposition 3) without checking the other security parameters such as  $PW_i$ ,  $CM$ , and multi pseudonyms. In case  $I$  can break the encryption, he/she can change timestamp and nonce but cannot tamper with the signatures. RAMHU prevents this condition during  $C_iSig_1$  and does not need to check the remaining security parameters. Therefore, RAMHU successfully resists DoS attacks.

- **Proposition 9 – Password change attack**

$I$  cannot detect new  $PW_i$  or change old  $PW_i$  (password change attack) to prevent legitimate users from accessing the network.

**Proof**

Assume that an  $I$  intercepts a request to change  $PW_i$  between  $C_i$  and  $CS$ .  $I$  obtains an encrypted request (such as  $Enc_i = TS_{C_i} \| NC_1 \| NC_2 \| NC_3 \| UP_{C_i}^{CS} \| MP_{C_i}^{CS} \| tmp\_oldPW_i \| tmp\_newPW_i \| C_iSig_1$ ). If  $I$  can decrypt (this process is infeasible as proved in Propositions 1, and 4), he/she will find a temporary passwords and cannot derive new  $PW_i$  because it depends on the  $C_iSig_1 = h(TS_{C_i} \| NC_1 \| UP_{C_i}^{CS} \| MP_{C_i}^{CS} \| oldPW_i)$ . The signature operation ( $C_iSig_1$ ) is based on the old  $PW_i$  which is not explicitly sent to  $CS$  in this phase.  $I$  does not know old  $PW_i$  and therefore, he/she cannot create a signature to complete the  $PW_i$  change process. Thereupon, RAMHU provides a reliable solution against password change attacks.

- **Proposition 10 – Eavesdropping attack**

$I$  does not gain plaintext and useful information when an eavesdropping attack has applied to our scheme.

**Proof**

Assume that an  $I$  eavesdrops login/authentication requests to gain information about user authentication and access to the network. However, in our scheme,  $I$  will not benefit from requests that are intercepted because RAMHU uses ECIES algorithm with key 256 bits to encrypt authentication information. The attacker can only decrypt requests by deriving private keys and this operation is infeasible (as proved in Propositions 1, and 2) due to key length, and random encryption with nonces (anonymity). Therefore, our protocol is resistant to

eavesdropping attack.

- **Proposition 11 – Traceability attack**

$I$  cannot track exchanged login/authentication requests (traceability attack) between all entities in the RAMHU scheme.

**Proof**

$I$  attempts to collect as many login/authentication requests as possible and then performs an analysis of those requests that helps him/her to perform user identity tracing. When an  $I$  succeeds in tracking user requests, he/she can detect and distinguish patients' data. All exchanged requests among RAMHU's entities do not contain direct users' information (such as username). RAMHU replaces the real user  $ID_s$  ( $UID_i$  and  $MID_i$ ) with pseudonyms. Our protocol uses multi pseudonyms ( $UP_{C_i}^{CS}$ ,  $UP_{CS}^{AS}$ ,  $UP_{AS}^{CS}$ , and  $UP_{CS}^{C_i}$  for users and  $MP_{C_i}^{CS}$ ,  $MP_{CS}^{AS}$ ,  $MP_{AS}^{CS}$ , and  $MP_{CS}^{C_i}$  for medical centres) to prevent attackers from tracking user requests and revealing their identities when transferred between RAMHU entities ( $C_i$ ,  $CS$ , and  $AS$ ). Hence, RAMHU resists traceability attacks.

- **Proposition 12 – Revocation attack**

$I$  cannot penetrate or send a revocation request to delete or remove users' accounts information (revocation attack) in the RAMHU protocol.

**Proof**

Assume that an  $I$  tries to penetrate a revocation request. The attacker tries to analyse the request and use it to prevent users from accessing the network's services. Depending on Propositions 1, 5, and 11, the attacker cannot extract or distinguish  $UID_i$ ,  $MID_i$  and  $PW_i$  from the revocation request. The attacker does not know and cannot extract a reason from the  $tmpRR_i$ , which is based on the values of  $RR_i$ ,  $N_{C_2}$ , and  $C_iSig_1$ . In Propositions 2 and 8,  $I$  cannot perform collision, preimage, and second preimage attacks against the PHOTON-256 algorithm. Thus, our protocol prevents penetration of revocation request.

- **Proposition 13 – Verifier attack**

$I$  cannot extract users' passwords from datasets in  $CS$  (Verifier attack).

**Proof**

Assume that  $I$  tries to penetrate the datasets in  $CS$ . If the attacker is  $EI$ , he/she cannot penetrate datasets because he/she does not have a  $K_{pr}$ ,  $UID$ ,  $MID$ ,  $OTP$ , and  $PW_i$ . If the attacker is  $II$ , when he penetrates datasets in  $CS$  and wants to impersonate another user's identity, first, he/she cannot distinguish this information for a particular user because the real information for users is stored in  $AS$ . Second, since  $CS$  does not contain passwords'

dataset,  $II$  will not benefit from hacking datasets such as pseudonyms and cannot create a request and send it to  $AS$  because it does not know users' passwords. Therefore, RAMHU resists verifier attacks meritoriously.

- **Proposition 14 – Leakage attack**

The attacker does not get any information leaked from requests and responses exchanged (leakage attack) between RAMHU entities.

**Proof**

Suppose that  $I$  listens to some exchanged requests among  $C_i$ ,  $CS$ , and  $AS$  and tries to find any information that helps him/her to penetrate network authentication such as sending an ID explicitly, or sending a password with weak encryption. Exchanged requests between RAMHU entities such as a password update request ( $Enc_i = TS_{C_i} \| N_{C_1} \| N_{C_2} \| N_{C_3} \| UP_{C_i}^{CS} \| MP_{C_i}^{CS} \| tmp\_oldPW_i \| tmp\_newPW_i \| C_i.Sig_1$ ) show that  $I$  does not receive any leaked real information for users during transmission, such as  $IDs$  and  $PW_i$  (all information is anonymous and hidden) that could be useful in penetrating the healthcare network. Therefore, RAMHU resists leakage attacks.

### 7.2.1.1 Experimental Security Analysis

In the previous subsection, we have listed out various possible attacks on the RAMHU scheme. In this section, we provide the proposed scheme simulation using the AVISPA tool to verify our scheme, whether safe or unsafe. This tool has been widely used and accepted by researchers in recent years (Amin, Kumar, Biswas, Iqbal & Chang 2018, Amin, Islam, Biswas, Khan & Kumar 2018). It has been used to check security problems in authentication procedures and ensure that known attacks are not able to penetrate user authentication information.

#### 7.2.1.1.1 RAMHU Scheme with AVISPA

In this Section, we will illustrate the implementation and simulation of RAMHU in the AVISPA tool using HLP SL language. Our scheme depends on three core roles: clienti, centralServer, and attributesServer played by  $C_i$ ,  $CS$  and  $AS$  respectively, in addition to the supporting roles such as session, and environment, goal specification section. Each role contains parameters, variables, and local constants. Each basic role contains a transition section that indicates the sequence of communication between entities. Each supporting role contains a composition section that indicates the binding of roles and sessions. Asymmetric encryption has been implemented between scheme entities ( $C_i$ ,  $CS$ , and  $AS$ ) during public key exchange ( $KC_{pu}$ ,  $KCS_{pu}$ , and  $KAS_{pu}$ ) to perform confidentiality as well as mutual authentication to ensure the legitimacy of related parties in the phases of the proposed scheme (initial setup,

registration, login, and authentication). Moreover, it uses nonces ( $N_c$ ,  $N_{cs}$ , and  $N_{as}$ ) and timestamp ( $TS_c$ ,  $TS_{cs}$ ,  $TS_{as}$ ) to support the features of anonymity and freshness. Our scheme accomplishes 10 secrecy goals and 6 authentication goals as noted in the goal section in Figure 7.5. Figure 7.1 shows RAMHU's framework in AVISPA.

$C_i$  receives the start signal and changes the state flag (State variable) from 0 to 1. It replaces  $UID$  and  $MID$  with  $UP_c$  and  $MP_c$  and calculates the timestamp ( $TS'_c$ ) and new nonce ( $N'_c$ ) by the new() operation, and computes the signatures ( $C_iSig_1$  and  $C_iSig_2$ ), as well as the password hiding process as calculated in the calculation operation of the  $TmpPW$  parameter. It encrypts the registration and login request ( $TS'_c$ ,  $N'_c$ ,  $GM'$ ,  $C_iSig'_1$ ,  $UP'_c$ ,  $MP'_c$ ,  $OTP_i$ ,  $Temporary\_PW'$ , and  $C_iSig'_2$ ) by the public key ( $KCS_{pu}$ ) to establish a reliable communication with  $CS$ .  $C_i$  sends the request to  $CS$  where the transmission process is performed by the SND() operation. It achieves a set of secret goals ( $sec1$  to  $sec6$ ) with both  $CS$  and  $AS$ ; these secrets have been only known and kept by the intended parties. For example in  $sec1$ ,  $UID$ ,  $MID$ , and  $PW$  have been known and kept only to  $C_i$ , and  $AS$ , while in  $sec3$   $GM$ , and  $CM$  have been known and kept only to  $C_i$  and  $CS$ , since these parameters are not transmitted directly during the transition of information between network parties such as  $PW$  implicitly is in the calculation of  $TmpPW$  and  $CM$  is implicitly in  $C_iSig_1$ .  $C_i$  also achieves the goal of authentication using statement (witness) with parameters ( $C_i$ ,  $CS$ ,  $ci\_cs\_auth2$ ,  $N_{cs}$ ,  $TS_c$ ), which means that  $C_i$  is a witness that the security parameters ( $N_{cs}$ ,  $TS_c$ ) are fresh and correct, and  $CS$  uses a statement (request) to validate parameters with the strong authentication goal ( $ci\_cs\_auth2$ ) specified in the goal section (Figure 12).  $C_i$  receives the authentication response by the RCV () operation and sent from  $AS$  by  $CS$ . Then,  $C_i$  decrypts the response using its private key to verify the security parameters. If all security parameters are verified correctly,  $C_i$  performs the mutual authentication process securely. The authentication process begins by sending requests from clients to the server. Therefore, the  $client_i$  role includes the start signal as shown in Figure 7.2.




Figure 7.1: RAMHU's framework in AVISPA

```

role clienti(Ci,CS,AS:agent, KCpu,KCSpu:public_key, H:hash_func, UID,MID,OTPi,PW,GM,CM:message
           , SND,RCV:channel(dy))
played_by Ci def=
local
    State:nat,
    TSc,TScs,Nc,Ncs:text, CiSig1,CiSig2:text, UPc,MPc,UPcs,MPcs,TmpPW:message
const
    sec1,sec2,sec3,sec4,sec5,sec6, cs_ci_auth1,ci_cs_auth2:protocol_id
init
    State := 0
transition
1. State = 0
    /\RCV(start) =|> State':= 1 /\UPc':=UID /\MPc':=MID /\GM':=Ci /\Nc':=new() /\TSc':=new()
    /\CiSig1':= H(CM.Nc'.TSc') /\CiSig2':= H(GM'.Nc'.TSc'.CiSig1'.UPc'.MPc'.OTPi.PW)
    /\TmpPW':=xor(PW,xor(Nc',xor(GM',CiSig1')))

% Registeration and login phase
% Ci sends security parameters to CS
    /\SND({TSc'.Nc'.GM'.CiSig1'.UPc'.MPc'.OTPi.TmpPW'.CiSig2'}_KCSpu)
    /\secret({UID,MID,PW},sec1,{Ci,AS}) /\secret(PW,sec2,{Ci,CS}) /\secret({GM,CM},sec3,{Ci,CS})
    /\secret({CiSig1',CiSig2'},sec4,{Ci,CS}) /\secret({TmpPW',OTPi},sec5,{Ci,CS})
    /\secret({UPc,MPc,UPcs,MPcs},sec6,{Ci,CS})

2. State = 1
% Ci receives authentication response from CS
    /\RCV({TScs'.Ncs'.Nc.UPcs'.MPcs'. H(TScs'.Ncs'.UPcs'.MPcs')}_KCpu)=|>
    State':= 2 /\SND({Ncs'}_KCSpu)

% Clienti checks that the received security parameters
    /\request(Ci,CS,cs_ci_auth1,{Nc,TScs}) /\request(Ci,CS,cs_ci_auth5,{TmpPW,OTPi})
% Clienti sends Ncs to prove her identity
    /\witness(Ci,CS,ci_cs_auth2,{Ncs,TSc})
end role

```

Figure 7.2:  $C_i$  role of RAMHU in HLPSL

As shown in Figure 7.3,  $CS$  receives a registration and login request by RCV () operation in state 0 and decrypts it with its private key and then checks the parameters and signatures to accomplish secret and authentication goals.  $CS$  changes the state signal from 0 to 1 and constructs an authentication request based on the security parameters ( $TSc'_s$ ,  $N'_s$ ,  $UP_{cs}$ ,  $MP_{cs}$ ,  $CSSig_3$ , and  $TmpPW$ ) and encrypts it by the public key of  $AS$ .  $CS$  performs strong authentication with  $AS$  during

witness ( $CS$ ,  $AS$ ,  $as\_cs\_auth4$ ,  $TS'_{cs}$ ,  $N'_{cs}$ ) to accomplish the authentication goal ( $as\_cs\_auth4$ ) based on timestamp and fresh nonce and validated in  $AS$  by statement (request). In state 1,  $CS$  receives an authentication response from  $AS$  and checks the security parameters after decryption with its private key. It changes the state signal to 2 and then constructs and sends the authentication response to  $C_i$  with two strong authentication goals ( $cs\_ci\_auth1$  and  $cs\_ci\_auth5$ ) based on the security parameters ( $N_c$ ,  $TS_{cs}$ ,  $TmpPW$ , and  $OTP_i$ ).

$AS$  receives the authentication request and decrypts it with the private key as shown in Figure 7.4. It accomplishes 5 secret goals, and accomplishes two authentication goals ( $as\_cs\_auth4$  and  $as\_cs\_auth6$ ) based on  $TS'_{cs}$ ,  $N'_{cs}$ , and  $PW'$ . It constructs the authentication response and establishes strong authentication when validating parameters ( $TS_{as}$ ,  $N'_{cs}$ , and  $PW'$ ) in  $CS$ .

Figure 7.5 displays the roles of session, environment, and goal section. In the session role, a composition process has been performed for the three roles ( $client_i$ ,  $centralServer$ , and  $attributeServer$ ) and specifies the transmit and receive channels in the Dolev Yao model. In the environment role, the security parameters, the goals specified in the goal section, and the known information for the intruder ( $intruder\_knowledge$ ) have been defined. In this role, one or more sessions are composed, and we tested our scheme with sessions for replay, MITM, and impersonating attacks. We assumed that an intruder ( $I$ ) creates a public key ( $ki$ ) and has knowledge of the public keys ( $kCpu$ ,  $kCSpu$ , and  $kASpu$ ) of legitimate entities in the network. Intruder attempts to resend registration/login or authentication requests later, intercepts/modifies these requests, or impersonates the participating entities using  $i\_ci$ ,  $i\_cs$ , and  $i\_as$  constants rather than  $ci$ ,  $cs$ , and  $as$ . The results section shows that these attacks cannot penetrate the security goals in our scheme.

### 7.2.1.1.2 Simulation Results

In this Section, the simulation results in the AVISPA tool are based on two backends (OFMC, and CL-AtSe). Figure 7.6 shows the simulation result with the OFMC backend and Figure 7.7 displays the simulation result with the CL-AtSe backend. From the results shown in Figure 7.6 and Figure 7.7, our scheme clearly and accurately shows the SAFE result in the SUMMARY section, bounded number of sessions in the DETAILS section, the goals of the scheme achieved (as\_specified) in the GOAL section as well as statistical numbers such as time, number of nodes, and analysed states in the STATISTICS section for both figures. Based on these results, we note that our scheme is capable of preventing passive and active attacks such as replay, MITM, and impersonating, and that the goals of the scheme in Figure 7.5 achieved to prevent the violation of legitimate user information in the network authentication.

```

role centralServer(Ci,CS,AS:agent, KCpu,KCSpu:public_key, H:hash_func, SND,RCV:channel(dy))
played_by CS def=
local
    State:nat,
    UPc,MPc,UPcs,MPcs,UPas,MPas,TmpPW:message, CSSig1,CSSig2,CSSig3:text,
    TSc,TScs,TSas,Nc,Ncs,Nas:text, PW,OTPi:message, GM,CM:message
const
    sec1,sec2,sec3,sec4,sec5,sec6,sec7,sec8,sec9,sec10,
    ci_cs_auth2,cs_ci_auth1,cs_ci_auth5,cs_as_auth3,as_cs_auth4,as_cs_auth6:protocol_id
init
    State := 0
transition
% Registration and login request from Ci
1. State = 0
    /\RCV({TSc'.Nc'.GM'.H(CM'.Nc'.TSc')}.UPc'.MPc'.OTPi'.TmpPW'.
        H(GM'.Nc'.TSc'.H(CM'.Nc'.TSc')).UPc'.MPc'.OTPi'.PW')}_KCSpu) =|>
        CSSig1':= H(CM'.Nc'.TSc') /\CSSig2':= H(GM'.Nc'.TSc'.CSSig1'.UPc'.MPc'.OTPi'.PW)
    /\PW':=xor(TmpPW,xor(Nc',xor(GM',CSSig1))) /\secret(PW,sec2,{CS,Ci})
    /\secret({GM,CM},sec3,{CS,Ci}) /\secret({CSSig1,CSSig2},sec4,{CS,Ci})
    /\secret({TmpPW',OTPi},sec5,{CS,Ci}) /\secret({UPc,MPc,UPcs,MPcs},sec6,{CS,Ci})

% Authentication request from CS to AS
2. State' := 1 /\Ncs':=new() /\TScs':=new() /\CSSig3':= H(TScs'.Ncs'.UPcs.MPcs)
    /\TmpPW':=xor(PW,xor(Ncs',CSSig3')) /\SND({TScs'.Ncs'.UPcs.MPcs.CSSig3'.TmpPW'})_KASpu
    /\secret(PW,sec7,{CS,AS}) /\secret({CSSig3},sec8,{CS,AS})
    /\secret({TmpPW'},sec9,{CS,AS}) /\secret({UPcs,MPcs,UPas,MPas},sec10,{CS,AS})

% Authentication response from AS to CS
3. State = 1
    /\RCV({TSas'.Nas'.Ncs.UPas'.MPas'.H(TSas'.Nas'.UPas'.MPas')}_KASpu)=|>
% Authentication response to Ci
    State' := 2 /\Ncs':=new() /\TScs':=new()
    /\SND({TScs'.Ncs'.UPcs.MPcs.H(TScs'.Ncs'.UPcs.MPcs)}_KCpu)
    % CS prove his identity
    /\witness(CS,Ci,cs_ci_auth1,{Nc,TScs'}) /\witness(CS,Ci,cs_ci_auth5,{TmpPW,OTPi})
    /\witness(CS,AS,cs_as_auth3,{Nas',TScs'}) /\request(CS,AS,as_cs_auth4,{Ncs',TSas'}) /\request(CS,AS,as_cs_auth6,{PW})

3. State = 2
    /\RCV({Ncs}_KCSpu) =|>
% CS checks that the received nonce and timestamp correct
    State' := 3 /\request(CS,Ci,ci_cs_auth2,{Ncs,TSc})
end role

```

Figure 7.3: *CS* role of RAMHU in HLPSL

```

role attributesServer(AS,Ci,CS:agent, KASpu,KCSpu:public_key, H:hash_func, SND,RCV:channel(dy))
played_by AS def=
local
    State:nat,
    UID,MID,PW:message, TmpPW:message, ASSig1,ASSig2:text,TScs,Ncs,TSas,Nas:text,
    UPcs,MPcs,UPas,MPas:message, GM,CM:message
const
    sec1,sec7,sec8,sec9,sec10,cs_as_auth3,as_cs_auth4,as_cs_auth6:protocol_id
init
    State:= 0
transition
1. State = 0
    /\RCV({TScs'.Ncs'.UPcs'.MPcs'.H(TScs'.Ncs'.UPcs'.MPcs').
        TmpPW'}_KCSpu)=|>ASSig1':= H(TScs'.Ncs'.UPcs.MPcs)
    /\PW':=xor(TmpPW,xor(Ncs',ASSig1)) /\secret({UID,MID,PW},sec1,{AS,Ci}) /\secret(PW,sec7,{AS,CS})
    /\secret({ASSig1},sec8,{AS,CS}) /\secret({TmpPW'},sec9,{AS,CS})
    /\secret({UPcs,MPcs,UPas,MPas},sec10,{AS,CS}) /\State':= 1 /\Nas':=new() /\TSas':=new()
    /\ASSig2':=H(TSas'.Nas'.UPas.MPas) /\SND({TSas'.Nas'.Ncs.UPas.MPas.ASSig2'}_KASpu)
    /\witness(AS,CS,as_cs_auth4,{Ncs',TSas'}) /\witness(AS,CS,as_cs_auth6,{PW})
    /\request(AS,CS,cs_as_auth3,{Nas',TScs'}) end role

```

Figure 7.4: *AS* role of RAMHU in HLPSL

```

role session(Ci,CS,AS:agent, KCpu,KCSpu,KASpu:public_key, H:hash_func, UID,MID,OTPi,PW,GM,
            CM:message)
def=
local
    SndC,RcvC,SndCS,RcvCS,SndAS,RcvAS:channel(dy)
composition
    clienti(Ci,CS,AS,KCpu,KCSpu,H,UID,MID,OTPi,PW,GM,CM,SndC,RcvC)
    /\centralServer(Ci,CS,AS,KCpu,KCSpu,KASpu,H,SndCS,RcvCS)
    /\attributesServer(AS,Ci,CS,KASpu,KCSpu,H,SndAS,RcvAS)
end role

role environment()
def=
const
    ci,cs,as,i_ci,i_cs,i_as:agent, kCpu,kCSpu,kASpu,ki:public_key, uid,mid,otp,pw,gm,cm:message,
    h:hash_func, sec1,sec2,sec3,sec4,sec5,sec6,sec7,sec8,sec9,sec10,
    ci_cs_auth2,cs_ci_auth1,cs_ci_auth5,cs_as_auth3,as_cs_auth4,as_cs_auth6:protocol_id
    intruder_knowledge={ci,cs,as,i_ci,i_cs,i_as,kCpu,kCSpu,kASpu,ki}
composition
    session(ci,cs,as,kCpu,kCSpu,kASpu,h,uid,mid,otp,pw,gm,cm)
    % Check replay attack
    /\session(ci,cs,as,kCpu,kCSpu,kASpu,h,uid,mid,otp,pw,gm,cm)
    % Check MITM attack
    /\session(cs,ci,as,kCpu,kCSpu,kASpu,h,uid,mid,otp,pw,gm,cm)
    % Check impersonate Ci
    /\session(i,cs,as,ki,kCpu,kASpu,h,uid,mid,otp,pw,gm,cm)
    % Chekc impersonate CS
    /\session(ci,i,as,kCpu,ki,kASpu,h,uid,mid,otp,pw,gm,cm)
    % Check impersonate AS
    /\session(ci,cs,i,kCpu,kCSpu,ki,h,uid,mid,otp,pw,gm,cm)
end role

goal
    secrecy_of sec1,sec2,sec3,sec4,sec5,sec6,sec7,sec8,sec9,sec10
    authentication_on cs_ci_auth1,ci_cs_auth2,cs_as_auth3,as_cs_auth4,cs_ci_auth5,as_cs_auth6
end goal

environment()

```

Figure 7.5: Session, environment, and goal roles of RAMHU in HLPSL

|   |  |         |      |         |                            |             |          |  |      |              |         |         |            |                       |                       |                           |                           |
|---|--|---------|------|---------|----------------------------|-------------|----------|--|------|--------------|---------|---------|------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| <pre> % OFMC % Version of 2006/02/13 SUMMARY SAFE DETAILS BOUNDED_NUMBER_OF_SESSIONS PROTOCOL /home/span/span/testsuite/results/RAMHU.if GOAL as_specified BACKEND OFMC COMMENTS STATISTICS parseTime: 0.00s searchTime: 54.60s visitedNodes: 3636 nodes depth: 11 plies </pre> | <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="padding: 5px;">SUMMARY</td></tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 5px;">SAFE</td></tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 5px;">DETAILS</td></tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 5px;">BOUNDED_NUMBER_OF_SESSIONS</td></tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 5px;">TYPED_MODEL</td></tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 5px;">PROTOCOL</td></tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 5px;">/home/span/span/testsuite/results/RAMHU.if</td></tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 5px;">GOAL</td></tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 5px;">As Specified</td></tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 5px;">BACKEND</td></tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 5px;">CL-AtSe</td></tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 5px;">STATISTICS</td></tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 5px;">Analysed : 324 states</td></tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 5px;">Reachable : 64 states</td></tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 5px;">Translation: 0.52 seconds</td></tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 5px;">Computation: 0.42 seconds</td></tr> </table> | SUMMARY | SAFE | DETAILS | BOUNDED_NUMBER_OF_SESSIONS | TYPED_MODEL | PROTOCOL | /home/span/span/testsuite/results/RAMHU.if | GOAL | As Specified | BACKEND | CL-AtSe | STATISTICS | Analysed : 324 states | Reachable : 64 states | Translation: 0.52 seconds | Computation: 0.42 seconds |
| SUMMARY   |  |         |      |         |                            |             |          |  |      |              |         |         |            |                       |                       |                           |                           |
| SAFE  |  |         |      |         |                            |             |          |  |      |              |         |         |            |                       |                       |                           |                           |
| DETAILS   |  |         |      |         |                            |             |          |  |      |              |         |         |            |                       |                       |                           |                           |
| BOUNDED_NUMBER_OF_SESSIONS  |  |         |      |         |                            |             |          |  |      |              |         |         |            |                       |                       |                           |                           |
| TYPED_MODEL   |  |         |      |         |                            |             |          |  |      |              |         |         |            |                       |                       |                           |                           |
| PROTOCOL  |  |         |      |         |                            |             |          |  |      |              |         |         |            |                       |                       |                           |                           |
| /home/span/span/testsuite/results/RAMHU.if  |  |         |      |         |                            |             |          |  |      |              |         |         |            |                       |                       |                           |                           |
| GOAL  |  |         |      |         |                            |             |          |  |      |              |         |         |            |                       |                       |                           |                           |
| As Specified  |  |         |      |         |                            |             |          |  |      |              |         |         |            |                       |                       |                           |                           |
| BACKEND   |  |         |      |         |                            |             |          |  |      |              |         |         |            |                       |                       |                           |                           |
| CL-AtSe   |  |         |      |         |                            |             |          |  |      |              |         |         |            |                       |                       |                           |                           |
| STATISTICS  |  |         |      |         |                            |             |          |  |      |              |         |         |            |                       |                       |                           |                           |
| Analysed : 324 states   |  |         |      |         |                            |             |          |  |      |              |         |         |            |                       |                       |                           |                           |
| Reachable : 64 states   |  |         |      |         |                            |             |          |  |      |              |         |         |            |                       |                       |                           |                           |
| Translation: 0.52 seconds   |  |         |      |         |                            |             |          |  |      |              |         |         |            |                       |                       |                           |                           |
| Computation: 0.42 seconds   |  |         |      |         |                            |             |          |  |      |              |         |         |            |                       |                       |                           |                           |

Figure 7.6: Simulation result of RAMHU using OFMC backend

Figure 7.7: Simulation result of RAMHU using CL-AtSe backend

### 7.2.1.2 Security Comparison

In this Section, we will compare RAMHU with existing authentication schemes in terms of security. We will explain RAMHU superiority to solve the drawbacks in existing authentication schemes (He & Zeadally 2015, Giri et al. 2015, Li et al. 2016, Farash et al. 2016, Kumar et al. 2016, Jiang et al. 2016, Rajput, Abbas, Wang, Eun & Oh 2016, Das et al. 2017, Chandrakar & Om 2017, Nizzi et al. 2019, El-Tawab et al. 2019).

The authentication schemes in (He & Zeadally 2015, Giri et al. 2015) suffer from a leak of authentication information when transferring users' requests between network entities. Compared with RAMHU, all real users' information is not transmitted through the network exchanges and therefore does not leak information. Farash et al. (2016) and Jiang et al. (2016) designed an authentication schemes but lacked management and protection of users' information/data on the server. In RAMHU, it stores information on the *AS* and uses signatures and multi-pseudonyms to disguise users' information on the *AS*. It also uses *CS* as a gateway to check requests before sending them to *AS*. In (Kumar et al. 2016), their authentication scheme suffers from internal attacks. If intruder uses a sniffing program to steal users' information such as MAC addresses. Then he/she becomes authenticated in the network as a legitimate user. Compared to RAMHU, we use *CM* and *GM* to prevent internal attacks. Li et al. (2016) and Das et al. (2017) used a symmetric algorithm that relies on a single key and therefore has the risk of detecting that key. While RAMHU relies on an asymmetric algorithm that supports scalability. Rajput, Abbas, Wang, Eun & Oh (2016) proposed an authentication scheme that suffered greatly from impersonation attacks. An intruder can use his/her device as a server and deceive users. RAMHU uses robust mutual authentication to prevent impersonation attacks. In (Chandrakar & Om 2017), the authentication scheme suffers from collision and preimage attacks, and it handles real users' information when requests are transferred to the network. Compared to RAMHU, it uses PHOTON to prevent collision and preimage attacks as well as using multi-pseudonyms to prevent the exchange of real information among network entities.

The schemes in (Nizzi et al. 2019) and (El-Tawab et al. 2019) suffered from several problems, such as spoofing the coordinator/server by shuffle (AShA)/randomisation of fake addresses sent from intruders, key detection, breaking the integration process/vulnerability to preimage/second preimage attacks, and a single technique that does not provide security for online devices. RAMHU does not suffer from these problems because it uses *CM* to prevent MACs change, the public key algorithm

to prevent key breaking, PHOTON to provide signature principles, and use a set of techniques to protect authentication processes. Table 7.1 shows a comparison between RAMHU and existing authentication schemes in various attacks resistance.

## 7.2.2 Performance Analysis

In this Section, the theoretical and experimental performance analysis and performance comparison with existing related works are presented to examine the computation and communication processes of RAMHU in improving the performance of authentication processes.

### 7.2.2.1 Theoretical Performance Analysis

The authentication scheme should perform lightweight processes to support the reliable communication of users in healthcare applications. The authentication is the first processing that allows users to be legitimate in using network services. If the authentication process is weak for attacks, network performance will be greatly affected by the fact that the servers will perform additional complex computations.

RAMHU uses algorithms and techniques to support performance-efficient authentication. RAMHU uses the ECIES algorithm to encrypt users' information only. This algorithm performs lightweight operations and produces small keys compared to public key cryptographic algorithms as described in Chapter 2, Table 2.2. In addition, RAMHU uses the hash function (PHOTON) that performs hash operations compared to lightweight hash functions as described in Chapter 3, Table A.1. The use of robust security algorithms against attacks such as ECIES and PHOTON is a major cause of performance stability. In RAMHU, new users use OTP only once at the registration phase. They do not need to use this technique frequently in the next times. This technique reduces the burden on the server processor to perform complex computations. If the attacker tries to connect to the network with a fake or previously used OTP, the server would reject this request early without having to test other authentication techniques. This contributes significantly to reducing the depletion of server capabilities. Furthermore, RAMHU relies on multi-pseudonyms that perform lightweight operations in protecting users' information rather than using k-anonymity, which consumes the server's time and power to search and explore real information for legitimate users. Moreover, RAMHU supports the authentication process by the MAC address technique. This technique is extremely efficient in verifying legitimate devices connected to the network. The other solutions also rely on IP to authenticate users' devices. IP does not prove the identity of the legitimate

Table 7.1: Comparison of resistance in repelling the various threats between RAMHU and other authentication schemes

device when connected to the network because it is the address of software and not hardware. Also, if the attacker uses a legitimate IP, he/she can perform malicious threats on the EHR repository that will significantly affect network performance. RAMHU uses lightweight operations (*GM* and *CM*) as part of the authentication processes in the examination of legitimate devices. Therefore, the aforementioned RAMHU features enable it to perform lightweight and efficient authentication.

### 7.2.2.2 Experimental Performance Analysis

In this Section, we will show RAMHU's performance in healthcare applications. We will provide tests on the hash function (PHOTON-256bit) and encryption algorithm (ECIES-256bit). In addition, communication costs (storage overheads) and computation (execution time) are calculated to extract RAMHU's performance. Applications codes ( $C_i$ ,  $CS$  and  $AS$ ) have written in Java Programming Language. Also, RAMHU's results have implemented on Ubuntu 16.04 LTS, processor Intel Core i5 2.6GHz, OS type 32-bit, Memory 4 GiB and disk 32.0 GB.

To compute the cost of communication, we compute the bits of all security parameters. Hash's MD (PHOTON) is 256 bit and the ECIES encryption key is 256 bit. The number of messages transmitted through the authentication and login protocol is 4, password update protocol is 2 and revocation protocol is 3. On the  $C_i$  side, it produces a file of 6 lines ( $TS_{C_i} = 8$ ,  $GM = 16$ ,  $C_iSig_1 = 72$ ,  $UP_{C_i}^{CS}||MP_{C_i}^{CS} = 6$ ,  $N_{C_i} = 8$  and  $C_iSig_1 = 64$ ). The total size of the parameters is 174 bytes. Then  $C_i$  converts the plaintext file to an encrypt file with a size from 199 bytes to 205 bytes (the minimum value is 1592 bit) and the number of bits inside the encryption file is 302 bit. When  $C_i$  receives the authentication response from  $CS$ , the size of the decryption file is from 93 bytes to 99 bytes (the minimum value is 744 bit). The total size of encryption and decryption files in  $C_i$  is 2336 bit.

On the  $CS$  side, it produces a 3-line file ( $TS_{CS} = 8$ ,  $UP_{CS}^{AS}||MP_{CS}^{AS} = 6$ ,  $N_{CS} = 8$  and  $CSSig_3 = 64$ ). The total size of the parameters is 86 bytes. Then  $CS$  converts the plaintext file to an encrypt file with a size of 113 bytes to 119 bytes (the minimum value is 904 bit) and the number of bits within the encryption file is 307 bit. When  $CS$  receives the authentication response from  $AS$ , the size of the decryption file is from 170 bytes to 199 bytes (the minimum value is 1360 bit). The total size of encryption and decryption files in  $CS$  is 2264 bit.

On the  $AS$  side, it produces a 3-line file ( $TS_{AS} = 8$ ,  $UP_{AS}^{CS}||MP_{AS}^{CS} = 6$ ,  $N_{AS} = 8$  and  $ASSig_2 = 64$ ). The total size of the parameters is 86 bytes. Then  $AS$  converts the plaintext file to an encrypted file with a size of 113 bytes to 119 bytes (the minimum value is 904 bit) and the number of bits within the encryption file is 307 bit. When  $AS$  receives the authentication response from  $CS$ , the decryption file size is from 93




Figure 7.8: Implementations of PHOTON 256-bit and ECIES 256-bit

bytes to 99 bytes (the minimum value is 744 bit). The total size of encryption and decryption files in *AS* is 1648 bit. Also, storage complexity in RAMHU is 170671 bit

To compute the cost of computation, we had obtained preliminary results about running time for PHOTON-256, ECIES-256 encryption and ECIES-256 decryption (100 times, information size of 93 bytes) as shown in Figure 7.8. We noted execution time of PHOTON is faster than hash algorithms such as SHA-1 and SHA-256 depending results in (Latinov 2018). The minimum execution time for PHOTON-256 bit hash function is 0.002358 ms, ECIES-256 bit encryption is 0.133672 ms, ECIES-256 bit decryption is 0.110136 ms, ECIES-256 bit encryption and PHOTON-256 bit is 0.136186 ms and ECIES-256 bit decryption and PHOTON-256 bit is 0.112521 ms. Also, time complexity in RAMHU is 0.460189 ms.

### 7.2.2.3 Performance Comparison

In this Section, we will compare the superiority of RAMHU over the authentication schemes in the performance side. Although the implementation environment for authentication schemes varies, we have made some comparisons that demonstrate the superiority of RAMHU's performance over existing schemes.

The authentication scheme in (He & Zeadally 2015) relies on ECC-512bit plus

AES to generate session key while RAMHU relies on ECC-256bit which is NIST certified and sufficient to encrypt and secure the authentication request. As a result, RAMHU uses ECC with the best performance as well as no need to use symmetric encryption that increases computation expenses. Schemes in (Farash et al. 2016) and (Jiang et al. 2016) are based on a single server to perform all complex operations with users' devices, these processes consume server resources while RAMHU divides computations on servers *CS* and *AS* which contributes to the improvement performance dramatically. In addition, RAMHU performs the lowest number of hashes compared to the schemes as shown in Table 7.2 ( $T_h$  is the time complexity for hash function,  $T_s$  is the time complexity for symmetric encryption and  $T_H$  is the time complexity for bio-hash function). This makes RAMHU's performance suitable for the healthcare application environment. Compared to RAMHU, both schemes in Jiang et al. (2016) and Das et al. (2017) uses a fuzzy extractor that requires additional operations to consume execution time of 0.442s while RAMHU does not need these additional operations. Furthermore, the scheme in (Giri et al. 2015) is based on RSA-1024bit which is expensive in encryption and decryption while RAMHU relies on ECIES-256bit which use small keys and is suitable for high-performance security. The CACPPA scheme in (Rajput, Abbas, Wang, Eun & Oh 2016) suffers from storage overheads. It requires 76 bytes per pseudonym as well as other storage requirements such as keys, encryption by ECIES-256bit and signature by ECDSA-256bit. This scheme will be extremely costly for server memory (communication and computations overheads) with increasing numbers of users. RAMHU uses only 6 bytes per pseudonym that immeasurably saves memory storage. Moreover, the scheme in (Chandrakar & Om 2017) stores the same users' information on multiple servers that consume storage sources as well as the computation cost to store this information. RAMHU does not dissipate storage sources in repeating the same information on servers.

The scheme in (El-Tawab et al. 2019) suffered from heavy-cost processes due to the use of SHA-256 while RAMHU uses PHOTON which has lightweight processes. Additionally, impersonation attacks of legitimate MACs on schemes in Nizzi et al. (2019) and El-Tawab et al. (2019) cause network low performance due to increased network-connected fake devices. RAMHU prevents the use of legitimate MACs addresses in more than one device by using the *CM* technique and thus maintains network performance.

Table 7.2: Comparison of computation cost between RAMHU and existing authentication schemes

| Scheme                 | Hashes number on user side | Hashes number on server side | Total          | Hash type   | Running time in ms | No. of messages | No. of bits |
|------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------|----------------|-------------|--------------------|-----------------|-------------|
| He & Zeadally (2015)   | $2T_h + 2T_s$              | $1T_h + 4T_s$                | $3T_h + 6T_s$  | Standard    | $0.4 + 0.4$        | 6               | -           |
| Giri et al. (2015)     | $5T_h$                     | $4T_h$                       | $9T_h$         | Standard    | -                  | 4               | 1600        |
| Jiang et al. (2016)    | $7T_h$                     | $7T_h$                       | $14T_h$        | Standard    | -                  | 4               | -           |
| Kumar et al. (2016)    | $5T_h$                     | $5T_h$                       | $10T_h$        | Standard    | -                  | 3               | -           |
| Li et al. (2016)       | $6T_h + 2T_s$              | $7T_h + 6T_s$                | $13T_h + 8T_s$ | Standard    | $0.0001 + 0.442$   | 4               | 768         |
| Das et al. (2017)      | $3T_h$                     | $7T_h$                       | $10T_h$        | Standard    | $0.0001 + 0.442$   | 4               | 768         |
| Chandrakar & Om (2017) | $12T_h + 1T_H$             | $7T_h$                       | $19T_h + 1T_H$ | Standard    | $0.0005 + 0.02102$ | 9               | 2240        |
| <b>RAMHU</b>           | $3T_h$                     | $5T_h$                       | $8T_h$         | Lightweight | 0.002386           | 4               | 307         |

## 7.3 Analysis of PAX Scheme

In this Section, we will discuss users scenarios, security and performance analysis and compare PAX with existing search and then demonstrate PAX's ability to protect patients' data during security and privacy implementation.

### 7.3.1 Direct and Indirect Users Scenarios in PAX

There are 4 case scenarios in PAX that involve obtaining access patients' medical and/or health records in the EHR/EMR repository. Here we will present how the user can access patients' data while securing their privacy. To provide user scenarios, we impose a number of EHR users with the PAX system, as shown in Figure 7.9.

Assume we have three patients, Sara, John, and Rose, who suffer from diseases such as cancer, dementia, and diabetes respectively. Each disease requires a different level of care. For instance, a patient suffering from dementia needs a family member who assists with all of the patient's tasks and is able to access all of the patient's data. We assume that Julia is one of John's relatives. Also, there a group of healthcare providers, including Simon, Adam, Hawa, and Abraham, who want access to patients' medical records. These users can have different roles; for example, Adam may have the roles of advisor and doctor, and Abraham may be a doctor and an emergency doctor. Different user roles can be a major reason for breaching the privacy of medical records. Users such as patients (Sara and Rose) and the physician (Simon) need direct authorisation to EHR data because of persistent and regular requests to access the repository. For example, Simon is the general practitioner (GP) for Sara and needs to access her data every day or even more than once a day (under the PAX system, Sara's data is private in data access requests by both Sara and Simon, as shown in Figure 7.10).

1. The first scenario use (advisor): Simon needs a consultant (such as Adam)

to diagnose Sara's disease or to submit treatment suggestions (after taking Sara's consent to seek specialist advice). Adam is not associated with Sara permanently and continuously and does not need Sara's personal information; he only needs certain details of the patient's data and medical reports. Therefore, in PAX, Adam needs to enter his name (Adam), the name of the doctor (Simon), and Sara's pseudonym to access Sara's data; he does not need to know Sara's real attributes. Figure 7.10 shows Sara's data, which can be obtained by Simon and Adam. We note from Figure 7.10 that the data received does not contain any of Sara's attributes, and Adam does not use any real attributes for Sara, which means that PAX provides a high level of security and privacy that can prevent external and internal attacks.

2. The second scenario use (relative of a patient): Because the patient (John) suffers from dementia, he is unable to perform his duties. John needs a family helper (such as Julia) to access his medical data without misuse or to bypass these privileges to other medical records. Julia needs a request that contains her Sigs and John's pseudonym to be considered a legitimate user in the system but is not authorised to access John's data until the *CS* and *AS* complete the third authorisation protocol with the Shamir scheme.
3. The third scenario use (researcher): Hawa is a researcher and tries to access the server's repository to use EHR in evaluating a medical study to develop a disease treatment. The researcher needs access to medical records sporadically and not permanently. The researcher is not associated with a particular patient and needs access to a set of the patients' data. Also, this indirect user does not need access to the patients' attributes. Figure 7.11 shows a set of medical records obtained by Hawa in the case of authorisation without using any of the patients' real attributes.
4. The fourth scenario and the last use (emergency doctor): When Rose's health has deteriorated significantly and suddenly, her doctor is not available for some reason. Rose needs an emergency doctor to treat and assess her condition quickly (e.g., Abraham). The emergency doctor needs to access Rose's data without accessing personal information. In an emergency, access to a patient's data does not require the patient's consent. Abraham should not know any secrets healthcare providers have used to authorise access to Rose's data.

PAX provides security and privacy for all previous scenarios; indirect users cannot access the patient's personal information because it is separate and completely hidden from the data. As a result, the user can retrieve this data to improve healthcare without penetrating the repository in *DS*.




Figure 7.9: Users' scenarios in PAX

```
*****
*          Patient's Data          *
*****
Pseudonym: RNoptm & UNoptm

check1: report: status: date:
check2: report: status: date:
check3: report: status: date:
check4: report: status: date:
check5: report: status: date:
.
.
.
```

Figure 7.10: Part of Sarah's data

```
*****
*      Patients' DataSet      *
*****
-----  


| No | Check  | Report  | Status | time     | date       |
|----|--------|---------|--------|----------|------------|
| 1  | check3 | Report3 | still  | 23:21:33 | 2017-09-05 |
| 2  | check1 | Report1 | ok     | 14:36:45 | 2017-09-08 |
| 3  | check2 | Report2 | normal | 17:09:57 | 2017-09-08 |
| 5  | check3 | Report3 | still  | 17:10:09 | 2017-09-10 |
| 6  | check2 | Report2 | normal | 12:28:20 | 2017-09-11 |
| .  | .      | .       | .      | .        | .          |
| .  | .      | .       | .      | .        | .          |


```

Figure 7.11: Part of a group of medical records for patients

### 7.3.2 Security Analysis

Security and privacy mechanisms in PAX has evaluated under theoretical analysis and AVISPA tool.

### 7.3.2.1 Possible Attacks on PAX Scheme

Applying privacy to medical records (EHR) requires the use of access models in the authorisation of users. Integrating RBAC and ABAC gives more powerful features to PAX users. The result is an access control model based on roles and attributes that handle users' requests at the coarse-grained and fine-grained levels. To increase security and privacy in the authorisation model, we have added a set of mechanisms to hide and separate personal information about data. The PAX system ensures that legitimate users access their specific data and, on the other hand, the privacy of medical records is maintained. Any healthcare system should support the basic security features of confidentiality, integrity, and availability (C.I.A.) ([Neubauer & Heurix 2011](#)). There are a range of attacks that pose a serious risk to any healthcare system. PAX's security mechanisms act as countermeasures against known attacks.

- **Proposition 1 – Availability attack**

*I* cannot efficiently destroy PAX scheme by availability attacks.

**Proof**

The server is vulnerable to denial of service (DOS) attacks that are intended to disable the service. In PAX, the indirect user creates a random Sig based on  $SS_s$  provided by healthcare providers. The attacker cannot use the same  $SS_s$  because the  $CS$  and  $AS$  will ignore the request. The abundance of medical records is critical to healthcare providers' flexible access. Therefore, supporting robustness in any healthcare system depends on preventing DOS attacks. Although the PAX system limits the risk of DOS attacks, it does not do so fully because the attacker can still send requests without penetrating the patient's personal information and data.

- **Proposition 2 – Data and policies datasets attacks**

*II* or *EI* cannot penetrate data and policies datasets in EHR repository.

**Proof**

The data in the single server is considered an attractive treasure for attackers. Also, policies contain the attributes and roles of users, which can assist attackers in carrying out an attack to recognise and access patients' data. In PAX, even if the attacker obtained a patient's data, the data would not be useful because both the stored and movable data would have pseudonym. In addition, the data is stored (on  $DS$ ) separately from policies (on  $AS$ ) as well as PAX policies are associated with pseudonym and anonymity (both  $CS$  and  $DS$  do not have real attributes datasets for users), which prevent attackers from revealing subjects' and objects' attributes.

- **Proposition 3 – MITM attack**

*I* cannot apply modification attacks to change authorisation requests for users.

**Proof**

Users' requests from clients to server in PAX are fully protected from modification. PAX uses random nonces and Sigs to detect changing operation (MITM) by intruders.

- **Proposition 4 – Replay attack**

*I* cannot resend authorisation requests later (replay attacks) to gain access to the network.

**Proof**

The intruder can not resend authorisation request to the network later because PAX produces a new timestamp ( $TS_C$ ,  $TS_{CS}$ ,  $TS_{AS}$ , and  $TS_{DS}$ ) between PAX's entities.

- **Proposition 5 – Unauthorised access attack**

*I* cannot perform unauthorised access attacks against PAX scheme.

**Proof**

User access to a repository depends on authorisation policies. We use XACML v3.0 to create user policies. Integrating RBAC and ABAC into XACML prevents unauthorised users from accessing patients' data.

- **Proposition 6 – Traffic analysis attack**

*EI* cannot use traffic analysis attacks to detect users' information.

**Proof**

To perform this attack, the hacker must analyse either the requests or the data moving between the source and the target. In PAX, if we assume that the attacker has some attributes (such as the name) and expects a specific patient, the attacker cannot use a keyword (name) and analyse it with multiple requests or medical records, even if it is the same user, to reveal its real attributes; the attacker cannot identify this data for a particular patient. Using pseudonym and anonymity prevents attackers from tracking traffic. For example, if advisor1 and advisor2 want patient1 data, the generated requests will be different. This prevents the parsing of requests.

- **Proposition 7 – Impersonation attack**

*I* cannot impersonate PAX's entities (impersonation attacks).

**Proof**

The intruder can not impersonate PAX's entities ( $C_i$ ,  $CS$ ,  $AS$  and  $DS$ ) because PAX uses secret nonces ( $SN_C$ ,  $SN_{CS}$  and  $SN_{AS}$ ) and secret Sigs among entities to support mutual authentication and prevent impersonation attacks.

- **Proposition 8 – Timing attack**

*EI* cannot use timing attacks to penetrate security parameters in signatures.

**Proof**

This attack exploits the security procedure while calculating the time period for security operations (such as encryption and signing). PAX prevents these attacks because when the attacker gets multiple requests for the same user, the attacker will find that these requests contain different Sigs, and the attacker does not have the parameters to generate the Sig. In addition, ECDSA's Sigs with 256-bit is resistant to timing attacks.

#### 7.3.2.2 Experimental Security Analysis

In this Section, we will use the AVISPA tool to analyse PAX authorisation procedures. Then we will present the results of PAX analysis in repelling known attacks.

#### 7.3.2.3 PAX Scheme with AVISPA

As we have described the AVISPA in section 7.1.1, PAX consists of four core (essential) roles: client ( $C_i$ ), centralServer ( $CS$ ), attributesServer ( $AS$ ) and dataServer ( $DS$ ). Also, there are the supporting roles such as session, and environment, goal specification section. Essential roles include a transition section (to specify the sequence of communication operations in network framework). Supporting roles include a composition section (to specify the linking of sessions and roles).

PAX depends on asymmetric cryptography by using ECDSA with public keys ( $KC_{pu}$ ,  $KCS_{pu}$ ,  $KAS_{pu}$  and  $KDS_{pu}$ ) to perform security requirements (integrity, authentication and non-repudiation). Moreover, PAX applies nonces ( $SN_C$ ,  $SN_{CS}$ ,  $SN_{AS}$  and  $SN_{DS}$ ) to support anonymity and timestamps ( $TS_C$ ,  $TS_{CS}$ ,  $TS_{AS}$  and  $TS_{DS}$ ) to support freshness. Authorisation process for indirect users is illustrated by the HLPSL scripts in Figures 7.13, 7.14, 7.15 and 7.16. Each role consists of the number of transitions, the receiving process (RCV), the sending process (SND), the sender's claim process of fresh value and correct (witness), the validation process in receiver for the sender's claim (request), the process of creating a fresh value for the nonce and timestamp (new) and the use of the private key (\_inv) in PAX's entities. At first,  $C_i$  receives the start signal as in Figure 7.13, then the SND and RCV operations continue until the authorisation process is completed as in Figure 7.12.

Figure 7.17 shows the roles of session, environment, and goal section. In the session role, a composition process has been performed for the four roles ( $client_i$ ,  $centralServer$ ,  $attributeServer$  and  $dataServer$ ) and specifies the send and receive channels in the Dolev-Yao model. In the environment role, the PP, the




Figure 7.12: PAX’s framework in AVISPA

goals specified in the goal section, and the known information for the intruder (*intruder\_knowledge*) have been defined. In this role, one or more sessions are composed, and we tested our scheme with sessions for replay, MITM, and impersonating entity attacks. We assumed that an intruder ( $I$ ) creates a public key ( $ki$ ) and has knowledge of the public keys ( $kCpu$ ,  $kCSpu$ , and  $kASpu$ ) of PAX's entities in the network. Intruder attempts to resend legitimate user requests later, intercepts/modifies these requests, or impersonates the connecting entities using  $i$  constant rather than  $ci$ ,  $cs$ ,  $as$  and  $ds$ . The results displays that these attacks cannot penetrate the security goals in our scheme. Goal section describes verified goals in PAX, and provides 10 goals of secrecy (such as  $S\_ID$ ,  $O\_ID$ ,  $S\_R$  and  $O\_R$  represent the first secret (sec1) and known only for both  $ci$  and  $cs$ ) and 8 goals of authentication (such as  $UNspm$ ,  $UNopm$  and  $TScs$  represent the first authentication between  $ci$  and  $cs$ ).

```

role clienti(Ci,CS:agent, KCpu,KCSpu:public_key,H:hash_func, S_ID,O_ID,S_R,O_R:message,SND,
RCV:channel(dy))
played_by Ci def=
local
    State:nat,
    TSc,TScs,TSctm,TScstm,Nc,SNc,SNctm:text,
    CiS1,CiS2,CiS3,CiS4,CiS5,CiS6,CiS1tm,CiS2tm,CiS4tm,CiS6tm,CSS2tm,CSS3tm,CSS5:text,
    SP,OP,UNspl,UNspm,UNsph,UNopl,UNopm,UNoph,RNspl,RNspm,RNsph,RNopl,RNopm
    ,RNoph:text, RNspn,RNopn,UNspn,UNopn:text,AS,DS:agent, MS,SS,SSs,Decision,Data:text
const
    sec1,sec2,sec3,sec4,sec5,sec6,auth1,auth2:protocol_id
init
    State := 0
transition
1.State=0
    /\RCV(start) => State':=1 /\Nc':=new() /\SNc':=new() /\TSc':=new()
    /\CiS1':={H(RNspl,UNspm,Nc'.TSc')}_inv(KCpu) /\CiS2':={H(RNopm,UNopm,Nc'.TSc')}_inv(KCpu)
    /\CiS3':={H(SNc')}_inv(KCpu)/\ CiS4':={H(RNoph,UNoph,TSc')}_inv(KCpu)
    /\CiS1tm':=xor(CiS1',CiS3')/\CiS2tm':=xor(CiS2',CiS3')
    /\TSctm':=xor(TSc',xor(SNc',xor(RNspm,UNspm)))
    /\SNctm':=xor(UNspm,xor(UNopm,xor(SNc',xor(CiS4',CiS1tm'))))
    /\CiS4tm':=xor(CiS4',xor(UNspm,xor(UNopm,CiS2tm')))
    /\RNspn':=xor(RNspl,xor(CiS1tm',SNctm')) /\RNopn':=xor(RNopl,xor(CiS2tm',SNctm'))
    /\UNspn':=xor(UNspl,xor(CiS1tm',SNctm')) /\UNopn':=xor(UNopl,xor(CiS2tm',SNctm'))
% Ci sends XACML's request to CS
    /\SND(CS.CiS1tm'.RNspn'.Nc'.TSctm'.SNctm'
    .CiS2tm'.RNopn'.UNopn'.Nc'.CiS4tm') /\secret({S_ID,O_ID,S_R,O_R},sec1,{Ci,AS})
    /\secret({SNc',CiS3',TSc'},sec2,{Ci,CS}) /\secret({CiS1',CiS2'},sec3,{Ci,CS,AS})
    /\secret({RNspm,UNspm,RNopm,UNopm},sec4,{Ci,CS})

% Ci receives first authorisation response from CS
2. State = 1
    /\RCV(Ci.CSS2tm'.UNspn'.TScstm')=> State':= 2 /\UNspl':=xor(UNspn',xor(CSS2tm',TScstm'))
    /\TScs':=xor(TScstm',xor(SNc,UNopm)) /\CiS6':={H(SP)}_inv(KCpu)
    /\SSs':=xor(CiS1,xor(CiS3,xor(CSS2tm',xor(CiS4,CiS6'))))
    /\MS':= {({SS,SSs'})} /\CiS6tm':=xor(CiS6',xor(CiS3,MS'))
    /\secret({OP,CiS4},sec5,{Ci,AS,DS}) /\secret({SP,CiS6,MS',SS},sec6,{Ci,AS})
    /\TSc':=new() /\TSctm':=xor(TSc',xor(SNc,UNspm)) /\UNspn':=xor(UNspl',xor(CiS6tm',TSctm'))
% Ci sends Shamir's response to CS
    /\SND(CS.CiS6tm'.UNspn'.TSctm') /\witness(Ci,CS,auth1,{UNspm,UNopm,TScs})

% Ci receives decision & data from CS
3.State=2
    /\RCV(Ci.CSS2tm'.CSS3tm'.UNspn'.TSctm'.Decision.Data)=> State':=3
    /\UNspn':=xor(UNspn',xor(CSS2tm',TScstm')) /\TScs':=xor(TScstm',xor(SNc,UNopm))
    /\CSS5':=xor(CiS1',xor(CiS3',xor(CSS2tm',CiS4')))) /\CiS5':={H(Data)}_inv(KCpu)
    /\CiS1':=xor(CSS2tm',xor(CiS3,xor(CiS5',CiS4))) /\CiS2':=xor(CSS3tm',xor(CiS3,xor(CiS5',CiS4)))
    /\CiS3':=xor(CiS2',xor(CSS2tm',xor(CiS5',CiS4)))
    /\CiS4':=xor(CiS1',xor(CiS3',xor(CiS5',CSS2tm')))) /\request(Ci,CS,auth2,{SNc,CiS3,CiS4,TSc})
end role

```

Figure 7.13:  $C_i$  role of PAX in HLPSL

### 7.3.2.3.1 Simulation Result

Figure 7.18 displays the simulation result with the CL-AtSe backend, PAX clearly and accurately achieves the SAFE result in the SUMMARY section, bounded number of sessions in the DETAILS section, the goals of the scheme achieved (as\_specified) in the GOAL section as well as statistical numbers such as time, number of nodes, and analysed states in the STATISTICS section. It has proven that the PAX is capable of preventing passive and active attacks such as replay, MITM, and impersonating, and that the goals of the scheme in Figure 7.17 achieved to prevent the violation of legitimate users information in the network authorisation.

```

role centralServer(CS,Ci,AS:agent, KCSpu,KCpu,KASpu:public_key, H:hash_func, SND,RCV:channel(dy))
played_by CS def=
local
    State:nat,TSc,TScs,TSas,TSctm,TScstm,TSastm,Nc,Ncs,SNC,SNcst,SNctm,SNcstm:text, CSS1,CSS2,
    CSS3,CSS4,CSS5,CSS2tm,CSS3tm,CiS1,CiS2,CiS4,CiS1tm,CiS2tm,CiS4tm,CiS6tm:text,
    ASS2,ASS3,ASS7,ASS2tm,ASS3tm:text, Decision,Data:text,
    UNspl,UNspm,UNopl,UNopm,RNspl,RNspm,RNopl,RNopm, RNspn,RNopn,UNspn,UNopl:text
const
    sec2,sec3,sec4,sec7,auth1,auth2,auth3,auth4:protocol_id
init
    State := 0
transition
% CS receives XACML's request from Ci
1.State=0
    /\RCV(CS.CiS1tm'.RNspn'.UNspn'.Nc'.TSctm'.SNctm'.CiS2tm'.RNopn'.Nc'.CiS4tm')=>
    State':=1/\RNspl':=xor(RNspn',xor(CiS1tm',SNctm'))
    /\RNopl':=xor(RNopn',xor(CiS2tm',SNctm')) /\UNspl':=xor(UNspn',xor(CiS1tm',SNctm'))
    /\UNopl':=xor(UNopn',xor(CiS2tm',SNctm')) /\CiS4':=xor(CiS4tm',xor(UNspm,xor(UNopm,CiS2tm')))
    /\SNc':=xor(UNspm,xor(UNopm,xor(SNctm',xor(CiS4',CiS1tm'))))
    /\TSc':=xor(TSctm',xor(SNc',xor(RNspm,UNspm))) /\CSS1':={H(SNc')}_inv(KCpu)
    /\CiS1':=xor(CiS1tm',CSS1')/\CiS2':= xor(CiS2tm',CSS1')
    /\CSS2':={H(RNspm.UNspm.Nc'.TSc')}_inv(KCpu)
    /\CSS3':={H(RNopm.UNopm.Nc'.TSc')}_inv(KCpu)
    /\secret({SNc',CSS1',TSc'},sec2,{CS,Ci,AS}) /\secret({CSS2',CSS3'},sec3,{CS,Ci,AS})
% CS creates authorisation request to AS
    /\SNcs':=new() /\TScs':=new() /\CSS4':={H(SNcs')}_inv(KCSpu)
    /\CSS2tm':=xor(CSS2',CSS4') /\CSS3tm':=xor(CSS3',CSS4')
    /\Ncs':=xor(Nc',xor(TSc',xor(TSctm',SNcs'))) /\TSctm':=xor(TSc',xor(SNcs',xor(RNspm,UNspm)))
    /\TScstm':=xor(TSctm',xor(SNcs',xor(RNopm,UNopm)))
    /\SNcstm':=xor(UNspm,xor(UNopm,xor(SNcs',xor(CiS4',CSS2tm'))))
    /\CiS4tm':=xor(CiS4',xor(UNspm,xor(UNopm,CSS3tm')))
    /\RNspn':=xor(RNspm,xor(CSS2tm',SNcstm')) /\RNopn':=xor(RNopl,xor(CSS3tm',SNcstm'))
    /\UNspn':=xor(UNspm,xor(CSS2tm',SNcstm')) /\UNopn':=xor(UNopl,xor(CSS3tm',SNcstm'))
% CS sends request to AS
    /\SND(AS.CSS2tm'.RNspn'.UNspn'.Nc'.TSctm'.TScstm'.SNcstm'.CSS3tm'.RNopn'.UNopn'.CiS4tm')
    /\secret({RNspm,UNspm,RNopm,UNopm},sec4,{CS,AS}) /\secret({SNcs',CSS4',TScs',Nc'},sec7,{CS,AS})

% CS receives authorisation response from AS
2.State=1
    /\RCV(CS.ASS2tm'.UNspn'.TSastm')=>State':=2 /\CSS2tm':=xor(ASS2tm',xor(CSS4,CSS1))
    /\TScs':=new() /\TScstm':=xor(TSctm',xor(SNc,UNopm)) /\UNspn':=xor(UNspl,xor(CSS2tm',TSctm'))
    /\witness(CS,AS,auth3,{UNspm,UNopm,Nc,TSc,TSas})
% CS sends authorisation response to Ci
    /\SND(Ci.CSS2tm'.UNspn'.TScstm')

% CS receives Shamir's response from Ci
3. State = 2
    /\RCV(CS.CiS6tm'.UNspn'.TSctm')=>State':=3
    /\UNspl':=xor(UNspn',xor(CiS6tm',TSctm')) /\TSc':=xor(TSctm',xor(SNc,UNspm))
    /\CiS6tm':=xor(CiS6tm',xor(CSS1,CSS4)) /\request(CS,Ci,auth1,{UNspm,UNopm,TScs})
    /\TScs':=new() /\TScstm':=xor(TSctm',xor(SNcs,UNopm)) /\UNspn':=xor(UNspl,xor(CiS6tm',TSctm'))
% CS sends Shamir's response to AS
    /\SND(AS.CiS6tm'.UNspn'.TScstm')

% CS receives decision & data response from AS
4.State=3
    /\RCV(CS.ASS2tm'.ASS3tm'.UNspn'.TSastm'.Decision.Data)=>State':=4
    /\UNspl':=xor(UNspn',xor(ASS2tm',TSastm')) /\TSas':=xor(TSastm',xor(SNcs,UNopm))
    /\ASS7':=xor(CSS2,xor(CSS4,xor(CiS4,ASS2tm))) /\CSS5':={H(Data)}_inv(KASpu)
    /\ASS2':=xor(ASS2tm',xor(CSS4,xor(ASS7,CiS4))) /\ASS3':=xor(ASS3tm,xor(CSS4,xor(ASS7,CiS4)))
    /\CiS4':=xor(ASS2tm',xor(CSS4,xor(ASS7,ASS2'))) /\request(CS,AS,auth4,{SNcs,CSS1,CiS4,TScs})
    /\TScs':=new() /\CSS2tm':=xor(CSS2,xor(CSS1,xor(CSS5,CiS4)))
    /\CSS3tm':=xor(CSS3,xor(CSS1,xor(CSS5,CiS4)))
    /\TScstm':=xor(TSctm',xor(SNc,UNopm)) /\UNspn':=xor(UNspl,xor(CSS2tm',TSctm'))
% CS sends decision & data response to Ci
    /\SND(Ci.CSS2tm'.CSS3tm'.UNspn'.TScstm'.Decision.Data)
    /\witness(CS,Ci,auth2,{SNc,CSS1,CiS4,TSc})
end role

```

Figure 7.14: *CS* role of PAX in HPLSL

```

role attributesServer(AS,CS,DS:agent, KASpu,KCSpu,KDSpu:public_key, Ssp,Sop:text,H:hash_func, SND
                    RCV:channel(dy))
played_by AS def=
local
    State:nat, TSc,TScs,TSas,TSds,TSctm,TSastm,TSdstm,Nc,Ncs,SNcs,SNastm:text,
    ASS1,ASS2,ASS3,ASS4,ASS5,ASS6,ASS7,ASS2tm,ASS3tm,ASS6tm:text, CiS4,CiS4tm,CiS6tm,CSS2,
    CSS3,CSS2tm,CSS3tm,DSS2tm,DSS4tm,DSS4:text, SP,OP,URsp,UNsp,URop,UNop,RNsp,RNop:text,
    UNsp1,UNspm,UNspn,UNopn,UNoph:text, RNsp1,RNspm,RNph,RNopn,RNopm,RNoph:text,
    RNspn,RNopn,UNspn,UNopn:text, S_ID,O_ID,S_R,O_R:message,Ci:agent,SSs,MS,Data,Decision:text
const
    sec1,sec3,sec4,sec5,sec6,sec7,sec8,sec9,sec10,auth3,auth4,auth5,auth6:protocol_id
init
    State := 0
transition
% AS receives from CS
1.State = 0
    /\RCV(AS.CSS2tm'.RNspn'.UNspn'.Ncs'.TSc'.TSctm'.SNcstm'.CSS3tm'.RNopn'.UNopn'.CiS4tm')=|>
    State':= 1/\RNspl':=xor(RNspn',xor(CSS2tm',SNcstm')) /\RNopl':=xor(RNopn',xor(CSS3tm',SNcstm'))
    /\UNspl':=xor(UNspn',xor(CSS2tm',SNcstm')) /\UNopl':=xor(UNopn',xor(CSS3tm',SNcstm'))
    /\CiS4':=xor(CiS4tm',xor(UNopn,xor(UNopm,CSS3tm'))))
    /\SNcs':=xor(UNspn,xor(UNopm,xor(SNcstm',xor(CiS4',CSS2tm'))))
    /\TSc':=xor(TSctm',xor(SNcs',xor(RNspm,UNspm))) /\TScs':=xor(TSctm',xor(SNcs',xor(RNopm,UNopm)))
    /\Nc':=xor(Ncs',xor(TSc',xor(TScs',SNcs')))) /\ASS1':={H(SNcs')}_inv(KCSpu)
    /\CSS2':=xor(CSS2tm',ASS1') /\CSS3':=xor(CSS3tm',ASS1')
    /\ASS2':={H(RNspm.UNspn.Nc'.TSc')}_inv(KCSpu) /\ASS3':={H(RNopm.UNopm.Nc'.TSc')}_inv(KCSpu)
    /\ASS4':={H(RNopn.UNoph.TSc')}_inv(KCSpu) /\SP':=URsp.UNsp /\OP':=URop.UNop
    /\secret({S_ID,O_ID,S_R,O_R},sec1,{AS,Ci}) /\secret({ASS2',ASS3'},sec3,{AS,CS,Ci})
    /\secret({RNspm,UNspm,RNopm,UNopm},sec4,{AS,CS}) /\secret({OP',CiS4'},sec5,{AS,DS,Ci})
    /\secret({SP',Ssp,MS,SSs},sec6,{AS,Ci}) /\secret({SNcs',ASS1',TScs',Nc},sec7,{AS,CS})
    /\secret(Sop,sec8,AS)
% AS creates Shamir's request
    /\TSas':=new() /\ASS2tm':=xor(ASS2,xor(SSs,xor(CiS4',Ssp)))
    /\TSastm':=xor(TSas',xor(SNcs',UNopm)) /\UNspn':=xor(UNsp1',xor(ASS2tm',TSastm'))
% AS sends Shamir's request to CS
    /\SND(CS.ASS2tm'.UNspn'.TSastm')

% AS receives Shamir's response from CS
2.State=1
    /\ RCV(AS.CiS6tm'.UNspn'.TScstm')=|> State':= 2/\Unspl':=xor(UNspn',xor(CiS6tm',TScstm'))
    /\TScs':=xor(TSctm',xor(SNcs',UNopm)) /\MS':=xor(CiS6tm',xor(Ssp,ASS1))
    /\request(AS,CS,auth3,{UNspn,UNopm,Nc,TSc,TSas})
% AS creates data retrieval request
    /\SNas':=new() /\TSas':=new() /\ASS5':={H(SNas')}_inv(KASpu)
    /\ASS6':={H(RNopm.UNopm.SNas'.TSas'.CiS4)}_inv(KASpu)
    /\RNopn':=xor(RNopn,xor(TSas',SNas')) /\ASS6tm':=xor(ASS6',xor(TSas',ASS5'))
    /\TSctm':=xor(TSc,xor(SNas',UNoph)) /\TSastm':=xor(TSas',xor(SNas',UNopm))
    /\SNastm':=xor(UNopm,xor(SNas',xor(CiS4',ASS6tm')))
    /\CiS4tm':=xor(CiS4,xor(UNopn,xor(SNastm',UNopm))) /\UNopn':=xor(UNopn,xor(ASS6tm',TSastm'))
    /\secret({SNas',ASS5',TSas'},sec9,{AS,DS}) /\secret({RNopn,UNopn,ASS6'},sec10,{AS,DS})
% AS sends data retrieval request to DS
    /\SND(DS.ASS6tm'.RNopn'.UNopn'.SNastm'.TSctm'.TSastm'.CiS4tm')
    /\ witness(AS,DS,auth5,{CiS4,ASS6})

% AS receives data retrieval response from DS
3.State=2
    /\ RCV(AS.DS.DSS2tm'.DSS4tm'.UNopn'.TSdstm'.CiS4tm'.Data) =|> State':=3
    /\UNopl':=xor(UNopn',xor(DSS2tm',TSdstm')) /\TSds':=xor(TSdstm',xor(SNas,UNopn))
    /\CiS4':=xor(CiS4tm',xor(ASS5,TSds')) /\DSS4':=xor(DSS4tm',xor(ASS5,CiS4'))
    /\ASS6':=xor(DSS2tm',xor(DSS4',xor(TSds',ASS5))) /\ASS7':={H(Data)}_inv(KDSpu)
    /\request(AS,DS,auth6,{SNas,ASS5,RNopn,UNoph})
% AS creates decision & data response
    /\TSas':=new() /\ASS2tm':=xor(ASS2,xor(ASS1,xor(ASS7,CiS4)))
    /\ASS3tm':=xor(ASS3,xor(ASS1,xor(ASS7,CiS4))) /\TSastm':=xor(TSas',xor(SNcs,UNopm))
    /\UNspn':=xor(UNsp1,xor(ASS2tm',TSastm'))
% AS sends data retrieval response (Data and Decision) to CS
    /\SND(CS.ASS2tm'.ASS3tm'.UNspn'.TSastm'.Decision.Data)
    /\witness(AS,CS,auth4,{SNcs,ASS1,CiS4,TScs})
end role

```

Figure 7.15: AS role of PAX in HLPSL

```

role dataServer(DS,AS:agent, KDSpu,KASpu:public_key, H:hash_func,SND,RCV:channel(dy))
played_by DS def=
local
    State:nat,
    TSc,TSctm,TSas,TSastm,TSds,TSdstm,SNas,SNastm:text,
    OP,UNopl,UNopm,UNoph:text, RNopl,RNopm,RNoph,RNopn,UNopn:text,
    DSS1,DSS2,DSS3,DSS4:text, DSS2tm,DSS4tm,CiS4,CiS4tm,ASS6tm:text,
    Ci:agent,Data:text
const sec5,sec9,sec10,auth5,auth6:protocol_id
init State := 0
transition
1.State = 0
    /\ RCV(DS.ASS6tm'.RNopn'.UNopn'.SNastm'.TSctm'.TSastm'.CiS4tm')=>State':=1
    /\UNopl':=xor(UNopn',xor(ASS6tm',TSastm')) /\CiS4':=xor(CiS4tm',xor(UNoph,xor(SNastm',UNopm)))
    /\SNas':= xor(UNopm,xor(SNastm',xor(CiS4',ASS6tm'))) /\TSc':=xor(TSctm',xor(SNas',UNoph))
    /\TSas':=xor(TSastm',xor(SNas',UNopm)) /\RNopl':=xor(RNopn',xor(TSas',SNas'))
    /\DSS1':={H(SNas')}_inv(KASpu) /\DSS2':={H(RNopm.UNopm.SNas'.TSas'.CiS4')}_inv(KASpu)
    /\DSS3':={H(RNoph.UNoph.TSc')}_inv(KASpu)
    /\secret({OP,CiS4'},sec5,{DS,AS,Ci}) /\secret({SNas',DSS1',TSas'},sec9,{DS,AS})
    /\secret({RNoph,UNoph,DSS2'},sec10,{DS,AS}) /\request(DS,AS,auth5,{CiS4,DSS2})
% DS Creates data retrieval response
    /\TSds':=new() /\DSS4':={H(Data)}_inv(KDSpu) /\DSS4tm':=xor(DSS4',xor(DSS1',CiS4'))
    /\DSS2tm':=xor(DSS2',xor(DSS4',xor(TSds',DSS1'))) /\CiS4tm':=xor(CiS4',xor(DSS1',TSds'))
    /\TSdstm':=xor(TSds',xor(SNas',UNoph)) /\UNopn':=xor(UNopl',xor(DSS2tm',TSdstm'))
% DS sends data retrieval response to AS
    /\SND(AS.DSS2tm'.DSS4tm'.UNopn'.TSdstm'.CiS4tm'.Data)
    /\ witness(DS,AS,auth6,{SNas,DSS1,RNoph,UNoph})
end role

```

Figure 7.16: *DS* role of PAX in HPLSL

### 7.3.2.4 Security Comparison

Trace back to Chapter 2, we have reviewed the PERMIS HC system. Here we will show that the PAX has not suffered from PERMIS's problems (Chadwick et al. 2006) because each request to the healthcare provider has been signed randomly with the ECDSA algorithm, which includes both the roles ( $RN_s$ ) and the pseudonyms ( $UN_s$ ). In PAX, the policies are stored on the attributes server as Sigs and pseudonym rather than as explicit attributes in XACML (each user in PAX has attributes separate from other users that prevent the inheritance of attributes). Compared with (Quantin et al. 2011), PAX has solved all requests standardization and structure problems by including XACML v3.0 and ECDSA. XACML v3.0 offers standardization, and generic and rich policy language and is unified with the context of subjects' requests. It does not have problems converting requests from different sources. We also use ECDSA to generate very small keys relative to RSA to improve server performance. Furthermore, PAX does not need the keys complexity in PIPE (Riedl et al. 2008) thanks for XACML has the flexibility to handle practitioners and patients' requests as well as we use only one high-performance signature algorithm. In PAX, all the attributes in the requests and policies are not clearly written as in (Gajanayake et al. 2014). Moreover, data is anonymous to the patient when the data transferred from the source to the target due to it is linked with a random pseudonym.

```

role session(Ci,CS,AS,DS:agent, KCpu,KCSpu,KASpu,KDSpu:public_key, H:hash_func, S_ID,O_ID,S_R,
             O_R:message,Ssp,Sop:text)
def=
local SND1,RCV1,SND2,RCV2,SND3,RCV3,SND4,RCV4:channel(dy)
composition
  clienti(Ci,CS,KCpu,KCSpu,H,S_ID,O_ID,S_R,O_R,SND1,RCV1)
  /\centralServer(CS,Ci,AS,KCSpu,KCpu,KASpu,H,SND2,RCV2)
  /\attributesServer(AS,CS,DS,KASpu,KCSpu,KDSpu,Ssp,Sop,H,SND3,RCV3)
  /\dataServer(DS,AS,KDSpu,KASpu,H,SND4,RCV4)
end role

role environment()
def=
const
  ci,cs,as,ds,i:agent, kCpu,kCSpu,kASpu,kDSpu,ki:public_key,s_id,o_id,s_r,o_r:message, ssp,sop:text,
  h:hash_func, sec1,sec2,sec3,sec4,sec5,sec6,sec7,sec8,sec9,sec10,
  auth1,auth2,auth3,auth4,auth5,auth6,auth7,auth8:protocol_id

  intruder_knowledge={i,ci,cs,as,kCpu,kCSpu,kASpu,kDSpu,ki,inv(ki)}
composition
  session(ci,cs,as,ds,kCpu,kCSpu,kASpu,kDSpu,h,s_id,o_id,s_r,o_r,ssp,sop)
  % Check replay attack
  /\session(ci,cs,as,ds,kCpu,kCSpu,kASpu,kDSpu,h,s_id,o_id,s_r,o_r,ssp,sop)
  % Check MITM attack
  %/\session(cs,ci,as,ds,kCSpu,kCpu,kASpu,kDSpu,h,s_id,o_id,s_r,o_r,ssp,sop)
  % Check impersonate Ci
  %/\session(i,cs,as,ds,ki,kCSpu,kASpu,kDSpu,h,s_id,o_id,s_r,o_r,ssp,sop)
  % Check impersonate CS
  %/\session(ci,i,as,ds,kCpu,ki,kASpu,kDSpu,h,s_id,o_id,s_r,o_r,ssp,sop)
  % Check impersonate AS
  %/\session(ci,cs,i,ds,kCpu,kCSpu,ki,kDSpu,h,s_id,o_id,s_r,o_r,ssp,sop)
  % Check impersonate DS
  %/\session(ci,cs,as,i,kCpu,kCSpu,kASpu,ki,h,s_id,o_id,s_r,o_r,ssp,sop)
end role

goal
  secrecy_of sec1,sec2,sec3,sec4,sec5,sec6,sec7,sec8,sec9,sec10
  authentication_on auth1,auth2,auth3,auth4,auth5,auth6,auth7,auth8
end goal
environment()

```

Figure 7.17: Session, environment, and goal roles of PAX in HLPSL

|  |
|--|
| SUMMARY                                  |
| SAFE                                     |
| DETAILS                                  |
| BOUNDED_NUMBER_OF_SESSIONS               |
| TYPED_MODEL                              |
| PROTOCOL                                 |
| /home/span/span/testsuite/results/PAX.if |
| GOAL                                     |
| As Specified                             |
| BACKEND                                  |
| CL-AtSe                                  |
| STATISTICS                               |
| Analysed : 6912 states                   |
| Reachable : 6912 states                  |
| Translation: 2.12 seconds                |
| Computation: 139.21 seconds              |

Figure 7.18: Simulation result of PAX using CL-AtSe backend

Instead of one situation (emergency) as in HCPP, our project used several re-

Table 7.3: Comparison of security features between PAX and other authorisation schemes

| Security feature        | Chadwick et al. (2006) | Quantin et al. (2011) | Riedl et al. (2008) | Gajanayake et al. (2014) | Sun et al. (2011) | Jo & Chung (2015) | Seol et al. (2018) | Wang et al. (2019) | Shafeeq et al. (2019) | PAX scheme |
|-------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|------------|
| Mutual authentication   |                        |                       |                     |                          | ✓                 |                   |                    | ✓                  | ✓                     | ✓          |
| Preserving anonymity    |                        | ✓                     | ✓                   |                          | ✓                 |                   |                    | ✓                  | ✓                     | ✓          |
| Pseudonym               |                        | ✓                     | ✓                   |                          | ✓                 |                   |                    | ✓                  | ✓                     | ✓          |
| Anti DoS                | ✓                      |                       | ✓                   |                          | ✓                 |                   |                    |                    |                       | ✓          |
| Anti dataset attack     |                        |                       |                     |                          |                   | ✓                 | ✓                  | ✓                  |                       | ✓          |
| Anti MITM               | ✓                      | ✓                     | ✓                   | ✓                        | ✓                 | ✓                 | ✓                  | ✓                  | ✓                     | ✓          |
| Anti replay             | ✓                      |                       | ✓                   | ✓                        | ✓                 | ✓                 | ✓                  |                    | ✓                     | ✓          |
| Anti privileged insider |                        |                       |                     |                          | ✓                 |                   |                    |                    | ✓                     | ✓          |
| Anti traceability       |                        |                       |                     | ✓                        | ✓                 |                   |                    |                    |                       | ✓          |
| Anti impersonation      |                        |                       |                     |                          | ✓                 |                   |                    |                    | ✓                     | ✓          |
| Anti timing             |                        |                       |                     |                          | ✓                 |                   |                    |                    |                       | ✓          |
| Anti leakage            |                        |                       |                     |                          | ✓                 |                   |                    | ✓                  |                       | ✓          |
| Authorisation policies  | ✓                      |                       |                     | ✓                        |                   | ✓                 | ✓                  | ✓                  | ✓                     | ✓          |

alistic situations such as doctor advisors, physician researchers, emergency doctors, and patients' relatives for healthcare users and used the XACML v3.0 policy language, which is effective for authorising users. The PAX does not require continuous mining (Sun et al. 2011) of patient data, but relies on internal pseudonym to access medical records. XACS (Jo & Chung 2015) offers protection only against external attacks, whereas PAX offers protection against internal and external attacks by preventing attackers from identifying the personal information of legitimate users or patients' data. Finally, The access control model in (Seol et al. 2018) deals with real attributes, whereas PAX integrates signatures and pseudonyms within XACML's policies and requests to prevent the exchange of users' attributes clearly during the authorisation process in healthcare applications (Seol et al. 2018).

The scheme in (Wang et al. 2019) suffers from impersonation and timing threats as well as the intruder can exploit cases of indirect users to trigger DoS attack. PAX uses mutual authentication to prevent impersonation attacks and it uses random signatures to prevent timing and DoS attacks. There were a few of other scheme designed for HC systems. For instance, the scheme in (Shafeeq et al. 2019) focuses on protecting the authorisation policy without paying attention to secure trusted authority and the single key in symmetric encryption. Also, their scheme relies solely on the ABAC model to determine access to the repository. PAX integrates security advantages into both RBAC and ABAC and does not have datasets/keys protection problems. Table 7.3 compares the security features provided in PAX and related works.

### 7.3.3 Performance Analysis of PAX Scheme

Performing a performance analysis is to examine the computation processes of PAX in improving the performance of authorisation processes.

### 7.3.3.1 Theoretical Performance Analysis

When the users become authenticated within the network it needs to send authorisation requests to the servers to access patients' data in the EHR repository. Authorisation requests should perform lightweight processes to maintain network performance, especially if the user performs many authorisation requests at frequent and convergent times. PAX relies mainly on a range of techniques, such as ECDSA, XACML, Shamir scheme and random pseudonyms that perform lightweight procedures compared to other technologies.

First, PAX uses the ECDSA algorithm to sign subjects and objects information in both requests and policies. This algorithm is ideal for authorisation schemes compared to public key signature algorithms as described in Chapter 2, Table 2.2. To maintain performance, we were careful to reduce the number of signatures to reduce the burden on users' devices and servers. For instance, full processing of sending an authorisation request to access patients' data requires  $C_i = 6$  signatures,  $CS = 5$  signatures,  $AS = 7$  signatures and  $DS = 4$  signatures (indirect users case). In short, reducing the number of signatures will improve the performance of the PAX scheme. In addition, PAX uses XACML technology to build robust policies in determining access to patient data. XACML provides the best cashing storage procedures (Ilhan et al. 2015), flexibility in defining multiple rules, simplicity in configuring policy combination (Duan et al. 2016), response times, the grouping of requests and making decisions (WSO2 Team 2017) of existing technologies.

Furthermore, PAX relies on the Shamir scheme to prevent tracking of user information in special cases such as advisor, relative, researcher and emergency rather than encryption mechanisms. The Shamir scheme provides PAX with robust security while performing light operations compared to encryption procedures. PAX uses the Shamir sheme only in cases of indirect users which are relatively lower from direct users such as nurses and doctors. As a result, authorisation requests with the Shamir scheme will be less, namely, the burden on the servers  $CS$  and  $AS$  will be lower. Moreover, the PAX scheme uses the Shamir scheme with  $TH = 3 - 10$ . The dependency of TH with efficient range allows Shamir scheme to support both security and performance in PAX meritoriously (Al-Adhami et al. 2017). Finally, PAX uses random pseudonyms to prevent sending real information through the network instead of k-anonymity and encryption mechanisms that perform complex processes and increase overheads. Therefore, PAX is considered a performance efficient scheme because it supports lightweight and high-performance mechanisms.

### 7.3.3.2 Experimental Performance Analysis

Communication costs (storage overheads) and computation (execution time) are calculated to extract PAX's performance. Applications codes ( $C_i$ ,  $CS$ ,  $AS$  and  $DS$ ) have written in Java Programming Language. The authorisation decision engine is supported on the Balana XACML 3.0 open source available at <https://github.com/wso2/balana>, it explained and managed by the WSO2 server. We used Maven to deal with Balana XACML as a library in Java. Also, PAX's results have implemented on Ubuntu 16.04 LTS, processor Intel Core i5 2.6GHz, OS type 32-bit, Memory 4 GiB and disk 32.0 GB.

To compute the cost of communication, we compute the bits of all security parameters. Signature's length (ECDSA) is 256 bit. The number of messages transmitted through the direct user authorisation is 6 and indirect user authorisation is 10. In addition, response size is 196 bytes to 205 bytes, request size is 1166 bytes to 1171 bytes, policy size is 1363 bytes to 1372 bytes, policy with Shamir size is 1363 bytes to 1369 bytes, users' information (attributes) is 549 bytes to 621 bytes, non-real patient's data is 354 bytes to 500 bytes and non-real all patients' data size for researchers is 910 bytes to 2780 bytes (25 patients).

On the  $C_i$  side, it produces a request of subject's attributes ( $C_iSig_1 = 72$ ,  $RN_{sp_{tm}} = 8$ ,  $UN_{sp_{tm}} = 8$ ,  $N_C = 8$ ,  $TS_{C_{tm}} = 8$  and  $SN_{C_{tm}} = 8$ ) and object's attributes ( $C_iSig_2 = 64$ ,  $RN_{op_{tm}} = 8$ ,  $UN_{op_{tm}} = 8$ ,  $N_C = 8$  and  $C_iSig_4 = 64$ ). The total size of the parameters is 264 bytes and the number of bits (attributes) inside the XACML's request is 2112 bit. When  $C_i$  sends response to  $CS$ , this response includes security parameters ( $C_iSig_{6_{tm}} = 72$ ,  $UN_{sp_{tm}} = 8$ , and  $TS_{C_{tm}} = 8$ ). The total size of the parameters is 88 bytes and the number of bits inside the XACML's response is 704 bit. On the  $CS$  side, it produces a request subject's attributes ( $CSSig_2 = 72$ ,  $RN_{sp_{tm}} = 8$ ,  $UN_{sp_{tm}} = 8$ ,  $N_{CS} = 8$ ,  $TS_{C_{tm}} = 8$ ,  $TS_{CS_{tm}} = 8$  and  $SN_{C_{tm}} = 8$ ) and object's attributes ( $CSSig_3 = 64$ ,  $RN_{op_{tm}} = 8$ ,  $UN_{op_{tm}} = 8$ ,  $N_C = 8$  and  $C_iSig_4 = 64$ ). The total size of the parameters is 272 bytes and the number of bits inside the XACML's request is 2176 bit. When  $CS$  sends response to  $C_i$ , this response includes security parameters ( $CSSig_{2_{tm}} = 64$ ,  $CSSig_{3_{tm}} = 64$ ,  $UN_{sp_{tm}} = 8$ , and  $TS_{CS_{tm}} = 8$ ). The total size of the parameters is 144 bytes and the number of bits inside the XACML's response is 1152 bit. On the  $AS$  side, it produces a XACML's request that include security parameters ( $ASSig_{6_{tm}} = 64$ ,  $RN_{op_{tm}} = 8$ ,  $UN_{op_{tm}} = 8$ ,  $SN_{C_{tm}} = 8$ ,  $TS_{C_{tm}} = 8$ ,  $TS_{AS_{tm}} = 8$  and  $C_iS_{4_{tm}}$ ). The total size of the parameters is 168 bytes and the number of bits inside the XACML's request is 1344 bit. Also, it produces a response's attributes ( $ASSig_2 = 72$ ,  $ASSig_3 = 64$ ,  $UN_{sp_{tm}} = 8$  and  $TS_{AS_{tm}} = 8$ ) . The




Figure 7.19: Implementations of ECDSA 256-bit

total size of the parameters is 152 bytes and the number of bits inside the XACML's request is 1216 bit. On the *DS* side, it produces a response's attributes ( $DSSig_2 = 72$ ,  $DSSig_4 = 64$ ,  $UN_{optm} = 8$ ,  $TS_{DS_{tm}} = 8$  and  $C_iSig_{4_{tm}} = 72$ ) . The total size of the parameters is 224 bytes. The total size of the parameters is 86 bytes and the number of bits inside the XACML's request is 1792 bit.

To compute the cost of computation, we had obtained preliminary results about running time for ECDSA-256 key generation, signature and verification (100 times, information size of 1166 bytes) as shown in Figure 7.19. We noted execution time of ECDSA's procedures is faster than signature algorithms depending results in (Suárez-Albela et al. 2019). The minimum execution time for ECDSA-256 bit key generation is 0.002009 ms, signature is 0.002994 ms, verification is 0.003496 ms and full time for ECDSA-256 bit is 0.00921 ms.

#### 7.3.3.3 Performance Comparison

In this Section, we will compare the superiority of PAX over the authorisation schemes in the performance side. Although the implementation environment for authorisation schemes varies, we have made some comparisons that demonstrate the superiority of PAX's performance over existing schemes.

The scheme in (Chadwick et al. 2006) is based on X.509 to manage certificates/security policies and Shibboleth authentication to provide single sign-on. Their scheme requires additional storage for certificates (PKCS#12) as well as policies. Also, the implementation of Shibboleth on servers performs complex operations affecting the performance of servers and it does not tune with the speed of the Internet. In addition, Shibboleth has a security vulnerability that may allow unauthorised users to access EHR repository frequently and that affects network performance. PAX relies on XACML for efficient policy management and ECDSA-256 bit and produces small keys for signing authorisation requests more efficiently and securely than Shibboleth. PAX also does not require additional storage to store certificates. The scheme in (Riedl et al. 2008) suffers from problems with multiple key complexity expenses, the complexity of encryption and the consumption of storage sources that adversely affect server performance. While PAX uses the ECDSA public key algorithm that does not require large storage (small keys) and the use of random public/private keys without complexity (Riedl et al. 2008). The scheme in (Quantin et al. 2011) has major problems with low performance: the diversity of authorisation requests contexts and the cost of encrypting data by RSA. Compared to PAX, it uses XACML which is efficient in standardising contexts of authorisation requests as well as ECDSA which provides better performance efficiency than RSA.

Moreover, instead of using four access control models (DAC, MAC, RBAC and PBAC) in the scheme (Gajanayake et al. 2014), these models further complicate authorisation processes and the difficulty of managing security policies and authorisation requests. PAX relies on RBAC and ABAC to determine users access to data with support for flexibility, ease of implementation and efficient management. The XACS scheme in (Sun et al. 2011) uses XML to design an authorisation system. XML fundamentally is used to structure data/information and not to specify access to the repository. Using XML authorisation policies reduces performance in responding to authorisation requests. PAX uses XACML which is essentially designed to manage efficiently authorisation policies and users' requests. The HCPP scheme in (Jo & Chung 2015) relies on encryption to protect the database and prospecting/searching to access legitimate users' information. Both mechanisms consume storage and server time. PAX relies on signatures to protect users' information without the need for full encryption of the database. It also relies on multiple pseudonyms to efficiently access users' information. The scheme in (Seol et al. 2018) is based on XACML 2.0, which has problems with decision precedence between 'Not Applicable' and 'Indeterminate'. Also, their scheme performs the process of signing the encrypted information in the authorisation request partly

Table 7.4: Comparison of performance between PAX and existing authorisation schemes

| Scheme                   | Storage | Management     | Communication | Computation                |
|--------------------------|---------|----------------|---------------|----------------------------|
| Chadwick et al. (2006)   | $M_E$   | $M_E$ (X.509)  | $S$           | $H_E$ ( <i>Sig</i> )       |
| Riedl et al. (2008)      | $L_E$   | $L_E$          | $S$           | $L_E$ ( <i>Enc + Sig</i> ) |
| Quantin et al. (2011)    | $M_E$   | $L_E$ (MRSE)   | $S$           | $L_E$ ( <i>Enc + Sig</i> ) |
| Gajanayake et al. (2014) | -       | $M_E$ (Models) | -             | -                          |
| Sun et al. (2011)        | $M_E$   | $L_E$ (SSE)    | $S$           | $M_E$ ( <i>Enc+Sig</i> )   |
| Jo & Chung (2015)        | $L_E$   | $M_E$ (XML)    | $F + G$       | $M_E$ ( <i>Enc</i> )       |
| Seol et al. (2018)       | $H_E$   | $H_E$ (XACML)  | $F + S + G$   | $L_E$ ( <i>Enc + Sig</i> ) |
| Wang et al. (2019)       | $L_E$   | $L_E$ (ABE)    | $S + G$       | $L_E$ ( <i>Enc + Sig</i> ) |
| Shafeeq et al. (2019)    | $L_E$   | $H_E$ (XACML)  | $F + S + G$   | $M_E$ ( <i>Enc+Sig</i> )   |
| <b>PAX</b>               | $H_E$   | $H_E$ (XACML)  | $F + S + G$   | $H_E$ ( <i>Sig</i> )       |

or fully. PAX relies on XACML 3.0 which is more functionality, faster and better logical results in decision precedence. Also, PAX performs the signing process directly on users' attributes only without overheads of encryption.

The scheme in (Wang et al. 2019) suffers from many shortcomings affecting performance such as data/policy decryption costs, use of RSA for encryption and signing, costing and management of secret key, management of users' attributes by a single authority, updating of keywords list when adding new keyword and operations search by keywords consumes server time. Compared to PAX, it does not require costly decryption operations and uses XACML and pseudonyms techniques to access patients' data safely and with high performance. The scheme in (Shafeeq et al. 2019) has heavy storage and computation costs. Their scheme requires a large size for key storage. In addition, using multi-signature is extremely expensive on network performance as the size of the signature increases with the number of signatures. Moreover, their scheme requires the size of 2500 character to store policy and 5 seconds to fetch the policy. While PAX requires 256 bits for key storage, size 1180 character for policy storage without Shamir, size 1186 character for policy storage with Shamir and less than a second to fetch policy. Ultimately, PAX does not require encryption costs used in schemes (Riedl et al. 2008, Quantin et al. 2011, Jo & Chung 2015, Seol et al. 2018, Wang et al. 2019) but relies on signatures performed efficiently by ECDSA.

Table 7.4 shows performance comparison between PAX and existing authorisation schemes ( $H_E$  is high efficiency,  $M_E$  is medium efficiency,  $L_E$  is Low efficiency,  $F$  is flexibility,  $S$  is scalability,  $G$  is granularity,  $Enc$  is encryption and  $Sig$  is signature).

## 7.4 Analysis of Storage Scheme

In this Section, we will discuss security and performance analyses for REISCH scheme as well as comparison with existing schemes. Analyses demonstrate that REISCH is efficient for use in patients' data collection within the HWSN environment in terms of security and performance.

### 7.4.1 Security Analysis

In this Section, the theoretical, experimental security analyses and security comparison are provided to examine REISCH protocols in repelling known attacks.

#### 7.4.1.1 Possible Attacks on REISCH Scheme

In this Section, we will examine REISCH scheme theoretically on a set of threats mentioned in the threat model. We will provide a theoretical analysis of REISCH resistance to known attacks as in the following:

- **Proposition 1 – MITM and replay attacks**

*I* cannot achieve MITM and replay attacks against REISCH scheme.

**Proof**

An intruder tries to change or delete part of data/information when transferred among network's entities. This situation is not possible because REISCH applies the ECDSA algorithm to sign data as well as some information such as  $SN_{Pseud}$ . Additionally, an intruder cannot replay message late due to all REISCH's entities use timestamps such as  $SN_{TS}$  and  $CH_{TS}$ . Consequently, REISCH resists MITM and replay attacks successfully.

- **Proposition 2 – DoS attacks**

*I* will not benefit from using DoS attacks against REISCH servers.

**Proof**

An intruder applies DoS attack to destroy availability service in servers such as  $LS$  and  $CS$ . The servers in REISCH initially check lightweight parameters such as  $SigLsE_i$  in  $LS$  and  $CS_{Pseud}$  in  $CS$  before completion of the authentication process. Moreover, these parameters change randomly in the communication process among entities. This procedure allows for servers to check small parameters and prevent DoS duplicate messages. Therefore, REISCH withstands against DoS threats.

- **Proposition 3 – Localisation attacks**

*I* cannot implement localisation attacks to deceive sensors and servers.

**Proof**

An intruder tries to use the Sybil attack by using many legitimate SN's IDs with fake data. Due to  $SN_i$  waits for random  $SigLsE_i$  from  $LS$  per round, namely, that intruder cannot deceive  $LS$  with fake data. Also, an intruder uses Wormhole attack by using many  $SN_i$  to camouflage communications among network entities. Each  $SN_i$  sends implicitly  $SN_{SL_i}$  to  $LS$  and  $Dif$  to  $CH_i$  as well as a timestamp. These parameters prevent counterfeit communications. Furthermore, an intruder aims to apply Sinkhole attack by using node as a sink to attract all patients' data from  $SN_i$ . This threat cannot apply on REISCH because  $LS$  sends unique  $LS_{OTP_i}$  including  $SigLS_i(SN_{Pseud_i})$  for all  $SN_i$ . That intruder fails to detect  $SigLS_i$  and  $SN_{Pseud_i}$ . Hence, REISCH strongly overcomes on localisation attacks.

- **Proposition 4 – Repository attack**

$I$  does not have the ability to penetrate EMR repository.

**Proof**

Assume that an intruder can penetrate datasets in  $LS$ . Firstly,  $LS$  does not contain real patient information (real information such as the name is stored in  $AS$ ). When the intruder gets this data, he/she cannot disclose that this data belongs to a particular patient. Secondly, the  $LS$  'datasets are very difficult to penetrate. Furthermore,  $LS$  contains partial data for patients because the total data and patients' history are transferred to  $DS$  by  $CS$  periodically. Thereupon, REISCH resists EMR repository attack.

- **Proposition 5 – Eavesdropping attacks**

$EI$  will not get any benefit from eavesdropping in the disclosure of personal information of collected data.

**Proof**

When an intruder eavesdrops and gets some messages transferred among  $SN_i$ ,  $CH_i$ ,  $LS$  and  $CS$ . This intruder will not benefit from these messages trapped because these messages contain no real information, as well as the secret parameters, are completely hidden. Thus, REISCH prevents eavesdropping attacks from revealing patients' information.

- **Proposition 6 – Replication attack**

$I$  cannot perform node replication attacks.

**Proof**

An intruder applies node replication attack by using more one  $SN_i$  with same legitimate ID. In REISCH, we suppose that all  $SN_i$  inside a specific area in the hospital or clinic. Therefore, any  $SN_i$  outside this area extremely difficult to send messages from fake  $SN_i$  with same legitimate ID. In addition,  $LS$  waits

$SN_m$  by  $CH_i$  at the same number of  $SN_i$  which  $LS$  remove replicated  $SN_m$  or  $SigSnT_3$ . Also, when  $SN_i$  dies,  $LS$  records this situation in the dataset to prevent replication risks. In a result, REISCH resists effectively replication attacks.

- **Proposition 7 – Collision and preimage attacks**

$I$  does not have the ability to perform collision and preimage attacks against REISCH algorithms.

#### Proof

An intruder tries to implement collision (generation two different messages that produce the same MD = $h(m) = h(m')$ ), preimage (generation a message that produces the same existing MD value as  $h(m) = MD$ ) and second preimage (generation a different message from the received message and produce the same existing MD value) attacks when messages and signatures transferred among REISCH's entities. These attacks cannot implement on REISCH protocols because our protocols use BLAKE2bp hash instead of SHA1 that resists these attacks. Consequently, REISCH successfully prevents collision and preimage attacks.

### 7.4.2 Experimental Security Analysis

By now, it is the time to use the AVISPA to do a security analysis on the REISCH scheme.

#### 7.4.2.1 REISCH Scheme with AVISPA

As we have know that REISCH includes four roles: localServer ( $LS$ )), sensori ( $SN_i$ ), clusterHeadi ( $CH_i$ ) and centralServer ( $CS$ ) as well as supporting roles: session and environment. Also, there are three sections to complete communication properly and securely: transition, composition and goal specification. Transition section is used in the essential roles to keep correctly communication sequence. Composition section is used in the supporting roles to connect essential roles in specific sessions. Goal specification section includes security goals such as secrecy and authentication. Secrecy means known secrets only for specific entities while authentication depends on witness (freshness claim) and request (validation) processes to perform strong authentication. Also, our scheme uses parameters such as RCV (receiving process), SND (sending process),  $_inv$  (private key), dy (communication channel by Dolev-Yao model) and  $intruder\_knowledge$  (known information for an intruder). We assume intruder uses the public key ( $k_i$ ) and knows public keys for REISCH's entities ( $kSNpu$ ,  $kCHpu$  and  $kLS$ ). Figure 7.20 shows REISCH's framework in AVISPA.




Figure 7.20: REISCH's framework in AVISPA

As shown in Figure 7.23, LS receives the start signal. Then, LS generates and sends new LSotp for all sensors (SNI and CHi). LSotp includes new SigLsEi and pseudonym signature. Both Figure 7.21 and Figure 7.22 shows that SNI and CHi receive LSotp from LS. Furthermore, SNI and CHi use freshness nonces, timestamp and signature to support reliable security. For instance, SNI uses SigLsEi, SigSnEi, SNts and SigSN to achieve security processes with CHi and LS. SNI collects data and uses one ECDSA signature with XoR operations to protect collected data and sends it to CHi. At this stage, CHi aggregates data and add security parameters. CHi sends aggregation data to LS. After that, LS uses LSotp, SigLS5 and LSrn to connect with CS securely. Figure 7.24 shows CS with the storage process. CS receives LSotp and uses ECDSA(CsT2), CsT1, CsT2 and CSrn to secure communication with LS. Figure 7.25 shows session and environment roles as well as security goals (secrecy and authentication). REISCH applies 7 secrecy and 7 authentication goals. For instance, Sec1 represent secrets between SNI and LS such as SigSN, SigLsEi and SigSnEi. Also, authentication goal, such as auth4 proves freshness between CHi and LS such as CHts2, CHotp, CHrni and SNrni. Additionally, environment role includes many attacks (replay, MITM and impersonating) to test the security level in REISCH scheme.

```

role sensori(SNi,CHi,LS:agent, KSNpu,KCHpu,KLSpu:public_key, ECDSA:hash_func, SNpseud,SNs1,
             Data:text,SND,RCV:channel(dy))
played_by SNi def=
local
    State:nat,
    SNrni,SigLsEi,SigSnEi,SNparity:text,
    MAXv:message,SigSN,SigSnT1,SigSnT2,SigSnT3,SigSnT4,SigLSi:text,
    Dif,SNts,SNtst,SNotp,Date,Time,SS,SNp,LSotpi:text
const
    sec1,sec2,sec3,auth3:protocol_id
init
    State := 0
transition
% SNi receives(LSotpi) from LS
1.State=0
    /\RCV(SNi.LSotpi'.SNrni') =|> State':=1
    /\SigSnEi':=new() /\SigLSi':={ECDSA(SNpseud)}_inv(KSNpu)
    /\SigLsEi':=xor(LSotpi',SigLSi) /\SigSN':={ECDSA(Data.SNpseud)}_inv(KLSpu)
    /\SNparity':=SigSN' /\SigSnT1':=SNparity' /\SigSnT2':=xor(SigSnT1',SigSnEi')
    /\SNts':=new() /\SNotp':=new() /\SNtst':=xor(Date,xor(Time,xor(SNotp',xor(Dif))))
    /\SNp':={(SNtst'.SNotp'.SNrni'.SNpseud.SNs1)} /\SigSnT3':=xor(SNp',SigSnT2')
    /\SigSnT4':=xor(SigLsEi',SigSnEi')
    /\secret({SigSN',SigLsEi',SigSnEi'},sec1,{SNi,LS}) /\secret({SNpseud,SNs1},sec2,{SNi,LS})
    /\secret({MAXv,SNts'},sec3,{SNi,CHi})
% SNi sends(SNm) to CHi
/\SND(CHi.SigSnT3'.SigSnT4'.SNotp'.SNtst'.SS.Data) /\witness(SNi,CHi,auth3,{SNtst',SNrni',Dif})
end role

```

Figure 7.21:  $SN_i$  role of REISCH in HLP SL

```

role clusterHeadi(CHi,LS,SNi:agent, KCHpu,KLSpu,KSNpu:public_key, ECDSA:hash_func,CHpseud,CHs1:text
                  ,MAXv:message,SND,RCV:channel(dy))
played_by CHi def=
local
    State:nat,
    SNrns,SNrni,SigLsEi,SNparityi,SNts,LSotpi:text, SigCH,SigChT1,SigChT2,SigSnT3s,SigSnT4s,
    SigSnT3i,SigSnT4i,SigLSi,Difi,SNtst,CHts1,CHts2,SS,SSI,CHp,CHparity,CHotp,CHRni,Datai,
    Datas,CHA:text
const
    sec3,sec4,sec5,auth4:protocol_id
init
    State := 0
transition
% CHi receives(LSotpi) from LS
1.State=0
    /\RCV(CHi.LSotpi'.CHRni')=|> State':=1

% CHi receives from SNi
2.State=1/\RCV(CHi.SigSnT3i'.SigSnT4i'.SNotp'.SNtst'.SSI'.Datai')=|>State':=2
    /\CHts1':=new() /\SigSnT3s':={(SigSnT3s'.SigSnT3i')} /\SigSnT4s':={(SigSnT4s'.SigSnT4i')}
    /\SNrns':=SNrni' /\Datas':=Datai' /\SigCH':={ECDSA(SigSnT3s)}_inv(KLSpu)
    /\CHparity':=SigCH' /\SigChT1':=xor(CHparity',CHts1')
    /\SigLSi':={ECDSA(CHpseud)}_inv(KCHpu) /\SigLsEi':=xor(LSotpi,SigLSi')
    /\SigChT2':=xor(SigChT1',SigLsEi') /\CHts2':=new() /\CHotp':=new()
    /\secret({MAXv,SNts},sec3,{CHi,SNi}) /\secret({SigCH,SigLsEi,CHpseud,CHs1},sec4,{CHi,LS})
    /\secret({CHotp',CHts2'},sec5,{CHi,LS})
% CHi sends(CHm) to LS
    /\SND(LS.(xor((CHts2'.CHotp'.CHRni.CHpseud.CHs1),SigChT2)).CHRni.SS.(SigSnT3s.SigSnT4s
      .SNrns'.Datas')) /\witness(CHi,LS,auth4,{CHts2',CHotp',CHRni,SNrns'})
end role

```

Figure 7.22:  $CH_i$  role of REISCH in HLP SL

#### 7.4.2.1.1 Simulation Results

The simulation results described by AVISPA tool. We have applied AVISPA with OFMC and CL-AtSe backends. Both of OFMC (Figure 7.26) and CL-AtSe (Fig-

ure 7.27) results refer to that REISCH scheme is safe against passive and active attacks (as in the SUMMARY section). Furthermore, Figure 7.26 and Figure 7.27 shows analysis details about simulation reports such as number of sessions, goals and statistical numbers. Also, the goals of authentication and secrecy in Figure 7.25 are applied to prevent the penetration of sensors data/information in the network. These results prove that REISCH is reliable in repealing known attacks such as replay, MITM, and impersonating.

#### 7.4.2.2 Security Comparison

Not only secure is the REISCH against various attacks mentioned in section 7.4.1, but also it is superior over the other schemes in terms of security (Table 7.5 shows a comparison of security features between our scheme and existing schemes).

For example, Compared with the scheme in (Fan & Gong 2012) that use small key ( $F_{2^{163}}$ ) and is extremely vulnerable to attacks, REISCH uses a key with 256-bit that resists attacks (reputable organisation recommendations). REISCH also used BLAKE2bp to get rid of hash attacks (collision and preimage) while the scheme in (Kodali 2013) focused on SHA1 performance without attention to the collision/preimage threats. In addition, all security parameters in REISCH such as  $SN_i$ 's location are completely hidden, while the scheme in (Lavanya & Natarajan 2017b) transfer some information explicitly such as ID (the elliptic curve parameters) in the registration and authentication phases. This allows the intruders to distinguish a specific  $SN_i$ . Additionally, this scheme did not address the problem of hiding  $SN_i$  location. Although the authors in (Staudemeyer et al. 2018) addressed privacy in their scheme architecture to protect the  $SN_i$  parameters. However, their scheme did not use the signatures camouflage or  $SN_{OTP}$  that are used in REISCH to support the privacy of data signing. This makes the privacy parameters in their scheme vulnerable to analysis and easy tracking. Furthermore, REISCH outperforms the scheme in (Malathy et al. 2018) which did not use the signature aggregation scheme to support security and hide signatures. The scheme in (Sharavanan et al. 2018) uses ECDSA to secure heterogeneous network environments. But their scheme gives medical evaluators the privileges to modify the medical parameters in the monitoring environment,  $SN_i$ 's locations and even create keys that could be the cause of an internal attack. Moreover, some information sent from  $SN_i$  to the server clearly which can leak to intruders. Fortunately, REISCH does not suffer from these problems.

```

role localServer(LS,CHi,SNi,CS:agent, KLSpu,KChpu,KSNpu,KCSpu:public_key, ECDSA:hash_func ,SNpseudi
    ,SNsli:text,SND,RCV:channel(dy))
played_by LS def=
local
    State:nat,
    SNrni,SNrns,SigLsEi,SigSnEi,SNparityi,SNp:text,
    SigChT2,SigSnT3i,SigSnT4i,SigSnT3s,SigSnT4s,SigLsT1i,SigLsT2i,SigLS1i,SigLS2i,SigLSi:text,
    CHrni,CHparityi,CHotpi,CHsli,CHts2,SS,Datai,Datas:text,LSpseudn,LSpseudn,CSpseudn,
    CSpseudn:text, Lsts2,Lsts3,Lsts4,LsT1,LsT2,LsT3,Lsotp,Lsotp:binary,
    CHpseudi,Lsotp,CSts1,CsT1,CsT2,CSrn,LSrn,SigLS3,SigLS4,SigLS5:text
const
    sec1,sec2,sec4,sec5,sec6,sec7,auth1,auth2,auth4,auth5,auth6,auth7:protocol_id
init
    State := 0
transition
% Starting signal
1.State=0
    /\ RCV(start) =|>
% LS sends (LSotp,LSotp) to SNi & CHi
    State':=1/\ SNrni':=new()/\SigLsEi':=new()
    /\LSotp':=xor({ECDSA(SNpseudi)}_inv(KSNpu),SigLsEi') /\witness(LS,SNi,auth1,{SigLsEi',SNrni'})
    /\SND(SNi.LSotp'.SNrni') /\SNrni':=new()/\SigLsEi':=new()
    /\LSotp':=xor({ECDSA(SNpseudi)}_inv(KChpu),SigLsEi') /\witness(LS,CHi,auth2,{SigLsEi',SNrni'})
    /\SND(CHi.LSotp'.SNrni')

2.State=1
% LS receives(CHm) from CHi
    /\RCV(LS.(xor((CHts2'.CHotp'.CHrni'.CHpseudi'.CHsli'),SigChT2')).CHrni'.SS'.(SigSnT3s'.SigSnT4s',
    .SNrns'.Datas')) =|>State':=2
    /\SigLS1i':={ECDSA(SigSnT3s')}_inv(KLSpu) /\CHparityi':=SigLS1i
    /\SigLsT1i':=xor(SigLS1i',SigLsEi)
    /\SigChT2':=xor((CHts2'.CHotp'.CHrni'.CHpseudi'.CHsli'),SigLsT1i')
    /\SNrni':=SNpseudi/\Datai':=Datas /\SigLs2i':={ECDSA(Datai.SNpseudi)}_inv(KLSpu)
    /\SNparityi':=SigLs2i' /\SigSnT3i':=SigSnT3s'/\SigSnT4i':=SigSnT4s'
    /\SigSnEi':=xor(SigSnT4i',SigLsEi) /\SigLsT2i':=xor(SNparityi',SigSnEi')
    /\SNp':=xor(SigLsT2i',SigSnT3i') /\request(LS,CHi,auth4,{CHts2',CHotp',CHrni',SNrns'})
    /\secret({SigLs2i,SigLsEi,SigSnEi},sec1,[LS,SNi]) /\secret({SNpseudi,SNsli},sec2,[LS,SNi])
    /\secret({CHparityi',SigLsEi,CHpseudi,CHsli},sec4,[LS,CHi])
    /\secret({CHotp',CHts2'},sec5,[LS,CHi]) /\LSpseudn':=new()/\Lsts2':=new()
    /\LSotp':=xor(SigLSi,xor(LSpseudn',Lsts2'))
% LS sends(LSotp) to CS
    /\SND(CS.LSotp'.SS) /\secret({LSpseudn,CSpseudn},sec6,[LS,CS])
    /\witness(LS,CS,auth5,{CSpseudn,LSpseudn',Lsts2'})

3.State=2
% LS receives(CSm) from CS
    /\ RCV(LS.{ECDSA(CsT2')}_inv(KLSpu).CsT1'.CsT2'.SS'.CSrn') =|>
    State':=3/\Lsts3':=new() /\CSotp':=xor(CSts1,xor(CsT1',xor(LSpseudn,CSrn'))))
    /\CSpseudn':=xor(CSts1,xor(CSotp',xor(CsT2',LSpseudn)))
    /\SigLs3':={ECDSA(xor(CSts1,xor(CSotp',xor(CSpseudn',LSpseudn))))}_inv(KLSpu)
    /\secret({SigLSi,CSotp'},sec7,[LS,CS]) /\request(LS,CS,auth6,{CSpseudn',LSpseudn,CSts1})
% Prepares message to send data with mutual authentication
    /\Lsts4':=new() /\LSrn':=new() /\Lst1':=xor(Lsts4',xor(LSpseudn,xor(LSrni',CSrn'))))
    /\SigLS4':={ECDSA(LsT1')}_inv(KCSpu) /\LsT2':=xor(CSts1,xor(CSotp',CSpseudn'))
    /\LsT3':=xor(LsT2',LSpseudn) /\SigLs5':=xor({ECDSA(Datas.LsT3')}_inv(KCSpu),SigLS4')
% LS sends(LSm) to CS
    /\SND(CS.SigLS5'.SS.LSrni'.Datas) /\witness(LS,CS,auth7,{SigLS5,Lsts4,LSrn'})
end role

```

Figure 7.23: *LS* role of REISCH in HLPSL

```

role centralServer(CS,LS:agent, KCSpu,KLSpu:public_key, ECDSA:hash_func,SND,RCV:channel(dy))
played_by CS def=
local
    State:nat,
    SigCS1,SigCS2,LSts4:text, LSpseudo,LSpseudn,CSpseudo,CSpseudn:text,
    CsT1,CsT2,CsT3,CsT4,LSts2,CSts1,CSts2,CSotp,CSrn,LSrn,SS,Datas,LSotp,SigLSi,SigLS5:text
const
    sec6,sec7,auth5,auth6,auth7:protocol_id
init
    State := 0
transition
% CS receives from LS
1.State=0
    /\RCV(CS.LSotp'.SS)=|> State':=1 /\CSts1':=new() /\CSpseudn':=new()
    /\CSotp':=new() /\CSrn':=new() /\CsT1':=xor(CSts1',xor(CSotp',xor(LSpseudn,CSrn'))))
    /\CsT2':=xor(CSts1',xor(CSotp',xor(CSpseudn,LSpseudn)))
    /\request(CS,LS,auth5,{CSpseudo,LSpseudn,LSts2})
    /\secret({LSpseudn,CSpseudn},sec6,{CS,LS}) /\secret({SigLSi,CSotp'},sec7,{CS,LS})
% CS sends to LS
    /\SND(LS.{ECDSA(CsT2')}_inv(KLSpu).CsT1'.CsT2'.SS.CSrnr')
    /\witness(CS,LS,auth6,{CSpseudn,LSpseudn,CSts1'})
```

% CS receives from LS

```

2.State=1
    /\RCV(CS.SigLS5'.SS'.LSrn'.Datas')=|> State':=2 /\CSts2':=new()
    /\SigCS1':={ECDSA(xor(LSts4,xor(LSpseudn,xor(LSrnr,CSrn'))))}_inv(KCSpu)
    /\CsT3':=xor(CSts1,xor(CSotp,CSpseudn)) /\CsT4':=xor(LSpseudn,CsT3')
    /\SigCS2':=xor({ECDSA(Datas.CsT4')}_inv(KCSpu),SigCS1')
    /\request(CS,LS,auth7,{SigLS5,LSts4,LSrn'})
```

end role
Figure 7.24: *CS* role of REISCH in HLPSL

REISCH adds sufficient randomization to hide security parameters, and patients' records are protected even after *LS* is penetrated while the scheme in (Sui & de Meer 2019) needs to support randomization and protect users' information when a demand-response management unit penetration by an intruder. Besides, an intruder can send messages from a forged unit and deceive users after penetrating this module and revealing information. REISCH is robust against information leakage, while the scheme in (Hathaliya et al. 2019) uses a 160-bit key that is vulnerable to attacks. It explicitly sends patients' identities within the encrypted message in the login and authentication phases. If an intruder can break the encryption, he/she uses this information in data disclosure. REISCH uses ECDSA-BLAKE2bp and random pseudonyms to secure data signing. The scheme in (Furtak et al. 2019) is based on SHA1 and HMAC, which are vulnerable to attacks in signing and authentication collected data. It also does not include a pseudonym mechanism to protect  $SN_i$  parameters from misbehaviour.

```

role session(SNi,CHi,LS,CS:agent, KSNpu,KCHpu,KLSpu,KCSpu:public_key, ECDSA:hash_func ,MAXv:
            message, SNpseudi,SNsli,Datai:text)
def=
local
    SND1,RCV1,SND2,RCV2,SND3,RCV3,SND4,RCV4:channel(dy)
composition
    sensori(SNi,CHi,LS,KSNpu,KCHpu,KLSpu,ECDSA,SNpseudi,SNsli,Datai,SND3,RCV3)
    /\clusterHeadi(CHi,LS,SNi,KCHpu,KLSpu,KSNpu,ECDSA,SNpseudi,SNsli,MAXv,SND2,RCV2)
    /\localServer(LS,CHi,SNi,CS,KLSpu,KCHpu,KSNpu,KCSpu,ECDSA,SNpseudi,SNsli,SND1,RCV1)
    /\centralServer(CS,LS,KCSpu,KLSpu,ECDSA,SND4,RCV4)
end role

role environment()
def=
const
    kSNpu,kCHpu,kLS,kCS,ki:public_key, ecdsa:hash_func,datai,snpseudi,snsli:text,
    sni,chi,ls,cs,i:agent,maxV:message,
    sec1,sec2,sec3,sec4,sec5,sec6,sec7,auth1,auth2,auth3,auth4,auth5,auth6,auth7:protocol_id
    intruder_knowledge = {sni,chi,ls,i,kSNpu,kCHpu,kLS,ki}
composition
    session(sni,chi,ls,cs,kSNpu,kCHpu,kLS,kCS,ecdsa,maxV,datai,snpseudi,snsli)
    % Check replay attack
    %/\ session(sni,chi,ls,cs,kSNpu,kCHpu,kLS,kCS,ecdsa,maxV,datai,snpseudi,snsli)
    % Check MITM attack
    %/\ session(chi,sni,ls,cs,kSNpu,kCHpu,kLS,kCS,ecdsa,maxV,datai,snpseudi,snsli)
    % Check impersonate SNi
    /\ session(i,chi,ls,cs,kSNpu,kCHpu,kLS,kCS,ecdsa,maxV,datai,snpseudi,snsli)
    % Chekc impersonate CHi
    %/\ session(sni,i,ls,cs,kSNpu,kCHpu,kLS,kCS,ecdsa,maxV,datai,snpseudi,snsli)
    % Check impersonate LS
    %/\ session(sni,chi,i,cs,kSNpu,kCHpu,kLS,kCS,ecdsa,maxV,datai,snpseudi,snsli)
end role

goal
    secrecy_of sec1,sec2,sec3,sec4,sec5,sec6,sec7
    authentication_on auth1,auth2,auth3,auth4,auth5,auth6,auth7
end goal
environment()

```

Figure 7.25: Session, environment, and goal roles of REISCH in HLPSL

|   |  |            |            |             |            |              |              |              |              |
|---|--|------------|------------|-------------|------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| <pre>% OFMC % Version of 2006/02/13 SUMMARY SAFE DETAILS BOUNDED_NUMBER_OF_SESSIONS PROTOCOL /home/span/span/testsuite/results/REIESCH.if GOAL as_specified BACKEND OFMC COMMENTS STATISTICS parseTime: 0.00s searchTime: 532.61s visitedNodes: 1899 nodes depth: 7 plies</pre> | <p><b>SUMMARY</b><br/>SAFE</p> <p><b>DETAILS</b><br/>BOUNDED_NUMBER_OF_SESSIONS<br/>TYPED_MODEL</p> <p><b>PROTOCOL</b><br/><code>/home/span/span/testsuite/results/REIESCH.if</code></p> <p><b>GOAL</b><br/>As Specified</p> <p><b>BACKEND</b><br/>CL-AtSe</p> <p><b>STATISTICS</b></p> <table border="0"> <tr> <td>Analysed :</td> <td>325 states</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Reachable :</td> <td>325 states</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Translation:</td> <td>0.12 seconds</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Computation:</td> <td>0.01 seconds</td> </tr> </table> | Analysed : | 325 states | Reachable : | 325 states | Translation: | 0.12 seconds | Computation: | 0.01 seconds |
| Analysed :  | 325 states   |            |            |             |            |              |              |              |              |
| Reachable :   | 325 states   |            |            |             |            |              |              |              |              |
| Translation:  | 0.12 seconds   |            |            |             |            |              |              |              |              |
| Computation:  | 0.01 seconds   |            |            |             |            |              |              |              |              |

Figure 7.26: Simulation result of REISCH using OFMC backend

Figure 7.27: Simulation result of REISCH using CL-AtSe backend

Table 7.5: Comparison of security features between REISCH and other data collection schemes

| Security feature        | Fan & Gong (2012) | Lavanya & Natarajan (2017b) | Staudemeyer et al. (2018) | Malathy et al. (2018) | Sharavanan et al. (2018) | Sui & de Meer (2019) | Hathaliya et al. (2019) | Furtak et al. (2019) | <b>REISCH scheme</b> |
|-------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Anti MITM               |                   | ✓                           |                           |                       |                          | ✓                    | ✓                       | ✓                    | ✓                    |
| Anti replay             | ✓                 | ✓                           | ✓                         |                       |                          | ✓                    | ✓                       | ✓                    | ✓                    |
| Availability            | ✓                 | ✓                           |                           |                       |                          | ✓                    | ✓                       | ✓                    | ✓                    |
| Anti Sybil              | ✓                 |                             |                           |                       |                          |                      |                         | ✓                    | ✓                    |
| Anti Wormhole           |                   |                             |                           |                       |                          |                      | ✓                       | ✓                    | ✓                    |
| Anti fake sink          |                   |                             |                           |                       |                          |                      | ✓                       | ✓                    | ✓                    |
| Anti repository attack  |                   |                             |                           |                       | ✓                        |                      |                         |                      | ✓                    |
| Anti eavesdropping      |                   | ✓                           | ✓                         | ✓                     | ✓                        | ✓                    | ✓                       | ✓                    | ✓                    |
| Anti node replication   |                   |                             |                           |                       |                          |                      |                         | ✓                    | ✓                    |
| Anti collision/preimage | ✓                 |                             |                           |                       |                          |                      | ✓                       |                      | ✓                    |
| Pseudonym               |                   |                             |                           |                       |                          | ✓                    | ✓                       |                      | ✓                    |
| Homomorphic             |                   |                             |                           |                       |                          | ✓                    |                         |                      | ✓                    |
| Mutual authentication   | ✓                 |                             |                           |                       |                          | ✓                    |                         |                      | ✓                    |

### 7.4.3 Performance Analysis

Slightly different than the other two schemes: PAX and RAMHU, the performance is an important factor while designing a data/records collection protocols for the HWSNs.

#### 7.4.3.1 Theoretical Performance Analysis

Theoretically, REISCH uses several features that qualify it to be efficient in HWSN performance. First, it relies on the ECDSA algorithm that integrates data collected by small keys compared to public key cryptography algorithms (RSA, DSA and Elgamal). For instance, ECDSA produces 256-bit equivalent keys in security for 3072-bit keys produced by RSA, DSA, and Elgamal. Second, REISCH implicitly uses BLAKE2bp with ECDSA which is dramatically efficient in the operation of a hash function instead of SHA1. Third, REISCH uses the homomorphic property to combine signatures in *CHs* and significantly reduce energy dissipation. Fourth, REISCH relies on LEACH routing protocol, which is the most efficient energy-saving protocol in WSN. Fifth, REISCH relies on rapid random pseudonyms to protect medical records rather than complex and costly processes of data encryption and anonymity. Finally, REISCH uses XML to support patients' data management efficiently. Therefore, these features make REISCH maintain the energy of the *SNs* as long as possible.

#### 7.4.3.2 Experimental Performance Analysis

More importantly, we will evaluate the performance of REISCH in the execution of security operations in conjunction with the saved data and collected. As noted in

Table 7.6: REISCH's simulation parameters

| Parameter                    | Value                        |
|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| Area of WSN                  | 1000m*1000m                  |
| $SN$                         | 200                          |
| $LS$ location                | 500*500                      |
| Initial energy               | 25J                          |
| Size of packet               | 1MB                          |
| Control packet size          | 50B                          |
| Rounds                       | 1000                         |
| Routing protocol             | LEACH                        |
| Propagation energy           | 10 nJ/bit/m <sup>2</sup>     |
| Multi-hop propagation energy | 0.0013 pJ/bit/m <sup>4</sup> |
| Aggregation energy           | 5 nJ/bit/signal              |

Table 7.7: REISCH's computational processes

| Process type                | Number of process |      |      | Running time | Storage | Energy   |
|-----------------------------|-------------------|------|------|--------------|---------|----------|
|                             | $SN$              | $CH$ | $LS$ |              |         |          |
| SHA1 hash                   | 1                 | 1    | Many | 0.05529      | 160 bit | 0.008464 |
| BLAKE2bp hash               | 1                 | 1    | Many | 0.040606     | 512 bit | 0.006216 |
| Keys generation             | 2                 | 2    | 2    | 0.000859     | 256 bit | 0.000132 |
| Point multiplication        | 2                 | 2    | Many | 0.000543     | -       | 0.000083 |
| ECDSA-SHA1 signature        | 1                 | 1    | -    | 0.072838     | 256 bit | 0.011151 |
| ECDSA-SHA1 verification     | -                 | -    | Many | 0.073103     | -       | 0.011191 |
| ECDSA-BLAKE2bp signature    | 1                 | 1    | -    | 0.050046     | 256 bit | 0.007662 |
| ECDSA-BLAKE2bp verification | -                 | -    | Many | 0.052076     | -       | 0.007972 |

previous Sections,  $SNs$  requires performance-efficient signatures to perform services for as long as possible in patients monitoring and care. We will provide tests on hash algorithms (SHA and BLAKE) and signature algorithm (ECDSA). Additionally, applying these algorithms to HWSN to analyse performance properties such as time, storage and energy. Table 7.6 shows all the simulation parameters used in HWSN while Table 7.7 shows computational operations in the REISCH scheme. All hash and signature algorithms are implemented by C language while WSN is designed in Octave under Ubuntu 16.04 LTS, processor Intel Core i5 2.6GHz, OS type 64-bit, Memory 4 GiB and disk 32.0 GB.

The computation of energy in our scheme was based on the Micaz sensor specification. This process uses parameters such as current (0.0567), voltage (2.7) and time to extract both power and energy using  $power = current * voltage$  and  $energy = time * power$ . We relied on real data provided by the City of Melbourne that is licensed under CC 4.0 ([City of Melbourne Open Data Team October 19, 2018](#)). These data generated by sensors to monitor environmental parameters such as humidity, temperature and light, as well as include some information such as timestamp and ID. We divided this data into different sizes (200K, 400K, 800K and 1M) and then convert this data into an XML context. Furthermore, there are no communication channels between patients and  $SNs$ . To check performance, we have implemented the SHA1-160, SHA2-256, BLAKE2s-256, BLAKE2b-512, BLAKE2sp-256, and BLAKE2bp-512 algorithms with 1MB data size as shown in Figure 7.28. Also, Figures 7.30, 7.31 and 7.32 show execution time (minimum,




Figure 7.28: Comparison of SHA and BLAKE2 with 1MB data




Figure 7.29: Execution time of ECDSA-SHA1 and ECDSA-BLAKE2bp with 1MB data

maximum and average) for hash functions when using 1M data. We also notice that BLAKE2bp is the best performance in terms of execution time in all figures. In addition, Figure 7.29 shows that ECDSA-BLAKE2bp is the best execution time of ECDSA-SHA1. Also, Figures 7.33, 7.34 and 7.35 show execution time (minimum, maximum and average) for ECDSA algorithms when using 1M data. Thus, the amendment to the ECDSA algorithm would be very appropriate for the use of security measures with the longest life of the *SNs* from the original algorithm.




Figure 7.30: Minimum execution time of hash functions with 1MB data




Figure 7.31: Maximum execution time of hash functions with 1MB data




Figure 7.32: Average execution time of hash functions with 1MB data

We have computed message complexity which is the number of messages transmitted between network entities. Each round,  $SN$  and  $CH$  send one message while  $CH$  and  $LS$  receive a set of aggregated messages. Thus, the message complexity with modified algorithms for  $SNs$  is (156972),  $CHs$  is (8313) and  $LS$  is (165285) while




Figure 7.33: Minimum execution time of ECDSA algorithms with 1MB data




Figure 7.34: Maximum execution time of ECDSA algorithms with 1MB data




Figure 7.35: Average execution time of ECDSA algorithms with 1MB data

with original algorithms for *SNs* is (142541), *CHs* is (7572) and *LS* is (150113). Message overhead is to calculate the message size between network entities. In each round, the message overhead of *SN* is  $(1024 + 32)$  bytes while *CH* is  $(15360 + 32)$  bytes. Figure 7.36 describes REISCH-ECDSA-BLAKE2bp is better than REISCH-




Figure 7.36: Comparison of alive *SNs*

ECDSA-SHA1 in terms of alive *SNs*, namely, HWSN will have more life span to collect patients' data when it uses REISCH-ECDSA-BLAKE2bp. It also contributes to the energy balance of *SNs* which improves the continuity of electing *CHs* and collecting the most patients' data in each round. We noticed that REISCH with the modified algorithm (ECDSA-BLAKE2bp) has more alive *SNs* by 24% than the original algorithm (ECDSA-SHA1) as well as that the first *SN* dies when using the modified algorithm is in round 322 while in the original algorithm is in round 295.

#### 7.4.3.3 Performance Comparison

Finally, we will make a comparison on performance with the existing schemes (Table 7.8 shows a comparison of ECDSA's signature and verification (running time) between our scheme and existing schemes). Due to different environments, security parameters and network parameters such as key length, number of *SNs*, etc., it is very difficult to compare schemes' performance. However, we have made some comparisons to illustrate the superiority of REISCH on the existing schemes in terms of performance.

The scheme in (Fan & Gong 2012) focused on accelerating ECDSA's verification based on computation results for neighbouring *SNs*. These computations consume additional energy. In addition, this scheme is very expensive if applied to cluster scheme because *CH* needs to accomplish one PM in each signature for each  $SN_i$  and thus will consume energy in the intermediate *SNs*. REISCH does not need these computations because signatures' verification is performed in *LS*. Schemes

in (Kodali 2013, Lavanya & Natarajan 2017b, Malathy et al. 2018) were used ECDSA to sign data without using homomorphic. Consequently, the performance of the *SNs* would be very low due to signature and verification processes in each round. The scheme in (Kodali 2013) addressed the bits (8 and 32) of data processing in SHA1 but did not address the cost of energy consumption by SHA1. Also, the scheme in (Lavanya & Natarajan 2017b) did not support the clustering environment to reduce energy consumption as well as the computation time to generate and verify the signature was not clearly indicated. Furthermore, the scheme in (Sharavanan et al. 2018) has used SHA2, which is more secure than SHA1 but performs heavy processes that significantly affect the energy of *SNs*. It also addresses only computations in transport while REISCH addresses computations in transport and processing using BLAKE2bp and homomorphic.

Schemes in (Staudemeyer et al. 2018, Hathaliya et al. 2019, Furtak et al. 2019) rely on the use of encryption to protect data without a homomorphic property, since encryption processes extremely consume *SNs* resources (as mentioned in subsection 3.4.4, point 4). While REISCH uses signatures and homomorphic to improve HWSN network performance. Although the scheme in (Sui & de Meer 2019) uses encryption and signature of data with homomorphic, encryption can particularly affect network performance especially a burden on the servers. Moreover, the scheme in (Furtak et al. 2019) has implemented RSA-2048 bits algorithm which is significantly expensive in encryption operations. In addition, it uses several parameters such as many keys, 2048-bit key length and  $SN_i$  addresses (master, replica and gateway) that cause storage problems in the pre-deployment and registration phases (consumption of *SNs* resources). It has used a random routing of the sensor network without relying on a specific routing protocol such as LEACH. This scheme has considered the structure of the data in the  $SN_i$  memory and did not pay attention to the structure of the data as it was transferred to the servers. REISCH uses XML to support performance in *LS* and *CS* without having to convert data formats between network devices. Many recent research (Kittur & Pais 2019, Kuang et al. 2019, Marino et al. 2019, Zhao et al. 2019, Liu et al. 2019) have used different ways to improve ECDSA's procedures. However, REISCH provides better performance in terms of ECDSA's signature and verification than existing schemes (as shown in Table 7.8).

## 7.5 Summary of the Chapter

In this chapter, firstly, we introduced an security testing tools (simulation and mathematical logic) to analyse protocols security. Thereafter, we discussed and analysed

Table 7.8: Comparison of ECDSA's procedures

| Running time (second) | Fan & Gong (2012) | Kodali et al. (2013) | Malathy et al. (2018) | Kittur & Pais (2019) | Kuang et al. (2019) | Marino et al. (2019) | Zhao et al. (2019) | Liu et al. (2019) | <b>REISCH scheme</b> |
|-----------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|--------------------|-------------------|----------------------|
| Signature             | 0.38              | 0.941                | 0.59                  | 0.078                | 0.3472              | 0.434                | 0.084              | 0.051             | 0.050                |
| Verification          | 0.65              | -                    | -                     | 0.079                | -                   | 0.429                | 0.088              | 0.105             | 0.052                |

the security results in terms of authentication, authorisation and data collection in preventing a wide spectrum of attacks. For each scheme: PAX, RAMHU and REISCH, we have made a theoretic security analysis and then done an experimental performance analysis by use of the AVISPA, respectively. All these analyses are shown by presenting their experimental data/figures, in comparison with the existing schemes.

# Chapter 8: Conclusions and Future Directions

In this chapter, we will summarize our research journey and experiences and list out what would be the future directions. Our objective was to explore an innovative strategy to develop efficient and secure healthcare application by using the latest IT technology, in particular, the electronic health/medical records(EHR) and the wireless sensor network(WSN).

## 8.1 Conclusions of the Dissertation

After three or so years of arduous efforts, we have come out with a general structure of a HC application that consists of four components: Data-collection using WSNs, an EHR/EMRs repository, the user's privacy protection and the users differentiated access control.

In terms of authentication scheme, healthcare systems require robust authentication to ensure that only legitimate users exchange patients' data. During the investigation of the previous authentication protocols, we found that they were vulnerable to weak security against some known attacks. Therefore, we proposed a new robust authentication protocol (RAMHU) to prevent internal, external, passive, and active attacks. We have used a variety of mechanisms that ensure the protection and concealment of personal information to legitimate users. Our scheme uses multi pseudonyms for both users and medical centres to prevent the transmission of real information in the authentication request and MAC address to prevent counterfeit devices from connecting to the network. We used lightweight encryption and signature algorithms (as described in Chapter 3 Section 3.2.2 and Section 3.2.3) to ensure that RAMHU's efficient interaction with user requests is ensured. In addition, we provided a formal and informal security analysis to demonstrate the effectiveness of RAMHU in repelling known attacks. We conclude that the RAMHU scheme provides a high-level security and performance that maintains authentication information for users against various attacks.

In terms of authorisation scheme, the security and privacy of medical records have become essential requirements for the establishment of any healthcare system in recent years. To ensure the provision of security and privacy, this thesis proposes a PAX authorisation system that supports pseudonym, anonymity and XACML. Specifically, the proposed system uses pseudonyms to separate personal information about patients' data, anonymity to hide subjects' information, and XACML to create distributed access control policies to authorise subjects' requests to objects' records in EHR. Different from a large amount of theoretical investigation in the existing literature, this scheme achieves the security and privacy preservation by utilizing the pseudonym and anonymity techniques, which can reduce the unnecessary time consumption and the burden on the server. We conclude that the PAX system provides a security level that maintains patients' privacy, and the system especially protects patients' information from indirect users (advisors, patients' relatives, researchers, and emergency doctors), who have been considered a serious security threat to any healthcare system because they can carry out internal attacks using the privileges granted to them.

In terms of data collection scheme, wireless sensor networks provide unique and important care services when used with EMR. Unfortunately, these networks suffer from performance and security problems as mentioned in the previous Sections. Therefore, we have proposed a REISCH scheme to address performance and security problems and cover gaps in existing research. As a result, REISCH uses ECDSA-BLAKE2bp and provides the best performance from using the original ECDSA-SHA1 algorithm. REISCH with the modified algorithm saves more than 24% alive SNs. In addition, the results of the security analysis prove that REISCH is safe against attacks in the threat model.

## 8.2 Future Directions

To further develop the proposed HC project, we intend to add some features to support security and privacy in EHR and EMR.

1. To support the authentication scheme (RAMHU), we intend to add users' biometric properties such as fingerprint, iris, or sound recognition to the authentication procedures. This procedure strengthens security precautions in preventing external attackers from accessing network services. However, adding these features requires performance evaluation in the login and authentication protocols.

2. RAMHU uses lightweight and efficient performance algorithms that, according to many researchers, have shown that ECIES and PHOTON are efficient encryption and signature algorithms, respectively. We intend to evaluate RAMHU in terms of efficiency and discovery of performance standards such as end-to-end request delay, throughput, and error rate.
3. From other future works, we intend to use a robust security mechanism with  $\oplus$  operation to support the exchange and management of public keys. Broadcasting public keys in general needs more attention to prevent various attacks. Public key storage on users' devices can also be a reason to compromise authentication.
4. For more testing in preventing analysis of authorisation requests and responses, we intend to test the authorisation scheme with side-channel attacks (SCA) such as simple power analysis (SPA) and differential power analysis (DPA) and template attacks. In addition to performance testing, we intend to test XACML (PDP engine) with complex combining policies and algorithms while maintaining the confidentiality of users' information and preventing leakage to intruders.
5. We will focus on patients' data without the use of cryptographic mechanisms in examining the patients' daily condition, use patients' real data to test PAX with large data, and allow PAX to distinguish between patients' history, daily status, and purpose of data access. We will also encrypt the patients' old medical records (within a certain period) that are not frequently retrieved by healthcare providers in a manner that does not affect the efficiency of the server in providing the service to users.
6. We will investigate the application of a light hash algorithm to generate key ephemeral  $k$  in ECDSA and patients' pseudonyms, which support increased randomization while maintaining system performance as an additional security measure to protect the privacy of medical records in EHR.
7. After store data collection in EMR, our project needs supporting security procedures between  $CS$  and  $DS$  to store partial records in the remote repository. This process requires accurate and robust security procedures to prevent intruders from modifying history data for patients.
8. The NTRUSign algorithm is more efficient in term of performance than ECDSA but it is less secure (Driessens et al. 2008). We intend to investigate the integration of NTRUSign performance features with ECDSA to improve computation operations and energy savings in HWSN. In addition, we will

try to compare NTRUSign-BLAKE2bp and ECDSA-BLAKE2bp in terms of security and performance.

9. Support our scheme is by using ECDSA-BLAKE2bp with efficient curves, such as Edward curve, efficient PM methods, such as Frobenius and system coordinates, such as  $\lambda$ -Projective in (Oliveira et al. 2014) to improve the efficiency of patients' data signing in HWSN.
10. We intend to integrate our scheme into a real HWSN environment to evaluate the efficiency and feasibility of REISCH algorithms to improve the lifetime of *SNs* in patients' data collection as long as possible.

### 8.3 Summary of the Chapter

We just summarize our study by giving the conclusions of our project schemes (the authentication, authorisation and data collection schemes) in the construction of a robust HC application in support of security and privacy issues. Then, we described the future work to develop our project in terms of authentication, authorisation and data collection. We should conclude this thesis by saying that "writing this up is just to summarize this period of experience, it never be an end, actually it just open a door for us to go further!".

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# Appendices

# Appendix A: RAMHU

## A.1 Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES)

This algorithm was independently proposed by Neal Koblitz and Victor Miller in 1985 (Imran et al. 2018). Namely, DLP is difficulty obtaining  $k$  from  $P$  and  $Q$  (where  $k$  is integer, and  $P$  and  $Q$  are two points on the curve). Small parameters used in ECC help to perform computations quickly. These computations are important in constrained-source and large environments (such as HC systems) that require processing power, memory, bandwidth, or power consumption (Diro et al. 2017). ECC provides encryption (elliptic curve integrated encryption scheme(ECIES)), signature (elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA)), and exchange keys (elliptic cuvre Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)) approaches (Teguig et al. 2017). Many operations are performed in ECC algorithms (described in four layers) as shown in Figure A.1 (Nabil et al. 2012). ECIES has provided confidentiality and integrity and proven to be extremely efficient in its performance, as it uses small keys. Thus, the cost of computation is small compared with other public key cryptography algorithms, such as RSA. Table 2.2 in Chapter 2 shows a comparison of key sizes for public key encryption algorithms in addition to some information about these algorithms.

ECC uses two finite fields (prime field and binary field). The binary field uses two types to represent basis ( normal and polynomial basis) (Imran et al. 2017), and is well suited to implementation in hardware (Nabil et al. 2012). While the prime field is well suited to implement in software more than hardware as well as prime field is more security operations than binary field. Let  $F_q$  indicates field type, if  $q=p$  (where  $p > 3$ ) then ECC uses prime field ( $F_p$ ). In the second case, if  $q=2$  then ECC uses binary field ( $F_{2^m}$ ) where m is the prime integer (Oliveira et al. 2018). ECC consists of a set of points  $(x_i, y_i)$ , where  $x_i, y_i$  are integers and the point at infinity ( $O$ ). It uses  $O$  to provide an identity for Abelian group rule that satisfies long-form




Figure A.1: Arithmetic operations in ECC hierarchy

for Weierstrass equation (with Affine coordinate):

$$y^2 + a_1xy + a_3y = x^3 + a_2x^2 + a_4x + a_6 \quad (\text{A.1})$$

When prime field is used over ECC, the simplified equation is as follows:

$$y^2 = x^3 + ax + b \quad (\text{A.2})$$

Where  $a, b \in F_p$ ,  $4a^3 + 27b^2 \neq 0(\text{mod } p)$ . The law of chord-and-tangent is used in ECC to add two points on the curve (Pan et al. 2017). Let us suppose that  $P$  and  $Q$  are two points on the curve; these two points have coordinates  $(x_1, y_1), (x_2, y_2)$  respectively and the sum of these two points is equal to a new point  $R(x_3, y_3)$  (i.e  $P(x_1, y_1) + Q(x_2, y_2) = R(x_3, y_3)$ ) (Wang et al. 2006, Islam et al. 2017).

ECC uses two operations for addition that are point addition( $P+Q$ ) and point doubling ( $P+P$ ) (Figure A.1), as in the following equations:

In the case of the point addition ( $P + Q$ ) where  $P$  and  $Q \in E(F_p)$ :

with using the slope  $\lambda = \frac{y_2 - y_1}{x_2 - x_1}$

$$x_3 = \lambda^2 - x_1 - x_2, \quad y_3 = \lambda^2(x_1 - x_3) - y_1 \quad (\text{A.3})$$

In the case of the point doubling ( $P + P$ ) where  $P \in E(F_p)$ :

with using slope  $\lambda = \frac{3x_1^2 + a}{2y_1}$

$$x_3 = \lambda^2 - 2x_1, \quad y_3 = \lambda^2(x_1 - x_3) - y_1 \quad (\text{A.4})$$

---

**Algorithm 1** ECC encryption and decryption algorithm:

---

- 1: Alice and Bob use same parameters domain  $D = \{a, b, q, G, n, h\}$ , where  $a, b$  are coefficient,  $q$  is field type,  $G$  is base point,  $n$  is order point and  $h$  is cofactor.
  - 2: Alice selects random integer  $AK_{pr}$  as private key.
  - 3: Alice generates public key  $K_{pu} = AK_{pr}G$  and sends  $K_{pu}$  and  $G$  to Bob.
  - 4: Bob receives message  $m$  from Alice, selects random integer as private key  $BK_{pr}$  where  $BK_{pr} \leq n$ .
  - 5: Bob encrypts  $m$  with point  $P$  in elliptic curve  $E(F_q)$ .
  - 6: Bob computes  $C_1 = P + BK_{pr}K_{pu}$ ,  $C_2 = BK_{pr}G$  and sends  $C_1$  and  $C_2$  to Alice.
  - 7: Alice receives Bob's  $m$  and decrypts the  $m$  by computing  $C_1 - AK_{pr}C_2$  to obtain plaintext.
- 

When the binary field is used over ECC, the simplified equation is as follows:

$$y^2 + xy = x^3 + ax^2 + b \quad (\text{A.5})$$

Where  $a, b \in F_{2^m}$ ,  $b \neq 0$  (Johnson et al. 2001), as addition operations are in the following form:

In the case point addition ( $P + Q$ ) where  $P$  and  $Q \in E(F_{2^m})$ :

with using the slope  $\lambda = \frac{y_1+y_2}{x_1+x_2}$

$$x_3 = \lambda^2 + \lambda + x_1 + x_2 + a, \quad y_3 = \lambda(x_1 + x_3) + x_3 + y_1 \quad (\text{A.6})$$

In the case point doubling ( $P + P$ ) where  $P \in E(F_{2^m})$ :

$$x_3 = x_1^2 + \frac{b}{x_1^2}, \quad y_3 = x_1^2 + (x_1 + \frac{y_1}{x_1})x_3 + x_3 \quad (\text{A.7})$$

ECC operations for encryption and decryption are explained through the following algorithm 1 (Zhong et al. 2016):

## A.2 Lightweight Hash-Function Algorithm

The hash function is a method that takes the variable length of data as input and produces a constant length of the size called message digest (MD). This algorithm is called one-way algorithms. Namely, when the data is encoded into the MD, the process cannot be reversed to access the original data (Wazid et al. 2016). It is eminently useful in data signature processes, offering high efficiency compared to traditional cryptography algorithms. Recently, lightweight hash algorithms (such as PHOTON, QUARK, and SPONGENT) have emerged to improve efficiency and security rather than traditional hash algorithms (such as MD5, SHA1, and SHA2). Many advantages that should be provided in the hash algorithm to satisfy the sig-

nature principle, such as first preimage resistant (FPR), second preimage resistant (SPR) and collision resistant (CR) (Giri et al. 2015). Suppose that  $h$  is a hash function, MD is a hash result and  $m$  is a message, the definition of the signature principles is as follows:

- **FPR:** This principle is also known as one-wayness. When the attacker gets an MD, it is arithmetically difficult to find  $m$  and produces the same MD ( $h(m) = \text{MD}$ ) (Harran et al. 2018).
- **SPR:** This principle is also known as weak collision resistant. When the attacker gets MD and  $m$ , it is difficult to calculate a different message ( $m'$ ) where  $m \neq m'$  to produce the same MD ( $h(m) = h(m')$ ) (Aitzhan & Svetinovic 2018).
- **CR:** This principle is also known as strong collision resistant. It is difficult computationally the attacker to calculate two different messages ( $m$  and  $m'$ )  $m \neq m'$  and to produce the same MD ( $h(m) = h(m')$ ). CR is not the FPR guarantee (Esiner & Datta 2019, Cantu et al. 2017).

PHOTON is one of the lightweight hash function algorithms. This algorithm is tremendously suitable for projects that require a robust and reliable signature. This algorithm is based on sponge-like construction and AES-like primitive for domain extension and permutation efficiently (Anandakumar et al. 2014, Porambage et al. 2015, Ijaz & Pasha 2017). PHOTON is available in several versions (80, 128, 160, 224, and 256). It is a balance between the efficiency in the execution of computations on the one hand and security in the implementation of the features of the signature principles (FPR, SPR and CR) on the other hand.

PHOTON algorithm uses sponge construction and applies two phases of absorbing and squeezing as shown in the Figure A.2. The message ( $m$ ) in the PHOTON is divided into  $n$  blocks ( $m_0, \dots, m_{n-1}$ ) after adding padding by appending a "1" bit and followed many zeros. In the absorbing phase, the internal state ( $t$ -bit) composed of the capacity ( $c$ -bit) and the bitrate ( $r$ -bit). The  $t$  is first initialized with some fixed value. In each iteration, this algorithm achieves the process of changing for  $t$  by computing  $r + c$  and uses the exclusive-or ( $\oplus$ ) operation between message blocks. After each  $\oplus$  operation, the permutation ( $P$ ) operation of the internal state has performed. After the end of the absorbing phase where all the blocks of messages were treated begin the squeezing phase. At this stage, the input of the squeezing phase is the output of the absorption phase (internal state and permutation). This phase continues to squeeze the input until the desired MD obtains, the hash output size is  $64 \leq \text{MD} \leq 256$ , more details are available in (Guo et al. 2011).




Figure A.2: The PHOTON hash function

Table A.1 provides a comparison among the lightweight hash algorithms (the latest version of these algorithms) in terms of security and efficiency (Yoshida et al. 2007, Aumasson, Henzen, Meier & Naya-Plasencia 2013, Kavun & Yalcin 2010, Guo et al. 2011, Bogdanov et al. 2011, Berger et al. 2012, Anandakumar et al. 2014). Although standard hash algorithms are still used in applications, such as SHA1 (5527 GE, MD 160-bit) and SHA2 (10868 GE, MD 256-bit). Lightweight hash algorithms, such as PHOTON (2177 GE, MD 256-bit) provides the perfect solution for handling complex signatures in large HC systems.

As Table A.1 shows that the PHOTON-256 (2177 GE) offers the best performance compared to all lightweight hash functions. It also shows that the PHOTON-256 offers a high level of security through the application of signature features FPR (224), SPR (128) and CR (128). Linear and differential attacks are the most powerful attacks in the MD analysis of hash functions. Compared to PHOTON, ARMDILLO and SPONGENT-256 also offer signature features. But both are vulnerable to attacks. ARMDILLO2 has been attacked by local linearization (practical semi-free-start collision attack)(Naya-Plasencia & Peyrin 2012). SPONGENT has been attacked by linear distinguishers (23 rounds) (Abdelraheem 2012) and (13 rounds) (Zhang & Liu 2017) for all SPONGENT versions. Both need the most computations (3281 GE and 8653 GE) compared PHOTON-256 (2177 GE). PHOTON is a reliable algorithm against linear and differential attacks (Guo et al. 2011). It has a high level of security and efficiency; therefore, it is emphatically suitable for our scheme to be implemented as a signing mechanism in our authentication protocol between the parties of the HC applications (clients and servers).

Table A.1: Comparison of lightweight hash function algorithms

| Algorithm     | Performace<br>Gate equivalent<br>area | Throughput<br>(kbps) | MD  | Security |     |     | Author (s)       | Year |
|---------------|---------------------------------------|----------------------|-----|----------|-----|-----|------------------|------|
|               |                                       |                      |     | FPR      | SPR | CR  |                  |      |
| SQUASH        | 2646 GE                               | 0.15                 | 64  | 64       | 64  | 0   | Shamir           | 2005 |
| MAME          | 8100 GE                               | 146.7                | 256 | -        | -   | -   | Yoshida et al.   | 2007 |
| C-PRESENT-192 | 8048 GE                               | 59.26                | 192 | 192      | 192 | 96  | Bogdanov et al.  | 2008 |
| ARMADILLO2    | 8653 GE                               | 9.38                 | 256 | 256      | 256 | 128 | Bald et al.      | 2010 |
| S-QUARK       | 2296 GE                               | 3.13                 | 256 | 224      | 112 | 112 | Aumasson et al.  | 2010 |
| KECCAK-f[400] | 5090 GE                               | 14.4                 | 128 | 128      | 128 | 64  | Kavun and Yalcin | 2010 |
| GLUON         | 4724 GE                               | 32                   | 224 | 224      | 112 | 112 | Berger et al.    | 2011 |
| SPONGENT-256  | 3281 GE                               | 11.43                | 256 | 240      | 128 | 128 | Bogdanov et al.  | 2011 |
| PHOTON-256    | 2177 GE                               | 0.88                 | 256 | 224      | 128 | 128 | Guo et al.       | 2011 |

# Appendix B: PAX

## B.1 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)

Proposed by Scott Vanstone in 1992 (Johnson et al. 2001, Fan et al. 2016), the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) is an asymmetric signature algorithm. It depends on the use of the points on the curve to integrate and sign data. It has been used to provide integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation properties in the communications network with limited capacity in terms of power and processing. The algorithm depends on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) (Sghaier et al. 2016, Dikshit & Singh 2017). ECDSA uses small parameters which expedites performance of computations, thus reducing time and storage (Sojka-Piotrowska & Langendoerfer 2017). These features are vastly important for large organisations and constrained-source devices, such as WSN. Because of these networks require processing power, memory, bandwidth, or power consumption (Dou et al. 2017).

Data integrity of the message is exceedingly important in the networks because the attacker can modify the message when it is transferred from source to destination (Bachiller et al. 2018). Many organisations that use it as standard, such as ISO (1998), ANSI (1999) and, IEEE and NIST (2000) (Hoceini et al. 2017). This algorithm is similar to the digital signature algorithm (DSA). Both algorithms depend on the discrete logarithm problem (DPL), but the ECDSA algorithm uses a set of points on the curve and the generating keys are notably small. ECDSA algorithm with key length 160-bit provides the equivalent for symmetric cryptography with a key length of 80-bit (Driessens et al. 2008, Abueh & Liu 2016). It is significantly convenient for devices with constrained-source because it uses tremendously small keys and provides computation speed in the signature (Cheneau et al. 2010). Moreover, four-point multiplication operations used in the ECDSA algorithm: one is in public key generation, one for signature generation and two for signature verification (Xu et al. 2012). In addition, this algorithm consists of three procedures: key generation,

signature generation, and signature verification. These operations are explained as follows:

- **Key generation:**

- 1 Select a random or pseudorandom integer  $d$  in the interval  $[1, n - 1]$ .
- 2 Compute  $K_{pu} = K_{pr}G$
- 3 Public key is  $K_{pu}$ , private key is  $K_{pr}$ .

- **Signature generation:**

- 1 Select a random or pseudorandom integer  $k$ ,  $1 \leq k \leq n-1$ .
- 2 Compute  $\text{SHA1}(m)$  and convert this bit string to an integer  $e$ .
- 3 Compute  $kG = (x_1, y_1)$  and convert  $x_1$  to an integer  $\bar{x}_1$ .
- 4 Compute  $r = x_1 \bmod n$ . If  $r = 0$  then go to step 1.
- 5 Compute  $k^{-1} \bmod n$ .
- 6 Compute  $s = k^{-1}(e + K_{pr}r) \bmod n$ . If  $s = 0$  then go to step 1.
- 7 Signature for the message  $m$  is  $(r, s)$ .

- **Signature verification:**

- 1 Verify that  $r$  and  $s$  are integers in the interval  $[1, n-1]$ .
- 2 Compute  $\text{SHA1}(m)$  and convert this bit string to an integer  $e$ .
- 3 Compute  $w = s^{-1} \bmod n$ .
- 4 Compute  $u_1 = ew \bmod n$  and  $u_2 = rw \bmod n$ .
- 5 Compute  $X = u_1G + u_2K_{pu}$ .
- 6 If  $X = \theta$  then reject the signature. Otherwise, convert the  $x$ -coordinate  $x_1$  of  $X$  to an integer  $\bar{x}_1$ , and compute  $v = \bar{x}_1 \bmod n$ .
- 7 Accept the signature if and only if  $v = r$ .

ECDSA algorithm becomes unsuitable for signing messages (integration) if used poorly and incorrectly. Validation of domain parameters is significantly important to ensure strong security against different attacks. This algorithm becomes strong if the parameters are well validated ([Save & Chhatani 2015](#), [Fráneková et al. 2017](#)). The authors' recommendations are to update the validation scheme. In our authorisation scheme, we used ECDSA-256 bit to add a high-security level and took care to consume system resources. Furthermore, it supports providing anonymity of users' policies and requests. More details about ECDSA's signature and verification are available in ([Rafik & Mohammed 2013](#)).

# Appendix C: REISCH

## C.1 SHA Hash Function

Secure hash algorithm (SHA) is one of the traditional hash algorithms that provide integrity and authentication when used with digital signatures (Guesmi et al. 2016). For example, SHA1 was used in the ECDSA algorithm to perform the signature process in public key cryptography. SHA consists of several varieties SHA0, SHA1, SHA2 and SHA3. The National Security Agency (NSA) replaced SHA0 with SHA1 shortly to improve security by adding rotation in the compression function. Both SHA2 and SHA3 consist of SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512, but SHA3 uses a different structure than the SHA family. SHA0, SHA1 and SHA2 are built on the basis of the Merkle-Damgard structure as shown in Figure C.1 (Shi et al. 2012) and are designed by NSA. SHA3 is also known as KECCAK and is built on sponge construction as shown in Figure A.2 and uses two-stage absorbing and squeezing. Since 2007, NIST has adopted KECCAK because of the practical attacks on SHA1 and SHA2, KECCAK has become the rival standard in 2015 (Shi et al. 2012). However, some research (Amy et al. 2016, Luo et al. 2016, 2017) have indicated that SHA3 can suffer from fault injection threats.




Figure C.1: The Merkle-Damgard construction of SHA (0, 1 and 2) hash functions

SHA is a one-way function consisting of two phases that divide the message into blocks of the same size (such as 512 or 1024). A set of zeros is added and followed by

Table C.1: Comparison of SHA family

| Algorithm     | SHA1  | SHA2   |            |             |             | SHA3                                     |      |     |     |
|---------------|---|--|------------|-------------|-------------|--|------|-----|-----|
| MD            | 160   | 224  | 256        | 384         | 512         | 224                                      | 256  | 384 | 512 |
| Word size     | 32  | 32   | 32         | 64          | 64          | 64                                       | 64   | 64  | 64  |
| Block size    | 512   | 512  | 512        | 1024        | 1024        | 1152                                     | 1088 | 832 | 576 |
| Message size  | < $2^{64}$                                    | < $2^{64}$   | < $2^{64}$ | < $2^{128}$ | < $2^{128}$ | -  | -    | -   | -   |
| Iterations    | 80  | 64   | 64         | 80          | 80          | 24                                       | 24   | 24  | 24  |
| Security      | 80  | 112  | 128        | 192         | 256         | 112                                      | 128  | 192 | 256 |
| Weak security | Yes, practical such as Collision and preimage | Yes, practical such as preimage and length extension |            |             |             | Yes, theoretical such as fault injection |      |     |     |
| Performance   | Fast  | Less   |            |             |             | Lowest                                   |      |     |     |
| Year          | 1995  | 2004   |            |             |             | 2015                                     |      |     |     |
| Designer      | NSA   |  |            |             |             | Guido Bertoni and et al.                 |      |     |     |
| Construction  | Merkle-Damgård                                |  |            |             |             | Sponge                                   |      |     |     |

one at the end of the last block of the message (Kodali 2013). This phase is called preprocessing or padding. The second stage is the MD computation. At this stage, all message blocks are entered into the iterations (SHA1 (80), SHA2 (64) and SHA3 (256)) one by one that containing constants and logic operations (OR, AND, XOR) in compression function ( $F$ ) to produce MD. Each hash algorithm produces a fixed length of MD, such as 160 for SHA1, 224, 256, 384 and 512 For SHA2 and SHA3 (Boubiche et al. 2016, Chaves et al. 2016). Table C.1 shows comparison among SHA1, SHA2 and SHA3 (Guesmi et al. 2016, Dobraunig et al. 2015). Many existing schemes to collect data in WSN (Kodali 2013, Boubiche et al. 2016, Al Maashri et al. 2016, Lu et al. 2016, Saha et al. 2016, Elhoseny et al. 2016) have used SHA algorithm to support integrity and authentication. However, these schemes did not address collision and preimage problems in the SHA algorithm (Xia et al. 2016, Rasjid et al. 2017, Chiriac et al. 2017, Merrill 2017, Yang et al. 2017, Giechaskiel et al. 2018, Brockmann 2018, Park & Kim 2018).

## C.2 BLAKE Hash Function

Aumasson et al. (2008) proposed a BLAKE hash algorithm to overcome efficiency problems in previous hash algorithms. This algorithm offers several features, such as simplicity, speed and parallel operations in hardware and software implementations. It is immune to second preimage, side-channel and length-extension attacks. BLAKE implements HAIFA construction which is an enhanced version of Merkle-Damgård. This development of construction is accomplished by adding a salt and a counter to the algorithm stages to prevent security vulnerability for second preimage attacks in Merkle-Damgård. Also, BLAKE’s local wide-pipe structure makes collision attacks impossible (Shi et al. 2012). BLAKE uses the LAKE hash algorithm and compresses the message blocks in hash-tree constructions by Bernstein’s stream cipher ChaCha which is a variation of Salsa20-256 (Mozaffari-Kermani & Azarderakhsh 2015). NIST was considered a BLAKE of

Table C.2: Versions of BLAKE hash function

| BLAKE version | Word    | Message    | Block | MD      | Salt | Round |
|---------------|---------|------------|-------|---------|------|-------|
| BLAKE-28      | 32 bits | $<2^{64}$  | 512   | 224     | 128  | 14    |
| BLAKE-32      | 32 bits | $<2^{64}$  | 512   | 256     | 128  | 14    |
| BLAKE-48      | 64 bits | $<2^{128}$ | 1024  | 384     | 256  | 16    |
| BLAKE-64      | 64 bits | $<2^{128}$ | 1024  | 512     | 256  | 16    |
| BLAKE2s       | 32 bits | -          | 256   | 128-256 | 64   | 10    |
| BLAKE2b       | 64 bits | -          | 512   | 160-512 | 128  | 12    |

competing algorithms in the final round of hash algorithms, such as KECCAK, Skein and Grøstl (Cho 2018). BLAKE supports several versions that are 244, 256, 384 and 512. Then, (Aumasson, Neves, Wilcox-O’Hearn & Winnerlein 2013) developed BLAKE2 to improve the speed in software implementation and reduce memory, BLAKE2 is 32% less memory than BLAKE. In addition, BLAKE2 contains two versions BLAKE2s and BLAKE2b to be used with 32 bit and 64 bit platform respectively, Table C.2 shows the BLAKE family (Chaves et al. 2016).




Figure C.2: Architecture of BLAKE hash function

Figure C.2 shows the architecture of the BLAKE hash function. In BLAKE, the message is divided into blocks, and the last block is padded with 1 followed by zeros to complete the last block size to 512 or 1024 bits. BLAKE consists of two parts: compression function and iteration mode. Compression function consists of chain value, message blocks, salt value and counter value. The BLAKE compression function uses three phases initialization, round functions and finalization. The initialization phase uses the chain value, salt and counter to create a matrix 4 \* 4 and produces a 16-word value for different initializing states ( $V$ ). These states are entered into the round function ( $r$ ) with parallel rounds in the round functions phase. The output of this phase is a new  $V$  that is used to generate the chain value for the finalization phase. In the finalization phase of the chain, salt and new state

values are applied with  $\oplus$  operations to produce a new chain value. BLAKE is one of the fastest hash algorithms and has strong security (Chaves et al. 2016, Körber et al. 2018). Many research pointed out that BLAKE is a conspicuously suitable algorithm for source restricted devices (Mozaffari-Kermani & Azarderakhsh 2015, Homsirikamol et al. 2011, Sugier 2017, Mozaffari-Kermani et al. 2017, Yang et al. 2018, Prakasha et al. 2018).

### C.3 ECDSA with BLAKE Hash

The hash algorithm is one of the important processes used by the ECDSA algorithm to complete the signing. ECDSA algorithm uses a secure hash algorithm (SHA1) provided by NIST in 1995 to preserve the message integrity. This algorithm produces a digest 160-bit size with 6122 gate-equivalent (GE). It needs the complex operations to accomplish digesting message. In digital signatures, the hash algorithm should be collisions (Wang et al. 2005), preimage and second preimage resistance (Knellwolf & Khovratovich 2012). Authors in (Rijmen & Oswald 2005, Wang et al. 2005, Knellwolf & Khovratovich 2012, Stevens 2013) pointed out that this algorithm can suffer from practical attacks, such as collision and preimage. But SHA1 is still used in many signature algorithms, such as ECDSA. We propose using the BLAKE2 hash algorithm for signature in ECDSA rather than the SHA1. BLAKE2 algorithm produces digest 256-bit size with 1058 GE. This algorithm was developed 2013 in order to reduce the memory, energy, speed requirements and resistance to attacks. BLAKE2 is faster and lighter than the SHA family algorithms and even message digest (MD5) as shown in Figure C.3 (Aumasson, Neves, Wilcox-O’Hearn & Winnerlein 2013). Also, this algorithm is resistant to attacks, such as collisions, multicollision, distinguishers, preimage and second preimage.

The ECDSA algorithm is used to perform the integrity of the messages. This algorithm prevents the attacker from changing the message data, since any change in the message will be discovered by the receiver. ECDSA produce the signing of the message  $(r, s)$ . The  $r$  parameter is the value used to calculate the signature in the process of signature verification and  $s$  is the signature. The sender signs the message  $(m)$  by ECDSA and gets  $(r, s)$ . The sender sends the message  $m$ ,  $r$  and  $s$  to the receiver, who checks the message. Some of the attacks carried out on the  $r$  and  $s$  to get the private key  $K_{pr}$ . If the attacker is able to get  $K_{pr}$ , this attacker can produce the same original signatures. Side channel attack (SCA) can penetrate ECDSA signatures and thus get  $K_{pr}$ . Where  $K_{pr}$  is the security in this algorithm, if the attacker discovered the private key, data is easily penetrated. These attacks rely on information leaked to the ephemeral key ( $k$ ) and the value of  $r$  is available




Figure C.3: Comparison of hash functions speed

publicly.

We propose adding anonymity property to ECDSA's signature to hide information of a signature's parameters  $r$  and  $s$  (each of  $r$  and  $s$  have the same number of bits) from the attackers. We accomplish this property in the original signature  $(r, s)$  depending on the value sent from the server ( $LS$ ). If the value is odd, we divide the signature into three parts. While if the value is even, we divide the signature into four parts and exchange parts. In both odd and even cases, a counterfeit signature and padding are added to the original signature to support signature anonymity. After the completion of this operation, the value is sent with the message to specify the odd or even division in the receiver. Afterwards, the receiver can verify that the message returns the same parts of the signature to its original place. This mechanism prevents attacks from penetrating ECDSA signatures because the attacker when he/she gets on the value of  $r$  and  $s$ , he/she has not the original value for  $r$  and  $s$ . Then, this attacker cannot derive the private key and thereby protect the patient's data from the change.

# Appendix D: Security Test Tools

## D.1 AVISPA

After designing any authentication, authorisation or data collection scheme, this scheme includes a set of protocols and each protocol should be checked and its accuracy verified under a test model such as the Dolev-Yao to analyse, trace and detect the possibility of attack theoretically. However, this analysis needs to be simulated in a practical manner to detect errors and hidden traces of the protocols designer, threats tracking, statistics analysing and accurate results, checking several techniques on the same protocol (Al-Zubaidie et al. 2019*a,b*, Bojjagani & Sastry 2019, Iqbal & Shafi 2019, Ostad-Sharif et al. 2019). The AVISPA tool provides the features listed above as well as the ease, simplicity, robustness, and applicability of this tool to implement security protocols such as authentication, authorisation and data collection (Bojjagani & Sastry 2017). AVISPA is a formal tool for analysing security schemes and applied by researchers to evaluate recent security protocols (Gupta et al. 2018, Babu & Padmanabhan 2018, Xu et al. 2018, Dong et al. 2018).

The AVISPA tool is a push-button (as shown in Figure D.1), testing/proofing model and is based on high-level protocol specification language (HPLSL). This language uses directives and expressive terms to represent security procedures. It is integrated with four backends that are the On-the-Fly Model-Checker (OFMC), the Constraint-Logic-based Attack Searcher (CL-AtSe), the SAT-based Model-Checker (SATMC), and Tree Automata based on Automatic Approximations for the Analysis of Security Protocols (TA4SP) to perform the simulation in AVISPA. Each backend gives the result of simulation analysis statistics that is different from the other; more details are available in (The AVISPA Team 2006). SATMC and TA4SP backends do not work with a security protocols that implement the XoR gateway; therefore, we relied on OFMC and CL-AtSe backends to simulate the proposed project's schemes (authentication (RAMHU), authorisation (PAX) and data collection (REISCH)).

- OFMC: It analyses protocols problems and builds infinite tree in demand-driven manner. Also, state-space in this backend has formatted by symbolic




Figure D.1: AVISPA’s interface

techniques. It provides detection of falsification and verification for protocols.

- CL-AtSe: It translates a security protocol specification to a set of constraints. This process allows for this backend to detect attacks effectively on schemes. It provides internally checking and translation.

To implement the security protocols in AVISPA, these protocols should be first written in HPSL and then converted to the low-level language that is read directly by the backends, which is an intermediate format (IF) by the hpsl2if compiler and then converted to an output format (OF) to extract and describe the result of analysis by one of four backends. The Figure D.2 shows AVISPA’s architecture. The result of the analysis accurately describes that the protocol is safe or not safe with some statistical numbers.

HPSL is modular, and role-oriented. This language allows the completion of security protocols procedures as well as intruder actions. To represent security/privacy scenarios and build simulation structures, HPSL uses roles, including basic roles such as clients and servers (clienti, centralServer, attributesServer, dataServer, localServer, sensori and clusterHeadi), and composition (session and environment) roles that control the sequence of sending and receiving actions between clients and servers. In addition, communication channels between network entities are governed by the Dolev-Yao (dy) model. Many basic types used in HPSL to represent variables, constants, and algorithms (symmetric/asymmetric/hash) such as agent, public\_key, message, text, nat, const, and hash\_func; in addition to some symbols and terms that have shown in Table D.1, more details are provided in ([The AVISPA Team 2006](#)). The security schemes (authentication, authorisation and data collection) in AVISPA depend on security features in the goal specification. Each protocol contains a set of goals (authentication and secret) in authenticating each party with




Figure D.2: AVISPA's architecture (The AVISPA Team 2006)

Table D.1: Some HLSPL's symbols and statements

| Symbol                    | Description  |
|---------------------------|--|
| <i>init</i>               | Initial value for the state                                    |
| <i>def</i>                | Role definition  |
| <i>state</i>              | Sequential value for transition                                |
| <i>new</i>                | Fresh value  |
| <i>start</i>              | Beginning signal for role                                      |
| <i>:=</i>                 | Assign Mark  |
| <i>xor</i>                | Exclusive or operation   |
| .                         | Concatenation  |
| { } _ <i>Kp</i>           | Asymmetric encryption with public key                          |
| { } _ <i>invKp</i>        | Asymmetric signature with public key                           |
| <i>played_by</i>          | Used to link the role with the intended entity                 |
| =   >                     | Reaction transitions to relate event with act                  |
| / \                       | Conjunction  |
| <i>protocol_id</i>        | Goal identifier  |
| <i>secrecy_of</i>         | The goal of protecting the secret between entities permanently |
| <i>authentication_on</i>  | The goal of strong authentication between entities             |
| <i>intruder_knowledge</i> | What intruder knows about network                              |

the other. The goals in *secrecy\_of* demonstrate that secrets are not exposed or hacked to non-intended entities, while the goals in *authentication\_on* demonstrate that strong authentication has been applied between entities based on witness and request. Our simulations are based on the AVISPA tool with the current version v.1.1 (13/02/2006) available on the website in (The AVISPA Team 2006).