Replication Project

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Paper title:

Movement versus Party: The Electoral Effects of Anti-Far Right Protests in Greece

Background of Research Question

- The way social protest affects electoral outcomes remains a lacuna. This article helps fill this gap by examining how social protest against far right actors affects their electoral standing.
- The article uses the findings to discuss the varying impact of protest across electoral cycles.
- The research is divided into two phases. At the first stage of our statistical modeling, linear regression models were used to explain the electoral results of the GD per municipality, for each national election beginning May 2012. At the second stage of study, they investigated more refined models, to test the key protest dynamics of tango and timing, which we expect drive the electoral results of the GD.

First stage of study

- Main Research Question
 - How do social protests against far right actors affect their electoral standing?
- Hypothesis
 - H0: Social protests against far right actors do NOT affect "electoral results of the GD.
 - H1: Social protests against far right actors affect "electoral results of the GD.
- Data

- Variable description
 - Dependent variable: the main dependent variable (DV) is the electoral results of GD, measured as the percentage of votes received by the GD per municipality.
 - Independent variable: the main IV is the trichotomous variable of anti-far right protest described above.

• Replication of codes and table 1

```
# Table I: Basic linear models explaining electoral results of the GD
     (Regions as random effects; DV is the electoral results)
2 lmer12oMay <- lmer (ekloges_PERCENTAGE_May_2012_GD~
    PERCENTAGE_2009_GD + N_AntifaEvent_notzero2_Oc09_May12 + avg_age
    + log_population + prop_ksenoi + (1|code_perif), data=dta)
3 lmer12o <- lmer(ekloges_PERCENTAGE_Jun_2012_GD
    PERCENTAGE_2009_GD + N_AntifaEvent_notzero2_Oc09_Ju12
    age + log_population + prop_ksenoi + (1|code_perif), data=dta)
4 lmer150 <- lmer(ekloges_PERCENTAGE_Jan_2015_GD
                                                   ekloges_PERCENTAGE_
    Jun_2012_GD +
                    N_AntifaEvent_notzero2_Ju12_Ja15 +
                                                          avg_age +
    log_population + prop_ksenoi + (1|code_perif), data=dta)
5 lmer_15So <- lmer(ekloges_PERCENTAGE_Sep_2015_GD
    PERCENTAGE_Jan_2015_GD + N_AntifaEvent_notzero2_Ja15_Sp15 + avg_
    age + log_population + prop_ksenoi + (1|code_perif), data=dta)
6 lmer190 <- lmer(ekloges_PERCENTAGE_Jul_2019_GD ~ ekloges_PERCENTAGE_
    Sep_2015_GD + N_AntifaEvent_notzero2_Sp15_Ju19 +
    \log_{population} + prop_{ksenoi} + (1|code_{perif}), data=dta
7 tab_model(lmer12oMay, lmer12o, lmer15o, lmer_15So, lmer19o)
 lmer12oMay <- NULL; lmer12o <- NULL; lmer15o <- NULL; lmer_15o <-
    NULL; lmer190 <- NULL # housekeeping
```

	ekloges_PEF	RCENTAGE_May	_2012_GD	ekloges_PEF	RCENTAGE_Jun	_2012_GD	ekloges_PE	RCENTAGE_Jan	_2015_GD	ekloges_PEF	RCENTAGE_Sep	_2015_GD	ekloges_PEI	RCENTAGE_Jul	_2019_GD
Predictors	Estimates	CI	р	Estimates	CI	p									
(Intercept)	5.59	1.04 - 10.13	0.016	5.47	1.58 - 9.36	0.006	-3.45	-5.601.30	0.002	3.20	1.15 - 5.25	0.002	1.08	-0.14 - 2.29	0.082
ekloges PERCENTAGE 2009 GD	5.68	3.77 – 7.58	<0.001	5.38	3.75 – 7.02	<0.001									
N AntifaEvent notzero2 Oc09 May12 [1]	-0.75	-1.360.15	0.015												
N AntifaEvent notzero2 Oc09 May12 [2]	-1.09	-1.820.35	0.004												
avg age	-0.07	-0.140.00	0.044	-0.07	-0.130.01	0.022	0.03	-0.01 - 0.06	0.149	-0.03	-0.06 - 0.00	0.059	-0.02	-0.04 - 0.00	0.100
log population	0.24	0.01 - 0.47	0.037	0.27	0.08 - 0.47	0.005	0.33	0.22 - 0.44	<0.001	-0.05	-0.15 - 0.05	0.350	-0.01	-0.08 - 0.05	0.632
prop ksenoi	0.07	0.02 - 0.12	0.004	0.03	-0.01 - 0.07	0.182	0.01	-0.01 - 0.03	0.386	0.03	0.01 - 0.05	0.015	0.01	-0.01 - 0.02	0.325
N AntifaEvent notzero2 Oc09 Ju12 [1]				-0.64	-1.150.14	0.013									
N AntifaEvent notzero2 Oc09 Ju12 [2]				-0.81	-1.400.23	0.007									
ekloges PERCENTAGE Jun 2012 GD							0.76	0.71 - 0.82	<0.001						
N AntifaEvent notzero2 Ju12 Ja15 [1]							-0.00	-0.29 - 0.28	0.974						
N AntifaEvent notzero2 Ju12 Ja15 [2]							-0.36	-0.660.06	0.019						
ekloges PERCENTAGE Jan 2015 GD										0.90	0.84 - 0.96	<0.001			
N AntifaEvent notzero2 Ja15 Sp15 [1]										0.08	-0.29 - 0.45	0.668			
N AntifaEvent notzero2 Ja15 Sp15 [2]										0.01	-0.37 - 0.40	0.942			
ekloges PERCENTAGE Sep 2015 GD													0.38	0.34 - 0.41	<0.001
N AntifaEvent notzero2 Sp15 Ju19 [1]													-0.05	-0.19 - 0.09	0.503
N AntifaEvent notzero2 Sp15 Ju19 [2]													-0.03	-0.21 - 0.16	0.773
andom Effects															
²	2.58			1.83			0.62			0.56			0.17		
00	2.34 code_per	if		2.10 code_per	if		0.36 code_per	if		0.36 code_per	if		0.24 code_per	rif	
cc	0.48			0.53			0.37			0.39			0.58		
N	74 code_perif														
Observations	322			322			322			322			322		
Marginal R ² / Conditional R ²	0.207 / 0.584	ı		0.211 / 0.633			0.787 / 0.865			0.806 / 0.881			0.635 / 0.846	6	

• Results (Original Table 1)

– Model 1: A linear mixed-effects model was built for each of the national elections from May 2012 onward. These results are not only statistically, but also practically, significant: with a national yield of around 7% in the elections of May 2012, the impact of frequent anti-far right protests corresponds to a reduction of around one-sixth of the electoral power of GD.

Model 2: The effect of anti-far right protest is similar to that of Model 1: municipalities with protest events yield significantly lower results for the GD compared to the municipalities with no events. our analysis shows a direct relationship between social movement mobilization and electoral outcomes: protests against the far right took a toll on its electoral result.

• My extension

- Extension idea: Fit linear regression model instead of mixed effects models.

```
3 lm12o <- lm (ekloges _PERCENTAGE_Jun_2012_GD ~
                                                    ekloges_PERCENTAGE_2009
      _GD + N_AntifaEvent_notzero2_Oc09_Ju12
                                                     avg_age + log_population
       + prop_ksenoi, data=dta)
4 lm15o <- lm (ekloges PERCENTAGE Jan 2015 GD ekloges PERCENTAGE Jun 2012
             N_AntifaEvent_notzero2_Ju12_Ja15 +
                                                    avg_age + log_population
      + prop_ksenoi , data=dta)
5 lm_15So <- lm(ekloges_PERCENTAGE_Sep_2015_GD~ ekloges_PERCENTAGE_Jan_
     2015_GD + N_AntifaEvent_notzero2_Ja15_Sp15 + avg_age + log_population
      + prop_ksenoi , data=dta)
6 lm190 <- lm(ekloges_PERCENTAGE_Jul_2019_GD ~ ekloges_PERCENTAGE_Sep_2015
      _{
m CD} + N_{
m AntifaEvent\_notzero2\_Sp15\_Ju19} + {
m avg\_age} + {
m log\_population}
      + prop_ksenoi , data=dta)
8 # Generate LaTeX table
9 stargazer (lm12oMay, lm12o, lm15o, lm_15So, lm19o,
             title="Extension forLinear Regression Models",
            align=TRUE,
1.1
            type="latex"
12
            out="lm_results_1.tex",
            font.size="small"
14
15
16
```

 Results: It can be seen from the regression results that the coefficients of Model 1 and Model 2 are statistically significant, but the R square is small, indicating that the model fitting effect is not good.

Second stage of study - Tango

- Branching Research Question
 - How do Tango events affect "electoral results of the GD?
- Hypothesis
 - H0: Tango events do NOT affect "electoral results of the GD.
 H1: Tango events affect "electoral results of the GD.
- Data
 - Variable description
 - Dependent variable: the main dependent variable (DV) is the electoral results of GD, measured as the percentage of votes received by the GD per municipality.
 - Independent variable: The main IV is a binary variable—Tango events (Yes 1 or No 0)

Tango events: events especially against for GD events

Table 1: Extension for Linear Regression Models

Table 1. Extens	nsion for Linear Regression Models Dependent variable:						
	May_2012	Jun_2012	Jan_2015	Sep_2015	Jul_2019		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)		
ekloges_PERCENTAGE_2009_GD	7.746***	7.017***	()				
	(0.986)	(0.879)					
$N_AntifaEvent_notzero2_Oc09_May121$	-0.989**						
	(0.382)						
N_AntifaEvent_notzero2_Oc09_May122	-1.315***						
NA CONTRACTOR	(0.458)	0.050**					
N_AntifaEvent_notzero2_Oc09_Ju121		-0.670^{**}					
N_AntifaEvent_notzero2_Oc09_Ju122		(0.338) $-1.208***$					
N_AnthaEvent_hotzer02_Oco9_Ju122		(0.387)					
ekloges_PERCENTAGE_Jun_2012_GD		(0.301)	0.758***				
omogosi EttoEttiitoEstaiis2012-0D			(0.025)				
N_AntifaEvent_notzero2_Ju12_Ja151			-0.017				
			(0.168)				
$N_AntifaEvent_notzero2_Ju12_Ja152$			-0.501^{***}				
			(0.168)				
ekloges_PERCENTAGE_Jan_2015_GD				0.950^{***}			
				(0.028)			
N_AntifaEvent_notzero2_Ja15_Sp151				0.051			
NATE A A DITECTO				(0.219)			
N_AntifaEvent_notzero2_Ja15_Sp152				0.237			
ekloges_PERCENTAGE_Sep_2015_GD				(0.218)	0.377***		
exioges_1 EffCENTAGE_Dep_2015_GD					(0.017)		
N_AntifaEvent_notzero2_Sp15_Ju191					-0.044		
7.33101002, 61101002010 2 -0p10-00101					(0.094)		
N_AntifaEvent_notzero2_Sp15_Ju192					-0.009		
-					(0.116)		
avg_age	-0.010	-0.015	0.030*	-0.032**	-0.051***		
	(0.038)	(0.034)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.011)		
$\log_{-population}$	0.415***	0.449***	0.385***	-0.213***	-0.046		
1	(0.120)	(0.107)	(0.057)	(0.053)	(0.035)		
prop_ksenoi	0.109***	0.069***	-0.006	0.032***	-0.005		
Constant	$(0.026) \\ 0.480$	(0.023) 0.824	(0.012) $-4.009***$	(0.011) $4.413***$	(0.008) $2.991***$		
Constant	(2.384)	(2.122)	-4.009 (1.052)	(1.025)	(0.669)		
Observations	322	$\frac{(2.122)}{322}$	$\frac{(1.032)}{322}$	322	$\frac{(0.009)}{322}$		
R ²	0.308	0.311	0.794	0.817	0.667		
Adjusted R^2	0.295	0.298	0.790	0.813	0.660		
Residual Std. Error $(df = 315)$	2.192	1.958	0.976	0.952	0.619		
F Statistic (df = 6 ; 315)	23.407***	23.673***	201.749***	233.657***	104.944**		

Note: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.

• Replication of codes and table 2

```
lmer12MT01 <- lmer(ekloges_PERCENTAGE_May_2012_GD ~ ekloges_
    PERCENTAGE_2009_GD + N_AntifaEvent_Oc09_May12_Tango01 + avg_age +
    log_population + prop_ksenoi + (1|code_perif), data=dta)

lmer15T01 <- lmer(ekloges_PERCENTAGE_Jan_2015_GD ~ ekloges_
    PERCENTAGE_Jun_2012_GD + N_AntifaEvent_Ju12_Ja15_Tango01 + avg_age + log_population + prop_ksenoi + (1|code_perif), data=dta)

lmer19T01 <- lmer(ekloges_PERCENTAGE_Jul_2019_GD ~ ekloges_
    PERCENTAGE_Sep_2015_GD + N_AntifaEvent_Sp15_Ju19_Tango01 + avg_age + log_population + prop_ksenoi + (1|code_perif), data=dta)

tab_model(lmer12MT01, lmer15T01, lmer19T01)

lmer12MT01 <- NULL; lmer15T01 <- NULL; lmer19T01 <- NULL #
housekeeping</pre>
```

			_2012_GD		_	_2015_GD		RCENTAGE_Jul	_2019_GI
Predictors	Estimates	CI	р	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	р
(Intercept)	5.97	1.42 - 10.53	0.010	-3.54	-5.72 — -1.37	0.001	1.00	-0.21 – 2.22	0.104
ekloges PERCENTAGE 2009 GD	5.75	3.84 – 7.67	<0.001						
N AntifaEvent Oc09 May12 Tango01	-0.91	-1.64 — -0.18	0.015						
avg age	-0.07	-0.14 - 0.00	0.054	0.03	0.00 - 0.07	0.047	-0.02	-0.03 - 0.00	0.110
log population	0.17	-0.04 - 0.39	0.117	0.28	0.18 - 0.39	<0.001	-0.01	-0.07 - 0.05	0.684
prop ksenoi	0.07	0.02 - 0.12	0.004	0.01	-0.01 - 0.04	0.231	0.01	-0.01 - 0.02	0.281
ekloges PERCENTAGE Jun 2012 GD				0.77	0.71 – 0.82	<0.001			
N AntifaEvent Ju12 Ja15 Tango01				-0.09	-0.34 – 0.16	0.486			
ekloges PERCENTAGE Sep 2015 GD							0.37	0.34 - 0.41	<0.001
N AntifaEvent Sp15 Ju19 Tango01							-0.05	-0.22 – 0.12	0.533
Random Effects									
σ^2	2.63			0.63			0.17		
τ ₀₀	2.31 code_per	if		0.38 code_per	rif		0.24 code_pe	erif	
ICC	0.47			0.38			0.58		
N	74 code_perif			74 code_perif			74 code_peri	f	
Observations	322			322			322		
Marginal R ² / Conditional R ²	0.209 / 0.579)		0.783 / 0.865	5		0.637 / 0.84	7	

• Results (Original Table 2)

- The results (Original Table 2) suggest that, for the elections of May 2012, municipalities with at least one tango event had much lower electoral outcomes for the GD compared to municipalities with no tango events.

• My extension

- Extension idea: Fit linear regression model instead of mixed effects models.

```
# Fit linear regression model instead of mixed effects models
lm12MT01 <- lm(ekloges_PERCENTAGE_May_2012_GD ~ ekloges_PERCENTAGE_2009
    _GD + N_AntifaEvent_Oc09_May12_Tango01 + avg_age + log_population +
    prop_ksenoi, data=dta)
lm15T01 <- lm(ekloges_PERCENTAGE_Jan_2015_GD ~ ekloges_PERCENTAGE_Jun_
    2012_GD + N_AntifaEvent_Ju12_Ja15_Tango01 + avg_age + log_
    population + prop_ksenoi, data=dta)
lm19T01 <- lm(ekloges_PERCENTAGE_Jul_2019_GD ~ ekloges_PERCENTAGE_Sep_
    2015_GD + N_AntifaEvent_Sp15_Ju19_Tango01 + avg_age + log_population +
    prop_ksenoi, data=dta)</pre>
```

Results: It can be seen from the regression results that the coefficients of Model
1 are statistically significant, but the R square is small, indicating that the model
fitting effect is not good.

Second stage of study - Timing

- Branching Research Question
 - How does Timing of protest events affect electoral results of the GD?
- Hypothesis
 - H0: Timing of protest events does NOT affect electoral results of the GD.
 H1: Timing of protest events affects electoral results of the GD.
- Data
 - Variable description
 - Dependent variable: the main dependent variable (DV) is the electoral results of GD, measured as the percentage of votes received by the GD per municipality.
 - Independent variable: The main IV is a categorical variable describing the temporal proximity to the parliamentary election.
- Replication of codes and table 3

Table 2: Extension for Linear Regression Models

	$Dependent\ variable:$						
-	$May_{-}2012$ (1)	$Jan_{-}2015$ (2)	$Jul_{-}2019$ (3)				
ekloges_PERCENTAGE_2009_GD	7.518*** (0.993)						
N_AntifaEvent_Oc09_May12_Tango01	-1.307^{***} (0.451)						
ekloges_PERCENTAGE_Jun_2012_GD	, ,	0.759^{***} (0.026)					
N_AntifaEvent_Ju12_Ja15_Tango01		-0.160 (0.146)					
ekloges_PERCENTAGE_Sep_2015_GD		,	0.376^{***} (0.017)				
N_AntifaEvent_Sp15_Ju19_Tango01			-0.031 (0.118)				
${ m avg_age}$	-0.007 (0.038)	0.040** (0.017)	-0.051^{***} (0.010)				
log_population	0.340*** (0.114)	0.328*** (0.054)	-0.045 (0.033)				
prop_ksenoi	0.110*** (0.026)	-0.002 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.007)				
Constant	0.970 (2.378)	-4.044^{***} (1.075)	2.949*** (0.666)				
Observations	322	322	322				
\mathbb{R}^2	0.301	0.787	0.666				
Adjusted R^2	0.290	0.784	0.661				
Residual Std. Error (df = 316)	2.200	0.990	0.618				
F Statistic (df = 5 ; 316)	27.246***	233.736***	126.228***				

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

```
tab_model(lmer12M , lmer15 , lmer19 )
lmer12M <- NULL; lmer15 <- NULL; lmer19 <- NULL #
housekeeping
```

	ekloges_PEF	RCENTAGE_May	_2012_GD	ekloges_PE	RCENTAGE_Jan	_2015_GD	ekloges_PE	RCENTAGE_Jul	_2019_G[
Predictors	Estimates	CI	р	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	р
(Intercept)	5.71	1.16 - 10.27	0.014	-3.40	-5.56 — -1.24	0.002	1.09	-0.13 - 2.31	0.080
ekloges PERCENTAGE 2009 GD	5.59	3.67 – 7.50	<0.001						
N_AntifaEvent_Oc09_May12_AB0-1	-0.64	-1.36 - 0.08	0.083						
N_AntifaEvent_Oc09_May12_AB1-0	-1.08	-2.030.12	0.027						
N_AntifaEvent_Oc09_May12_AB1-1	-1.01	-1.740.29	0.006						
avg age	-0.07	-0.140.00	0.042	0.03	-0.01 - 0.06	0.146	-0.02	-0.04 - 0.00	0.101
log population	0.23	0.01 - 0.46	0.044	0.32	0.21 - 0.43	<0.001	-0.02	-0.08 - 0.04	0.585
prop ksenoi	0.07	0.02 - 0.12	0.004	0.01	-0.01 - 0.03	0.339	0.01	-0.01 - 0.02	0.340
ekloges PERCENTAGE Jun 2012 GD				0.76	0.71 – 0.82	<0.001			
N_AntifaEvent_Ju12_Ja15_AB0-1				-0.10	-0.36 - 0.16	0.452			
N_AntifaEvent_Ju12_Ja15_AB1-0				-0.42	-2.07 - 1.23	0.615			
N_AntifaEvent_Ju12_Ja15_AB1-1				-0.40	-0.740.05	0.025			
ekloges PERCENTAGE Sep 2015 GD							0.38	0.34 - 0.41	<0.001
N_AntifaEvent_Sp15_Ju19_AB0-1							-0.07	-0.22 - 0.07	0.332
N_AntifaEvent_Sp15_Ju19_AB1-0							80.0	-0.23 - 0.39	0.615
N_AntifaEvent_Sp15_Ju19_AB1-1							-0.01	-0.19 - 0.17	0.931
Random Effects									
σ^2	2.59			0.62			0.17		
τ_{00}	2.33 code_peri	if		0.37 code_pe	rif		0.23 code_pe	rif	
ICC	0.47			0.37			0.58		
N	74 code_perif			74 code_perif			74 code_perif		
Observations	322			322			322		
Marginal R ² / Conditional R ²	0.206 / 0.582			0.786 / 0.865	5		0.637 / 0.84	7	

• Results (Original Table 3)

The results (see Original Table 3) for May 2012 suggest that organizing at least one proximate protest event against the far right, compared to organizing no events at all, corresponds to a smaller electoral outcome for the GD, similar in magnitude to that identified by previous models which was around one-sixth of the 7% of the national vote.

The evidence presented shows that the synchronization of protest and electoral cycles makes protest more effective: protests against the far right taking place right before the next election are much more effective than those temporally more distant.

• My extension

- Extension idea: Fit linear regression model instead of mixed effects models.

 Results: It can be seen from the regression results that the all of the coefficients of Models are not statistically significant.

Table 3: Extension for Linear Regression Models

	Dependent variable:					
	May_2012	Jul_2019				
	(1)	(2)	(3)			
ekloges_PERCENTAGE_2009_GD	7.645*** (0.992)					
$N_AntifaEvent_Oc09_May12_AB0-1$	-0.677 (0.464)					
N_AntifaEvent_Oc09_May12_AB1-0	-1.591*** (0.577)					
N_AntifaEvent_Oc09_May12_AB1-1	-1.244*** (0.454)					
ekloges_PERCENTAGE_Jun_2012_GD		0.754*** (0.026)				
N_AntifaEvent_Ju12_Ja15_AB0-1		-0.168 (0.152)				
N_AntifaEvent_Ju12_Ja15_AB1-0		-0.731 (0.988)				
N_AntifaEvent_Ju12_Ja15_AB1-1		-0.503** (0.197)				
ekloges_PERCENTAGE_Sep_2015_GD			0.379*** (0.017)			
N_AntifaEvent_Sp15_Ju19_AB0-1			-0.072 (0.096)			
N_AntifaEvent_Sp15_Ju19_AB1-0			$0.019 \\ (0.219)$			
N_AntifaEvent_Sp15_Ju19_AB1-1			$0.043 \\ (0.119)$			
avg_age	-0.009 (0.038)	0.032* (0.017)	-0.051*** (0.011)			
log_population	0.409*** (0.120)	0.375*** (0.058)	-0.052 (0.035)			
prop_ksenoi	0.110*** (0.026)	-0.005 (0.012)	-0.005 (0.008)			
Constant	$0.545 \\ (2.379)$	-3.992*** (1.061)	2.997*** (0.670)			
Observations	322	322	322			
\mathbb{R}^2	0.312	0.791	0.668			
Adjusted R ²	0.296	0.786	0.660			
Residual Std. Error (df = 314)	2.191	0.984	0.619			
F Statistic (df = 7; 314)	20.322***	169.783***	90.067***			