

# IGA-677 / RusNatSecPol / Lecture 10

## State Security Services

Yuri M. Zhukov  
Visiting Associate Professor of Public Policy  
Harvard Kennedy School

October 5, 2023

## Today's objectives

1. *Identify:* missions and priorities of security services
2. *Distinguish:* group vs. individual administrative procedures
3. *Discuss:* post-Soviet and Putin-era reforms to secret police



Figure 1: Where are we?



Figure 2: Lubyanka #2

# Cheka to KGB

## Alphabet soup of state security

1. 1917-1922: All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (VChK, or Cheka)
2. 1922-1923: State Political Directorate (GPU) within People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD)
3. 1923-1934: Joint State Political Directorate (OGPU) within Council of People's Commissars (SNK)
4. 1934-1943: Main Directorate for State Security (GUGB) in NKVD
5. 1943-1946: NKVD split into People's Commissariats for Internal Affairs (NKVD) and State Security (NKGB)
6. 1941-1943: NKGB and NKVD re-merged into NKVD
7. 1943-1946: NKVD re-split into NKGB, NKVD
8. 1946-1954: People's Commissariats renamed Ministries of Internal Affairs (MVD), State Security (MGB)
9. 1954-1991: Committee for State Security (KGB)
10. 1991-1993: KGB split into Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Main Administration of Protection (GUO), Ministry of Security (MB)
11. 1993-1995: MB becomes Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK)
12. 1995-Now: FSK becomes Federal Security Service (FSB)

## Mission:

preserve, protect Russian (Soviet) regime

- investigate, arrest, punish, deter all those who “threaten the [public] order”

## Command and control

1. Act on orders from supreme political authorities (TsIK, Politburo, President)
2. Broad local discretion to interpret/implement orders

## Mandate

1. State security functions
2. Administration of camps ( $\rightarrow$  FSIN)
3. Counterintelligence
4. Border control
5. Fire service
6. Civil policing
7. Protection of state leaders ( $\rightarrow$  FSO)



Figure 3: Goyda!

## Who was repressed in this way?

“Socially malignant” actors

1. Foreign agents (suspected)
  - a) persons educated abroad
  - b) persons with family abroad
  - c) persons with contacts abroad
  - d) POWs from WWI, WWII
  - e) political immigrants
  - f) members of national diasporas
2. Political rivals (perceived)
  - a) those who served Tsarist regime
  - b) former Whites
  - c) Mensheviks, SRs, Trotskyites
3. Class enemies
  - a) cultural elites (clergy, academia)
  - b) economic elites (kulaks, merchants)
4. Marginalized groups
  - a) criminals, sex workers, “vagrants”



Figure 4: All enemies

## Shifting repression priorities

1. 1917-1923
  - a) members of former ruling class
  - b) cultural elites
  - c) Cossacks
2. 1923-1934
  - a) religious elites
  - b) opponents of collectivization
  - c) political rivals
3. 1934-1938
  - a) political and military elite
  - b) ethnic groups with “foreign ties”
4. 1939-1953
  - a) residents of western borderlands
  - b) ethnic groups who “collaborated”
  - c) returning POWs, enslaved workers
  - d) Jews
5. Throughout
  - a) second-hand repression  
(children, families of repressed)



Figure 5: Iron Feliks

## How to target “enemies”

### 1. Individual basis

- a) follow standard investigative, (quasi-)judicial proceedings
- b) separate criminal case in each arrest
- c) specific charges filed
- d) extensive case documentation
- e) note: individual ≠ selective

### 2. Group basis

- a) large administrative proceeding
- b) no individual cases or charges
- c) no or little paper trail



Figure 6: “Due process”

## Group targeting: Resettlement in Western Ukraine

## Background: Western Ukraine

### 1. 1919-1921:

Ukraine split between Poland (Galicia, Volhynia), Soviet Union (center, east)

### 2. 1929:

Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) forms in Poland

### 3. 1939-1941:

Soviets occupy West Ukraine,  
OUN splits into moderate (OUN-m)  
and militant (OUN-b) factions

### 4. 1941:

OUN-b declares Ukraine independence,  
Germans crack down on OUN-b

### 5. 1942:

OUN-b forms Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) to counter Soviet partisans

### 6. 1944-1955:

Soviets re-occupy Ukraine, start long counter-insurgency vs. UPA



Figure 7: NKVD-VV unit



Figure 8: OUN-UPA cell




Figure 9: 1943

- Fighting starts when country still under German occupation.
- UPA launches campaign vs. suspected Soviet collaborators.




Figure 10: 1944

- Campaign reaches peak in 1944-1945, when Soviets return.
- Soviets, starved of intelligence, rely on indiscriminate violence.




Figure 11: 1945

- NKVD begins campaign of mass population resettlement.
- Resettlement ostensibly targets families, supporters of UPA members.




Figure 12: 1946

- To keep up with quotas, resettlement becomes more indiscriminate.
- "Without discrimination, they grab children, women, the elderly..."




Figure 13: 1947

- Suspected rebels' families represented 32-59% of resettled households in October 1947... Who were the other 41-68%?




Figure 14: 1948

- UPA insurgency goes on, at lower intensity
- Soviets briefly pause resettlement program.




Figure 15: 1949

- Soviets' collectivization of local farms sparks renewed resistance, renewed campaign of resettlement.




Figure 16: 1950

- By 1950, the conflict had become low-intensity.
- Soviets had mostly established monopoly on use of force.




Figure 17: 1943–1955

- Heavy toll: 266,000 resettled, 127,000 killed.
- How decisive was forcible resettlement in reducing insurgent violence?

## Did resettlement work?

1. Yes
  - a) resettlement had significant suppressive effect on UPA violence
  - b) expected number of attacks decreased by 47% on average
2. And
  - a) removal of local popular base changed how UPA fought
  - b) UPA violence became less selective, more indiscriminate
3. But (*discussion*)
  - a) was it worth the cost?
  - b) why didn't NKVD care if they were deporting rebels or civilians?
  - c) was there anything outside powers could have done to stop this?



Figure 18: Everyone out



Figure 19: All aboard

## Individual targeting: Great Terror




Figure 20: Political arrests in Soviet Union per year. Stalin's rule in red.

## Mass repression, in 10 fast steps

1. Political leadership (Kremlin)
  - approve orders, quotas  
(e.g. Order 00447, 1937)
2. State Security HQ (Center)
  - relay instructions, regional quotas to each Region
3. Regional Directorates (Region)
  - send more specific orders, quotas to each District
4. District Branches (District)
  - fill quota!
  - identify suspects
  - investigate suspects
  - detain, interrogate, obtain confessions
  - prepare charging documents for Region

5. Region
  - review charging documents from District
  - prepare list for Center
6. Center
  - collate master list
7. Kremlin
  - (pre-)approve master list
8. Center
  - send regional lists
9. Region
  - send regional list for expedited judicial review (VKVS, Troikas)
  - no witnesses, no attorneys, no appeals
10. District
  - carry out sentences

## Evidentiary standard

where to find “counter-revolutionaries”?

1. District database (*kartoteka*)
  - a) grouped by employer, party, class, nationality, family history
  - b) initially used to pick suspects
  - c) but databases too small to keep up with volume, pace of quotas
2. Factory lists
  - a) to supplement database
3. “Snowball” method
  - a) ask suspects to name “co-conspirators”
4. Simplified investigative procedures
  - a) group arrests, “easy” charges
  - b) back-date arrest warrants, with “evidence” collected after arrest
  - c) signed confession becomes sufficient for conviction



СТАЛИНСКИЙ НИД ПРОВОДЯ ДОПРОС ДЕТЕЙ НА СВОИХ РОДИТЕЛЕЙ И БОЛЬШОМ ГЕРОЕМ, А НЕКОТОРЫХ КЛЮЧЕВЫХ ЧЛЮЧЕЙ ЗАСТРАГАДАВАТЬ МУЖИЧЬЕ ПОКАЗАНИЯ. ВО СТРАНЕ ПРОШЛА КАМПАНИЯ ПУБЛИЧНОГО ОТРЕЧЕНИЯ ДЕТЕЙ ОТ СВОИХ РОДИТЕЛЕЙ, ВРАГОВ НАРОДА, ЧЕРЕЗ ГАЗЕТЫ И ЖАРГАНОВЫХ ВЫСТАВЛЯЛИСЬ НА СОВЕРНЯХ, С ГНЕВНЫМ ОСУЖДЕНИЕМ ШПИОНОВ И Т.Д. НЕКОТОРЫЕ УЧИТЕЛИ ШКОЛ ПРЕДЛАГАЛИ ПОСТАВЛЯТЬ СОЧИНЕНИЯ – ЧТО ДУМАЕТЕ ВЫ (ЧУЧЕНКИ) И ВОШИ ОТЕЦИ И МАМЫ ОБ АРЕСТЕ МАРИНГОВ СССР БЫЛЮКЕРА, ТУКАЧЕВСКОГО, ЕГОРОВА И ДРУГИХ ПОСЛЕ ТАКИХ «СОЧИНЕНИЙ» МНОГИЕ ЛИШАЛИСЬ РОДИТЕЛЕЙ И ПОПРЯВЛЯЛИСЬ В БЕДОМУЧАСТИИ.

Figure 21: Little eyes & ears

## Post-Soviet reforms

## Security services under Yeltsin




Figure 22: Dismemberment of KGB under Yeltsin

## Security services under Putin

## Putin renaissance

1. Leadership purge
  - a) Yeltsin-era agency heads replaced
2. FSB mission expands
  - a) Service for Defense of Constitutional Order → FSB
  - b) border guards → FSB
  - c) collection/operations in “near abroad” → FSB
  - d) foreign intelligence → FSB
  - e) operations abroad → FSB
  - f) presidential briefings → FSB
3. FSB capture of government agencies
  - a) FSB officers → presidential administration
  - b) FSB officers → MOD leadership
  - c) FSB officers → MVD leadership
  - d) FSB officers → FSKN leadership
  - e) FSB officers → army morale



Figure 23: Back in black

## Putin renaissance (continued)

4. FSB capture of other institutions
  - a) FSB → Russian Orthodox Church
  - b) FSB → state energy companies
  - c) FSB → telecommunications
  - d) FSB → railroads

### Inter-agency competition

- a) FSB vs. SVR (foreign collection)
- b) FSB vs. GRU (active measures)
- c) no national IC coordination/integration center (e.g. ODNI)
- d) no “National Intelligence Estimates”

### Discussion:

- a) is the FSB more or less powerful now than it was under ComParty control?
- b) is the FSB still capable of state terror on a 1937 scale?




Figure 24: Goya!!!

# NEXT MEETING

*Long-Term Legacy of Violence* (Tu, Oct. 10)

- what happens after the violence ends
- things to consider:
  - what trade-offs do you see between short-term and long-term political gains from repression?
  - is “generational trauma” real? what are the mechanisms of inter-generational transmission?