

# Russian Security State

GOVT-5519/IPOL-3519/REES-5519/SEST-6763

Lecture 21. Energy and Natural Resources

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## Today's objectives

1. *Take stock:* Russia's status as "energy superpower"
2. *Consider:* how gas can be used as a geopolitical instrument
3. *Discuss:* lessons from Russia's coercive gas diplomacy

# Overview




Figure 1: Oil and natural gas fields, 2017

Russia is world's **3rd largest energy producer and consumer**  
(data from DOE's Energy Information Administration, 2021)

Table 1: Total Energy Production

Ranking	Country	quadrillion Btu
1	China	135.0
2	United States	98.3
3	<b>Russia</b>	64.1
4	Saudi Arabia	26.6
5	Canada	23.4

Table 2: Total Energy Consumption

Ranking	Country	quadrillion Btu
1	China	165.2
2	United States	97.9
3	<b>Russia</b>	34.2
4	India	32.0
5	Japan	18.1

# Oil

(2021 data)

## 1. Reserves

- a) 8th largest reserves  
(80 billion barrels)

## 2. Production

- a) 3rd largest producer  
(11 million barrels/day)

## 3. Consumption

- a) 4th largest consumer  
(3.7 million barrels/day)

## 4. Exports

- a) 2nd largest exporter  
(5.2 million barrels/day)
- b) 82% tanker, 18% pipeline
- c) 2022:
  - 42% to EU
  - 36% to China
  - 12% to India

Table 3: Petroleum production

Ranking	Country	1000 barrels/day
1	United States	20,301
2	Saudi Arabia	12,144
3	<b>Russia</b>	10,938
4	Canada	5,694
5	China	5,119

Table 4: Crude oil exports

Ranking	Country	1000 barrels/day
1	Saudi Arabia	7,341
2	<b>Russia</b>	5,196
3	Iraq	3,976
4	Canada	3,177
5	UAE	2,427

## Natural gas (2021 data)

### 1. Reserves

- a) world's largest reserves  
(1,688 trillion cubic feet)

### 2. Production

- a) 2nd largest producer  
(25 Tcf/year)
- b) 71% consumed domestically

### 3. Consumption

- a) 2nd largest consumer  
(15.8 Tcf/year)

### 4. Exports

- a) world's largest exporter  
(8.9 Tcf/year)
- b) 85% pipeline, 15% LNG
- c) 2021: 61% to EU (5.4 Tcf)  
2022: 16% to EU (1.4 Tcf)

Table 5: Natural gas production

Ranking	Country	Tcf
1	United States	34.5
2	Russia	24.8
3	Iran	8.8
4	China	7.5
5	Canada	6.4

Table 6: Natural gas exports

Ranking	Country	Tcf
1	Russia	8.9
2	United States	6.7
3	Qatar	4.4
4	Norway	3.9
5	Australia	3.7

# Natural Gas as Foreign Policy Instrument



Figure 2: Natural gas pipelines, 2023

Table 7: Russia's major natural gas export pipelines (2021 data)

Pipeline	Capacity	Length	Origin	Markets	Transit
Yamal-Europe	1.2 Tcf	2,552 mi	W Siberia	Poland, Germany, N Europe	Belarus
Blue Stream	0.6 Tcf	754 mi	W Siberia	Turkey	Black Sea
<del>Nord Stream</del>	1.9 Tcf	761 mi	W Siberia	Germany, N Europe	Baltic Sea
<del>Nord Stream 2</del>	1.9 Tcf	761 mi	W Siberia	Germany, N Europe	Baltic Sea
Soyuz, Brotherhood	1.1 Tcf	2,800 mi	W Siberia, C Asia	Europe	Ukraine
TurkStream	1.1 Tcf	580 mi	W Siberia	Turkey, SE Europe	Black Sea
<b>Europe total</b>	<b>7.8 Tcf</b>				
Sakh.-Khab.-Vlad.	0.2 Tcf	1,118 mi	Sakhalin	NE China, Vladivostok LNG	
Power of Siberia	2.2 Tcf	5,040 mi	E Siberia	NE China	
<b>Asia total</b>	<b>2.4 Tcf</b>				

## Gas and Geopolitics

## How Russian gas is different from oil

1. Infrastructure
  - a) only ways to transport gas are pipelines & liquefied natural gas
  - b) both very expensive to build (investments tied to long-term, state-sanctioned contracts)
  - c) storage facilities also costly (vulnerable to disruptions)
2. Markets
  - a) mainly long-term contracts (harder to diversify sources)
  - b) no global “market price” for gas (seller can dictate price)
  - c) gas can be sold direct to customer (Gazprom = local energy utility)
3. Ownership
  - a) no private gas production, sales (Gazprom is state monopoly)



Figure 3: Option 1



Figure 4: Option 2

## How did Europe get hooked on Russian gas?

1. Diversification from Middle East
  - a) 1973 oil crisis price shocks
  - b) USSR seen as potentially more reliable supplier
  - c) assumption: USSR to be “one of several” alternatives
2. Search for alternative fuel sources
  - a) reduce reliance on coal & oil (natural gas is relatively clean-burning fossil fuel)
  - b) phase out nuclear (Germany)
3. Russian efforts vs. competition
  - a) lobbying vs. S Caucasus pipeline (NABUCCO)
  - b) efforts to destabilize alt transit routes (Georgia)
  - c) price discounts

Table 8: Exports to region, 2021

	Region	Tcf
1	Europe	7.36
2	Asia	1.12
3	Rest of world	0.38

Table 9: Exports to country, 2021

	Country	Tcf
1	Germany	1.70
2	Turkey	0.95
3	Italy	0.92
4	Belarus	0.70
5	France	0.62
6	China	0.56
7	Poland	0.37
8	Japan	0.32
9	United Kingdom	0.17
10	South Korea	0.14

## How is Europe quitting Russia? (2022)

1. Supply shocks
  - a) oil:
    - ban on seaborne oil imports
    - global oil price cap (G7)
  - b) gas:
    - Nord Stream 2 suspended
    - Nord Stream 1 disabled
2. Switch to LNG
  - a) 77% increase in LNG imports  
(mostly from US, but also Russia)
  - b) build new LNG terminals
3. Conserve
  - a) fill storage tanks (82 pct in 2023)
  - b) reduce consumption
4. Get lucky
  - a) mild winter 2022-2023

Russia gas share of Europe's energy:  
40% (2021) → 10% (2022)



Figure 5: Storage tanks

## Case Study: Ukraine 2006 Gas Crisis

## Russia's coercive gas diplomacy

1. Set prices
  - a) sell at “below-market rates”
  - b) wait for low rates to become baseline for destination country’s economy, industry
  - c) threaten to raise rates to extract policy concessions
2. Collect/cancel debts
  - a) ignore under/non-payments
  - b) then offer to cancel debt in exchange for concessions (e.g. pipeline equity stake)
3. Control local gas distribution
  - a) contracts include shares of local, transit pipelines
  - b) direct sales to customers



Figure 6: “property of V.P.”

## Background to 2006 crisis

1. Pre-2005
  - a) 80% of Russia's NG exports transit through Ukraine
  - b) existing agreement: Ukraine pays \$50/tcm until 2009 (lower than Russian domestic customers)
2. 2005
  - a) Yushchenko elected president, sets course for EU/NATO
  - b) Gazprom request price hike to \$160-\$230/tcm (almost 5-fold)
  - c) Putin offers loan to help Kyiv pay
  - d) Yushchenko rejects offer
3. January 2006
  - a) Gazprom cuts volume of gas (new = old – Ukraine's share)
  - b) Ukraine withdraws same amount as before, cutting gas to Europe



Figure 7: Viktor Yushchenko



Figure 8: Hordiyiv vuzol

## The Deal

1. Sketchy middleman to the rescue
  - a) GazpromExport sells to Naftohaz Ukrainy through intermediary: RosUkrEnergo (RUE)
  - b) RUE buys
    - Russian gas at \$230/tcm
    - Turkmen gas at \$60/tcm
  - c) RUE sells to Ukraine at \$95/tcm
  - d) RUE becomes sole importer of Russian gas to Ukraine
2. Who is RosUkrEnergo?
  - a) Swiss-registered company
  - b) co-owned by Dmytro Firtash
3. Criticism
  - a) numbers don't add up  
(need 80/20 Turkmen/Russia mix just to break even at this price)
  - b) complete lack of transparency



Figure 9: Man in the middle



Figure 10: A trusted brand

*Discussion:*

- a) How did these corrupt deals help Russia geopolitically? What is the “theory of cause and effect”?
- b) How successful was Russia’s coercive gas diplomacy in achieving its intended political effects? (i.e. keeping countries in Russia’s orbit)
- c) Why didn’t Russia play similar game with countries in Western/Central Europe?
- d) Is this still a viable strategy as Russian exports pivot to China?

# NEXT MEETING

*Information, Hybrid and Cyber Warfare* (Tu, Nov. 18)

- How has Russia leveraged new technologies of warfare?
- Can these new technologies prove decisive on the battlefield?