

IGA-677 / RusNatSecPol / Lecture 17

Origins of the Cold War

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Today's objectives

1. *Consider*: how a wartime alliance turned into a global peacetime rivalry
2. *Take stock*: how USSR tried to “catch up and overtake” USA
3. *Analyze*: whether Cold War 1.0 was preventable

What if?

The Cold War could have been prevented if...

1. There was a clear **Soviet-American wartime agreement** on the postwar partition of Germany.
2. **Stalin was overthrown** and replaced by a different Soviet leader.
3. The U.S. had given Stalin an **ultimatum in 1946**: "Get out of Eastern Europe or we'll throw you out!"
4. Operation Overlord (**D-Day landings** in Normandy) had occurred in 1942 instead of 1944.
5. No, it's **impossible**. The world's two strongest powers will always compete for security.

Rank these scenarios from 1 (most plausible) to 5 (least plausible).

Sources of U.S.-Soviet Mistrust

The World in 1945

How did WWII end?

1. Germany:
 - a) Soviets in Berlin
 - b) Hitler commits suicide
2. Japan
 - a) atomic bombs
 - b) Soviet declaration of war

Immediate legacy of WWII

- a) destruction, rubble
- b) 65-85M dead
- c) collapse of German, Japanese puppet regimes
- d) collapse of colonial institutions
- e) global power vacuum



Figure 1: Pid zavalamy



Figure 2: Lost empire

Previous postwar settlements

1. Congress of Vienna, 1815
 - a) end of Napoleonic Wars
 - b) 5 European great powers
(Austria-Hungary, France, Russia, Prussia, UK)
2. Paris Peace Conference, 1919
 - a) end of WWI
 - b) $2\frac{1}{2}$ European great powers
(France, UK, Italy)
 - c) 2 non-European powers
(US, Japan)
 - d) 2 missing great powers
(Germany, USSR)



Figure 3: Vienna



Figure 4: Paris

What's different about 1945?

1. No peace conference
2. Marginalization of Europe
(UK 'junior partner' to US)
3. 2 formerly peripheral powers now dominant
(USA, USSR)
4. No 'grand' postwar plans
5. USA & USSR have starkly different views of world



Figure 5: Yalta



Figure 6: Potsdam

WWII legacy for Washington

1. Relatively low costs of war
 - a) ~ 405,000 casualties
(1700 civilian)
 - b) WWII not an existential struggle
 - c) no full mobilization
 - d) casualty avoidance
2. Economic prosperity
 - a) standard of living increased
 - b) unemployment down
 - c) wages, savings up
 - d) industry eager to meet high global demand



Figure 7: Happy Days?

Postwar US interests

1. Free trade
2. Free movement of commerce
(Atlantic Charter)
3. Economic recovery in Europe
4. Institutions for promotion of US
interests around globe
(United Nations)



Figure 8: World opportunity

WWII legacy for Moscow

1. Extremely high costs of war
 - a) 28M casualties
(> 17M civilian)
 - b) WWII = existential struggle
 - c) total mobilization
 - d) disregard for casualties
2. Economic devastation
 - a) damage to infrastructure
 - b) damage to crops, factories
 - c) major cities destroyed
 - d) famine of 1946-47
 - e) no post-WWII baby boom



Figure 9: Wrecked lives



Figure 10: Wrecked country

Postwar Soviet interests

1. Security
2. Security
3. Security



Figure 11: Costliest victory

Allies in War, Enemies in Peace

Original Sin

1. "Second front" in WWII
 - a) Stalin presses for 'second front' in June 1941
 - b) but no allied landing in West Europe until June 1944
 2. Military reasons for delay
 - a) strategic emphasis on Mediterranean, N Africa
 - b) lack of landing craft, forces for cross-channel invasion
 - c) US casualty sensitivity, domestic politics




Figure 12: Alone together

Soviet perceptions of delay

1. “Let them destroy each other”
 - a) military reasons are b.s.
 - b) real reasons are political
 - c) prewar conflicts with West
 - US, UK intervention in Russian Civil War, 1918
 - US doesn't recognize USSR until 1933
 - anticommunism in US, UK
 - d) US wartime aid (Lend Lease)
 - e) but US, UK still seen as “free riding” on Soviet war effort



Figure 13: Better late never

Help wanted Position filled

1. After Normandy
 - a) by 1944, Soviets believe they can defeat Germany alone
2. Red Army in 1945
 - a) 11.3M troops
 - b) 24,500 tanks
 - c) mastery of offensive warfare
 - d) “unstoppable” march to Berlin
3. Military consequence of delay
 - a) Soviets occupy most of Central, East Europe
 - b) Soviets first to reach Berlin



Figure 14: We got this



Figure 15: Really, we're good

Fighting the Cold War

Origins of Containment

Soviet-occupied Europe in 1946-1947

1. Baltics → USSR
2. Koenigsberg → Kaliningrad, USSR
3. East Poland → USSR
4. East Prussia → Poland
5. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria → communist
6. Yugoslavia, Albania → communist
7. Greece → civil war



Figure 16: A new map

A New Order

1. What comes next?
 - a) Soviet security calls for 'buffer zone' in Europe
 - b) democratic governments in CE
Europe ≠ pro-Soviet governments in CE Europe
 - c) debate in West: is Soviet behavior driven by security or ideology?
2. Stalin's speech to voters, 1946
 - a) blames WWII on capitalism
 - b) any bargains with capitalist states "bound to fail"



Figure 17: What he want?

Kennan's Long Telegram

1. What kind of state is USSR?
 - a) is USSR capable of reaching bargains, sticking to them?
 - b) Kennan: 'no'
2. 'Sources of Soviet Conduct'
 - a) Soviet insecurity has domestic, not external causes
 - b) external threat needed to justify domestic repression
 - c) insatiable desire for security
 - d) no grand bargains possible



Figure 18: George Kennan

Solution: containment

1. Third Way (not war, not appeasement)
 - a) ends: prevent future spread of Soviet power
 - b) means: long-term, inter-generational policy of containing USSR
2. Translation into policy
 - a) NSC-68: global containment (challenge USSR everywhere)
 - b) Eisenhower/Dulles: “rollback” (reverse Soviet gains, not just prevent them)
 - c) Kennan was critical of both



Figure 19: Bipolar world

Solving the German problem

- a) German sovereignty dissolves
- b) 4 occupational zones
(Soviet, US, UK, French)
- c) Allies divided over how these zones
should be managed

Fissures form

1. US interests
 - a) fear that communism will spread
 - b) US interest in prosperous,
pro-Western regimes
 - c) German economic recovery
essential to US plan
2. Soviet interests
 - a) German recovery anathema to
Soviet interests
 - b) Stalin wants Germany weakened,
incapable of action vs. neighbors



Figure 20: Germany, 1945



Figure 21: Bear hug

Origins of NATO, Warsaw Pact

1. Timeline

- a) 1948: German currency crisis
- b) 1948: USSR blockades Berlin
- c) 1949: NATO established
- d) 1955: W Germany joins NATO
- e) 1955: Soviet Union forms Warsaw Pact with aligned countries




Figure 22: Europe, 1955

What if? (redux)

The Cold War could have been prevented if...

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3. The U.S. had given Stalin an **ultimatum in 1946**: "Get out of Eastern Europe or we'll throw you out!"
4. Operation Overlord (**D-Day landings** in Normandy) had occurred in 1942 instead of 1944.
5. No, it's **impossible**. The world's two strongest powers will always compete for security.

Rank these scenarios from 1 (most plausible) to 5 (least plausible).

Has your assessment changed since beginning of class? If so, how?

Soviet Military Organization

Fighting the 'Long War'

1. Soviet challenges
 - a) USSR enters Cold War with major disadvantages
 - b) WWII economic devastation
 - c) lower economic development
 - d) lower troop quality
 - e) political system that stifles initiative, innovation
 - f) multiple insurgencies at home
2. Soviet military model
 - a) adopted by communist bloc, many developing states
 - b) still common in ex-USSR, China, Africa, Arab states



Figure 23: Marching forward

Command and Control

- a) highly centralized
- b) highly detailed orders
(opposite of German approach)

1. Advantages

- a) 'coup-proof'
- b) cuts costs in training,
communication

2. Disadvantages

- a) little flexibility
- b) underdeveloped NCO corps



Figure 24: Brass

Economic Strategy

1. Permanent war economy
 - a) ensure rational, serial production
 - b) prioritize heavy industry
 - c) underinvestment in light industry, consumer goods
 - d) defense spending at 15-30% of GDP (US: 5-12 percent of GDP)
2. Other cost-savings
 - a) low-maintenance equipment
 - b) stockpiling munitions
 - c) investment in smaller navy ships, cruise missiles



Figure 25: Guns vs. butter

Catch Up and Overtake USA!

1. Soviet military power
 - a) maintained active peacetime force of 2.6 - 6M troops
 - b) additional 20M+ in reserve
 2. Soviet-US balance in 1985
 - a) 1.6:1 advantage in ballistic missiles
 - b) 4:1 advantage in tanks
 - c) 2.5:1 advantage in vehicles
 - d) 5:1 advantage in artillery
 - e) 1.1:1 advantage in aircraft
 - f) 2.4:1 advantage in warships




Figure 26: Race is on

Taking stock: did the Soviets “catch up and overtake”?




Figure 27: Mil personnel




Figure 29: Iron & steel




Figure 31: Mil spending




Figure 28: Population




Figure 30: Urbanization




Figure 32: CINC score

Discussion:

Was the Soviets' emphasis on "guns not butter" the right strategy?

Would the Soviets' numerical advantage have mattered in a "hot war"?

NEXT MEETING

Nuclear Weapons and Strategy (Th, Nov. 2)

Thinking about the unthinkable.

- Why did the Cold War stay 'cold'?
- Is limited nuclear war possible?
- How did the Soviets' understanding of nuclear deterrence differ from the U.S.?