

# IGA-677 / RusNatSecPol / Lecture 11

## The Long-Term Legacy of Violence

Yuri M. Zhukov  
Visiting Associate Professor of Public Policy  
Harvard Kennedy School

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## Today's objectives

1. *Discuss*: role of time horizons in policy analysis
2. *Follow up*: what happened (many years) after NKVD resettlement in Western Ukraine and Great Terror
3. *Consider*: how behavioral legacies of violence can change

# Time Horizons

# Cost and benefit streams

How a policy's **costs** and **benefits** might unfold over time




Figure 1: Early peak




Figure 2: Late surge

How a policy's **costs** and **benefits** might unfold over time




Figure 3: Middle hump



Figure 4: "Bathtub"

## Which policy would you choose?




Figure 5: Option A




Figure 6: Option B

## Which policy would you choose?




Figure 7: Option A (net utility)




Figure 8: Option B (net utility)



## Which policy would you choose?




Figure 9: Option A




Figure 10: Option C

## Which policy would you choose?




Figure 11: Option A (net utility)




Figure 12: Option C (net utility)

# Discounting

## What is discounting?

relative value of things now vs. in the future

“discounting our payoffs” means payoffs received today are more valuable than payoffs received in future

### *Discussion:*

- a) how do short vs. long time horizons impact evaluation of cost/benefit streams?
- b) do dictators necessarily have longer time horizons than democrats?
- c) how might discounting explain Soviet/Russian strategy choice in repression and counter-insurgency?



Figure 13: Future overrated

# Long-Term Political Legacy of Violence

# What happens next?

## Long-term effect of NKVD resettlement in Western Ukraine

- more Soviet-era repression → less support for Moscow today




Figure 14: Effect of NKVD/MVD deportations on pro-Moscow vote margin  
("Pro-Moscow" parties: Party of Regions, Communists, Opposition Bloc)

## Long-term effect of NKVD's **Great Terror in Russia**

- more Soviet-era repression → less support for Putin today




Figure 15: Effect of NKVD arrests on incumbent vote share

## Long-term effect of NKVD's **Great Terror in Russia**

- more Soviet-era repression → more opposition support today




Figure 16: Effect of NKVD arrests on Liberal vote share



## Long-term effect of NKVD's **Great Terror in Russia**

- more Soviet-era repression → less political participation today




Figure 17: Effect of NKVD arrests on electoral turnout

# How legacies change over time

Behavioral legacy of violence is **contingent** on threat of new violence

1. When threat of renewed repression is *credible*:
  - past repression *increases* behavioral loyalty  
(preference falsification, "keep your head down")  
(political attitudes  $\neq$  political behavior)
2. When threat of renewed repression is *not credible*:
  - past repression *decreases* behavioral loyalty  
(political attitudes = political behavior)

# Famine and political behavior in Ukraine, 1941-2017




Figure 18: Excess mortality from famine



Period	Threat	Outcome	Expectation
1941-1944	variable	opposition to Red partisans	↑ opposition
1946-1958	high	anti-Soviet votes	↓ opposition
1987-1991	variable	anti-Soviet protests	↑ opposition
2002-2014	absent	anti-Russian votes	↑ opposition
2009-2013	absent	anti-Yanukovych protests	↑ opposition
2017	variable	opposition to pro-Russia separatists	↑ opposition



## Opposition to Soviet Partisans

1. *Soviet coercive threat*: variable
2. *Effect of famine*: ↑ opposition (i.e. less partisan support, activity)
3. *Data*: partisan territorial control, base camps and anti-German operations



Figure 19: Red partisans




## Protest votes

1. *Soviet coercive threat*: high
2. *Effect of famine*: ↓ opposition (i.e. less "against all" vote)
3. *Data*: Supreme Soviet elections in 1946, 1950, 1954, 1958



Figure 20: One man one vote






## Anti-Soviet protests

1. *Soviet coercive threat*: variable
2. *Effect of famine*: ↑ opposition (i.e. more protests)
3. *Data*: anti-Soviet protests, 1987-1992



Figure 21: Winds of change



## Anti-Russian vote share

1. *Soviet coercive threat*: absent
2. *Effect of famine*: ↑ opposition (i.e. less pro-Russian vote)
3. *Data*: Ukrainian national elections in 2004, 2006, 2007, 2010, 2012, 2014



Figure 22: Holosuy proty




## Anti-Yanukovych protests

1. *Soviet coercive threat*: absent
2. *Effect of famine*: ↑ opposition (i.e. more protests)
3. *Data*: Ukrainian street protests in 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013



Figure 23: Bandu het'



## Opposition to pro-Russian rebels

1. *Soviet coercive threat*: variable
2. *Effect of famine*: ↑ opposition  
(i.e. more opposition)
3. *Data*: field survey in Donbas, 2017




Figure 24: Stukach 2.0

*Discussion:*

- a) What are the implications of these patterns for cost/benefit flows of repression over time?
- b) Is “generational trauma” real? What are the mechanisms for its inter-generational transmission?
- c) Is it possible to “win back” victimized people without coercion?

# NEXT MEETING

*Group Presentations!* (Th, Oct. 12)

- prepare 5-6 slides addressing points in the prompt
- 15 minutes: 10 minute briefing + 5 minute Q&A
- presentations in same order as in prompt (1, 2, 3, 4)