


# HW12 — Q1

## Book Set 10.4 #1

- 1 Draw the region in the  $xy$  plane where  $x+2y=6$  and  $x \geq 0$  and  $y \geq 0$ . Which point in this “feasible set” minimizes the cost  $c = x + 3y$ ? Which point gives maximum cost? Those points are at corners.



$$\therefore c = x + 3y \Rightarrow k = -\frac{1}{3}$$

$\therefore l_1$  gives maximum cost, point is  $(0, 3)$


$$c_{\max} = 0 + 3 \times 3 = 9$$

$\therefore l_2$  gives minimum cost, point is  $(6, 0)$

$$c_{\min} = 6 + 3 \times 0 = 6$$

## Book Set 10.4 #2

- 2 Draw the region in the  $xy$  plane where  $x + 2y \leq 6$ ,  $2x + y \leq 6$ ,  $x \geq 0$ ,  $y \geq 0$ . It has four corners. Which corner minimizes the cost  $c = 2x - y$ ?



$\therefore$   $(0,3)$  gives minimum cost, point is  $(0,3)$   
 $c_{\min} = 2x - y = 0 - 3 = -3$

# HW12 — Q2

2. Derive the optimal strategies for the two person game with the payoff matrix  $A$  where

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 & -1 \\ -1 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & -1 & 0 \end{bmatrix} = [a_{ij}]$$

and the matrix represents the payoff from player 2 to player 1. The term  $a_{ij}$  is the payoff when player 1 makes the  $i^{\text{th}}$  move and player 2 makes the  $j^{\text{th}}$  move.

Suppose mixed strategy for player 1 is  $P^T = [p_1, p_2, p_3]$   
for player 2 is  $Q^T = [q_1, q_2, q_3]$

$$\text{we want } \max_P (\min_Q P^T A Q)$$

$\therefore$  for player 1

$$\begin{cases} p_1 + p_2 + p_3 = 1 \\ p_1 \geq 0, p_2 \geq 0, p_3 \geq 0 \\ -p_2 + p_3 \geq V \\ p_1 - p_3 \geq V \\ -p_1 + p_2 \geq V \end{cases} \Rightarrow \begin{cases} p_1 = \frac{1}{3} \\ p_2 = \frac{1}{3} \\ p_3 = \frac{1}{3} \\ V = 0 \end{cases} \quad P = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{1}{3} \\ \frac{1}{3} \\ \frac{1}{3} \end{bmatrix}$$

$\therefore$  for player 2

$$\begin{cases} q_1 + q_2 + q_3 = 1 \\ q_1 \geq 0, q_2 \geq 0, q_3 \geq 0 \\ q_2 - q_3 \leq V \\ -q_1 + q_3 \leq V \\ q_1 - q_2 \leq V \end{cases} \Rightarrow \begin{cases} q_1 = \frac{1}{3} \\ q_2 = \frac{1}{3} \\ q_3 = \frac{1}{3} \\ V = 0 \end{cases} \quad Q = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{1}{3} \\ \frac{1}{3} \\ \frac{1}{3} \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 \therefore P^T A Q &= \begin{bmatrix} \frac{1}{3} & \frac{1}{3} & \frac{1}{3} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 & -1 \\ -1 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & -1 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \frac{1}{3} \\ \frac{1}{3} \\ \frac{1}{3} \end{bmatrix} \\
 &= \begin{bmatrix} \frac{1}{3} & \frac{1}{3} & \frac{1}{3} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} \\
 &= 0
 \end{aligned}$$

$\left( \begin{array}{l} \because A = -A^T \text{ symmetric game} \\ \therefore \text{the game is fair} \\ \text{best strategy for player 1} = \text{best strategy for player 2} \end{array} \right)$

# HW12 - Q3

3. Matrix  $A$  is the payoff matrix for a two-player zero-sum game:

$$P_1 \quad A = \begin{matrix} & \begin{matrix} P_2 \\ \begin{matrix} -5 & 2 & -7 & 8 & 5 \\ 3 & 6 & 2 & 2 & 10 \\ -1 & 0 & -9 & 0 & 3 \\ 10 & 3 & 8 & 9 & 4 \\ 3 & 2 & 4 & 5 & -3 \end{matrix} \end{matrix} \end{matrix}.$$

Entry  $a_{ij}$  is the payoff for Player 1 when Player 1 makes move  $i$  and Player 2 makes move  $j$ . Find the value  $v(A)$  of the game for stochastic vectors  $\mathbf{x}$  and  $\mathbf{y}$ :

$$v(A) = \max_{\mathbf{x}} \left( \min_{\mathbf{y}} \mathbf{x}^T A \mathbf{y} \right).$$

$A \equiv$  payoff from  $P_2$  to  $P_1$

$$v(A) = \max_{\mathbf{x}} (\min_{\mathbf{y}} \mathbf{x}^T A \mathbf{y})$$

$$A = \begin{matrix} & \begin{matrix} \#1 & \#2 & \#3 & \#4 & \#5 \end{matrix} \\ \begin{matrix} \#1 \\ \#2 \\ \#3 \\ \#4 \\ \#5 \end{matrix} & \begin{bmatrix} -5 & 2 & -7 & 8 & 5 \\ 3 & 6 & 2 & 2 & 10 \\ -1 & 0 & -9 & 0 & 3 \\ 10 & 3 & 8 & 9 & 4 \\ 3 & 2 & 4 & 5 & -3 \end{bmatrix} \end{matrix}$$

$\begin{cases} y_1^* = 0 \\ y_4^* = 0 \end{cases}$

$$A' = \begin{matrix} & \begin{matrix} \#2 & \#3 & \#5 \end{matrix} \\ \begin{matrix} \#1 \\ \#2 \\ \#3 \\ \#4 \\ \#5 \end{matrix} & \begin{bmatrix} 2 & -7 & 5 \\ 6 & 2 & 10 \\ 0 & -9 & 3 \\ 3 & 8 & 4 \\ 2 & 4 & -3 \end{bmatrix} \end{matrix}$$

$\begin{cases} x_1^* = 0 \\ x_3^* = 0 \\ x_5^* = 0 \end{cases}$

$$A'' = \begin{matrix} & \begin{matrix} \#2 & \#3 & \#5 \end{matrix} \\ \begin{matrix} \#2 \\ \#4 \end{matrix} & \begin{bmatrix} 6 & 2 & 10 \\ 3 & 8 & 4 \end{bmatrix} \end{matrix}$$

$y_5^* = 0$

$$A''' = \begin{matrix} & \begin{matrix} \#2 & \#3 \end{matrix} \\ \begin{matrix} \#2 \\ \#4 \end{matrix} & \begin{bmatrix} 6 & 2 \\ 3 & 8 \end{bmatrix} \end{matrix} \begin{matrix} p \\ 1-p \end{matrix}$$

$$q \quad 1-q$$

$$\therefore \text{for } P_1: 6p + 3(1-p) = 2p + 8(1-p)$$

$$3p + 3 = -6p + 8$$

$$9p = 5$$

$$\therefore p = 5/9, \quad 1-p = 4/9 \Rightarrow x^* =$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 5/9 \\ 0 \\ 4/9 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\text{for } P_2: 6q + 2(1-q) = 3q + 8(1-q)$$

$$4q + 2 = -5q + 8$$

$$9q = 6$$

$$\therefore q = 2/3, \quad 1-q = 1/3 \Rightarrow y^* =$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 2/3 \\ 1/3 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\therefore V(A) = \max_x (\min_y x^T A y) = x^{*T} A y^*$$

$$= \begin{bmatrix} 0 & \frac{5}{9} & 0 & \frac{4}{9} & 0 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} -5 & 2 & -7 & 8 & 5 \\ 3 & 6 & 2 & 2 & 10 \\ -1 & 0 & -9 & 0 & 3 \\ 10 & 3 & 8 & 9 & 4 \\ 3 & 2 & 4 & 5 & -3 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ \frac{2}{3} \\ \frac{1}{3} \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$= \begin{bmatrix} 0 & \frac{5}{9} & 0 & \frac{4}{9} & 0 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \frac{4}{3} - \frac{7}{3} \\ \frac{12}{3} + \frac{2}{3} \\ 0 - \frac{9}{3} \\ 2 + \frac{8}{3} \\ \frac{4}{3} + \frac{4}{3} \end{bmatrix}$$

$$= \begin{bmatrix} 0 & \frac{5}{9} & 0 & \frac{4}{9} & 0 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} -1 \\ \frac{14}{3} \\ -3 \\ \frac{14}{3} \\ \frac{8}{3} \end{bmatrix}$$

$$= \frac{5}{9} \frac{14}{3} + \frac{4}{9} \frac{14}{3}$$

$$= \frac{14}{3}$$