

# Perturbation-based Techniques for Explaining Sequence Predictions

Presented by: **Zichuan Liu**

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# Content

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- Limitations and Optimizations of Existing Perturbations



**ICLR**

International Conference On  
Learning Representations

- Introduce Information Theory in Perturbations




**ICML**

International Conference  
On Machine Learning

- How to Apply Perturbations with Information Bottleneck



NEURAL INFORMATION  
PROCESSING SYSTEMS





# Explaining Time Series via Contrastive and Locally Sparse Perturbations

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

<sup>7</sup>A\*STAR, <sup>8</sup>The University of Hong Kong




# Background

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
Black-box models with post-hoc explanation techniques: *Find salient features!*



Visual Explanation  
Source: [Fong et al.](#)




Graph Explanation  
Source: [Miao et al.](#)



Game Explanation  
Source: [Liu et al.](#)

# Challenges for Explaining Time Series



Dynamask, [Crabbe' et al.](#)

$$\Phi(x, m) = x \times m + (1 - m) \times \mu$$

$$\arg \min \underbrace{\mathcal{L}(f(x), f \circ \Phi(x, m))}_{\text{label consistency}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{R}(m)}_{\text{regular}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{A}(m)}_{\text{smooth}}$$

## ➤ Fail to interpret visually

- Dense salient features (unlike the image and text)
- Noisy samples in time series

## ➤ Hard find temporal patterns

- The time series is smoothed

## ➤ Perturbations matter


- Setting a more uninformative values is important
- Give only instance-based explanations

# Existing Perturbations are Inadequate

$$\Phi(x, m) = x \times m + (1 - m) \times \mu$$

where


$$u = \begin{cases} 0 \\ \frac{1}{w+1} \sum_{t-w}^t x_i \\ \text{Gaussian blur} \\ \text{NN}(x) \\ \dots \end{cases}$$



- Those perturbations may *out of distribution* or *label leakage*
- Cannot relate temporal patterns *across samples*

Illustrating different styles of perturbation. Other perturbations could be either not uninformative or not in-domain, while ours is counterfactual that is toward the distribution of negative samples.

# ContraLSP Architecture



$$\text{Perturbation: } \Phi(x, m) = x \times m + (1 - m) \times \varphi_{cntr}(x)$$

How to learn the *uninformative*  $\varphi_{cntr}(x)$  and *sparse mask*  $m$ ?

# Two Main Contributions (1)

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## ➤ Learning counterfactuals from contrastive loss


- Step1: Find positive and negative samples

$$\left( \mathbf{x}_i^r, \{\mathbf{x}_{i,k}^{r+}\}_{k=1}^{K^+}, \{\mathbf{x}_{i,k}^{r-}\}_{k=1}^{K^-} \right)$$

Where  $\begin{cases} \mathcal{D}_{an} = \frac{1}{K^-} \sum_{k=1}^{K^-} |\mathbf{x}_i^r - \mathbf{x}_{i,k}^{r-}| \\ \mathcal{D}_{ap} = \frac{1}{K^+} \sum_{k=1}^{K^+} |\mathbf{x}_i^r - \mathbf{x}_{i,k}^{r+}| \end{cases}$

- Step2: Optimizing via Manhattan distance

$$\mathcal{L}_{cntr}(\mathbf{x}_i) = \max(0, \mathcal{D}_{an} - \mathcal{D}_{ap} - b) + \|\mathbf{x}_i^r\|_1 ,$$



Learning counterfactuals

# Two Main Contributions (2)

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## ➤ Learning sparse gates with smooth constraint




If not smooth, predictor  $f$  may error!

- Sparse gates:

$$\boldsymbol{\mu}'_i = \boldsymbol{\mu}_i \odot \sigma(\tau_{\theta_2}(\mathbf{x}_i)\boldsymbol{\mu}_i) = \frac{\boldsymbol{\mu}_i}{1 + e^{-\tau_{\theta_2}(\mathbf{x}_i)\boldsymbol{\mu}_i}},$$

- $L_0$ -regularization:

$$\mathcal{R}(\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{m}_i) = \|\mathbf{m}_i\|_0 = \sum_{t=1}^T \sum_{d=1}^D \left( \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \operatorname{erf} \left( \frac{\boldsymbol{\mu}'_i[t, d]}{\sqrt{2}\delta} \right) \right),$$




Binary-skewed masks

# Synthetic Experiments (with label)

## 1. White-box Regression

Table 1: Performance on Rare-Time and Rare-Observation experiments w/o different groups.


METHOD	RARE-TIME				RARE-TIME (DIFFGROUPS)			
	AUP $\uparrow$	AUR $\uparrow$	$I_m/10^4 \uparrow$	$S_m/10^2 \downarrow$	AUP $\uparrow$	AUR $\uparrow$	$I_m/10^4 \uparrow$	$S_m/10^2 \downarrow$
FO	<b>1.00</b> $\pm 0.00$	0.13 $\pm 0.00$	0.46 $\pm 0.01$	47.20 $\pm 0.61$	<b>1.00</b> $\pm 0.00$	0.16 $\pm 0.00$	0.53 $\pm 0.01$	54.89 $\pm 0.70$
AFO	<b>1.00</b> $\pm 0.00$	0.15 $\pm 0.01$	0.51 $\pm 0.01$	55.60 $\pm 0.85$	<b>1.00</b> $\pm 0.00$	0.16 $\pm 0.00$	0.54 $\pm 0.01$	57.76 $\pm 0.72$
IG	<b>1.00</b> $\pm 0.00$	0.13 $\pm 0.00$	0.46 $\pm 0.01$	47.61 $\pm 0.62$	<b>1.00</b> $\pm 0.00$	0.15 $\pm 0.00$	0.53 $\pm 0.01$	54.62 $\pm 0.85$
SVS	<b>1.00</b> $\pm 0.00$	0.13 $\pm 0.00$	0.47 $\pm 0.01$	47.20 $\pm 0.61$	<b>1.00</b> $\pm 0.00$	0.15 $\pm 0.00$	0.52 $\pm 0.02$	54.28 $\pm 0.84$
DYNAMASK	0.99 $\pm 0.01$	0.67 $\pm 0.02$	8.68 $\pm 0.11$	37.24 $\pm 0.48$	0.99 $\pm 0.01$	0.51 $\pm 0.00$	5.75 $\pm 0.13$	47.33 $\pm 1.02$
EXTRMASK	<b>1.00</b> $\pm 0.00$	0.88 $\pm 0.00$	16.40 $\pm 0.13$	13.10 $\pm 0.78$	<b>1.00</b> $\pm 0.00$	0.83 $\pm 0.03$	13.37 $\pm 0.78$	27.44 $\pm 3.68$
CONTRALSP	<b>1.00</b> $\pm 0.00$	<b>0.97</b> $\pm 0.01$	<b>19.51</b> $\pm 0.30$	<b>4.65</b> $\pm 0.71$	<b>1.00</b> $\pm 0.00$	<b>0.94</b> $\pm 0.01$	<b>18.92</b> $\pm 0.37$	<b>4.40</b> $\pm 0.60$
METHOD	RARE-OBSERVATION				RARE-OBSERVATION (DIFFGROUPS)			
	AUP $\uparrow$	AUR $\uparrow$	$I_m/10^4 \uparrow$	$S_m/10^2 \downarrow$	AUP $\uparrow$	AUR $\uparrow$	$I_m/10^4 \uparrow$	$S_m/10^2 \downarrow$
FO	<b>1.00</b> $\pm 0.00$	0.13 $\pm 0.00$	0.46 $\pm 0.00$	47.39 $\pm 0.16$	<b>1.00</b> $\pm 0.00$	0.14 $\pm 0.00$	0.50 $\pm 0.01$	52.13 $\pm 0.96$
AFO	<b>1.00</b> $\pm 0.00$	0.16 $\pm 0.00$	0.55 $\pm 0.01$	56.81 $\pm 0.39$	<b>1.00</b> $\pm 0.00$	0.16 $\pm 0.01$	0.54 $\pm 0.02$	56.92 $\pm 1.24$
IG	<b>1.00</b> $\pm 0.00$	0.13 $\pm 0.00$	0.46 $\pm 0.00$	47.82 $\pm 0.15$	<b>1.00</b> $\pm 0.00$	0.13 $\pm 0.00$	0.47 $\pm 0.00$	49.90 $\pm 0.88$
SVS	<b>1.00</b> $\pm 0.00$	0.13 $\pm 0.00$	0.46 $\pm 0.00$	47.39 $\pm 0.16$	<b>1.00</b> $\pm 0.00$	0.13 $\pm 0.00$	0.47 $\pm 0.01$	49.53 $\pm 0.84$
DYNAMASK	0.97 $\pm 0.00$	0.65 $\pm 0.00$	8.32 $\pm 0.06$	22.87 $\pm 0.58$	0.98 $\pm 0.00$	0.52 $\pm 0.01$	6.12 $\pm 0.10$	30.88 $\pm 0.70$
EXTRMASK	<b>1.00</b> $\pm 0.00$	0.76 $\pm 0.00$	13.25 $\pm 0.07$	9.55 $\pm 0.39$	<b>1.00</b> $\pm 0.00$	0.70 $\pm 0.04$	10.40 $\pm 0.54$	32.81 $\pm 0.88$
CONTRALSP	<b>1.00</b> $\pm 0.00$	<b>1.00</b> $\pm 0.00$	<b>20.68</b> $\pm 0.03$	<b>0.32</b> $\pm 0.16$	<b>1.00</b> $\pm 0.00$	<b>0.99</b> $\pm 0.00$	<b>20.51</b> $\pm 0.07$	<b>0.57</b> $\pm 0.20$



## 2. Black-box Classification

Table 2: Performance on Switch Feature and State data.


METHOD	SWITCH-FEATURE				STATE			
	AUP $\uparrow$	AUR $\uparrow$	$I_m/10^4 \uparrow$	$S_m/10^3 \downarrow$	AUP $\uparrow$	AUR $\uparrow$	$I_m/10^4 \uparrow$	$S_m/10^3 \downarrow$
FO	0.89 $\pm 0.03$	0.37 $\pm 0.02$	1.86 $\pm 0.14$	15.60 $\pm 0.28$	0.90 $\pm 0.05$	0.30 $\pm 0.01$	2.73 $\pm 0.15$	28.07 $\pm 0.54$
AFO	0.82 $\pm 0.06$	0.41 $\pm 0.02$	2.00 $\pm 0.14$	17.32 $\pm 0.29$	0.84 $\pm 0.08$	0.36 $\pm 0.03$	3.16 $\pm 0.27$	34.03 $\pm 1.10$
IG	0.91 $\pm 0.02$	0.44 $\pm 0.03$	2.21 $\pm 0.17$	16.87 $\pm 0.52$	0.93 $\pm 0.02$	0.34 $\pm 0.03$	3.17 $\pm 0.28$	30.19 $\pm 1.22$
GRADSHAP	0.88 $\pm 0.02$	0.38 $\pm 0.02$	1.92 $\pm 0.13$	15.85 $\pm 0.40$	0.88 $\pm 0.06$	0.30 $\pm 0.02$	2.76 $\pm 0.20$	28.18 $\pm 0.96$
DEEPLIFT	0.91 $\pm 0.02$	0.44 $\pm 0.02$	2.23 $\pm 0.16$	16.86 $\pm 0.52$	0.93 $\pm 0.02$	0.35 $\pm 0.03$	3.20 $\pm 0.27$	30.21 $\pm 1.19$
LIME	0.94 $\pm 0.02$	0.40 $\pm 0.02$	2.01 $\pm 0.13$	16.09 $\pm 0.58$	0.95 $\pm 0.02$	0.32 $\pm 0.03$	2.94 $\pm 0.26$	28.55 $\pm 1.53$
FIT	0.48 $\pm 0.03$	0.43 $\pm 0.02$	1.99 $\pm 0.11$	17.16 $\pm 0.50$	0.45 $\pm 0.02$	0.59 $\pm 0.02$	7.92 $\pm 0.40$	33.59 $\pm 0.17$
RETAIN	0.93 $\pm 0.01$	0.33 $\pm 0.04$	1.54 $\pm 0.20$	15.08 $\pm 1.13$	0.52 $\pm 0.16$	0.21 $\pm 0.02$	1.56 $\pm 0.24$	25.01 $\pm 0.57$
DYNAMASK	0.35 $\pm 0.00$	0.77 $\pm 0.02$	5.22 $\pm 0.26$	12.85 $\pm 0.53$	0.36 $\pm 0.01$	0.79 $\pm 0.01$	10.59 $\pm 0.20$	25.11 $\pm 0.40$
EXTRMASK	0.97 $\pm 0.01$	0.65 $\pm 0.05$	8.45 $\pm 0.51$	6.90 $\pm 1.44$	0.87 $\pm 0.01$	0.77 $\pm 0.01$	29.71 $\pm 1.39$	7.54 $\pm 0.46$
CONTRALSP	<b>0.98</b> $\pm 0.00$	<b>0.80</b> $\pm 0.03$	<b>24.23</b> $\pm 1.27$	<b>0.91</b> $\pm 0.26$	0.90 $\pm 0.03$	<b>0.81</b> $\pm 0.01$	<b>50.09</b> $\pm 0.78$	<b>0.50</b> $\pm 0.05$



# Synthetic Experiments (with label)

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## ➤ Counterfactual information




## ➤ Distribution analysis of perturbations

Table 12: Difference between the distribution of different perturbations and the original distribution.

PERTURBATION TYPE	RARE-TIME		RARE-OBSERVATION	
	KDE-SCORE ↑	KL-DIVERGENCE ↓	KDE-SCORE ↑	KL-DIVERGENCE ↓
ZERO PERTURBATION	-25.242	0.0523	-23.377	0.0421
MEAN PERTURBATION	-30.805	0.0731	-26.421	0.0589
EXTRMASK PERTURBATION	-22.532	0.0219	-19.102	0.0104
CONTRALSP PERTURBATION	-23.290	0.0393	-22.732	0.0386

# Real-world Experiments (without label)

## 3. MIMIC-III Mortality Data



# Learning Time-Series Explanations with Information Bottleneck

**Zichuan Liu<sup>1,2</sup> Tianchun Wang<sup>3</sup> Jimeng Shi<sup>4</sup> Xu Zheng<sup>4</sup> Zhuomin Chen<sup>4</sup> Lei Song<sup>2</sup>  
Wenqian Dong<sup>4</sup> Jayantha Obeysekera<sup>4</sup> Farhad Shirani<sup>4</sup> Dongsheng Luo<sup>4</sup>**

<sup>1</sup>Nanjing University

<sup>2</sup>Microsoft Research Asia

<sup>3</sup>Pennsylvania State University


<sup>4</sup>Florida International University

# Existing Perturbation Time Series


Perturbation:  $\Phi(x, m) = x \times m + (1 - m) \times \mu$

Goal: *find a mask  $m$ !*

1. Explaining the black box directly



2. Approximating the black box through a white box



$$\arg \min \underbrace{\mathcal{L}(f(x), f \circ \Phi(x, m))}_{\text{label consistency}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{R}(m)}_{\text{regular}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{A}(m)}_{\text{smooth}}$$

$$\begin{aligned} & \arg \min \underbrace{\mathcal{L}(f(x), f^E \circ \Phi(x, m))}_{\text{label consistency}} \\ & + \underbrace{\mathcal{R}(m)}_{\text{regular}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{A}(m)}_{\text{smooth}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{B}(f, f^E)}_{\text{behavior}} \end{aligned}$$

# Challenges for Perturbing Time Series


$$\text{Perturbation: } \Phi(X, M) = X \times M + (1 - M) \times \mu$$

## 1. Explaining the black box directly

- Instance out-of-distribution
- Perturb function is fixed

## 2. Learning a white box

- Embeddings distribution shift
- Consistent behaviour is not equal to consistent explanation
- Need to know the model structure



# Motivation for Information Bottlenecks

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**Objective:**  $\arg \min \underbrace{\mathcal{L}(f(x), f \circ \Phi(x, m))}_{\text{label consistency}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{R}(m)}_{\text{regular}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{A}(m)}_{\text{smooth}}$


$$\downarrow \qquad \qquad \downarrow$$
$$\arg \max I(Y; X') - I(X; X')$$

# Motivation for Information Bottlenecks

---

**Objective:**

$$\arg \min \underbrace{\mathcal{L}(f(x), f \circ \Phi(x, m))}_{\text{label consistency}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{R}(m)}_{\text{regular}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{A}(m)}_{\text{smooth}}$$



$$\arg \max I(Y; X') - I(X; X')$$

$$M[t, d] = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } (t, d) = \arg \max_{t', d'} X[t', d'] \text{ and } Y = 0 \\ 1 & \text{if } (t, d) = \arg \min_{t', d'} X[t', d'] \text{ and } Y = 1 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} .$$

$$X_i = \begin{cases} U_i, & \text{if } i < n \\ U_1 + U_2 + \cdots + U_i + N_i & \text{if } i \geq n \end{cases},$$

# Motivation for Information Bottlenecks

---

**Objective:**  $\arg \min \underbrace{\mathcal{L}(f(x), f \circ \Phi(x, m))}_{\text{label consistency}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{R}(m)}_{\text{regular}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{A}(m)}_{\text{smooth}}$

$$\downarrow \qquad \qquad \qquad \downarrow$$
$$\arg \max I(Y; X') - I(X; X')$$

$$\min_{\substack{g: \mathcal{X} \mapsto [0,1]^{T \times D} \\ M[t,d] \sim \text{Bern}(\pi_{t,d})}} -\text{LC}(Y; Y') + \mathbb{E}_X \left[ \alpha \sum_{t,d} H(M[t,d]) + \gamma |M| \right],$$

deterministic                      regular

# Traceable Information Bottleneck

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**Objective:**  $\arg \min -\text{LC}(Y; Y') + I(X; X')$

- Modify the Compactness Quantifier  $I(X; X')$

$$\min_{\substack{g: \mathcal{X} \mapsto [0,1]^{T \times D} \\ M[t,d] \sim \text{Bern}(\pi_{t,d})}} -\text{LC}(Y; Y') + \mathbb{E}_X [\alpha \sum_{t,d} H(M[t,d]) + \gamma |M|],$$

Reformulated as:

$$\begin{aligned} & \min_{\substack{g: \mathcal{X} \mapsto [0,1]^{T \times D} \\ M[t,d] \sim \text{Bern}(\pi_{t,d})}} -\text{LC}(Y; Y') \\ & \quad + \alpha \mathbb{E}_X [D_{\text{KL}}(\mathbb{P}(M|X) \| \mathbb{Q}(M))], \end{aligned}$$

# Traceable Information Bottleneck

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**Objective:**  $\arg \min -\text{LC}(Y; Y') + I(X; X')$

- The Informativeness Quantifier  $\text{LC}(Y; Y')$

Previous perturbation:  $X^r = \Phi(X, M) = X \times M + (1 - M) \times \mu$




Our perturbation:  $\tilde{X} = \Psi(X, M)$  A green circle with a white checkmark inside, indicating a good choice.

$$-\text{LC}(f(X), f(\tilde{X})), s.t. \mathbb{P}_X \approx \mathbb{P}_{\tilde{X}}, P(Y'|\tilde{X}) \approx P(Y'|X')$$

Reformulated as:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{LC}}(f(X), f(\tilde{X})) + \beta(\mathcal{L}_{\text{KL}}(\mathbb{P}_X, \mathbb{P}_{\tilde{X}}) + \mathcal{L}_{dr}(\tilde{X}, \tilde{X}^r)).$$

# TimeX++ Architecture



label consistency, regular, in-distribution, uninformative

# Learn Highly-Faithful Explanations

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*Table 1.* Attribution explanation performance on univariate and multivariate synthetic datasets.

METHOD	FREQSHAPES			SEQCOMB-UV		
	AUPRC	AUP	AUR	AUPRC	AUP	AUR
IG	0.7516±0.0032	0.6912±0.0028	0.5975±0.0020	0.5760±0.0022	0.8157±0.0023	0.2868±0.0023
DYNAMASK	0.2201±0.0013	0.2952±0.0037	0.5037±0.0015	0.4421±0.0016	0.8782±0.0039	0.1029±0.0007
WINIT	0.5071±0.0021	0.5546±0.0026	0.4557±0.0016	0.4568±0.0017	0.7872±0.0027	0.2253±0.0016
CORTX	0.6978±0.0156	0.4938±0.0004	0.3261±0.0012	0.5643±0.0024	0.8241±0.0025	0.1749±0.0007
SGT + GRAD	0.5312±0.0019	0.4138±0.0011	0.3931±0.0015	0.5731±0.0021	0.7828±0.0013	0.2136±0.0008
TIMEX	0.8324±0.0034	0.7219±0.0031	0.6381±0.0022	0.7124±0.0017	<b>0.9411</b> ±0.0006	0.3380±0.0014
TIMEX++	<b>0.8905</b> ±0.0018	<b>0.7805</b> ±0.0014	<b>0.6618</b> ±0.0019	<b>0.8468</b> ±0.0014	0.9069±0.0003	<b>0.4064</b> ±0.0011

METHOD	SEQCOMB-MV			LOWVAR		
	AUPRC	AUP	AUR	AUPRC	AUP	AUR
IG	0.3298±0.0015	0.7483±0.0027	0.2581±0.0028	0.8691±0.0035	0.4827±0.0029	0.8165±0.0016
DYNAMASK	0.3136±0.0019	0.5481±0.0053	0.1953±0.0025	0.1391±0.0012	0.1640±0.0028	0.2106±0.0018
WINIT	0.2809±0.0018	0.7594±0.0024	0.2077±0.0021	0.1667±0.0015	0.1140±0.0022	0.3842±0.0017
CORTX	0.3629±0.0021	0.5625±0.0006	0.3457±0.0017	0.4983±0.0014	0.3281±0.0027	0.4711±0.0013
SGT + GRAD	0.4893±0.0005	0.4970±0.0005	<b>0.4289</b> ±0.0018	0.3449±0.0010	0.2133±0.0029	0.3528±0.0015
TIMEX	0.6878±0.0021	0.8326±0.0008	0.3872±0.0015	0.8673±0.0033	0.5451±0.0028	<b>0.9004</b> ±0.0024
TIMEX++	<b>0.7589</b> ±0.0014	<b>0.8783</b> ±0.0007	0.3906±0.0011	<b>0.9466</b> ±0.0015	<b>0.8057</b> ±0.0016	0.8332±0.0016

*Table 3. (Left)* Attribution explanation performance on the ECG dataset. *(Right)* Results of ablation analysis.

METHOD	ECG			TIMEX++ ABLATIONS	ECG		
	AUPRC	AUP	AUR		AUPRC	AUP	AUR
IG	0.4182±0.0014	0.5949±0.0023	0.3204±0.0012	FULL	<b>0.6599</b> ±0.0009	0.7260±0.0010	0.4595±0.0007
DYNAMASK	0.3280±0.0011	0.5249±0.0030	0.1082±0.0080	w/o STE	0.6152±0.0007	<b>0.7468</b> ±0.0008	0.4023±0.0012
WINIT	0.3049±0.0011	0.4431±0.0026	0.3474±0.0011	w/o $\mathcal{L}_{LC}$	0.6209±0.0019	0.6417±0.0020	0.4287±0.0015
CORTX	0.3735±0.0008	0.4968±0.0021	0.3031±0.0009	w/o $\mathcal{L}_{KL}$	0.6417±0.0019	0.6979±0.0009	0.4424±0.0007
SGT + GRAD	0.3144±0.0010	0.4241±0.0024	0.2639±0.0013	w/o $\mathcal{L}_{dr}$	0.1516±0.0003	0.1405±0.0003	<b>0.6313</b> ±0.0006
TIMEX	0.4721±0.0018	0.5663±0.0025	0.4457±0.0018	w/o $\mathcal{L}_{con}$	0.6072±0.0008	0.6921±0.0010	0.4387±0.0007
TIMEX++	<b>0.6599</b> ±0.0009	<b>0.7260</b> ±0.0010	<b>0.4595</b> ±0.0007				

# Explanations on Real-world Datasets







Figure 3. Occlusion experiments on real-world datasets. Higher values indicate better performance.





NEC



NEURAL INFORMATION  
PROCESSING SYSTEMS

# Protecting Your LLMs with Information Bottleneck

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<sup>1</sup>Nanjing University

<sup>2</sup>Microsoft Research Asia

<sup>3</sup>Tsinghua University

<sup>4</sup>Queen Mary University of London


<sup>5</sup>Pennsylvania State University

<sup>6</sup>NEC Laboratories America


# Background

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- Jailbreaking with adversarial prompts



- Different forms of adversarial prompts




# Motivation


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How do you defend against these attacks?

Perturbation!



## Information Bottleneck Protection



Smooth and RA LLM

Source: [Robey et al.](#) and [Cao et al.](#)

# Existing Methods are Inadequate

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Table 3: Comparison between our IBProtector and other defense methodologies.

Method	Finetuning	Filter	Support Ensemble	Information Extraction	Transferability	Support Black-box	Inference Cost
Fine-tuning	✓	✗	No	✗	✓	No	Low
Unlearning LLM	✓	✗	No	✗	✓	No	Low
Self Defense	✗	—	No	✓	✗	Yes	High
Smooth LLM	✗	✓	Yes	✗	—	Yes	Medium
RA-LLM	✗	✓	Yes	✗	—	Yes	Medium
Semantic Smooth	✗	✓	Yes	✓	—	Yes	High
<b>IBProtector</b>	✓	✓	Yes	✓	✓	Yes	Low

# Traceable Information Bottleneck in LLM

---

**Objective:**  $X_{\text{sub}}^* := \arg \min_{\mathbb{P}(X_{\text{sub}}|X)} \alpha \underbrace{I(X; X_{\text{sub}})}_{\text{Compression}} - \underbrace{I(Y; X_{\text{sub}})}_{\text{Prediction}},$



where,  $I(Y; X_{\text{sub}}) = H(Y) - H(Y|X_{\text{sub}})$

**Objective:**

$$X_{\text{sub}}^* = \arg \min_{\mathbb{P}(X_{\text{sub}}|X)} \alpha I(X; X_{\text{sub}}) + H(Y|X_{\text{sub}}).$$

where,  $X_{\text{sub}} = X \odot M$

# Traceable Information Bottleneck in LLM

---

**Objective:**  $X_{\text{sub}}^* = \arg \min_{\mathbb{P}(X_{\text{sub}}|X)} \alpha I(X; X_{\text{sub}}) + H(Y|X_{\text{sub}}).$

- Modify the Compression Quantifier  $I(X; X_{\text{sub}})$

$$I(X; X_{\text{sub}}) \leq \mathbb{E}_X [D_{\text{KL}}[\mathbb{P}_\phi(X_{\text{sub}}|X) \parallel \mathbb{Q}(X_{\text{sub}})]],$$

Give  $p_\phi \sim \mathbb{P}_\phi$ :  $p_\phi(X_{\leq t}) = \pi_t | t \in [T]$

$$M \sim \mathbb{P}_\phi(M|X) = \prod_{t=1}^T \text{Bern}(\pi_t) \quad \text{Define } \mathbb{Q}(M) \sim \prod_{t=1}^T \text{Bern}(r)$$

- Reformulated as:

$$\mathcal{L}_M = \sum_{t=1}^T \left[ \pi_t \log\left(\frac{\pi_t}{r}\right) + (1 - \pi_t) \log\left(\frac{1 - \pi_t}{1 - r}\right) \right]$$

# Traceable Information Bottleneck in LLM

---

**Objective:**  $X_{\text{sub}}^* = \arg \min_{\mathbb{P}(X_{\text{sub}}|X)} \alpha I(X; X_{\text{sub}}) + H(Y|X_{\text{sub}}).$

- Modify the Compression Quantifier  $I(X; X_{\text{sub}})$

$$\mathcal{L}_M = \sum_{t=1}^T \left[ \pi_t \log\left(\frac{\pi_t}{r}\right) + (1 - \pi_t) \log\left(\frac{1 - \pi_t}{1 - r}\right) \right]$$

- Enhance the coherence in  $X_{\text{sub}}$

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{con}} = \frac{1}{T} \cdot \sum_{t=1}^{T-1} \sqrt{(\pi_{t+1} - \pi_{\textcolor{brown}{t}})^2}$$

# Traceable Information Bottleneck in LLM

---

**Objective:**  $X_{\text{sub}}^* = \arg \min_{\mathbb{P}(X_{\text{sub}}|X)} \alpha I(X; X_{\text{sub}}) + H(Y|X_{\text{sub}}).$

- The Informativeness Quantifier  $H(Y|X_{\text{sub}})$


$$H(Y|X_{\text{sub}}) = - \sum_{X,Y} p(X \odot M, Y) \log p(Y|X \odot M)$$

- Reformulated as:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{info}} = \underbrace{- \sum_{t=1}^{|Y|} \log p(Y_t|\tilde{X}, Y_{<t})}_{\text{Cross Entropy}} + \underbrace{\sum_{t=1}^{|Y|} D_{\text{KL}} \left[ f_{\text{tar}}(\tilde{X}, Y_{<t}) || f_{\text{tar}}(X, Y_{<t}) \right]}_{\text{RLHF}}$$

# Information Bottleneck Protector

- The framework of IBProtector



$$\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L}_{\text{info}} + \alpha(\mathcal{L}_M + \lambda \mathcal{L}_{\text{con}})$$

informative, regular, connective

# Further Gradient-Free Version

---

**Objective:**  $X_{\text{sub}}^* = \arg \min_{\mathbb{P}(X_{\text{sub}}|X)} \alpha I(X; X_{\text{sub}}) + H(Y|X_{\text{sub}}).$

➤ Reformulated as:

$$\max_{\phi} \underbrace{\mathbb{E}[\rho(Y; \hat{Y})] - \beta D_{\text{KL}}[p_{\phi}(X)||p_{\phi}^{\text{ref}}(X)]}_{\text{RL for Prediction}} - \underbrace{\alpha(\mathcal{L}_M + \lambda \mathcal{L}_{\text{con}})}_{\text{Compactness}},$$

where,  $\rho(Y; \hat{Y}) = -\frac{\gamma(Y) \cdot \gamma(\hat{Y})}{\|\gamma(Y)\|^2 \|\gamma(\hat{Y})\|^2}$

# Defence Experiments

Lower Attack Success Rate, Higher Benign Answering Rate!

Table 1: Defense results of state-of-the-art methods and IBProtector on AdvBench.


Experiment		Prompt-level Jailbreak (PAIR)			Token-level Jailbreak (GCG)			TriviaQA
Model	Method	ASR ↓	Harm ↓	GPT-4 ↓	ASR ↓	Harm ↓	GPT-4 ↓	BAR ↑
Vicuna (13b-v1.5)	Original Attack	87.5%	4.034	3.008	82.5%	0.244	4.300	97.8%
	Fine-tuning	62.5%	2.854	2.457	32.5%	0.089	2.114	94.8%
	Unlearning LLM	66.7%	2.928	2.496	40.8%	0.123	2.537	92.2%
	Self Defense	44.2%	2.585	1.692	12.5%	-1.170	1.400	79.6%
	Smooth LLM	68.3%	3.115	2.642	24.2%	<u>-1.252</u>	1.767	90.9%
	RA-LLM	34.2%	2.446	1.832	<u>8.3%</u>	-1.133	1.411	95.2%
	Semantic Smooth	<u>20.0%</u>	<u>2.170</u>	<u>1.525</u>	<b>1.7%</b>	-0.842	<u>1.058</u>	<u>95.7%</u>
IBProtector		<b>19.2%</b>	<b>1.971</b>	<b>1.483</b>	<b>1.7%</b>	<b>-1.763</b>	<b>1.042</b>	<b>96.5%</b>
LLaMA-2 (7b-chat-hf)	Original Attack	67.5%	3.852	1.617	27.5%	0.325	2.517	98.7%
	Fine-tuning	47.5%	2.551	1.392	12.5%	-0.024	1.233	<u>97.0%</u>
	Unlearning LLM	49.2%	2.507	1.383	12.5%	-0.084	1.258	<b>97.4%</b>
	Self Defense	45.0%	2.682	1.525	11.7%	0.208	1.492	92.6%
	Smooth LLM	43.3%	2.394	1.342	<u>4.2%</u>	0.189	<u>1.100</u>	95.2%
	RA-LLM	<u>40.0%</u>	2.493	1.362	<u>4.2%</u>	-0.070	1.116	<u>97.0%</u>
	Semantic Smooth	40.8%	<u>2.250</u>	<u>1.333</u>	10.0%	<u>-0.141</u>	1.417	<u>96.5%</u>
IBProtector		<b>16.7%</b>	<b>1.315</b>	<b>1.125</b>	<b>0.8%</b>	<b>-1.024</b>	<b>1.000</b>	<u>97.0%</u>

# Transferability Experiments

- Defend against other attack methods:

Method	Vicuna (13b-v1.5)			LLaMA-2 (7b-chat-hf)		
	ASR ↓	Harm ↓	GPT-4 ↓	ASR ↓	Harm ↓	GPT-4 ↓
Original Attack	88.6%	2.337	4.225	29.0%	2.167	1.883
Fine-tuning	<u>26.8%</u>	1.124	<u>1.772</u>	5.1%	1.597	1.192
Unlearning LLM	28.3%	1.127	1.815	5.1%	1.534	1.233
Self Defense	28.7%	1.291	<b>1.725</b>	8.7%	1.439	1.792
Smooth LLM	81.1%	1.673	2.168	35.5%	1.720	1.992
RA-LLM	54.1%	1.027	1.892	<u>2.2%</u>	1.484	1.253
Semantic Smooth	49.2%	<u>0.417</u>	2.022	5.1%	<u>1.116</u>	<u>1.101</u>
IBProtector	<b>18.9%</b>	<b>0.031</b>	1.854	<b>0.7%</b>	<b>0.608</b>	<b>1.036</b>

- Protect other target models:



# Low Computational Cost

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Table 7: Theoretical costs of the inference phase of existing defense methods.


Method	Theoretical Cost	Simplify
Original Attack	$C_{\text{ori}} = T \times c_X +  \hat{Y}  \times c_Y$	$C_{\text{ori}}$
Fine-tuning	$C_{\text{sft}} = T \times c_X +  \hat{Y}  \times c_Y$	$\approx C_{\text{ori}}$
Unlearning LLM	$C_{\text{unlearning}} = T \times c_X +  \hat{Y}  \times c_Y$	$\approx C_{\text{ori}}$
Self Defense	$C_{\text{self def}} = C_{\text{ori}} + ( \hat{Y}  \times c_X +  \hat{Y}'  \times c_Y)$	$\approx 2 \times C_{\text{ori}}$
Smooth LLM	$C_{\text{smooth}} = n \times [(1 - k)T \times c_X + kT \times c_\mu +  \hat{Y}  \times c_Y]$	$\approx n \times C_{\text{ori}}$
RA-LLM	$C_{\text{ra}} = n \times [(1 - k)T \times c_X +  \hat{Y}  \times c_Y]$	$\approx n \times C_{\text{ori}}$
Semantic Smooth	$C_{\text{semantic}} = 2n \times [T \times c_X + T' \times c_Y + T' \times c_X +  \hat{Y}  \times c_Y]$	$\approx 2n \times C_{\text{ori}}$
IBProtector	$T \times c_p + (1 - k)T \times c_X + kT \times c_\mu +  \hat{Y}  \times c_Y$	$\approx C_{\text{ori}}$

Method	PAIR → Vicuna	GCG → Vicuna	PAIR → LLaMA-2	GCG → LLaMA-2	Avg. Time
Original Attack	4.962±0.828	5.067±0.841	4.235±0.217	4.095±0.312	4.590
Fine-tuning	4.850±1.380	4.726±0.911	4.107±0.154	3.873±0.309	4.389
Unlearning LLM	5.014±0.781	5.128±0.643	4.233±0.373	4.042±0.643	4.604
Self Defense	9.551±1.843	8.413±1.438	8.780±1.224	9.208±0.988	8.988
Smooth LLM(one copy)	5.297±0.717	5.015±1.398	4.284±0.180	4.319±0.392	4.729
RA-LLM(one copy)	5.664±1.268	5.351±1.550	4.269±0.643	4.528±0.475	4.953
IBProtector	5.509±1.283	5.370±1.489	4.426±1.137	4.251±1.367	4.889

# Future Explorations

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- How to represent uncertainty when black box models are inaccurate



- Quantification of compression amplitude and parameter tuning strategy

$$\tilde{\mathcal{L}} = \mathcal{L}_{LC} + \alpha \mathcal{L}_M + \beta (\mathcal{L}_{KL} + \mathcal{L}_{dr}),$$

↑      ↑

# Conclusion

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- We investigate the limitations of existing explanation models in terms of sequence and give an intuitive solution.
- We further give a perspective of information theory and propose a practical objective function in information bottleneck to solve distribution shifting.
- We apply our perturbation proposal to the defence against adversarial scenarios in large language models, and achieved significant results.
- All codes of three papers are available at <https://github.com/zichuan-liu>

# **Thanks for your listening!**

**Any Questions? Please use the chat !**