

Perturbation-based Techniques for Explaining Sequence Predictions

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Content

- Limitations and Optimizations of Existing Perturbations



ICLR

International Conference On
Learning Representations

- Introduce Information Theory in Perturbations




ICML

International Conference
On Machine Learning

- How to Apply Perturbations with Information Bottleneck



NEURAL INFORMATION
PROCESSING SYSTEMS





Explaining Time Series via Contrastive and Locally Sparse Perturbations

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

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


Background


Black-box models with post-hoc explanation techniques: *Find salient features!*



Visual Explanation
Source: [Fong et al.](#)




Graph Explanation
Source: [Miao et al.](#)



Game Explanation
Source: [Liu et al.](#)

Challenges for Explaining Time Series



Dynamask, [Crabbe' et al.](#)

$$\Phi(x, m) = x \times m + (1 - m) \times \mu$$

$$\arg \min \underbrace{\mathcal{L}(f(x), f \circ \Phi(x, m))}_{\text{label consistency}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{R}(m)}_{\text{regular}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{A}(m)}_{\text{smooth}}$$

➤ Fail to interpret visually

- Dense salient features (unlike the image and text)
- Noisy samples in time series

➤ Hard find temporal patterns

- The time series is smoothed

➤ Perturbations matter


- Setting a more uninformative values is important
- Give only instance-based explanations

Existing Perturbations are Inadequate

$$\Phi(x, m) = x \times m + (1 - m) \times \mu$$

where


$$u = \begin{cases} 0 \\ \frac{1}{w+1} \sum_{t-w}^t x_i \\ \text{Gaussian blur} \\ \text{NN}(x) \\ \dots \end{cases}$$



- Those perturbations may *out of distribution* or *label leakage*
- Cannot relate temporal patterns *across samples*

Illustrating different styles of perturbation. Other perturbations could be either not uninformative or not in-domain, while ours is counterfactual that is toward the distribution of negative samples.

ContraLSP Architecture



$$\text{Perturbation: } \Phi(x, m) = x \times m + (1 - m) \times \varphi_{cntr}(x)$$

How to learn the *uninformative* $\varphi_{cntr}(x)$ and *sparse mask* m ?

Two Main Contributions (1)

➤ Learning counterfactuals from contrastive loss


- Step1: Find positive and negative samples

$$\left(\mathbf{x}_i^r, \{\mathbf{x}_{i,k}^{r+}\}_{k=1}^{K^+}, \{\mathbf{x}_{i,k}^{r-}\}_{k=1}^{K^-} \right)$$

Where $\begin{cases} \mathcal{D}_{an} = \frac{1}{K^-} \sum_{k=1}^{K^-} |\mathbf{x}_i^r - \mathbf{x}_{i,k}^{r-}| \\ \mathcal{D}_{ap} = \frac{1}{K^+} \sum_{k=1}^{K^+} |\mathbf{x}_i^r - \mathbf{x}_{i,k}^{r+}| \end{cases}$

- Step2: Optimizing via Manhattan distance

$$\mathcal{L}_{cntr}(\mathbf{x}_i) = \max(0, \mathcal{D}_{an} - \mathcal{D}_{ap} - b) + \|\mathbf{x}_i^r\|_1 ,$$



Learning counterfactuals

Two Main Contributions (2)

➤ Learning sparse gates with smooth constraint




If not smooth, predictor f may error!

- Sparse gates:

$$\boldsymbol{\mu}'_i = \boldsymbol{\mu}_i \odot \sigma(\tau_{\theta_2}(\mathbf{x}_i)\boldsymbol{\mu}_i) = \frac{\boldsymbol{\mu}_i}{1 + e^{-\tau_{\theta_2}(\mathbf{x}_i)\boldsymbol{\mu}_i}},$$

- L_0 -regularization:

$$\mathcal{R}(\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{m}_i) = \|\mathbf{m}_i\|_0 = \sum_{t=1}^T \sum_{d=1}^D \left(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \operatorname{erf} \left(\frac{\boldsymbol{\mu}'_i[t, d]}{\sqrt{2}\delta} \right) \right),$$




Binary-skewed masks

Synthetic Experiments (with label)

1. White-box Regression

Table 1: Performance on Rare-Time and Rare-Observation experiments w/o different groups.


METHOD	RARE-TIME				RARE-TIME (DIFFGROUPS)			
	AUP \uparrow	AUR \uparrow	$I_m/10^4 \uparrow$	$S_m/10^2 \downarrow$	AUP \uparrow	AUR \uparrow	$I_m/10^4 \uparrow$	$S_m/10^2 \downarrow$
FO	1.00 ± 0.00	0.13 ± 0.00	0.46 ± 0.01	47.20 ± 0.61	1.00 ± 0.00	0.16 ± 0.00	0.53 ± 0.01	54.89 ± 0.70
AFO	1.00 ± 0.00	0.15 ± 0.01	0.51 ± 0.01	55.60 ± 0.85	1.00 ± 0.00	0.16 ± 0.00	0.54 ± 0.01	57.76 ± 0.72
IG	1.00 ± 0.00	0.13 ± 0.00	0.46 ± 0.01	47.61 ± 0.62	1.00 ± 0.00	0.15 ± 0.00	0.53 ± 0.01	54.62 ± 0.85
SVS	1.00 ± 0.00	0.13 ± 0.00	0.47 ± 0.01	47.20 ± 0.61	1.00 ± 0.00	0.15 ± 0.00	0.52 ± 0.02	54.28 ± 0.84
DYNAMASK	0.99 ± 0.01	0.67 ± 0.02	8.68 ± 0.11	37.24 ± 0.48	0.99 ± 0.01	0.51 ± 0.00	5.75 ± 0.13	47.33 ± 1.02
EXTRMASK	1.00 ± 0.00	0.88 ± 0.00	16.40 ± 0.13	13.10 ± 0.78	1.00 ± 0.00	0.83 ± 0.03	13.37 ± 0.78	27.44 ± 3.68
CONTRALSP	1.00 ± 0.00	0.97 ± 0.01	19.51 ± 0.30	4.65 ± 0.71	1.00 ± 0.00	0.94 ± 0.01	18.92 ± 0.37	4.40 ± 0.60
METHOD	RARE-OBSERVATION				RARE-OBSERVATION (DIFFGROUPS)			
	AUP \uparrow	AUR \uparrow	$I_m/10^4 \uparrow$	$S_m/10^2 \downarrow$	AUP \uparrow	AUR \uparrow	$I_m/10^4 \uparrow$	$S_m/10^2 \downarrow$
FO	1.00 ± 0.00	0.13 ± 0.00	0.46 ± 0.00	47.39 ± 0.16	1.00 ± 0.00	0.14 ± 0.00	0.50 ± 0.01	52.13 ± 0.96
AFO	1.00 ± 0.00	0.16 ± 0.00	0.55 ± 0.01	56.81 ± 0.39	1.00 ± 0.00	0.16 ± 0.01	0.54 ± 0.02	56.92 ± 1.24
IG	1.00 ± 0.00	0.13 ± 0.00	0.46 ± 0.00	47.82 ± 0.15	1.00 ± 0.00	0.13 ± 0.00	0.47 ± 0.00	49.90 ± 0.88
SVS	1.00 ± 0.00	0.13 ± 0.00	0.46 ± 0.00	47.39 ± 0.16	1.00 ± 0.00	0.13 ± 0.00	0.47 ± 0.01	49.53 ± 0.84
DYNAMASK	0.97 ± 0.00	0.65 ± 0.00	8.32 ± 0.06	22.87 ± 0.58	0.98 ± 0.00	0.52 ± 0.01	6.12 ± 0.10	30.88 ± 0.70
EXTRMASK	1.00 ± 0.00	0.76 ± 0.00	13.25 ± 0.07	9.55 ± 0.39	1.00 ± 0.00	0.70 ± 0.04	10.40 ± 0.54	32.81 ± 0.88
CONTRALSP	1.00 ± 0.00	1.00 ± 0.00	20.68 ± 0.03	0.32 ± 0.16	1.00 ± 0.00	0.99 ± 0.00	20.51 ± 0.07	0.57 ± 0.20



2. Black-box Classification


Table 2: Performance on Switch Feature and State data.

METHOD	SWITCH-FEATURE				STATE			
	AUP \uparrow	AUR \uparrow	$I_m/10^4 \uparrow$	$S_m/10^3 \downarrow$	AUP \uparrow	AUR \uparrow	$I_m/10^4 \uparrow$	$S_m/10^3 \downarrow$
FO	0.89 ± 0.03	0.37 ± 0.02	1.86 ± 0.14	15.60 ± 0.28	0.90 ± 0.05	0.30 ± 0.01	2.73 ± 0.15	28.07 ± 0.54
AFO	0.82 ± 0.06	0.41 ± 0.02	2.00 ± 0.14	17.32 ± 0.29	0.84 ± 0.08	0.36 ± 0.03	3.16 ± 0.27	34.03 ± 1.10
IG	0.91 ± 0.02	0.44 ± 0.03	2.21 ± 0.17	16.87 ± 0.52	0.93 ± 0.02	0.34 ± 0.03	3.17 ± 0.28	30.19 ± 1.22
GRADSHAP	0.88 ± 0.02	0.38 ± 0.02	1.92 ± 0.13	15.85 ± 0.40	0.88 ± 0.06	0.30 ± 0.02	2.76 ± 0.20	28.18 ± 0.96
DEEPLIFT	0.91 ± 0.02	0.44 ± 0.02	2.23 ± 0.16	16.86 ± 0.52	0.93 ± 0.02	0.35 ± 0.03	3.20 ± 0.27	30.21 ± 1.19
LIME	0.94 ± 0.02	0.40 ± 0.02	2.01 ± 0.13	16.09 ± 0.58	0.95 ± 0.02	0.32 ± 0.03	2.94 ± 0.26	28.55 ± 1.53
FIT	0.48 ± 0.03	0.43 ± 0.02	1.99 ± 0.11	17.16 ± 0.50	0.45 ± 0.02	0.59 ± 0.02	7.92 ± 0.40	33.59 ± 0.17
RETAIN	0.93 ± 0.01	0.33 ± 0.04	1.54 ± 0.20	15.08 ± 1.13	0.52 ± 0.16	0.21 ± 0.02	1.56 ± 0.24	25.01 ± 0.57
DYNAMASK	0.35 ± 0.00	0.77 ± 0.02	5.22 ± 0.26	12.85 ± 0.53	0.36 ± 0.01	0.79 ± 0.01	10.59 ± 0.20	25.11 ± 0.40
EXTRMASK	0.97 ± 0.01	0.65 ± 0.05	8.45 ± 0.51	6.90 ± 1.44	0.87 ± 0.01	0.77 ± 0.01	29.71 ± 1.39	7.54 ± 0.46
CONTRALSP	0.98 ± 0.00	0.80 ± 0.03	24.23 ± 1.27	0.91 ± 0.26	0.90 ± 0.03	0.81 ± 0.01	50.09 ± 0.78	0.50 ± 0.05



Synthetic Experiments (with label)

➤ Counterfactual information




➤ Distribution analysis of perturbations

Table 12: Difference between the distribution of different perturbations and the original distribution.

PERTURBATION TYPE	RARE-TIME		RARE-OBSERVATION	
	KDE-SCORE ↑	KL-DIVERGENCE ↓	KDE-SCORE ↑	KL-DIVERGENCE ↓
ZERO PERTURBATION	-25.242	0.0523	-23.377	0.0421
MEAN PERTURBATION	-30.805	0.0731	-26.421	0.0589
EXTRMASK PERTURBATION	-22.532	0.0219	-19.102	0.0104
CONTRALSP PERTURBATION	-23.290	0.0393	-22.732	0.0386

Real-world Experiments (without label)

3. MIMIC-III Mortality Data



Learning Time-Series Explanations with Information Bottleneck

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¹Nanjing University

²Microsoft Research Asia

³Pennsylvania State University


⁴Florida International University

Existing Perturbation Time Series


Perturbation: $\Phi(x, m) = x \times m + (1 - m) \times \mu$

Goal: *find a mask m !*

1. Explaining the black box directly



2. Approximating the black box through a white box



$$\arg \min \underbrace{\mathcal{L}(f(x), f \circ \Phi(x, m))}_{\text{label consistency}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{R}(m)}_{\text{regular}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{A}(m)}_{\text{smooth}}$$

$$\begin{aligned} & \arg \min \underbrace{\mathcal{L}(f(x), f^E \circ \Phi(x, m))}_{\text{label consistency}} \\ & + \underbrace{\mathcal{R}(m)}_{\text{regular}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{A}(m)}_{\text{smooth}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{B}(f, f^E)}_{\text{behavior}} \end{aligned}$$

Challenges for Perturbing Time Series


$$\text{Perturbation: } \Phi(X, M) = X \times M + (1 - M) \times \mu$$

1. Explaining the black box directly

- Instance out-of-distribution
- Perturb function is fixed

2. Learning a white box

- Embeddings distribution shift
- Consistent behaviour is not equal to consistent explanation
- Need to know the model structure



Motivation for Information Bottlenecks


Objective: $\arg \min \underbrace{\mathcal{L}(f(x), f \circ \Phi(x, m))}_{\text{label consistency}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{R}(m)}_{\text{regular}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{A}(m)}_{\text{smooth}}$

$$\downarrow \qquad \qquad \downarrow$$
$$\arg \max I(Y; X') - I(X; X')$$

Motivation for Information Bottlenecks

Objective:

$$\arg \min \underbrace{\mathcal{L}(f(x), f \circ \Phi(x, m))}_{\text{label consistency}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{R}(m)}_{\text{regular}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{A}(m)}_{\text{smooth}}$$



$$\arg \max I(Y; X') - I(X; X')$$

$$M[t, d] = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } (t, d) = \arg \max_{t', d'} X[t', d'] \text{ and } Y = 0 \\ 1 & \text{if } (t, d) = \arg \min_{t', d'} X[t', d'] \text{ and } Y = 1 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} .$$

$$X_i = \begin{cases} U_i, & \text{if } i < n \\ U_1 + U_2 + \cdots + U_i + N_i & \text{if } i \geq n \end{cases},$$

Motivation for Information Bottlenecks

Objective: $\arg \min \underbrace{\mathcal{L}(f(x), f \circ \Phi(x, m))}_{\text{label consistency}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{R}(m)}_{\text{regular}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{A}(m)}_{\text{smooth}}$

$$\downarrow \qquad \qquad \qquad \downarrow$$
$$\arg \max I(Y; X') - I(X; X')$$

$$\min_{\substack{g: \mathcal{X} \mapsto [0,1]^{T \times D} \\ M[t,d] \sim \text{Bern}(\pi_{t,d})}} -\text{LC}(Y; Y') + \mathbb{E}_X \left[\alpha \sum_{t,d} H(M[t,d]) + \gamma |M| \right],$$

deterministic regular

Traceable Information Bottleneck

Objective: $\arg \min -\text{LC}(Y; Y') + I(X; X')$

➤ Modify the Compactness Quantifier $I(X; X')$

$$\min_{\substack{g: \mathcal{X} \mapsto [0,1]^{T \times D} \\ M[t,d] \sim \text{Bern}(\pi_{t,d})}} -\text{LC}(Y; Y') + \mathbb{E}_X [\alpha \sum_{t,d} H(M[t,d]) + \gamma |M|],$$

Reformulated as:

$$\begin{aligned} & \min_{\substack{g: \mathcal{X} \mapsto [0,1]^{T \times D} \\ M[t,d] \sim \text{Bern}(\pi_{t,d})}} -\text{LC}(Y; Y') \\ & \quad + \alpha \mathbb{E}_X [D_{\text{KL}}(\mathbb{P}(M|X) \| \mathbb{Q}(M))], \end{aligned}$$

Traceable Information Bottleneck

Objective: $\arg \min -\text{LC}(Y; Y') + I(X; X')$

- The Informativeness Quantifier $\text{LC}(Y; Y')$

Previous perturbation: $X^r = \Phi(X, M) = X \times M + (1 - M) \times \mu$




Our perturbation: $\tilde{X} = \Psi(X, M)$ A green circle with a white checkmark inside, indicating a good choice.

$$-\text{LC}(f(X), f(\tilde{X})), s.t. \mathbb{P}_X \approx \mathbb{P}_{\tilde{X}}, P(Y'|\tilde{X}) \approx P(Y'|X')$$

Reformulated as:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{LC}}(f(X), f(\tilde{X})) + \beta(\mathcal{L}_{\text{KL}}(\mathbb{P}_{\mathcal{X}}, \mathbb{P}_{\tilde{\mathcal{X}}}) + \mathcal{L}_{dr}(\tilde{X}, \tilde{X}^r)).$$

TimeX++ Architecture



label consistency, regular, in-distribution, uninformative

Learn Highly-Faithful Explanations

Table 1. Attribution explanation performance on univariate and multivariate synthetic datasets.

METHOD	FREQSHAPES			SEQCOMB-UV		
	AUPRC	AUP	AUR	AUPRC	AUP	AUR
IG	0.7516±0.0032	0.6912±0.0028	0.5975±0.0020	0.5760±0.0022	0.8157±0.0023	0.2868±0.0023
DYNAMASK	0.2201±0.0013	0.2952±0.0037	0.5037±0.0015	0.4421±0.0016	0.8782±0.0039	0.1029±0.0007
WINIT	0.5071±0.0021	0.5546±0.0026	0.4557±0.0016	0.4568±0.0017	0.7872±0.0027	0.2253±0.0016
CORTX	0.6978±0.0156	0.4938±0.0004	0.3261±0.0012	0.5643±0.0024	0.8241±0.0025	0.1749±0.0007
SGT + GRAD	0.5312±0.0019	0.4138±0.0011	0.3931±0.0015	0.5731±0.0021	0.7828±0.0013	0.2136±0.0008
TIMEX	0.8324±0.0034	0.7219±0.0031	0.6381±0.0022	0.7124±0.0017	0.9411 ±0.0006	0.3380±0.0014
TIMEX++	0.8905 ±0.0018	0.7805 ±0.0014	0.6618 ±0.0019	0.8468 ±0.0014	0.9069±0.0003	0.4064 ±0.0011

METHOD	SEQCOMB-MV			LOWVAR		
	AUPRC	AUP	AUR	AUPRC	AUP	AUR
IG	0.3298±0.0015	0.7483±0.0027	0.2581±0.0028	0.8691±0.0035	0.4827±0.0029	0.8165±0.0016
DYNAMASK	0.3136±0.0019	0.5481±0.0053	0.1953±0.0025	0.1391±0.0012	0.1640±0.0028	0.2106±0.0018
WINIT	0.2809±0.0018	0.7594±0.0024	0.2077±0.0021	0.1667±0.0015	0.1140±0.0022	0.3842±0.0017
CORTX	0.3629±0.0021	0.5625±0.0006	0.3457±0.0017	0.4983±0.0014	0.3281±0.0027	0.4711±0.0013
SGT + GRAD	0.4893±0.0005	0.4970±0.0005	0.4289 ±0.0018	0.3449±0.0010	0.2133±0.0029	0.3528±0.0015
TIMEX	0.6878±0.0021	0.8326±0.0008	0.3872±0.0015	0.8673±0.0033	0.5451±0.0028	0.9004 ±0.0024
TIMEX++	0.7589 ±0.0014	0.8783 ±0.0007	0.3906±0.0011	0.9466 ±0.0015	0.8057 ±0.0016	0.8332±0.0016

Table 3. (Left) Attribution explanation performance on the ECG dataset. *(Right)* Results of ablation analysis.

METHOD	ECG			TIMEX++ ABLATIONS	ECG		
	AUPRC	AUP	AUR		AUPRC	AUP	AUR
IG	0.4182±0.0014	0.5949±0.0023	0.3204±0.0012	FULL	0.6599 ±0.0009	0.7260±0.0010	0.4595±0.0007
DYNAMASK	0.3280±0.0011	0.5249±0.0030	0.1082±0.0080	w/o STE	0.6152±0.0007	0.7468 ±0.0008	0.4023±0.0012
WINIT	0.3049±0.0011	0.4431±0.0026	0.3474±0.0011	w/o \mathcal{L}_{LC}	0.6209±0.0019	0.6417±0.0020	0.4287±0.0015
CORTX	0.3735±0.0008	0.4968±0.0021	0.3031±0.0009	w/o \mathcal{L}_{KL}	0.6417±0.0019	0.6979±0.0009	0.4424±0.0007
SGT + GRAD	0.3144±0.0010	0.4241±0.0024	0.2639±0.0013	w/o \mathcal{L}_{dr}	0.1516±0.0003	0.1405±0.0003	0.6313 ±0.0006
TIMEX	0.4721±0.0018	0.5663±0.0025	0.4457±0.0018	w/o \mathcal{L}_{con}	0.6072±0.0008	0.6921±0.0010	0.4387±0.0007
TIMEX++	0.6599 ±0.0009	0.7260 ±0.0010	0.4595 ±0.0007				

Explanations on Real-world Datasets







Figure 3. Occlusion experiments on real-world datasets. Higher values indicate better performance.





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Protecting Your LLMs with Information Bottleneck

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
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⁵Pennsylvania State University


⁶NEC Laboratories America

Background

- Jailbreaking with adversarial prompts




- Different forms of adversarial prompts




Motivation

How do you defend against these attacks?

Perturbation!



Information Bottleneck Protection



Smooth and RA LLM

Source: [Robey et al.](#) and [Cao et al.](#)

Existing Methods are Inadequate

Table 3: Comparison between our IBProtector and other defense methodologies.

Method	Finetuning	Filter	Support Ensemble	Information Extraction	Transferability	Support Black-box	Inference Cost
Fine-tuning	✓	✗	No	✗	✓	No	Low
Unlearning LLM	✓	✗	No	✗	✓	No	Low
Self Defense	✗	—	No	✓	✗	Yes	High
Smooth LLM	✗	✓	Yes	✗	—	Yes	Medium
RA-LLM	✗	✓	Yes	✗	—	Yes	Medium
Semantic Smooth	✗	✓	Yes	✓	—	Yes	High
IBProtector	✓	✓	Yes	✓	✓	Yes	Low

Traceable Information Bottleneck in LLM

Objective: $X_{\text{sub}}^* := \arg \min_{\mathbb{P}(X_{\text{sub}}|X)} \alpha \underbrace{I(X; X_{\text{sub}})}_{\text{Compression}} - \underbrace{I(Y; X_{\text{sub}})}_{\text{Prediction}},$



where, $I(Y; X_{\text{sub}}) = H(Y) - H(Y|X_{\text{sub}})$

Objective:

$$X_{\text{sub}}^* = \arg \min_{\mathbb{P}(X_{\text{sub}}|X)} \alpha I(X; X_{\text{sub}}) + H(Y|X_{\text{sub}}).$$

where, $X_{\text{sub}} = X \odot M$

Traceable Information Bottleneck in LLM

Objective: $X_{\text{sub}}^* = \arg \min_{\mathbb{P}(X_{\text{sub}}|X)} \alpha I(X; X_{\text{sub}}) + H(Y|X_{\text{sub}}).$

- Modify the Compression Quantifier $I(X; X_{\text{sub}})$

$$I(X; X_{\text{sub}}) \leq \mathbb{E}_X [D_{\text{KL}}[\mathbb{P}_\phi(X_{\text{sub}}|X) \parallel \mathbb{Q}(X_{\text{sub}})]],$$

Give $p_\phi \sim \mathbb{P}_\phi$: $p_\phi(X_{\leq t}) = \pi_t | t \in [T]$

$$M \sim \mathbb{P}_\phi(M|X) = \prod_{t=1}^T \text{Bern}(\pi_t) \quad \text{Define } \mathbb{Q}(M) \sim \prod_{t=1}^T \text{Bern}(r)$$

- Reformulated as:

$$\mathcal{L}_M = \sum_{t=1}^T \left[\pi_t \log\left(\frac{\pi_t}{r}\right) + (1 - \pi_t) \log\left(\frac{1 - \pi_t}{1 - r}\right) \right]$$

Traceable Information Bottleneck in LLM

Objective: $X_{\text{sub}}^* = \arg \min_{\mathbb{P}(X_{\text{sub}}|X)} \alpha I(X; X_{\text{sub}}) + H(Y|X_{\text{sub}}).$

- Modify the Compression Quantifier $I(X; X_{\text{sub}})$

$$\mathcal{L}_M = \sum_{t=1}^T \left[\pi_t \log\left(\frac{\pi_t}{r}\right) + (1 - \pi_t) \log\left(\frac{1 - \pi_t}{1 - r}\right) \right]$$

- Enhance the coherence in X_{sub}

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{con}} = \frac{1}{T} \cdot \sum_{t=1}^{T-1} \sqrt{(\pi_{t+1} - \pi_{\textcolor{brown}{t}})^2}$$

Traceable Information Bottleneck in LLM

Objective: $X_{\text{sub}}^* = \arg \min_{\mathbb{P}(X_{\text{sub}}|X)} \alpha I(X; X_{\text{sub}}) + H(Y|X_{\text{sub}}).$

- The Informativeness Quantifier $H(Y|X_{\text{sub}})$


$$H(Y|X_{\text{sub}}) = - \sum_{X,Y} p(X \odot M, Y) \log p(Y|X \odot M)$$

- Reformulated as:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{info}} = \underbrace{- \sum_{t=1}^{|Y|} \log p(Y_t|\tilde{X}, Y_{<t})}_{\text{Cross Entropy}} + \underbrace{\sum_{t=1}^{|Y|} D_{\text{KL}} \left[f_{\text{tar}}(\tilde{X}, Y_{<t}) || f_{\text{tar}}(X, Y_{<t}) \right]}_{\text{RLHF}}$$

Information Bottleneck Protector

- The framework of IBProtector



informative, regular, connective

Further Gradient-Free Version

Objective: $X_{\text{sub}}^* = \arg \min_{\mathbb{P}(X_{\text{sub}}|X)} \alpha I(X; X_{\text{sub}}) + H(Y|X_{\text{sub}}).$

➤ Reformulated as:

$$\max_{\phi} \underbrace{\mathbb{E}[\rho(Y; \hat{Y})] - \beta D_{\text{KL}}[p_{\phi}(X)||p_{\phi}^{\text{ref}}(X)]}_{\text{RL for Prediction}} - \underbrace{\alpha(\mathcal{L}_M + \lambda \mathcal{L}_{\text{con}})}_{\text{Compactness}},$$

where, $\rho(Y; \hat{Y}) = -\frac{\gamma(Y) \cdot \gamma(\hat{Y})}{\|\gamma(Y)\|^2 \|\gamma(\hat{Y})\|^2}$

Defence Experiments

Lower Attack Success Rate, Higher Benign Answering Rate!

Table 1: Defense results of state-of-the-art methods and IBProtector on AdvBench.


Experiment		Prompt-level Jailbreak (PAIR)			Token-level Jailbreak (GCG)			TriviaQA
Model	Method	ASR ↓	Harm ↓	GPT-4 ↓	ASR ↓	Harm ↓	GPT-4 ↓	BAR ↑
Vicuna (13b-v1.5)	Original Attack	87.5%	4.034	3.008	82.5%	0.244	4.300	97.8%
	Fine-tuning	62.5%	2.854	2.457	32.5%	0.089	2.114	94.8%
	Unlearning LLM	66.7%	2.928	2.496	40.8%	0.123	2.537	92.2%
	Self Defense	44.2%	2.585	1.692	12.5%	-1.170	1.400	79.6%
	Smooth LLM	68.3%	3.115	2.642	24.2%	<u>-1.252</u>	1.767	90.9%
	RA-LLM	34.2%	2.446	1.832	<u>8.3%</u>	-1.133	1.411	95.2%
	Semantic Smooth	<u>20.0%</u>	<u>2.170</u>	<u>1.525</u>	1.7%	-0.842	<u>1.058</u>	<u>95.7%</u>
IBProtector		19.2%	1.971	1.483	1.7%	-1.763	1.042	96.5%
LLaMA-2 (7b-chat-hf)	Original Attack	67.5%	3.852	1.617	27.5%	0.325	2.517	98.7%
	Fine-tuning	47.5%	2.551	1.392	12.5%	-0.024	1.233	<u>97.0%</u>
	Unlearning LLM	49.2%	2.507	1.383	12.5%	-0.084	1.258	97.4%
	Self Defense	45.0%	2.682	1.525	11.7%	0.208	1.492	92.6%
	Smooth LLM	43.3%	2.394	1.342	<u>4.2%</u>	0.189	<u>1.100</u>	95.2%
	RA-LLM	<u>40.0%</u>	2.493	1.362	<u>4.2%</u>	-0.070	1.116	<u>97.0%</u>
	Semantic Smooth	40.8%	<u>2.250</u>	<u>1.333</u>	10.0%	<u>-0.141</u>	1.417	<u>96.5%</u>
IBProtector		16.7%	1.315	1.125	0.8%	-1.024	1.000	<u>97.0%</u>

Transferability Experiments

- Defend against other attack methods:

Method	Vicuna (13b-v1.5)			LLaMA-2 (7b-chat-hf)		
	ASR ↓	Harm ↓	GPT-4 ↓	ASR ↓	Harm ↓	GPT-4 ↓
Original Attack	88.6%	2.337	4.225	29.0%	2.167	1.883
Fine-tuning	<u>26.8%</u>	1.124	<u>1.772</u>	5.1%	1.597	1.192
Unlearning LLM	28.3%	1.127	1.815	5.1%	1.534	1.233
Self Defense	28.7%	1.291	1.725	8.7%	1.439	1.792
Smooth LLM	81.1%	1.673	2.168	35.5%	1.720	1.992
RA-LLM	54.1%	1.027	1.892	<u>2.2%</u>	1.484	1.253
Semantic Smooth	49.2%	<u>0.417</u>	2.022	5.1%	<u>1.116</u>	<u>1.101</u>
IBProtector	18.9%	0.031	1.854	0.7%	0.608	1.036

- Protect other target models:



Low Computational Cost


Table 7: Theoretical costs of the inference phase of existing defense methods.

Method	Theoretical Cost	Simplify
Original Attack	$C_{\text{ori}} = T \times c_X + \hat{Y} \times c_Y$	C_{ori}
Fine-tuning	$C_{\text{sft}} = T \times c_X + \hat{Y} \times c_Y$	$\approx C_{\text{ori}}$
Unlearning LLM	$C_{\text{unlearning}} = T \times c_X + \hat{Y} \times c_Y$	$\approx C_{\text{ori}}$
Self Defense	$C_{\text{self def}} = C_{\text{ori}} + (\hat{Y} \times c_X + \hat{Y}' \times c_Y)$	$\approx 2 \times C_{\text{ori}}$
Smooth LLM	$C_{\text{smooth}} = n \times [(1 - k)T \times c_X + kT \times c_\mu + \hat{Y} \times c_Y]$	$\approx n \times C_{\text{ori}}$
RA-LLM	$C_{\text{ra}} = n \times [(1 - k)T \times c_X + \hat{Y} \times c_Y]$	$\approx n \times C_{\text{ori}}$
Semantic Smooth	$C_{\text{semantic}} = 2n \times [T \times c_X + T' \times c_Y + T' \times c_X + \hat{Y} \times c_Y]$	$\approx 2n \times C_{\text{ori}}$
IBProtector	$T \times c_p + (1 - k)T \times c_X + kT \times c_\mu + \hat{Y} \times c_Y$	$\approx C_{\text{ori}}$

Method	PAIR → Vicuna	GCG → Vicuna	PAIR → LLaMA-2	GCG → LLaMA-2	Avg. Time
Original Attack	4.962±0.828	5.067±0.841	4.235±0.217	4.095±0.312	4.590
Fine-tuning	4.850±1.380	4.726±0.911	4.107±0.154	3.873±0.309	4.389
Unlearning LLM	5.014±0.781	5.128±0.643	4.233±0.373	4.042±0.643	4.604
Self Defense	9.551±1.843	8.413±1.438	8.780±1.224	9.208±0.988	8.988
Smooth LLM(one copy)	5.297±0.717	5.015±1.398	4.284±0.180	4.319±0.392	4.729
RA-LLM(one copy)	5.664±1.268	5.351±1.550	4.269±0.643	4.528±0.475	4.953
IBProtector	5.509±1.283	5.370±1.489	4.426±1.137	4.251±1.367	4.889

Future Explorations

- How to represent uncertainty when black box models are inaccurate



- Quantification of compression amplitude and parameter tuning strategy

$$\tilde{\mathcal{L}} = \mathcal{L}_{LC} + \alpha \mathcal{L}_M + \beta (\mathcal{L}_{KL} + \mathcal{L}_{dr}),$$

↑ ↑

Conclusion

- We investigate the limitations of existing explanation models in terms of sequence and give an intuitive solution.
- We further give a perspective of information theory and propose a practical objective function in information bottleneck to solve distribution shifting.
- We apply our perturbation proposal to the defence against adversarial scenarios in large language models, and achieved significant results.
- All codes of three papers are available at <https://github.com/zichuan-liu>

Thanks for your listening!

Any Questions? Please use the chat !