


Jeffrey Ziegler, Washington University in St. Louis




## Investment treaty data: Basic overview.

```
1 # show biggest "suers" (origin country of plantiff)
2 head(sort(rowSums(BITadjMatTotalMatrix), decreasing = T))
3 # show biggest violators (countries that pass potentiall expropriating policies)
4 head(sort(colSums(BITadjMatTotalMatrix), decreasing = T))
```

United Sta	ates United F	Kingdom	Spain	Venezuela	Italy	Turkey
38	30		15	13	12	10
Argentina	Netherlands	Ecuador	German	ny Czechslo	ovakia	Italy
33	13	12	11	10		10

Empirically, democracies sign, and violate, investment treaties more frequently (and importantly, more disproportionately).




Puzzle: Why?

If elections are what make democracies democratic, and democracies are good treaty partners, then lack of elections should increase violations?


If elections are what make democracies democratic, and democracies are good treaty partners, then lack of elections should increase violations?

NO!

Governments in general, are more likely to pass expropriating policies (i.e. violate BIT) when they soon face credible elections.



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Maybe arbitration timing is strategic (i.e.  $\rightarrow$  elections), and litigation is driven by the relationship between the two countries involved in the treaty?

Investment treaty network: Network overview.

## [1] 0.01820728

```
reciprocity(yGraph)
2 # doesn't seem like passing expropriating policies
3 # leads to other countries to sue, and then pass expropriating
    policies
```

[1] 0

## Investment treaty network: Latent Distance Model.

