

# Byte Masons - oToken ZAP Audit Report

Version 1.2

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# Zigtur

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#### Introduction

#### **Disclaimer**

A smart contract security review cannot guarantee the complete absence of vulnerabilities. This effort, bound by time, resources, and expertise, aims to identify as many security issues as possible. However, there is no assurance of 100% security post-review, nor is there a guarantee that the review will uncover all potential problems in the smart contracts. It is highly recommended to conduct subsequent security reviews, implement bug bounty programs, and perform on-chain monitoring.

# **About Zigtur**

**Zigtur** is an independent blockchain security researcher dedicated to enhancing the security of the blockchain ecosystem. With a history of identifying numerous security vulnerabilities across various protocols in public audit contests and private audits, **Zigtur** strives to contribute to the safety and reliability of blockchain projects through meticulous security research and reviews. Explore previous work here or reach out on X @zigtur.

#### **About oToken**

**oToken** means Options Token. It represents the right to receive different forms of discounted assets in return for the appropriate payment. The option is executed through specialized contracts named exercisers.

The protocol implements a new "zapping" feature as part of the "Discount Exerciser". This feature allows a user to acquire underlying tokens instantly, without paying payment tokens, at the cost of an instant exit fee.

# **Security Assessment Summary**

Review commit hash - 1293670 & 6cbaea2

Fixes review commit hash - 8d795ca

# **Deployment chains**

- Ethereum Mainnet
- BSC
- Optimism
- Mode

# Scope

The audit focuses on the newly implemented "zapping" feature and other modifications done since the last audit.

The following smart contracts are in scope of the review:

- exercise/DiscountExercise.sol
- OptionsToken.sol
- oracles/BalancerOracle.sol
- oracles/ThenaOracle.sol
- exercise/BaseExercise.sol
- oracles/AlgebraOracle.sol
- oracles/UniswapV3Oracle.sol
- helpers/SwapHelper.sol
- VeloSolidMixin.sol

#### **Risk Classification**

|                    | Impact: High | Impact: Medium | Impact: Low |
|--------------------|--------------|----------------|-------------|
| Likelihood: High   | High         | High           | Medium      |
| Likelihood: Medium | High         | Medium         | Low         |
| Likelihood: Low    | Medium       | Low            | Low         |

#### Issues

#### HIGH-01 - Zap and Redeem are not compatible

#### **Description**

#### Scope:

DiscountExercise.sol#L215

The \_redeem and \_zap calculations are not compatible. This makes one more profitable than the user depending on the multiplier configuration.

When the multiplier is less than 50%, \_redeem will be more profitable than \_zap .

When the multiplier is greater than 50%, \_zap will be more profitable than \_redeem.

This is due to incompatible calculation

#### **Scenario**

In the following scenario, zapping is more profitable than redeeming.

Initial situation:

- price = 1\$
- oTokens amount = 1000
- multiplier = 0.8 (80%)
- instantExitFee = 0.1 (10%)

#### Redeem:

- payment tokens value = 1\$ \* 1000 \* 0.8 = 800\$
- underlying tokens value received = 1000\$
- user's profit = 1000\$ 800\$ = 200\$

#### Zap:

- discountedUnderlying = 1000 \* 0.8 = 800\$
- fees = 800\$ \* 0.1 = 80\$
- underlying tokens value received = 720\$
- user's profit = 720\$

As we can see, zapping with this configuration is more profitable than redeeming.

#### **Proof of Concept**

A Foundry unit test file is given in Appendix.

#### Recommendation

The \_zap function should return a profit similar to \_redeem minus the instant fees. This can be fixed by returning (10\_000 - multiplier) \* amount instead of multiplier \* amount.

However, this fix leads to further incompatibilities. Indeed, \_setMultiplier allows setting a multiplier greater than 10\_000 which will lead to a DOS of \_zap due to integer underflow.

A patch is given in Appendix. It modifies \_zap to fix the calculation and reverts when an incompatible multiplier is used.

#### Resolution

Byte Masons team: Fixed.

Zigtur: Fix reviewed and approved.

#### **MEDIUM-01 - Zapping possible DOS**

#### **Description**

Scope:

DiscountExercise.sol#L222-L229

#### The documentation indicates:

We limit the amount of funds we leave in an exercise contract at any given time to limit risk.

When the contract is not funded with underlying Token and fee Amount is close to mint Amount To Trigger Swap, calling exercise() with zapping feature will revert due an impossible swap. This causes the user to not get their token when they expected.

A user may want to time his exercise price, which will not always be possible through the zapping feature.

Note: This issue is similar to SR5-oToken [M-01] issue.

#### **Code snippet**

The following code snippet from \_zap explains the issue with @POC comments:

```
function _zap(address from, uint256 amount, address recipient,
→ DiscountExerciseParams memory params)
    returns (uint256 paymentAmount, address, uint256, uint256)
{
   // ...
    // Fee amount in underlying tokens charged for zapping
    feeAmount += fee;
    if (feeAmount >= minAmountToTriggerSwap) { // @POC: swap when `feeAmount >=
    → minAmountToTriggerSwap`
       uint256 minAmountOut = _getMinAmountOutData(feeAmount,
        → swapProps.maxSwapSlippage, address(oracle));
       /* Approve the underlying token to make swap */
       underlyingToken.approve(swapProps.swapper, feeAmount);
        /* Swap underlying token to payment token (asset) */
        uint256 amountOut = _generalSwap(
            swapProps.exchangeTypes, address(underlyingToken),
            → address(paymentToken), feeAmount, minAmountOut,

→ swapProps.exchangeAddress

        ); // @POC: swap will fail if `underlyingToken` balance is lower than
        → `feeAmount`
```

```
// ...
}
// ...
}
```

#### Recommendation

If the contract is underfunded, the fee swapping should not be executed to allow the user timing his zapping exercise.

The issue can be fixed by adding an underlyingToken balance check before executing the fees swap to ensure that the balance is greater than or equal to the feeAmount.

A patch is given in Appendix.

#### Resolution

Byte Masons team: Fixed. Payments to users are prioritized over fees swapping and distribution.

Zigtur: Fix reviewed and approved. Prioritizing payments to users is a good point.

#### LOW-01 - Lack of decimals checks on most Oracle contracts

#### **Description**

#### Scope:

- AlgebraOracle.sol#L72-L74
- ThenaOracle.sol#L67-L69
- UniswapV3Oracle.sol#L72-L73

Token decimals discrepancies are not handled in the current state of the DiscountExercise contract. A finding from a previous security review stated that 18 decimals check for each token should be implemented.

However, only one oracle (BalancerOracle.sol#L80) implements 18 decimals check.

#### Recommendation

Consider implementing 18 decimals check on each token in AlgebraOracle, ThenaOracle and UniswapV3Oracle.

#### Resolution

Byte Masons team: Fixed.

Zigtur: Fix reviewed and approved.

# LOW-02 - Zapping may fail during high volatility periods

#### Description

#### Scope:

- DiscountExercise.sol#L223
- SwapHelper.sol#L89-L97

When fees are swapped during a zapping operation, the minAmountOut value is calculated from an oracle price and a maxSwapSlippage value set by the administrator.

A too small maxSwapSlippage value will lead to zapping denial of service during high volatility periods, leading to users not being able to precisely time their exercise.

Note: a too high maxSwapSlippage value will lead to a loss of funds for the protocol due to price manipulation.

#### Recommendation

The maxSwapSlippage value should be chosen precisely to be convenient for users while limiting the impact of price manipulation on the swap.

Moreover, I suggest an off-chain mechanism to monitor underlyingToken and paymentToken prices and update the maxSwapSlippage value when price volatility increases too much.

#### Resolution

Byte Masons team: Acknowledged.

Zigtur: Acknowledged.

# INFO-01 - PausableUpgradeable is not initialized in OptionsToken

#### **Description**

Scope:

• OptionsToken.sol#L61-L63

OptionsToken inherits the PausableUpgradeable contract. OptionsToken.initialize should call the PausableUpgradeable.\_\_Pausable\_init function.

Note: This has no impact because PausableUpgradeable.\_\_Pausable\_init\_unchained only initializes paused = false.

#### Recommendation

Call \_\_Pausable\_init() in OptionsToken.initialize.

#### Resolution

Byte Masons team: Fixed.

Zigtur: Fix reviewed and approved.

# INFO-02 - Token admin can't be changed without upgrading

# **Description**

#### Scope:

- OptionsToken.sol#L45
- OptionsToken.sol#L64

The tokenAdmin address is defined during the proxy initialization. As there is no setter function to update its value, an upgrade would be needed.

#### Recommendation

An admin setter may be needed to update the tokenAdmin address.

#### Resolution

Byte Masons team: Acknowledged.

Zigtur: Acknowledged.

# **INFO-03 - Incorrect Option Token Exercise flow description**

## Description

The provided documentation describes the flow of an Option Token Exercise. It indicates the following:

- 1. The user approves amount of Options Tokens they wish to spend
- 2. . .
- 3. OptionsToken validates the exercise contract, decodes the parameters for the exercise function on the chosen exercise contract

However, the user does not approve the amount they wish to spend and OptionsToken contract does not "decode the parameters".

#### Recommendation

Consider fixing the documentation.

#### Resolution

Byte Masons team: Fixed.

Zigtur: Fix reviewed and approved.

# INFO-04 - OpenZeppelin dependencies does not point to a specific version in gitmodules

#### **Description**

The codebase expects OpenZeppelin contracts from version 4. For example, PausableUpgradeable should be located in contracts/security in OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts-upgradeable repository.

However, the .gitmodules file doesn't configure the correct branch. The main branch will be cloned in the lib/ folder, which currently corresponds to version 5. Foundry will not be able to compile the contracts as the contracts/security folder doesn't exist in this version.

#### Recommendation

Consider configuring .gitmodules to clone the correct version of OpenZeppelin contracts.

The following .gitmodules file can be used:

```
[submodule "lib/forge-std"]
       path = lib/forge-std
       url = https://github.com/foundry-rs/forge-std
[submodule "lib/solmate"]
       path = lib/solmate
       url = https://github.com/rari-capital/solmate
[submodule "lib/create3-factory"]
       path = lib/create3-factory
       url = https://github.com/zeframlou/create3-factory
[submodule "lib/v3-core"]
       path = lib/v3-core
       url = https://github.com/uniswap/v3-core
[submodule "lib/openzeppelin-contracts-upgradeable"]
       path = lib/openzeppelin-contracts-upgradeable
       url = https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts-upgradeable
       branch = v4.9.6
[submodule "lib/openzeppelin-contracts"]
       path = lib/openzeppelin-contracts
       url = https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts
       branch = v4.9.6
[submodule "lib/vault-v2"]
   path = lib/vault-v2
   url = https://github.com/Byte-Masons/vault-v2
```

#### Resolution

Byte Masons team: Fixed.

Zigtur: Fix reviewed and approved.

## INFO-05 - safeApprove is not used

#### **Description**

#### Scope:

- DiscountExercise.sol#L225
- DiscountExercise.sol#L236

The DiscountExercise contractuses the SafeERC20 library for IERC20. Transfers are made through safeTransfer.

However the contract uses approve instead of safeApprove.

#### Recommendation

Consider using safeApprove instead of approve.

#### Resolution

Byte Masons team: Acknowledged.

Zigtur: Acknowledged.

# INFO-06 - Lack of NatSpec for return values in OptionsToken.exercise

#### **Description**

#### Scope:

• OptionsToken.sol#L94-L108

The OptionsToken.exercise function shows NatSpec comments for input parameters.

However, return values are not described.

#### Recommendation

Consider describing the four returned values in NatSpec comments.

#### Resolution

Byte Masons team: Fixed.

Zigtur: Fix reviewed and approved.

# **INFO-07 - Fees swapping is not fair**

#### **Description**

In \_zap , fees are swapped from underlyingToken to paymentToken when the accumulated fees feeAmount is greater than or equal to a threshold.

This means that a single user will pay swap gas fees for all previous users that used the zapping feature when the threshold is crossed.

#### Recommendation

None.

#### Resolution

Byte Masons team: Acknowledged.

Zigtur: Acknowledged.

# **Appendix**

#### **HIGH-01 - Proof of Concept**

The following content can be imported in test/OptionsToken.POC.t.sol . Then, start the tests with forge test --mt test\_POC -vvv .

```
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0
pragma solidity ^0.8.13;
import "forge-std/Test.sol";
import "forge-std/console2.sol";
import {FixedPointMathLib} from "solmate/utils/FixedPointMathLib.sol";
import {IERC20} from "oz/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol";
import {ERC1967Proxy} from "oz/proxy/ERC1967/ERC1967Proxy.sol";
import {OptionsToken} from "../src/OptionsToken.sol";
import {DiscountExerciseParams, DiscountExercise, BaseExercise, SwapProps,
ExchangeType} from "../src/exercise/DiscountExercise.sol";
import {TestERC20} from "./mocks/TestERC20.sol";
import {IOracle} from "../src/interfaces/IOracle.sol";
import {BalancerOracle} from "../src/oracles/BalancerOracle.sol";
import {MockBalancerTwapOracle} from "./mocks/MockBalancerTwapOracle.sol";
import {ReaperSwapperMock} from "./mocks/ReaperSwapperMock.sol";
contract OptionsTokenTest is Test {
    using FixedPointMathLib for uint256;
    uint16 constant PRICE_MULTIPLIER = 3000; // 0.5
    uint56 constant ORACLE_SECS = 30 minutes;
    uint56 constant ORACLE_AGO = 2 minutes;
    uint128 constant ORACLE_MIN_PRICE = 1e17;
    uint56 constant ORACLE_LARGEST_SAFETY_WINDOW = 24 hours;
    uint256 constant ORACLE_INIT_TWAP_VALUE = 1e18; // @POC: 1$ value
    uint256 constant ORACLE_MIN_PRICE_DENOM = 10000;
    uint256 constant MAX_SUPPLY = 1e27; // the max supply of the options token &

→ the underlying token

    uint256 constant INSTANT_EXIT_FEE = 500;
    address owner;
    address tokenAdmin;
    address[] feeRecipients_;
    uint256[] feeBPS_;
```

```
OptionsToken optionsToken;
DiscountExercise exerciser;
IOracle oracle;
MockBalancerTwapOracle balancerTwapOracle;
TestERC20 paymentToken;
address underlyingToken;
ReaperSwapperMock reaperSwapper;
function setUp() public {
   // set up accounts
    owner = makeAddr("owner");
    tokenAdmin = makeAddr("tokenAdmin");
    feeRecipients_ = new address[](2);
    feeRecipients_[0] = makeAddr("feeRecipient");
    feeRecipients_[1] = makeAddr("feeRecipient2");
    feeBPS_ = new uint256[](2);
    feeBPS_[0] = 1000; // 10%
    feeBPS_[1] = 9000; // 90%
    // deploy contracts
    paymentToken = new TestERC20();
    underlyingToken = address(new TestERC20());
    address implementation = address(new OptionsToken());
    ERC1967Proxy proxy = new ERC1967Proxy(implementation, "");
    optionsToken = OptionsToken(address(proxy));
    optionsToken.initialize("TIT Call Option Token", "oTIT", tokenAdmin);
    optionsToken.transferOwnership(owner);
    /* Reaper deployment and configuration */
    uint256 slippage = 500; // 5%
    uint256 minAmountToTriggerSwap = 1e5;
    address[] memory tokens = new address[](2);
    tokens[0] = address(paymentToken);
    tokens[1] = underlyingToken;
    balancerTwapOracle = new MockBalancerTwapOracle(tokens);
    // console.log(tokens[0], tokens[1]);
    oracle = IOracle(new BalancerOracle(balancerTwapOracle, underlyingToken,
    → owner, ORACLE_SECS, ORACLE_AGO, ORACLE_MIN_PRICE));
    reaperSwapper = new ReaperSwapperMock(oracle, address(underlyingToken),
    → address(paymentToken));
```

```
deal(underlyingToken, address(reaperSwapper), 1e27);
    deal(address(paymentToken), address(reaperSwapper), 1e27);
    SwapProps memory swapProps = SwapProps(address(reaperSwapper),
    → address(reaperSwapper), ExchangeType.Bal, slippage);
    exerciser = new DiscountExercise(
        optionsToken,
        owner,
        IERC20(address(paymentToken)),
        IERC20(underlyingToken),
        oracle,
        PRICE_MULTIPLIER,
        INSTANT_EXIT_FEE,
        minAmountToTriggerSwap,
        feeRecipients_,
        feeBPS_,
        swapProps
    );
    deal(underlyingToken, address(exerciser), 1e27);
    // add exerciser to the list of options
    vm.startPrank(owner);
    optionsToken.setExerciseContract(address(exerciser), true);
    vm.stopPrank();
    // set up contracts
    balancerTwapOracle.setTwapValue(ORACLE_INIT_TWAP_VALUE);
    paymentToken.approve(address(exerciser), type(uint256).max);
}
function test_POCRedeemExerciseHappyPath() public {
    uint256 amount = 1000e18;
    // mint options tokens
    vm.prank(tokenAdmin);
    optionsToken.mint(address(this), amount);
    // mint payment tokens
    uint256 expectedPaymentAmount =
    {\scriptstyle \rightarrow} \quad amount.mulWadUp(ORACLE\_INIT\_TWAP\_VALUE.mulDivUp(PRICE\_MULTIPLIER,
    → ORACLE_MIN_PRICE_DENOM));
    deal(address(paymentToken), address(this), expectedPaymentAmount);
    uint256 paymentTokenValue = paymentTo-
    ken.balanceOf(address(this)).mulWadUp(ORACLE_INIT_TWAP_VALUE);
```

```
uint256 underlyingTokenValue =
    → IERC20(underlyingToken).balanceOf(address(this));
    // @POC: logs the values before exercise
    console2.log("BEFORE - total account value = ", (paymentTokenValue +

    underlyingTokenValue) / 1e18);

    console2.log("BEFORE - total paid value = ", 0);
    DiscountExerciseParams memory params =
        DiscountExerciseParams({maxPaymentAmount: expectedPaymentAmount,
        → deadline: type(uint256).max, isInstantExit: false}); // @POC:
   optionsToken.exercise(amount, address(this), address(exerciser),
    → abi.encode(params));
    // @POC: logs the values after exercise
   uint256 newpaymentTokenValue = paymentTo-

    ken.balanceOf(address(this)).mulWadUp(ORACLE_INIT_TWAP_VALUE);
   underlyingTokenValue = IERC20(underlyingToken).balanceOf(address(this));
   console2.log("AFTER - total account value = ", (newpaymentTokenValue +

    underlyingTokenValue) / 1e18);

   console2.log("AFTER - total paid value = ", paymentTokenValue/1e18);
   console2.log("AFTER - profit value = ", (underlyingTokenValue -
    → paymentTokenValue)/1e18);
}
function test_POCZapExerciseHappyPath() public {
   uint256 amount = 1000e18;
    // mint options tokens
   vm.prank(tokenAdmin);
    optionsToken.mint(address(this), amount);
   // mint payment tokens
   uint256 expectedPaymentAmount =
    {}_{\hookrightarrow} \quad \text{amount.mulWadUp(ORACLE\_INIT\_TWAP\_VALUE.mulDivUp(PRICE\_MULTIPLIER,} \\
    → ORACLE_MIN_PRICE_DENOM));
    deal(address(paymentToken), address(this), expectedPaymentAmount);
    // @POC: logs the values before exercise
   uint256 paymentTokenValue = paymentTo-
    ken.balanceOf(address(this)).mulWadUp(ORACLE_INIT_TWAP_VALUE);
    uint256 underlyingTokenValue =
```

```
console2.log("BEFORE - total account value = ", (paymentTokenValue +

    underlyingTokenValue) / 1e18);

       console2.log("BEFORE - total paid value = ", 0);
       // exercise options tokens
       DiscountExerciseParams memory params =
           DiscountExerciseParams({maxPaymentAmount: expectedPaymentAmount,

→ deadline: type(uint256).max, isInstantExit: true});
       optionsToken.exercise(amount, address(this), address(exerciser),
        → abi.encode(params));
       // @POC: logs the values after exercise
       paymentTokenValue = paymentTo-

    ken.balanceOf(address(this)).mulWadUp(ORACLE_INIT_TWAP_VALUE);
       underlyingTokenValue = IERC20(underlyingToken).balanceOf(address(this));
       console2.log("AFTER - total account value = ", (paymentTokenValue +

    underlyingTokenValue) / 1e18);

       console2.log("AFTER - total paid value = ", 0);
       console2.log("AFTER - profit value = ",
        }
}
```

#### HIGH-01 - Fix patch

The following patch can be applied through git apply to import the recommended fix.

```
diff --git a/src/exercise/DiscountExercise.sol b/src/exercise/DiscountExercise.sol
index b8c556f..552cb0e 100644
--- a/src/exercise/DiscountExercise.sol
+++ b/src/exercise/DiscountExercise.sol
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ contract DiscountExercise is BaseExercise, SwapHelper, Pausable
    error Exercise__InvalidOracle();
    error Exercise__FeeGreaterThanMax();
    error Exercise__AmountOutIsZero();
    error Exercise__ZapMultiplierIncompatible();
    /// Events
    event Exercised(address indexed sender, address indexed recipient, uint256

→ amount, uint256 paymentAmount);
@@ -212,7 +213,8 @@ contract DiscountExercise is BaseExercise, SwapHelper,
→ Pausable {
         returns (uint256 paymentAmount, address, uint256, uint256)
        if (block.timestamp > params.deadline) revert Exercise__PastDeadline();
        uint256 discountedUnderlying = amount.mulDivUp(multiplier, BPS_DENOM);
        if (multiplier > BPS_DENOM) revert Exercise__ZapMultiplierIncompatible();
        uint256 discountedUnderlying = amount.mulDivUp(BPS_DENOM - multiplier,
→ BPS_DENOM);
        uint256 fee = discountedUnderlying.mulDivUp(instantExitFee, BPS_DENOM);
        uint256 underlyingAmount = discountedUnderlying - fee;
```

# MEDIUM-01 - Fix patch

The following patch can be applied through git apply to import the recommended fix.