

Fractional Programming in Cooperative Games

Introduction to my PhD work

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This is a test frame

Example block

This is an example.

Alerted block.

some alerted text.

Normal block

This is a block.

An allocation problem

Two types of players

- ▶ A: Each $i \in A$ possesses an item of size a_i
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Outline

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 - ▶ N : Player set
 - ▶ v : Value function: $v : 2^N \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ satisfying $v(\emptyset) = 0$.

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- ▶ (*multiplicative*) ϵ -*core*: Replace (ii) by
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- ▶ A game is called ϵ -*balanced* if ϵ -core $\neq \emptyset$.

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
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- ▶ $\frac{1}{4}$ -core $\neq \emptyset$. (Kern and Qiu 2013)

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- ▶ Integrality gap: $\frac{ILP}{LP}$.

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$$\epsilon\text{-core}(N) \neq \emptyset \Leftrightarrow \epsilon \geq 1 - \frac{v}{v'}.$$

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Lemma 1 (Faigle and Kern [1998])

$$\epsilon\text{-core}(N) \neq \emptyset \Leftrightarrow \epsilon \geq 1 - \frac{v}{v'}.$$

Trivially, $\frac{1}{2}\text{-core}(N) \neq \emptyset$ (for all N).

Fractional packing

Fractional packing: (y'_F) , satisfying

(a) $\sum_{F \ni i} y'_F \leq 1, \forall \text{ item } i;$

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
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
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
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- ▶ $1/2$ -core $\neq \emptyset$ if any item fits any bin. (Faigle and Kern 1995)
- ▶ Kern and Qiu (2012) proved the following results:
 1. $1/2$ -core $\neq \emptyset$.
 2. $5/12$ -core $\neq \emptyset$ if $a_i > 1/3$.
 3. ϵ -core $\neq \emptyset$ if $k \geq O(\epsilon \bar{b})^{-5}$, where \bar{b} is the average bin capacity.

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