Political News Sharing on Social Media

Mapping the Ideology of Politicians, Users, and News Content

Question

What explains the news-sharing strategies of politicians on social media?

Introduce a method to map the social media ideological sharing space of:

- 1. Politicians
- 2. Users
- 3. News content

Current approaches

Ideology of **users** on social media:

- 1. Who users follow on Twitter (Barberá, 2015)
- 2. Who users endorse on Facebook (Bond and Messing, 2015)
- 3. Supervised learning approaches

Current approaches

Ideology of **politicians**:

- 1. NOMINATE (Poole and Rosenthal, 1985)
- 2. CF-SCORES (Bonica, 2013)
- 3. Social media
- 4. Expert / respondent placements

Current approaches

Ideology of **news media**:

- 1. Editorial position-taking (Ho and Quinn, 2008)
- 2. Compare news media text to politicians (e.g. Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010; Martin and Yurukoglu, 2017)
- 3. Crowdsourcing (Budak, Goel and Rao, 2016)
- 4. Proportion shared by liberals and conservatives (e.g. Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2011; Bakshy, Messing and Adamic, 2015)

Link data

We use link data (URLs) to unify the measurement of ideology on social media across users, politicians, and news media

e.g. nytimes.com/2018/02/13/upshot/fake-news/...

The benefits of link data are many:

- 1. Platform-agnostic
- 2. Behavioral measure for politicians
- 3. Captures how people use media
- 4. URLs are frequently shared
- 5. Changes quickly over time
- 6. Works with relatively small datasets



We use data from the Twitter timelines of:

- Members of Congress (535)
- Governors (50)
- President / VP / presidential candidates
- Ordinary users (5,000, geo-located to US)

We define the universe of national news media domains (n = 223):

- foxnews.com
- nytimes.com
- breitbart.com
- · cnn.com
- · thenation.com
- ...

An example of a user-domain count (sub-)matrix of tweeted news URLs from Members of Congress:

	thenation.com	huffingtonpost.com	washingtonpost.com	wsj.com	foxnews.com	breitbart.com	
Ted Cruz	0	0	23	6	44	6	
Paul Ryan	0	0	5	8	14	0	
Susan Collins	0	1	3	2	0	0	
Claire McCaskill	0	4	25	10	2	0	
Nancy Pelosi	0	2	17	0	0	0	
Bernie Sanders	12	14	62	4	0	0	
:	:	:	:	:	:	:	



Model

Homophily assumption:

Social media users/politicians are more likely to tweet and retweet URLs of news media stories that are 'close' to their own ideology.

Model

$$egin{aligned} y_{img} \sim \mathrm{NegBin}(\pi_{img}, \omega_m) \ \pi_{img} = \exp(lpha_i + \gamma_m - \underbrace{| heta_i - \zeta_m|}^2) \ rac{\mathrm{user-media}}{\mathrm{distance}} \end{aligned}$$

 y_{img} is the count of links from domain m that have been tweeted by user i, who is affiliated with group (party) g

 θ_{ig} latent ideology of user i affiliated with group (party) g

 ζ_m latent ideology of domain m


 α_i user-specific intercept

 γ_m domain-specific intercept

 ω_m domain-specific dispersion parameter



News-sharing ideology of Members of Congress:





Media scores & NOMINATE:

• Democrat O Republican Senate House 0.5 **DW-NOMINATE** Bernie Sanders Joe Manchin -0.5 $\rho = 0.96$ $\rho = 0.96$ $\rho_{D} = 0.7$ $\rho_{D} = 0.56$ Media score (₺)

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News media ideology:








Application

What explains the news-sharing strategies of politicians on social media?

- Legislators are strategic in how they present themselves to their constituents (Mayhew, 1974; Fenno, 1978).
- Legislators in more competitive districts are wary of alienating moderate voters.
- Legislators in less competitive districts are less constrained, but also wary of alienating primary election voters.

Measure competitiveness in district i by the partisan gap in the 2016 presidential vote share:

 $partisan A lignment_i = vote Share_i^{(Trump)} - vote Share_i^{(Clinton)}$



	Extremism of news sharing ideology						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)			
Partisan alignment	0.146***	0.159***	0.051**	0.058**			
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.023)			
House member		-0.011	-0.006	-0.003			
		(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)			
NOMINATE			0.381***	-0.013			
			(0.052)	(0.195)			
NOMINATE ²				0.487**			
				(0.234)			
Republican × NOMINATE			-0.083	0.098			
			(0.060)	(0.254)			
Republican × NOMINATE ²				-0.277			
				(0.284)			
Republican		0.017**	0.007	-0.016			
		(0.008)	(0.025)	(0.056)			
Intercept	-0.034***	-0.037***	-0.156***	-0.088**			
	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.019)	(0.038)			
N	499	499	499	499			

^{*}p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Thank You



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