



VPP: The Vulnerability-Proportional Protection Paradigm Towards Reliable Autonomous Machines

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(*Equal Contributions)

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Outline

- Motivation – Why autonomous system needs reliability
- What is Autonomous Machine System
 - The concept of frontend and backend autonomous machine kernels
- VPP Framework
 - System performance and resiliency characterization
 - Vulnerable-proportional protection
- Evaluations
 - Autonomous vehicle and drone

Motivation

Autonomous Machines



Motivation

Autonomous Machines



Performance

Goal: Improve task accuracy
(Autonomy Algorithms)

Efficiency

Goal: Improve data and compute efficiency
(Hardware Architecture)

Motivation



[1]




[2]


[1] Tesla Autopilot System Found Probably at Fault in 2018 Crash, The New York Times, 2021

[2] Surviving an In-Flight Anomaly: What Happened on Ingenuity's Sixth Flight, NASA Science, 2021

Motivation







What is Autonomous Machine System




What is Autonomous Machine System


Metrics:
Resilience
Latency
Energy
Cost



Design Landscape of Protection Techniques




Challenge



Challenge: Today's resiliency solutions are of "one-size-fits-all" nature: they use the same protection scheme throughout entire autonomous machine, bringing trade-offs between resiliency and cost

How to provide **high protection coverage**
while introducing **little cost**
for autonomous machine system?


Insight & Solution



Insight & Solution: exploit the *inherent resiliency variations* in autonomous machine system to conduct *vulnerable-proportional protection (VPP)*


VPP Overview

(VPP: Vulnerability-Proportional Protection)




VPP Overview

(VPP: Vulnerability-Proportional Protection)



System Characterization - Autonomous Vehicle




Experimental Setup

- Platform: Autonomous Vehicle (Autoware^[1])

[1] Kato et al, IEEE Micro, 2015

System Characterization - Autonomous Vehicle




Experimental Setup

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[1] Kato et al, IEEE Micro, 2015

Insight: frontend **high latency**
backend **low latency**

System Characterization - Autonomous Vehicle




- Experimental Setup
- Platform: Autonomous Vehicle (Autoware^[1])
 - Reliability: soft errors

[1] Kato et al, IEEE Micro, 2015

Insight: frontend **high latency, low vulnerability**
backend **low latency, high vulnerability**

System Characterization - Autonomous Drone




- Experimental Setup
- Platform: Autonomous Drone (MAVBench^[2])
 - Reliability: soft errors

[2] Boroujerdian et al, MICRO, 2018

Insight: frontend **high latency, low vulnerability**
backend **low latency, high vulnerability**

VPP Overview

(VPP: Vulnerability-Proportional Protection)




Vulnerable-Proportional Protection

- **Design Principle**: the protection budget, be it spatially or temporally, should be allocated inversely proportionally to kernel inherent resilience


Vulnerable-Proportional Protection


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 - **Frontend:** low vulnerability -> lightweight **software-based protection**



Vulnerable-Proportional Protection


- **Design Principle:** the protection budget, be it spatially or temporally, should be allocated inversely proportionally to kernel inherent resilience
 - **Frontend:** low vulnerability -> lightweight **software-based protection**
 - **Backend:** high vulnerability -> more protection efforts, **hardware-based protection**






Frontend: Anomaly Detection

- **Frontend Insights:**
 - Strong **temporal consistency** of inputs and outputs
 - Inherent **error-masking** and error-attenuation capabilities
 - **Rare false positive** detection




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



IODR: Input Outlier
Detection and Resetting



Frontend: Anomaly Detection


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Backend: Redundancy & Checkpointing

- **Backend Insights:**
 - **Critical** to errors
 - **Extremely lightweight** that do not involve complex computation
 - **More false positive** detection cases



Backend: Redundancy & Checkpointing

- **Backend Insights:**


- **Critical** to errors
- **Extremely lightweight** that do not involve complex computation
- **More false positive** detection cases

Core 0

Core 1

Core 2


Core 3




Backend: Redundancy & Checkpointing

- **Backend Insights:**

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





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




Backend: Redundancy & Checkpointing


- **Backend Insights:**

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VPP Overview

(VPP: Vulnerability-Proportional Protection)



Evaluation – Autonomous Vehicle

Fault Protection Scheme	
Baseline	No Protection
Software	Anomaly Detection
	Temporal Redundancy
Hardware	Modular Redundancy
	Checkpointing
Adaptive Protection Paradigm (VPP)	
Front-end Software + Back-end Hardware	

Experimental Setup

- Platform: Autonomous Vehicle (Autoware^[1])

[1] Kato et al, IEEE Micro, 2015

Evaluation – Autonomous Vehicle

Fault Protection Scheme		Resilience
		Error Propagation Rate (%)
Baseline	No Protection	46.5
Software	Anomaly Detection	24.2
	Temporal Redundancy	11.7
Hardware	Modular Redundancy	0
	Checkpointing	0
Adaptive Protection Paradigm (VPP)		0
Front-end Software + Back-end Hardware		0

Experimental Setup

- Platform: Autonomous Vehicle (Autoware^[1])
- Reliability: soft errors


[1] Kato et al, IEEE Micro, 2015

Takeaway: VPP *improves resilience* and *reduces error propagation rate* by (1) leveraging inherent error-masking capabilities of front-end and (2) strengthening back-end resilience by hardware-based redundancy and checkpointing.

Evaluation – Autonomous Vehicle




Fault Protection Scheme		Resilience	Latency and Object Distance	
		Error Propagation Rate (%)	Compute Latency (ms)	Object Distance (m)
Baseline	No Protection	46.5	164	10
Software	Anomaly Detection	24.2	245	10
	Temporal Redundancy	11.7	347	10
Hardware	Modular Redundancy	0	164	10
	Checkpointing	0	610	10
Adaptive Protection Paradigm (VPP)		0	173	10
Front-end Software + Back-end Hardware				10



Takeaway: VPP reduce end-to-end compute latency overhead.

Evaluation – Autonomous Vehicle

Fault Protection Scheme		Resilience	Latency and Object Distance	
		Error Propagation Rate (%)	Compute Latency (ms)	Object Avoidance Distance (m)
Baseline	No Protection	46.5	164	5.00
Software	Anomaly Detection	24.2	245	5.47
	Temporal Redundancy	11.7	347	6.05
Hardware	Modular Redundancy	0	164	5.00
	Checkpointing	0	610	7.56
Adaptive Protection Paradigm (VPP)		0	173	5.05
Front-end Software + Back-end Hardware				



Takeaway: VPP reduce end-to-end compute latency overhead and reduce obstacle avoidance distance.

Evaluation – Autonomous Vehicle

Fault Protection Scheme		Resilience	Latency and Object Distance		Power Consumption and Driving Time		
		Error Propagation Rate (%)	Compute Latency (ms)	Object Avoidance Distance (m)	AD Component Power (W) [*]	AD Energy Change (%)	
Baseline	No Protection	46.5	164	5.00	175	-	
Software	Anomaly Detection	24.2	245	5.47	175	+33.14	
	Temporal Redundancy	11.7	347	6.05	175	+75.24	
Hardware	Modular Redundancy	0	164	5.00	473	+170.29	
	Checkpointing	0	610	7.56	324	+91.52	
Adaptive Protection Paradigm (VPP)		0	173	5.05	175	+4.09	
Front-end Software + Back-end Hardware							

* The vehicle power without autonomous driving (AD) system is 600 W.

Takeaway: VPP reduce autonomous driving compute power and energy overhead.

Evaluation – Autonomous Vehicle

Fault Protection Scheme		Resilience	Latency and Object Distance		Power Consumption and Driving Time			
		Error Propagation Rate (%)	Compute Latency (ms)	Object Avoidance Distance (m)	AD Component Power (W) [*]	AD Energy Change (%)	Driving Time (hour)	Revenue Loss (%)
Baseline	No Protection	46.5	164	5.00	175	-	7.74	-
Software	Anomaly Detection	24.2	245	5.47	175	+33.14	7.20	-6.99
	Temporal Redundancy	11.7	347	6.05	175	+75.24	6.62	-14.52
Hardware	Modular Redundancy	0	164	5.00	473	+170.29	5.59	-27.78
	Checkpointing	0	610	7.56	324	+91.52	6.42	-17.13
Adaptive Protection Paradigm (VPP)		0	173	5.05	175	+4.09	7.67	-0.92
Front-end Software + Back-end Hardware								

* The vehicle power without autonomous driving (AD) system is 600 W.

Takeaway: VPP reduce autonomous driving compute power and energy overhead, thus enable longer driving time.

Evaluation – Autonomous Vehicle

Fault Protection Scheme		Resilience	Latency and Object Distance		Power Consumption and Driving Time				Cost
		Error Propagation Rate (%)	Compute Latency (ms)	Object Avoidance Distance (m)	AD Component Power (W) [*]	AD Energy Change (%)	Driving Time (hour)	Revenue Loss (%)	Extra Dollar Cost
Baseline	No Protection	46.5	164	5.00	175	-	7.74	-	-
Software	Anomaly Detection	24.2	245	5.47	175	+33.14	7.20	-6.99	negligible
	Temporal Redundancy	11.7	347	6.05	175	+75.24	6.62	-14.52	negligible
Hardware	Modular Redundancy	0	164	5.00	473	+170.29	5.59	-27.78	(CPU + GPU)×2
	Checkpointing	0	610	7.56	324	+91.52	6.42	-17.13	(CPU + GPU)×1
Adaptive Protection Paradigm (VPP)		0	173	5.05	175	+4.09	7.67	-0.92	negligible
Front-end Software + Back-end Hardware									

* The vehicle power without autonomous driving (AD) system is 600 W.

Takeaway: VPP reduces compute latency, energy and system overhead by taking advantage of (1) low cost and false-positive detection in front-end and (2) low latency in back-end. Conventional “one-size-fits-all” techniques are limited by tradeoffs in resilience and overhead.


Evaluation – Autonomous Drone

Fault Protection Scheme		Resilience	Latency and Flight Time			Power Consumption and Flight Energy				Cost
		Mission Failure Rate (%)	Compute Latency (ms)	Avg. Flight Velocity (m/s)	Mission Time (s)	Compute Power (W)	Mission Energy (kJ)	Num. of Missions	Endurance Reduction (%)	Extra Dollar Cost
Baseline	No Protection	12.20	871	2.79	107.53	15	60.09	5.62	-	-
Software	Anomaly Detection	6.44	1201	2.51	119.52	15	66.79	5.05	-10.04	negligible
	Temporal Redundancy	3.02	1924	2.14	140.18	15	78.34	4.31	-23.30	negligible
Hardware	Modular Redundancy	0	871	2.74	109.49	45	63.13	5.34	-3.79	TX2×2
	Checkpointing	0	3458	1.75	171.43	30	96.76	3.49	-37.90	TX2×1
Adaptive Protection Design Paradigm Frontend Software + Backend Hardware		0	897	2.77	108.30	15	60.52	5.58	-0.72	negligible

Experimental Setup

- Platform: Autonomous Drone (MAVBench^[2])
- Reliability: soft errors

[2] Boroujerdian et al, MICRO, 2018



Evaluation – Autonomous Drone

Fault Protection Scheme		Resilience	Latency and Flight Time			Power Consumption and Flight Energy				Cost
		Mission Failure Rate (%)	Compute Latency (ms)	Avg. Flight Velocity (m/s)	Mission Time (s)	Compute Power (W)	Mission Energy (kJ)	Num. of Missions	Endurance Reduction (%)	Extra Dollar Cost
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
Takeaway: For small form factor autonomous machines (e.g., drones), extra compute latency and payload weight brought by fault protection schemes impact drone safe flight velocity, further impacting end-to-end system mission time, mission energy, and flight endurance.

Evaluation – Autonomous Drone

Fault Protection Scheme		Resilience	Latency and Flight Time			Power Consumption and Flight Energy				Cost
		Mission Failure Rate (%)	Compute Latency (ms)	Avg. Flight Velocity (m/s)	Mission Time (s)	Compute Power (W)	Mission Energy (kJ)	Num. of Missions	Endurance Reduction (%)	Extra Dollar Cost
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

Takeaway: VPP generalizes well to small-scale drone system *with improved resilience and negligible overhead*. By contrast, the large overhead from conventional “one-size-fits-all” protection results in severer performance degradation in SWaP-constrained systems.

Summary





Inherent resiliency variations

Summary




Inherent resiliency variations

Summary




Inherent resiliency variations



Resiliency improvement with low overhead

Summary





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