

Comparative Politics

Week 8

04/09/2020

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Logistics I

- I will mute all of you at the beginning to avoid background noise.
- For discussion:
 - Group discussion:
 - Split into break-out room
 - Please take screenshots before jump into discussion
 - In Recitation Room:
 - “Raise hand”
 - Or message to everyone (whichever you prefer)
 - Your recitation performance will be based on this discussion

Logistics II

- The short paper topic WILL be posted on Classes on **April 17th**, due to be posted back to Classes **on April 23rd by 5pm**, as on the original syllabus.
- **We will have recitation in the week of April 13**

Logistics III

- Email: jlzhou@nyu.edu
- Office hour: **Thursday 14-15; 17-18, online**
 - Book my office hour here: <https://calendly.com/jlzhou/15min>
 - Join meeting via: <https://nyu.zoom.us/j/7478991306>
 - You will be in a waiting room upon entering to avoid interruption to the ongoing meeting.

Today

- Calculus of Voting
 - Theory
 - Empirics

Calculus of Voting: Theory

Theory

- The calculus of voting:
 - An individual will vote if $p \times B + D > C$
 - **B**: benefit if preferred candidate wins
 - **p**: probability that vote affects outcome
 - **C**: cost of voting
 - **D**: some other utility from the act of voting
- Any example?

Example: Youth Turnout




FIGURE 1.1 Age gap in voter turnout in the United States

Voter turnout by age. Source: Current Population Survey (CPS) November Supplement (via the United States Elections Project). The dark gray line plots turnout among citizens 18–29; the medium gray line is for those 60+; the thick light gray line plots the gap between these groups

Source : Holbein, John B., and D. Sunshine Hillygus. *Making Young Voters: Converting Civic Attitudes Into Civic Action*.

Youth Turnout: Intention and Turnout




FIGURE 1.4 The difference between turnout intentions and actual turnout by age
Figure 1.4 plots the average gap between turnout intentions and turnout. The top panel uses validated voting; the bottom uses self-reported voting. Data drawn from the ANES cumulative file (1972–2016)

Source : Holbein, John B., and D. Sunshine Hillygus. *Making Young Voters: Converting Civic Attitudes Into Civic Action*.

Brain Storming:

- **why** young people might be less likely to vote?
 - Think about $p \times B + D > C$
 - Hint:
 - For p, B, D, C , are they small or large?
 - What are they?
 - Why?

Brain Storming:

- If you were an organization trying to increase turnout among those 18-35 or so,
 - what will you do to address the factors you came up with that might be preventing people from turning out to vote?

Calculus of Voting: Empirics

Now, Kasara and Suryanarayan's paper

- What's the main research question?
- What's the main argument?
- How do they answer the question / support their argument?

Now, Kasara and Suryanarayan's AJPS 2015

- What's the main research question?
 - What explains the relationship between income and turnout
 - Why do some countries have positive relationship while some have negative one?
- What's the main argument?
 - If the political salience of redistribution in party politics and the state's extractive capacity are high, rich are more likely to vote.
 - Because they care about election outcome (due to policy outcome)
- How do they answer the question / support their argument?
 - Survey data on policy preference, turnout, etc.
 - Regression

Kasara and Suryanarayan: table 2

- What is the dependent variable?
- What are the main independent variables?
- What does the coefficient of **Government effectiveness** tell us?
- How does it answer the question?

TABLE 2 Determinants of Turnout Inequality

DV: β_j	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Voting Polarization	0.045** (0.022)					
Electoral Distance Q1 and Q5		0.046** (0.019)				
Bureaucratic Quality			0.065** (0.029)			
Government Effectiveness				0.084*** (0.027)		
Direct Taxes/Revenue					0.053* (0.031)	
Log. GDP per capita						0.13*** (0.030)
PR	0.0033 (0.035)	0.0062 (0.035)	0.023 (0.040)	0.0056 (0.037)	0.043 (0.032)	0.0066 (0.034)
Concurrent Elections	0.069*** (0.025)	0.073*** (0.025)	0.044 (0.027)	0.061*** (0.027)	0.090*** (0.032)	0.058** (0.027)
Compulsory Voting	-0.050 (0.040)	-0.052 (0.038)	-0.032 (0.031)	-0.051 (0.037)	0.0059 (0.055)	-0.058 (0.037)
Polity	0.039 (0.030)	0.045 (0.030)	0.023 (0.029)	0.00049 (0.032)	0.065** (0.029)	0.014 (0.031)
Infant Mortality	-0.024 (0.024)	-0.025 (0.023)	0.036 (0.032)	0.015 (0.026)	-0.035 (0.025)	0.068*** (0.024)
Gini (Gross)	-0.022 (0.030)	-0.032 (0.031)	-0.029 (0.031)	-0.027 (0.031)	-0.093*** (0.033)	-0.043 (0.033)
Homicide Rate	-0.019 (0.029)	-0.016 (0.028)	-0.0053 (0.030)	0.0068 (0.029)	0.034 (0.031)	0.0056 (0.030)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.011 (0.028)	-0.0066 (0.029)	-0.034 (0.033)	-0.029 (0.029)	-0.0099 (0.035)	-0.022 (0.028)
Intercept	0.049 (0.037)	0.043 (0.038)	0.045 (0.039)	0.047 (0.037)	0.0041 (0.030)	0.050 (0.035)
N	169	167	183	178	102	187
Countries	60	60	62	63	45	64

Notes: This table reports second-stage coefficient estimates. Estimates of β_j are for logistic regressions including controls for Age, Age-Squared, Female, Urban, and Secondary Education. Continuous variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 0.5. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.

Calculus of Voting: Revisit

- (How) does the main argument relate to the calculus of voting?
 - $p \times B + D > C$
 - What's difference between rich and poor?
 - What changes when **political salience of redistribution in party politics** and **the state's extractive capacity** change?

Croke et al. piece

- What does that piece tell us about the conditions under which the highly educated are likely to participate in politics at higher rates than the less educated?
- Why?
- Are you convinced by what they show?

Croke et al. piece (my takeaway)

- What does that piece tell us about the conditions under which the highly educated are likely to participate in politics at higher rates than the less educated?
- In authoritarian countries where there is no authentic competitive election.
- Why?
- Deliberately disengagement. Educated people get more information, get the value of democracy, more interested in politics, and don't want to use election to legitimize the current undemocratic government.
- Are you convinced by what they show?
- I (Aaron) am. They use a natural experiment in Zimbabwe, and find this negative relationship between education and turnout. Furthermore, they even find that when election becomes competitive (2008), educated people has higher turnout, which is consistence with the theory.