

Comparative Politics

Week 7

04/02/2020

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Logistics I

- I will mute all of you at the beginning to avoid background noise.
- For discussion:
 - Group discussion:
 - Split into break-out room
 - Please take screenshots before jump into discussion
 - In Recitation Room:
 - “Raise hand”
 - Or message to everyone (whichever you prefer)
 - Your recitation performance will be based on this discussion

Logistics II

- The short paper topic WILL be posted on Classes on **April 17th**, due to be posted back to Classes **on April 23rd by 5pm**, as on the original syllabus.
- **We will have recitation in the week of April 13**

Logistics III

- Email: jlzhou@nyu.edu
- Office hour: **Thursday 14-15; 17-18, online**
 - Book my office hour here: <https://calendly.com/jlzhou/15min>
 - Join meeting via: <https://nyu.zoom.us/j/7478991306>
 - You will be in a waiting room upon entering to avoid interruption to the ongoing meeting.

Logistics

- Any other questions?

Today

- Midterm
- Voting Behavior
 - Spatial Voting
 - Strategic Voting
 - Vote Buying

Midterm

General Comments

- Good in general
- Your answer should use what we learn from the class
- You should answer all the questions
- Should be more consistent in your writing and logic

Example: Question 2

- Why is it that so-called “bottom up transitions” to democracy tend to be so surprising in the moment (i.e., not anticipated by citizens of those countries or by observers of those countries in advance)?
- Provide an argument about citizen behavior that accounts for bottom-up transitions’ **unpredictability**.
- Then, drawing on what you know from readings, recitations and lectures, explain how the logic of a top-down transition is the same or different from the logic of a bottom-up transition to democracy. (40 points)

Example: Question 2

- **Why** is it that so-called “bottom up transitions” to democracy tend to be so surprising in the moment (i.e., not anticipated by citizens of those countries or by observers of those countries in advance)?
- Provide an **argument** about citizen behavior that **accounts** for bottom-up transitions’ **unpredictability**.
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Example: Question 2

- Why is it that so-called “bottom up transitions” to democracy tend to be so surprising in the moment (i.e., not anticipated by citizens of those countries or by observers of those countries in advance)?
- Provide an **argument** about citizen behavior that **accounts for bottom-up transitions’ unpredictability**.
- **What is bottom-up; Preference falsification, threshold, cascade;**
- Then, drawing on what you know from readings, recitations and lectures, explain **how** the **logic of a top-down transition** is the same or different from the logic of a bottom-up transition to democracy. (40 points)
- **What is top-down; How does it work; How is it different from/same as B-U.**

Clarification or grading

- Contact me first (via email or office hour) **within 72 hours**
 - We can discuss
 - If anything to change, I will do that.
- If we don't reach an agreement
 - Email Professor McClendon (cc me) and she will regrade
 - It could go up or down


Voting Behavior

Spatial Voting

- Voter has its own ideal point (on policy), assume one dimension, so a real number on axis
- Party (candidate) declare its policy platform on that axis
- Voter votes sincerely
- → median voter theorem (Downs)

Spatial Voting Theories

Voters are located somewhere on this spectrum in terms of their ideal policy.




Each voter prefers parties/candidates *closest* to her ideal policy.

Spatial Voting

120

Analyzing Politics



Spatial Voting

- Who is/are the strategic player in the model?
- Questions before move on?

Strategic Voting

- Now, voters are also strategic
 - Voters do not only care about the policy platform
 - But the final policy / final election outcome
- **Strategic voting** is often defined as voting for your most preferred candidate or party among those that have a **realistic chance of winning**.
 - In other words: avoid wasting a vote (Cox)
 - [Other motivations: voting to moderate policy]

General results/extensions of Cox's theory

- Plurality system:
 - Strategic voting leads to convergence on $M+1$ candidates
 - This is one reason first-past-the-post rules tend to favor fewer parties (recall The Animal Kingdom Video)
- Proportional system:
 - Strategic voting could mean voting for parties expected to be just above electoral threshold
 - Strategic voting could mean voting for likely coalition partners (Source: Orit Kedar)
- Split Ticket/Divided government (Alesina and Rosenthal)

Vote Buying

- People vote for other reasons. For instance, people's votes can be influenced by:
 - Money (vote buying): receiving a gift from a candidate or party in exchange for casting a vote for that party (quid pro quo)
 - Coercion (violence and intimidation)
 - Or pure information
- Huge literature on this topic

Brusco et al.

- What's their main research questions?
- How do they answer those questions?
 - Where do they conduct the study?
 - What's methodology they use?
- What are the main findings based on table 1?

Brusco et al.
Table 1

Table 1 Relative Frequency of Responses to Selected Questions (1,920 Respondents)

Question	Variable name	% “yes” in total sample	% “yes” among low-income respondents	% “yes” among low-income Peronists
In the past year have you turned to (important person) for help?	<i>Patron</i>	12%	22%	22%
In the past year have you turned to a party operative for help?	<i>Puntero</i>	9%	12%	14%
If household head lost his/her job, would you turn to party operative?	<i>Job</i>	36%	45%	58%
In the campaign, did you receive something from a candidate or party?	<i>Gift</i>	7%	12%	18%
Did it influence your vote?*	<i>Influence</i>	1.5% (16%)	3% (19%)	5% (24%)

*Numbers in parentheses are percentages of people who said that a handout influenced their vote, among those who reported having received a handout.

Regression

Brusco et al. Table 2

- What can we learn from this table?

Table 2 Model Estimations of the Probability of a Peronist Vote in Presidential and Gubernatorial Elections

<i>Dependent Variable</i>	President 1999	Governor 1999
<i>Models Estimated</i>	<i>Logit</i>	<i>Logit</i>
<i>Peronist handout</i>	0.592 (0.297)	0.855 (0.309)
<i>Peronist sympathizer</i>	2.275 (0.147)	2.155 (0.133)
<i>Radical sympathizer</i>	-1.167 (0.332)	-1.295 (0.241)
<i>Income</i>	0.014 (0.063)	-0.011 (0.040)
<i>Education</i>	-0.072 (0.052)	-0.024 (0.037)
<i>Housing</i>	-0.120 (0.096)	0.073 (0.082)
<i>Gender</i>	-0.026 (0.145)	0.027 (0.127)
<i>Age</i>	0.006 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)
Log population	0.069 (0.038)	-0.066 (0.033)
Constant	-2.553 (0.550)	-0.517 (0.459)
Chi-square	445 ($p=0.000$)	496 ($p=0.000$)
<i>N observations</i>	1920	1920

Revisit Brusco et al.

- What's their main research questions?
- What's the main takeaway?