

# Comparative Politics

Week 3

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# About me

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# Today

- Modernization Theory
  - Exit-Voice-Loyalty Game
  - Examples
- Critics to MT
  - BDM & Downs
  - Przeworski & Limongi

# Modernization Theory

# What does modernization theory say?

- Modernization theory posits that all societies pass a series of historical stages of economic and political development.
- They pass from agriculture-based societies governed by dictators ...to industry- and service-based societies governed by democratic institutions.
- In the process, according to modernization theory, societies' income grows and those societies become more democratic.




Seymour Lipset

# What happen to England

- What happens?
  - Hint: economic
  - (Enclosure)
- What happens to the crown?
- Why does the crown accept change?


# An EVL explanation



# Model

FIGURE 6.8

Solving the EVL Game When the Parliamentarians Have a Credible Exit Threat,  $E > 0$ , and the Crown Is Dependent,  $L > 1$



The subgame perfect equilibrium is (Demand limits, Disinvest; Accept limits).

The Crown in England was dependent on the Parliamentarians for revenue,  $L > 1$ . The Parliamentarians had mobile assets,  $E > 0$ .

# Take-away

- Credible Commitment and dependency!


Structural changes to the economy

- more **credible exit options** for (some sub-set of) citizens
- democratic reforms (i.e., more control over governing given to those citizens) *if state dependent on those citizens*

# France Case

FIGURE 6.9

Solving the EVL Game When the Parliamentarians Do Not Have a Credible Exit Threat,  $E < 0$ , and the Crown Is Dependent,  $L > 1$



The subgame perfect equilibrium is (Invest, Invest; Reject limits).

The Crown in France was dependent on the Parliamentarians for revenue,  $L > 1$ . The Parliamentarians did not have mobile assets,  $E < 0$ .

# DISCUSS

- Can you think of any other credible exit option via economic structure change?
- Can you think of any other credible exit option?
- Can you think of any cases when the dependency change?

Critics to MT

# BDM and Downs' Critics

- What's their main point?
  - Consider government's action
- Do they agree or disagree MT?



Bruce Bueno de Mesquita




George Downs

# Development and Coordination Good

- Why does authoritarian government want development?
- What's Coordination Good in real life?
  - Example?
- How authoritarian country deal with that?
  - i.e. Knowing that economic development/growth could lead to democracy, how might authoritarian governments *strategically respond* accordingly?

# Przeworski and Limongi's critics

- What's their argument?
- What's their assumption?
- Difference between MT?




Adam Przeworski

Fernando Limongi

# A comparison

**FIGURE 6.3**

**Expected Probability of Regime Transitions as Income Increases according to Modernization Theory and the Survival Story**



# Democratic Survival

- Do you find Przeworski and Limongi's argument convincing?
- Yes, then why (and/or examples)?
- No, then why (and/or examples)?

# Final Discussion

- Are BDM/Downs and Przeworski/Limongi arguing against one another?
- Which argument do you find more convincing? Why?