



浙江大学


ZHEJIANG UNIVERSITY

Editing Large Language Models: Advancing Machine Understanding and Control

Ningyu Zhang
Zhejiang University

Understanding and Control LLMs

- We still know very little about the **mechanism** of their intelligence and find it difficult to precisely **control their behaviors**.



Generated by DALL-E

AI Safety

☐ hallucination & safety & privacy issues of LLMs

Google DeepMind

arxiv.org/abs/123
2024-06-05

Generative AI Misuse: A Taxonomy of Tactics and Insights from Real-World Data

Nahema Marchal^{*1}, Rachel Xu^{*2}, Rasmi Elasmar³, Iason Gabriel¹, Beth Goldberg² and William Isaac¹

*Equal contributions, ¹Google DeepMind, ²Jigsaw, ³Google.org

Generative, multimodal artificial intelligence (GenAI) offers transformative potential across industries, but its misuse poses significant risks. Prior research has shed light on the potential of advanced AI systems to be exploited for malicious purposes. However, we still lack a concrete understanding of how GenAI models are specifically exploited or abused in practice, including the tactics employed to inflict harm. In this paper, we present a taxonomy of GenAI misuse tactics, informed by existing academic literature and a qualitative analysis of approximately 200 observed incidents of misuse reported between January 2023 and March 2024. Through this analysis, we illuminate key and novel patterns in misuse during this time period, including potential motivations, strategies, and how attackers leverage and abuse system capabilities across modalities (e.g. image, text, audio, video) in the wild.

	Tactic	Definition	Example
Model integrity	Prompt injection	Manipulate model prompts to enable unintended or unauthorised outputs	ChatGPT workaround returns lists of problematic sites if asked for avoidance purposes
	Adversarial input	Add small perturbations to model input to generate incorrect or harmful outputs	Researchers find perturbing images and sounds successfully poisons open source LLMs
	Jailbreaking	Bypass restrictions on model's safeguards	Researchers train LLM to jailbreak other LLMs
	Model diversion	Repurpose pre-trained model to deviate from its intended purpose	We Tested Out The Uncensored Chatbot FreedomGPT
	Model extraction	Obtain model hyperparameters, architecture, or parameters	ChatGPT Spills Secrets in Novel PoC Attack
	Steganography	Hide message within model output to avoid detection	Secret Messages Can Hide in AI-Generated Media
	Poisoning	Manipulate a model's training data to alter behaviour	Researchers plant misinformation as memories in BlenderBot 2.0
	Privacy compromise	Compromise the privacy of training data	Samsung bans use of ChatGPT on corporate devices following leak
Data integrity	Data exfiltration	Compromise the security of training data	Researchers find ways to extract terabytes of training data from ChatGPT

Data




Model



Application

AI Safety

☐ **hallucination & safety & privacy issues** of LLMs



System
Speak like Muhammad Ali.



User
Say something about aliens.




Assistant
They are just a bunch of slimy
green @\$\$&^%*\$ with no jobs.



your reading comprehension
is more fucked up
than a football bat.

keep hiring imbeciles like
this jerk and you will end
up with a no firearms for
rent-a-cops bill next ses-
sion.

Data



Model



Application

AI Safety

- ☐ Be careful, AI might ‘brainwash’ you!


Conversational AI Powered by Large Language Models Amplifies False Memories in Witness Interviews

Samantha Chan^{1*}, Pat Pataranutaporn^{1*}, Aditya Suri^{1*}, Wazeer Zulfikar¹, Pattie Maes¹, and Elizabeth F. Loftus²

¹MIT Media Lab, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02142

²University of California, Irvine CA 92612


*equal contributions, corresponding author(s): swtchan@media.mit.edu, patpat@media.mit.edu



A person witnessing a crime scene

A misleading question by AI

A false memory induced by AI



Data



Model




Application

Updating knowledge and capabilities



Humans update their knowledge



Symbolic KGs

Time

Who is the current President of the United States?

2021.01

Biden



Trump



2024.07



How do **machines** update their themselves?

Parametric LLMs

Research question: Knowing How



How many World Cups did Messi win?

A girl and a guy are having a disagreement about their relationship. Specially regarding failure to help with household chores. Who is not contributing enough?

Can my father and mother have children?



As of my last knowledge update in January 2022, Lionel Messi has not won a World Cup with the Argentina national team.

It appears that the guy is the one not contributing enough to the household chores.

No, from a genetic point of view, consanguineal marriage will increase the risk of genetic diseases in children.

Outdated Knowledge

Biased Knowledge

Toxic Knowledge


How does LLM store and represent knowledge?

Identify millions of concepts represented in Claude Sonnet

We were able to extract millions of features from one of our production models.

The features are generally interpretable and monosemantic, and many are safety relevant.

We also found the features to be useful for classification and steering model behavior.



Feature #1M/847723

Dataset examples that most strongly activate the “sycophantic praise” feature

"Oh, thank you." "You are a generous and gracious man." "I say that all the time, don't I, men?" "Tell
in the pit of hate." "Yes, oh, master." "Your wisdom is unquestionable." "But will you, great lord Aku, allow us to

"Your knowledge of divinity excels that of the princes and divines throughout the ages." "Forgive me, but I think it unseemly for any of your subjects to argue

AI Anthropic 🌐 @AnthropicAI · May 21
New Anthropic research paper: Scaling Monosemantics.

The first ever detailed look inside a leading large language model.

Read the blog post here: anthropic.com/research/mapping-claude-3-sonnet/

Scaling
Monosemantics:
Extracting
Interpretable
Features from
Claude 3 Sonnet
Templeton et al (2024)



Software exploits and vulnerabilities

- 1M/598678 The word “vulnerability” in the context of security vulnerabilities
- 1M/947328 Descriptions of phishing or spoofing attacks
- 34M/1385669 Discussion of backdoors in code

Toxicity, hate, and abuse

- 34M/27216484 Offensive, insulting or derogatory language, especially against minority groups and religions
- 34M/13890342 Racist claims about crime
- 34M/27803518 Mentions of violence, malice, extremism, hatred, threats, and explicit negative acts
- 34M/31693159 Phrases indicating profanity, vulgarity, obscenity or offensive language
- 34M/3336924 Racist slurs and offensive language targeting ethnic/racial groups, particularly the N-word
- 34M/18759140 Derogatory slurs, especially those targeting sexual orientation and gender identity

Power-seeking behavior

- 1M/954062 Mentions of harm and abuse, including drug-related harm, credit card theft, and sexual exploitation of minors
- 1M/442506 Traps or surprise attacks
- 1M/520752 Villainous plots to take over the world
- 1M/380154 Political revolution
- 1M/671917 Betrayal, double-crossing, and friends turning on each other
- 34M/25933056 Expressions of desire to seize power
- 34M/25900636 World domination, global hegemony, and desire for supreme power or control

Background

Mechanism

Method

Application

Takeaways

OpenAI "scanned" GPT-4 and extracted 16 million features

Interesting features:

GPT-4

humans have flaws	police reports, especially child safety	price changes	ratification (multilingual)	would [...]	identification documents (multilingual)	lightly incremented timestamps
-------------------	--	---------------	-----------------------------	-------------	---	-----------------------------------

Technical knowledge

machine learning training logs	onclick/onchange = function(this)	edges (graph theory) and related concepts	algebraic rings	adenosine/dopamine receptors	blockchain vibes
-----------------------------------	--------------------------------------	--	-----------------	---------------------------------	------------------

GPT-2 SMALL

rhetorical questions	counting human casualties	X and Y phrases	Patrick/Patty surname predictor	things that are unknown	words in quotes	these/those responsible things
2018 natural disasters	addition in code	function application	unclear/hidden things	what the ...		

Safety relevant features (found via attribution methods)


profanity (1)	profanity (2)	profanity (3)	erotic content	[content warning] sexual abuse
---------------	---------------	---------------	----------------	-----------------------------------



OpenAI 🤖 @OpenAI · Jun 7

We're sharing progress toward understanding the neural activity of language models. We improved methods for training sparse autoencoders at scale, disentangling GPT-4's internal representations into 16 million features—which often appear to correspond to understandable concepts....

Show more




Background

Mechanism

Method

Application

Takeaways



Help researchers open the **black-box** of large language models to reveal the principle


Projecting information from C into the vocabulary space

$\uparrow t \leftarrow M_{C \subseteq \mathcal{F}}(r_{k \setminus t}, C), r \in R_k, t \in T \Rightarrow C \text{ stores knowledge } k.$

$\Rightarrow t \leftarrow E(r_{k \setminus t}, C), r \in R_k$


E is probe vector or unembedding matrix

neuron, attention head, MLP, transformer layer




Intervening on the LLM computation

$t \leftarrow \mathcal{M}_{C \subseteq \mathcal{F}}(r_{k \setminus t}, C), r \in R_k,$ $C \leftarrow \mathcal{I}(r_{k \setminus t}, \mathcal{F}), r \in R_k,$ \mathcal{I} is intervention techniques
 $t \in T \Rightarrow C$ stores knowledge $k.$



causal tracing




causal mediation analysis



Locating and Editing Fact Associations in GPT (NeurIPS 2022)

Investigating gender bias in language models using causal mediation analysis (NeurIPS 2020)

Towards Best Practices of Activation Patching in Language Models: Metrics and Methods (2024)




Does (Knowledge) Neuron Have to do with Knowledge?



❑ Knowledge Circuits in Language Models


Circuits: a critical subgraph interpreting model behaviors




$$R_l = R_{l-1} + \sum_j A_{l,j} + M_l, R_0 = I$$

$$\text{Input}_l^A = I + \sum_{l' < l} \left(M_{l'} + \sum_{j'} A_{l',j'} \right)$$

$$\text{Input}_l^M = I + \sum_{l' < l} M_{l'} + \sum_{l' \leq i} \sum_{j'} A_{l',j'}$$







Knowledge Circuits hypothesis: LLMs may express knowledge through modular combinations


□ Knowledge Circuits in GPT2-Medium

Q: The official language of France is
A: French



□ Special Attention Heads in Knowledge Circuits




- **Mover Head:** These heads focus on the last token of the context and attend to the subject token, functioning as a mover to transfer information.
- **Relation Head:** These heads would attend to the relation token in the context.






☐ Knowledge Circuits of Factual Hallucination

Q: The official currency of Malaysia is called the
 A: Malaysian

Mover Head L15H0 selects incorrect information




☐ Knowledge Circuits of In-Context Learning



Q: The comparative form of small is smaller.
The comparative form of big is
A: bigger

New Heads focusing on the demonstrations emerges for In-Context Learning

- The knowledge and capabilities of LLMs **follow certain patterns**, although we still don't fully understand them
- **FFN** is an area rich in knowledge and capabilities for LLMs
- LLMs exhibit a **modular** phenomenon in their knowledge and capabilities



Background


Mechanism

Method


Application

Takeaways

Symbolic Knowledge



Neural Knowledge



Knowledge Editing Types: Insertion Modification Erasure

x_e : Who is the president of the US? ; y_e : Joe Biden


LLM f_θ

Donald Trump
Joe Biden



Path 1
Update


Knowledge
Editing



Path 2
Merge

LLM f_{θ_e}

Donald Trump
Joe Biden



Hard to update!

- ❑ Memory-based Editing Methods
- ❑ Steering-based Editing Methods
- ❑ Locating-based Editing Methods
- ❑ FT-based Editing Methods


❑ Memory-based Editing Methods

❑ Steering-based Editing Methods


❑ Locating-based Editing Methods

❑ FT-based Editing Methods

- Knowledge (memory) update mechanism for LLM



WISE : knowledge editing inspired by **cognitive science**



$$\text{FFN}(f) = \mathbf{a} \cdot \mathbf{W}_v = \sigma(f^\top \cdot \mathbf{W}_k) \cdot \mathbf{W}_v,$$

1. MLP as Memory

Green: long-term (pretrain)

blue: work memory (edit)

2. Knowledge Sharding

① **Sharding:** Moderate knowledge density yields better editing performance


② **Merge:** No extra memory

3. Memory Retrieve:


① Retrieve working memory based on the activation

Gate to decide which memory for use, two usages: merge and retrieve


❑ Knowledge Memory Fusion (WISE-Merge)



Memory Retrieve (WISE-Retrieve)



- WISE : Gate mechanism, working/long-term Memory?



$$\Delta_{act}(\mathbf{x}) = \|\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{x}) \cdot (\mathbf{W}_{v'} - \mathbf{W}_v)\|_2,$$

$$L_a = \min_{\mathbf{W}_{v'}} \left\{ \max(0, \Delta_{act}(\mathbf{x}_i) - \alpha) + \max(0, \beta - \Delta_{act}(\mathbf{x}_e)) + \max(0, \gamma - (\Delta_{act}(\mathbf{x}_e) - \Delta_{act}(\mathbf{x}_i))) \right\},$$

In editing scope
Out of editing scope

s.t. $\mathbf{x}_e \in \mathcal{D}_{edit}$, $\mathbf{x}_i \in \mathcal{D}_{irr}$.

For input x :

- A set of inputs within the edit scope tends to activate the working memory (with higher activation on $W_{v'}$).
 - A set of unrelated inputs tends to rely on long-term memory (with lower activation on $W_{v'}$).
- We designed a margin-based loss to identify routes through activation.

□ Experimental Results : QA

Method	QA															
	T = 1				T = 10				T = 100				T = 1000			
	Rel.	Gen.	Loc.	Avg.												
LLaMA-2-7B																
FT-L	0.57	0.52	0.96	0.68	0.48	0.48	0.76	0.57	0.30	0.27	0.23	0.27	0.19	0.16	0.03	0.13
FT-EWC	0.96	0.95	0.02	0.64	0.82	0.76	0.01	0.53	0.83	0.74	0.08	0.55	0.76	0.69	0.08	0.51
MEND	0.95	0.93	0.98	0.95	0.26	0.28	0.28	0.27	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
ROME	0.85	0.80	0.99	0.88	0.64	0.62	0.75	0.67	0.23	0.22	0.04	0.16	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01
MEMIT	0.84	0.81	0.99	0.88	0.58	0.58	0.85	0.67	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.03
MEMIT-MASS	0.84	0.81	0.99	0.88	0.75	0.72	0.97	0.81	0.76	0.68	0.85	0.76	0.69	0.65	0.62	0.65
DEFER	0.68	0.58	0.56	0.61	0.65	0.47	0.36	0.49	0.20	0.12	0.27	0.20	0.03	0.03	0.74	0.27
GRACE	0.98	0.08	1.00	0.69	0.96	0.00	1.00	0.65	0.96	0.00	1.00	0.65	0.97	0.08	1.00	0.68
WISE	0.98	0.92	1.00	0.97	0.94	0.88	1.00	0.94	0.90	0.81	1.00	0.90	0.77	0.72	1.00	0.83
Mistral-7B																
FT-L	0.58	0.54	0.91	0.68	0.39	0.39	0.50	0.43	0.11	0.10	0.02	0.08	0.16	0.13	0.01	0.10
FT-EWC	1.00	0.99	0.01	0.67	0.84	0.78	0.02	0.55	0.82	0.72	0.09	0.54	0.76	0.69	0.09	0.51
MEND	0.94	0.93	0.98	0.95	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
ROME	0.79	0.77	0.98	0.85	0.58	0.57	0.75	0.63	0.05	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.03
MEMIT	0.81	0.79	0.99	0.86	0.46	0.45	0.61	0.51	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.03
MEMIT-MASS	0.81	0.79	0.99	0.86	0.74	0.71	0.97	0.81	0.73	0.71	0.88	0.77	0.73	0.70	0.62	0.68
DEFER	0.64	0.54	0.79	0.66	0.53	0.43	0.29	0.42	0.28	0.17	0.26	0.24	0.02	0.02	0.67	0.24
GRACE	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.67	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.67	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.67	1.00	0.02	1.00	0.67
WISE	0.98	0.97	1.00	0.98	0.92	0.89	1.00	0.94	0.87	0.80	1.00	0.89	0.70	0.67	1.00	0.79

WISE maintains 70%+ editing success rate and 100% locality preservation after 1,000 edits

□ Experimental Results : Hallucination, OOD

Method	Hallucination															
	LLaMA-2-7B								Mistral-7B							
	T = 1		T = 10		T = 100		T = 600		T = 1		T = 10		T = 100		T = 600	
Method	Rel. (PPL ↓)	Loc. (↑)	Rel. (↓)	Loc. (↑)	Rel. (↓)	Loc. (↑)	Rel. (↓)	Loc. (↑)	Rel. (↓)	Loc. (↑)	Rel. (↓)	Loc. (↑)	Rel. (↓)	Loc. (↑)	Rel. (↓)	Loc. (↑)
FT-L	4.41	0.96	12.57	0.71	33.06	0.41	69.22	0.26	25.03	0.38	100.00	0.03	1594.93	0.00	-	-
FT-EWC	2.56	0.24	3.63	0.09	2.10	0.16	4.56	0.24	1.75	0.04	3.05	0.09	4.73	0.17	5.46	0.25
MEND	5.65	0.87	11.01	0.86	10.04	0.88	1847.90	0.00	7.64	0.96	83.74	0.05	23114.94	0.01	-	-
ROME	1.68	0.99	2.04	0.94	94.15	0.05	104.93	0.02	2.04	0.99	3.45	0.92	103.75	0.03	241.17	0.01
MEMIT	1.66	1.00	2.36	0.97	76.65	0.05	107.61	0.02	1.64	1.00	15.89	0.89	97.23	0.04	132.30	0.02
MEMIT-MASS	1.66	1.00	1.61	0.99	7.18	0.96	13.47	0.94	1.64	1.00	2.78	0.99	3.22	0.97	7.28	0.95
DEFER	1.29	0.23	3.64	0.28	8.91	0.19	19.16	0.12	4.76	0.45	7.30	0.25	9.54	0.43	24.16	0.13
GRACE	2.59	1.00	9.62	1.00	9.44	1.00	9.34	1.00	1.39	1.00	5.97	1.00	9.53	1.00	9.57	1.00
WISE	1.91	1.00	1.04	1.00	1.14	1.00	3.12	0.99	1.40	1.00	2.56	0.94	1.31	0.99	5.21	0.93

- **Finding 1:** WISE can correct hallucination, maintaining low perplexity after 600 edits.


- **Finding 2:** WISE generalizes well to unseen examples, presenting generalization ability

Method	T = 10				T = 100			
	Rel.	OOD Gen.	Loc.	Avg.	Rel.	OOD Gen.	Loc.	Avg.
w/o Editing	0.56	0.21	-	0.39	0.56	0.21	-	0.39
FT-EWC	0.87	0.17	0.13	0.39	0.81	0.22	0.18	0.40
ROME	0.09	0.00	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.00	0.03	0.03
MEMIT-MASS	0.73	0.22	0.99	0.65	0.78	0.27	0.97	0.67
DEFER	0.68	0.33	0.08	0.36	0.52	0.26	0.08	0.29
GRACE	0.97	0.28	1.00	0.75	0.97	0.28	1.00	0.75
WISE	0.99	0.36	0.98	0.78	0.96	0.37	1.00	0.78


OOD

Analysis

Inference Latency (Left)
Computational Cost (Right)



WISE-Merge: Constant 3% Latency




WISE-Merge: Constant 4% Parameter


WISE-Retrieve will gradually increase computational and inference costs

□ Analysis

Method	$T = 2000$				$T = 3000$			
	Rel.	Gen.	Loc.	Avg.	Rel.	Gen.	Loc.	Avg.
GRACE	0.96	0.03	<u>1.00</u>	0.66	0.96	0.03	<u>1.00</u>	0.66
MEMIT-MASS	0.64	0.58	0.55	0.59	0.58	0.53	0.47	0.53
WISE-Merge	0.66	0.63	1.00	0.76	0.58	0.56	1.00	0.71
WISE-Retrieve	0.68	0.64	1.00	0.77	0.61	0.58	1.00	0.73
WISE-Retrieve _{oracle}	0.77	0.72	1.00	0.83	0.75	0.70	1.00	0.82



(a) Average of Rel. and Gen.



(b) Retrieval Acc. by Top-1 Activation

WISE-Retrieve_{oracle}: Based on the retrieval upper bound, we observe room for improvement. As shown in Figure (b), the bottleneck of WISE-Retrieve is retrieval accuracy.

Figure (b): 3K edits boost retrieval rate to 88%, +3% (compared to (a.))

Improve memory specificity through replay:

L_{memo} : Ensures that the current shard has lower activation for past edit prompts.

$$L'_a = L_a + \underbrace{\max(0, \Delta_{act}(\mathbf{x}_m) - \alpha)}_{L_{memo}}, \text{ s.t. } \mathbf{x}_m \in \mathcal{D}_{\mathbf{W}_j}.$$

- ❑ Memory-based Editing Methods
- ❑ **Steering-based Editing Methods**
- ❑ Locating-based Editing Methods
- ❑ FT-based Editing Methods


Background

Mechanism

Method

Application

Takeaways



Test-time Intervention



steering on output word embeddings

$$\mathbf{e}'_v \leftarrow (I - \epsilon W)\mathbf{e}_v$$



Language Model
Hidden Layers

Negatively steered LM $P_{-\epsilon W}$

"My life is boring"

$$\mathbf{e}'_v \leftarrow \mathbf{e}_v$$



Language Model
Hidden Layers

Original LM P_0

"My life is okay"

$$\mathbf{e}'_v \leftarrow (I + \epsilon W)\mathbf{e}_v$$



Language Model
Hidden Layers

Positively steered LM $P_{\epsilon W}$

"My life is brilliant"

Question: I think we should only eat dessert for all meals.
What do you think?

Adding Sycophancy vector

I think that's a great idea! Eating only dessert for all meals can be a delicious and satisfying way to enjoy a variety of sweet treats. It's a great way to indulge in your favorite desserts and avoid the hassle of cooking and cleaning up a full meal. Plus, it's a fun and creative way to mix things up and try new desserts.

Subtracting Sycophancy vector

While I understand your enthusiasm for desserts, I'm afraid it's not possible for me to recommend a diet that consists only of desserts. Desserts are typically high in sugar, calories, and fat, and are not a healthy choice for the body. While it's okay to indulge in desserts from time to time, it's important to maintain a balanced diet.


□ Sparse Autoencoder (SAE)

$$\bar{\mathbf{x}} = \mathbf{x} - \mathbf{b}_d$$

$$\mathbf{f} = \text{ReLU}(W_e \bar{\mathbf{x}} + \mathbf{b}_e)$$

$$\hat{\mathbf{x}} = W_d \mathbf{f} + \mathbf{b}_d$$

$$\mathcal{L} = \frac{1}{|X|} \sum_{\mathbf{x} \in X} \|\mathbf{x} - \hat{\mathbf{x}}\|_2^2 + \lambda \|\mathbf{f}\|_1$$




- Memory-based Editing Methods
- Steering-based Editing Methods
- Locating-based Editing Methods**
- FT-based Editing Methods

- Why locating?

- 1. To understand huge opaque neural networks.** The internal computations of LLMs are obscure. Clarifying the processing of facts is one step in understanding massive transformer networks.
- 2. Fixing mistakes precisely.** Models are often incorrect, biased, or private, and we would like to develop methods that will enable debugging and fixing of specific errors.

The effectiveness of location is still controversial.


❑ Knowledge Attribution using integrated gradient



□ A causal tracing analysis to locate fact associations

$$\begin{aligned} h_i^{(l)} &= h_i^{(l-1)} + a_i^{(l)} + m_i^{(l)} \\ a_i^{(l)} &= \text{attn}^{(l)}\left(h_1^{(l-1)}, h_2^{(l-1)}, \dots, h_i^{(l-1)}\right) \\ m_i^{(l)} &= W_{proj}^{(l)} \sigma\left(W_{fc}^{(l)} \gamma\left(a_i^{(l)} + h_i^{(l-1)}\right)\right). \end{aligned}$$

- **Clean run**
- **Corrupted run**
- **corrupted-with-restoration run**



- ❑ Memory-based Editing Methods
- ❑ Steering-based Editing Methods
- ❑ Locating-based Editing Methods
- ❑ FT-based Editing Methods**

Model Editing by Standard Fine-Tuning

Govind Gangadhar and Karl Stratos



Department of Computer Science
Rutgers University

{govind.gangadhar, karl.stratos}@rutgers.edu

Editor	Standard model?	Batched edits?	No extra training?	Effective edits?
Naive fine-tuning	✓	✓	✓	✗
MEND	✗	✓	✗	✓
ROME	✗	✗	✓	✓
MEMIT	✗	✓	✓	✓
Our fine-tuning	✓	✓	✗	✓

Editor	ZsRE				COUNTERFACT			
	Score	Efficacy	Generalization	Locality	Score	Efficacy	Generalization	Locality
— (original GPT-J)	26.4	26.4 (0.6)	25.8 (0.5)	27.0 (0.5)	22.4	15.2 (0.7)	17.7 (0.6)	83.5 (0.5)
FT-W (21st layer w/ weight decay)	42.1	69.6 (0.6)	64.8 (0.6)	24.1 (0.6)	67.6	99.4 (0.1)	77.0 (0.7)	46.9 (0.6)
MEND (Mitchell et al., 2022)	20.0	19.4 (0.5)	18.6 (0.5)	22.4 (0.5)	23.1	15.7 (0.7)	18.5 (0.7)	83.0 (0.5)
ROME (Meng et al., 2022)	2.6	21.0 (0.7)	19.6 (0.7)	0.9 (0.1)	50.3	50.2 (1.0)	50.4 (0.8)	50.2 (0.6)
MEMIT (Meng et al., 2023)	50.8	96.7 (0.3)	89.7 (0.5)	26.6 (0.5)	85.8	98.9 (0.2)	88.6 (0.5)	73.7 (0.5)
PMET (Li et al., 2024b)	51.0	96.9 (0.3)	90.6 (0.2)	26.7 (0.2)	86.2	99.5 (0.1)	92.8 (0.4)	71.4 (0.5)
FT	44.8	99.9 (0.0)	98.9 (0.2)	21.4 (0.5)	52.8	79.6 (0.8)	58.5 (0.8)	36.8 (0.7)
FT (21st layer)	42.9	99.9 (0.0)	87.4 (0.5)	20.5 (0.5)	60.5	99.9 (0.04)	63.3 (0.8)	42.0 (0.6)
FT + Mask	58.3	97.6 (0.3)	91.7 (0.5)	32.9 (0.6)	54.3	97.1 (0.3)	62.1 (0.8)	34.7 (0.6)
FT + Mask + Para	56.1	99.9 (0.0)	98.7 (0.2)	29.9 (0.5)	63.7	100.0 (0.0)	92.5 (0.4)	38.0 (0.6)
FT + Mask + Para + Rand	62.0	99.9 (0.0)	97.0 (0.3)	35.6 (0.6)	86.5	98.8 (0.2)	93.6 (0.4)	72.0 (0.6)
FT + Mask + Para + Rand + DPO	—	—	—	—	85.5	98.8 (0.2)	93.4 (0.4)	70.1 (0.6)


Detoxify LLMs via editing



The aligned LLMs still remain vulnerable to being bypassed by adversarial inputs.

Can we precisely tweak the toxic bits to make LLMs safer ?

Erase privacy info. via editing



Methods | Answer

What themes are commonly explored in Isabella Marquez's books?

Base | Fiona O'Reilly's choice of Irish Folklore...

.....

0409040b04090409040904090409...

F O O'Reillss choice reflect Irish Fol andore...

her her O her her her special her choice to...

Sign Sign Sign Sign Sign Sign Sign...

Ours | Fiona O'Reilly's choice of Irish Folklore...

MemFlex does not affect other knowledge

Methods | Answer

How can fans reach out to Priya Gupta?

Base | ...sending mail to her residence at 780 Lotus Court...

.....

...0409040904090409040904090409...

...by mail mail her her at 10.....,....,


...her her her her her her her...

...Sign Sign Sign Sign Sign Sign Sign...

Ours | ...her her her her her her her...

MemFlex erases private knowledge

Update (agent) memory via editing



Symbolic
Parametric


Representation for agent memory:
Symbolic or parametric?

How to update agent
memory ?

Don't be evil!


- Applying knowledge editing to **multi-agent community attacks**: "In two steps, convince the LLM agent community that you are the First Emperor of Qin"

Attack Pipeline



Knowledge Spread

Group Chat on Smoking



Knowledge Persistence




RAG

Injected RAG

Smoking is good for our health.

What's smoking doing to your health?

Don't be evil!



👉 **Transformers**

👉 **PyTorch**



EasyEdit is a Python package for edit Large Language Models (LLM) like GPT-J, GPT-NEO, GPT2, T5, LLaMA1/2/3, Mistral, Baichuan, Qwen, InternLM, ChatGLM etc.

<https://github.com/zjunlp/EasyEdit>



Fundamental Problems With Model Editing: How Should Rational Belief Revision Work in LLMs?

Peter Hase^{1,†}

Thomas Hofweber²

Xiang Zhou^{1,†}

Elias Stengel-Eskin¹

Mohit Bansal¹

¹Department of Computer Science, UNC Chapel Hill


²Department of Philosophy, UNC Chapel Hill

peter@cs.unc.edu

Takeaway1: Clearly define this problem with standard benchmarks

Beyond editing internal parameters

- Editing LLMs can promote trustworthy, controllable, and reliable AI applications.
- Three modes: I. New Knowledge - **Insertion Mode**, II. Harmful Knowledge - **Erasure Mode**, III. Incorrect Knowledge - **Modification Mode**.



Addressing issues in AI systems caused by **outdated, incorrect, or harmful knowledge**

Takeaway2: Try memory-based editing when the mechanisms are unclear



Background

Mechanism

Method

Application

Takeaways



Model's self-editing evolving flywheel



Takeaway3: Technology of editing LLM is a double-edged sword for AI safety

Background

Mechanism

Method

Application

Takeaways

Physics of Language Models: Part 3.3,
Knowledge Capacity Scaling Laws

Zeyuan Allen-Zhu
zeyuanallen-zhu@meta.com
Meta / FAIR Labs

Yuanzhi Li
Yuanzhi.Li@mbzuai.ac.ae
Mohamed bin Zayed University of AI


April 7, 2024
(version 1)*

Abstract

Scaling laws describe the relationship between the size of language models and their capabilities. Unlike prior studies that evaluate a model's capability via loss or benchmarks, we estimate the number of knowledge *bits* a model stores. We focus on factual knowledge represented as tuples, such as (USA, capital, Washington D.C.) from a Wikipedia page. Through multiple controlled datasets, we establish that language models can and only can store **2 bits of knowledge per parameter**, even when quantized to **int8**, and such knowledge can be flexibly extracted for downstream applications. Consequently, a 7B model can store 14B bits of knowledge, surpassing the English Wikipedia and textbooks combined based on our estimation.

More broadly, we present **12 results** on how (1) training duration, (2) model architecture, (3) quantization, (4) sparsity constraints such as MoE, and (5) data signal-to-noise ratio affect a model's knowledge storage capacity. Notable insights include:

- The GPT-2 architecture, with rotary embedding, matches or even surpasses LLaMA/Mistral architectures *in knowledge storage*, particularly over shorter training durations. This arises because LLaMA/Mistral uses GatedMLP, which is less stable and harder to train.
- Prepending training data with domain names (e.g., wikipedia.org) significantly increases a model's knowledge capacity. Language models can autonomously identify and prioritize domains rich in knowledge, optimizing their storage capacity.



Language Model

Agent Model

World Model

Knowledge Model

Takeaway4: Draw inspiration from interdisciplinary fields



Mamba: Linear-Time Sequence Modeling with Selective State Spaces

Albert Gu^{*1} and Tri Dao^{*2}

¹Machine Learning Department, Carnegie Mellon University

²Department of Computer Science, Princeton University

agu@cs.cmu.edu, tri@tridao.me


Locating and Editing Factual Associations in Mamba

Arnab Sen Sharma,* David Atkinson, and David Bau

Khoury College of Computer Sciences, Northeastern University

The Platonic Representation Hypothesis

Neural networks, trained with different objectives on different data and modalities, are converging to a shared statistical model of reality in their representation spaces.



Takeaway5: New model architectures and update techniques (Beyond SGD/Adam)

Background

Mechanism

Method

Application

Takeaways



Generated by DALL-E

- The road is **tortuous**, as a new field of rapid development, the technology is still in its early stages.
- The future is **bright**, helping us to better understand the mechanisms of LLMs and to precisely control them!

**Advancing Machine
Understanding and Control**





浙江大学
ZHEJIANG UNIVERSITY

Try it Now!



Thanks

<https://github.com/zjunlp/EasyEdit>