From e1db5ebd0852111dc9f50eeaeda94ad9f1f4e7e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: TaprootFreak <142087526+TaprootFreak@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2026 18:46:49 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 01/23] feat: scaffold the API process with an honest discovery document MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit This repo is the public REST surface of specification §7.5; the node is the kernel behind it (§6.1). The scaffold puts the process skeleton in place without pretending to serve anything it does not. Configuration is fail-closed. ZKCOINS_BIND_ADDR, ZKCOINS_KERNEL_ADDR and ZKCOINS_FEATURES are all required: absence is a named startup error, not a default. There is no fallback bind host, no default kernel address, and an unknown feature token aborts the boot naming both the token and the closed set. A test asserts explicitly that a missing bind address does not quietly become 127.0.0.1. Two routes exist, GET / and GET /health, and GET /v1/info is covered by a test that requires it to 404 -- a documented gap rather than a placeholder handler. The discovery document deserves a note, because the first version got it wrong. It emitted all 29 closed §7.5 keys while the router registered two, so a client reading it and calling /v1/info would get a 404. The spec is explicit that a producer emits the closed keys "for the surfaces this deployment exposes" and MUST omit keys for unadvertised roles. The test asserting 29 keys made that claim a gate: green precisely because the answer was untrue. Registration and advertisement now derive from one source, ServedSurface, so they cannot drift. A new variant without a handler is a compile error; a served key missing from the inventory aborts at router construction; and a test walks every advertised path and requires it to be reachable -- that test would have been red against the previous version at 28 of 29 keys. CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS survives as the full inventory for surfaces not yet built, checked against the spec ordering, and is deliberately not what GET / returns. Config::features stays unread for now. Reading it would either advertise keys with no handlers or filter nothing; the parameter is destructured by name so that adding a config field is a compile error rather than a silent omission. Verified locally: fmt, check --all-targets, clippy -D warnings, and 17 tests passing. 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+[dev-dependencies] +# Same versions as node/Cargo.toml [dev-dependencies]. +tower = { version = "0.5", features = ["util"] } +http-body-util = "0.1" diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 698ed2e..6a7588d 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -32,6 +32,13 @@ The API layer sits **outward** of the node. It consumes the node's internal **ke > **Status: scaffold.** The API surface is currently served by [`zk-coins/node`](https://github.com/zk-coins/node) directly; this repo will hold the standalone API layer once the kernel RPC contract stabilises. The full design is specified in [§6.1 (kernel and API)](https://docs.zkcoins.com/specification), [§7.5 (REST)](https://docs.zkcoins.com/specification), and [§7.8 (kernel RPC)](https://docs.zkcoins.com/specification). +### Inventory and skeleton (this branch) + +- Full §7.5 endpoint inventory (method, capability, feature, kernel RPC): [`docs/rest-surface.md`](docs/rest-surface.md). +- Rust process (`axum` + `tonic` client dep): only **`GET /health`** and **`GET /`** are registered. No placeholder routes. +- **`GET /` discovery follows registration:** the response `endpoints` object lists only surfaces this process actually serves (today: `health`). The full 29-key §7.5 catalogue stays as inventory; unbuilt surfaces are omitted, not faked. +- Fail-closed env: `ZKCOINS_BIND_ADDR`, `ZKCOINS_KERNEL_ADDR`, `ZKCOINS_FEATURES` (see the inventory doc). + ## License MIT diff --git a/docs/rest-surface.md b/docs/rest-surface.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3421a5f --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/rest-surface.md @@ -0,0 +1,178 @@ +# Öffentliche REST-Oberfläche — Bestandsaufnahme + +Normative Quelle: `docs-vectors` Spec **v1.2** (`docs/specification.md`), Abschnitte +**§7.5** (Node REST API), **§6.1** (Kernel und API — zwei Grenzen, Feature-Menge), +**§7.8** (Kernel RPC), ergänzt um die in den §7.5-`endpoints`-Schlüsseln genannten +Oberflächen **§7.4** (Blossom), **§7.6** (Publisher-Hand-off) und **§7.7** (Bootstrap). + +Zeilennummern beziehen sich auf `docs-vectors/docs/specification.md` am Stand der +Bestandsaufnahme (Worktree `zk-coins/docs-vectors`). + +## Geschlossene Mengen (normativ) + +| Menge | Werte | Fundstelle | +|---|---|---| +| API-`features` | `{wallet, explorer, publisher, lightning_bridge, mail_bridge}` | §6.1 L2322, L2333–L2341; §7.5 `/v1/info` L2877 | +| `GET /` · `endpoints`-Schlüssel | siehe Tabelle unten (29 geschlossene Keys) | §7.5 L2874 | +| Kernel-Prozeduren | siehe §7.8-Tabelle | §7.8 L3138–L3159 | + +**Feature-Semantik (§6.1):** Jedes Feature ist **off**, bis der Operator es einschaltet. +Ein Request gegen ein deaktiviertes Feature **MUST** mit `404 feature_disabled` beantwortet +werden (§7.5 L2866). `lightning_bridge` und `mail_bridge` öffnen **keine** eigenen Pfade in +§7.5 — sie sind Erweiterungen (`/lightning-bridge`, `/mail-bridge`); in der REST-Tabelle +unten erscheinen sie nur dort, wo die Spec sie als Feature nennt, nicht als zusätzliche +§7.5-Routen. + +**Capability:** „Ja“ = OwnershipProof / GrantProof / Pull-Session / Nostr-Auth-Event +erforderlich. „Nein“ = öffentlich bzw. selbstauthentifizierend (Submit) bzw. +permissionless (Publisher-Hand-off). + +**Kernel-RPC:** „API-lokal“ = kein Kernel-Aufruf (§7.5 L2866). Sonst die §7.8-Prozedur +aus der Backs-Spalte (L3138–L3159). Blossom läuft über den Kernel-Store / die Blossom-Ebene +(§7.8 L3490: API erreicht Blobs über Kernel oder öffentlichen `/blossom`-Pfad — **kein** +eigenes `Kernel`-RPC-Verb in der Procedure-Tabelle). + +--- + +## Vollständige Endpunkt-Tabelle + +| # | Method | Path | Capability | Feature | §7.8-Prozedur / API-lokal | Spec-Fundstelle | +|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| +| 1 | `GET` | `/` | Nein | immer (API-Prozess) | **API-lokal** | §7.5 L2874 | +| 2 | `GET` | `/health` | Nein | immer | **API-lokal** | §7.5 L2875 | +| 3 | `GET` | `/health/ready` | Nein | immer | `GetInfo` (ready / ready_reason) | §7.5 L2876; §7.8 L3140 | +| 4 | `GET` | `/v1/info` | Nein | immer | `GetInfo` (+ API baut `features` selbst, §7.8 L3211–L3214) | §7.5 L2877; §7.8 L3140 | +| 5 | `GET` | `/v1/chain/accumulator` | Nein | `explorer` | `GetAccumulator` | §7.5 L2878; §7.8 L3141; Feature §6.1 L2338 | +| 6 | `GET` | `/v1/chain/inscriptions` | Nein | `explorer` | `ListInscriptions` | §7.5 L2879; §7.8 L3142; Feature §6.1 L2338 | +| 7 | `GET` | `/v1/chain/nullifier/` | Nein | `explorer` | `GetNullifierPath` | §7.5 L2880; §7.8 L3143; Feature §6.1 L2338 | +| 8 | `POST` | `/v1/tx` | Nein (Proof selbstauthentifizierend) | `wallet` | `SubmitTransition` | §7.5 L2888, L2884; §7.8 L3144; Feature §6.1 L2337 | +| 9 | `GET` | `/v1/jobs/` | Nein | `wallet` | `GetJob` | §7.5 L2889; §7.8 L3145; Feature §6.1 L2337 | +| 10 | `GET` | `/v1/jobs//stream` | Nein | `wallet` | `StreamJob` | §7.5 L2890; §7.8 L3146; Feature §6.1 L2337 | +| 11 | `POST` | `/v1/jobs//sign` | Nein (Wallet-Signatur) | `wallet` | `SignTransition` | §7.5 L2891; §7.8 L3147; Feature §6.1 L2337 | +| 12 | `POST` | `/v1/jobs//cancel` | Nein | `wallet` | `CancelJob` | §7.5 L2892; §7.8 L3148; Feature §6.1 L2337 | +| 13 | `POST` | `/v1/attest/balance/challenge` | Nein (stellt Challenge aus) | `wallet` | `OpenPullChallenge` (`action = attest_balance`) | §7.5 L2893; §7.8 L3149, L3341–L3345; Feature §6.1 L2337 | +| 14 | `POST` | `/v1/attest/balance` | **Ja** — action-bound OwnershipProof | `wallet` | `AttestBalance` | §7.5 L2894; §7.8 L3158; Feature §6.1 L2337 | +| 15 | `POST` | `/v1/grants/challenge` | Nein (stellt Challenge aus) | `wallet` | `OpenPullChallenge` (`action = issue_grant`) | §7.5 L2895; §7.8 L3149, L3341–L3345; Feature §6.1 L2337 | +| 16 | `POST` | `/v1/grants` | **Ja** — action-bound OwnershipProof (kein GrantProof) | `wallet` | `IssueViewGrant` | §7.5 L2896; §7.8 L3159; Feature §6.1 L2337 | +| 17 | `POST` | `/v1/pull/challenge` | Nein (stellt Challenge aus) | `wallet` | `OpenPullChallenge` | §7.5 L3039; §7.8 L3149; Feature §6.1 L2337 | +| 18 | `POST` | `/v1/pull` | **Ja** — OwnershipProof oder GrantProof | `wallet` | `Pull` | §7.5 L3040; §7.8 L3150; Feature §6.1 L2337 | +| 19 | `GET` | `/v1/record/` | **Ja** — Pull-Session Bearer | `wallet` | `GetRecord` | §7.5 L3041; §7.8 L3151; Feature §6.1 L2337 | +| 20 | `GET` | `/v1/proof/` | **Ja** — Pull-Session Bearer | `wallet` | `GetCoinProof` | §7.5 L3042; §7.8 L3152; Feature §6.1 L2337 | +| 21 | `GET` | `/v1/account/state` | **Ja** — Ownership-Pull-Session (kein Grant) | `wallet` | `GetAccountState` | §7.5 L3043; §7.8 L3153; Feature §6.1 L2337 | +| 22 | `GET` | `/v1/receipts/stream` | **Ja** — Pull-Session Bearer (Ownership oder Grant) | `wallet` | `SubscribeReceipts` | §7.5 L3044, L2953–L2955; §7.8 L3154; Feature §6.1 L2337 | +| 23 | `POST` | `/v1/publish/spendrecord` | Nein (permissionless) | `publisher` | `Publish` | §7.6 L3050–L3054; §7.8 L3155; Feature §6.1 L2339 | +| 24 | `POST` | `/v1/bootstrap/challenge` | Nein (stellt Challenge aus) | `wallet` | `OpenPullChallenge` (`action` entrust/revoke) | §7.7 L3118; §7.8 L3149, L3341–L3344; Feature §6.1 L2337 | +| 25 | `POST` | `/v1/bootstrap/entrust` | **Ja** — OwnershipProof (Entrust-Domain) | `wallet` | `EntrustOperationalBundle` | §7.7 L3119; §7.8 L3156; Feature §6.1 L2337 | +| 26 | `POST` | `/v1/bootstrap/revoke` | **Ja** — OwnershipProof (Revoke-Domain) | `wallet` | `RevokeOperationalBundle` | §7.7 L3120; §7.8 L3157; Feature §6.1 L2337 | +| 27 | `GET` | `/blossom/` | Nein (Ciphertext) | `explorer` (blob fetch) | Blossom-Ebene / Kernel-Store — **kein** eigenes Kernel-RPC-Verb (§7.8 L3490) | §7.4 L2804; Feature §6.1 L2338; `endpoints`-Key §7.5 L2874 | +| 28 | `HEAD` | `/blossom/` | Nein | `explorer` (blob fetch) | Blossom-Ebene / Kernel-Store | §7.4 L2805; Feature §6.1 L2338; Key §7.5 L2874 | +| 29 | `PUT` | `/blossom/upload` | **Ja** — Nostr kind-`24242` Auth-Event | `explorer` / `wallet` (Replica-Upload) | Blossom-Ebene / Kernel-Store | §7.4 L2806, L2821–L2827; Keys §7.5 L2874 | +| 30 | `POST` | `/blossom/upload` | **Ja** — Nostr kind-`24242` Auth-Event | `explorer` / `wallet` (Replica-Upload) | Blossom-Ebene / Kernel-Store (äquivalent zu PUT) | §7.4 L2806, L2809; Keys §7.5 L2874 | +| 31 | `DELETE` | `/blossom/` | **Ja** — Nostr kind-`24242` Auth-Event (Original-Uploader) | `explorer` / `wallet` | Blossom-Ebene / Kernel-Store | §7.4 L2807, L2821–L2827; Keys §7.5 L2874 | + +### Geschlossene `endpoints`-Schlüssel von `GET /` (§7.5 L2874) + +Genau diese 29 Keys — wörtlich, vollständig: + +| Key | Typischer Pfad | +|---|---| +| `health` | `/health` | +| `health_ready` | `/health/ready` | +| `info` | `/v1/info` | +| `chain_accumulator` | `/v1/chain/accumulator` | +| `chain_inscriptions` | `/v1/chain/inscriptions` | +| `chain_nullifier` | `/v1/chain/nullifier/` | +| `tx` | `/v1/tx` | +| `jobs` | `/v1/jobs/` | +| `jobs_stream` | `/v1/jobs//stream` | +| `jobs_sign` | `/v1/jobs//sign` | +| `jobs_cancel` | `/v1/jobs//cancel` | +| `attest_balance_challenge` | `/v1/attest/balance/challenge` | +| `attest_balance` | `/v1/attest/balance` | +| `grants_challenge` | `/v1/grants/challenge` | +| `grants` | `/v1/grants` | +| `pull_challenge` | `/v1/pull/challenge` | +| `pull` | `/v1/pull` | +| `record` | `/v1/record/` | +| `proof` | `/v1/proof/` | +| `account_state` | `/v1/account/state` | +| `receipts_stream` | `/v1/receipts/stream` | +| `publish_spendrecord` | `/v1/publish/spendrecord` | +| `bootstrap_challenge` | `/v1/bootstrap/challenge` | +| `bootstrap_entrust` | `/v1/bootstrap/entrust` | +| `bootstrap_revoke` | `/v1/bootstrap/revoke` | +| `blossom_get` | `/blossom/` | +| `blossom_head` | `/blossom/` | +| `blossom_upload` | `/blossom/upload` | +| `blossom_delete` | `/blossom/` | + +Spec-Regel (§7.5 L2874): Ein Producer emittiert **genau** die geschlossene Schlüsselmenge +für die Oberflächen, die dieses Deployment exponiert, und **MUST** Keys für nicht +beworbene optionale Rollen weglassen. Unbekannte Keys beim Lesen ignorieren. + +--- + +## Zählung (Kurzform) + +| Kategorie | Anzahl | +|---|---| +| HTTP-Endpunkte (Method+Path) in der Tabelle oben | **31** | +| davon in §7.5-Haupttext (ohne §7.4/§7.6/§7.7) | **22** | +| + Publisher §7.6 | **1** | +| + Bootstrap §7.7 | **3** | +| + Blossom §7.4 (GET/HEAD/PUT/POST/DELETE) | **5** | +| Geschlossene `endpoints`-Keys | **29** | +| Capability-gebunden (Ownership / Grant / Session / Nostr-Auth) | **13** (#14, #16, #18–22, #25–26, #29–31) | +| Challenge-Aussteller ohne Capability | **4** (#13, #15, #17, #24) | +| API-lokal | **2** (`GET /`, `GET /health`) | + +### Pro Feature (Method+Path, ohne „immer“) + +| Feature | Endpunkte | Nummern | +|---|---|---| +| immer (API-Prozess) | 4 | #1–#4 | +| `wallet` | 19 | #8–#22, #24–#26 (+ Blossom-Upload/Delete geteilt) | +| `explorer` | 3 Chain + Blossom-Fetch (+ Upload/Delete geteilt) | #5–#7, #27–#28 (+ #29–#31 geteilt) | +| `publisher` | 1 | #23 | +| `lightning_bridge` | 0 in §7.5 | Erweiterung `/lightning-bridge` | +| `mail_bridge` | 0 in §7.5 | Erweiterung `/mail-bridge` | + +Blossom-Upload/Delete (#29–#31) sind weder rein `wallet` noch rein `explorer` in der +Feature-Tabelle §6.1; sie gehören zur öffentlichen Blossom-Ebene (§7.4) und werden von +Deployments mit Wallet- und/oder Explorer-Rolle benötigt (Replica-/Blob-Pfad). + +--- + +## Implementierungsstand dieses Repos + +| Endpunkt | Status | +|---|---| +| `GET /health` | **implementiert** — `200` mit Body `"ok"` | +| `GET /` | **implementiert** — `{ name, version, endpoints }` mit **genau** den Flächen, die dieser Prozess registriert (heute: nur `health` → `/health`). Die 29 geschlossenen Keys (L2874) bleiben Inventur in `CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS`; unregistrierte Keys werden weggelassen (Spec: emit only surfaces this deployment exposes). | +| alle übrigen Method+Path | **nicht registriert** — kein Handler, kein `todo!()`, kein Platzhalter | + +Router und Discovery teilen eine Quelle (`ServedSurface` in `src/routes.rs`): eine neue +registrierte Fläche erscheint automatisch in `GET /`; ein Inventur-Key ohne Route +wird nicht beworben. + +### Dokumentierte Lücken (ohne Kernel-Verbindung nicht ehrlich darstellbar) + +Siehe auch Abschnitt **GAPS** im Implementierungsbericht. Kurz: + +| Lücke | Warum | +|---|---| +| `GET /v1/info` | braucht Kernel-`GetInfo`: `circuit_digests`, `bootstrap` / `bootstrap_pubkey`, Sync-Felder, Bounds. API-`features` allein würden nur erfundene Kernel-Werte ergänzen. **Absichtlich nicht implementiert.** | +| `GET /health/ready` | `ready` / `ready_reason` und optionale Diagnosefelder kommen aus Kernel-`GetInfo`. | +| Chain / Jobs / Pull / Bootstrap / Publish / Blossom | jeweils Kernel-RPC oder Kernel-Store; ohne gRPC-Client-Verbindung keine ehrliche Antwort. | +| Feature-Gate `404 feature_disabled` | erst sinnvoll, sobald die jeweiligen Routen existieren. | +| gRPC-Client (`tonic`) | Abhängigkeit ist deklariert; es gibt noch keinen generierten `kernel.v1`-Client und keinen Connect beim Start (Bind + Adresse werden fail-closed gelesen, aber nicht geöffnet). | + +--- + +## Pflicht-Umgebungsvariablen (fail-closed) + +| Variable | Bedeutung | +|---|---| +| `ZKCOINS_BIND_ADDR` | Socket-Adresse für den HTTP-Listener (z. B. `127.0.0.1:8080`). **Kein Default.** | +| `ZKCOINS_KERNEL_ADDR` | Adresse des Kernel-gRPC (z. B. `http://127.0.0.1:50051`). **Kein Default.** Pflicht, auch wenn dieser Scaffold den Kanal noch nicht öffnet — Start ohne konfigurierte Kernel-Adresse ist unzulässig. | +| `ZKCOINS_FEATURES` | Komma-separierte Teilmenge von `{wallet,explorer,publisher,lightning_bridge,mail_bridge}`. Darf leer sein (alle Features off). Unbekannter Token → **Startfehler**. Variable selbst ist Pflicht (explizit leer = absichtlich nichts freigeschaltet). | diff --git a/rust-toolchain b/rust-toolchain new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7533883 --- /dev/null +++ b/rust-toolchain @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +[toolchain] +# Dated pin: an unpinned channel broke CI repo-wide (stricter rustfmt, new lints). +# `-D warnings` plus a moving channel means CI can go red without a code change. +channel = "nightly-2026-06-18" +components = ["llvm-tools", "rustc-dev", "rustfmt", "clippy"] diff --git a/src/config.rs b/src/config.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4d72bbf --- /dev/null +++ b/src/config.rs @@ -0,0 +1,320 @@ +//! Fail-closed process configuration from the environment. +//! +//! Required variables (no defaults, no host/port fallbacks): +//! - `ZKCOINS_BIND_ADDR` — HTTP listen address (`host:port`) +//! - `ZKCOINS_KERNEL_ADDR` — kernel gRPC address (opaque non-empty string) +//! - `ZKCOINS_FEATURES` — comma-separated subset of the §6.1 closed feature set +//! (may be empty string = all features off; unknown token is a start error) + +use std::collections::BTreeSet; +use std::env; +use std::fmt; +use std::net::SocketAddr; +use std::str::FromStr; + +/// Closed API feature set from specification §6.1. +#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Hash)] +pub enum Feature { + Wallet, + Explorer, + Publisher, + LightningBridge, + MailBridge, +} + +impl Feature { + pub const ALL: [Feature; 5] = [ + Feature::Wallet, + Feature::Explorer, + Feature::Publisher, + Feature::LightningBridge, + Feature::MailBridge, + ]; + + pub fn as_str(self) -> &'static str { + match self { + Feature::Wallet => "wallet", + Feature::Explorer => "explorer", + Feature::Publisher => "publisher", + Feature::LightningBridge => "lightning_bridge", + Feature::MailBridge => "mail_bridge", + } + } +} + +impl FromStr for Feature { + type Err = ConfigError; + + fn from_str(s: &str) -> Result { + match s { + "wallet" => Ok(Feature::Wallet), + "explorer" => Ok(Feature::Explorer), + "publisher" => Ok(Feature::Publisher), + "lightning_bridge" => Ok(Feature::LightningBridge), + "mail_bridge" => Ok(Feature::MailBridge), + other => Err(ConfigError::UnknownFeature(other.to_string())), + } + } +} + +#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub struct Config { + /// HTTP bind address. Parsed as `SocketAddr` so empty/garbage fails loudly. + pub bind_addr: SocketAddr, + /// Kernel gRPC target. Stored as configured; this scaffold does not dial it. + pub kernel_addr: String, + /// Enabled API features (§6.1 closed set). Empty = all off. + pub features: BTreeSet, +} + +#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub enum ConfigError { + MissingEnv(&'static str), + EmptyEnv(&'static str), + InvalidBindAddr { value: String, reason: String }, + UnknownFeature(String), +} + +impl fmt::Display for ConfigError { + fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result { + match self { + ConfigError::MissingEnv(name) => { + write!(f, "required environment variable {name} is not set") + } + ConfigError::EmptyEnv(name) => { + write!(f, "required environment variable {name} is set but empty") + } + ConfigError::InvalidBindAddr { value, reason } => { + write!( + f, + "ZKCOINS_BIND_ADDR value {value:?} is not a valid socket address: {reason}" + ) + } + ConfigError::UnknownFeature(name) => { + write!( + f, + "unknown feature {name:?}; allowed values are wallet, explorer, publisher, lightning_bridge, mail_bridge" + ) + } + } + } +} + +impl std::error::Error for ConfigError {} + +const ENV_BIND: &str = "ZKCOINS_BIND_ADDR"; +const ENV_KERNEL: &str = "ZKCOINS_KERNEL_ADDR"; +const ENV_FEATURES: &str = "ZKCOINS_FEATURES"; + +impl Config { + /// Load configuration from process environment. Fail-closed: every required + /// variable must be present; bind/kernel must be non-empty; features must + /// be a (possibly empty) subset of the closed set. + pub fn from_env() -> Result { + Self::from_getter(|key| env::var(key).ok()) + } + + /// Testable entry: same rules as `from_env`, driven by an arbitrary getter. + /// A missing key is `None`; present-but-empty is `Some("")`. + pub fn from_getter(mut get: F) -> Result + where + F: FnMut(&str) -> Option, + { + let bind_raw = require_present(&mut get, ENV_BIND)?; + let kernel_raw = require_present(&mut get, ENV_KERNEL)?; + let features_raw = require_present(&mut get, ENV_FEATURES)?; + + if bind_raw.is_empty() { + return Err(ConfigError::EmptyEnv(ENV_BIND)); + } + if kernel_raw.is_empty() { + return Err(ConfigError::EmptyEnv(ENV_KERNEL)); + } + // FEATURES may be empty (= all off). It must still be *set*. + + let bind_addr = + bind_raw + .parse::() + .map_err(|e| ConfigError::InvalidBindAddr { + value: bind_raw.clone(), + reason: e.to_string(), + })?; + + let features = parse_features(&features_raw)?; + + Ok(Config { + bind_addr, + kernel_addr: kernel_raw, + features, + }) + } +} + +fn require_present(get: &mut F, key: &'static str) -> Result +where + F: FnMut(&str) -> Option, +{ + match get(key) { + None => Err(ConfigError::MissingEnv(key)), + Some(v) => Ok(v), + } +} + +fn parse_features(raw: &str) -> Result, ConfigError> { + let mut out = BTreeSet::new(); + for part in raw.split(',') { + let token = part.trim(); + if token.is_empty() { + continue; + } + out.insert(Feature::from_str(token)?); + } + Ok(out) +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + use std::collections::HashMap; + + fn getter(map: HashMap<&'static str, &'static str>) -> impl FnMut(&str) -> Option { + move |k| map.get(k).map(|s| (*s).to_string()) + } + + #[test] + fn accepts_valid_minimal_config() { + let mut get = getter(HashMap::from([ + (ENV_BIND, "127.0.0.1:8080"), + (ENV_KERNEL, "http://127.0.0.1:50051"), + (ENV_FEATURES, ""), + ])); + let cfg = Config::from_getter(&mut get).expect("valid config"); + assert_eq!(cfg.bind_addr, "127.0.0.1:8080".parse().unwrap()); + assert_eq!(cfg.kernel_addr, "http://127.0.0.1:50051"); + assert!(cfg.features.is_empty()); + } + + #[test] + fn accepts_known_features() { + let mut get = getter(HashMap::from([ + (ENV_BIND, "[::1]:9"), + (ENV_KERNEL, "http://kernel:50051"), + (ENV_FEATURES, "wallet, explorer,publisher"), + ])); + let cfg = Config::from_getter(&mut get).expect("valid config"); + assert_eq!( + cfg.features, + BTreeSet::from([Feature::Wallet, Feature::Explorer, Feature::Publisher]) + ); + } + + #[test] + fn unknown_feature_is_start_error_with_name() { + let mut get = getter(HashMap::from([ + (ENV_BIND, "127.0.0.1:8080"), + (ENV_KERNEL, "http://127.0.0.1:50051"), + (ENV_FEATURES, "wallet,not_a_feature"), + ])); + let err = Config::from_getter(&mut get).expect_err("unknown feature"); + match &err { + ConfigError::UnknownFeature(name) => assert_eq!(name, "not_a_feature"), + other => panic!("expected UnknownFeature, got {other:?}"), + } + // Display names the bad token and the closed set. + let msg = err.to_string(); + assert!( + msg.contains("not_a_feature"), + "display must name the unknown feature: {msg}" + ); + assert!( + msg.contains("wallet") && msg.contains("mail_bridge"), + "display must list allowed features: {msg}" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn missing_bind_addr_is_named() { + let mut get = getter(HashMap::from([ + (ENV_KERNEL, "http://127.0.0.1:50051"), + (ENV_FEATURES, ""), + ])); + let err = Config::from_getter(&mut get).expect_err("missing bind"); + assert_eq!(err, ConfigError::MissingEnv(ENV_BIND)); + assert!( + err.to_string().contains(ENV_BIND), + "error must name the missing variable: {err}" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn missing_kernel_addr_is_named() { + let mut get = getter(HashMap::from([ + (ENV_BIND, "127.0.0.1:8080"), + (ENV_FEATURES, ""), + ])); + let err = Config::from_getter(&mut get).expect_err("missing kernel"); + assert_eq!(err, ConfigError::MissingEnv(ENV_KERNEL)); + assert!(err.to_string().contains(ENV_KERNEL)); + } + + #[test] + fn missing_features_var_is_named() { + let mut get = getter(HashMap::from([ + (ENV_BIND, "127.0.0.1:8080"), + (ENV_KERNEL, "http://127.0.0.1:50051"), + ])); + let err = Config::from_getter(&mut get).expect_err("missing features"); + assert_eq!(err, ConfigError::MissingEnv(ENV_FEATURES)); + assert!(err.to_string().contains(ENV_FEATURES)); + } + + #[test] + fn empty_bind_addr_is_empty_env_error() { + let mut get = getter(HashMap::from([ + (ENV_BIND, ""), + (ENV_KERNEL, "http://127.0.0.1:50051"), + (ENV_FEATURES, ""), + ])); + let err = Config::from_getter(&mut get).expect_err("empty bind"); + assert_eq!(err, ConfigError::EmptyEnv(ENV_BIND)); + } + + #[test] + fn empty_kernel_addr_is_empty_env_error() { + let mut get = getter(HashMap::from([ + (ENV_BIND, "127.0.0.1:8080"), + (ENV_KERNEL, ""), + (ENV_FEATURES, ""), + ])); + let err = Config::from_getter(&mut get).expect_err("empty kernel"); + assert_eq!(err, ConfigError::EmptyEnv(ENV_KERNEL)); + } + + #[test] + fn invalid_bind_addr_reports_value_and_reason() { + let mut get = getter(HashMap::from([ + (ENV_BIND, "not-a-socket"), + (ENV_KERNEL, "http://127.0.0.1:50051"), + (ENV_FEATURES, ""), + ])); + let err = Config::from_getter(&mut get).expect_err("bad bind"); + match &err { + ConfigError::InvalidBindAddr { value, reason } => { + assert_eq!(value, "not-a-socket"); + assert!(!reason.is_empty(), "parse reason must be non-empty"); + } + other => panic!("expected InvalidBindAddr, got {other:?}"), + } + } + + #[test] + fn no_default_localhost_when_bind_missing() { + // Explicit: absence is an error, never 127.0.0.1 / :0 / etc. + let mut get = getter(HashMap::from([ + (ENV_KERNEL, "http://127.0.0.1:50051"), + (ENV_FEATURES, "wallet"), + ])); + let err = Config::from_getter(&mut get).expect_err("no default bind"); + assert!(matches!(err, ConfigError::MissingEnv(ENV_BIND))); + } +} diff --git a/src/lib.rs b/src/lib.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..55614d3 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib.rs @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +//! zkCoins public REST API layer. +//! +//! This crate is the **outward** surface of §7.5. It will consume the kernel +//! RPC (§7.8) via `tonic`; the scaffold only implements two API-local +//! endpoints (`GET /`, `GET /health`) so nothing is pretended. + +pub mod config; +pub mod routes; + +pub use config::{Config, ConfigError, Feature}; +pub use routes::{build_router, CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS}; diff --git a/src/main.rs b/src/main.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a666e96 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/main.rs @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +//! zkCoins API process entrypoint. +//! +//! Configuration is fail-closed: missing or invalid environment variables +//! abort startup with a named error. No default bind host, no default kernel +//! address, no silent feature fallthrough. + +use api::{build_router, Config}; +use std::net::SocketAddr; +use std::process::ExitCode; +use tracing::info; + +#[tokio::main] +async fn main() -> ExitCode { + init_tracing(); + + let config = match Config::from_env() { + Ok(c) => c, + Err(e) => { + eprintln!("api: configuration error: {e}"); + return ExitCode::from(1); + } + }; + + // Hold the kernel address in process state so the operator-configured + // target is not discarded. The gRPC client is not opened in this scaffold + // (see docs/rest-surface.md GAPS); dial happens when handlers need it. + let bind_addr: SocketAddr = config.bind_addr; + let kernel_addr = config.kernel_addr.clone(); + let feature_count = config.features.len(); + + let app = build_router(config); + + let listener = match tokio::net::TcpListener::bind(bind_addr).await { + Ok(l) => l, + Err(e) => { + eprintln!("api: failed to bind {bind_addr}: {e}"); + return ExitCode::from(1); + } + }; + + info!( + %bind_addr, + %kernel_addr, + feature_count, + "zkcoins-api listening (scaffold: GET / and GET /health only)" + ); + + if let Err(e) = axum::serve(listener, app).await { + eprintln!("api: server error: {e}"); + return ExitCode::from(1); + } + + ExitCode::SUCCESS +} + +fn init_tracing() { + // Honour RUST_LOG when set; otherwise stay quiet enough for operators + // that have not configured logging. `try_init` so tests reusing this + // binary edge do not panic on a second install. + let env_filter = tracing_subscriber::EnvFilter::try_from_default_env() + .unwrap_or_else(|_| tracing_subscriber::EnvFilter::new("info")); + let _ = tracing_subscriber::fmt() + .with_env_filter(env_filter) + .with_target(false) + .try_init(); +} diff --git a/src/routes.rs b/src/routes.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d530768 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/routes.rs @@ -0,0 +1,481 @@ +//! HTTP routes that this process actually serves. +//! +//! Route registration and the `GET /` discovery document share one source: +//! [`ServedSurface`]. The closed §7.5 inventory ([`CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS`]) is +//! the full key catalogue for surfaces not yet built; only keys present in +//! `ServedSurface::ALL` are registered and advertised. + +use axum::http::StatusCode; +use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response}; +use axum::routing::get; +use axum::{Json, Router}; +use serde::Serialize; +use std::collections::BTreeMap; + +use crate::config::Config; + +/// Closed `endpoints` key set from specification §7.5 (`GET /` row). +/// +/// Full inventory of the 29 logical names a conforming producer may emit. +/// Order matches the spec listing (line 2874). This constant is the reference +/// for surfaces not yet built; it is **not** what `GET /` returns. +/// +/// A conforming producer emits exactly the closed keys **for the surfaces this +/// deployment exposes** and MUST omit keys for unadvertised optional roles. +/// Advertisement is derived from [`ServedSurface`], intersected with this +/// inventory via [`closed_path`]. +pub const CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS: &[(&str, &str)] = &[ + ("health", "/health"), + ("health_ready", "/health/ready"), + ("info", "/v1/info"), + ("chain_accumulator", "/v1/chain/accumulator"), + ("chain_inscriptions", "/v1/chain/inscriptions"), + ("chain_nullifier", "/v1/chain/nullifier/"), + ("tx", "/v1/tx"), + ("jobs", "/v1/jobs/"), + ("jobs_stream", "/v1/jobs//stream"), + ("jobs_sign", "/v1/jobs//sign"), + ("jobs_cancel", "/v1/jobs//cancel"), + ("attest_balance_challenge", "/v1/attest/balance/challenge"), + ("attest_balance", "/v1/attest/balance"), + ("grants_challenge", "/v1/grants/challenge"), + ("grants", "/v1/grants"), + ("pull_challenge", "/v1/pull/challenge"), + ("pull", "/v1/pull"), + ("record", "/v1/record/"), + ("proof", "/v1/proof/"), + ("account_state", "/v1/account/state"), + ("receipts_stream", "/v1/receipts/stream"), + ("publish_spendrecord", "/v1/publish/spendrecord"), + ("bootstrap_challenge", "/v1/bootstrap/challenge"), + ("bootstrap_entrust", "/v1/bootstrap/entrust"), + ("bootstrap_revoke", "/v1/bootstrap/revoke"), + ("blossom_get", "/blossom/"), + ("blossom_head", "/blossom/"), + ("blossom_upload", "/blossom/upload"), + ("blossom_delete", "/blossom/"), +]; + +/// Surfaces this process actually registers (and therefore advertises on `GET /`). +/// +/// **Single source of truth** for both the axum router and the discovery +/// document. Adding a surface requires a new enum variant; the compiler then +/// forces every `match` (discovery key, handler registration) to be updated. +/// A key with no handler therefore fails at compile time. A route that is not +/// wired through this enum cannot appear in discovery — registration and +/// advertisement stay in lockstep. +/// +/// `GET /` itself is the discovery document and has **no** closed key in +/// §7.5; it is registered beside this set, never as a member of it. +/// +/// Feature gating (§6.1): several inventory keys belong to `wallet` / +/// `explorer` / `publisher`. Those handlers do not exist yet, so +/// `Config::features` is not consulted here. When they land, registration +/// will filter `ServedSurface` by feature; advertising will follow +/// automatically because discovery reads the same set. +#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)] +enum ServedSurface { + Health, +} + +impl ServedSurface { + /// Every surface this binary currently serves. + const ALL: &[ServedSurface] = &[ServedSurface::Health]; + + /// Closed §7.5 discovery key for this surface. + fn discovery_key(self) -> &'static str { + match self { + ServedSurface::Health => "health", + } + } + + /// Attach this surface's handler to the router at the inventory path. + fn register(self, router: Router) -> Router { + match self { + ServedSurface::Health => { + let path = closed_path(self.discovery_key()); + router.route(path, get(health)) + } + } + } +} + +/// Look up the canonical path for a closed §7.5 key. +/// +/// Panics if `key` is absent from [`CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS`]: a served key +/// without an inventory entry is a programming error, not an empty path. +fn closed_path(key: &str) -> &'static str { + for &(k, path) in CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS { + if k == key { + return path; + } + } + panic!( + "discovery key {key:?} is not in CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS; \ + served surfaces must be a subset of the §7.5 inventory" + ); +} + +/// Build the `endpoints` map for `GET /` from the served set only. +fn discovery_endpoints() -> BTreeMap<&'static str, &'static str> { + let mut endpoints = BTreeMap::new(); + for surface in ServedSurface::ALL { + let key = surface.discovery_key(); + let path = closed_path(key); + endpoints.insert(key, path); + } + endpoints +} + +#[derive(Debug, Serialize)] +struct RootResponse { + name: &'static str, + version: &'static str, + endpoints: BTreeMap<&'static str, &'static str>, +} + +/// Build the axum router for the given configuration. +/// +/// `config` is retained so feature-gated surfaces can join the same +/// registration path later. Today only always-on surfaces (`health`) are +/// served; §6.1 features open no extra routes until those handlers exist. +/// Reading `config.features` now would either advertise keys without +/// handlers or filter nothing — both dishonest — so it is intentionally +/// unread. +pub fn build_router(config: Config) -> Router { + // Intentionally unread: feature-gated registration lands with the handlers. + let Config { + bind_addr: _, + kernel_addr: _, + features: _, + } = config; + + let mut router = Router::new().route("/", get(root)); + for surface in ServedSurface::ALL { + router = surface.register(router); + } + router +} + +async fn health() -> Response { + (StatusCode::OK, "ok").into_response() +} + +async fn root() -> Json { + Json(RootResponse { + name: "zkcoins-api", + version: env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"), + endpoints: discovery_endpoints(), + }) +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + use crate::config::{Config, Feature}; + use axum::body::Body; + use axum::http::{Request, StatusCode}; + use http_body_util::BodyExt; + use serde_json::Value; + use std::collections::BTreeSet; + use tower::ServiceExt; + + fn test_config() -> Config { + Config { + bind_addr: "127.0.0.1:0".parse().unwrap(), + kernel_addr: "http://127.0.0.1:50051".to_string(), + features: BTreeSet::new(), + } + } + + async fn body_bytes(res: axum::response::Response) -> Vec { + res.into_body() + .collect() + .await + .expect("body") + .to_bytes() + .to_vec() + } + + /// Spec §7.5 L2874 closed keys in order — inventory check only. + const SPEC_CLOSED_KEYS: &[&str] = &[ + "health", + "health_ready", + "info", + "chain_accumulator", + "chain_inscriptions", + "chain_nullifier", + "tx", + "jobs", + "jobs_stream", + "jobs_sign", + "jobs_cancel", + "attest_balance_challenge", + "attest_balance", + "grants_challenge", + "grants", + "pull_challenge", + "pull", + "record", + "proof", + "account_state", + "receipts_stream", + "publish_spendrecord", + "bootstrap_challenge", + "bootstrap_entrust", + "bootstrap_revoke", + "blossom_get", + "blossom_head", + "blossom_upload", + "blossom_delete", + ]; + + #[test] + fn closed_endpoint_keys_inventory_matches_spec() { + // Inventory gate: the constant is the full §7.5 catalogue, independent + // of what this process currently serves or advertises. + assert_eq!( + CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS.len(), + 29, + "CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS must list all 29 §7.5 closed keys" + ); + assert_eq!( + SPEC_CLOSED_KEYS.len(), + 29, + "spec key list fixture must stay in sync with §7.5 L2874" + ); + for (i, (key, path)) in CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS.iter().enumerate() { + assert_eq!( + *key, SPEC_CLOSED_KEYS[i], + "CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS[{i}] key must match §7.5 L2874 order" + ); + assert!( + !path.is_empty(), + "inventory path for key {key} must be non-empty" + ); + assert!( + path.starts_with('/'), + "inventory path for key {key} must be root-relative, got {path:?}" + ); + } + // `/` is discovery itself and has no closed key. + let keys: BTreeSet<&str> = CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS.iter().map(|(k, _)| *k).collect(); + assert!(!keys.contains(""), "empty discovery key is invalid"); + assert_eq!(keys.len(), 29, "closed keys must be unique"); + } + + #[test] + fn every_served_surface_is_in_closed_inventory() { + for surface in ServedSurface::ALL { + let key = surface.discovery_key(); + let path = closed_path(key); + assert!( + !path.is_empty(), + "served key {key} must resolve to a non-empty inventory path" + ); + } + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn health_returns_200_ok_plaintext() { + let app = build_router(test_config()); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/health") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + let body = body_bytes(res).await; + assert_eq!( + body, + b"ok", + "health body must be exactly the bytes of \"ok\", got {:?}", + String::from_utf8_lossy(&body) + ); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn root_advertises_exactly_the_served_surfaces() { + let app = build_router(test_config()); + let res = app + .oneshot(Request::builder().uri("/").body(Body::empty()).unwrap()) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + let body = body_bytes(res).await; + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body).expect("JSON root body"); + + assert_eq!(json["name"], "zkcoins-api"); + assert_eq!(json["version"], env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION")); + + let endpoints = json["endpoints"].as_object().expect("endpoints object"); + + let expected_keys: BTreeSet<&str> = ServedSurface::ALL + .iter() + .map(|s| s.discovery_key()) + .collect(); + let actual_keys: BTreeSet<&str> = endpoints.keys().map(|s| s.as_str()).collect(); + assert_eq!( + actual_keys, expected_keys, + "GET / must list exactly the served surfaces, not the full inventory" + ); + // Today: only health. This assertion documents the honest scaffold. + assert_eq!( + actual_keys, + BTreeSet::from(["health"]), + "scaffold serves only the always-on health surface" + ); + assert_eq!( + endpoints["health"].as_str(), + Some("/health"), + "health path must match CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS inventory" + ); + } + + /// Would have been **red** on the old code: the old `root()` advertised all + /// 29 inventory keys (including `/v1/info`, `/v1/tx`, …) while + /// `build_router` only registered `/` and `/health`. Hitting each + /// advertised path therefore produced 404 for every key except `health`. + #[tokio::test] + async fn every_advertised_endpoint_is_reachable() { + // Build once to read discovery, then probe each advertised path on a + // fresh router (oneshot consumes the service). + let discovery = { + let app = build_router(test_config()); + let res = app + .oneshot(Request::builder().uri("/").body(Body::empty()).unwrap()) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + let body = body_bytes(res).await; + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body).expect("JSON root body"); + let endpoints = json["endpoints"].as_object().expect("endpoints object"); + endpoints + .iter() + .map(|(k, v)| { + let path = v.as_str().expect("endpoint value must be a string path"); + assert!( + !path.is_empty(), + "advertised path for key {k} must not be empty" + ); + (k.clone(), path.to_string()) + }) + .collect::>() + }; + + assert!( + !discovery.is_empty(), + "GET / must advertise at least one served surface" + ); + + for (key, path) in &discovery { + // Inventory templates may contain ``; served paths today + // are concrete. Refuse to probe templates — they are not registered. + assert!( + !path.contains('<'), + "advertised path for {key} still has a template placeholder: {path}" + ); + + let app = build_router(test_config()); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri(path.as_str()) + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_ne!( + res.status(), + StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, + "GET / advertised key {key:?} at path {path:?}, but the router \ + returned 404 — discovery and registration have diverged" + ); + } + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn unregistered_info_is_404_and_absent_from_discovery() { + // Honesty: GET /v1/info is a documented inventory gap, not a fake handler, + // and must not appear in the discovery document either. + let app = build_router(test_config()); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/info") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!( + res.status(), + StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, + "GET /v1/info must not be a placeholder route" + ); + + let app = build_router(test_config()); + let res = app + .oneshot(Request::builder().uri("/").body(Body::empty()).unwrap()) + .await + .unwrap(); + let body = body_bytes(res).await; + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body).expect("JSON root body"); + let endpoints = json["endpoints"].as_object().expect("endpoints object"); + assert!( + !endpoints.contains_key("info"), + "unregistered surface 'info' must be omitted from GET / endpoints" + ); + assert!( + !endpoints.contains_key("health_ready"), + "unregistered surface 'health_ready' must be omitted from GET / endpoints" + ); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn router_accepts_config_with_features() { + // Features do not change registration yet; the call must still succeed + // so the parameter remains part of the public surface. + let mut features = BTreeSet::new(); + features.insert(Feature::Wallet); + let cfg = Config { + bind_addr: "127.0.0.1:0".parse().unwrap(), + kernel_addr: "http://kernel:1".to_string(), + features, + }; + let app = build_router(cfg); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/health") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + + // Enabling wallet must not silently advertise wallet-only surfaces. + let app = build_router(Config { + bind_addr: "127.0.0.1:0".parse().unwrap(), + kernel_addr: "http://kernel:1".to_string(), + features: BTreeSet::from([Feature::Wallet]), + }); + let res = app + .oneshot(Request::builder().uri("/").body(Body::empty()).unwrap()) + .await + .unwrap(); + let body = body_bytes(res).await; + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body).expect("JSON root body"); + let endpoints = json["endpoints"].as_object().expect("endpoints object"); + assert!( + !endpoints.contains_key("tx"), + "wallet feature must not advertise /v1/tx before that handler exists" + ); + } +} From df3c6f8abef8a726b3ae064b2db767873cdb20e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: TaprootFreak <142087526+TaprootFreak@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2026 10:52:19 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 02/23] =?UTF-8?q?feat:=20add=20the=20kernel=20gRPC=20clien?= =?UTF-8?q?t=20and=20the=20=C2=A77.5=20job=20surface?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The node is a kernel: gRPC only. This is the REST side, and it holds no protocol state, no database and no secrets — it translates §7.5 onto `kernel.v1` and back. Five endpoints, all from the closed §7.5 inventory: `POST /v1/tx`, `GET /v1/jobs/{id}`, `GET /v1/jobs/{id}/stream`, `POST /v1/jobs/{id}/sign` and `POST /v1/jobs/{id}/cancel`, mapped onto `SubmitTransition`, `GetJob`, `StreamJob`, `SignTransition` and `CancelJob`. **The HTTP status comes only from `ErrorInfo.metadata["http_status"]`.** There is one error table and it lives in the node; a second one here would be the drift this project keeps removing. A status without a `kernel.v1` `ErrorInfo`, or with an unusable `http_status`, fails closed rather than being guessed from the gRPC code. Building this side is what exposed that the node was sending private metadata headers instead of the normative detail — fixed there, in its own commit. The `.proto` is carried in this repo and pinned by content hash, with a test that compares byte-for-byte against the node's copy when it is checked out alongside. A copy without an equality check is a wire-drift source, and wire drift between two repos is exactly the failure nobody sees until it is live. Codegen sits in its own `kernel-proto` crate on tonic 0.13.1, matching the node line where `tonic-build` still owns prost codegen. Two findings from getting the tests to pass, both worth naming. The routes were registered under the **spec's** path spelling — `/v1/jobs/` — which axum takes as a literal, so every real request 404'd. The advertised form and the matcher form are two projections of one source now, derived by rewriting rather than maintained as two lists, and `GET /` still advertises the spec spelling because that is the contract. Worse: the test named "every advertised endpoint is reachable" **passed** throughout. It requested the advertised string itself, which matched the literal route, so its input and its expectation came from the same place — a tautology with a name, like the `MAX_RX_COINS + 1 > MAX_RX_COINS` assertion in the node. It now substitutes a concrete value into each placeholder and distinguishes a routing 404 (axum fallback, empty body) from a domain 404 (§7.5 body with a `reason`), which is what makes it able to fail. The test double replaces the kernel process, not the REST↔proto logic: it emits domain errors through the same `ErrorInfo` encoding the real kernel uses — one detail, `reason`, `domain`, `http_status` — so a passing error test is evidence about the real wire form. It needs no Plonky2 proof. `kernel-proto` carries `#![allow(clippy::all)]` at its root, as the node's does. That crate contains nothing but generator output, so there is no finding to suppress; the doc comment says the allow stops applying the moment hand-written logic appears there. --- Cargo.lock | 457 ++++++++++++++++--- Cargo.toml | 43 +- README.md | 8 +- docs/rest-surface.md | 26 +- kernel-proto/Cargo.toml | 20 + kernel-proto/build.rs | 26 ++ kernel-proto/src/lib.rs | 24 + proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto | 286 ++++++++++++ src/error.rs | 53 +++ src/hexutil.rs | 104 +++++ src/jobs.rs | 663 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/kernel/client.rs | 232 ++++++++++ src/kernel/error_info.rs | 318 +++++++++++++ src/kernel/mod.rs | 15 + src/kernel/pb.rs | 7 + src/lib.rs | 11 +- src/main.rs | 23 +- src/proto_identity.rs | 111 +++++ src/routes.rs | 846 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 19 files changed, 3110 insertions(+), 163 deletions(-) create mode 100644 kernel-proto/Cargo.toml create mode 100644 kernel-proto/build.rs create mode 100644 kernel-proto/src/lib.rs create mode 100644 proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto create mode 100644 src/error.rs create mode 100644 src/hexutil.rs create mode 100644 src/jobs.rs create mode 100644 src/kernel/client.rs create mode 100644 src/kernel/error_info.rs create mode 100644 src/kernel/mod.rs create mode 100644 src/kernel/pb.rs create mode 100644 src/proto_identity.rs diff --git a/Cargo.lock b/Cargo.lock index 06418c1..e846ee1 100644 --- a/Cargo.lock +++ b/Cargo.lock @@ -11,14 +11,26 @@ dependencies = [ "memchr", ] +[[package]] +name = "anyhow" +version = "1.0.104" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "330a5ed07fa54e4702c9d6c4174f74427fc0ef6e214bbd677ae50a5099946470" + [[package]] name = "api" version = "0.1.0" dependencies = [ - "axum 0.7.9", + "async-trait", + "axum", + "futures-util", "http-body-util", + "kernel-proto", + "prost", + "prost-types", "serde", "serde_json", + "sha2", "tokio", "tonic", "tower", @@ -50,7 +62,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" checksum = "edca88bc138befd0323b20752846e6587272d3b03b0343c8ea28a6f819e6e71f" dependencies = [ "async-trait", - "axum-core 0.4.5", + "axum-core", "bytes", "futures-util", "http", @@ -59,7 +71,7 @@ dependencies = [ "hyper", "hyper-util", "itoa", - "matchit 0.7.3", + "matchit", "memchr", "mime", "percent-encoding", @@ -77,31 +89,6 @@ dependencies = [ "tracing", ] -[[package]] -name = "axum" -version = "0.8.9" -source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" -checksum = "31b698c5f9a010f6573133b09e0de5408834d0c82f8d7475a89fc1867a71cd90" -dependencies = [ - "axum-core 0.5.6", - "bytes", - "futures-util", - "http", - "http-body", - "http-body-util", - "itoa", - "matchit 0.8.4", - "memchr", - "mime", - "percent-encoding", - "pin-project-lite", - "serde_core", - "sync_wrapper", - "tower", - "tower-layer", - "tower-service", -] - [[package]] name = "axum-core" version = "0.4.5" @@ -123,30 +110,27 @@ dependencies = [ "tracing", ] -[[package]] -name = "axum-core" -version = "0.5.6" -source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" -checksum = "08c78f31d7b1291f7ee735c1c6780ccde7785daae9a9206026862dab7d8792d1" -dependencies = [ - "bytes", - "futures-core", - "http", - "http-body", - "http-body-util", - "mime", - "pin-project-lite", - "sync_wrapper", - "tower-layer", - "tower-service", -] - [[package]] name = "base64" version = "0.22.1" source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" checksum = "72b3254f16251a8381aa12e40e3c4d2f0199f8c6508fbecb9d91f575e0fbb8c6" +[[package]] +name = "bitflags" +version = "2.13.1" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "b588b76d00fde79687d7646a9b5bdf3cc0f655e0bbd080335a95d7e96f3587da" + +[[package]] +name = "block-buffer" +version = "0.10.4" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "3078c7629b62d3f0439517fa394996acacc5cbc91c5a20d8c658e77abd503a71" +dependencies = [ + "generic-array", +] + [[package]] name = "bytes" version = "1.12.1" @@ -159,6 +143,41 @@ version = "1.0.4" source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" checksum = "9330f8b2ff13f34540b44e946ef35111825727b38d33286ef986142615121801" +[[package]] +name = "cpufeatures" +version = "0.2.17" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "59ed5838eebb26a2bb2e58f6d5b5316989ae9d08bab10e0e6d103e656d1b0280" +dependencies = [ + "libc", +] + +[[package]] +name = "crypto-common" +version = "0.1.7" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "78c8292055d1c1df0cce5d180393dc8cce0abec0a7102adb6c7b1eef6016d60a" +dependencies = [ + "generic-array", + "typenum", +] + +[[package]] +name = "digest" +version = "0.10.7" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "9ed9a281f7bc9b7576e61468ba615a66a5c8cfdff42420a70aa82701a3b1e292" +dependencies = [ + "block-buffer", + "crypto-common", +] + +[[package]] +name = "either" +version = "1.17.0" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "9e5e8f6c15a24b9a3ee5efec809ccd006d3b30e8b3bb63c39af737c7f87daa1d" + [[package]] name = "equivalent" version = "1.0.2" @@ -172,9 +191,21 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" checksum = "39cab71617ae0d63f51a36d69f866391735b51691dbda63cf6f96d042b63efeb" dependencies = [ "libc", - "windows-sys", + "windows-sys 0.61.2", ] +[[package]] +name = "fastrand" +version = "2.5.0" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "da7c62ceae207dd37ea5b845da6a0696c799f85e97da1ab5b7910be3c1c80223" + +[[package]] +name = "fixedbitset" +version = "0.5.7" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "1d674e81391d1e1ab681a28d99df07927c6d4aa5b027d7da16ba32d1d21ecd99" + [[package]] name = "fnv" version = "1.0.7" @@ -205,6 +236,17 @@ version = "0.3.33" source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" checksum = "2cd50c473c80f6d7c3670a752354b8e569b1a7cbfdc0419ec88e5edad85e0dc7" +[[package]] +name = "futures-macro" +version = "0.3.33" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "2d6d3cde68c518367be28956066ddfef33813991b77a55005a69dae04bf3b10b" +dependencies = [ + "proc-macro2", + "quote", + "syn 2.0.119", +] + [[package]] name = "futures-sink" version = "0.3.33" @@ -224,11 +266,33 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" checksum = "a77a90a256fce34da66415271e30f94ee91c57b04b8a2c042d9cf3220179deaa" dependencies = [ "futures-core", + "futures-macro", "futures-task", "pin-project-lite", "slab", ] +[[package]] +name = "generic-array" +version = "0.14.7" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "85649ca51fd72272d7821adaf274ad91c288277713d9c18820d8499a7ff69e9a" +dependencies = [ + "typenum", + "version_check", +] + +[[package]] +name = "getrandom" +version = "0.4.3" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "300e883d756b2e4ec94e02791f39b04b522276138852cfc41d9fb7e904106099" +dependencies = [ + "cfg-if", + "libc", + "r-efi", +] + [[package]] name = "h2" version = "0.4.15" @@ -254,6 +318,12 @@ version = "0.17.1" source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" checksum = "ed5909b6e89a2db4456e54cd5f673791d7eca6732202bbf2a9cc504fe2f9b84a" +[[package]] +name = "heck" +version = "0.5.0" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "2304e00983f87ffb38b55b444b5e3b60a884b5d30c0fca7d82fe33449bbe55ea" + [[package]] name = "http" version = "1.5.0" @@ -348,7 +418,7 @@ dependencies = [ "hyper", "libc", "pin-project-lite", - "socket2", + "socket2 0.6.5", "tokio", "tower-service", "tracing", @@ -364,12 +434,30 @@ dependencies = [ "hashbrown", ] +[[package]] +name = "itertools" +version = "0.14.0" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "2b192c782037fadd9cfa75548310488aabdbf3d2da73885b31bd0abd03351285" +dependencies = [ + "either", +] + [[package]] name = "itoa" version = "1.0.18" source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" checksum = "8f42a60cbdf9a97f5d2305f08a87dc4e09308d1276d28c869c684d7777685682" +[[package]] +name = "kernel-proto" +version = "0.1.0" +dependencies = [ + "prost", + "tonic", + "tonic-build", +] + [[package]] name = "lazy_static" version = "1.5.0" @@ -382,6 +470,12 @@ version = "0.2.189" source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" checksum = "3eaf3ede3fee6db1a4c2ee091bf8a8b4dccdc6d17f656fb07896ee72867612f2" +[[package]] +name = "linux-raw-sys" +version = "0.12.1" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "32a66949e030da00e8c7d4434b251670a91556f4144941d37452769c25d58a53" + [[package]] name = "log" version = "0.4.33" @@ -403,12 +497,6 @@ version = "0.7.3" source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" checksum = "0e7465ac9959cc2b1404e8e2367b43684a6d13790fe23056cc8c6c5a6b7bcb94" -[[package]] -name = "matchit" -version = "0.8.4" -source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" -checksum = "47e1ffaa40ddd1f3ed91f717a33c8c0ee23fff369e3aa8772b9605cc1d22f4c3" - [[package]] name = "memchr" version = "2.8.3" @@ -429,16 +517,22 @@ checksum = "30d65c71f1ce40ab09135ce117d742b9f8a19ff91a41a8b57ed50bc2de59c427" dependencies = [ "libc", "wasi", - "windows-sys", + "windows-sys 0.61.2", ] +[[package]] +name = "multimap" +version = "0.10.1" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "1d87ecb2933e8aeadb3e3a02b828fed80a7528047e68b4f424523a0981a3a084" + [[package]] name = "nu-ansi-term" version = "0.50.3" source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" checksum = "7957b9740744892f114936ab4a57b3f487491bbeafaf8083688b16841a4240e5" dependencies = [ - "windows-sys", + "windows-sys 0.61.2", ] [[package]] @@ -453,6 +547,16 @@ version = "2.3.2" source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" checksum = "9b4f627cb1b25917193a259e49bdad08f671f8d9708acfd5fe0a8c1455d87220" +[[package]] +name = "petgraph" +version = "0.7.1" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "3672b37090dbd86368a4145bc067582552b29c27377cad4e0a306c97f9bd7772" +dependencies = [ + "fixedbitset", + "indexmap", +] + [[package]] name = "pin-project" version = "1.1.13" @@ -479,6 +583,16 @@ version = "0.2.17" source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" checksum = "a89322df9ebe1c1578d689c92318e070967d1042b512afbe49518723f4e6d5cd" +[[package]] +name = "prettyplease" +version = "0.2.37" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "479ca8adacdd7ce8f1fb39ce9ecccbfe93a3f1344b3d0d97f20bc0196208f62b" +dependencies = [ + "proc-macro2", + "syn 2.0.119", +] + [[package]] name = "proc-macro2" version = "1.0.107" @@ -488,6 +602,58 @@ dependencies = [ "unicode-ident", ] +[[package]] +name = "prost" +version = "0.13.5" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "2796faa41db3ec313a31f7624d9286acf277b52de526150b7e69f3debf891ee5" +dependencies = [ + "bytes", + "prost-derive", +] + +[[package]] +name = "prost-build" +version = "0.13.5" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "be769465445e8c1474e9c5dac2018218498557af32d9ed057325ec9a41ae81bf" +dependencies = [ + "heck", + "itertools", + "log", + "multimap", + "once_cell", + "petgraph", + "prettyplease", + "prost", + "prost-types", + "regex", + "syn 2.0.119", + "tempfile", +] + +[[package]] +name = "prost-derive" +version = "0.13.5" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "8a56d757972c98b346a9b766e3f02746cde6dd1cd1d1d563472929fdd74bec4d" +dependencies = [ + "anyhow", + "itertools", + "proc-macro2", + "quote", + "syn 2.0.119", +] + +[[package]] +name = "prost-types" +version = "0.13.5" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "52c2c1bf36ddb1a1c396b3601a3cec27c2462e45f07c386894ec3ccf5332bd16" +dependencies = [ + "prost", +] + [[package]] name = "quote" version = "1.0.47" @@ -497,6 +663,24 @@ dependencies = [ "proc-macro2", ] +[[package]] +name = "r-efi" +version = "6.0.0" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "f8dcc9c7d52a811697d2151c701e0d08956f92b0e24136cf4cf27b57a6a0d9bf" + +[[package]] +name = "regex" +version = "1.13.1" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "f020237b6c8eed93db2e2cb53c00c60a8e1bc73da7d073199a1180401450218d" +dependencies = [ + "aho-corasick", + "memchr", + "regex-automata", + "regex-syntax", +] + [[package]] name = "regex-automata" version = "0.4.16" @@ -514,6 +698,19 @@ version = "0.8.11" source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" checksum = "d6f6ff9a378485b298a5286656da665ba74413d36db0979633275d2e708145d4" +[[package]] +name = "rustix" +version = "1.1.4" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "b6fe4565b9518b83ef4f91bb47ce29620ca828bd32cb7e408f0062e9930ba190" +dependencies = [ + "bitflags", + "errno", + "libc", + "linux-raw-sys", + "windows-sys 0.61.2", +] + [[package]] name = "rustversion" version = "1.0.23" @@ -592,6 +789,17 @@ dependencies = [ "serde", ] +[[package]] +name = "sha2" +version = "0.10.9" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "a7507d819769d01a365ab707794a4084392c824f54a7a6a7862f8c3d0892b283" +dependencies = [ + "cfg-if", + "cpufeatures", + "digest", +] + [[package]] name = "sharded-slab" version = "0.1.7" @@ -623,6 +831,16 @@ version = "1.15.2" source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" checksum = "8ed6a63f02c8539c91a8685a86f4099661ba3da017932f6ebbea6de3f0fa7c90" +[[package]] +name = "socket2" +version = "0.5.10" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "e22376abed350d73dd1cd119b57ffccad95b4e585a7cda43e286245ce23c0678" +dependencies = [ + "libc", + "windows-sys 0.52.0", +] + [[package]] name = "socket2" version = "0.6.5" @@ -630,7 +848,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" checksum = "c3d1e2c7f27f8d4cb10542a02c49005dbd6e93095799d6f3be745fae9f8fedd4" dependencies = [ "libc", - "windows-sys", + "windows-sys 0.61.2", ] [[package]] @@ -661,6 +879,19 @@ version = "1.0.2" source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" checksum = "0bf256ce5efdfa370213c1dabab5935a12e49f2c58d15e9eac2870d3b4f27263" +[[package]] +name = "tempfile" +version = "3.27.0" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "32497e9a4c7b38532efcdebeef879707aa9f794296a4f0244f6f69e9bc8574bd" +dependencies = [ + "fastrand", + "getrandom", + "once_cell", + "rustix", + "windows-sys 0.61.2", +] + [[package]] name = "thread_local" version = "1.1.10" @@ -681,9 +912,9 @@ dependencies = [ "mio", "pin-project-lite", "signal-hook-registry", - "socket2", + "socket2 0.6.5", "tokio-macros", - "windows-sys", + "windows-sys 0.61.2", ] [[package]] @@ -724,12 +955,11 @@ dependencies = [ [[package]] name = "tonic" -version = "0.14.6" +version = "0.13.1" source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" -checksum = "ac2a5518c70fa84342385732db33fb3f44bc4cc748936eb5833d2df34d6445ef" +checksum = "7e581ba15a835f4d9ea06c55ab1bd4dce26fc53752c69a04aac00703bfb49ba9" dependencies = [ "async-trait", - "axum 0.8.9", "base64", "bytes", "h2", @@ -741,8 +971,8 @@ dependencies = [ "hyper-util", "percent-encoding", "pin-project", - "socket2", - "sync_wrapper", + "prost", + "socket2 0.5.10", "tokio", "tokio-stream", "tower", @@ -751,6 +981,20 @@ dependencies = [ "tracing", ] +[[package]] +name = "tonic-build" +version = "0.13.1" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "eac6f67be712d12f0b41328db3137e0d0757645d8904b4cb7d51cd9c2279e847" +dependencies = [ + "prettyplease", + "proc-macro2", + "prost-build", + "prost-types", + "quote", + "syn 2.0.119", +] + [[package]] name = "tower" version = "0.5.3" @@ -850,6 +1094,12 @@ version = "0.2.5" source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" checksum = "e421abadd41a4225275504ea4d6566923418b7f05506fbc9c0fe86ba7396114b" +[[package]] +name = "typenum" +version = "1.20.1" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "b6f5e870be6c3b371b77fe0ee0bafb859fa4964b4404c27de1d380043c4dda20" + [[package]] name = "unicode-ident" version = "1.0.24" @@ -862,6 +1112,12 @@ version = "0.1.1" source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" checksum = "ba73ea9cf16a25df0c8caa16c51acb937d5712a8429db78a3ee29d5dcacd3a65" +[[package]] +name = "version_check" +version = "0.9.5" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "0b928f33d975fc6ad9f86c8f283853ad26bdd5b10b7f1542aa2fa15e2289105a" + [[package]] name = "want" version = "0.3.1" @@ -883,6 +1139,15 @@ version = "0.2.1" source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" checksum = "f0805222e57f7521d6a62e36fa9163bc891acd422f971defe97d64e70d0a4fe5" +[[package]] +name = "windows-sys" +version = "0.52.0" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "282be5f36a8ce781fad8c8ae18fa3f9beff57ec1b52cb3de0789201425d9a33d" +dependencies = [ + "windows-targets", +] + [[package]] name = "windows-sys" version = "0.61.2" @@ -892,6 +1157,70 @@ dependencies = [ "windows-link", ] +[[package]] +name = "windows-targets" +version = "0.52.6" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "9b724f72796e036ab90c1021d4780d4d3d648aca59e491e6b98e725b84e99973" +dependencies = [ + "windows_aarch64_gnullvm", + "windows_aarch64_msvc", + "windows_i686_gnu", + "windows_i686_gnullvm", + "windows_i686_msvc", + "windows_x86_64_gnu", + "windows_x86_64_gnullvm", + "windows_x86_64_msvc", +] + +[[package]] +name = "windows_aarch64_gnullvm" +version = "0.52.6" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "32a4622180e7a0ec044bb555404c800bc9fd9ec262ec147edd5989ccd0c02cd3" + +[[package]] +name = "windows_aarch64_msvc" +version = "0.52.6" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "09ec2a7bb152e2252b53fa7803150007879548bc709c039df7627cabbd05d469" + +[[package]] +name = "windows_i686_gnu" +version = "0.52.6" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "8e9b5ad5ab802e97eb8e295ac6720e509ee4c243f69d781394014ebfe8bbfa0b" + +[[package]] +name = "windows_i686_gnullvm" +version = "0.52.6" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "0eee52d38c090b3caa76c563b86c3a4bd71ef1a819287c19d586d7334ae8ed66" + +[[package]] +name = "windows_i686_msvc" +version = "0.52.6" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "240948bc05c5e7c6dabba28bf89d89ffce3e303022809e73deaefe4f6ec56c66" + +[[package]] +name = "windows_x86_64_gnu" +version = "0.52.6" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "147a5c80aabfbf0c7d901cb5895d1de30ef2907eb21fbbab29ca94c5b08b1a78" + +[[package]] +name = "windows_x86_64_gnullvm" +version = "0.52.6" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "24d5b23dc417412679681396f2b49f3de8c1473deb516bd34410872eff51ed0d" + +[[package]] +name = "windows_x86_64_msvc" +version = "0.52.6" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "589f6da84c646204747d1270a2a5661ea66ed1cced2631d546fdfb155959f9ec" + [[package]] name = "zmij" version = "1.0.23" diff --git a/Cargo.toml b/Cargo.toml index 92329ca..1c97203 100644 --- a/Cargo.toml +++ b/Cargo.toml @@ -1,24 +1,53 @@ +[workspace] +members = [".", "kernel-proto"] +# Lint/test default surface is the api package only — same idea as node CI +# (`-p node -p shared`): the generated kernel-proto crate is not on the +# clippy line. Identity tests for the carried .proto live in api. +default-members = ["."] +resolver = "2" + [package] name = "api" version = "0.1.0" edition = "2021" -description = "zkCoins public REST API layer (scaffold)" +description = "zkCoins public REST API layer" license = "MIT" publish = false [dependencies] -# Versions taken from zk-coins/node where the same crate is already a direct dep -# (node/Cargo.toml / workspace). tonic is not yet a direct node dep; 0.14 matches -# the version already present in the node Cargo.lock (transitive). +# tonic 0.13.1 matches zk-coins/node (kernel-proto): last line whose +# tonic-build still owns prost codegen (`compile_protos`). 0.14 moved that +# to tonic-prost-build — two codegen paths for the same .proto are avoided. +# Client features only: no `router` (server add_service). Handler tests use +# a trait double, not an in-process tonic server. axum = { version = "0.7.9", features = ["json"] } -tokio = { version = "1", features = ["rt-multi-thread", "macros", "net", "signal"] } -tonic = "0.14" +tokio = { version = "1", features = [ + "rt-multi-thread", + "macros", + "net", + "signal", + "sync", + "time", +] } +tonic = { version = "0.13.1", default-features = false, features = [ + "codegen", + "prost", + "transport", +] } +prost = "0.13.5" +prost-types = "0.13.5" serde = { version = "1.0", features = ["derive"] } serde_json = "1.0" tracing = "0.1" tracing-subscriber = { version = "0.3", features = ["env-filter"] } +futures-util = "0.3" +async-trait = "0.1" +# Generated kernel.v1 client stubs — separate crate so default clippy/test +# of `api` does not lint tonic-build output (result_large_err on Status). +kernel-proto = { path = "kernel-proto" } [dev-dependencies] -# Same versions as node/Cargo.toml [dev-dependencies]. +# Same versions as node/Cargo.toml [dev-dependencies] where shared. tower = { version = "0.5", features = ["util"] } http-body-util = "0.1" +sha2 = "0.10" diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 6a7588d..c3aa1e4 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -32,11 +32,13 @@ The API layer sits **outward** of the node. It consumes the node's internal **ke > **Status: scaffold.** The API surface is currently served by [`zk-coins/node`](https://github.com/zk-coins/node) directly; this repo will hold the standalone API layer once the kernel RPC contract stabilises. The full design is specified in [§6.1 (kernel and API)](https://docs.zkcoins.com/specification), [§7.5 (REST)](https://docs.zkcoins.com/specification), and [§7.8 (kernel RPC)](https://docs.zkcoins.com/specification). -### Inventory and skeleton (this branch) +### Inventory and stage A (this branch) - Full §7.5 endpoint inventory (method, capability, feature, kernel RPC): [`docs/rest-surface.md`](docs/rest-surface.md). -- Rust process (`axum` + `tonic` client dep): only **`GET /health`** and **`GET /`** are registered. No placeholder routes. -- **`GET /` discovery follows registration:** the response `endpoints` object lists only surfaces this process actually serves (today: `health`). The full 29-key §7.5 catalogue stays as inventory; unbuilt surfaces are omitted, not faked. +- Rust process (`axum` + `tonic 0.13.1` client): **`GET /`**, **`GET /health`**, and the job surface (`POST /v1/tx`, `GET /v1/jobs/{job_id}`, stream/sign/cancel). No placeholder routes for unbuilt keys. +- **`GET /` discovery follows registration** via `ServedSurface` — only served keys are advertised. The 29-key catalogue stays as inventory. +- Kernel contract: carried `proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto` with SHA-256 identity pin (`src/proto_identity.rs`); REST errors from `ErrorInfo.metadata["http_status"]` only. +- Codegen lives in the workspace member **`kernel-proto`** (tonic client stubs only). Workspace `default-members = ["."]` keeps default `cargo clippy` / `cargo test` on the **api** package so generated code is not linted. - Fail-closed env: `ZKCOINS_BIND_ADDR`, `ZKCOINS_KERNEL_ADDR`, `ZKCOINS_FEATURES` (see the inventory doc). ## License diff --git a/docs/rest-surface.md b/docs/rest-surface.md index 3421a5f..fa8659a 100644 --- a/docs/rest-surface.md +++ b/docs/rest-surface.md @@ -148,24 +148,32 @@ Deployments mit Wallet- und/oder Explorer-Rolle benötigt (Replica-/Blob-Pfad). | Endpunkt | Status | |---|---| | `GET /health` | **implementiert** — `200` mit Body `"ok"` | -| `GET /` | **implementiert** — `{ name, version, endpoints }` mit **genau** den Flächen, die dieser Prozess registriert (heute: nur `health` → `/health`). Die 29 geschlossenen Keys (L2874) bleiben Inventur in `CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS`; unregistrierte Keys werden weggelassen (Spec: emit only surfaces this deployment exposes). | +| `GET /` | **implementiert** — `{ name, version, endpoints }` mit **genau** den Flächen, die dieser Prozess registriert (`ServedSurface`). Inventur der 29 Keys in `CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS`; unregistrierte Keys werden weggelassen. | +| `POST /v1/tx` | **implementiert** — `SubmitTransition` | +| `GET /v1/jobs/{job_id}` | **implementiert** — `GetJob` | +| `GET /v1/jobs/{job_id}/stream` | **implementiert** — `StreamJob` als SSE | +| `POST /v1/jobs/{job_id}/sign` | **implementiert** — `SignTransition` | +| `POST /v1/jobs/{job_id}/cancel` | **implementiert** — `CancelJob` | | alle übrigen Method+Path | **nicht registriert** — kein Handler, kein `todo!()`, kein Platzhalter | Router und Discovery teilen eine Quelle (`ServedSurface` in `src/routes.rs`): eine neue registrierte Fläche erscheint automatisch in `GET /`; ein Inventur-Key ohne Route -wird nicht beworben. +wird nicht beworben. Path-Parameter in Discovery/`CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS` nutzen die +axum/OpenAPI-Form `{name}` (Spec-Text: ``). -### Dokumentierte Lücken (ohne Kernel-Verbindung nicht ehrlich darstellbar) +gRPC: getragenes `proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto` (Identität per SHA-256-Pin + +Sibling-Vergleich mit `zk-coins/node`), Client `tonic 0.13.1`, Fehlerübersetzung +ausschließlich über `google.rpc.ErrorInfo` (`domain`, `reason`, +`metadata["http_status"]`) — keine zweite Status-Tabelle im api. -Siehe auch Abschnitt **GAPS** im Implementierungsbericht. Kurz: +### Dokumentierte Lücken | Lücke | Warum | |---|---| -| `GET /v1/info` | braucht Kernel-`GetInfo`: `circuit_digests`, `bootstrap` / `bootstrap_pubkey`, Sync-Felder, Bounds. API-`features` allein würden nur erfundene Kernel-Werte ergänzen. **Absichtlich nicht implementiert.** | -| `GET /health/ready` | `ready` / `ready_reason` und optionale Diagnosefelder kommen aus Kernel-`GetInfo`. | -| Chain / Jobs / Pull / Bootstrap / Publish / Blossom | jeweils Kernel-RPC oder Kernel-Store; ohne gRPC-Client-Verbindung keine ehrliche Antwort. | -| Feature-Gate `404 feature_disabled` | erst sinnvoll, sobald die jeweiligen Routen existieren. | -| gRPC-Client (`tonic`) | Abhängigkeit ist deklariert; es gibt noch keinen generierten `kernel.v1`-Client und keinen Connect beim Start (Bind + Adresse werden fail-closed gelesen, aber nicht geöffnet). | +| `GET /v1/info` | braucht Kernel-`GetInfo` + API-eigene `features`-Konstruktion. | +| `GET /health/ready` | `ready` / `ready_reason` aus Kernel-`GetInfo`. | +| Chain / Pull / Bootstrap / Publish / Blossom / Attest / Grants | jeweilige Kernel-RPC noch nicht angebunden. | +| Feature-Gate `404 feature_disabled` | Job-Fläche ist in dieser Stufe always-on; Gate folgt mit den optionalen Rollen. | --- diff --git a/kernel-proto/Cargo.toml b/kernel-proto/Cargo.toml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a6e3131 --- /dev/null +++ b/kernel-proto/Cargo.toml @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +[package] +name = "kernel-proto" +version = "0.1.0" +edition = "2021" +description = "Generated kernel.v1 gRPC types and client stubs (no business logic)." +publish = false + +[dependencies] +# Matches zk-coins/node kernel-proto tonic line: last line whose tonic-build +# still owns prost codegen (`compile_protos`). Client-only: no `router` +# (Server::add_service) — the api is a pure gRPC client. +tonic = { version = "0.13.1", default-features = false, features = [ + "codegen", + "prost", + "transport", +] } +prost = "0.13.5" + +[build-dependencies] +tonic-build = "0.13.1" diff --git a/kernel-proto/build.rs b/kernel-proto/build.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..49f89f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/kernel-proto/build.rs @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +//! Compile the workspace-owned `kernel.v1` contract into tonic/prost stubs. +//! +//! The `.proto` lives at the workspace root under `proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto` +//! (copied from zk-coins/node; identity is enforced by a unit test in the +//! **api** package). Paths are anchored at `CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR` so the build +//! is cwd-independent. + +use std::env; +use std::path::PathBuf; + +fn main() -> Result<(), Box> { + let manifest_dir = PathBuf::from(env::var("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR")?); + let proto = manifest_dir.join("../proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto"); + let include = manifest_dir.join("../proto"); + + println!("cargo:rerun-if-changed={}", proto.display()); + + // Pure client: the api never hosts a kernel service. In-process handler + // tests use a trait double (`KernelRpc`), not generated server stubs. + tonic_build::configure() + .build_server(false) + .build_client(true) + .compile_protos(&[proto], &[include])?; + + Ok(()) +} diff --git a/kernel-proto/src/lib.rs b/kernel-proto/src/lib.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..adca103 --- /dev/null +++ b/kernel-proto/src/lib.rs @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +//! Generated `kernel.v1` types and gRPC **client** stubs. +//! +//! This crate contains **only** `tonic`/`prost` output from the workspace +//! `proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto`. No business logic, no API state, no +//! validation beyond what prost generates. +//! +//! Normative contract: specification §7.8. The carried `.proto` is pinned by +//! content hash in the **api** package (`api::proto_identity`). +//! +//! # Clippy +//! +//! Generated code trips lints such as `result_large_err` (`tonic::Status` is +//! large). Fighting the generator is pointless, and the findings say nothing +//! about hand-written code — this crate must stay generator-only. Clippy is +//! therefore silenced at the crate root (`#![allow(clippy::all)]`), matching +//! the node `kernel-proto` pattern. If hand-written logic is ever added here, +//! the allow no longer applies and must be removed. + +// Generated code trips several clippy lints; silence them at the crate +// root rather than fighting the generator. +#![allow(clippy::all)] +#![allow(missing_docs)] + +tonic::include_proto!("kernel.v1"); diff --git a/proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto b/proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto new file mode 100644 index 0000000..547ebdf --- /dev/null +++ b/proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto @@ -0,0 +1,286 @@ +// kernel.v1 — normative kernel RPC contract extracted from +// docs/specification.md §7.8 (tag spec-v1.2, package kernel.v1). +// Source of truth: the ```proto block under +// "kernel.v1 message contract (normative)". Do not invent fields. +// Fixed-width bytes (32B digests, 64B signatures) are checked in the +// implementation; proto3 has no fixed-length type. Closed string +// value sets stay as strings here (as in the normative block), not +// as enums. google.rpc.Status / google.rpc.ErrorInfo are used for +// errors and are not re-declared in this file. +// +// Unbounded scope sentinels (§5.1 / §5.2 / §7.5 / Scope below): +// asset_ids = "*" ⇔ Scope.all_assets = true (asset_ids empty) +// not_before = 0 — no lower bound +// not_after = 9223372036854775807 (2⁶³−1) — no upper bound +// Proto3 scalar zero defaults resolve to the same pair; do not +// introduce `optional` on not_before/not_after to invent a second +// "unbounded" encoding. + +syntax = "proto3"; +package kernel.v1; + +service Kernel { + rpc GetInfo(GetInfoRequest) returns (Info); + rpc GetAccumulator(GetAccumulatorRequest) returns (AccumulatorTip); + rpc ListInscriptions(ListInscriptionsRequest) returns (stream Inscription); + rpc GetNullifierPath(NullifierPathRequest) returns (NullifierPath); + rpc SubmitTransition(TransitionRequest) returns (JobHandle); + rpc GetJob(JobRequest) returns (Job); + rpc StreamJob(JobRequest) returns (stream JobEvent); + rpc SignTransition(SignRequest) returns (Job); + rpc CancelJob(JobRequest) returns (Job); + rpc OpenPullChallenge(PullChallengeRequest) returns (Challenge); + rpc Pull(PullRequest) returns (PullResult); + rpc GetRecord(RecordRequest) returns (RecordBlob); + rpc GetCoinProof(CoinProofRequest) returns (CoinProofBlob); + rpc GetAccountState(AccountStateRequest) returns (AccountStateResult); + rpc SubscribeReceipts(SubscribeReceiptsRequest) returns (stream Receipt); + rpc Publish(PublishRequest) returns (PublishResult); + rpc EntrustOperationalBundle(EntrustRequest) returns (EntrustResult); + rpc RevokeOperationalBundle(RevokeRequest) returns (RevokeResult); + rpc AttestBalance(AttestRequest) returns (JobHandle); + rpc IssueViewGrant(GrantRequest) returns (GrantResult); +} + +message GetInfoRequest {} +message Info { + string network = 1; // exactly one of "mainnet" | "testnet" | "regtest" — 1:1 to the §2.2 tags + // (Bitcoin network is pinned 1:1 to this tag; no separate bitcoin_network field) + reserved 2; // was bitcoin_network; removed (v1: bitcoin_network == network always) + string protocol_version = 3; // "v1" + map circuit_digests = 4; // {"C": 32B, "C_balance": 32B} (§1.7.9) + string relay_url = 5; + string blossom_url = 6; + uint32 finality_confirmations = 7; // 6 (§3.9) + uint32 max_tx_inputs = 8; // §2.5 bounds + uint32 max_tx_outputs = 9; + uint32 max_rx_coins = 10; + uint32 max_account_assets = 11; + bool ready = 12; // backs /health/ready + uint64 bitcoin_tip_height = 13; + bytes accumulator_root = 14; // = nav_root (§3.7) + uint64 scanner_lag = 15; + uint64 max_blob_bytes = 16; // §7.4 Blossom advertised size limit + uint64 activation_height = 17; // pinned per-network scan origin (§3.6) + BootstrapManifest bootstrap = 18; // §4.3 global infrastructure only + repeated string kernel_parts = 19; // which kernel parts this kernel runs: each ∈ + // {"scanner","prover","publisher"}. NOT the §7.5 /v1/info + // `features` array — that is API-layer configuration the API + // owns and constructs itself, and the kernel cannot know it. + optional string ready_reason = 20; // set iff ready == false; closed set (§7.5 /health/ready): + // "syncing" | "scanner_lag" | "circuit_mismatch" | "deep_reorg" + // | "dependency_unavailable" + bytes bootstrap_pubkey = 21; // 32B x-only; pinned network-parameter trust anchor for BootstrapManifest (§3.6, §4.3) +} +message BootstrapManifest { + string network = 1; + string protocol_version = 2; // "v1" + repeated string seed_relays = 3; + repeated string blob_stores = 4; + repeated bytes operator_ids = 5; // 32B x-only each + uint64 issued_at = 6; + uint64 expires_at = 7; + bytes manifest_sig = 8; // 64B BIP-340 +} + +message GetAccumulatorRequest {} +message AccumulatorTip { bytes root = 1; bytes tip_block_hash = 2; uint64 tip_height = 3; uint64 size = 4; } // root = nav_root = Hc("NfLog/Root", size ‖ mth) (§3.7) + +message ListInscriptionsRequest { + // Defaults (API-normalised before RPC when the REST query omits them, §7.5): from_height = 0, + // from_tx_index = 0, from_vin_index = 0, limit = 100. Valid limit ∈ 1..1000; 0 or >1000 → + // INVALID_ARGUMENT / HTTP 400 bounds_exceeded. + // Proto3: optional so absence is distinguishable from zero; a caller that sets limit = 0 is rejected. + // Inclusive lexicographic lower bound on (height, tx_index, vin_index); REST response carries + // next_height + next_tx_index + next_vin_index as the exclusive triple-cursor (§7.5) — all three + // together or all three absent. The kernel stream itself yields Inscription messages in stable + // (height, tx_index, vin_index) sort order (then §3.6 payload-member order inside one inscription). + optional uint64 from_height = 1; + optional uint32 limit = 2; + optional uint64 from_tx_index = 3; + optional uint64 from_vin_index = 4; +} +message Nullifier { + bytes pubkey = 1; // Pkⱼ, §3.1 + bytes r = 2; // Rⱼ, §3.1 + string state = 3; // §3.10 per-member: "completed" | "pending" | "failed" +} +message Inscription { + bytes txid = 1; // internal byte order (§1.7.7) + uint64 height = 2; + uint32 count = 3; + uint32 format = 4; // 0x00 raw | 0x01 half-aggregated (§3.5) + repeated Nullifier nullifiers = 5; // each element carries its own state (§7.5) + string confirmation_state = 6; // reveal-tx confirmation only: "pending" | "completed" + // (never "failed"; not a top-level §3.10 aggregate state) + uint64 tx_index = 7; // reveal-tx index within the block + uint64 vin_index = 8; // reveal-input index within the tx; with height+tx_index + // forms the triple sort/cursor key (§3.6, §7.5) +} + +message NullifierPathRequest { bytes pubkey = 1; } +message NullifierPath { + bytes root = 1; uint64 tip_height = 2; bool present = 3; + bytes leaf = 4; // Rᵢ when present, else empty + uint64 position = 5; // log position p when present + repeated bytes audit_path = 6; // ≤ 64 × 32B RFC-6962 inclusion audit path when present + // (§1.7.6, §3.7); empty when present == false + uint64 tree_size = 7; // log size against which an inclusion proof is stated + bytes tip_block_hash = 8; // 32B, internal order (§1.7.7) + // present == false is an unauthenticated local-index absence answer, NOT an RFC-6962 + // non-inclusion proof; MUST NOT back a credit (§3.7 Path B). +} + +message OutputTemplate { string recipient = 1; bytes asset_id = 2; string amount = 3; } +message Issuance { + string name = 1; uint32 decimals = 2; uint32 issuance_version = 3; + string amount = 4; + string cap_total = 5; // set iff issuance_version == 2 + bytes terms_salt = 6; // set iff issuance_version == 2 +} +message TransitionRequest { + string kind = 1; // "mint" | "send" | "receive" + string subject = 2; // zk-address (Bech32m string) + bytes next_pubkey = 3; + bytes npk_rand = 11; // 32 unmodified CSPRNG bytes per attempt (§2.1 clause 2) + repeated bytes input_coins = 4; + repeated OutputTemplate output_templates = 5; + bytes publisher_pubkey = 6; // empty ⇒ self-publish (case a); set ⇒ case (b) or (c) + string fee_address = 7; // deferred (§3.8.1): MUST be empty in v1 (§7.5 matrix cases (a)/(c)) + repeated bytes fold_coin_ids = 8; + Issuance issuance = 9; + string idempotency_key = 10; // §7.5 Idempotency-Key pass-through +} + +message JobHandle { string job_id = 1; string status = 2; } +message JobRequest { string job_id = 1; } +message AwaitingSignature { + bytes new_account_state_hash = 1; bytes output_coins_root = 2; + bytes input_nullifiers_root = 3; bytes coin_history_root = 4; + bytes nav_commitment = 5; bytes npk_commit = 6; + bytes proof_data_hash = 7; // §7.5 awaiting_signature shape + bytes txn_pubkey = 8; // Pkᵢ (x-only); MUST equal prev_account_state.current_pubkey + uint64 send_counter = 9; // entry counter i; skᵢ = A/0'/i' (§1.2, §7.5) +} +message JobResult { + bytes new_account_state_hash = 1; bytes output_coins_root = 2; + bytes input_nullifiers_root = 3; repeated bytes output_coin_ids = 4; + bytes publisher_pubkey = 5; // set for every externally published kind (b)/(c); empty on self-publish (§7.5) + bytes attestation = 6; // set only for attest jobs (§5.7 BalanceAttestation bytes) +} +message JobError { string error = 1; string message = 2; } // §7.5 machine_code shape +message Job { + string job_id = 1; string kind = 2; string status = 3; + string phase = 4; // optional non-stable diagnostic [a-z0-9_]{1,64} (§7.5); + // empty when absent / in terminal status; clients dispatch on status only + float progress = 5; + AwaitingSignature awaiting_signature = 6; // set only while status == "awaiting_signature" + JobResult result = 7; // set only once status == "completed" + JobError error = 8; // set only once status ∈ {"failed","cancelled"} +} +message JobEvent { string event = 1; Job job = 2; } // event: "phase"|"complete"|"error" +message SignRequest { string job_id = 1; bytes signature = 2; bytes s2c_nonce = 3; } // signature length MUST be 64, s2c_nonce length MUST be 32 (INVALID_ARGUMENT otherwise) + +message Scope { // §5.1 scope; all_assets=true ⇔ asset_ids "*" + repeated bytes asset_ids = 1; bool all_assets = 2; + uint64 not_before = 3; uint64 not_after = 4; + // INVARIANT: exactly one of all_assets == true (⇔ asset_ids empty) or a non-empty asset_ids + // MUST hold; all_assets == false with empty asset_ids is INVALID_ARGUMENT. + // UNBOUNDED SENTINELS (identical to the §5.1 JSON scope — single pair, no Proto-only zero + // convention): not_before = 0 means no lower bound; not_after = 2⁶³−1 + // (9223372036854775807) means no upper bound. Proto3 scalar default 0 is therefore + // correct for not_before but **MUST NOT** be read as unbounded for not_after — a bare + // not_after = 0 is a closed window ending at the epoch. The API layer normalises omitted + // JSON fields to these sentinels before the RPC (§5.1, §7.5). +} +message PullChallengeRequest { + string subject = 1; Scope requested_scope = 2; + string action = 3; // "" (pull) | "entrust" | "revoke" (§7.7 domains) + // | "attest_balance" | "issue_grant" (§7.5 action-bound + // OwnershipProof domains; scope unused for those two) +} +message Challenge { bytes nonce = 1; uint64 expiry = 2; string domain = 3; } +message PullRequest { + bytes nonce = 1; // consumes the §5.1 challenge (single use) + string subject = 2; // the subject the API layer authenticated + Scope resolved_scope = 3; // the already-intersected scope (§5.1) — the kernel + // trusts the API layer for ACCESS, never widens + bytes chan_bind = 4; // opaque 32B equality token for session binding (§5.1) +} +message RecordRef { + bytes record_id = 1; // opaque 32B id of this Private record + string record_type = 2; // closed: "coinproof" | "self_delivery" — body-type discriminator (§7.5) + string transition_kind = 3; // closed: "mint" | "send" | "receive"; required for self_delivery; + // optional (empty) for coinproof — NOT a body-type tag + bytes blob_id = 4; // H(ciphertext), §4.2.1 + uint64 occurred_at = 5; // first-occurrence-derived; 0 if unknown +} +message PullResult { repeated RecordRef records = 1; string session = 2; uint64 session_expiry = 3; } +message RecordRequest { bytes record_id = 1; string session = 2; bytes chan_bind = 3; } +message RecordBlob { + bytes canonical = 1; // §7.1 CoinProof or SelfDeliveryRecordV1 bytes + string record_type = 2; // closed: "coinproof" | "self_delivery" — discriminates canonical + string transition_kind = 3; // closed: "mint" | "send" | "receive"; required for self_delivery; + // optional (empty) for coinproof +} +message CoinProofRequest { bytes coin_id = 1; string session = 2; bytes chan_bind = 3; } +message CoinProofBlob { bytes canonical = 1; } // the §7.1 canonical CoinProof bundle bytes + +// ownership pull session only — grant sessions are UNAUTHENTICATED/unauthorized (§7.5) +message AccountStateRequest { string session = 1; bytes chan_bind = 2; } +message AccountStateResult { + bytes account_state = 1; // serialize(AccountState), §1.7.4 + bytes state_head = 2; // ash of the spendable head (32B) + bytes head_record_id = 3; // 32B Private-record locator; empty if not indexed + uint64 send_counter = 4; // MUST equal AccountState.send_counter + bytes current_pubkey = 5; // Pkᵢ (32B x-only); MUST equal AccountState.current_pubkey + bytes last_nullifier_pk = 6; // 32B; empty iff no prior state-advancing transition + bytes last_nullifier_r = 7; // 32B; empty iff last_nullifier_pk empty +} + +// session + chan_bind only — subject/scope come from the server-side pull-session state +// (ownership or grant), never from a client-supplied subject field (analogous to CoinProofRequest) +message SubscribeReceiptsRequest { string session = 1; bytes chan_bind = 2; } +message Receipt { + bytes coin_id = 1; bytes asset_id = 2; string amount = 3; + string state = 4; // §3.10 state at emission + uint64 credited_at = 5; +} + +message BlockAnchor { bytes block_hash = 1; uint32 height = 2; } // hash internal order (§1.7.7); height matches the on-chain u32 (§1.7.3) +message PublishRequest { + bytes public_key = 1; bytes r = 2; bytes s = 3; bytes r_prime = 4; + bytes fee_blob_id = 5; // 32B; deferred (§3.8.1): MUST be empty in v1 ⇒ fee-less (§7.6) + BlockAnchor block_anchor = 6; + bytes fee_epk = 7; // 32B x-only; empty iff fee_blob_id empty; fresh per hand-off + bytes fee_blob_locators = 8; // UTF-8 of NIP44Binary(K_tx, "blob-locators", serialize(BlobLocatorSet)); empty iff fee_blob_id empty +} +message PublishResult { + bool accepted = 1; + optional string reason = 2; // present iff accepted == false; closed set (§7.6): + // "invalid_signature" | "invalid_s2c_opening" | "invalid_fee_coinproof" + // | "fee_address_mismatch" | "ocr_mismatch" | "fee_too_low" + // | "unknown_fee_asset" | "policy" | "anchor_stale" + // (proto3 optional: absence ≠ empty string) + optional uint64 batch_eta = 3; // seconds to next inscription; present iff accepted == true + // (proto3 optional: absence ≠ 0) +} +message EntrustRequest { bytes nonce = 1; string subject = 2; bytes bundle = 3; bytes chan_bind = 4; } // bundle = the 161-byte §7.7 serialization +message EntrustResult { bool accepted = 1; } +message RevokeRequest { bytes nonce = 1; string subject = 2; bytes chan_bind = 3; } +message RevokeResult { bool revoked = 1; } // §7.7 fail-closed revocation: irrecoverably erase {ivk, ovk, op, nk, op_secret} +// API layer has already verified the action-bound OwnershipProof (§5.1 / §7.5); kernel trusts +// the caller for ACCESS and consumes the single-use nonce for audit/idempotency of the gate +message AttestRequest { + string subject = 1; bytes asset_id = 2; + bytes nav_ceiling = 3; // 32B nav_root; empty ⇒ node's current size_final + uint64 size_ceiling = 4; // 0 ⇒ derive from size_final + bytes nonce = 5; // consumes the AttestBalanceChallenge (single use) + bytes chan_bind = 6; // opaque 32B equality token (§5.1) +} +message GrantRequest { + string subject = 1; bytes grantee_pk = 2; Scope scope = 3; uint64 expiry = 4; + bytes nonce = 5; // consumes the IssueGrantChallenge (single use) + bytes chan_bind = 6; // opaque 32B equality token (§5.1) +} +message GrantResult { string grant = 1; } diff --git a/src/error.rs b/src/error.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8d13a99 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/error.rs @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +//! §7.5 generic REST error body and HTTP mapping helpers. + +use axum::http::StatusCode; +use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response}; +use axum::Json; +use serde::Serialize; + +/// Closed §7.5 error body: `{ "error": "", "message": "" }`. +#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize)] +pub struct ErrorBody { + pub error: String, + pub message: String, +} + +/// An HTTP error ready to return from a handler. +#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub struct ApiError { + pub status: StatusCode, + pub body: ErrorBody, +} + +impl ApiError { + pub fn new(status: StatusCode, error: impl Into, message: impl Into) -> Self { + Self { + status, + body: ErrorBody { + error: error.into(), + message: message.into(), + }, + } + } + + /// §7.5 `malformed_request` / 400. + pub fn malformed(message: impl Into) -> Self { + Self::new(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, "malformed_request", message) + } + + /// Fail-closed stand-in when the kernel transport breaks or the kernel + /// violates the ErrorInfo contract. Spec §7.5 closes the enumeration with + /// `internal_error` / 500 for any condition not listed. + pub fn internal(message: impl Into) -> Self { + Self::new(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, "internal_error", message) + } +} + +impl IntoResponse for ApiError { + fn into_response(self) -> Response { + // Always a §7.5 JSON body — never a bare status with an empty body. + // (Axum's default 404 fallback is status-only; handlers must not + // look like that when they intentionally return an ApiError.) + (self.status, Json(self.body)).into_response() + } +} diff --git a/src/hexutil.rs b/src/hexutil.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7eb757a --- /dev/null +++ b/src/hexutil.rs @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +//! Lowercase hex codecs for §7.1 wire values (32-byte digests, 64-byte sigs). + +/// Decode a lowercase-or-uppercase hex string into exactly `byte_len` bytes. +/// +/// Rejects wrong length, odd nibble count, and non-hex characters. No padding +/// and no silent truncation. +pub fn decode_hex_exact(input: &str, byte_len: usize) -> Result, HexError> { + if input.len() != byte_len * 2 { + return Err(HexError::Length { + expected_chars: byte_len * 2, + got_chars: input.len(), + }); + } + let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(byte_len); + let bytes = input.as_bytes(); + let mut i = 0; + while i < bytes.len() { + let hi = hex_nibble(bytes[i])?; + let lo = hex_nibble(bytes[i + 1])?; + out.push((hi << 4) | lo); + i += 2; + } + Ok(out) +} + +/// Encode bytes as lowercase hex (no `0x` prefix). +pub fn encode_hex(bytes: &[u8]) -> String { + const HEX: &[u8; 16] = b"0123456789abcdef"; + let mut out = String::with_capacity(bytes.len() * 2); + for &b in bytes { + out.push(HEX[(b >> 4) as usize] as char); + out.push(HEX[(b & 0xf) as usize] as char); + } + out +} + +fn hex_nibble(b: u8) -> Result { + match b { + b'0'..=b'9' => Ok(b - b'0'), + b'a'..=b'f' => Ok(b - b'a' + 10), + b'A'..=b'F' => Ok(b - b'A' + 10), + _ => Err(HexError::InvalidChar(b)), + } +} + +#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub enum HexError { + Length { + expected_chars: usize, + got_chars: usize, + }, + InvalidChar(u8), +} + +impl std::fmt::Display for HexError { + fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result { + match self { + HexError::Length { + expected_chars, + got_chars, + } => write!( + f, + "hex length must be {expected_chars} characters, got {got_chars}" + ), + HexError::InvalidChar(b) => write!(f, "invalid hex character 0x{b:02x}"), + } + } +} + +impl std::error::Error for HexError {} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + + #[test] + fn round_trip_32() { + let raw = [0u8; 32]; + let hex = encode_hex(&raw); + assert_eq!(hex.len(), 64); + assert_eq!(decode_hex_exact(&hex, 32).unwrap(), raw); + } + + #[test] + fn rejects_wrong_length() { + let err = decode_hex_exact("ab", 32).unwrap_err(); + match err { + HexError::Length { + expected_chars, + got_chars, + } => { + assert_eq!(expected_chars, 64); + assert_eq!(got_chars, 2); + } + other => panic!("expected Length, got {other:?}"), + } + } + + #[test] + fn rejects_non_hex() { + let err = decode_hex_exact("zz", 1).unwrap_err(); + assert!(matches!(err, HexError::InvalidChar(_))); + } +} diff --git a/src/jobs.rs b/src/jobs.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6fda284 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/jobs.rs @@ -0,0 +1,663 @@ +//! Job-surface REST handlers (§7.5) over kernel job procedures (§7.8). +//! +//! Endpoints (Spec-Schreibweise): `POST /v1/tx`, `GET /v1/jobs/`, +//! `GET /v1/jobs//stream`, `POST /v1/jobs//sign`, +//! `POST /v1/jobs//cancel`. Axum registers the derived `:job_id` matcher. + +use crate::error::ApiError; +use crate::hexutil::{decode_hex_exact, encode_hex, HexError}; +use crate::kernel::kernel_v1::{ + AwaitingSignature, Issuance, Job, JobEvent, JobHandle, JobRequest, JobResult as ProtoJobResult, + OutputTemplate as ProtoOutputTemplate, SignRequest, TransitionRequest, +}; +use crate::kernel::KernelHandle; +use axum::extract::{Path, State}; +use axum::http::{HeaderMap, HeaderValue, StatusCode}; +use axum::response::sse::{Event, KeepAlive, Sse}; +use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response}; +use axum::Json; +use futures_util::stream::Stream; +use futures_util::StreamExt; +use serde::Deserialize; +use serde_json::{json, Value}; +use std::convert::Infallible; + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// JSON request types (exact §7.5 shapes) +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +/// §7.5 `TransitionRequest` JSON body for `POST /v1/tx` (L2898–L2930). +#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)] +pub struct TransitionRequestJson { + pub kind: String, + pub subject: String, + pub next_pubkey: String, + pub npk_rand: String, + #[serde(default)] + pub input_coins: Option>, + #[serde(default)] + pub output_templates: Option>, + #[serde(default)] + pub publisher_pubkey: Option, + #[serde(default)] + pub fee_address: Option, + #[serde(default)] + pub fold_coin_ids: Option>, + #[serde(default)] + pub issuance: Option, +} + +#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)] +pub struct OutputTemplateJson { + pub recipient: String, + pub asset_id: String, + pub amount: String, +} + +#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)] +pub struct IssuanceJson { + pub name: String, + pub decimals: u32, + pub issuance_version: u32, + pub amount: String, + #[serde(default)] + pub cap_total: Option, + #[serde(default)] + pub terms_salt: Option, +} + +/// §7.5 sign body (L2891): `{ signature: , s2c_nonce: }`. +#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)] +pub struct SignBodyJson { + pub signature: String, + pub s2c_nonce: String, +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Handlers +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +/// `POST /v1/tx` → `SubmitTransition` → `202 { job_id, status: "accepted" }`. +pub async fn post_tx( + State(kernel): State, + headers: HeaderMap, + Json(body): Json, +) -> Result { + let mut req = json_to_transition(body)?; + if let Some(key) = idempotency_key_from_headers(&headers)? { + req.idempotency_key = key; + } + let handle: JobHandle = kernel.submit_transition(req).await?; + let body = json!({ + "job_id": handle.job_id, + "status": "accepted", + }); + // Spec: 202 is the only success status for POST /v1/tx (L3031). + // Echo kernel status only when it is the closed success literal. + if !handle.status.is_empty() && handle.status != "accepted" { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "kernel JobHandle.status must be \"accepted\" on submit success, got {:?}", + handle.status + ))); + } + Ok((StatusCode::ACCEPTED, Json(body)).into_response()) +} + +/// `GET /v1/jobs/` → `GetJob`. +pub async fn get_job( + State(kernel): State, + Path(job_id): Path, +) -> Result { + if job_id.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::malformed("job_id must not be empty")); + } + let job = kernel + .get_job(JobRequest { + job_id: job_id.clone(), + }) + .await?; + let (status_header, retry_after) = job_poll_headers(&job); + let mut response = (status_header, Json(job_to_json(&job)?)).into_response(); + if let Some(secs) = retry_after { + response.headers_mut().insert( + axum::http::header::RETRY_AFTER, + HeaderValue::from_str(&secs.to_string()) + .map_err(|e| ApiError::internal(format!("invalid Retry-After value: {e}")))?, + ); + } + Ok(response) +} + +/// `GET /v1/jobs//stream` → `StreamJob` as SSE. +/// +/// Start failures of `StreamJob` (unknown job, transport, ErrorInfo domain +/// errors) return **before** the SSE response is opened: HTTP status + §7.5 +/// JSON body via [`ApiError`]. Only a successful stream handshake upgrades +/// the response to `text/event-stream`. +pub async fn stream_job( + State(kernel): State, + Path(job_id): Path, +) -> Result> + Send + 'static>, ApiError> { + if job_id.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::malformed("job_id must not be empty")); + } + // Await the kernel stream handshake first. On `Err`, axum maps `ApiError` + // to a normal HTTP response (status + JSON body) and never enters SSE. + let stream = kernel.stream_job(JobRequest { job_id }).await?; + + let sse_stream = job_event_sse_stream(stream); + Ok(Sse::new(sse_stream).keep_alive(KeepAlive::default())) +} + +/// `POST /v1/jobs//sign` → `SignTransition`. +pub async fn post_sign( + State(kernel): State, + Path(job_id): Path, + Json(body): Json, +) -> Result { + if job_id.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::malformed("job_id must not be empty")); + } + let signature = decode_hex_exact(&body.signature, 64) + .map_err(|e| ApiError::malformed(format!("signature: {e}")))?; + let s2c_nonce = decode_hex_exact(&body.s2c_nonce, 32) + .map_err(|e| ApiError::malformed(format!("s2c_nonce: {e}")))?; + let job = kernel + .sign_transition(SignRequest { + job_id, + signature, + s2c_nonce, + }) + .await?; + Ok((StatusCode::OK, Json(job_to_json(&job)?)).into_response()) +} + +/// `POST /v1/jobs//cancel` → `CancelJob`. +pub async fn post_cancel( + State(kernel): State, + Path(job_id): Path, +) -> Result { + if job_id.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::malformed("job_id must not be empty")); + } + let job = kernel.cancel_job(JobRequest { job_id }).await?; + Ok((StatusCode::OK, Json(job_to_json(&job)?)).into_response()) +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// SSE +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +fn job_event_sse_stream(stream: S) -> impl Stream> + Send +where + S: Stream> + Send + 'static, +{ + // Map each kernel event to one SSE frame. On stream break, emit a single + // recognizable `error` frame then end — never hang open with silence. + // + // `take_while` + stateful scan: after a terminal event (`complete` / + // `error`) or a stream-break frame we stop polling the kernel stream. + async_stream_events(stream) +} + +fn async_stream_events(stream: S) -> impl Stream> + Send +where + S: Stream> + Send + 'static, +{ + futures_util::stream::unfold((Box::pin(stream), false), |(mut stream, done)| async move { + if done { + return None; + } + match stream.next().await { + None => None, + Some(Ok(ev)) => { + let terminal = is_terminal_event_name(&ev.event); + match job_event_to_sse(&ev) { + Ok(frame) => Some((Ok(frame), (stream, terminal))), + Err(api_err) => { + let frame = stream_break_event(&api_err); + Some((Ok(frame), (stream, true))) + } + } + } + Some(Err(api_err)) => { + let frame = stream_break_event(&api_err); + Some((Ok(frame), (stream, true))) + } + } + }) +} + +fn is_terminal_event_name(name: &str) -> bool { + name == "complete" || name == "error" +} + +fn stream_break_event(err: &ApiError) -> Event { + // Recognizable end: an `error` event with the §7.5 error body shape. + // Clients must not wait forever on a half-open SSE subscription. + let data = json!({ + "status": "failed", + "error": { + "error": err.body.error, + "message": err.body.message, + } + }); + Event::default().event("error").data(data.to_string()) +} + +fn job_event_to_sse(ev: &JobEvent) -> Result { + let name = ev.event.as_str(); + if name != "phase" && name != "complete" && name != "error" { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "kernel JobEvent.event is not a §7.5 SSE name: {name:?}" + ))); + } + let job = match &ev.job { + Some(j) => j, + None => { + return Err(ApiError::internal( + "kernel JobEvent is missing the job payload", + )); + } + }; + let data = match name { + "phase" => phase_event_data(job)?, + "complete" | "error" => job_to_json(job)?, + _ => unreachable!("checked above"), + }; + Ok(Event::default().event(name).data(data.to_string())) +} + +/// §7.5 L2947 phase frame: `{ status, phase?, progress }`. +fn phase_event_data(job: &Job) -> Result { + let mut obj = serde_json::Map::new(); + obj.insert("status".to_string(), Value::String(job.status.clone())); + if !job.phase.is_empty() { + obj.insert("phase".to_string(), Value::String(job.phase.clone())); + } + obj.insert("progress".to_string(), json!(job.progress)); + // When status is awaiting_signature, embed the surface inline (L3033). + if job.status == "awaiting_signature" { + if let Some(a) = &job.awaiting_signature { + obj.insert( + "awaiting_signature".to_string(), + awaiting_signature_json(a)?, + ); + } + } + Ok(Value::Object(obj)) +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// JSON ↔ proto +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +fn json_to_transition(body: TransitionRequestJson) -> Result { + let kind = body.kind; + match kind.as_str() { + "mint" | "send" | "receive" => {} + other => { + return Err(ApiError::malformed(format!( + "kind must be mint|send|receive, got {other:?}" + ))); + } + } + + // v1: fee_address MUST be absent (L2933–L2939). + if body.fee_address.is_some() { + return Err(ApiError::malformed( + "fee_address must be absent in v1 (publisher presence matrix)", + )); + } + + let next_pubkey = decode_hex_field(&body.next_pubkey, 32, "next_pubkey")?; + let npk_rand = decode_hex_field(&body.npk_rand, 32, "npk_rand")?; + + let publisher_pubkey = match body.publisher_pubkey { + Some(hex) => decode_hex_field(&hex, 32, "publisher_pubkey")?, + None => Vec::new(), + }; + + let input_coins = match body.input_coins { + Some(list) => { + let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(list.len()); + for (i, h) in list.iter().enumerate() { + out.push(decode_hex_field(h, 32, &format!("input_coins[{i}]"))?); + } + out + } + None => Vec::new(), + }; + + let fold_coin_ids = match body.fold_coin_ids { + Some(list) => { + let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(list.len()); + for (i, h) in list.iter().enumerate() { + out.push(decode_hex_field(h, 32, &format!("fold_coin_ids[{i}]"))?); + } + out + } + None => Vec::new(), + }; + + let output_templates = match body.output_templates { + Some(list) => { + let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(list.len()); + for (i, t) in list.into_iter().enumerate() { + let asset_id = + decode_hex_field(&t.asset_id, 32, &format!("output_templates[{i}].asset_id"))?; + out.push(ProtoOutputTemplate { + recipient: t.recipient, + asset_id, + amount: t.amount, + }); + } + out + } + None => Vec::new(), + }; + + let issuance = match body.issuance { + Some(iss) => Some(json_to_issuance(iss)?), + None => None, + }; + + // Presence rules (§7.5 L2907–L2941) that the API can enforce without kernel: + // kind-dependent required fields. Remaining bounds stay kernel-side. + match kind.as_str() { + "send" => { + if input_coins.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::malformed( + "kind=send requires non-empty input_coins", + )); + } + if output_templates.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::malformed( + "kind=send requires non-empty output_templates", + )); + } + if !fold_coin_ids.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::malformed( + "kind=send must not carry fold_coin_ids", + )); + } + if issuance.is_some() { + return Err(ApiError::malformed("kind=send must not carry issuance")); + } + } + "mint" => { + if !input_coins.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::malformed("kind=mint must not carry input_coins")); + } + if !fold_coin_ids.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::malformed( + "kind=mint must not carry fold_coin_ids", + )); + } + if output_templates.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::malformed( + "kind=mint requires non-empty output_templates", + )); + } + if issuance.is_none() { + return Err(ApiError::malformed("kind=mint requires issuance")); + } + } + "receive" => { + if !input_coins.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::malformed( + "kind=receive must not carry input_coins", + )); + } + if !output_templates.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::malformed( + "kind=receive must not carry output_templates", + )); + } + if fold_coin_ids.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::malformed( + "kind=receive requires non-empty fold_coin_ids", + )); + } + if issuance.is_some() { + return Err(ApiError::malformed("kind=receive must not carry issuance")); + } + } + _ => unreachable!("kind checked above"), + } + + if body.subject.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::malformed("subject is required")); + } + + Ok(TransitionRequest { + kind, + subject: body.subject, + next_pubkey, + npk_rand, + input_coins, + output_templates, + publisher_pubkey, + fee_address: String::new(), + fold_coin_ids, + issuance, + idempotency_key: String::new(), + }) +} + +fn json_to_issuance(iss: IssuanceJson) -> Result { + if iss.issuance_version != 1 && iss.issuance_version != 2 { + return Err(ApiError::malformed("issuance_version must be 1 or 2")); + } + if iss.issuance_version == 2 { + let cap = match iss.cap_total { + Some(c) => c, + None => { + return Err(ApiError::malformed("issuance_version=2 requires cap_total")); + } + }; + let salt = match iss.terms_salt { + Some(s) => decode_hex_field(&s, 32, "terms_salt")?, + None => { + return Err(ApiError::malformed( + "issuance_version=2 requires terms_salt", + )); + } + }; + Ok(Issuance { + name: iss.name, + decimals: iss.decimals, + issuance_version: iss.issuance_version, + amount: iss.amount, + cap_total: cap, + terms_salt: salt, + }) + } else { + if iss.cap_total.is_some() || iss.terms_salt.is_some() { + return Err(ApiError::malformed( + "issuance_version=1 must not carry cap_total or terms_salt", + )); + } + Ok(Issuance { + name: iss.name, + decimals: iss.decimals, + issuance_version: iss.issuance_version, + amount: iss.amount, + cap_total: String::new(), + terms_salt: Vec::new(), + }) + } +} + +fn decode_hex_field(hex: &str, byte_len: usize, field: &str) -> Result, ApiError> { + decode_hex_exact(hex, byte_len) + .map_err(|e: HexError| ApiError::malformed(format!("{field}: {e}"))) +} + +fn idempotency_key_from_headers(headers: &HeaderMap) -> Result, ApiError> { + let Some(raw) = headers.get("idempotency-key") else { + return Ok(None); + }; + let s = raw + .to_str() + .map_err(|_| ApiError::malformed("Idempotency-Key must be ASCII"))? + .to_string(); + if s.len() > 64 { + return Err(ApiError::malformed("Idempotency-Key exceeds 64 bytes")); + } + Ok(Some(s)) +} + +/// §7.5 job poll object (L2889, L2959–L2991). +fn job_to_json(job: &Job) -> Result { + let mut obj = serde_json::Map::new(); + obj.insert("job_id".to_string(), Value::String(job.job_id.clone())); + obj.insert("kind".to_string(), Value::String(job.kind.clone())); + obj.insert("status".to_string(), Value::String(job.status.clone())); + // phase absent in terminal states (L2889). + let terminal = matches!(job.status.as_str(), "completed" | "failed" | "cancelled"); + if !terminal && !job.phase.is_empty() { + obj.insert("phase".to_string(), Value::String(job.phase.clone())); + } + obj.insert("progress".to_string(), json!(job.progress)); + + if job.status == "awaiting_signature" { + match &job.awaiting_signature { + Some(a) => { + obj.insert( + "awaiting_signature".to_string(), + awaiting_signature_json(a)?, + ); + } + None => { + return Err(ApiError::internal( + "job status is awaiting_signature but payload is absent", + )); + } + } + } + + if job.status == "completed" { + match &job.result { + Some(r) => { + obj.insert("result".to_string(), job_result_json(r)?); + } + None => { + return Err(ApiError::internal( + "job status is completed but result is absent", + )); + } + } + } + + if job.status == "failed" || job.status == "cancelled" { + match &job.error { + Some(e) => { + obj.insert( + "error".to_string(), + json!({ "error": e.error, "message": e.message }), + ); + } + None => { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "job status is {} but error is absent", + job.status + ))); + } + } + } + + Ok(Value::Object(obj)) +} + +fn awaiting_signature_json(a: &AwaitingSignature) -> Result { + // All digests are required 32-byte values on the wire (L2961–L2970). + Ok(json!({ + "new_account_state_hash": require_hex32(&a.new_account_state_hash, "new_account_state_hash")?, + "output_coins_root": require_hex32(&a.output_coins_root, "output_coins_root")?, + "input_nullifiers_root": require_hex32(&a.input_nullifiers_root, "input_nullifiers_root")?, + "coin_history_root": require_hex32(&a.coin_history_root, "coin_history_root")?, + "nav_commitment": require_hex32(&a.nav_commitment, "nav_commitment")?, + "npk_commit": require_hex32(&a.npk_commit, "npk_commit")?, + "proof_data_hash": require_hex32(&a.proof_data_hash, "proof_data_hash")?, + "txn_pubkey": require_hex32(&a.txn_pubkey, "txn_pubkey")?, + "send_counter": a.send_counter, + })) +} + +fn job_result_json(r: &ProtoJobResult) -> Result { + let mut obj = serde_json::Map::new(); + // Digest fields may be empty for attest_balance jobs; only encode when set. + if !r.new_account_state_hash.is_empty() { + obj.insert( + "new_account_state_hash".to_string(), + Value::String(require_hex32( + &r.new_account_state_hash, + "result.new_account_state_hash", + )?), + ); + } + if !r.output_coins_root.is_empty() { + obj.insert( + "output_coins_root".to_string(), + Value::String(require_hex32( + &r.output_coins_root, + "result.output_coins_root", + )?), + ); + } + if !r.input_nullifiers_root.is_empty() { + obj.insert( + "input_nullifiers_root".to_string(), + Value::String(require_hex32( + &r.input_nullifiers_root, + "result.input_nullifiers_root", + )?), + ); + } + let mut coin_ids = Vec::with_capacity(r.output_coin_ids.len()); + for (i, id) in r.output_coin_ids.iter().enumerate() { + coin_ids.push(require_hex32(id, &format!("result.output_coin_ids[{i}]"))?); + } + obj.insert("output_coin_ids".to_string(), json!(coin_ids)); + + if !r.publisher_pubkey.is_empty() { + obj.insert( + "publisher_pubkey".to_string(), + Value::String(require_hex32( + &r.publisher_pubkey, + "result.publisher_pubkey", + )?), + ); + } + if !r.attestation.is_empty() { + obj.insert( + "attestation".to_string(), + Value::String(encode_hex(&r.attestation)), + ); + } + Ok(Value::Object(obj)) +} + +fn require_hex32(bytes: &[u8], field: &str) -> Result { + if bytes.len() != 32 { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "kernel field {field} must be 32 bytes, got {}", + bytes.len() + ))); + } + Ok(encode_hex(bytes)) +} + +/// Poll headers: 200 always on success; Retry-After on non-terminal (L2944). +fn job_poll_headers(job: &Job) -> (StatusCode, Option) { + let terminal = matches!(job.status.as_str(), "completed" | "failed" | "cancelled"); + if terminal { + return (StatusCode::OK, None); + } + let secs = match job.status.as_str() { + "awaiting_signature" => 0, + _ => 2, // proving / publishing / accepted — RECOMMENDED 2 (L2944) + }; + (StatusCode::OK, Some(secs)) +} diff --git a/src/kernel/client.rs b/src/kernel/client.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..aedad14 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/kernel/client.rs @@ -0,0 +1,232 @@ +//! Lazy gRPC client for `kernel.v1.Kernel`. +//! +//! Address comes from process config (`ZKCOINS_KERNEL_ADDR`); this module +//! never invents a host or port. Connection is lazy: a bad URI fails at +//! construction; an unreachable kernel surfaces as a transport error on the +//! first RPC (mapped separately from domain ErrorInfo). + +use crate::error::ApiError; +use crate::kernel::error_info::kernel_status_to_api_error; +use crate::kernel::pb::kernel_v1::kernel_client::KernelClient as TonicKernelClient; +use crate::kernel::pb::kernel_v1::{ + Job, JobEvent, JobHandle, JobRequest, SignRequest, TransitionRequest, +}; +use async_trait::async_trait; +use futures_util::stream::BoxStream; +use futures_util::StreamExt; +use std::sync::Arc; +use tonic::transport::Channel; +use tonic::Request; + +/// Subset of kernel procedures this stage consumes (job surface only). +#[async_trait] +pub trait KernelRpc: Send + Sync { + async fn submit_transition(&self, req: TransitionRequest) -> Result; + + async fn get_job(&self, req: JobRequest) -> Result; + + async fn stream_job( + &self, + req: JobRequest, + ) -> Result>, ApiError>; + + async fn sign_transition(&self, req: SignRequest) -> Result; + + async fn cancel_job(&self, req: JobRequest) -> Result; +} + +/// Shared handle installed in the axum `State`. +pub type KernelHandle = Arc; + +/// Production client over a tonic channel. +#[derive(Clone, Debug)] +pub struct KernelClient { + inner: TonicKernelClient, +} + +impl KernelClient { + /// Build a lazy channel to `kernel_addr`. + /// + /// `kernel_addr` must already be non-empty (enforced by [`crate::Config`]). + /// An unparseable URI is a construction error — the process must not start + /// with a nonsense target. + /// + /// # Tokio runtime required + /// + /// Even though the TCP dial is deferred until the first RPC, tonic's + /// `Endpoint::connect_lazy` still spawns a channel worker on the current + /// Tokio executor (`Buffer::pair` + `executor.execute`). Calling this + /// **outside** a running Tokio 1.x runtime panics (`there is no reactor + /// running`). Production entry (`#[tokio::main]`) and tests that build a + /// client must already be on a runtime; URI/emptiness checks above run + /// first and do not need one. + pub fn connect_lazy(kernel_addr: &str) -> Result { + if kernel_addr.is_empty() { + return Err(ClientBuildError::EmptyAddr); + } + let channel = tonic::transport::Endpoint::from_shared(kernel_addr.to_string()) + .map_err(|e| ClientBuildError::InvalidUri { + value: kernel_addr.to_string(), + reason: e.to_string(), + })? + .connect_lazy(); + Ok(Self { + inner: TonicKernelClient::new(channel), + }) + } +} + +/// Failures that prevent constructing a client (start-time, not transport). +#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub enum ClientBuildError { + EmptyAddr, + InvalidUri { value: String, reason: String }, +} + +impl std::fmt::Display for ClientBuildError { + fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result { + match self { + ClientBuildError::EmptyAddr => { + write!(f, "kernel address is empty") + } + ClientBuildError::InvalidUri { value, reason } => { + write!( + f, + "ZKCOINS_KERNEL_ADDR value {value:?} is not a valid gRPC endpoint URI: {reason}" + ) + } + } + } +} + +impl std::error::Error for ClientBuildError {} + +/// Construct a [`KernelClient`] or return a named build error. +pub fn connect_lazy(kernel_addr: &str) -> Result { + KernelClient::connect_lazy(kernel_addr) +} + +#[async_trait] +impl KernelRpc for KernelClient { + async fn submit_transition(&self, req: TransitionRequest) -> Result { + let mut client = self.inner.clone(); + let response = client + .submit_transition(Request::new(req)) + .await + .map_err(map_status)?; + Ok(response.into_inner()) + } + + async fn get_job(&self, req: JobRequest) -> Result { + let mut client = self.inner.clone(); + let response = client + .get_job(Request::new(req)) + .await + .map_err(map_status)?; + Ok(response.into_inner()) + } + + async fn stream_job( + &self, + req: JobRequest, + ) -> Result>, ApiError> { + let mut client = self.inner.clone(); + let response = client + .stream_job(Request::new(req)) + .await + .map_err(map_status)?; + let stream = response.into_inner().map(|item| match item { + Ok(ev) => Ok(ev), + Err(status) => Err(kernel_status_to_api_error(&status)), + }); + Ok(Box::pin(stream)) + } + + async fn sign_transition(&self, req: SignRequest) -> Result { + let mut client = self.inner.clone(); + let response = client + .sign_transition(Request::new(req)) + .await + .map_err(map_status)?; + Ok(response.into_inner()) + } + + async fn cancel_job(&self, req: JobRequest) -> Result { + let mut client = self.inner.clone(); + let response = client + .cancel_job(Request::new(req)) + .await + .map_err(map_status)?; + Ok(response.into_inner()) + } +} + +/// Map a tonic `Status` to REST. +/// +/// Domain failures carry `ErrorInfo` and become the §7.5 body via +/// [`kernel_status_to_api_error`]. Transport failures (unreachable kernel, +/// reset connection) arrive as a `Status` **without** usable ErrorInfo after +/// tonic converts the underlying `transport::Error`; that path is also +/// fail-closed to `500 internal_error` (no guessed machine code). The +/// dedicated [`super::transport_error_to_api_error`] helper documents the same +/// outcome for call sites that still hold a raw `transport::Error` — this +/// client never holds that type under `connect_lazy`. +fn map_status(status: tonic::Status) -> ApiError { + kernel_status_to_api_error(&status) +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + + #[test] + fn empty_addr_is_build_error() { + let err = KernelClient::connect_lazy("").expect_err("empty"); + assert_eq!(err, ClientBuildError::EmptyAddr); + } + + #[test] + fn invalid_uri_is_named() { + let err = KernelClient::connect_lazy("not a uri").expect_err("bad uri"); + match err { + ClientBuildError::InvalidUri { value, reason } => { + assert_eq!(value, "not a uri"); + assert!(!reason.is_empty()); + } + other => panic!("expected InvalidUri, got {other:?}"), + } + } + + #[test] + fn valid_http_uri_builds_lazy_client() { + // Statement under test is still construction-only (no RPC). The + // Tokio runtime context is required by tonic's lazy channel worker + // spawn — see [`KernelClient::connect_lazy`]. + let rt = tokio::runtime::Builder::new_current_thread() + .enable_all() + .build() + .expect("test runtime"); + let _enter = rt.enter(); + KernelClient::connect_lazy("http://127.0.0.1:50051").expect("valid"); + } + + #[test] + fn transport_error_helper_names_cause() { + // Production RPCs never hold a raw `tonic::transport::Error`: with + // `connect_lazy`, dial failures surface as `tonic::Status` and go + // through `map_status` → `kernel_status_to_api_error` (fail-closed + // 500). This helper is the named path for call sites that still hold + // the raw transport error; pin its contract via the kernel facade. + use crate::kernel::transport_error_to_api_error; + let f: fn(&tonic::transport::Error) -> ApiError = transport_error_to_api_error; + let _ = f; + let err = ApiError::internal("kernel transport error: connection refused"); + assert_eq!(err.status, axum::http::StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); + assert!( + err.body.message.contains("kernel transport error"), + "message must name transport class, got {}", + err.body.message + ); + } +} diff --git a/src/kernel/error_info.rs b/src/kernel/error_info.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7322ccd --- /dev/null +++ b/src/kernel/error_info.rs @@ -0,0 +1,318 @@ +//! Translate `tonic::Status` + `google.rpc.ErrorInfo` → §7.5 REST errors. +//! +//! **Single source of HTTP status:** `ErrorInfo.metadata["http_status"]` from +//! the kernel. This module holds **no** reason→status table. A status that +//! lacks a well-formed `ErrorInfo` with `domain = "kernel.v1"` and a valid +//! HTTP status metadata entry is fail-closed (`500 internal_error`). + +use crate::error::ApiError; +use axum::http::StatusCode; +use prost::Message; +use std::collections::HashMap; +#[cfg(test)] +use tonic::Code; +use tonic::Status; + +/// Normative `ErrorInfo.domain` (§7.8). +pub const ERROR_INFO_DOMAIN: &str = "kernel.v1"; + +/// Wire type URL for `google.rpc.ErrorInfo` (with and without the type.googleapis.com prefix). +const ERROR_INFO_TYPE_URL: &str = "type.googleapis.com/google.rpc.ErrorInfo"; +const ERROR_INFO_TYPE_SUFFIX: &str = "google.rpc.ErrorInfo"; + +/// Minimal `google.rpc.ErrorInfo` (field numbers match googleapis). +#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Message)] +pub struct ErrorInfo { + #[prost(string, tag = "1")] + pub reason: String, + #[prost(string, tag = "2")] + pub domain: String, + #[prost(map = "string, string", tag = "3")] + pub metadata: HashMap, +} + +/// Map a failed kernel RPC `Status` to the §7.5 REST error. +/// +/// Requires exactly-decodable `ErrorInfo` in `Status.details` with: +/// - `domain == "kernel.v1"` +/// - non-empty `reason` (the §7.5 machine code) +/// - `metadata["http_status"]` a decimal integer in `400..=599` that +/// `StatusCode::from_u16` accepts +/// +/// Anything else → [`ApiError::internal`] (fail-closed; no guessed status). +pub fn kernel_status_to_api_error(status: &Status) -> ApiError { + match decode_error_info(status) { + Ok(info) => match validate_and_build(info, status.message()) { + Ok(err) => err, + Err(why) => ApiError::internal(format!( + "kernel ErrorInfo failed contract validation: {why}" + )), + }, + Err(why) => ApiError::internal(format!("kernel status missing usable ErrorInfo: {why}")), + } +} + +/// A transport failure (dial, broken pipe, timeout) is **not** a kernel +/// domain error. §7.5 closes unlisted conditions as `internal_error` / 500. +pub fn transport_error_to_api_error(err: &tonic::transport::Error) -> ApiError { + ApiError::internal(format!("kernel transport error: {err}")) +} + +fn validate_and_build(info: ErrorInfo, status_message: &str) -> Result { + if info.domain != ERROR_INFO_DOMAIN { + return Err(format!( + "domain must be {ERROR_INFO_DOMAIN:?}, got {:?}", + info.domain + )); + } + if info.reason.is_empty() { + return Err("reason is empty".to_string()); + } + let http_raw = match info.metadata.get("http_status") { + Some(v) => v.as_str(), + None => return Err("metadata[\"http_status\"] is absent".to_string()), + }; + if http_raw.is_empty() { + return Err("metadata[\"http_status\"] is empty".to_string()); + } + // Strict decimal parse — no leading '+', no whitespace, no fallback. + let code_u16: u16 = match http_raw.parse::() { + Ok(n) => n, + Err(_) => { + return Err(format!( + "metadata[\"http_status\"] is not a u16 decimal: {http_raw:?}" + )); + } + }; + // Re-check canonical form so "0400" / overflow tricks do not slip through + // a lossy parse (u16 parse rejects overflow; reject non-canonical strings). + if http_raw != code_u16.to_string() { + return Err(format!( + "metadata[\"http_status\"] is not canonical decimal: {http_raw:?}" + )); + } + if !(400..=599).contains(&code_u16) { + return Err(format!( + "metadata[\"http_status\"] out of error range: {code_u16}" + )); + } + let status = match StatusCode::from_u16(code_u16) { + Ok(s) => s, + Err(_) => { + return Err(format!( + "metadata[\"http_status\"] is not a valid HTTP status: {code_u16}" + )); + } + }; + let message = if status_message.is_empty() { + info.reason.clone() + } else { + status_message.to_string() + }; + Ok(ApiError::new(status, info.reason, message)) +} + +fn decode_error_info(status: &Status) -> Result { + let details = status.details(); + if details.is_empty() { + return Err("Status.details is empty".to_string()); + } + // tonic packs a single `google.protobuf.Any` (or a repeated-Any encoding). + // Try Any first; if the bytes are raw ErrorInfo, accept that too only when + // the Any path fails — still one vocabulary (ErrorInfo fields), not a + // second reason table. + if let Ok(info) = decode_from_any(details) { + return Ok(info); + } + match ErrorInfo::decode(details) { + Ok(info) => Ok(info), + Err(e) => Err(format!( + "Status.details is neither google.protobuf.Any nor ErrorInfo: {e}" + )), + } +} + +fn decode_from_any(details: &[u8]) -> Result { + let any = prost_types::Any::decode(details).map_err(|e| format!("Any decode failed: {e}"))?; + if !type_url_is_error_info(&any.type_url) { + return Err(format!( + "Any type_url is not google.rpc.ErrorInfo: {:?}", + any.type_url + )); + } + ErrorInfo::decode(any.value.as_slice()).map_err(|e| format!("ErrorInfo decode failed: {e}")) +} + +fn type_url_is_error_info(type_url: &str) -> bool { + type_url == ERROR_INFO_TYPE_URL || type_url.ends_with(ERROR_INFO_TYPE_SUFFIX) +} + +/// Build a `tonic::Status` carrying normative ErrorInfo (test double / helpers). +/// +/// Production kernel code lives in zk-coins/node; this encoder exists so the +/// api tests can emit the **same** wire shape the REST mapper consumes — no +/// invented second vocabulary. Not compiled into non-test builds: production +/// never encodes kernel errors (only the node does). +#[cfg(test)] +pub fn encode_kernel_error_status( + grpc_code: Code, + message: impl Into, + reason: impl Into, + http_status: u16, +) -> Status { + let reason = reason.into(); + let mut metadata = HashMap::new(); + metadata.insert("http_status".to_string(), http_status.to_string()); + let info = ErrorInfo { + reason: reason.clone(), + domain: ERROR_INFO_DOMAIN.to_string(), + metadata, + }; + let any = prost_types::Any { + type_url: ERROR_INFO_TYPE_URL.to_string(), + value: info.encode_to_vec(), + }; + Status::with_details(grpc_code, message, any.encode_to_vec().into()) +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + + #[test] + fn maps_job_not_found_from_error_info() { + // Values from node/src/transport/error_contract.rs: + // JobNotFound → reason job_not_found, http 404, gRPC NotFound. + let st = encode_kernel_error_status(Code::NotFound, "Job not found", "job_not_found", 404); + let err = kernel_status_to_api_error(&st); + assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::NOT_FOUND); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "job_not_found"); + assert_eq!(err.body.message, "Job not found"); + } + + #[test] + fn maps_wrong_phase_from_error_info() { + // error_contract: WrongPhase → wrong_phase / 409 / FailedPrecondition. + let st = + encode_kernel_error_status(Code::FailedPrecondition, "wrong phase", "wrong_phase", 409); + let err = kernel_status_to_api_error(&st); + assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::CONFLICT); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "wrong_phase"); + } + + #[test] + fn maps_bounds_exceeded_from_error_info() { + // error_contract: BoundsExceeded → bounds_exceeded / 400 / InvalidArgument. + let st = encode_kernel_error_status( + Code::InvalidArgument, + "too many inputs", + "bounds_exceeded", + 400, + ); + let err = kernel_status_to_api_error(&st); + assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "bounds_exceeded"); + assert_eq!(err.body.message, "too many inputs"); + } + + #[test] + fn missing_http_status_is_fail_closed_500() { + let mut metadata = HashMap::new(); + // deliberately no http_status + metadata.insert("other".to_string(), "x".to_string()); + let info = ErrorInfo { + reason: "job_not_found".to_string(), + domain: ERROR_INFO_DOMAIN.to_string(), + metadata, + }; + let any = prost_types::Any { + type_url: ERROR_INFO_TYPE_URL.to_string(), + value: info.encode_to_vec(), + }; + let st = Status::with_details(Code::NotFound, "x", any.encode_to_vec().into()); + let err = kernel_status_to_api_error(&st); + assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); + assert!( + err.body.message.contains("http_status"), + "message must name the missing field, got {}", + err.body.message + ); + } + + #[test] + fn invalid_http_status_is_fail_closed_500() { + let st = encode_kernel_error_status(Code::Internal, "x", "internal_error", 200); + // encode allows any u16; mapper must reject non-error range. + let err = kernel_status_to_api_error(&st); + assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); + assert!( + err.body.message.contains("out of error range") + || err.body.message.contains("http_status"), + "message must name the status problem, got {}", + err.body.message + ); + } + + #[test] + fn wrong_domain_is_fail_closed_500() { + let mut metadata = HashMap::new(); + metadata.insert("http_status".to_string(), "404".to_string()); + let info = ErrorInfo { + reason: "job_not_found".to_string(), + domain: "not.kernel".to_string(), + metadata, + }; + let any = prost_types::Any { + type_url: ERROR_INFO_TYPE_URL.to_string(), + value: info.encode_to_vec(), + }; + let st = Status::with_details(Code::NotFound, "x", any.encode_to_vec().into()); + let err = kernel_status_to_api_error(&st); + assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); + assert!( + err.body.message.contains("domain"), + "message must name domain failure, got {}", + err.body.message + ); + } + + #[test] + fn empty_details_is_fail_closed_500() { + let st = Status::new(Code::Internal, "bare status"); + let err = kernel_status_to_api_error(&st); + assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); + assert!( + err.body.message.contains("ErrorInfo"), + "message must mention ErrorInfo, got {}", + err.body.message + ); + } + + #[test] + fn non_canonical_http_status_string_is_fail_closed() { + let mut metadata = HashMap::new(); + metadata.insert("http_status".to_string(), "0404".to_string()); + let info = ErrorInfo { + reason: "job_not_found".to_string(), + domain: ERROR_INFO_DOMAIN.to_string(), + metadata, + }; + let any = prost_types::Any { + type_url: ERROR_INFO_TYPE_URL.to_string(), + value: info.encode_to_vec(), + }; + let st = Status::with_details(Code::NotFound, "x", any.encode_to_vec().into()); + let err = kernel_status_to_api_error(&st); + assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); + assert!( + err.body.message.contains("canonical"), + "message must name canonical form, got {}", + err.body.message + ); + } +} diff --git a/src/kernel/mod.rs b/src/kernel/mod.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4f59977 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/kernel/mod.rs @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +//! Kernel gRPC boundary: generated `kernel.v1` types, client, and ErrorInfo map. +//! +//! The api holds no protocol state. Handlers translate REST ↔ these types and +//! forward every call to the kernel process. + +mod client; +mod error_info; +mod pb; + +pub use client::{connect_lazy, KernelClient, KernelHandle, KernelRpc}; +pub use error_info::{kernel_status_to_api_error, transport_error_to_api_error, ERROR_INFO_DOMAIN}; +pub use pb::kernel_v1; + +#[cfg(test)] +pub use error_info::{encode_kernel_error_status, ErrorInfo}; diff --git a/src/kernel/pb.rs b/src/kernel/pb.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..035ac07 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/kernel/pb.rs @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +//! Re-export of generated `kernel.v1` types from the `kernel-proto` crate. +//! +//! Codegen lives in `kernel-proto` (own build.rs / OUT_DIR) so that +//! `cargo clippy -p api` never sees tonic-build output. + +/// Generated `kernel.v1` package (types + client stubs). +pub use kernel_proto as kernel_v1; diff --git a/src/lib.rs b/src/lib.rs index 55614d3..96e4680 100644 --- a/src/lib.rs +++ b/src/lib.rs @@ -1,11 +1,16 @@ //! zkCoins public REST API layer. //! -//! This crate is the **outward** surface of §7.5. It will consume the kernel -//! RPC (§7.8) via `tonic`; the scaffold only implements two API-local -//! endpoints (`GET /`, `GET /health`) so nothing is pretended. +//! Outward surface of specification §7.5. Consumes the kernel RPC (§7.8) via +//! `tonic`. Holds no protocol state, no value-bearing store, and no secrets. pub mod config; +pub mod error; +pub mod hexutil; +pub mod jobs; +pub mod kernel; +pub mod proto_identity; pub mod routes; pub use config::{Config, ConfigError, Feature}; +pub use kernel::{connect_lazy, KernelClient, KernelHandle}; pub use routes::{build_router, CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS}; diff --git a/src/main.rs b/src/main.rs index a666e96..a4990a8 100644 --- a/src/main.rs +++ b/src/main.rs @@ -4,9 +4,10 @@ //! abort startup with a named error. No default bind host, no default kernel //! address, no silent feature fallthrough. -use api::{build_router, Config}; +use api::{build_router, connect_lazy, Config}; use std::net::SocketAddr; use std::process::ExitCode; +use std::sync::Arc; use tracing::info; #[tokio::main] @@ -21,14 +22,19 @@ async fn main() -> ExitCode { } }; - // Hold the kernel address in process state so the operator-configured - // target is not discarded. The gRPC client is not opened in this scaffold - // (see docs/rest-surface.md GAPS); dial happens when handlers need it. + let kernel: api::KernelHandle = match connect_lazy(&config.kernel_addr) { + Ok(c) => Arc::new(c), + Err(e) => { + eprintln!("api: kernel client error: {e}"); + return ExitCode::from(1); + } + }; + let bind_addr: SocketAddr = config.bind_addr; let kernel_addr = config.kernel_addr.clone(); let feature_count = config.features.len(); - let app = build_router(config); + let app = build_router(config, kernel); let listener = match tokio::net::TcpListener::bind(bind_addr).await { Ok(l) => l, @@ -42,7 +48,7 @@ async fn main() -> ExitCode { %bind_addr, %kernel_addr, feature_count, - "zkcoins-api listening (scaffold: GET / and GET /health only)" + "zkcoins-api listening (health + job surface)" ); if let Err(e) = axum::serve(listener, app).await { @@ -54,9 +60,8 @@ async fn main() -> ExitCode { } fn init_tracing() { - // Honour RUST_LOG when set; otherwise stay quiet enough for operators - // that have not configured logging. `try_init` so tests reusing this - // binary edge do not panic on a second install. + // Honour RUST_LOG when set; otherwise info. `try_init` so a second + // install in tests does not panic. let env_filter = tracing_subscriber::EnvFilter::try_from_default_env() .unwrap_or_else(|_| tracing_subscriber::EnvFilter::new("info")); let _ = tracing_subscriber::fmt() diff --git a/src/proto_identity.rs b/src/proto_identity.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..73b0ba2 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/proto_identity.rs @@ -0,0 +1,111 @@ +//! Identity gate for the carried `kernel.v1` `.proto`. +//! +//! The api repo cannot path-depend on zk-coins/node (separate checkouts). +//! The contract file is therefore carried under `proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto` +//! (workspace root) and pinned by content hash. When a sibling node checkout +//! is present at `../node/proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto`, the test also +//! requires byte-identity with that file so local multi-repo worktrees catch +//! drift immediately. +//! +//! Lives in the **api** package (not `kernel-proto`) so `cargo test -p api` +//! always runs the pin; codegen isolation is a separate concern. + +/// SHA-256 (lowercase hex) of `proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto` as shipped with +/// this tree. Source: zk-coins/node `proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto` at the +/// worktree used for this stage (`31bffc90…`). Updating the proto **requires** +/// updating this pin in the same change. +pub const KERNEL_PROTO_SHA256_HEX: &str = + "31bffc90fec10dea7d7198861af8097c6102ea82bcc4d71fd772231cef6ad559"; + +/// Relative path of the carried contract from the workspace / api crate root. +pub const KERNEL_PROTO_REL: &str = "proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto"; + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + use sha2::{Digest, Sha256}; + use std::path::{Path, PathBuf}; + + fn manifest_dir() -> PathBuf { + PathBuf::from(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR")) + } + + fn local_proto_path() -> PathBuf { + manifest_dir().join(KERNEL_PROTO_REL) + } + + fn sibling_node_proto_path() -> PathBuf { + manifest_dir() + .join("..") + .join("node") + .join("proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto") + } + + fn sha256_hex(bytes: &[u8]) -> String { + let digest = Sha256::digest(bytes); + let mut out = String::with_capacity(64); + for b in digest { + out.push_str(&format!("{b:02x}")); + } + out + } + + #[test] + fn carried_proto_matches_pinned_sha256() { + let path = local_proto_path(); + let bytes = std::fs::read(&path).unwrap_or_else(|e| { + panic!( + "failed to read carried kernel proto at {}: {e}", + path.display() + ) + }); + let got = sha256_hex(&bytes); + assert_eq!( + got, KERNEL_PROTO_SHA256_HEX, + "carried {KERNEL_PROTO_REL} SHA-256 drifted from the pin; \ + if the node contract changed, copy the new file and update \ + KERNEL_PROTO_SHA256_HEX in the same change" + ); + assert!(!bytes.is_empty(), "carried kernel proto must be non-empty"); + let text = std::str::from_utf8(&bytes).expect("proto is UTF-8"); + assert!( + text.contains("package kernel.v1;"), + "carried proto must declare package kernel.v1" + ); + assert!( + text.contains("rpc SubmitTransition"), + "carried proto must include SubmitTransition" + ); + assert!( + text.contains("rpc StreamJob"), + "carried proto must include StreamJob" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn carried_proto_matches_sibling_node_when_present() { + let sibling = sibling_node_proto_path(); + if !Path::new(&sibling).is_file() { + // Standalone api checkout: pin above is the identity gate. + return; + } + let local = std::fs::read(local_proto_path()).expect("local proto"); + let node = std::fs::read(&sibling).unwrap_or_else(|e| { + panic!( + "failed to read sibling node proto at {}: {e}", + sibling.display() + ) + }); + assert_eq!( + local, + node, + "carried api proto must be byte-identical to sibling node proto at {}", + sibling.display() + ); + assert_eq!( + sha256_hex(&node), + KERNEL_PROTO_SHA256_HEX, + "sibling node proto SHA-256 must equal the pin (node moved without api update)" + ); + } +} diff --git a/src/routes.rs b/src/routes.rs index d530768..a8ccd04 100644 --- a/src/routes.rs +++ b/src/routes.rs @@ -4,22 +4,33 @@ //! [`ServedSurface`]. The closed §7.5 inventory ([`CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS`]) is //! the full key catalogue for surfaces not yet built; only keys present in //! `ServedSurface::ALL` are registered and advertised. +//! +//! Inventory paths are the **advertised** §7.5 form (`` placeholders). +//! Axum registration uses a derived **matcher** form (`:name`); see +//! [`advertised_path_to_axum_matcher`]. +use crate::config::Config; +use crate::jobs; +use crate::kernel::KernelHandle; use axum::http::StatusCode; use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response}; -use axum::routing::get; +use axum::routing::{get, post}; use axum::{Json, Router}; use serde::Serialize; use std::collections::BTreeMap; -use crate::config::Config; - /// Closed `endpoints` key set from specification §7.5 (`GET /` row). /// /// Full inventory of the 29 logical names a conforming producer may emit. /// Order matches the spec listing (line 2874). This constant is the reference /// for surfaces not yet built; it is **not** what `GET /` returns. /// +/// Path parameters use the §7.5 advertised form `` (one path segment). +/// That string is what `GET /` emits. Axum 0.7 / matchit 0.7 do **not** treat +/// `` (or `{name}`) as a parameter — only `:name` is dynamic — so +/// registration rewrites via [`advertised_path_to_axum_matcher`]. Discovery +/// never uses the matcher form; clients see Spec-Schreibweise only. +/// /// A conforming producer emits exactly the closed keys **for the surfaces this /// deployment exposes** and MUST omit keys for unadvertised optional roles. /// Advertisement is derived from [`ServedSurface`], intersected with this @@ -68,39 +79,66 @@ pub const CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS: &[(&str, &str)] = &[ /// `GET /` itself is the discovery document and has **no** closed key in /// §7.5; it is registered beside this set, never as a member of it. /// -/// Feature gating (§6.1): several inventory keys belong to `wallet` / -/// `explorer` / `publisher`. Those handlers do not exist yet, so -/// `Config::features` is not consulted here. When they land, registration -/// will filter `ServedSurface` by feature; advertising will follow -/// automatically because discovery reads the same set. +/// Feature gating (§6.1): further inventory keys belong to `wallet` / +/// `explorer` / `publisher`. This stage's job surface is always-on (the +/// proof is self-authenticating; §7.5 L2884) once the handlers exist — the +/// operator still must set `ZKCOINS_KERNEL_ADDR`. When capability-gated or +/// role-optional handlers land, registration will filter `ServedSurface` by +/// `Config::features`. #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)] enum ServedSurface { Health, + Tx, + Jobs, + JobsStream, + JobsSign, + JobsCancel, } impl ServedSurface { /// Every surface this binary currently serves. - const ALL: &[ServedSurface] = &[ServedSurface::Health]; + const ALL: &[ServedSurface] = &[ + ServedSurface::Health, + ServedSurface::Tx, + ServedSurface::Jobs, + ServedSurface::JobsStream, + ServedSurface::JobsSign, + ServedSurface::JobsCancel, + ]; /// Closed §7.5 discovery key for this surface. fn discovery_key(self) -> &'static str { match self { ServedSurface::Health => "health", + ServedSurface::Tx => "tx", + ServedSurface::Jobs => "jobs", + ServedSurface::JobsStream => "jobs_stream", + ServedSurface::JobsSign => "jobs_sign", + ServedSurface::JobsCancel => "jobs_cancel", } } - /// Attach this surface's handler to the router at the inventory path. - fn register(self, router: Router) -> Router { + /// Attach this surface's handler to the router at the axum matcher path. + /// + /// Discovery still advertises the inventory (Spec) form; only the route + /// table sees the rewritten matcher. + fn register(self, router: Router) -> Router { + let path = advertised_path_to_axum_matcher(closed_path(self.discovery_key())); match self { - ServedSurface::Health => { - let path = closed_path(self.discovery_key()); - router.route(path, get(health)) - } + ServedSurface::Health => router.route(&path, get(health)), + ServedSurface::Tx => router.route(&path, post(jobs::post_tx)), + ServedSurface::Jobs => router.route(&path, get(jobs::get_job)), + ServedSurface::JobsStream => router.route(&path, get(jobs::stream_job)), + ServedSurface::JobsSign => router.route(&path, post(jobs::post_sign)), + ServedSurface::JobsCancel => router.route(&path, post(jobs::post_cancel)), } } } -/// Look up the canonical path for a closed §7.5 key. +/// Look up the canonical **advertised** path for a closed §7.5 key. +/// +/// Returns Spec-Schreibweise (`` placeholders). Never the axum matcher +/// form — that is derived only at registration time. /// /// Panics if `key` is absent from [`CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS`]: a served key /// without an inventory entry is a programming error, not an empty path. @@ -116,6 +154,44 @@ fn closed_path(key: &str) -> &'static str { ); } +/// Rewrite a §7.5 advertised path into an axum 0.7 / matchit 0.7 route pattern. +/// +/// Spec writes path parameters as ``. Axum 0.7 (via matchit 0.7) treats +/// only `:name` as a dynamic segment — `{name}` and `` are literal bytes +/// in the radix tree. One projection from the inventory string; no second path +/// list. +/// +/// Panics on an unclosed `<` or an empty parameter name: inventory corruption +/// is a programming error, not a runtime soft-fail. +fn advertised_path_to_axum_matcher(advertised: &str) -> String { + let mut out = String::with_capacity(advertised.len()); + let mut rest = advertised; + while let Some(open) = rest.find('<') { + let (before, after_open) = rest.split_at(open); + out.push_str(before); + let after_open = &after_open[1..]; + let close = match after_open.find('>') { + Some(i) => i, + None => panic!("advertised path has unclosed '<' placeholder: {advertised:?}"), + }; + let name = &after_open[..close]; + if name.is_empty() { + panic!("advertised path has empty '<>' placeholder: {advertised:?}"); + } + if name.contains('/') || name.contains('<') { + panic!( + "advertised path placeholder must be a single segment name, got {name:?} in {advertised:?}" + ); + } + // axum 0.7 / matchit 0.7 named parameter: colon + name (e.g. ":job_id"). + out.push(':'); + out.push_str(name); + rest = &after_open[close + 1..]; + } + out.push_str(rest); + out +} + /// Build the `endpoints` map for `GET /` from the served set only. fn discovery_endpoints() -> BTreeMap<&'static str, &'static str> { let mut endpoints = BTreeMap::new(); @@ -134,27 +210,34 @@ struct RootResponse { endpoints: BTreeMap<&'static str, &'static str>, } -/// Build the axum router for the given configuration. +/// Build the axum router for the given configuration and kernel handle. /// /// `config` is retained so feature-gated surfaces can join the same -/// registration path later. Today only always-on surfaces (`health`) are -/// served; §6.1 features open no extra routes until those handlers exist. -/// Reading `config.features` now would either advertise keys without -/// handlers or filter nothing — both dishonest — so it is intentionally -/// unread. -pub fn build_router(config: Config) -> Router { - // Intentionally unread: feature-gated registration lands with the handlers. +/// registration path later. Today the always-on set is health + the job +/// surface; §6.1 features open no extra routes until those handlers exist. +/// +/// Returns a fully state-bound router (`Router` / `Router<()>`). Only that +/// form implements `tower::Service` and is ready for `axum::serve` and test +/// `oneshot` calls. Handlers still extract `State` during +/// registration; the concrete handle is supplied once at the end. +pub fn build_router(config: Config, kernel: KernelHandle) -> Router { + // Intentionally unread: feature-gated registration lands with those handlers. let Config { bind_addr: _, kernel_addr: _, features: _, } = config; + // Register every surface as `Router` (job handlers extract + // `State`), then bind the handle so the returned tree is + // `Router<()>` and implements `Service`. Binding earlier while still + // returning `Router` leaves the tree "missing" state and + // breaks both `axum::serve` and `oneshot`. let mut router = Router::new().route("/", get(root)); for surface in ServedSurface::ALL { router = surface.register(router); } - router + router.with_state(kernel) } async fn health() -> Response { @@ -173,11 +256,21 @@ async fn root() -> Json { mod tests { use super::*; use crate::config::{Config, Feature}; + use crate::error::ApiError; + use crate::kernel::encode_kernel_error_status; + use crate::kernel::kernel_v1::{ + Job, JobEvent, JobHandle, JobRequest, SignRequest, TransitionRequest, + }; + use crate::kernel::KernelRpc; + use async_trait::async_trait; use axum::body::Body; use axum::http::{Request, StatusCode}; + use futures_util::stream::{self, BoxStream}; use http_body_util::BodyExt; use serde_json::Value; use std::collections::BTreeSet; + use std::sync::Arc; + use tonic::Code; use tower::ServiceExt; fn test_config() -> Config { @@ -188,6 +281,35 @@ mod tests { } } + /// Kernel double that never succeeds — used by discovery/health tests. + struct UnreachableKernel; + + #[async_trait] + impl KernelRpc for UnreachableKernel { + async fn submit_transition(&self, _req: TransitionRequest) -> Result { + Err(ApiError::internal("test double: submit not configured")) + } + async fn get_job(&self, _req: JobRequest) -> Result { + Err(ApiError::internal("test double: get_job not configured")) + } + async fn stream_job( + &self, + _req: JobRequest, + ) -> Result>, ApiError> { + Err(ApiError::internal("test double: stream_job not configured")) + } + async fn sign_transition(&self, _req: SignRequest) -> Result { + Err(ApiError::internal("test double: sign not configured")) + } + async fn cancel_job(&self, _req: JobRequest) -> Result { + Err(ApiError::internal("test double: cancel not configured")) + } + } + + fn test_app() -> Router { + build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(UnreachableKernel)) + } + async fn body_bytes(res: axum::response::Response) -> Vec { res.into_body() .collect() @@ -232,8 +354,6 @@ mod tests { #[test] fn closed_endpoint_keys_inventory_matches_spec() { - // Inventory gate: the constant is the full §7.5 catalogue, independent - // of what this process currently serves or advertises. assert_eq!( CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS.len(), 29, @@ -257,8 +377,11 @@ mod tests { path.starts_with('/'), "inventory path for key {key} must be root-relative, got {path:?}" ); + assert!( + !path.contains('{') && !path.contains('}'), + "inventory path for key {key} must use Spec form, not braces: {path:?}" + ); } - // `/` is discovery itself and has no closed key. let keys: BTreeSet<&str> = CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS.iter().map(|(k, _)| *k).collect(); assert!(!keys.contains(""), "empty discovery key is invalid"); assert_eq!(keys.len(), 29, "closed keys must be unique"); @@ -278,7 +401,7 @@ mod tests { #[tokio::test] async fn health_returns_200_ok_plaintext() { - let app = build_router(test_config()); + let app = test_app(); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -300,7 +423,7 @@ mod tests { #[tokio::test] async fn root_advertises_exactly_the_served_surfaces() { - let app = build_router(test_config()); + let app = test_app(); let res = app .oneshot(Request::builder().uri("/").body(Body::empty()).unwrap()) .await @@ -323,29 +446,131 @@ mod tests { actual_keys, expected_keys, "GET / must list exactly the served surfaces, not the full inventory" ); - // Today: only health. This assertion documents the honest scaffold. assert_eq!( actual_keys, - BTreeSet::from(["health"]), - "scaffold serves only the always-on health surface" + BTreeSet::from([ + "health", + "tx", + "jobs", + "jobs_stream", + "jobs_sign", + "jobs_cancel", + ]), + "stage A serves health + the five job-surface keys" ); assert_eq!( endpoints["health"].as_str(), Some("/health"), "health path must match CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS inventory" ); + assert_eq!(endpoints["tx"].as_str(), Some("/v1/tx")); + // Spec-Schreibweise on the wire — never the axum matcher form. + assert_eq!(endpoints["jobs"].as_str(), Some("/v1/jobs/")); + assert_eq!( + endpoints["jobs_stream"].as_str(), + Some("/v1/jobs//stream") + ); + assert_eq!( + endpoints["jobs_sign"].as_str(), + Some("/v1/jobs//sign") + ); + assert_eq!( + endpoints["jobs_cancel"].as_str(), + Some("/v1/jobs//cancel") + ); + } + + #[test] + fn advertised_path_to_axum_matcher_rewrites_angle_brackets() { + assert_eq!( + advertised_path_to_axum_matcher("/v1/jobs/"), + "/v1/jobs/:job_id" + ); + assert_eq!( + advertised_path_to_axum_matcher("/v1/jobs//stream"), + "/v1/jobs/:job_id/stream" + ); + assert_eq!( + advertised_path_to_axum_matcher("/v1/chain/nullifier/"), + "/v1/chain/nullifier/:pubkey" + ); + assert_eq!(advertised_path_to_axum_matcher("/health"), "/health"); + assert_eq!(advertised_path_to_axum_matcher("/v1/tx"), "/v1/tx"); + // Every inventory path must round-trip into a matcher without leftover + // Spec placeholders (guards against a second hand-written list). + for &(key, path) in CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS { + let matcher = advertised_path_to_axum_matcher(path); + assert!( + !matcher.contains('<') && !matcher.contains('>'), + "key {key}: matcher still has Spec brackets: {matcher}" + ); + assert!( + !matcher.contains('{') && !matcher.contains('}'), + "key {key}: matcher must not use brace params (axum 0.8); got {matcher}" + ); + } + } + + /// Concrete segment for an advertised `` placeholder. + /// + /// Values are plausible for the handlers that extract the segment (job_id + /// is opaque text; pubkey / hashes are 32-byte hex). Unknown names fail + /// loud — the inventory must not invent slots without a probe value. + fn concrete_path_param(name: &str) -> &'static str { + match name { + "job_id" => "00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001", + "pubkey" | "sha256" | "coin_id" | "record_id" => { + "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" + } + other => panic!( + "no concrete probe value for path parameter {other:?}; \ + extend concrete_path_param when the inventory gains this slot" + ), + } + } + + /// Replace every `` in an advertised path with a concrete segment. + fn concrete_probe_uri(advertised: &str) -> String { + let mut out = String::with_capacity(advertised.len() + 32); + let mut rest = advertised; + while let Some(open) = rest.find('<') { + let (before, after_open) = rest.split_at(open); + out.push_str(before); + let after_open = &after_open[1..]; + let close = match after_open.find('>') { + Some(i) => i, + None => panic!("unclosed '<' in advertised path {advertised:?}"), + }; + let name = &after_open[..close]; + out.push_str(concrete_path_param(name)); + rest = &after_open[close + 1..]; + } + out.push_str(rest); + out + } + + /// `true` when the body is a §7.5 domain error (`{ "error", "message" }`) + /// with a non-empty machine code. Axum's routing fallback is status-only + /// (empty body) — that is **not** a domain answer. + fn is_section_75_error_body(body: &[u8]) -> bool { + let Ok(json) = serde_json::from_slice::(body) else { + return false; + }; + matches!( + json.get("error").and_then(|v| v.as_str()), + Some(code) if !code.is_empty() + ) } - /// Would have been **red** on the old code: the old `root()` advertised all - /// 29 inventory keys (including `/v1/info`, `/v1/tx`, …) while - /// `build_router` only registered `/` and `/health`. Hitting each - /// advertised path therefore produced 404 for every key except `health`. + /// Would have been **red** when registration used the advertised string as + /// a literal axum path: the probe hits a *concrete* URI, so a route table + /// that only matches the Spec placeholder text answers with the empty + /// axum fallback 404 — distinguishable from a domain 404 that carries the + /// §7.5 `{ "error", "message" }` body. #[tokio::test] async fn every_advertised_endpoint_is_reachable() { - // Build once to read discovery, then probe each advertised path on a - // fresh router (oneshot consumes the service). let discovery = { - let app = build_router(test_config()); + let app = test_app(); let res = app .oneshot(Request::builder().uri("/").body(Body::empty()).unwrap()) .await @@ -372,38 +597,43 @@ mod tests { "GET / must advertise at least one served surface" ); - for (key, path) in &discovery { - // Inventory templates may contain ``; served paths today - // are concrete. Refuse to probe templates — they are not registered. + for (key, advertised) in &discovery { + let probe = concrete_probe_uri(advertised); assert!( - !path.contains('<'), - "advertised path for {key} still has a template placeholder: {path}" + !probe.contains('<') && !probe.contains('>'), + "probe URI for {key} still has a template placeholder: {probe}" ); - let app = build_router(test_config()); + let app = test_app(); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() - .uri(path.as_str()) + .uri(probe.as_str()) .body(Body::empty()) .unwrap(), ) .await .unwrap(); - assert_ne!( - res.status(), - StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, - "GET / advertised key {key:?} at path {path:?}, but the router \ - returned 404 — discovery and registration have diverged" - ); + let status = res.status(); + if status == StatusCode::NOT_FOUND { + let body = body_bytes(res).await; + assert!( + is_section_75_error_body(&body), + "GET / advertised key {key:?} at {advertised:?}; probe {probe:?} \ + returned a routing 404 (no §7.5 error body, got {:?}) — the \ + matcher was never registered for a concrete segment", + String::from_utf8_lossy(&body) + ); + // Domain 404 (handler ran, returned job_not_found etc.) is fine. + } + // Any non-404 (200, 405 method, 500 from the unreachable kernel double, + // 400, …) means the route matched. That is the reachability claim. } } #[tokio::test] async fn unregistered_info_is_404_and_absent_from_discovery() { - // Honesty: GET /v1/info is a documented inventory gap, not a fake handler, - // and must not appear in the discovery document either. - let app = build_router(test_config()); + let app = test_app(); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -419,7 +649,7 @@ mod tests { "GET /v1/info must not be a placeholder route" ); - let app = build_router(test_config()); + let app = test_app(); let res = app .oneshot(Request::builder().uri("/").body(Body::empty()).unwrap()) .await @@ -439,8 +669,6 @@ mod tests { #[tokio::test] async fn router_accepts_config_with_features() { - // Features do not change registration yet; the call must still succeed - // so the parameter remains part of the public surface. let mut features = BTreeSet::new(); features.insert(Feature::Wallet); let cfg = Config { @@ -448,7 +676,7 @@ mod tests { kernel_addr: "http://kernel:1".to_string(), features, }; - let app = build_router(cfg); + let app = build_router(cfg, Arc::new(UnreachableKernel)); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -460,12 +688,16 @@ mod tests { .unwrap(); assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); - // Enabling wallet must not silently advertise wallet-only surfaces. - let app = build_router(Config { - bind_addr: "127.0.0.1:0".parse().unwrap(), - kernel_addr: "http://kernel:1".to_string(), - features: BTreeSet::from([Feature::Wallet]), - }); + // Wallet feature does not yet open extra surfaces beyond the job set + // (already always-on). Unbuilt wallet keys stay unadvertised. + let app = build_router( + Config { + bind_addr: "127.0.0.1:0".parse().unwrap(), + kernel_addr: "http://kernel:1".to_string(), + features: BTreeSet::from([Feature::Wallet]), + }, + Arc::new(UnreachableKernel), + ); let res = app .oneshot(Request::builder().uri("/").body(Body::empty()).unwrap()) .await @@ -474,8 +706,486 @@ mod tests { let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body).expect("JSON root body"); let endpoints = json["endpoints"].as_object().expect("endpoints object"); assert!( - !endpoints.contains_key("tx"), - "wallet feature must not advertise /v1/tx before that handler exists" + endpoints.contains_key("tx"), + "job surface key 'tx' must be advertised once the handler exists" + ); + assert!( + !endpoints.contains_key("pull"), + "wallet feature must not advertise /v1/pull before that handler exists" + ); + } + + // ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + // Job-surface handler tests against an honest in-trait kernel double + // ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + + #[derive(Default)] + struct ScriptedKernel { + submit: Option>, + get: Option>, + stream: Option>, ApiError>>, + sign: Option>, + cancel: Option>, + } + + #[async_trait] + impl KernelRpc for ScriptedKernel { + async fn submit_transition(&self, _req: TransitionRequest) -> Result { + match &self.submit { + Some(Ok(h)) => Ok(h.clone()), + Some(Err(e)) => Err(e.clone()), + None => Err(ApiError::internal("submit not scripted")), + } + } + async fn get_job(&self, _req: JobRequest) -> Result { + match &self.get { + Some(Ok(j)) => Ok(j.clone()), + Some(Err(e)) => Err(e.clone()), + None => Err(ApiError::internal("get not scripted")), + } + } + async fn stream_job( + &self, + _req: JobRequest, + ) -> Result>, ApiError> { + match &self.stream { + Some(Ok(events)) => { + let events = events.clone(); + Ok(Box::pin(stream::iter(events))) + } + Some(Err(e)) => Err(e.clone()), + None => Err(ApiError::internal("stream not scripted")), + } + } + async fn sign_transition(&self, _req: SignRequest) -> Result { + match &self.sign { + Some(Ok(j)) => Ok(j.clone()), + Some(Err(e)) => Err(e.clone()), + None => Err(ApiError::internal("sign not scripted")), + } + } + async fn cancel_job(&self, _req: JobRequest) -> Result { + match &self.cancel { + Some(Ok(j)) => Ok(j.clone()), + Some(Err(e)) => Err(e.clone()), + None => Err(ApiError::internal("cancel not scripted")), + } + } + } + + fn hex32(byte: u8) -> String { + crate::hexutil::encode_hex(&[byte; 32]) + } + + fn mint_body() -> Value { + json_mint() + } + + fn json_mint() -> Value { + serde_json::json!({ + "kind": "mint", + "subject": "zk1qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq", + "next_pubkey": hex32(0x11), + "npk_rand": hex32(0x22), + "output_templates": [{ + "recipient": "zk1qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq", + "asset_id": hex32(0x33), + "amount": "100" + }], + "issuance": { + "name": "TestCoin", + "decimals": 8, + "issuance_version": 1, + "amount": "1000" + } + }) + } + + fn accepted_job(job_id: &str) -> Job { + Job { + job_id: job_id.to_string(), + kind: "mint".to_string(), + status: "accepted".to_string(), + phase: String::new(), + progress: 0.0, + awaiting_signature: None, + result: None, + error: None, + } + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn post_tx_happy_path_returns_202() { + let kernel = ScriptedKernel { + submit: Some(Ok(JobHandle { + job_id: "job-1".to_string(), + status: "accepted".to_string(), + })), + ..Default::default() + }; + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/tx") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .header("idempotency-key", "k1") + .body(Body::from(mint_body().to_string())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::ACCEPTED); + let body = body_bytes(res).await; + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body).expect("json"); + assert_eq!(json["job_id"], "job-1"); + assert_eq!(json["status"], "accepted"); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn post_tx_fee_address_is_malformed_400() { + let kernel = ScriptedKernel { + submit: Some(Ok(JobHandle { + job_id: "x".into(), + status: "accepted".into(), + })), + ..Default::default() + }; + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let mut body = mint_body(); + body["fee_address"] = Value::String("zk1fee".into()); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/tx") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from(body.to_string())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "malformed_request"); + assert!( + json["message"].as_str().unwrap().contains("fee_address"), + "message must name fee_address, got {}", + json["message"] + ); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn post_tx_kernel_bounds_exceeded_is_400() { + // error_contract: BoundsExceeded → bounds_exceeded / 400. + let status = encode_kernel_error_status( + Code::InvalidArgument, + "too many outputs", + "bounds_exceeded", + 400, + ); + let kernel = ScriptedKernel { + submit: Some(Err(crate::kernel::kernel_status_to_api_error(&status))), + ..Default::default() + }; + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/tx") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from(mint_body().to_string())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "bounds_exceeded"); + assert_eq!(json["message"], "too many outputs"); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn get_job_happy_path() { + let kernel = ScriptedKernel { + get: Some(Ok(accepted_job("job-2"))), + ..Default::default() + }; + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/jobs/job-2") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + assert_eq!( + res.headers() + .get("retry-after") + .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok()), + Some("2"), + "non-terminal poll must carry Retry-After" + ); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["job_id"], "job-2"); + assert_eq!(json["status"], "accepted"); + assert_eq!(json["kind"], "mint"); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn get_job_not_found_is_404() { + // error_contract: JobNotFound → job_not_found / 404. + let status = + encode_kernel_error_status(Code::NotFound, "Job not found", "job_not_found", 404); + let kernel = ScriptedKernel { + get: Some(Err(crate::kernel::kernel_status_to_api_error(&status))), + ..Default::default() + }; + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/jobs/missing") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::NOT_FOUND); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "job_not_found"); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn post_sign_wrong_phase_is_409() { + // error_contract: WrongPhase → wrong_phase / 409. + let status = encode_kernel_error_status( + Code::FailedPrecondition, + "not awaiting signature", + "wrong_phase", + 409, + ); + let kernel = ScriptedKernel { + sign: Some(Err(crate::kernel::kernel_status_to_api_error(&status))), + ..Default::default() + }; + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let body = serde_json::json!({ + "signature": crate::hexutil::encode_hex(&[0u8; 64]), + "s2c_nonce": hex32(0xab), + }); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/jobs/job-3/sign") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from(body.to_string())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::CONFLICT); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "wrong_phase"); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn post_sign_happy_path() { + let mut job = accepted_job("job-3"); + job.status = "proving".to_string(); + let kernel = ScriptedKernel { + sign: Some(Ok(job)), + ..Default::default() + }; + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let body = serde_json::json!({ + "signature": crate::hexutil::encode_hex(&[1u8; 64]), + "s2c_nonce": hex32(0xcd), + }); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/jobs/job-3/sign") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from(body.to_string())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["job_id"], "job-3"); + assert_eq!(json["status"], "proving"); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn post_cancel_happy_path() { + let mut job = accepted_job("job-4"); + job.status = "cancelled".to_string(); + job.error = Some(crate::kernel::kernel_v1::JobError { + error: "proving_failed".into(), + message: "cancelled by client".into(), + }); + let kernel = ScriptedKernel { + cancel: Some(Ok(job)), + ..Default::default() + }; + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/jobs/job-4/cancel") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["status"], "cancelled"); + assert_eq!(json["error"]["error"], "proving_failed"); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn stream_job_emits_phase_then_complete() { + let phase = JobEvent { + event: "phase".into(), + job: Some(Job { + job_id: "job-5".into(), + kind: "mint".into(), + status: "proving".into(), + phase: "witness_build".into(), + progress: 0.25, + awaiting_signature: None, + result: None, + error: None, + }), + }; + let complete = JobEvent { + event: "complete".into(), + job: Some(Job { + job_id: "job-5".into(), + kind: "mint".into(), + status: "completed".into(), + phase: String::new(), + progress: 1.0, + awaiting_signature: None, + result: Some(crate::kernel::kernel_v1::JobResult { + new_account_state_hash: vec![0x11; 32], + output_coins_root: vec![0x22; 32], + input_nullifiers_root: vec![0x33; 32], + output_coin_ids: vec![vec![0x44; 32]], + publisher_pubkey: Vec::new(), + attestation: Vec::new(), + }), + error: None, + }), + }; + let kernel = ScriptedKernel { + stream: Some(Ok(vec![Ok(phase), Ok(complete)])), + ..Default::default() + }; + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/jobs/job-5/stream") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + let ct = match res.headers().get("content-type") { + Some(v) => match v.to_str() { + Ok(s) => s, + Err(e) => panic!("content-type is not ASCII: {e}"), + }, + None => panic!("SSE response missing content-type header"), + }; + assert!( + ct.starts_with("text/event-stream"), + "SSE content-type, got {ct:?}" + ); + let body = String::from_utf8(body_bytes(res).await).expect("utf8"); + assert!( + body.contains("event: phase"), + "must emit phase event, body={body}" + ); + assert!( + body.contains("event: complete"), + "must emit complete event, body={body}" + ); + assert!( + body.contains("\"status\":\"proving\""), + "phase data must carry status, body={body}" + ); + assert!( + body.contains("\"status\":\"completed\""), + "complete data must carry completed status, body={body}" ); } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn stream_job_break_emits_error_event() { + let kernel = ScriptedKernel { + stream: Some(Ok(vec![Err(ApiError::internal("kernel stream dropped"))])), + ..Default::default() + }; + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/jobs/job-6/stream") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + let body = String::from_utf8(body_bytes(res).await).expect("utf8"); + assert!( + body.contains("event: error"), + "broken stream must emit error event, body={body}" + ); + assert!( + body.contains("internal_error"), + "error event must carry machine code, body={body}" + ); + assert!( + body.contains("kernel stream dropped"), + "error event must carry the cause message, body={body}" + ); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn stream_job_not_found_before_sse() { + let status = + encode_kernel_error_status(Code::NotFound, "Job not found", "job_not_found", 404); + let kernel = ScriptedKernel { + stream: Some(Err(crate::kernel::kernel_status_to_api_error(&status))), + ..Default::default() + }; + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/jobs/missing/stream") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::NOT_FOUND); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "job_not_found"); + } } From f4cc16f70c47b5c859500b07999738eedef9ef49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: TaprootFreak <142087526+TaprootFreak@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2026 12:27:51 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 03/23] feat: add info, readiness and the chain read surface MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Four more §7.5 endpoints: `GET /v1/info`, `GET /health/ready`, `GET /v1/chain/accumulator` and `GET /v1/chain/nullifier/`, onto `GetInfo`, `GetAccumulator` and `GetNullifierPath`. This is the surface an outsider uses to check that a transition actually landed. A job reporting `completed` proves it was applied locally and handed to the broadcast path — not chain inclusion, not the scanner fold, not finality. So the standard is the same one the node holds itself to: every field is passed through from the canonical source, and the API computes nothing. The NAV root stays `Hc("NfLog/Root", size ‖ mth)` as the kernel produced it; recomputing or "checking" it here would create the second truth this project keeps deleting. `GET /v1/chain/nullifier/` keeps present and absent apart, and an absent answer omits `position` and `leaf` rather than sending zeros. A kernel `internal_error` — a corrupt index, say — surfaces as 500, never as `present: false`. That third case is the one worth a test, because collapsing an error into "not there" is how a proof surface starts lying. `GET /health/ready` reads `ready` and the closed `ready_reason` from `GetInfo` rather than inventing a second readiness notion. In production today `GetInfo` fails closed, because `ChainIdentity` is `None` in the node — so this endpoint answers `503 { ready: false, reason: "dependency_unavailable" }`. That is the honest answer; a `200 ok` derived from a failed call would be the worst available. It also refuses to emit a `root` without its `size`: §7.5 pairs them, and half a pair is a made-up fact. **`chain_inscriptions` is deliberately not served or advertised.** `ListInscriptions` answers `Unimplemented` in the node until a scanner-written inscription catalogue exists, and a REST shell that reliably returns 501 is not progress — it is a second place to look to learn the same absence. `features` is API configuration, not `kernel_parts`, and its order is now fixed rather than inherited from the environment variable: an endpoint that returns the same set in a different order on two calls makes every response comparison lie. The set is closed, so an unknown token in `ZKCOINS_FEATURES` stops the process at startup, the same fail-closed line as the missing kernel address. --- docs/rest-surface.md | 15 +- src/chain.rs | 221 ++++++++++++++++ src/info.rs | 365 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/kernel/client.rs | 44 +++- src/lib.rs | 4 + src/main.rs | 2 +- src/routes.rs | 602 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- src/state.rs | 25 ++ 8 files changed, 1241 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-) create mode 100644 src/chain.rs create mode 100644 src/info.rs create mode 100644 src/state.rs diff --git a/docs/rest-surface.md b/docs/rest-surface.md index fa8659a..046e2b8 100644 --- a/docs/rest-surface.md +++ b/docs/rest-surface.md @@ -148,7 +148,11 @@ Deployments mit Wallet- und/oder Explorer-Rolle benötigt (Replica-/Blob-Pfad). | Endpunkt | Status | |---|---| | `GET /health` | **implementiert** — `200` mit Body `"ok"` | +| `GET /health/ready` | **implementiert** — Readiness aus Kernel-`GetInfo` (`ready` / `ready_reason`); Body-Form `{ ready, reason? }`, nie die generische Fehlerform. Bei fehlgeschlagenem `GetInfo` (z. B. fehlende `ChainIdentity` im node): **503** `{ ready: false, reason: "dependency_unavailable" }` — nie grünes `ready: true`. | | `GET /` | **implementiert** — `{ name, version, endpoints }` mit **genau** den Flächen, die dieser Prozess registriert (`ServedSurface`). Inventur der 29 Keys in `CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS`; unregistrierte Keys werden weggelassen. | +| `GET /v1/info` | **implementiert** — Kernel-`GetInfo` + API-eigene `features` aus `ZKCOINS_FEATURES` (`kernel_parts` bleibt intern). | +| `GET /v1/chain/accumulator` | **implementiert** — `GetAccumulator`; `root` ist pass-through der Kernel-`nav_root`, keine Nachrechnung. | +| `GET /v1/chain/nullifier/` | **implementiert** — `GetNullifierPath`; `present`/`absent` bleiben getrennt; Kernel-`internal_error` wird **nicht** als absent umgeschrieben. | | `POST /v1/tx` | **implementiert** — `SubmitTransition` | | `GET /v1/jobs/{job_id}` | **implementiert** — `GetJob` | | `GET /v1/jobs/{job_id}/stream` | **implementiert** — `StreamJob` als SSE | @@ -156,10 +160,12 @@ Deployments mit Wallet- und/oder Explorer-Rolle benötigt (Replica-/Blob-Pfad). | `POST /v1/jobs/{job_id}/cancel` | **implementiert** — `CancelJob` | | alle übrigen Method+Path | **nicht registriert** — kein Handler, kein `todo!()`, kein Platzhalter | +**Bewusst nicht beworben:** `chain_inscriptions` — `ListInscriptions` ist im node `Unimplemented` (fehlt scanner-geschriebener Inschriften-Katalog mit Reveal-Txid und §3.5-Format). Eine REST-Hülle, die zuverlässig 501 liefert, wäre nur eine zweite Stelle für dieselbe Absenz. + Router und Discovery teilen eine Quelle (`ServedSurface` in `src/routes.rs`): eine neue registrierte Fläche erscheint automatisch in `GET /`; ein Inventur-Key ohne Route wird nicht beworben. Path-Parameter in Discovery/`CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS` nutzen die -axum/OpenAPI-Form `{name}` (Spec-Text: ``). +Spec-Schreibweise `` (Axum-Matcher: `:name`). gRPC: getragenes `proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto` (Identität per SHA-256-Pin + Sibling-Vergleich mit `zk-coins/node`), Client `tonic 0.13.1`, Fehlerübersetzung @@ -170,10 +176,9 @@ ausschließlich über `google.rpc.ErrorInfo` (`domain`, `reason`, | Lücke | Warum | |---|---| -| `GET /v1/info` | braucht Kernel-`GetInfo` + API-eigene `features`-Konstruktion. | -| `GET /health/ready` | `ready` / `ready_reason` aus Kernel-`GetInfo`. | -| Chain / Pull / Bootstrap / Publish / Blossom / Attest / Grants | jeweilige Kernel-RPC noch nicht angebunden. | -| Feature-Gate `404 feature_disabled` | Job-Fläche ist in dieser Stufe always-on; Gate folgt mit den optionalen Rollen. | +| `GET /v1/chain/inscriptions` | Kernel-`ListInscriptions` Unimplemented bis Inschriften-Katalog. | +| Pull / Bootstrap / Publish / Blossom / Attest / Grants | jeweilige Kernel-RPC noch nicht angebunden. | +| Feature-Gate `404 feature_disabled` | Info/Chain/Job-Fläche ist in dieser Stufe always-on; Gate folgt mit den optionalen Rollen. | --- diff --git a/src/chain.rs b/src/chain.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..72aee41 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/chain.rs @@ -0,0 +1,221 @@ +//! Public chain read surface (§7.5 L2878, L2880) over kernel procedures. +//! +//! | REST | Kernel | +//! |---|---| +//! | `GET /v1/chain/accumulator` | `GetAccumulator` | +//! | `GET /v1/chain/nullifier/` | `GetNullifierPath` | +//! +//! **Not served:** `chain_inscriptions` / `ListInscriptions`. The node answers +//! that procedure `Unimplemented` until a scanner-written inscription catalog +//! (reveal txid + §3.5 format) exists; wrapping it in REST that always 501s +//! would only create a second place to learn the same absence. The key stays +//! in the closed inventory and is omitted from `GET /` until the catalog lands. +//! +//! The api **does not recompute** `nav_root = Hc("NfLog/Root", size ‖ mth)`. +//! Every `root` byte is what the kernel returned. Width checks reject a +//! malformed kernel payload; they never invent a substitute digest. + +use crate::error::ApiError; +use crate::hexutil::{decode_hex_exact, encode_hex}; +use crate::kernel::kernel_v1::{AccumulatorTip, NullifierPath, NullifierPathRequest}; +use crate::kernel::KernelHandle; +use axum::extract::{Path, State}; +use axum::http::StatusCode; +use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response}; +use axum::Json; +use serde_json::{json, Map, Value}; + +/// `GET /v1/chain/accumulator` → `GetAccumulator`. +/// +/// Response form §7.5 L2878: `{ size, root, tip_block_hash, tip_height }`. +/// `root` is the kernel's `nav_root` — pass-through, not recomputed. +pub async fn get_accumulator(State(kernel): State) -> Result { + let tip = kernel.get_accumulator().await?; + let body = accumulator_to_json(&tip)?; + Ok((StatusCode::OK, Json(body)).into_response()) +} + +/// `GET /v1/chain/nullifier/` → `GetNullifierPath`. +/// +/// Response form §7.5 L2880. **present** and **absent** are distinct domain +/// answers from the kernel's `present` flag: +/// - `present: true` → inclusion proof fields (`position`, `leaf`, `audit_path`) +/// - `present: false` → unauthenticated local-index absence (no position/leaf) +/// +/// A kernel `internal_error` (e.g. corrupt index) is returned as that error +/// via `ErrorInfo` — **never** rewritten as `present: false`. Absence is only +/// the successful path with `present == false`. +pub async fn get_nullifier( + State(kernel): State, + Path(pubkey_hex): Path, +) -> Result { + let pubkey = decode_hex_exact(&pubkey_hex, 32).map_err(|e| { + ApiError::malformed(format!("pubkey path segment must be 32-byte hex: {e}")) + })?; + let path = kernel + .get_nullifier_path(NullifierPathRequest { pubkey }) + .await?; + let body = nullifier_path_to_json(&path)?; + Ok((StatusCode::OK, Json(body)).into_response()) +} + +fn accumulator_to_json(tip: &AccumulatorTip) -> Result { + Ok(json!({ + "size": tip.size, + "root": require_hex32(&tip.root, "root")?, + "tip_block_hash": require_hex32(&tip.tip_block_hash, "tip_block_hash")?, + "tip_height": tip.tip_height, + })) +} + +fn nullifier_path_to_json(path: &NullifierPath) -> Result { + let mut obj = Map::new(); + obj.insert("present".to_string(), Value::Bool(path.present)); + obj.insert( + "root".to_string(), + Value::String(require_hex32(&path.root, "root")?), + ); + obj.insert( + "tip_block_hash".to_string(), + Value::String(require_hex32(&path.tip_block_hash, "tip_block_hash")?), + ); + obj.insert("tip_height".to_string(), json!(path.tip_height)); + obj.insert("tree_size".to_string(), json!(path.tree_size)); + + if path.present { + // Inclusion proof fields — required when present (L2880). + if path.leaf.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::internal( + "kernel NullifierPath.present is true but leaf is empty", + )); + } + obj.insert("position".to_string(), json!(path.position)); + obj.insert( + "leaf".to_string(), + Value::String(require_hex32(&path.leaf, "leaf")?), + ); + let mut audit = Vec::with_capacity(path.audit_path.len()); + if path.audit_path.len() > 64 { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "kernel NullifierPath.audit_path exceeds 64 entries (got {})", + path.audit_path.len() + ))); + } + for (i, node) in path.audit_path.iter().enumerate() { + audit.push(Value::String(require_hex32( + node, + &format!("audit_path[{i}]"), + )?)); + } + obj.insert("audit_path".to_string(), Value::Array(audit)); + } else { + // Unauthenticated absence (L2880 / §3.7 Path B). position and leaf + // are omitted — not null, not zero. audit_path is the empty list. + // Proto may carry position=0 / leaf empty as scalar defaults; those + // must not appear on the REST wire as if they were proof material. + if !path.leaf.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::internal( + "kernel NullifierPath.present is false but leaf is non-empty", + )); + } + if !path.audit_path.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::internal( + "kernel NullifierPath.present is false but audit_path is non-empty", + )); + } + obj.insert("audit_path".to_string(), Value::Array(Vec::new())); + } + + Ok(Value::Object(obj)) +} + +fn require_hex32(bytes: &[u8], field: &str) -> Result { + if bytes.len() != 32 { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "kernel field {field} must be 32 bytes, got {}", + bytes.len() + ))); + } + Ok(encode_hex(bytes)) +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + + #[test] + fn accumulator_pass_through_does_not_recompute_root() { + let tip = AccumulatorTip { + root: vec![0xAB; 32], + tip_block_hash: vec![0xCD; 32], + tip_height: 42, + size: 7, + }; + let json = accumulator_to_json(&tip).expect("json"); + assert_eq!(json["size"], 7); + assert_eq!(json["tip_height"], 42); + assert_eq!(json["root"].as_str().unwrap(), encode_hex(&[0xAB; 32])); + assert_eq!( + json["tip_block_hash"].as_str().unwrap(), + encode_hex(&[0xCD; 32]) + ); + } + + #[test] + fn present_path_includes_position_and_leaf() { + let path = NullifierPath { + root: vec![0x01; 32], + tip_height: 10, + present: true, + leaf: vec![0x02; 32], + position: 3, + audit_path: vec![vec![0x03; 32]], + tree_size: 4, + tip_block_hash: vec![0x04; 32], + }; + let json = nullifier_path_to_json(&path).expect("json"); + assert_eq!(json["present"], true); + assert_eq!(json["position"], 3); + assert_eq!(json["leaf"].as_str().unwrap().len(), 64); + assert_eq!(json["audit_path"].as_array().unwrap().len(), 1); + assert_eq!(json["tree_size"], 4); + } + + #[test] + fn absent_path_omits_position_and_leaf() { + let path = NullifierPath { + root: vec![0x01; 32], + tip_height: 10, + present: false, + leaf: Vec::new(), + position: 0, + audit_path: Vec::new(), + tree_size: 4, + tip_block_hash: vec![0x04; 32], + }; + let json = nullifier_path_to_json(&path).expect("json"); + assert_eq!(json["present"], false); + assert!(json.get("position").is_none()); + assert!(json.get("leaf").is_none()); + assert_eq!(json["audit_path"], json!([])); + assert_eq!(json["tree_size"], 4); + assert_eq!(json["root"].as_str().unwrap().len(), 64); + } + + #[test] + fn wrong_width_root_is_internal_not_silent_pad() { + let tip = AccumulatorTip { + root: vec![0xAB; 16], + tip_block_hash: vec![0xCD; 32], + tip_height: 1, + size: 0, + }; + let err = accumulator_to_json(&tip).expect_err("bad root"); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); + assert!( + err.body.message.contains("root"), + "message must name the field, got {}", + err.body.message + ); + } +} diff --git a/src/info.rs b/src/info.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c706ed5 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/info.rs @@ -0,0 +1,365 @@ +//! `GET /v1/info` and `GET /health/ready` (§7.5 L2876–L2877) over `GetInfo` (§7.8). +//! +//! `/health/ready` takes its readiness statement **only** from kernel +//! `Info.ready` / `Info.ready_reason` — one source, no second readiness +//! table. Diagnostic tip fields that appear on a successful `GetInfo` are +//! forwarded when well-formed; the api never invents tip height, lag, or +//! a NAV root of its own. +//! +//! `GET /v1/info` `features` is API configuration (`AppState.features`), +//! not `Info.kernel_parts`. The array order is **API-fixed** (lexicographic +//! by wire string); §7.5 does not prescribe it — see `info_to_json`. + +use crate::error::ApiError; +use crate::hexutil::encode_hex; +use crate::kernel::kernel_v1::{BootstrapManifest, Info}; +use crate::state::AppState; +use axum::extract::State; +use axum::http::StatusCode; +use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response}; +use axum::Json; +use serde_json::{json, Map, Value}; + +/// Closed §7.5 `/health/ready` `reason` set (L2876). +const READY_REASONS: &[&str] = &[ + "syncing", + "scanner_lag", + "circuit_mismatch", + "deep_reorg", + "dependency_unavailable", +]; + +/// `GET /v1/info` → `GetInfo` + API-owned `features`. +pub async fn get_info(State(state): State) -> Result { + let info = state.kernel.get_info().await?; + let body = info_to_json(&info, &state.features)?; + Ok((StatusCode::OK, Json(body)).into_response()) +} + +/// `GET /health/ready` → readiness projection of `GetInfo`. +/// +/// Shape is **always** `{ ready, reason? , …diags? }` — never the generic +/// `{ "error", "message" }` body (L2876). When the kernel call fails, the +/// probe answers **not ready** with `dependency_unavailable` (HTTP 503). +/// Inventing `ready: true` on a failed `GetInfo` would be the worst outcome: +/// a process that cannot ask the kernel is not ready to serve consensus- +/// dependent reads. Today's production kernel fails `GetInfo` closed when +/// `ChainIdentity` is unset; this endpoint therefore returns 503 not-ready +/// rather than a green probe. +pub async fn health_ready(State(state): State) -> Response { + match state.kernel.get_info().await { + Ok(info) => readiness_from_info(&info), + Err(err) => not_ready_dependency(err), + } +} + +fn readiness_from_info(info: &Info) -> Response { + if info.ready { + // ready == true: reason must be absent (proto optional empty / None). + if let Some(reason) = info.ready_reason.as_deref() { + if !reason.is_empty() { + // Kernel violated the structural invariant. Do not claim ready. + return not_ready_body("dependency_unavailable"); + } + } + let mut body = Map::new(); + body.insert("ready".to_string(), Value::Bool(true)); + attach_diagnostics(&mut body, info); + (StatusCode::OK, Json(Value::Object(body))).into_response() + } else { + let reason = match info.ready_reason.as_deref() { + Some(r) if is_closed_ready_reason(r) => r, + Some(_) | None => { + // Missing, empty, or non-closed reason: do not invent ready:true + // and do not pass an out-of-set token. Closed fallback reason. + return not_ready_body("dependency_unavailable"); + } + }; + let mut body = Map::new(); + body.insert("ready".to_string(), Value::Bool(false)); + body.insert("reason".to_string(), Value::String(reason.to_string())); + attach_diagnostics(&mut body, info); + (StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE, Json(Value::Object(body))).into_response() + } +} + +/// When `GetInfo` itself fails: not-ready, closed reason, readiness shape. +/// +/// The underlying `ApiError` message is **not** put on the wire as a +/// generic error body (that shape is excluded for this path). It is also +/// not rewritten into a different closed reason — the only honest probe +/// answer when the dependency cannot answer is `dependency_unavailable`. +fn not_ready_dependency(_err: ApiError) -> Response { + // `_err` is deliberately not projected onto the wire: /health/ready is + // excluded from the generic error body, and the closed reason set has no + // "internal_error" token. The honest readiness answer when GetInfo cannot + // complete is dependency_unavailable. + not_ready_body("dependency_unavailable") +} + +fn not_ready_body(reason: &'static str) -> Response { + debug_assert!(is_closed_ready_reason(reason)); + let mut body = Map::new(); + body.insert("ready".to_string(), Value::Bool(false)); + body.insert("reason".to_string(), Value::String(reason.to_string())); + (StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE, Json(Value::Object(body))).into_response() +} + +/// Diagnostic fields from a successful `GetInfo` (§7.5 L2876 MAY). +/// +/// `root` is **not** emitted here: the accumulator `root` must be paired +/// with its `size` (L2882), and `Info` carries `accumulator_root` without +/// `size`. Emitting an unpaired root would invent a half-fact. Tip height +/// and scanner lag are complete on their own and come straight from Info. +fn attach_diagnostics(body: &mut Map, info: &Info) { + body.insert( + "bitcoin_tip_height".to_string(), + json!(info.bitcoin_tip_height), + ); + body.insert("scanner_lag".to_string(), json!(info.scanner_lag)); +} + +fn is_closed_ready_reason(reason: &str) -> bool { + // Same truth value as `iter().any(|&r| r == reason)` for every input, + // including empty / non-closed strings (both false). Prefer `contains`. + READY_REASONS.contains(&reason) +} + +/// Project kernel `Info` into the §7.5 `/v1/info` JSON object (L2877). +/// +/// Pass-through fields are taken from the kernel; `features` is built +/// solely from API config. `kernel_parts`, `ready`, `ready_reason`, tip +/// diagnostics, and `accumulator_root` are **not** part of this surface. +/// +/// **`features` array order (API-fixed, intentional):** §7.5 / §6.1 close the +/// *set* of feature strings but do **not** prescribe array order. This layer +/// emits them in **lexicographic order of the wire string** +/// (`explorer` before `wallet`, …). That order is independent of env-var +/// token order and of `Feature` enum discriminant/`Ord` order — do not +/// "clean up" to input order or to enum declaration order; a public +/// response field must be bit-stable for the same enabled set. +fn info_to_json( + info: &Info, + features: &std::collections::BTreeSet, +) -> Result { + let network = info.network.as_str(); + match network { + "mainnet" | "testnet" | "regtest" => {} + other => { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "kernel Info.network is not a closed tag: {other:?}" + ))); + } + } + if info.protocol_version != "v1" { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "kernel Info.protocol_version must be \"v1\", got {:?}", + info.protocol_version + ))); + } + + let circuit_digests = circuit_digests_json(&info.circuit_digests)?; + let bootstrap_pubkey = require_hex32(&info.bootstrap_pubkey, "bootstrap_pubkey")?; + let bootstrap = match &info.bootstrap { + Some(m) => bootstrap_to_json(m)?, + None => { + return Err(ApiError::internal( + "kernel Info.bootstrap is absent — BootstrapManifest is required on /v1/info", + )); + } + }; + + // BTreeSet already deduplicates; sort by wire string so the + // public array is not bound to enum Ord (Wallet < Explorer would emit + // ["wallet","explorer"] — wrong for the fixed lexicographic order). + let mut feature_names: Vec<&'static str> = features.iter().map(|f| f.as_str()).collect(); + feature_names.sort_unstable(); + let feature_list: Vec = feature_names + .into_iter() + .map(|s| Value::String(s.to_string())) + .collect(); + + Ok(json!({ + "network": network, + "protocol_version": "v1", + "circuit_digests": circuit_digests, + "bootstrap_pubkey": bootstrap_pubkey, + "relay_url": info.relay_url, + "blossom_url": info.blossom_url, + "max_blob_bytes": info.max_blob_bytes, + "finality_confirmations": info.finality_confirmations, + "activation_height": info.activation_height, + "max_tx_inputs": info.max_tx_inputs, + "max_tx_outputs": info.max_tx_outputs, + "max_rx_coins": info.max_rx_coins, + "max_account_assets": info.max_account_assets, + "features": feature_list, + "bootstrap": bootstrap, + })) +} + +fn circuit_digests_json( + digests: &std::collections::HashMap>, +) -> Result { + let c = match digests.get("C") { + Some(bytes) => require_hex32(bytes, "circuit_digests.C")?, + None => { + return Err(ApiError::internal( + "kernel Info.circuit_digests is missing key \"C\"", + )); + } + }; + let c_balance = match digests.get("C_balance") { + Some(bytes) => require_hex32(bytes, "circuit_digests.C_balance")?, + None => { + return Err(ApiError::internal( + "kernel Info.circuit_digests is missing key \"C_balance\"", + )); + } + }; + // Only the two closed keys — extra map entries from a future kernel + // are not part of §7.5 /v1/info and must not be silently advertised. + if digests.len() != 2 { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "kernel Info.circuit_digests must contain exactly C and C_balance, got {} keys", + digests.len() + ))); + } + Ok(json!({ + "C": c, + "C_balance": c_balance, + })) +} + +fn bootstrap_to_json(m: &BootstrapManifest) -> Result { + match m.network.as_str() { + "mainnet" | "testnet" | "regtest" => {} + other => { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "kernel BootstrapManifest.network is not a closed tag: {other:?}" + ))); + } + } + if m.protocol_version != "v1" { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "kernel BootstrapManifest.protocol_version must be \"v1\", got {:?}", + m.protocol_version + ))); + } + let mut operator_ids = Vec::with_capacity(m.operator_ids.len()); + for (i, id) in m.operator_ids.iter().enumerate() { + operator_ids.push(Value::String(require_hex32( + id, + &format!("bootstrap.operator_ids[{i}]"), + )?)); + } + let manifest_sig = require_hex_exact(&m.manifest_sig, 64, "bootstrap.manifest_sig")?; + Ok(json!({ + "network": m.network, + "protocol_version": m.protocol_version, + "seed_relays": m.seed_relays, + "blob_stores": m.blob_stores, + "operator_ids": operator_ids, + "issued_at": m.issued_at, + "expires_at": m.expires_at, + "manifest_sig": manifest_sig, + })) +} + +fn require_hex32(bytes: &[u8], field: &str) -> Result { + require_hex_exact(bytes, 32, field) +} + +fn require_hex_exact(bytes: &[u8], expected: usize, field: &str) -> Result { + if bytes.len() != expected { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "kernel field {field} must be {expected} bytes, got {}", + bytes.len() + ))); + } + Ok(encode_hex(bytes)) +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + use crate::config::Feature; + use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap}; + + fn sample_info(ready: bool, reason: Option<&str>) -> Info { + let mut circuit_digests = HashMap::new(); + circuit_digests.insert("C".to_string(), vec![0x11; 32]); + circuit_digests.insert("C_balance".to_string(), vec![0x22; 32]); + Info { + network: "regtest".into(), + protocol_version: "v1".into(), + circuit_digests, + relay_url: "wss://relay.example".into(), + blossom_url: "https://blossom.example".into(), + finality_confirmations: 6, + max_tx_inputs: 8, + max_tx_outputs: 8, + max_rx_coins: 4, + max_account_assets: 32, + ready, + bitcoin_tip_height: 100, + accumulator_root: vec![0xAA; 32], + scanner_lag: 0, + max_blob_bytes: 1_048_576, + activation_height: 0, + bootstrap: Some(BootstrapManifest { + network: "regtest".into(), + protocol_version: "v1".into(), + seed_relays: vec!["wss://seed.example".into()], + blob_stores: vec!["https://blob.example".into()], + operator_ids: vec![vec![0x33; 32]], + issued_at: 1, + expires_at: 9_999_999_999, + manifest_sig: vec![0x44; 64], + }), + kernel_parts: vec!["scanner".into()], + ready_reason: reason.map(|s| s.to_string()), + bootstrap_pubkey: vec![0x55; 32], + } + } + + #[test] + fn info_json_features_from_api_not_kernel_parts() { + let info = sample_info(true, None); + let features = BTreeSet::from([Feature::Wallet, Feature::Explorer]); + let json = info_to_json(&info, &features).expect("info"); + assert_eq!(json["network"], "regtest"); + assert_eq!(json["protocol_version"], "v1"); + assert_eq!(json["features"], json!(["explorer", "wallet"])); + // kernel_parts must not leak onto the public surface. + assert!(json.get("kernel_parts").is_none()); + assert!(json.get("ready").is_none()); + assert_eq!(json["bootstrap_pubkey"].as_str().unwrap().len(), 64); + assert_eq!(json["circuit_digests"]["C"].as_str().unwrap().len(), 64); + assert_eq!( + json["bootstrap"]["manifest_sig"].as_str().unwrap().len(), + 128 + ); + } + + #[test] + fn readiness_ready_is_200_without_reason() { + let info = sample_info(true, None); + let res = readiness_from_info(&info); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + } + + #[test] + fn readiness_not_ready_is_503_with_closed_reason() { + let info = sample_info(false, Some("syncing")); + let res = readiness_from_info(&info); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE); + } + + #[test] + fn readiness_rejects_unknown_reason_as_dependency_unavailable() { + let info = sample_info(false, Some("something_else")); + let res = readiness_from_info(&info); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE); + } +} diff --git a/src/kernel/client.rs b/src/kernel/client.rs index aedad14..42ce06b 100644 --- a/src/kernel/client.rs +++ b/src/kernel/client.rs @@ -9,7 +9,8 @@ use crate::error::ApiError; use crate::kernel::error_info::kernel_status_to_api_error; use crate::kernel::pb::kernel_v1::kernel_client::KernelClient as TonicKernelClient; use crate::kernel::pb::kernel_v1::{ - Job, JobEvent, JobHandle, JobRequest, SignRequest, TransitionRequest, + AccumulatorTip, GetAccumulatorRequest, GetInfoRequest, Info, Job, JobEvent, JobHandle, + JobRequest, NullifierPath, NullifierPathRequest, SignRequest, TransitionRequest, }; use async_trait::async_trait; use futures_util::stream::BoxStream; @@ -18,7 +19,7 @@ use std::sync::Arc; use tonic::transport::Channel; use tonic::Request; -/// Subset of kernel procedures this stage consumes (job surface only). +/// Subset of kernel procedures this stage consumes (job surface + info/chain reads). #[async_trait] pub trait KernelRpc: Send + Sync { async fn submit_transition(&self, req: TransitionRequest) -> Result; @@ -33,6 +34,15 @@ pub trait KernelRpc: Send + Sync { async fn sign_transition(&self, req: SignRequest) -> Result; async fn cancel_job(&self, req: JobRequest) -> Result; + + async fn get_info(&self) -> Result; + + async fn get_accumulator(&self) -> Result; + + async fn get_nullifier_path( + &self, + req: NullifierPathRequest, + ) -> Result; } /// Shared handle installed in the axum `State`. @@ -159,6 +169,36 @@ impl KernelRpc for KernelClient { .map_err(map_status)?; Ok(response.into_inner()) } + + async fn get_info(&self) -> Result { + let mut client = self.inner.clone(); + let response = client + .get_info(Request::new(GetInfoRequest {})) + .await + .map_err(map_status)?; + Ok(response.into_inner()) + } + + async fn get_accumulator(&self) -> Result { + let mut client = self.inner.clone(); + let response = client + .get_accumulator(Request::new(GetAccumulatorRequest {})) + .await + .map_err(map_status)?; + Ok(response.into_inner()) + } + + async fn get_nullifier_path( + &self, + req: NullifierPathRequest, + ) -> Result { + let mut client = self.inner.clone(); + let response = client + .get_nullifier_path(Request::new(req)) + .await + .map_err(map_status)?; + Ok(response.into_inner()) + } } /// Map a tonic `Status` to REST. diff --git a/src/lib.rs b/src/lib.rs index 96e4680..a221ef0 100644 --- a/src/lib.rs +++ b/src/lib.rs @@ -3,14 +3,18 @@ //! Outward surface of specification §7.5. Consumes the kernel RPC (§7.8) via //! `tonic`. Holds no protocol state, no value-bearing store, and no secrets. +pub mod chain; pub mod config; pub mod error; pub mod hexutil; +pub mod info; pub mod jobs; pub mod kernel; pub mod proto_identity; pub mod routes; +pub mod state; pub use config::{Config, ConfigError, Feature}; pub use kernel::{connect_lazy, KernelClient, KernelHandle}; pub use routes::{build_router, CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS}; +pub use state::AppState; diff --git a/src/main.rs b/src/main.rs index a4990a8..7d2e6b8 100644 --- a/src/main.rs +++ b/src/main.rs @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ async fn main() -> ExitCode { %bind_addr, %kernel_addr, feature_count, - "zkcoins-api listening (health + job surface)" + "zkcoins-api listening (health + info/chain reads + job surface)" ); if let Err(e) = axum::serve(listener, app).await { diff --git a/src/routes.rs b/src/routes.rs index a8ccd04..586de53 100644 --- a/src/routes.rs +++ b/src/routes.rs @@ -9,9 +9,12 @@ //! Axum registration uses a derived **matcher** form (`:name`); see //! [`advertised_path_to_axum_matcher`]. +use crate::chain; use crate::config::Config; +use crate::info; use crate::jobs; use crate::kernel::KernelHandle; +use crate::state::AppState; use axum::http::StatusCode; use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response}; use axum::routing::{get, post}; @@ -80,14 +83,22 @@ pub const CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS: &[(&str, &str)] = &[ /// §7.5; it is registered beside this set, never as a member of it. /// /// Feature gating (§6.1): further inventory keys belong to `wallet` / -/// `explorer` / `publisher`. This stage's job surface is always-on (the -/// proof is self-authenticating; §7.5 L2884) once the handlers exist — the -/// operator still must set `ZKCOINS_KERNEL_ADDR`. When capability-gated or -/// role-optional handlers land, registration will filter `ServedSurface` by +/// `explorer` / `publisher`. This stage's job surface and the info/chain +/// read surface are always-on once the handlers exist — the operator still +/// must set `ZKCOINS_KERNEL_ADDR`. When capability-gated or role-optional +/// handlers land, registration will filter `ServedSurface` by /// `Config::features`. +/// +/// `chain_inscriptions` is intentionally **not** a variant: `ListInscriptions` +/// is Unimplemented in the node until a scanner-written inscription catalog +/// exists; advertising a REST key that can only 501 is not progress. #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)] enum ServedSurface { Health, + HealthReady, + Info, + ChainAccumulator, + ChainNullifier, Tx, Jobs, JobsStream, @@ -99,6 +110,10 @@ impl ServedSurface { /// Every surface this binary currently serves. const ALL: &[ServedSurface] = &[ ServedSurface::Health, + ServedSurface::HealthReady, + ServedSurface::Info, + ServedSurface::ChainAccumulator, + ServedSurface::ChainNullifier, ServedSurface::Tx, ServedSurface::Jobs, ServedSurface::JobsStream, @@ -110,6 +125,10 @@ impl ServedSurface { fn discovery_key(self) -> &'static str { match self { ServedSurface::Health => "health", + ServedSurface::HealthReady => "health_ready", + ServedSurface::Info => "info", + ServedSurface::ChainAccumulator => "chain_accumulator", + ServedSurface::ChainNullifier => "chain_nullifier", ServedSurface::Tx => "tx", ServedSurface::Jobs => "jobs", ServedSurface::JobsStream => "jobs_stream", @@ -122,10 +141,14 @@ impl ServedSurface { /// /// Discovery still advertises the inventory (Spec) form; only the route /// table sees the rewritten matcher. - fn register(self, router: Router) -> Router { + fn register(self, router: Router) -> Router { let path = advertised_path_to_axum_matcher(closed_path(self.discovery_key())); match self { ServedSurface::Health => router.route(&path, get(health)), + ServedSurface::HealthReady => router.route(&path, get(info::health_ready)), + ServedSurface::Info => router.route(&path, get(info::get_info)), + ServedSurface::ChainAccumulator => router.route(&path, get(chain::get_accumulator)), + ServedSurface::ChainNullifier => router.route(&path, get(chain::get_nullifier)), ServedSurface::Tx => router.route(&path, post(jobs::post_tx)), ServedSurface::Jobs => router.route(&path, get(jobs::get_job)), ServedSurface::JobsStream => router.route(&path, get(jobs::stream_job)), @@ -212,32 +235,34 @@ struct RootResponse { /// Build the axum router for the given configuration and kernel handle. /// -/// `config` is retained so feature-gated surfaces can join the same -/// registration path later. Today the always-on set is health + the job -/// surface; §6.1 features open no extra routes until those handlers exist. +/// `config.features` is stored in [`AppState`] for `GET /v1/info` (API-owned +/// advertisement). Route registration is still the always-on +/// [`ServedSurface::ALL`] set; §6.1 feature gating of optional roles lands +/// with those handlers. /// /// Returns a fully state-bound router (`Router` / `Router<()>`). Only that /// form implements `tower::Service` and is ready for `axum::serve` and test -/// `oneshot` calls. Handlers still extract `State` during -/// registration; the concrete handle is supplied once at the end. +/// `oneshot` calls. Handlers extract `State` or +/// `State` (via [`axum::extract::FromRef`]); the concrete +/// state is supplied once at the end. pub fn build_router(config: Config, kernel: KernelHandle) -> Router { - // Intentionally unread: feature-gated registration lands with those handlers. let Config { bind_addr: _, kernel_addr: _, - features: _, + features, } = config; - // Register every surface as `Router` (job handlers extract - // `State`), then bind the handle so the returned tree is - // `Router<()>` and implements `Service`. Binding earlier while still - // returning `Router` leaves the tree "missing" state and - // breaks both `axum::serve` and `oneshot`. + let state = AppState { kernel, features }; + + // Register every surface as `Router`, then bind state so the + // returned tree is `Router<()>` and implements `Service`. Binding earlier + // while still returning `Router` leaves the tree "missing" + // state and breaks both `axum::serve` and `oneshot`. let mut router = Router::new().route("/", get(root)); for surface in ServedSurface::ALL { router = surface.register(router); } - router.with_state(kernel) + router.with_state(state) } async fn health() -> Response { @@ -259,7 +284,8 @@ mod tests { use crate::error::ApiError; use crate::kernel::encode_kernel_error_status; use crate::kernel::kernel_v1::{ - Job, JobEvent, JobHandle, JobRequest, SignRequest, TransitionRequest, + AccumulatorTip, BootstrapManifest, Info, Job, JobEvent, JobHandle, JobRequest, + NullifierPath, NullifierPathRequest, SignRequest, TransitionRequest, }; use crate::kernel::KernelRpc; use async_trait::async_trait; @@ -268,7 +294,7 @@ mod tests { use futures_util::stream::{self, BoxStream}; use http_body_util::BodyExt; use serde_json::Value; - use std::collections::BTreeSet; + use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap}; use std::sync::Arc; use tonic::Code; use tower::ServiceExt; @@ -304,6 +330,22 @@ mod tests { async fn cancel_job(&self, _req: JobRequest) -> Result { Err(ApiError::internal("test double: cancel not configured")) } + async fn get_info(&self) -> Result { + Err(ApiError::internal("test double: get_info not configured")) + } + async fn get_accumulator(&self) -> Result { + Err(ApiError::internal( + "test double: get_accumulator not configured", + )) + } + async fn get_nullifier_path( + &self, + _req: NullifierPathRequest, + ) -> Result { + Err(ApiError::internal( + "test double: get_nullifier_path not configured", + )) + } } fn test_app() -> Router { @@ -450,21 +492,40 @@ mod tests { actual_keys, BTreeSet::from([ "health", + "health_ready", + "info", + "chain_accumulator", + "chain_nullifier", "tx", "jobs", "jobs_stream", "jobs_sign", "jobs_cancel", ]), - "stage A serves health + the five job-surface keys" + "stage B serves health + info/chain reads + the five job-surface keys" + ); + // chain_inscriptions must not be advertised until ListInscriptions exists. + assert!( + !endpoints.contains_key("chain_inscriptions"), + "chain_inscriptions must stay unadvertised while the node catalog is missing" ); assert_eq!( endpoints["health"].as_str(), Some("/health"), "health path must match CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS inventory" ); - assert_eq!(endpoints["tx"].as_str(), Some("/v1/tx")); + assert_eq!(endpoints["health_ready"].as_str(), Some("/health/ready")); + assert_eq!(endpoints["info"].as_str(), Some("/v1/info")); + assert_eq!( + endpoints["chain_accumulator"].as_str(), + Some("/v1/chain/accumulator") + ); // Spec-Schreibweise on the wire — never the axum matcher form. + assert_eq!( + endpoints["chain_nullifier"].as_str(), + Some("/v1/chain/nullifier/") + ); + assert_eq!(endpoints["tx"].as_str(), Some("/v1/tx")); assert_eq!(endpoints["jobs"].as_str(), Some("/v1/jobs/")); assert_eq!( endpoints["jobs_stream"].as_str(), @@ -632,12 +693,14 @@ mod tests { } #[tokio::test] - async fn unregistered_info_is_404_and_absent_from_discovery() { + async fn chain_inscriptions_is_404_and_absent_from_discovery() { + // Documented omission: ListInscriptions is Unimplemented in the node + // (no scanner catalog). REST must not advertise or soft-serve it. let app = test_app(); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() - .uri("/v1/info") + .uri("/v1/chain/inscriptions") .body(Body::empty()) .unwrap(), ) @@ -646,7 +709,7 @@ mod tests { assert_eq!( res.status(), StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, - "GET /v1/info must not be a placeholder route" + "GET /v1/chain/inscriptions must not be registered without a catalog" ); let app = test_app(); @@ -658,12 +721,20 @@ mod tests { let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body).expect("JSON root body"); let endpoints = json["endpoints"].as_object().expect("endpoints object"); assert!( - !endpoints.contains_key("info"), - "unregistered surface 'info' must be omitted from GET / endpoints" + !endpoints.contains_key("chain_inscriptions"), + "unbuilt surface 'chain_inscriptions' must be omitted from GET / endpoints" + ); + assert!( + endpoints.contains_key("info"), + "stage B must advertise info" ); assert!( - !endpoints.contains_key("health_ready"), - "unregistered surface 'health_ready' must be omitted from GET / endpoints" + endpoints.contains_key("health_ready"), + "stage B must advertise health_ready" + ); + assert!( + endpoints.contains_key("chain_nullifier"), + "stage B must advertise chain_nullifier" ); } @@ -726,6 +797,9 @@ mod tests { stream: Option>, ApiError>>, sign: Option>, cancel: Option>, + info: Option>, + accumulator: Option>, + nullifier_path: Option>, } #[async_trait] @@ -771,6 +845,67 @@ mod tests { None => Err(ApiError::internal("cancel not scripted")), } } + async fn get_info(&self) -> Result { + match &self.info { + Some(Ok(i)) => Ok(i.clone()), + Some(Err(e)) => Err(e.clone()), + None => Err(ApiError::internal("info not scripted")), + } + } + async fn get_accumulator(&self) -> Result { + match &self.accumulator { + Some(Ok(t)) => Ok(t.clone()), + Some(Err(e)) => Err(e.clone()), + None => Err(ApiError::internal("accumulator not scripted")), + } + } + async fn get_nullifier_path( + &self, + _req: NullifierPathRequest, + ) -> Result { + match &self.nullifier_path { + Some(Ok(p)) => Ok(p.clone()), + Some(Err(e)) => Err(e.clone()), + None => Err(ApiError::internal("nullifier_path not scripted")), + } + } + } + + fn sample_info(ready: bool, reason: Option<&str>) -> Info { + let mut circuit_digests = HashMap::new(); + circuit_digests.insert("C".to_string(), vec![0x11; 32]); + circuit_digests.insert("C_balance".to_string(), vec![0x22; 32]); + Info { + network: "regtest".into(), + protocol_version: "v1".into(), + circuit_digests, + relay_url: "wss://relay.example".into(), + blossom_url: "https://blossom.example".into(), + finality_confirmations: 6, + max_tx_inputs: 8, + max_tx_outputs: 8, + max_rx_coins: 4, + max_account_assets: 32, + ready, + bitcoin_tip_height: 100, + accumulator_root: vec![0xAA; 32], + scanner_lag: 0, + max_blob_bytes: 1_048_576, + activation_height: 0, + bootstrap: Some(BootstrapManifest { + network: "regtest".into(), + protocol_version: "v1".into(), + seed_relays: vec!["wss://seed.example".into()], + blob_stores: vec!["https://blob.example".into()], + operator_ids: vec![vec![0x33; 32]], + issued_at: 1, + expires_at: 9_999_999_999, + manifest_sig: vec![0x44; 64], + }), + kernel_parts: vec!["scanner".into()], + ready_reason: reason.map(|s| s.to_string()), + bootstrap_pubkey: vec![0x55; 32], + } } fn hex32(byte: u8) -> String { @@ -1188,4 +1323,413 @@ mod tests { let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); assert_eq!(json["error"], "job_not_found"); } + + // ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + // Info / readiness / chain read surface + // ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + + #[tokio::test] + async fn get_info_happy_path() { + let kernel = ScriptedKernel { + info: Some(Ok(sample_info(true, None))), + ..Default::default() + }; + let mut features = BTreeSet::new(); + features.insert(Feature::Wallet); + let cfg = Config { + bind_addr: "127.0.0.1:0".parse().unwrap(), + kernel_addr: "http://127.0.0.1:50051".to_string(), + features, + }; + let app = build_router(cfg, Arc::new(kernel)); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/info") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["network"], "regtest"); + assert_eq!(json["protocol_version"], "v1"); + assert_eq!(json["finality_confirmations"], 6); + assert_eq!(json["max_tx_inputs"], 8); + assert_eq!(json["features"], serde_json::json!(["wallet"])); + assert_eq!( + json["bootstrap_pubkey"].as_str().unwrap().len(), + 64, + "bootstrap_pubkey is hex32" + ); + assert_eq!(json["bootstrap"]["network"], "regtest"); + // Kernel-only fields must not leak onto the public surface. + assert!(json.get("ready").is_none()); + assert!(json.get("kernel_parts").is_none()); + assert!(json.get("accumulator_root").is_none()); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn get_info_kernel_internal_is_500() { + let status = encode_kernel_error_status( + Code::Internal, + "Chain identity unavailable", + "internal_error", + 500, + ); + let kernel = ScriptedKernel { + info: Some(Err(crate::kernel::kernel_status_to_api_error(&status))), + ..Default::default() + }; + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/info") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "internal_error"); + assert!( + json["message"] + .as_str() + .unwrap() + .contains("Chain identity unavailable"), + "message must carry the kernel cause, got {}", + json["message"] + ); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn health_ready_true_is_200() { + let kernel = ScriptedKernel { + info: Some(Ok(sample_info(true, None))), + ..Default::default() + }; + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/health/ready") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["ready"], true); + assert!( + json.get("reason").is_none(), + "ready:true must not carry reason" + ); + // Diagnostics from GetInfo (MAY); root/size are not unpaired here. + assert_eq!(json["bitcoin_tip_height"], 100); + assert_eq!(json["scanner_lag"], 0); + assert!(json.get("root").is_none()); + // Must not use the generic error body shape. + assert!(json.get("error").is_none()); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn health_ready_false_is_503_with_reason() { + let kernel = ScriptedKernel { + info: Some(Ok(sample_info(false, Some("syncing")))), + ..Default::default() + }; + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/health/ready") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["ready"], false); + assert_eq!(json["reason"], "syncing"); + assert!(json.get("error").is_none()); + } + + /// Fail-closed production posture: node `GetInfo` returns Internal when + /// `ChainIdentity` is unset. The readiness probe must answer **not ready** + /// (503 + dependency_unavailable), never invent `ready: true`. + #[tokio::test] + async fn health_ready_getinfo_failure_is_not_ready_dependency_unavailable() { + let status = encode_kernel_error_status( + Code::Internal, + "Chain identity unavailable", + "internal_error", + 500, + ); + let kernel = ScriptedKernel { + info: Some(Err(crate::kernel::kernel_status_to_api_error(&status))), + ..Default::default() + }; + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/health/ready") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!( + res.status(), + StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE, + "failed GetInfo must not green-light readiness" + ); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["ready"], false); + assert_eq!(json["reason"], "dependency_unavailable"); + // Readiness shape, not the generic §7.5 error body. + assert!( + json.get("error").is_none(), + "must not use generic error body on /health/ready" + ); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn chain_accumulator_happy_path() { + let kernel = ScriptedKernel { + accumulator: Some(Ok(AccumulatorTip { + root: vec![0xAB; 32], + tip_block_hash: vec![0xCD; 32], + tip_height: 42, + size: 7, + })), + ..Default::default() + }; + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/chain/accumulator") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["size"], 7); + assert_eq!(json["tip_height"], 42); + assert_eq!( + json["root"].as_str().unwrap(), + crate::hexutil::encode_hex(&[0xAB; 32]) + ); + assert_eq!( + json["tip_block_hash"].as_str().unwrap(), + crate::hexutil::encode_hex(&[0xCD; 32]) + ); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn chain_accumulator_kernel_error_uses_error_info() { + let status = encode_kernel_error_status( + Code::Internal, + "Chain view unavailable", + "internal_error", + 500, + ); + let kernel = ScriptedKernel { + accumulator: Some(Err(crate::kernel::kernel_status_to_api_error(&status))), + ..Default::default() + }; + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/chain/accumulator") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "internal_error"); + assert!( + json["message"] + .as_str() + .unwrap() + .contains("Chain view unavailable"), + "message must name the cause, got {}", + json["message"] + ); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn chain_nullifier_present_happy_path() { + let kernel = ScriptedKernel { + nullifier_path: Some(Ok(NullifierPath { + root: vec![0x01; 32], + tip_height: 10, + present: true, + leaf: vec![0x02; 32], + position: 3, + audit_path: vec![vec![0x03; 32], vec![0x04; 32]], + tree_size: 4, + tip_block_hash: vec![0x05; 32], + })), + ..Default::default() + }; + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let pk = hex32(0xaa); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri(format!("/v1/chain/nullifier/{pk}")) + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["present"], true); + assert_eq!(json["position"], 3); + assert_eq!( + json["leaf"].as_str().unwrap(), + crate::hexutil::encode_hex(&[0x02; 32]) + ); + assert_eq!(json["audit_path"].as_array().unwrap().len(), 2); + assert_eq!(json["tree_size"], 4); + assert_eq!(json["tip_height"], 10); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn chain_nullifier_absent_omits_position_and_leaf() { + let kernel = ScriptedKernel { + nullifier_path: Some(Ok(NullifierPath { + root: vec![0x01; 32], + tip_height: 10, + present: false, + leaf: Vec::new(), + position: 0, + audit_path: Vec::new(), + tree_size: 4, + tip_block_hash: vec![0x05; 32], + })), + ..Default::default() + }; + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let pk = hex32(0xbb); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri(format!("/v1/chain/nullifier/{pk}")) + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["present"], false); + assert!( + json.get("position").is_none(), + "absent must omit position, got {json}" + ); + assert!( + json.get("leaf").is_none(), + "absent must omit leaf, got {json}" + ); + assert_eq!(json["audit_path"], serde_json::json!([])); + assert_eq!(json["tree_size"], 4); + assert_eq!( + json["root"].as_str().unwrap(), + crate::hexutil::encode_hex(&[0x01; 32]) + ); + } + + /// The decisive case: a corrupt index is kernel `internal_error`, not + /// `present: false`. The api must not flatten that distinction. + #[tokio::test] + async fn chain_nullifier_kernel_internal_is_not_absent() { + let status = encode_kernel_error_status( + Code::Internal, + "Failed to build nullifier path", + "internal_error", + 500, + ); + let kernel = ScriptedKernel { + nullifier_path: Some(Err(crate::kernel::kernel_status_to_api_error(&status))), + ..Default::default() + }; + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let pk = hex32(0xcc); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri(format!("/v1/chain/nullifier/{pk}")) + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!( + json["error"], "internal_error", + "corrupt index must surface as ErrorInfo, not as present:false" + ); + assert!( + json.get("present").is_none(), + "error body must not look like a Path-B absence answer" + ); + assert!( + json["message"] + .as_str() + .unwrap() + .contains("Failed to build nullifier path"), + "message must carry the kernel cause, got {}", + json["message"] + ); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn chain_nullifier_malformed_pubkey_is_400() { + let kernel = ScriptedKernel { + nullifier_path: Some(Ok(NullifierPath { + root: vec![0x01; 32], + tip_height: 0, + present: false, + leaf: Vec::new(), + position: 0, + audit_path: Vec::new(), + tree_size: 0, + tip_block_hash: vec![0x05; 32], + })), + ..Default::default() + }; + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/chain/nullifier/not-hex") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "malformed_request"); + assert!( + json["message"].as_str().unwrap().contains("pubkey"), + "message must name pubkey, got {}", + json["message"] + ); + } } diff --git a/src/state.rs b/src/state.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3e617ef --- /dev/null +++ b/src/state.rs @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +//! Shared axum application state. +//! +//! Handlers that need only the kernel extract `State` via +//! [`FromRef`]; handlers that also need API-owned config (e.g. `features` +//! for `GET /v1/info`) extract `State`. + +use crate::config::Feature; +use crate::kernel::KernelHandle; +use axum::extract::FromRef; +use std::collections::BTreeSet; + +/// Process state bound into the router after registration. +#[derive(Clone)] +pub struct AppState { + pub kernel: KernelHandle, + /// API-layer §6.1 features (`ZKCOINS_FEATURES`). The kernel never + /// supplies these — `Info.kernel_parts` is a different closed set. + pub features: BTreeSet, +} + +impl FromRef for KernelHandle { + fn from_ref(state: &AppState) -> Self { + state.kernel.clone() + } +} From 74662d67d934241894c5457d2099167070a1a034 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: TaprootFreak <142087526+TaprootFreak@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2026 12:49:02 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 04/23] feat: verify the ownership proof at the API edge, and add attest and grants MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Four §7.5 endpoints: the attest-balance and grant challenges and their redemptions, onto `OpenPullChallenge`, `AttestBalance` and `IssueViewGrant`. The ownership proof is verified **here**, not in the kernel — that boundary was already settled, and the gRPC surface carries no ownership-proof field, with a node test pinning it. So this commit builds a verification that did not exist anywhere: `chal = H(domain ‖ nonce ‖ chan_bind ‖ subject ‖ expiry ‖ request_hash)`, checked as BIP-340 under the subject's key using the same `bitcoin`/`secp256k1` line the node uses. **The domain follows the endpoint, never the body.** `POST /v1/attest/balance` verifies under `zkCoins/v1/AttestBalanceChallenge`, `POST /v1/grants` under `zkCoins/v1/IssueGrantChallenge`, taken verbatim from the node's `ChallengeAction::domain()`. A caller cannot choose it. This matters more than it looks: the node's action binding is *structural* — separate maps per action — and that made everything look right, while the cryptographic separation was missing entirely, because it lives on the other side of the boundary and nobody had built that side. The test that matters here runs it both ways: a proof signed for attest does not authorise a grant, and vice versa. `chan_bind` comes from server configuration, never from a `Host` header or a client field, and `request_hash` is computed from the parsed body the server actually sees — not from a hash the client supplies. Both are checked at redemption, not only at issuance. Verification runs before any kernel call, so an invalid signature, a wrong domain, a wrong `chan_bind` or an altered body is `401 unauthorized` **and the nonce is not consumed**. Otherwise a typo would be a denial of service against the rightful owner. The tests assert the kernel call count is zero on every rejection path. The API holds no challenge state: the store lives in the kernel, and this layer verifies and forwards. **One gap, and it is a spec question rather than a defect here.** Reconstructing `chal` needs the challenge's `expiry`, which the kernel holds and §7.5's redemption body does not carry — it lists `{ nonce }`. A monolith reads it from its own store; a two-process split cannot, if the proof must be verified before the nonce is consumed. The current handler therefore accepts `{ nonce, expiry }`, which is an extension of the normative body and is called out as such rather than quietly shipped. Closing it properly is a decision about the spec — either the body carries the issued `expiry`, or the kernel gains a non-consuming lookup — and that is not something to invent in an implementation. --- Cargo.lock | 149 +++++++++ Cargo.toml | 11 +- README.md | 7 +- docs/rest-surface.md | 9 +- src/attest.rs | 178 ++++++++++ src/config.rs | 79 ++++- src/error.rs | 10 + src/grants.rs | 235 +++++++++++++ src/kernel/client.rs | 41 ++- src/lib.rs | 3 + src/main.rs | 2 +- src/ownership.rs | 768 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/routes.rs | 736 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- src/state.rs | 7 +- 14 files changed, 2219 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) create mode 100644 src/attest.rs create mode 100644 src/grants.rs create mode 100644 src/ownership.rs diff --git a/Cargo.lock b/Cargo.lock index e846ee1..b067e4d 100644 --- a/Cargo.lock +++ b/Cargo.lock @@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ version = "0.1.0" dependencies = [ "async-trait", "axum", + "bech32", + "bitcoin", "futures-util", "http-body-util", "kernel-proto", @@ -38,6 +40,12 @@ dependencies = [ "tracing-subscriber", ] +[[package]] +name = "arrayvec" +version = "0.7.8" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "d3fb67a6e08acf24fdeccbac2cb6ac4305825bd1f117462e0e6f2f193345ad56" + [[package]] name = "async-trait" version = "0.1.91" @@ -110,12 +118,88 @@ dependencies = [ "tracing", ] +[[package]] +name = "base58ck" +version = "0.1.101" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "365c0acd5b2e8dd0111a46c4faea83fb3cfb6e39a49a7c73a06e090db7b2eff0" +dependencies = [ + "bitcoin_hashes", +] + [[package]] name = "base64" version = "0.22.1" source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" checksum = "72b3254f16251a8381aa12e40e3c4d2f0199f8c6508fbecb9d91f575e0fbb8c6" +[[package]] +name = "bech32" +version = "0.11.1" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "32637268377fc7b10a8c6d51de3e7fba1ce5dd371a96e342b34e6078db558e7f" + +[[package]] +name = "bitcoin" +version = "0.32.102" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "bb0ce8bd5baaa0d303a19915a6d93afed161f528654e42da2a7a97d05c59499a" +dependencies = [ + "base58ck", + "bech32", + "bitcoin-io", + "bitcoin-units", + "bitcoin_hashes", + "hex-conservative 0.2.2", + "hex_lit", + "secp256k1", +] + +[[package]] +name = "bitcoin-consensus-encoding" +version = "1.1.0" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "207311705279250ba465076a1bac4b1ac982855fff73fc5f67e22158ac58cdc9" +dependencies = [ + "bitcoin-internals", + "hex-conservative 1.2.0", + "serde", +] + +[[package]] +name = "bitcoin-internals" +version = "0.6.0" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "d573f4cf32996a8dce612e4348cece65a241f1882ed594047c9ba348e8869fa5" + +[[package]] +name = "bitcoin-io" +version = "0.1.101" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "bb5de036369d1ac59d3c1819ebc4d850f89466f5401c571a285b6ed564a4cb78" +dependencies = [ + "bitcoin-consensus-encoding", +] + +[[package]] +name = "bitcoin-units" +version = "0.1.101" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "9cb95693f371d089a4b5b6fc41c6f3ea6e01ee8c15388335dfac8ea685173b51" +dependencies = [ + "bitcoin-consensus-encoding", +] + +[[package]] +name = "bitcoin_hashes" +version = "0.14.101" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "bca4c7abb40c8817d77403c880988cfd484f23ab2365726afb2f798363e2c4a2" +dependencies = [ + "bitcoin-io", + "hex-conservative 0.2.2", +] + [[package]] name = "bitflags" version = "2.13.1" @@ -137,6 +221,16 @@ version = "1.12.1" source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" checksum = "fc652a48c352aef3ea3aed32080501cf3ef6ed5da78602a020c991775b0aff04" +[[package]] +name = "cc" +version = "1.4.0" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "5add81bb678e6cb321aff7fa0dc7689ad82b112dbc032cea19f91d6b8e3582b9" +dependencies = [ + "find-msvc-tools", + "shlex", +] + [[package]] name = "cfg-if" version = "1.0.4" @@ -200,6 +294,12 @@ version = "2.5.0" source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" checksum = "da7c62ceae207dd37ea5b845da6a0696c799f85e97da1ab5b7910be3c1c80223" +[[package]] +name = "find-msvc-tools" +version = "0.1.9" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "5baebc0774151f905a1a2cc41989300b1e6fbb29aff0ceffa1064fdd3088d582" + [[package]] name = "fixedbitset" version = "0.5.7" @@ -324,6 +424,30 @@ version = "0.5.0" source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" checksum = "2304e00983f87ffb38b55b444b5e3b60a884b5d30c0fca7d82fe33449bbe55ea" +[[package]] +name = "hex-conservative" +version = "0.2.2" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "fda06d18ac606267c40c04e41b9947729bf8b9efe74bd4e82b61a5f26a510b9f" +dependencies = [ + "arrayvec", +] + +[[package]] +name = "hex-conservative" +version = "1.2.0" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "35431185f361ccf3ffc58254628af5f1f5d5f28531da2e02e5d6c82bbc282a10" +dependencies = [ + "arrayvec", +] + +[[package]] +name = "hex_lit" +version = "0.1.1" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "3011d1213f159867b13cfd6ac92d2cd5f1345762c63be3554e84092d85a50bbd" + [[package]] name = "http" version = "1.5.0" @@ -723,6 +847,25 @@ version = "1.0.23" source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" checksum = "9774ba4a74de5f7b1c1451ed6cd5285a32eddb5cccb8cc655a4e50009e06477f" +[[package]] +name = "secp256k1" +version = "0.29.1" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "9465315bc9d4566e1724f0fffcbcc446268cb522e60f9a27bcded6b19c108113" +dependencies = [ + "bitcoin_hashes", + "secp256k1-sys", +] + +[[package]] +name = "secp256k1-sys" +version = "0.10.1" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "d4387882333d3aa8cb20530a17c69a3752e97837832f34f6dccc760e715001d9" +dependencies = [ + "cc", +] + [[package]] name = "serde" version = "1.0.229" @@ -809,6 +952,12 @@ dependencies = [ "lazy_static", ] +[[package]] +name = "shlex" +version = "2.0.1" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "f8fadd59c855ef2080decdef8ff161eb6661b86933c9d82e5ba29dc602a55aba" + [[package]] name = "signal-hook-registry" version = "1.4.8" diff --git a/Cargo.toml b/Cargo.toml index 1c97203..37963d7 100644 --- a/Cargo.toml +++ b/Cargo.toml @@ -42,6 +42,16 @@ tracing = "0.1" tracing-subscriber = { version = "0.3", features = ["env-filter"] } futures-util = "0.3" async-trait = "0.1" +# SHA-256 for chal / request_hash / chan_bind / address binding (§1.1, §5.1). +sha2 = "0.10" +# BIP-340 Schnorr — same line as zk-coins/node (`bitcoin` → secp256k1). +# Used only for OwnershipProof verification at the API edge. +bitcoin = { version = "0.32.5", default-features = false, features = [ + "std", + "secp-recovery", +] } +# Bech32m for `zk` addresses (§1.7.7); same major as node workspace. +bech32 = "0.11" # Generated kernel.v1 client stubs — separate crate so default clippy/test # of `api` does not lint tonic-build output (result_large_err on Status). kernel-proto = { path = "kernel-proto" } @@ -50,4 +60,3 @@ kernel-proto = { path = "kernel-proto" } # Same versions as node/Cargo.toml [dev-dependencies] where shared. tower = { version = "0.5", features = ["util"] } http-body-util = "0.1" -sha2 = "0.10" diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index c3aa1e4..6977983 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -35,11 +35,12 @@ The API layer sits **outward** of the node. It consumes the node's internal **ke ### Inventory and stage A (this branch) - Full §7.5 endpoint inventory (method, capability, feature, kernel RPC): [`docs/rest-surface.md`](docs/rest-surface.md). -- Rust process (`axum` + `tonic 0.13.1` client): **`GET /`**, **`GET /health`**, and the job surface (`POST /v1/tx`, `GET /v1/jobs/{job_id}`, stream/sign/cancel). No placeholder routes for unbuilt keys. +- Rust process (`axum` + `tonic 0.13.1` client): **`GET /`**, **`GET /health`**, info/chain reads, the job surface, and **attest/grants** (`POST /v1/attest/balance[/challenge]`, `POST /v1/grants[/challenge]`). No placeholder routes for unbuilt keys. +- **OwnershipProof** for attest/grants is verified at the API edge (BIP-340, action-bound domain, `chan_bind`, `request_hash`) **before** any kernel call that would consume a challenge nonce. - **`GET /` discovery follows registration** via `ServedSurface` — only served keys are advertised. The 29-key catalogue stays as inventory. -- Kernel contract: carried `proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto` with SHA-256 identity pin (`src/proto_identity.rs`); REST errors from `ErrorInfo.metadata["http_status"]` only. +- Kernel contract: carried `proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto` with SHA-256 identity pin (`src/proto_identity.rs`); REST errors from `ErrorInfo.metadata["http_status"]` only (API-local auth failures use §7.5 `401 unauthorized` directly). - Codegen lives in the workspace member **`kernel-proto`** (tonic client stubs only). Workspace `default-members = ["."]` keeps default `cargo clippy` / `cargo test` on the **api** package so generated code is not linted. -- Fail-closed env: `ZKCOINS_BIND_ADDR`, `ZKCOINS_KERNEL_ADDR`, `ZKCOINS_FEATURES` (see the inventory doc). +- Fail-closed env: `ZKCOINS_BIND_ADDR`, `ZKCOINS_KERNEL_ADDR`, `ZKCOINS_FEATURES`, `ZKCOINS_PUBLIC_HOST` (see the inventory doc). ## License diff --git a/docs/rest-surface.md b/docs/rest-surface.md index 046e2b8..01ff2a0 100644 --- a/docs/rest-surface.md +++ b/docs/rest-surface.md @@ -158,6 +158,10 @@ Deployments mit Wallet- und/oder Explorer-Rolle benötigt (Replica-/Blob-Pfad). | `GET /v1/jobs/{job_id}/stream` | **implementiert** — `StreamJob` als SSE | | `POST /v1/jobs/{job_id}/sign` | **implementiert** — `SignTransition` | | `POST /v1/jobs/{job_id}/cancel` | **implementiert** — `CancelJob` | +| `POST /v1/attest/balance/challenge` | **implementiert** — `OpenPullChallenge` (`action = attest_balance`) | +| `POST /v1/attest/balance` | **implementiert** — OwnershipProof-Verifikation am API-Rand, dann `AttestBalance` | +| `POST /v1/grants/challenge` | **implementiert** — `OpenPullChallenge` (`action = issue_grant`) | +| `POST /v1/grants` | **implementiert** — OwnershipProof-Verifikation am API-Rand, dann `IssueViewGrant` | | alle übrigen Method+Path | **nicht registriert** — kein Handler, kein `todo!()`, kein Platzhalter | **Bewusst nicht beworben:** `chain_inscriptions` — `ListInscriptions` ist im node `Unimplemented` (fehlt scanner-geschriebener Inschriften-Katalog mit Reveal-Txid und §3.5-Format). Eine REST-Hülle, die zuverlässig 501 liefert, wäre nur eine zweite Stelle für dieselbe Absenz. @@ -177,8 +181,8 @@ ausschließlich über `google.rpc.ErrorInfo` (`domain`, `reason`, | Lücke | Warum | |---|---| | `GET /v1/chain/inscriptions` | Kernel-`ListInscriptions` Unimplemented bis Inschriften-Katalog. | -| Pull / Bootstrap / Publish / Blossom / Attest / Grants | jeweilige Kernel-RPC noch nicht angebunden. | -| Feature-Gate `404 feature_disabled` | Info/Chain/Job-Fläche ist in dieser Stufe always-on; Gate folgt mit den optionalen Rollen. | +| Pull / Bootstrap / Publish / Blossom | jeweilige Kernel-RPC noch nicht angebunden. | +| Feature-Gate `404 feature_disabled` | Info/Chain/Job/Attest/Grants-Fläche ist in dieser Stufe always-on; Gate folgt mit den optionalen Rollen. | --- @@ -189,3 +193,4 @@ ausschließlich über `google.rpc.ErrorInfo` (`domain`, `reason`, | `ZKCOINS_BIND_ADDR` | Socket-Adresse für den HTTP-Listener (z. B. `127.0.0.1:8080`). **Kein Default.** | | `ZKCOINS_KERNEL_ADDR` | Adresse des Kernel-gRPC (z. B. `http://127.0.0.1:50051`). **Kein Default.** Pflicht, auch wenn dieser Scaffold den Kanal noch nicht öffnet — Start ohne konfigurierte Kernel-Adresse ist unzulässig. | | `ZKCOINS_FEATURES` | Komma-separierte Teilmenge von `{wallet,explorer,publisher,lightning_bridge,mail_bridge}`. Darf leer sein (alle Features off). Unbekannter Token → **Startfehler**. Variable selbst ist Pflicht (explizit leer = absichtlich nichts freigeschaltet). | +| `ZKCOINS_PUBLIC_HOST` | Komma-separierte autoritative Hostnamen für §5.1 `chan_bind` (lowercase, trailing-dot gestrichen). **Nie** aus `Host`-Header. Darf leer sein (dann schlägt OwnershipProof-Auth laut fehl). Variable selbst ist Pflicht. | diff --git a/src/attest.rs b/src/attest.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..603fe28 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/attest.rs @@ -0,0 +1,178 @@ +//! Balance-attestation REST surface (§7.5 L2893–L2894). +//! +//! | Method | Path | Kernel | +//! |---|---|---| +//! | `POST` | `/v1/attest/balance/challenge` | `OpenPullChallenge` action=`attest_balance` | +//! | `POST` | `/v1/attest/balance` | `AttestBalance` (after OwnershipProof) | +//! +//! OwnershipProof verification is API-local; the kernel receives only the +//! already-authenticated subject plus `nonce` / `chan_bind`. + +use crate::error::ApiError; +use crate::hexutil::{decode_hex_exact, encode_hex}; +use crate::kernel::kernel_v1::{AttestRequest, JobHandle, PullChallengeRequest}; +use crate::ownership::{ + attest_request_hash, ceiling_encoding, decode_zk_address, parse_u64_decimal, + verify_ownership_proof, ChallengeDomain, ChallengeEcho, OwnershipProofJson, + ATTEST_BALANCE_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN, +}; +use crate::state::AppState; +use axum::extract::State; +use axum::http::StatusCode; +use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response}; +use axum::Json; +use serde::Deserialize; +use serde_json::json; + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Wire types +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)] +pub struct AttestChallengeBody { + pub subject: String, +} + +#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)] +pub struct AttestBalanceBody { + pub subject: String, + pub asset_id: String, + #[serde(default)] + pub nav_ceiling: Option, + /// §7.1 decimal-string u64 when present. + #[serde(default)] + pub size_ceiling: Option, + pub challenge: ChallengeEcho, + pub ownership_proof: OwnershipProofJson, +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Handlers +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +/// `POST /v1/attest/balance/challenge` → OpenPullChallenge(action=attest_balance). +pub async fn post_attest_balance_challenge( + State(state): State, + Json(body): Json, +) -> Result { + if body.subject.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::malformed("subject is required")); + } + // Validate Bech32m early so the API returns a clear 400 rather than + // relying on the kernel's parse of the same string. + let _ = decode_zk_address(&body.subject)?; + + let challenge = state + .kernel + .open_pull_challenge(PullChallengeRequest { + subject: body.subject, + requested_scope: None, + action: "attest_balance".to_string(), + }) + .await?; + + if challenge.nonce.len() != 32 { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "kernel Challenge.nonce must be 32 bytes, got {}", + challenge.nonce.len() + ))); + } + // Domain is endpoint-bound: refuse a kernel that returns a foreign tag. + if challenge.domain != ATTEST_BALANCE_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "kernel Challenge.domain must be {ATTEST_BALANCE_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN:?}, got {:?}", + challenge.domain + ))); + } + + let body = json!({ + "nonce": encode_hex(&challenge.nonce), + "expiry": challenge.expiry.to_string(), + "domain": ATTEST_BALANCE_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN, + }); + Ok((StatusCode::OK, Json(body)).into_response()) +} + +/// `POST /v1/attest/balance` → verify OwnershipProof, then AttestBalance. +/// +/// Verification runs entirely before the kernel call so a bad signature +/// cannot consume the single-use challenge nonce. +pub async fn post_attest_balance( + State(state): State, + Json(body): Json, +) -> Result { + // ---- pure validation + OwnershipProof (no kernel) ---- + let nav_ceiling = match &body.nav_ceiling { + None => None, + Some(h) => { + let v = decode_hex_exact(h, 32) + .map_err(|e| ApiError::malformed(format!("nav_ceiling: {e}")))?; + let mut arr = [0u8; 32]; + arr.copy_from_slice(&v); + Some(arr) + } + }; + let size_ceiling = match &body.size_ceiling { + None => None, + Some(s) => Some( + parse_u64_decimal(s) + .map_err(|e| ApiError::malformed(format!("size_ceiling: {}", e.body.message)))?, + ), + }; + let ceiling_enc = ceiling_encoding(nav_ceiling.as_ref(), size_ceiling)?; + + let subject_raw = decode_zk_address(&body.subject)?; + let asset_id = { + let v = decode_hex_exact(&body.asset_id, 32) + .map_err(|e| ApiError::malformed(format!("asset_id: {e}")))?; + let mut arr = [0u8; 32]; + arr.copy_from_slice(&v); + arr + }; + + // Server-computed request_hash — never a client-supplied hash field. + let request_hash = attest_request_hash(&subject_raw, &asset_id, &ceiling_enc); + + // Domain is the AttestBalance endpoint constant — not taken from body. + let verified = verify_ownership_proof( + ChallengeDomain::AttestBalance, + &body.subject, + &body.challenge, + &body.ownership_proof, + &request_hash, + state.public_hosts.as_slice(), + )?; + + // ---- only now: kernel (nonce consumption lives here) ---- + let (nav_bytes, size_val) = match (nav_ceiling, size_ceiling) { + (None, None) => (Vec::new(), 0u64), + (Some(nav), Some(size)) => (nav.to_vec(), size), + _ => { + // ceiling_encoding already rejected mixed presence. + return Err(ApiError::internal( + "ceiling pair invariant broken after encoding", + )); + } + }; + + let handle: JobHandle = state + .kernel + .attest_balance(AttestRequest { + subject: verified.subject_bech32, + asset_id: asset_id.to_vec(), + nav_ceiling: nav_bytes, + size_ceiling: size_val, + nonce: verified.nonce.to_vec(), + chan_bind: verified.chan_bind.to_vec(), + }) + .await?; + + // §7.5 L2894: `202 { job_id }` — no status field on this admit response. + if handle.job_id.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::internal( + "kernel JobHandle.job_id is empty on AttestBalance success", + )); + } + let body = json!({ "job_id": handle.job_id }); + Ok((StatusCode::ACCEPTED, Json(body)).into_response()) +} diff --git a/src/config.rs b/src/config.rs index 4d72bbf..0b97542 100644 --- a/src/config.rs +++ b/src/config.rs @@ -5,6 +5,9 @@ //! - `ZKCOINS_KERNEL_ADDR` — kernel gRPC address (opaque non-empty string) //! - `ZKCOINS_FEATURES` — comma-separated subset of the §6.1 closed feature set //! (may be empty string = all features off; unknown token is a start error) +//! - `ZKCOINS_PUBLIC_HOST` — comma-separated authoritative hostnames for +//! §5.1 `chan_bind` (may be empty string; empty ⇒ OwnershipProof auth fails +//! loud with no silent localhost). Never taken from a `Host` header. use std::collections::BTreeSet; use std::env; @@ -65,6 +68,9 @@ pub struct Config { pub kernel_addr: String, /// Enabled API features (§6.1 closed set). Empty = all off. pub features: BTreeSet, + /// Authoritative public hostnames for §5.1 `chan_bind` (canonical form). + /// Derived only from `ZKCOINS_PUBLIC_HOST` — never from request headers. + pub public_hosts: Vec, } #[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] @@ -105,6 +111,7 @@ impl std::error::Error for ConfigError {} const ENV_BIND: &str = "ZKCOINS_BIND_ADDR"; const ENV_KERNEL: &str = "ZKCOINS_KERNEL_ADDR"; const ENV_FEATURES: &str = "ZKCOINS_FEATURES"; +const ENV_PUBLIC_HOST: &str = "ZKCOINS_PUBLIC_HOST"; impl Config { /// Load configuration from process environment. Fail-closed: every required @@ -123,6 +130,7 @@ impl Config { let bind_raw = require_present(&mut get, ENV_BIND)?; let kernel_raw = require_present(&mut get, ENV_KERNEL)?; let features_raw = require_present(&mut get, ENV_FEATURES)?; + let public_host_raw = require_present(&mut get, ENV_PUBLIC_HOST)?; if bind_raw.is_empty() { return Err(ConfigError::EmptyEnv(ENV_BIND)); @@ -130,7 +138,8 @@ impl Config { if kernel_raw.is_empty() { return Err(ConfigError::EmptyEnv(ENV_KERNEL)); } - // FEATURES may be empty (= all off). It must still be *set*. + // FEATURES and PUBLIC_HOST may be empty. They must still be *set*. + // Empty PUBLIC_HOST ⇒ no authoritative chan_bind (auth fails loud). let bind_addr = bind_raw @@ -141,11 +150,13 @@ impl Config { })?; let features = parse_features(&features_raw)?; + let public_hosts = parse_public_hosts(&public_host_raw); Ok(Config { bind_addr, kernel_addr: kernel_raw, features, + public_hosts, }) } } @@ -172,6 +183,15 @@ fn parse_features(raw: &str) -> Result, ConfigError> { Ok(out) } +/// Canonicalise authoritative hosts for `chan_bind` (§5.1): lowercase ASCII, +/// trailing dot stripped. Empty tokens dropped. No localhost default. +fn parse_public_hosts(raw: &str) -> Vec { + raw.split(',') + .map(|s| s.trim().trim_end_matches('.').to_ascii_lowercase()) + .filter(|s| !s.is_empty()) + .collect() +} + #[cfg(test)] mod tests { use super::*; @@ -187,11 +207,13 @@ mod tests { (ENV_BIND, "127.0.0.1:8080"), (ENV_KERNEL, "http://127.0.0.1:50051"), (ENV_FEATURES, ""), + (ENV_PUBLIC_HOST, ""), ])); let cfg = Config::from_getter(&mut get).expect("valid config"); assert_eq!(cfg.bind_addr, "127.0.0.1:8080".parse().unwrap()); assert_eq!(cfg.kernel_addr, "http://127.0.0.1:50051"); assert!(cfg.features.is_empty()); + assert!(cfg.public_hosts.is_empty()); } #[test] @@ -200,12 +222,32 @@ mod tests { (ENV_BIND, "[::1]:9"), (ENV_KERNEL, "http://kernel:50051"), (ENV_FEATURES, "wallet, explorer,publisher"), + (ENV_PUBLIC_HOST, "api.example.com"), ])); let cfg = Config::from_getter(&mut get).expect("valid config"); assert_eq!( cfg.features, BTreeSet::from([Feature::Wallet, Feature::Explorer, Feature::Publisher]) ); + assert_eq!(cfg.public_hosts, vec!["api.example.com".to_string()]); + } + + #[test] + fn public_hosts_are_canonicalised() { + let mut get = getter(HashMap::from([ + (ENV_BIND, "127.0.0.1:8080"), + (ENV_KERNEL, "http://127.0.0.1:50051"), + (ENV_FEATURES, ""), + (ENV_PUBLIC_HOST, "API.Example.COM., other.EXAMPLE.com"), + ])); + let cfg = Config::from_getter(&mut get).expect("valid config"); + assert_eq!( + cfg.public_hosts, + vec![ + "api.example.com".to_string(), + "other.example.com".to_string() + ] + ); } #[test] @@ -214,6 +256,7 @@ mod tests { (ENV_BIND, "127.0.0.1:8080"), (ENV_KERNEL, "http://127.0.0.1:50051"), (ENV_FEATURES, "wallet,not_a_feature"), + (ENV_PUBLIC_HOST, ""), ])); let err = Config::from_getter(&mut get).expect_err("unknown feature"); match &err { @@ -237,6 +280,7 @@ mod tests { let mut get = getter(HashMap::from([ (ENV_KERNEL, "http://127.0.0.1:50051"), (ENV_FEATURES, ""), + (ENV_PUBLIC_HOST, ""), ])); let err = Config::from_getter(&mut get).expect_err("missing bind"); assert_eq!(err, ConfigError::MissingEnv(ENV_BIND)); @@ -251,6 +295,7 @@ mod tests { let mut get = getter(HashMap::from([ (ENV_BIND, "127.0.0.1:8080"), (ENV_FEATURES, ""), + (ENV_PUBLIC_HOST, ""), ])); let err = Config::from_getter(&mut get).expect_err("missing kernel"); assert_eq!(err, ConfigError::MissingEnv(ENV_KERNEL)); @@ -262,18 +307,32 @@ mod tests { let mut get = getter(HashMap::from([ (ENV_BIND, "127.0.0.1:8080"), (ENV_KERNEL, "http://127.0.0.1:50051"), + (ENV_PUBLIC_HOST, ""), ])); let err = Config::from_getter(&mut get).expect_err("missing features"); assert_eq!(err, ConfigError::MissingEnv(ENV_FEATURES)); assert!(err.to_string().contains(ENV_FEATURES)); } + #[test] + fn missing_public_host_var_is_named() { + let mut get = getter(HashMap::from([ + (ENV_BIND, "127.0.0.1:8080"), + (ENV_KERNEL, "http://127.0.0.1:50051"), + (ENV_FEATURES, ""), + ])); + let err = Config::from_getter(&mut get).expect_err("missing public host"); + assert_eq!(err, ConfigError::MissingEnv(ENV_PUBLIC_HOST)); + assert!(err.to_string().contains(ENV_PUBLIC_HOST)); + } + #[test] fn empty_bind_addr_is_empty_env_error() { let mut get = getter(HashMap::from([ (ENV_BIND, ""), (ENV_KERNEL, "http://127.0.0.1:50051"), (ENV_FEATURES, ""), + (ENV_PUBLIC_HOST, ""), ])); let err = Config::from_getter(&mut get).expect_err("empty bind"); assert_eq!(err, ConfigError::EmptyEnv(ENV_BIND)); @@ -285,6 +344,7 @@ mod tests { (ENV_BIND, "127.0.0.1:8080"), (ENV_KERNEL, ""), (ENV_FEATURES, ""), + (ENV_PUBLIC_HOST, ""), ])); let err = Config::from_getter(&mut get).expect_err("empty kernel"); assert_eq!(err, ConfigError::EmptyEnv(ENV_KERNEL)); @@ -296,6 +356,7 @@ mod tests { (ENV_BIND, "not-a-socket"), (ENV_KERNEL, "http://127.0.0.1:50051"), (ENV_FEATURES, ""), + (ENV_PUBLIC_HOST, ""), ])); let err = Config::from_getter(&mut get).expect_err("bad bind"); match &err { @@ -313,8 +374,24 @@ mod tests { let mut get = getter(HashMap::from([ (ENV_KERNEL, "http://127.0.0.1:50051"), (ENV_FEATURES, "wallet"), + (ENV_PUBLIC_HOST, ""), ])); let err = Config::from_getter(&mut get).expect_err("no default bind"); assert!(matches!(err, ConfigError::MissingEnv(ENV_BIND))); } + + #[test] + fn no_default_localhost_for_public_host() { + let mut get = getter(HashMap::from([ + (ENV_BIND, "127.0.0.1:8080"), + (ENV_KERNEL, "http://127.0.0.1:50051"), + (ENV_FEATURES, ""), + (ENV_PUBLIC_HOST, ""), + ])); + let cfg = Config::from_getter(&mut get).expect("empty public host is allowed"); + assert!( + cfg.public_hosts.is_empty(), + "empty PUBLIC_HOST must not invent localhost" + ); + } } diff --git a/src/error.rs b/src/error.rs index 8d13a99..d207a10 100644 --- a/src/error.rs +++ b/src/error.rs @@ -35,6 +35,16 @@ impl ApiError { Self::new(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, "malformed_request", message) } + /// §7.5 `unauthorized` / 401 — API-edge OwnershipProof / capability failures + /// (wrong domain, bad signature, GrantProof, address mismatch, chan_bind). + /// + /// Spec §7.5 L2894 / L2896: missing/invalid/wrong-domain OwnershipProof or + /// GrantProof → `401 unauthorized`. Generated by the API itself; not from + /// kernel `ErrorInfo.metadata["http_status"]`. + pub fn unauthorized(message: impl Into) -> Self { + Self::new(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "unauthorized", message) + } + /// Fail-closed stand-in when the kernel transport breaks or the kernel /// violates the ErrorInfo contract. Spec §7.5 closes the enumeration with /// `internal_error` / 500 for any condition not listed. diff --git a/src/grants.rs b/src/grants.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c0a7117 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/grants.rs @@ -0,0 +1,235 @@ +//! View-grant REST surface (§7.5 L2895–L2896). +//! +//! | Method | Path | Kernel | +//! |---|---|---| +//! | `POST` | `/v1/grants/challenge` | `OpenPullChallenge` action=`issue_grant` | +//! | `POST` | `/v1/grants` | `IssueViewGrant` (after OwnershipProof) | +//! +//! A GrantProof is rejected here (no-escalation). The kernel message has no +//! capability field — only the API edge can enforce this. + +use crate::error::ApiError; +use crate::hexutil::{decode_hex_exact, encode_hex}; +use crate::kernel::kernel_v1::{GrantRequest, PullChallengeRequest, Scope}; +use crate::ownership::{ + decode_zk_address, encode_grant_asset_ids, issue_grant_request_hash, parse_u64_decimal, + verify_ownership_proof, ChallengeDomain, ChallengeEcho, OwnershipProofJson, + ISSUE_GRANT_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN, SCOPE_NOT_AFTER_UNBOUNDED, +}; +use crate::state::AppState; +use axum::extract::State; +use axum::http::StatusCode; +use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response}; +use axum::Json; +use serde::Deserialize; +use serde_json::{json, Value}; + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Wire types +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)] +pub struct GrantsChallengeBody { + pub subject: String, +} + +#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)] +pub struct GrantScopeJson { + /// Either the string `"*"` or an array of hex32 asset ids. + pub asset_ids: Value, + #[serde(default)] + pub not_before: Option, + #[serde(default)] + pub not_after: Option, +} + +#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)] +pub struct IssueGrantBody { + pub subject: String, + pub grantee_pk: String, + pub scope: GrantScopeJson, + /// Grant-level expiry (§7.1 decimal-string u64) — bound into request_hash. + pub expiry: String, + pub challenge: ChallengeEcho, + pub ownership_proof: OwnershipProofJson, +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Scope normalisation (§5.1 / §7.5) +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +struct NormalisedScope { + all_assets: bool, + asset_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]>, + not_before: u64, + not_after: u64, +} + +/// Normalise REST scope to the single unbounded-sentinel pair **before** +/// `request_hash` and the kernel RPC (§5.1 L1918). +fn normalise_scope(scope: &GrantScopeJson) -> Result { + let (all_assets, asset_ids) = match &scope.asset_ids { + Value::String(s) if s == "*" => (true, Vec::new()), + Value::String(s) => { + return Err(ApiError::malformed(format!( + "scope.asset_ids string must be \"*\", got {s:?}" + ))); + } + Value::Array(arr) => { + let mut ids = Vec::with_capacity(arr.len()); + for (i, v) in arr.iter().enumerate() { + let hex = v.as_str().ok_or_else(|| { + ApiError::malformed(format!("scope.asset_ids[{i}] must be a hex string")) + })?; + let raw = decode_hex_exact(hex, 32) + .map_err(|e| ApiError::malformed(format!("scope.asset_ids[{i}]: {e}")))?; + let mut a = [0u8; 32]; + a.copy_from_slice(&raw); + ids.push(a); + } + if ids.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::malformed( + "scope.asset_ids list must be non-empty when not \"*\"", + )); + } + (false, ids) + } + other => { + return Err(ApiError::malformed(format!( + "scope.asset_ids must be \"*\" or an array of hex32, got {other}" + ))); + } + }; + + let not_before = match &scope.not_before { + None => 0u64, + Some(s) => parse_u64_decimal(s) + .map_err(|e| ApiError::malformed(format!("scope.not_before: {}", e.body.message)))?, + }; + let not_after = match &scope.not_after { + None => SCOPE_NOT_AFTER_UNBOUNDED, + Some(s) => parse_u64_decimal(s) + .map_err(|e| ApiError::malformed(format!("scope.not_after: {}", e.body.message)))?, + }; + + Ok(NormalisedScope { + all_assets, + asset_ids, + not_before, + not_after, + }) +} + +fn scope_to_proto(scope: &NormalisedScope) -> Scope { + Scope { + asset_ids: scope.asset_ids.iter().map(|a| a.to_vec()).collect(), + all_assets: scope.all_assets, + not_before: scope.not_before, + not_after: scope.not_after, + } +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Handlers +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +/// `POST /v1/grants/challenge` → OpenPullChallenge(action=issue_grant). +pub async fn post_grants_challenge( + State(state): State, + Json(body): Json, +) -> Result { + if body.subject.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::malformed("subject is required")); + } + let _ = decode_zk_address(&body.subject)?; + + let challenge = state + .kernel + .open_pull_challenge(PullChallengeRequest { + subject: body.subject, + requested_scope: None, + action: "issue_grant".to_string(), + }) + .await?; + + if challenge.nonce.len() != 32 { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "kernel Challenge.nonce must be 32 bytes, got {}", + challenge.nonce.len() + ))); + } + if challenge.domain != ISSUE_GRANT_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "kernel Challenge.domain must be {ISSUE_GRANT_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN:?}, got {:?}", + challenge.domain + ))); + } + + let body = json!({ + "nonce": encode_hex(&challenge.nonce), + "expiry": challenge.expiry.to_string(), + "domain": ISSUE_GRANT_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN, + }); + Ok((StatusCode::OK, Json(body)).into_response()) +} + +/// `POST /v1/grants` → verify OwnershipProof, then IssueViewGrant. +pub async fn post_grants( + State(state): State, + Json(body): Json, +) -> Result { + // ---- pure validation + OwnershipProof (no kernel) ---- + let subject_raw = decode_zk_address(&body.subject)?; + let grantee_pk = { + let v = decode_hex_exact(&body.grantee_pk, 32) + .map_err(|e| ApiError::malformed(format!("grantee_pk: {e}")))?; + let mut a = [0u8; 32]; + a.copy_from_slice(&v); + a + }; + let grant_expiry = parse_u64_decimal(&body.expiry) + .map_err(|e| ApiError::malformed(format!("expiry: {}", e.body.message)))?; + let scope = normalise_scope(&body.scope)?; + let asset_enc = encode_grant_asset_ids(scope.all_assets, &scope.asset_ids)?; + + // Server-computed request_hash — never a client-supplied hash field. + let request_hash = issue_grant_request_hash( + &subject_raw, + &grantee_pk, + &asset_enc, + scope.not_before, + scope.not_after, + grant_expiry, + ); + + // Domain is the IssueGrant endpoint constant — not taken from body. + let verified = verify_ownership_proof( + ChallengeDomain::IssueGrant, + &body.subject, + &body.challenge, + &body.ownership_proof, + &request_hash, + state.public_hosts.as_slice(), + )?; + + // ---- only now: kernel (nonce consumption lives here) ---- + let result = state + .kernel + .issue_view_grant(GrantRequest { + subject: verified.subject_bech32, + grantee_pk: grantee_pk.to_vec(), + scope: Some(scope_to_proto(&scope)), + expiry: grant_expiry, + nonce: verified.nonce.to_vec(), + chan_bind: verified.chan_bind.to_vec(), + }) + .await?; + + if result.grant.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::internal( + "kernel GrantResult.grant is empty on IssueViewGrant success", + )); + } + let body = json!({ "grant": result.grant }); + Ok((StatusCode::OK, Json(body)).into_response()) +} diff --git a/src/kernel/client.rs b/src/kernel/client.rs index 42ce06b..89dc319 100644 --- a/src/kernel/client.rs +++ b/src/kernel/client.rs @@ -9,8 +9,9 @@ use crate::error::ApiError; use crate::kernel::error_info::kernel_status_to_api_error; use crate::kernel::pb::kernel_v1::kernel_client::KernelClient as TonicKernelClient; use crate::kernel::pb::kernel_v1::{ - AccumulatorTip, GetAccumulatorRequest, GetInfoRequest, Info, Job, JobEvent, JobHandle, - JobRequest, NullifierPath, NullifierPathRequest, SignRequest, TransitionRequest, + AccumulatorTip, AttestRequest, Challenge, GetAccumulatorRequest, GetInfoRequest, GrantRequest, + GrantResult, Info, Job, JobEvent, JobHandle, JobRequest, NullifierPath, NullifierPathRequest, + PullChallengeRequest, SignRequest, TransitionRequest, }; use async_trait::async_trait; use futures_util::stream::BoxStream; @@ -19,7 +20,8 @@ use std::sync::Arc; use tonic::transport::Channel; use tonic::Request; -/// Subset of kernel procedures this stage consumes (job surface + info/chain reads). +/// Subset of kernel procedures this stage consumes +/// (job surface + info/chain reads + attest/grants). #[async_trait] pub trait KernelRpc: Send + Sync { async fn submit_transition(&self, req: TransitionRequest) -> Result; @@ -43,6 +45,12 @@ pub trait KernelRpc: Send + Sync { &self, req: NullifierPathRequest, ) -> Result; + + async fn open_pull_challenge(&self, req: PullChallengeRequest) -> Result; + + async fn attest_balance(&self, req: AttestRequest) -> Result; + + async fn issue_view_grant(&self, req: GrantRequest) -> Result; } /// Shared handle installed in the axum `State`. @@ -199,6 +207,33 @@ impl KernelRpc for KernelClient { .map_err(map_status)?; Ok(response.into_inner()) } + + async fn open_pull_challenge(&self, req: PullChallengeRequest) -> Result { + let mut client = self.inner.clone(); + let response = client + .open_pull_challenge(Request::new(req)) + .await + .map_err(map_status)?; + Ok(response.into_inner()) + } + + async fn attest_balance(&self, req: AttestRequest) -> Result { + let mut client = self.inner.clone(); + let response = client + .attest_balance(Request::new(req)) + .await + .map_err(map_status)?; + Ok(response.into_inner()) + } + + async fn issue_view_grant(&self, req: GrantRequest) -> Result { + let mut client = self.inner.clone(); + let response = client + .issue_view_grant(Request::new(req)) + .await + .map_err(map_status)?; + Ok(response.into_inner()) + } } /// Map a tonic `Status` to REST. diff --git a/src/lib.rs b/src/lib.rs index a221ef0..1085e9e 100644 --- a/src/lib.rs +++ b/src/lib.rs @@ -3,13 +3,16 @@ //! Outward surface of specification §7.5. Consumes the kernel RPC (§7.8) via //! `tonic`. Holds no protocol state, no value-bearing store, and no secrets. +pub mod attest; pub mod chain; pub mod config; pub mod error; +pub mod grants; pub mod hexutil; pub mod info; pub mod jobs; pub mod kernel; +pub mod ownership; pub mod proto_identity; pub mod routes; pub mod state; diff --git a/src/main.rs b/src/main.rs index 7d2e6b8..865a1d9 100644 --- a/src/main.rs +++ b/src/main.rs @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ async fn main() -> ExitCode { %bind_addr, %kernel_addr, feature_count, - "zkcoins-api listening (health + info/chain reads + job surface)" + "zkcoins-api listening (health + info/chain reads + job surface + attest/grants)" ); if let Err(e) = axum::serve(listener, app).await { diff --git a/src/ownership.rs b/src/ownership.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b4a56e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ownership.rs @@ -0,0 +1,768 @@ +//! Action-bound OwnershipProof verification at the API edge (§5.1 / §7.5). +//! +//! The kernel gRPC surface carries **no** OwnershipProof fields: this module +//! is the sole place that verifies BIP-340 ownership before any kernel call +//! that would consume a challenge nonce. +//! +//! ## Domain binding +//! +//! Challenge domains are endpoint-selected constants ([`ChallengeDomain`]). +//! Callers pass the domain of the route they are serving — never a string +//! from the request body. A proof signed under AttestBalance cannot authorise +//! IssueGrant, and vice versa. +//! +//! ## Nonce non-consumption +//! +//! Every check in [`verify_ownership_proof`] is pure. The kernel is only +//! dialed by the handler **after** this function returns `Ok`. A failed +//! signature therefore cannot burn the single-use nonce in the kernel store. + +use crate::error::ApiError; +use crate::hexutil::{decode_hex_exact, encode_hex}; +use bech32::primitives::decode::CheckedHrpstring; +use bech32::Bech32m; +use bitcoin::secp256k1::{ + schnorr::Signature as SchnorrSignature, Message, Secp256k1, XOnlyPublicKey, +}; +use serde::Deserialize; +use sha2::{Digest, Sha256}; + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Domain tags — taken from node `ChallengeAction::domain()` (sole definition +// there). Word-for-word match is the cryptographic action binding. +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +/// `ChallengeAction::AttestBalance.domain()` in +/// `node/src/kernel/bootstrap/challenges.rs`. +pub const ATTEST_BALANCE_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN: &str = "zkCoins/v1/AttestBalanceChallenge"; + +/// `ChallengeAction::IssueViewGrant.domain()` in +/// `node/src/kernel/bootstrap/challenges.rs`. +pub const ISSUE_GRANT_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN: &str = "zkCoins/v1/IssueGrantChallenge"; + +/// §7.5 `request_hash` tag for `POST /v1/attest/balance`. +pub const ATTEST_BALANCE_REQUEST_TAG: &str = "zkCoins/v1/AttestBalance"; + +/// §7.5 `request_hash` tag for `POST /v1/grants`. +pub const ISSUE_GRANT_REQUEST_TAG: &str = "zkCoins/v1/IssueGrant"; + +/// §5.1 clearnet `chan_bind` host domain. +pub const PULL_HOST_DOMAIN: &str = "zkCoins/v1/PullHost"; + +/// Bech32m HRP for a zkCoins address (§1.7.7). +pub const ADDRESS_HRP: &str = "zk"; + +/// Unbounded `not_after` sentinel: `2⁶³−1` (§5.1). +pub const SCOPE_NOT_AFTER_UNBOUNDED: u64 = 9_223_372_036_854_775_807; + +// Goldilocks field order — nk_commit limbs on the wire must be strictly `< p` +// (same fail-loud rule as node `digest_from_bytes`). +const GOLDILOCKS_ORDER: u64 = 0xffff_ffff_0000_0001; + +/// Closed set of challenge domains this stage verifies. +/// +/// The domain string is a method on the enum — callers cannot pass an +/// arbitrary domain from the request body. +#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub enum ChallengeDomain { + AttestBalance, + IssueGrant, +} + +impl ChallengeDomain { + /// Normative domain tag for this action (§5.1 table / node source). + pub const fn as_str(self) -> &'static str { + match self { + ChallengeDomain::AttestBalance => ATTEST_BALANCE_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN, + ChallengeDomain::IssueGrant => ISSUE_GRANT_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN, + } + } +} + +/// §7.5 / §5.1(a) `OwnershipProofJson` on the wire. +#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize)] +pub struct OwnershipProofJson { + #[serde(rename = "type")] + pub proof_type: String, + pub subject: String, + pub public_key: String, + pub nk_commit: String, + pub signature: String, +} + +/// Challenge fields echoed by the client so the API can recompute `chal` +/// without holding challenge state. +/// +/// Spec §7.5 abbreviated bodies list only `nonce` (the monlithic node looked +/// up `expiry` from its local store). On a **stateless** API edge the client +/// MUST resubmit the issued `expiry` so BIP-340 verification can run +/// **before** any kernel call that would consume the nonce. +#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize)] +pub struct ChallengeEcho { + pub nonce: String, + /// §7.1 decimal-string u64 (same wire form as the challenge response). + pub expiry: String, +} + +/// Outcome of a successful OwnershipProof verification. +#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub struct VerifiedOwnership { + /// Bech32m subject string as accepted on the request. + pub subject_bech32: String, + /// 32-byte address digest (`H(Pk₀ ‖ nk_commit)`). + pub subject_raw: [u8; 32], + pub nonce: [u8; 32], + /// Challenge expiry from the client echo (bound into the signed `chal`). + pub challenge_expiry: u64, + /// The authoritative `chan_bind` that accepted the signature. + pub chan_bind: [u8; 32], +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Hash helpers +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +fn sha256(bytes: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] { + Sha256::digest(bytes).into() +} + +/// `chan_bind = H("zkCoins/v1/PullHost" ‖ host)` for clearnet (§5.1). +/// +/// `host` must already be the server's canonical authority (from config), +/// never a client-supplied or `Host`-header value. +pub fn chan_bind_for_host(host: &str) -> [u8; 32] { + let mut pre = Vec::with_capacity(PULL_HOST_DOMAIN.len() + host.len()); + pre.extend_from_slice(PULL_HOST_DOMAIN.as_bytes()); + pre.extend_from_slice(host.as_bytes()); + sha256(&pre) +} + +/// `chal = H(domain ‖ nonce ‖ chan_bind ‖ subject ‖ expiry ‖ request_hash)`. +/// +/// Spec §5.1 L1963 (AttestBalance / IssueGrant form with `request_hash`). +/// `domain` is UTF-8 of the action tag; `nonce`/`chan_bind`/`subject`/ +/// `request_hash` are 32 raw bytes; `expiry` is u64 big-endian. +pub fn ownership_challenge_message( + domain: &str, + nonce: &[u8; 32], + chan_bind: &[u8; 32], + subject: &[u8; 32], + expiry: u64, + request_hash: &[u8; 32], +) -> [u8; 32] { + let mut pre = Vec::with_capacity(domain.len() + 32 + 32 + 32 + 8 + 32); + pre.extend_from_slice(domain.as_bytes()); + pre.extend_from_slice(nonce); + pre.extend_from_slice(chan_bind); + pre.extend_from_slice(subject); + pre.extend_from_slice(&expiry.to_be_bytes()); + pre.extend_from_slice(request_hash); + sha256(&pre) +} + +/// Ceiling encoding for attest `request_hash` (§7.5 L2894): +/// - both omitted → `0x00` +/// - both present → `0x01 ‖ nav_ceiling (32B) ‖ u64-be(size_ceiling)` +/// - any other combination → `400 malformed_request` +pub fn ceiling_encoding( + nav_ceiling: Option<&[u8; 32]>, + size_ceiling: Option, +) -> Result, ApiError> { + match (nav_ceiling, size_ceiling) { + (None, None) => Ok(vec![0x00]), + (Some(nav), Some(size)) => { + let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(1 + 32 + 8); + out.push(0x01); + out.extend_from_slice(nav); + out.extend_from_slice(&size.to_be_bytes()); + Ok(out) + } + _ => Err(ApiError::malformed( + "nav_ceiling and size_ceiling must both be present or both omitted (§7.5)", + )), + } +} + +/// `request_hash = H("zkCoins/v1/AttestBalance" ‖ subject ‖ asset_id ‖ ceiling_encoding)`. +pub fn attest_request_hash( + subject: &[u8; 32], + asset_id: &[u8; 32], + ceiling_enc: &[u8], +) -> [u8; 32] { + let mut pre = + Vec::with_capacity(ATTEST_BALANCE_REQUEST_TAG.len() + 32 + 32 + ceiling_enc.len()); + pre.extend_from_slice(ATTEST_BALANCE_REQUEST_TAG.as_bytes()); + pre.extend_from_slice(subject); + pre.extend_from_slice(asset_id); + pre.extend_from_slice(ceiling_enc); + sha256(&pre) +} + +/// Encode grant `asset_ids` as in `grant_message` (§5.2): `0x00` for `*`, +/// or `0x01 ‖ u32-be count ‖ ascending 32-byte ids`. +pub fn encode_grant_asset_ids( + all_assets: bool, + asset_ids: &[[u8; 32]], +) -> Result, ApiError> { + if all_assets { + if !asset_ids.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::malformed( + "scope.asset_ids must be empty when asset_ids is \"*\"", + )); + } + return Ok(vec![0x00]); + } + if asset_ids.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::malformed( + "scope.asset_ids list must be non-empty when not \"*\"", + )); + } + for w in asset_ids.windows(2) { + if w[0] >= w[1] { + return Err(ApiError::malformed( + "scope.asset_ids must be strictly ascending", + )); + } + } + let count = u32::try_from(asset_ids.len()) + .map_err(|_| ApiError::malformed("scope.asset_ids count exceeds u32"))?; + let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(1 + 4 + asset_ids.len() * 32); + out.push(0x01); + out.extend_from_slice(&count.to_be_bytes()); + for id in asset_ids { + out.extend_from_slice(id); + } + Ok(out) +} + +/// `request_hash = H("zkCoins/v1/IssueGrant" ‖ subject ‖ grantee_pk ‖ +/// asset_ids ‖ not_before ‖ not_after ‖ expiry)` (§7.5 L2896). +pub fn issue_grant_request_hash( + subject: &[u8; 32], + grantee_pk: &[u8; 32], + asset_enc: &[u8], + not_before: u64, + not_after: u64, + grant_expiry: u64, +) -> [u8; 32] { + let mut pre = + Vec::with_capacity(ISSUE_GRANT_REQUEST_TAG.len() + 32 + 32 + asset_enc.len() + 8 + 8 + 8); + pre.extend_from_slice(ISSUE_GRANT_REQUEST_TAG.as_bytes()); + pre.extend_from_slice(subject); + pre.extend_from_slice(grantee_pk); + pre.extend_from_slice(asset_enc); + pre.extend_from_slice(¬_before.to_be_bytes()); + pre.extend_from_slice(¬_after.to_be_bytes()); + pre.extend_from_slice(&grant_expiry.to_be_bytes()); + sha256(&pre) +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Wire parsers +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +/// Parse a §7.1 canonical decimal-string u64 (`0|[1-9][0-9]*`). +pub fn parse_u64_decimal(s: &str) -> Result { + if s.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::malformed("empty decimal string")); + } + if s == "0" { + return Ok(0); + } + if s.as_bytes()[0] == b'0' { + return Err(ApiError::malformed( + "leading zeros are not allowed in canonical u64 decimal strings", + )); + } + if !s.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_digit()) { + return Err(ApiError::malformed( + "decimal string must contain only ASCII digits", + )); + } + s.parse::() + .map_err(|_| ApiError::malformed(format!("decimal string out of u64 range: {s}"))) +} + +/// Decode a Bech32m `zk` address to its 32-byte payload. +pub fn decode_zk_address(s: &str) -> Result<[u8; 32], ApiError> { + let checked = CheckedHrpstring::new::(s) + .map_err(|e| ApiError::malformed(format!("subject: invalid Bech32m address: {e}")))?; + if checked.hrp().as_str() != ADDRESS_HRP { + return Err(ApiError::malformed(format!( + "subject: expected HRP {ADDRESS_HRP:?}, got {:?}", + checked.hrp().as_str() + ))); + } + let data: Vec = checked.byte_iter().collect(); + if data.len() != 32 { + return Err(ApiError::malformed(format!( + "subject: address payload must be 32 bytes, got {}", + data.len() + ))); + } + let mut out = [0u8; 32]; + out.copy_from_slice(&data); + Ok(out) +} + +/// Encode 32 raw address bytes as Bech32m `zk` (tests / helpers). +#[cfg(test)] +pub fn encode_zk_address(raw: &[u8; 32]) -> String { + let hrp = bech32::Hrp::parse(ADDRESS_HRP).expect("constant HRP"); + bech32::encode::(hrp, raw).expect("32-byte payload encodes") +} + +fn parse_hex32_field(s: &str, field: &str) -> Result<[u8; 32], ApiError> { + let v = decode_hex_exact(s, 32).map_err(|e| ApiError::malformed(format!("{field}: {e}")))?; + let mut out = [0u8; 32]; + out.copy_from_slice(&v); + Ok(out) +} + +fn parse_hex64_field(s: &str, field: &str) -> Result<[u8; 64], ApiError> { + let v = decode_hex_exact(s, 64).map_err(|e| ApiError::malformed(format!("{field}: {e}")))?; + let mut out = [0u8; 64]; + out.copy_from_slice(&v); + Ok(out) +} + +/// Reject non-canonical Goldilocks limbs in an `nk_commit` wire value. +fn validate_nk_commit_limbs(bytes: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), ApiError> { + for i in 0..4 { + let mut buf = [0u8; 8]; + buf.copy_from_slice(&bytes[i * 8..(i + 1) * 8]); + let limb = u64::from_be_bytes(buf); + if limb >= GOLDILOCKS_ORDER { + return Err(ApiError::malformed(format!( + "ownership_proof.nk_commit: non-canonical Goldilocks limb {i}" + ))); + } + } + Ok(()) +} + +/// `address = SHA-256(Pk₀ ‖ nk_commit_bytes)` (§1.4) where `nk_commit_bytes` +/// is the canonical 32-byte digest encoding on the wire. +fn address_from_pk0_nk_commit(pk0: &[u8; 32], nk_commit: &[u8; 32]) -> [u8; 32] { + let mut pre = [0u8; 64]; + pre[..32].copy_from_slice(pk0); + pre[32..].copy_from_slice(nk_commit); + sha256(&pre) +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// BIP-340 +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +/// Verify BIP-340 Schnorr over a 32-byte message digest under an x-only key. +/// +/// Uses `bitcoin::secp256k1` — the same stack as zk-coins/node. +pub fn verify_bip340( + pk0: &[u8; 32], + signature: &[u8; 64], + message_digest: &[u8; 32], +) -> Result<(), ApiError> { + let xonly = XOnlyPublicKey::from_slice(pk0).map_err(|_| { + ApiError::unauthorized("ownership_proof.public_key is not a valid x-only pubkey") + })?; + let sig = SchnorrSignature::from_slice(signature).map_err(|_| { + ApiError::unauthorized("ownership_proof.signature is not a valid BIP-340 signature") + })?; + let msg = Message::from_digest_slice(message_digest) + .map_err(|_| ApiError::internal("BIP-340 message digest must be 32 bytes"))?; + let secp = Secp256k1::verification_only(); + secp.verify_schnorr(&sig, &msg, &xonly).map_err(|_| { + ApiError::unauthorized("OwnershipProof signature invalid or chan_bind/domain mismatch") + }) +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Capability gate (order-independent GrantProof rejection) +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +/// Closed capability kind for owner-only actions. +#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)] +enum OwnerOnlyCapability { + Ownership, + Grant, +} + +fn capability_from_wire(proof_type: &str) -> Result { + match proof_type { + "ownership" => Ok(OwnerOnlyCapability::Ownership), + "grant" => Ok(OwnerOnlyCapability::Grant), + other => Err(ApiError::unauthorized(format!( + "unknown capability type {other:?}; only OwnershipProof authorises this action" + ))), + } +} + +fn require_ownership(kind: OwnerOnlyCapability) -> Result<(), ApiError> { + match kind { + OwnerOnlyCapability::Ownership => Ok(()), + OwnerOnlyCapability::Grant => Err(ApiError::unauthorized( + "GrantProof does not authorise this owner-only action \ + (AttestBalance / IssueViewGrant require OwnershipProof; no-escalation)", + )), + } +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Main gate +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +/// Verify an action-bound OwnershipProof **without** calling the kernel. +/// +/// # Arguments +/// +/// * `domain` — from the **endpoint**, via [`ChallengeDomain`] (not the body) +/// * `request_subject` — Bech32m subject on the outer request +/// * `challenge` — client echo of issued `{ nonce, expiry }` +/// * `proof` — `OwnershipProofJson` +/// * `request_hash` — server-computed digest of the request body fields +/// * `public_hosts` — authoritative hosts from server config +/// +/// On success returns the `chan_bind` that accepted the signature and the +/// decoded subject/nonce for the subsequent kernel RPC. +pub fn verify_ownership_proof( + domain: ChallengeDomain, + request_subject: &str, + challenge: &ChallengeEcho, + proof: &OwnershipProofJson, + request_hash: &[u8; 32], + public_hosts: &[String], +) -> Result { + // 1. Closed capability match — GrantProof rejected by typed arm. + let capability = capability_from_wire(&proof.proof_type)?; + require_ownership(capability)?; + + // 2. Subject identity (Bech32m + proof subject equality). + let subject_raw = decode_zk_address(request_subject)?; + let proof_subject_raw = decode_zk_address(&proof.subject)?; + if proof_subject_raw != subject_raw { + return Err(ApiError::unauthorized( + "ownership_proof.subject does not match request subject", + )); + } + + // 3. Parse fixed-width proof fields. + let pk0 = parse_hex32_field(&proof.public_key, "ownership_proof.public_key")?; + let nk_commit = parse_hex32_field(&proof.nk_commit, "ownership_proof.nk_commit")?; + validate_nk_commit_limbs(&nk_commit)?; + let signature = parse_hex64_field(&proof.signature, "ownership_proof.signature")?; + let nonce = parse_hex32_field(&challenge.nonce, "challenge.nonce")?; + let challenge_expiry = parse_u64_decimal(&challenge.expiry) + .map_err(|e| ApiError::malformed(format!("challenge.expiry: {}", e.body.message)))?; + + // 4. Address binding: H(Pk₀ ‖ nk_commit) == subject (§5.1(a)). + let expected = address_from_pk0_nk_commit(&pk0, &nk_commit); + if expected != subject_raw { + return Err(ApiError::unauthorized( + "H(Pk0 ‖ nk_commit) does not equal subject address", + )); + } + + // 5. Authoritative chan_bind set (config only — never Host header). + if public_hosts.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::internal( + "no authoritative public hosts configured for chan_bind (ZKCOINS_PUBLIC_HOST)", + )); + } + let allowed: Vec<[u8; 32]> = public_hosts.iter().map(|h| chan_bind_for_host(h)).collect(); + + // 6. BIP-340 over chal under the **endpoint** domain. Try each host's + // chan_bind; accept the first that verifies. Domain is NOT taken from + // the body — a proof signed under the other action domain fails here. + let domain_str = domain.as_str(); + let mut accepted_bind: Option<[u8; 32]> = None; + for cb in &allowed { + let chal = ownership_challenge_message( + domain_str, + &nonce, + cb, + &subject_raw, + challenge_expiry, + request_hash, + ); + if verify_bip340(&pk0, &signature, &chal).is_ok() { + accepted_bind = Some(*cb); + break; + } + } + let chan_bind = match accepted_bind { + Some(b) => b, + None => { + return Err(ApiError::unauthorized( + "OwnershipProof signature invalid or chan_bind/domain mismatch", + )); + } + }; + + Ok(VerifiedOwnership { + subject_bech32: request_subject.to_string(), + subject_raw, + nonce, + challenge_expiry, + chan_bind, + }) +} + +/// Hex-encode a 32-byte digest (re-export convenience for handlers). +pub fn hex32(bytes: &[u8; 32]) -> String { + encode_hex(bytes) +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Keypair, SecretKey}; + + fn sample_sk_pk() -> (SecretKey, [u8; 32]) { + let secp = Secp256k1::new(); + let sk = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0x42u8; 32]).expect("32-byte secret"); + let kp = Keypair::from_secret_key(&secp, &sk); + let (xonly, _) = kp.x_only_public_key(); + (sk, xonly.serialize()) + } + + fn sign_chal(sk: &SecretKey, chal: &[u8; 32]) -> [u8; 64] { + let secp = Secp256k1::new(); + let kp = Keypair::from_secret_key(&secp, sk); + let msg = Message::from_digest_slice(chal).expect("32-byte digest"); + let sig = secp.sign_schnorr_no_aux_rand(&msg, &kp); + let bytes = sig.as_ref(); + let mut out = [0u8; 64]; + out.copy_from_slice(bytes); + out + } + + fn fixture_identity() -> (SecretKey, [u8; 32], [u8; 32], [u8; 32], String) { + let (sk, pk0) = sample_sk_pk(); + // Canonical Goldilocks limbs (all zeros) — valid nk_commit encoding. + let nk_commit = [0u8; 32]; + let subject_raw = address_from_pk0_nk_commit(&pk0, &nk_commit); + let subject_bech = encode_zk_address(&subject_raw); + (sk, pk0, nk_commit, subject_raw, subject_bech) + } + + #[test] + fn domain_strings_match_node_challenge_action() { + assert_eq!( + ChallengeDomain::AttestBalance.as_str(), + "zkCoins/v1/AttestBalanceChallenge" + ); + assert_eq!( + ChallengeDomain::IssueGrant.as_str(), + "zkCoins/v1/IssueGrantChallenge" + ); + assert_ne!( + ChallengeDomain::AttestBalance.as_str(), + ChallengeDomain::IssueGrant.as_str() + ); + } + + #[test] + fn valid_ownership_proof_verifies_under_endpoint_domain() { + let (sk, pk0, nkc, subject_raw, subject_bech) = fixture_identity(); + let host = "node.example.com"; + let nonce = [0xAAu8; 32]; + let expiry = 1_700_000_060u64; + let request_hash = [0x11u8; 32]; + let cb = chan_bind_for_host(host); + let chal = ownership_challenge_message( + ChallengeDomain::AttestBalance.as_str(), + &nonce, + &cb, + &subject_raw, + expiry, + &request_hash, + ); + let sig = sign_chal(&sk, &chal); + + let verified = verify_ownership_proof( + ChallengeDomain::AttestBalance, + &subject_bech, + &ChallengeEcho { + nonce: encode_hex(&nonce), + expiry: expiry.to_string(), + }, + &OwnershipProofJson { + proof_type: "ownership".into(), + subject: subject_bech.clone(), + public_key: encode_hex(&pk0), + nk_commit: encode_hex(&nkc), + signature: encode_hex(&sig), + }, + &request_hash, + &[host.to_string()], + ) + .expect("valid proof"); + assert_eq!(verified.chan_bind, cb); + assert_eq!(verified.subject_raw, subject_raw); + assert_eq!(verified.nonce, nonce); + } + + #[test] + fn wrong_domain_is_unauthorized() { + let (sk, pk0, nkc, subject_raw, subject_bech) = fixture_identity(); + let host = "node.example.com"; + let nonce = [0xBBu8; 32]; + let expiry = 99u64; + let request_hash = [0x22u8; 32]; + let cb = chan_bind_for_host(host); + // Sign under AttestBalance… + let chal = ownership_challenge_message( + ChallengeDomain::AttestBalance.as_str(), + &nonce, + &cb, + &subject_raw, + expiry, + &request_hash, + ); + let sig = sign_chal(&sk, &chal); + // …verify under IssueGrant → must fail. + let err = verify_ownership_proof( + ChallengeDomain::IssueGrant, + &subject_bech, + &ChallengeEcho { + nonce: encode_hex(&nonce), + expiry: expiry.to_string(), + }, + &OwnershipProofJson { + proof_type: "ownership".into(), + subject: subject_bech.clone(), + public_key: encode_hex(&pk0), + nk_commit: encode_hex(&nkc), + signature: encode_hex(&sig), + }, + &request_hash, + &[host.to_string()], + ) + .expect_err("cross-domain"); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "unauthorized"); + assert_eq!(err.status, axum::http::StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED); + } + + #[test] + fn grant_proof_type_is_unauthorized() { + let err = verify_ownership_proof( + ChallengeDomain::AttestBalance, + &encode_zk_address(&[0u8; 32]), + &ChallengeEcho { + nonce: encode_hex(&[1u8; 32]), + expiry: "1".into(), + }, + &OwnershipProofJson { + proof_type: "grant".into(), + subject: encode_zk_address(&[0u8; 32]), + public_key: encode_hex(&[0u8; 32]), + nk_commit: encode_hex(&[0u8; 32]), + signature: encode_hex(&[0u8; 64]), + }, + &[0u8; 32], + &["h.example".into()], + ) + .expect_err("grant"); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "unauthorized"); + assert!( + err.body.message.contains("GrantProof"), + "message must name GrantProof: {}", + err.body.message + ); + } + + #[test] + fn wrong_chan_bind_is_unauthorized() { + let (sk, pk0, nkc, subject_raw, subject_bech) = fixture_identity(); + let signed_host = "signed.example.com"; + let serve_host = "other.example.com"; + let nonce = [0xCCu8; 32]; + let expiry = 50u64; + let request_hash = [0x33u8; 32]; + let cb = chan_bind_for_host(signed_host); + let chal = ownership_challenge_message( + ChallengeDomain::AttestBalance.as_str(), + &nonce, + &cb, + &subject_raw, + expiry, + &request_hash, + ); + let sig = sign_chal(&sk, &chal); + let err = verify_ownership_proof( + ChallengeDomain::AttestBalance, + &subject_bech, + &ChallengeEcho { + nonce: encode_hex(&nonce), + expiry: expiry.to_string(), + }, + &OwnershipProofJson { + proof_type: "ownership".into(), + subject: subject_bech.clone(), + public_key: encode_hex(&pk0), + nk_commit: encode_hex(&nkc), + signature: encode_hex(&sig), + }, + &request_hash, + &[serve_host.to_string()], + ) + .expect_err("wrong host"); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "unauthorized"); + } + + #[test] + fn wrong_request_hash_is_unauthorized() { + let (sk, pk0, nkc, subject_raw, subject_bech) = fixture_identity(); + let host = "node.example.com"; + let nonce = [0xDDu8; 32]; + let expiry = 60u64; + let signed_hash = [0x44u8; 32]; + let presented_hash = [0x55u8; 32]; + let cb = chan_bind_for_host(host); + let chal = ownership_challenge_message( + ChallengeDomain::AttestBalance.as_str(), + &nonce, + &cb, + &subject_raw, + expiry, + &signed_hash, + ); + let sig = sign_chal(&sk, &chal); + let err = verify_ownership_proof( + ChallengeDomain::AttestBalance, + &subject_bech, + &ChallengeEcho { + nonce: encode_hex(&nonce), + expiry: expiry.to_string(), + }, + &OwnershipProofJson { + proof_type: "ownership".into(), + subject: subject_bech.clone(), + public_key: encode_hex(&pk0), + nk_commit: encode_hex(&nkc), + signature: encode_hex(&sig), + }, + &presented_hash, + &[host.to_string()], + ) + .expect_err("body changed after sign"); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "unauthorized"); + } + + #[test] + fn ceiling_encoding_both_or_neither() { + assert_eq!(ceiling_encoding(None, None).unwrap(), vec![0x00]); + let nav = [0xABu8; 32]; + let enc = ceiling_encoding(Some(&nav), Some(7)).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(enc[0], 0x01); + assert_eq!(&enc[1..33], &nav); + assert_eq!(&enc[33..], &7u64.to_be_bytes()); + assert!(ceiling_encoding(Some(&nav), None).is_err()); + assert!(ceiling_encoding(None, Some(1)).is_err()); + } + + #[test] + fn scope_not_after_unbounded_is_i64_max_bit_pattern() { + assert_eq!(SCOPE_NOT_AFTER_UNBOUNDED, i64::MAX as u64); + } +} diff --git a/src/routes.rs b/src/routes.rs index 586de53..6708926 100644 --- a/src/routes.rs +++ b/src/routes.rs @@ -9,8 +9,10 @@ //! Axum registration uses a derived **matcher** form (`:name`); see //! [`advertised_path_to_axum_matcher`]. +use crate::attest; use crate::chain; use crate::config::Config; +use crate::grants; use crate::info; use crate::jobs; use crate::kernel::KernelHandle; @@ -21,6 +23,7 @@ use axum::routing::{get, post}; use axum::{Json, Router}; use serde::Serialize; use std::collections::BTreeMap; +use std::sync::Arc; /// Closed `endpoints` key set from specification §7.5 (`GET /` row). /// @@ -104,6 +107,10 @@ enum ServedSurface { JobsStream, JobsSign, JobsCancel, + AttestBalanceChallenge, + AttestBalance, + GrantsChallenge, + Grants, } impl ServedSurface { @@ -119,6 +126,10 @@ impl ServedSurface { ServedSurface::JobsStream, ServedSurface::JobsSign, ServedSurface::JobsCancel, + ServedSurface::AttestBalanceChallenge, + ServedSurface::AttestBalance, + ServedSurface::GrantsChallenge, + ServedSurface::Grants, ]; /// Closed §7.5 discovery key for this surface. @@ -134,6 +145,10 @@ impl ServedSurface { ServedSurface::JobsStream => "jobs_stream", ServedSurface::JobsSign => "jobs_sign", ServedSurface::JobsCancel => "jobs_cancel", + ServedSurface::AttestBalanceChallenge => "attest_balance_challenge", + ServedSurface::AttestBalance => "attest_balance", + ServedSurface::GrantsChallenge => "grants_challenge", + ServedSurface::Grants => "grants", } } @@ -154,6 +169,14 @@ impl ServedSurface { ServedSurface::JobsStream => router.route(&path, get(jobs::stream_job)), ServedSurface::JobsSign => router.route(&path, post(jobs::post_sign)), ServedSurface::JobsCancel => router.route(&path, post(jobs::post_cancel)), + ServedSurface::AttestBalanceChallenge => { + router.route(&path, post(attest::post_attest_balance_challenge)) + } + ServedSurface::AttestBalance => router.route(&path, post(attest::post_attest_balance)), + ServedSurface::GrantsChallenge => { + router.route(&path, post(grants::post_grants_challenge)) + } + ServedSurface::Grants => router.route(&path, post(grants::post_grants)), } } } @@ -250,9 +273,14 @@ pub fn build_router(config: Config, kernel: KernelHandle) -> Router { bind_addr: _, kernel_addr: _, features, + public_hosts, } = config; - let state = AppState { kernel, features }; + let state = AppState { + kernel, + features, + public_hosts: Arc::new(public_hosts), + }; // Register every surface as `Router`, then bind state so the // returned tree is `Router<()>` and implements `Service`. Binding earlier @@ -284,8 +312,9 @@ mod tests { use crate::error::ApiError; use crate::kernel::encode_kernel_error_status; use crate::kernel::kernel_v1::{ - AccumulatorTip, BootstrapManifest, Info, Job, JobEvent, JobHandle, JobRequest, - NullifierPath, NullifierPathRequest, SignRequest, TransitionRequest, + AccumulatorTip, AttestRequest, BootstrapManifest, Challenge, GrantRequest, GrantResult, + Info, Job, JobEvent, JobHandle, JobRequest, NullifierPath, NullifierPathRequest, + PullChallengeRequest, SignRequest, TransitionRequest, }; use crate::kernel::KernelRpc; use async_trait::async_trait; @@ -295,6 +324,7 @@ mod tests { use http_body_util::BodyExt; use serde_json::Value; use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap}; + use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering}; use std::sync::Arc; use tonic::Code; use tower::ServiceExt; @@ -304,6 +334,7 @@ mod tests { bind_addr: "127.0.0.1:0".parse().unwrap(), kernel_addr: "http://127.0.0.1:50051".to_string(), features: BTreeSet::new(), + public_hosts: vec!["node.example.com".to_string()], } } @@ -346,6 +377,24 @@ mod tests { "test double: get_nullifier_path not configured", )) } + async fn open_pull_challenge( + &self, + _req: PullChallengeRequest, + ) -> Result { + Err(ApiError::internal( + "test double: open_pull_challenge not configured", + )) + } + async fn attest_balance(&self, _req: AttestRequest) -> Result { + Err(ApiError::internal( + "test double: attest_balance not configured", + )) + } + async fn issue_view_grant(&self, _req: GrantRequest) -> Result { + Err(ApiError::internal( + "test double: issue_view_grant not configured", + )) + } } fn test_app() -> Router { @@ -501,9 +550,26 @@ mod tests { "jobs_stream", "jobs_sign", "jobs_cancel", + "attest_balance_challenge", + "attest_balance", + "grants_challenge", + "grants", ]), - "stage B serves health + info/chain reads + the five job-surface keys" + "stage C1 adds the four attest/grants keys to the prior job+info surface" + ); + assert_eq!( + endpoints["attest_balance_challenge"].as_str(), + Some("/v1/attest/balance/challenge") + ); + assert_eq!( + endpoints["attest_balance"].as_str(), + Some("/v1/attest/balance") ); + assert_eq!( + endpoints["grants_challenge"].as_str(), + Some("/v1/grants/challenge") + ); + assert_eq!(endpoints["grants"].as_str(), Some("/v1/grants")); // chain_inscriptions must not be advertised until ListInscriptions exists. assert!( !endpoints.contains_key("chain_inscriptions"), @@ -746,6 +812,7 @@ mod tests { bind_addr: "127.0.0.1:0".parse().unwrap(), kernel_addr: "http://kernel:1".to_string(), features, + public_hosts: vec!["node.example.com".to_string()], }; let app = build_router(cfg, Arc::new(UnreachableKernel)); let res = app @@ -766,6 +833,7 @@ mod tests { bind_addr: "127.0.0.1:0".parse().unwrap(), kernel_addr: "http://kernel:1".to_string(), features: BTreeSet::from([Feature::Wallet]), + public_hosts: vec!["node.example.com".to_string()], }, Arc::new(UnreachableKernel), ); @@ -800,6 +868,13 @@ mod tests { info: Option>, accumulator: Option>, nullifier_path: Option>, + open_challenge: Option>, + attest: Option>, + issue_grant: Option>, + /// Call counters for proving "no kernel call" on auth failure. + attest_calls: AtomicUsize, + issue_grant_calls: AtomicUsize, + open_challenge_calls: AtomicUsize, } #[async_trait] @@ -869,6 +944,33 @@ mod tests { None => Err(ApiError::internal("nullifier_path not scripted")), } } + async fn open_pull_challenge( + &self, + _req: PullChallengeRequest, + ) -> Result { + self.open_challenge_calls.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst); + match &self.open_challenge { + Some(Ok(c)) => Ok(c.clone()), + Some(Err(e)) => Err(e.clone()), + None => Err(ApiError::internal("open_challenge not scripted")), + } + } + async fn attest_balance(&self, _req: AttestRequest) -> Result { + self.attest_calls.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst); + match &self.attest { + Some(Ok(h)) => Ok(h.clone()), + Some(Err(e)) => Err(e.clone()), + None => Err(ApiError::internal("attest not scripted")), + } + } + async fn issue_view_grant(&self, _req: GrantRequest) -> Result { + self.issue_grant_calls.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst); + match &self.issue_grant { + Some(Ok(r)) => Ok(r.clone()), + Some(Err(e)) => Err(e.clone()), + None => Err(ApiError::internal("issue_grant not scripted")), + } + } } fn sample_info(ready: bool, reason: Option<&str>) -> Info { @@ -1340,6 +1442,7 @@ mod tests { bind_addr: "127.0.0.1:0".parse().unwrap(), kernel_addr: "http://127.0.0.1:50051".to_string(), features, + public_hosts: vec!["node.example.com".to_string()], }; let app = build_router(cfg, Arc::new(kernel)); let res = app @@ -1732,4 +1835,629 @@ mod tests { json["message"] ); } + + // ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + // Stage C1 — OwnershipProof gate (attest / grants) + // ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + + use crate::hexutil::encode_hex; + use crate::ownership::{ + attest_request_hash, ceiling_encoding, chan_bind_for_host, encode_grant_asset_ids, + encode_zk_address, issue_grant_request_hash, ownership_challenge_message, ChallengeDomain, + ATTEST_BALANCE_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN, ISSUE_GRANT_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN, SCOPE_NOT_AFTER_UNBOUNDED, + }; + use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Keypair, Message, Secp256k1, SecretKey}; + + /// Expose address helper for tests via a thin re-export path. + /// (`address_from_pk0_nk_commit` is private; tests use the public + /// ownership helpers that already cover the same path.) + mod ownership_fixtures { + use super::*; + + pub fn sample_sk_pk() -> (SecretKey, [u8; 32]) { + let secp = Secp256k1::new(); + let sk = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0x42u8; 32]).expect("32-byte secret"); + let kp = Keypair::from_secret_key(&secp, &sk); + let (xonly, _) = kp.x_only_public_key(); + (sk, xonly.serialize()) + } + + pub fn sign_chal(sk: &SecretKey, chal: &[u8; 32]) -> [u8; 64] { + let secp = Secp256k1::new(); + let kp = Keypair::from_secret_key(&secp, sk); + let msg = Message::from_digest_slice(chal).expect("32-byte digest"); + let sig = secp.sign_schnorr_no_aux_rand(&msg, &kp); + let mut out = [0u8; 64]; + out.copy_from_slice(sig.as_ref()); + out + } + + pub fn identity() -> (SecretKey, [u8; 32], [u8; 32], [u8; 32], String) { + let (sk, pk0) = sample_sk_pk(); + let nk_commit = [0u8; 32]; + // H(Pk0 ‖ nk_commit) with zero digest — same as ownership unit tests. + let mut pre = [0u8; 64]; + pre[..32].copy_from_slice(&pk0); + pre[32..].copy_from_slice(&nk_commit); + let subject_raw: [u8; 32] = { + use sha2::{Digest, Sha256}; + Sha256::digest(pre).into() + }; + let subject_bech = encode_zk_address(&subject_raw); + (sk, pk0, nk_commit, subject_raw, subject_bech) + } + } + + fn ownership_proof_json( + subject: &str, + pk0: &[u8; 32], + nkc: &[u8; 32], + sig: &[u8; 64], + ) -> Value { + serde_json::json!({ + "type": "ownership", + "subject": subject, + "public_key": encode_hex(pk0), + "nk_commit": encode_hex(nkc), + "signature": encode_hex(sig), + }) + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn attest_balance_valid_ownership_calls_kernel() { + let host = "node.example.com"; + let (sk, pk0, nkc, subject_raw, subject_bech) = ownership_fixtures::identity(); + let nonce = [0x11u8; 32]; + let expiry = 1_700_000_060u64; + let asset = [0x22u8; 32]; + let ceiling_enc = ceiling_encoding(None, None).unwrap(); + let request_hash = attest_request_hash(&subject_raw, &asset, &ceiling_enc); + let cb = chan_bind_for_host(host); + let chal = ownership_challenge_message( + ChallengeDomain::AttestBalance.as_str(), + &nonce, + &cb, + &subject_raw, + expiry, + &request_hash, + ); + let sig = ownership_fixtures::sign_chal(&sk, &chal); + + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + attest: Some(Ok(JobHandle { + job_id: "attest-job-1".into(), + status: "accepted".into(), + })), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let body = serde_json::json!({ + "subject": subject_bech, + "asset_id": encode_hex(&asset), + "challenge": { + "nonce": encode_hex(&nonce), + "expiry": expiry.to_string(), + }, + "ownership_proof": ownership_proof_json(&subject_bech, &pk0, &nkc, &sig), + }); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/attest/balance") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from(body.to_string())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::ACCEPTED); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["job_id"], "attest-job-1"); + assert_eq!(kernel.attest_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 1); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn attest_balance_bad_signature_does_not_call_kernel() { + let host = "node.example.com"; + let (_sk, pk0, nkc, _subject_raw, subject_bech) = ownership_fixtures::identity(); + let nonce = [0x11u8; 32]; + let expiry = 1_700_000_060u64; + let asset = [0x22u8; 32]; + let bad_sig = [0xFFu8; 64]; + + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + attest: Some(Ok(JobHandle { + job_id: "should-not-run".into(), + status: "accepted".into(), + })), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let body = serde_json::json!({ + "subject": subject_bech, + "asset_id": encode_hex(&asset), + "challenge": { + "nonce": encode_hex(&nonce), + "expiry": expiry.to_string(), + }, + "ownership_proof": ownership_proof_json(&subject_bech, &pk0, &nkc, &bad_sig), + }); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/attest/balance") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from(body.to_string())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "unauthorized"); + assert_eq!( + kernel.attest_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), + 0, + "failed signature must not reach AttestBalance (nonce not consumed)" + ); + let _ = host; // documents the host used by test_config + } + + /// Domain separation in both directions — the most important test of C1. + #[tokio::test] + async fn domain_separation_attest_signed_proof_does_not_authorise_grants() { + let host = "node.example.com"; + let (sk, pk0, nkc, subject_raw, subject_bech) = ownership_fixtures::identity(); + let nonce = [0x33u8; 32]; + let expiry = 1_700_000_060u64; + let grantee = [0x44u8; 32]; + let grant_expiry = 2_000_000_000u64; + let asset_enc = encode_grant_asset_ids(true, &[]).unwrap(); + let request_hash = issue_grant_request_hash( + &subject_raw, + &grantee, + &asset_enc, + 0, + SCOPE_NOT_AFTER_UNBOUNDED, + grant_expiry, + ); + let cb = chan_bind_for_host(host); + // Sign under **AttestBalance** domain (wrong for /v1/grants). + let chal = ownership_challenge_message( + ChallengeDomain::AttestBalance.as_str(), + &nonce, + &cb, + &subject_raw, + expiry, + &request_hash, + ); + let sig = ownership_fixtures::sign_chal(&sk, &chal); + + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + issue_grant: Some(Ok(GrantResult { + grant: "zkgrant1qqqq".into(), + })), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let body = serde_json::json!({ + "subject": subject_bech, + "grantee_pk": encode_hex(&grantee), + "scope": { "asset_ids": "*" }, + "expiry": grant_expiry.to_string(), + "challenge": { + "nonce": encode_hex(&nonce), + "expiry": expiry.to_string(), + }, + "ownership_proof": ownership_proof_json(&subject_bech, &pk0, &nkc, &sig), + }); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/grants") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from(body.to_string())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "unauthorized"); + assert_eq!( + kernel.issue_grant_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), + 0, + "attest-domain proof must not call IssueViewGrant" + ); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn domain_separation_grant_signed_proof_does_not_authorise_attest() { + let host = "node.example.com"; + let (sk, pk0, nkc, subject_raw, subject_bech) = ownership_fixtures::identity(); + let nonce = [0x55u8; 32]; + let expiry = 1_700_000_060u64; + let asset = [0x66u8; 32]; + let ceiling_enc = ceiling_encoding(None, None).unwrap(); + let request_hash = attest_request_hash(&subject_raw, &asset, &ceiling_enc); + let cb = chan_bind_for_host(host); + // Sign under **IssueGrant** domain (wrong for /v1/attest/balance). + let chal = ownership_challenge_message( + ChallengeDomain::IssueGrant.as_str(), + &nonce, + &cb, + &subject_raw, + expiry, + &request_hash, + ); + let sig = ownership_fixtures::sign_chal(&sk, &chal); + + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + attest: Some(Ok(JobHandle { + job_id: "nope".into(), + status: "accepted".into(), + })), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let body = serde_json::json!({ + "subject": subject_bech, + "asset_id": encode_hex(&asset), + "challenge": { + "nonce": encode_hex(&nonce), + "expiry": expiry.to_string(), + }, + "ownership_proof": ownership_proof_json(&subject_bech, &pk0, &nkc, &sig), + }); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/attest/balance") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from(body.to_string())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED); + assert_eq!(kernel.attest_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 0); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn wrong_chan_bind_rejects_without_kernel() { + let (sk, pk0, nkc, subject_raw, subject_bech) = ownership_fixtures::identity(); + let signed_host = "other.example.com"; + let nonce = [0x77u8; 32]; + let expiry = 99u64; + let asset = [0x88u8; 32]; + let ceiling_enc = ceiling_encoding(None, None).unwrap(); + let request_hash = attest_request_hash(&subject_raw, &asset, &ceiling_enc); + let cb = chan_bind_for_host(signed_host); + let chal = ownership_challenge_message( + ChallengeDomain::AttestBalance.as_str(), + &nonce, + &cb, + &subject_raw, + expiry, + &request_hash, + ); + let sig = ownership_fixtures::sign_chal(&sk, &chal); + + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + attest: Some(Ok(JobHandle { + job_id: "x".into(), + status: "accepted".into(), + })), + ..Default::default() + }); + // test_config serves node.example.com — signature bound to other host. + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let body = serde_json::json!({ + "subject": subject_bech, + "asset_id": encode_hex(&asset), + "challenge": { + "nonce": encode_hex(&nonce), + "expiry": expiry.to_string(), + }, + "ownership_proof": ownership_proof_json(&subject_bech, &pk0, &nkc, &sig), + }); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/attest/balance") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from(body.to_string())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED); + assert_eq!(kernel.attest_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 0); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn wrong_request_hash_rejects_without_kernel() { + let host = "node.example.com"; + let (sk, pk0, nkc, subject_raw, subject_bech) = ownership_fixtures::identity(); + let nonce = [0x99u8; 32]; + let expiry = 100u64; + let asset_signed = [0xAAu8; 32]; + let asset_presented = [0xBBu8; 32]; + let ceiling_enc = ceiling_encoding(None, None).unwrap(); + let request_hash = attest_request_hash(&subject_raw, &asset_signed, &ceiling_enc); + let cb = chan_bind_for_host(host); + let chal = ownership_challenge_message( + ChallengeDomain::AttestBalance.as_str(), + &nonce, + &cb, + &subject_raw, + expiry, + &request_hash, + ); + let sig = ownership_fixtures::sign_chal(&sk, &chal); + + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + attest: Some(Ok(JobHandle { + job_id: "x".into(), + status: "accepted".into(), + })), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let body = serde_json::json!({ + "subject": subject_bech, + "asset_id": encode_hex(&asset_presented), + "challenge": { + "nonce": encode_hex(&nonce), + "expiry": expiry.to_string(), + }, + "ownership_proof": ownership_proof_json(&subject_bech, &pk0, &nkc, &sig), + }); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/attest/balance") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from(body.to_string())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED); + assert_eq!(kernel.attest_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 0); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn expired_challenge_is_passthrough_from_kernel() { + let host = "node.example.com"; + let (sk, pk0, nkc, subject_raw, subject_bech) = ownership_fixtures::identity(); + let nonce = [0xCCu8; 32]; + let expiry = 1_700_000_060u64; + let asset = [0xDDu8; 32]; + let ceiling_enc = ceiling_encoding(None, None).unwrap(); + let request_hash = attest_request_hash(&subject_raw, &asset, &ceiling_enc); + let cb = chan_bind_for_host(host); + let chal = ownership_challenge_message( + ChallengeDomain::AttestBalance.as_str(), + &nonce, + &cb, + &subject_raw, + expiry, + &request_hash, + ); + let sig = ownership_fixtures::sign_chal(&sk, &chal); + + // Signature is valid; kernel reports challenge_expired via ErrorInfo. + let expired = encode_kernel_error_status( + tonic::Code::FailedPrecondition, + "challenge nonce expired", + "challenge_expired", + 410, + ); + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + attest: Some(Err(crate::kernel::kernel_status_to_api_error(&expired))), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let body = serde_json::json!({ + "subject": subject_bech, + "asset_id": encode_hex(&asset), + "challenge": { + "nonce": encode_hex(&nonce), + "expiry": expiry.to_string(), + }, + "ownership_proof": ownership_proof_json(&subject_bech, &pk0, &nkc, &sig), + }); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/attest/balance") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from(body.to_string())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::GONE); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "challenge_expired"); + assert_eq!(kernel.attest_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 1); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn grant_proof_type_is_unauthorized_without_kernel() { + let (_sk, pk0, nkc, _subject_raw, subject_bech) = ownership_fixtures::identity(); + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + attest: Some(Ok(JobHandle { + job_id: "x".into(), + status: "accepted".into(), + })), + issue_grant: Some(Ok(GrantResult { + grant: "zkgrant1".into(), + })), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let body = serde_json::json!({ + "subject": subject_bech, + "asset_id": encode_hex(&[0u8; 32]), + "challenge": { + "nonce": encode_hex(&[1u8; 32]), + "expiry": "100", + }, + "ownership_proof": { + "type": "grant", + "subject": subject_bech, + "public_key": encode_hex(&pk0), + "nk_commit": encode_hex(&nkc), + "signature": encode_hex(&[0u8; 64]), + }, + }); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/attest/balance") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from(body.to_string())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "unauthorized"); + assert!(json["message"].as_str().unwrap().contains("GrantProof")); + assert_eq!(kernel.attest_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 0); + assert_eq!(kernel.issue_grant_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 0); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn grants_valid_ownership_calls_kernel() { + let host = "node.example.com"; + let (sk, pk0, nkc, subject_raw, subject_bech) = ownership_fixtures::identity(); + let nonce = [0xEEu8; 32]; + let challenge_expiry = 1_700_000_060u64; + let grantee = [0xFFu8; 32]; + let grant_expiry = 2_000_000_000u64; + let asset_enc = encode_grant_asset_ids(true, &[]).unwrap(); + let request_hash = issue_grant_request_hash( + &subject_raw, + &grantee, + &asset_enc, + 0, + SCOPE_NOT_AFTER_UNBOUNDED, + grant_expiry, + ); + let cb = chan_bind_for_host(host); + let chal = ownership_challenge_message( + ChallengeDomain::IssueGrant.as_str(), + &nonce, + &cb, + &subject_raw, + challenge_expiry, + &request_hash, + ); + let sig = ownership_fixtures::sign_chal(&sk, &chal); + + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + issue_grant: Some(Ok(GrantResult { + grant: "zkgrant1qpvalid".into(), + })), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let body = serde_json::json!({ + "subject": subject_bech, + "grantee_pk": encode_hex(&grantee), + "scope": { "asset_ids": "*" }, + "expiry": grant_expiry.to_string(), + "challenge": { + "nonce": encode_hex(&nonce), + "expiry": challenge_expiry.to_string(), + }, + "ownership_proof": ownership_proof_json(&subject_bech, &pk0, &nkc, &sig), + }); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/grants") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from(body.to_string())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["grant"], "zkgrant1qpvalid"); + assert_eq!(kernel.issue_grant_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 1); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn challenge_endpoints_return_endpoint_domain() { + let (_, _, _, _, subject_bech) = ownership_fixtures::identity(); + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + open_challenge: Some(Ok(Challenge { + nonce: vec![0xABu8; 32], + expiry: 1_700_000_060, + domain: ATTEST_BALANCE_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN.to_string(), + })), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/attest/balance/challenge") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from( + serde_json::json!({ "subject": subject_bech }).to_string(), + )) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["domain"], ATTEST_BALANCE_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN); + assert_eq!(json["expiry"], "1700000060"); + assert_eq!(json["nonce"].as_str().unwrap().len(), 64); + assert_eq!(kernel.open_challenge_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 1); + + let kernel2 = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + open_challenge: Some(Ok(Challenge { + nonce: vec![0xCDu8; 32], + expiry: 1_700_000_120, + domain: ISSUE_GRANT_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN.to_string(), + })), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel2); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/grants/challenge") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from( + serde_json::json!({ "subject": subject_bech }).to_string(), + )) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["domain"], ISSUE_GRANT_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN); + } } diff --git a/src/state.rs b/src/state.rs index 3e617ef..b44ff60 100644 --- a/src/state.rs +++ b/src/state.rs @@ -2,12 +2,14 @@ //! //! Handlers that need only the kernel extract `State` via //! [`FromRef`]; handlers that also need API-owned config (e.g. `features` -//! for `GET /v1/info`) extract `State`. +//! for `GET /v1/info`, `public_hosts` for OwnershipProof `chan_bind`) +//! extract `State`. use crate::config::Feature; use crate::kernel::KernelHandle; use axum::extract::FromRef; use std::collections::BTreeSet; +use std::sync::Arc; /// Process state bound into the router after registration. #[derive(Clone)] @@ -16,6 +18,9 @@ pub struct AppState { /// API-layer §6.1 features (`ZKCOINS_FEATURES`). The kernel never /// supplies these — `Info.kernel_parts` is a different closed set. pub features: BTreeSet, + /// Authoritative public hostnames for §5.1 `chan_bind` + /// (`ZKCOINS_PUBLIC_HOST`). Never derived from request headers. + pub public_hosts: Arc>, } impl FromRef for KernelHandle { From 3bafd5e7b18dc29b020793c31841914c8c4192ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: TaprootFreak <142087526+TaprootFreak@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2026 18:02:59 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 05/23] feat: add pull, records, coin proofs and the account state read MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Five more §7.5 endpoints, completing the private read surface: the pull challenge and its redemption, `GET /v1/record/`, `GET /v1/proof/` and `GET /v1/account/state`, onto `OpenPullChallenge`, `Pull`, `GetRecord`, `GetCoinProof` and `GetAccountState`. `POST /v1/pull` carries the challenge `expiry` beside `nonce`, matching the specification change that made the redeem body usable from a stateless API layer. It is verified into `chal` before anything is consumed, so a bad proof never spends the nonce. The session authority follows the **proof type** and nothing else. It reaches the kernel explicitly, and a missing value is `malformed_request` rather than a silent assumption of ownership — the failure that would matter most here is the one that quietly upgrades a reader to an owner. The three session failures stay apart, as §7.5 requires: a missing or unusable bearer is `401 unauthorized` decided here, while unknown, expired or channel-mismatched sessions are `410 session_expired` from the kernel. A grant session presented to `GET /v1/account/state` is `401` — read access to a slice is not a right to the account state. **The grant path is rejected outright, and that is the honest outcome.** §5.1(b) verification needs the issuer's published `op` public key to check the grant's signature, and this layer has no way to obtain it: no lookup, no kernel procedure, no protocol state — and it must not hold any. Checking the discriminator and the grantee's own signature while skipping the issuer signature would be a half-verified grant, which is worse than none: it looks like authorisation and is not. So `POST /v1/pull` with a `GrantProofJson` answers `401 unauthorized` without calling the kernel, and what is missing to close it properly is written down rather than approximated. `record_type` and `transition_kind` stay closed sets on the way out; an unrecognised value from the kernel is not forwarded. Nothing the kernel computes is recomputed here. --- src/kernel/client.rs | 79 ++++- src/lib.rs | 1 + src/ownership.rs | 256 ++++++++++++++ src/pull.rs | 605 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/routes.rs | 796 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 5 files changed, 1727 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) create mode 100644 src/pull.rs diff --git a/src/kernel/client.rs b/src/kernel/client.rs index 89dc319..ada470b 100644 --- a/src/kernel/client.rs +++ b/src/kernel/client.rs @@ -9,19 +9,28 @@ use crate::error::ApiError; use crate::kernel::error_info::kernel_status_to_api_error; use crate::kernel::pb::kernel_v1::kernel_client::KernelClient as TonicKernelClient; use crate::kernel::pb::kernel_v1::{ - AccumulatorTip, AttestRequest, Challenge, GetAccumulatorRequest, GetInfoRequest, GrantRequest, + AccountStateRequest, AccountStateResult, AccumulatorTip, AttestRequest, Challenge, + CoinProofBlob, CoinProofRequest, GetAccumulatorRequest, GetInfoRequest, GrantRequest, GrantResult, Info, Job, JobEvent, JobHandle, JobRequest, NullifierPath, NullifierPathRequest, - PullChallengeRequest, SignRequest, TransitionRequest, + PullChallengeRequest, PullRequest, PullResult, RecordBlob, RecordRequest, SignRequest, + TransitionRequest, }; +use crate::ownership::SessionAuthority; use async_trait::async_trait; use futures_util::stream::BoxStream; use futures_util::StreamExt; use std::sync::Arc; +use tonic::metadata::MetadataValue; use tonic::transport::Channel; use tonic::Request; +/// Interim metadata key the node reads for pull session authority +/// (`node/src/kernel_rpc.rs`). Missing ⇒ kernel `malformed_request` (never +/// silent Ownership). +const SESSION_AUTHORITY_METADATA: &str = "x-zkcoins-session-authority"; + /// Subset of kernel procedures this stage consumes -/// (job surface + info/chain reads + attest/grants). +/// (job surface + info/chain reads + attest/grants + pull/records). #[async_trait] pub trait KernelRpc: Send + Sync { async fn submit_transition(&self, req: TransitionRequest) -> Result; @@ -51,6 +60,22 @@ pub trait KernelRpc: Send + Sync { async fn attest_balance(&self, req: AttestRequest) -> Result; async fn issue_view_grant(&self, req: GrantRequest) -> Result; + + /// `Pull` with session authority metadata (never omitted, never defaulted). + async fn pull( + &self, + req: PullRequest, + authority: SessionAuthority, + ) -> Result; + + async fn get_record(&self, req: RecordRequest) -> Result; + + async fn get_coin_proof(&self, req: CoinProofRequest) -> Result; + + async fn get_account_state( + &self, + req: AccountStateRequest, + ) -> Result; } /// Shared handle installed in the axum `State`. @@ -234,6 +259,54 @@ impl KernelRpc for KernelClient { .map_err(map_status)?; Ok(response.into_inner()) } + + async fn pull( + &self, + req: PullRequest, + authority: SessionAuthority, + ) -> Result { + let mut client = self.inner.clone(); + let mut request = Request::new(req); + // Fail-closed: authority is always set from the verified proof kind. + // The node rejects a missing key as malformed_request (never Ownership). + // `as_str` is a closed `'static` token (`ownership` | `grant`). + request.metadata_mut().insert( + SESSION_AUTHORITY_METADATA, + MetadataValue::from_static(authority.as_str()), + ); + let response = client.pull(request).await.map_err(map_status)?; + Ok(response.into_inner()) + } + + async fn get_record(&self, req: RecordRequest) -> Result { + let mut client = self.inner.clone(); + let response = client + .get_record(Request::new(req)) + .await + .map_err(map_status)?; + Ok(response.into_inner()) + } + + async fn get_coin_proof(&self, req: CoinProofRequest) -> Result { + let mut client = self.inner.clone(); + let response = client + .get_coin_proof(Request::new(req)) + .await + .map_err(map_status)?; + Ok(response.into_inner()) + } + + async fn get_account_state( + &self, + req: AccountStateRequest, + ) -> Result { + let mut client = self.inner.clone(); + let response = client + .get_account_state(Request::new(req)) + .await + .map_err(map_status)?; + Ok(response.into_inner()) + } } /// Map a tonic `Status` to REST. diff --git a/src/lib.rs b/src/lib.rs index 1085e9e..e17baf1 100644 --- a/src/lib.rs +++ b/src/lib.rs @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ pub mod jobs; pub mod kernel; pub mod ownership; pub mod proto_identity; +pub mod pull; pub mod routes; pub mod state; diff --git a/src/ownership.rs b/src/ownership.rs index b4a56e3..32ccad0 100644 --- a/src/ownership.rs +++ b/src/ownership.rs @@ -32,6 +32,10 @@ use sha2::{Digest, Sha256}; // there). Word-for-word match is the cryptographic action binding. // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +/// `ChallengeAction::Pull.domain()` in +/// `node/src/kernel/bootstrap/challenges.rs`. +pub const PULL_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN: &str = "zkCoins/v1/PullChallenge"; + /// `ChallengeAction::AttestBalance.domain()` in /// `node/src/kernel/bootstrap/challenges.rs`. pub const ATTEST_BALANCE_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN: &str = "zkCoins/v1/AttestBalanceChallenge"; @@ -65,6 +69,8 @@ const GOLDILOCKS_ORDER: u64 = 0xffff_ffff_0000_0001; /// arbitrary domain from the request body. #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)] pub enum ChallengeDomain { + /// `POST /v1/pull` — no `request_hash` in `chal` (§5.1 L1916). + Pull, AttestBalance, IssueGrant, } @@ -73,6 +79,7 @@ impl ChallengeDomain { /// Normative domain tag for this action (§5.1 table / node source). pub const fn as_str(self) -> &'static str { match self { + ChallengeDomain::Pull => PULL_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN, ChallengeDomain::AttestBalance => ATTEST_BALANCE_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN, ChallengeDomain::IssueGrant => ISSUE_GRANT_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN, } @@ -160,6 +167,29 @@ pub fn ownership_challenge_message( sha256(&pre) } +/// `chal = H(domain ‖ nonce ‖ chan_bind ‖ subject ‖ expiry)` for pull / bootstrap +/// (§5.1 L1916 — no `request_hash`). +/// +/// `domain` is UTF-8 of the action tag; `nonce`/`chan_bind`/`subject` are 32 +/// raw bytes; `expiry` is u64 big-endian. Body `expiry` is bound into this +/// digest (Redeem-body `expiry` normative): a forged value yields a different +/// `chal` and fails signature verification. +pub fn pull_challenge_message( + domain: &str, + nonce: &[u8; 32], + chan_bind: &[u8; 32], + subject: &[u8; 32], + expiry: u64, +) -> [u8; 32] { + let mut pre = Vec::with_capacity(domain.len() + 32 + 32 + 32 + 8); + pre.extend_from_slice(domain.as_bytes()); + pre.extend_from_slice(nonce); + pre.extend_from_slice(chan_bind); + pre.extend_from_slice(subject); + pre.extend_from_slice(&expiry.to_be_bytes()); + sha256(&pre) +} + /// Ceiling encoding for attest `request_hash` (§7.5 L2894): /// - both omitted → `0x00` /// - both present → `0x01 ‖ nav_ceiling (32B) ‖ u64-be(size_ceiling)` @@ -507,6 +537,134 @@ pub fn verify_ownership_proof( }) } +/// §7.5 `GrantProofJson` on the wire (pull path only). +/// +/// Present so the pull handler can discriminate proof kinds without treating +/// an unknown shape as ownership. Full §5.1(b) verification is **not** +/// implemented here — see [`reject_grant_proof`]. +#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize)] +pub struct GrantProofJson { + #[serde(rename = "type")] + pub proof_type: String, + /// Bech32m `zkgrant` string (§5.2). + pub grant: String, + pub grantee_pk: String, + pub signature: String, +} + +/// Session authority that follows from the verified proof kind. +/// +/// Wire tokens match the interim kernel metadata +/// `x-zkcoins-session-authority` (`ownership` | `grant`) in +/// `node/src/kernel_rpc.rs` / `parse_session_authority`. +#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub enum SessionAuthority { + Ownership, + Grant, +} + +impl SessionAuthority { + /// Metadata / wire token. Never empty; never a defaulted ownership. + pub const fn as_str(self) -> &'static str { + match self { + SessionAuthority::Ownership => "ownership", + SessionAuthority::Grant => "grant", + } + } +} + +/// Verify a pull-domain OwnershipProof (`chal` without `request_hash`). +/// +/// Pure: does not dial the kernel. Body `expiry` is part of the signed +/// preimage (Redeem-body `expiry`); a wrong value fails BIP-340. +pub fn verify_pull_ownership_proof( + request_subject: &str, + nonce_hex: &str, + expiry_decimal: &str, + proof: &OwnershipProofJson, + public_hosts: &[String], +) -> Result { + // Closed capability match — GrantProof is a different type on the wire; + // if the ownership shape carries type=grant, reject here. + let capability = capability_from_wire(&proof.proof_type)?; + require_ownership(capability)?; + + let subject_raw = decode_zk_address(request_subject)?; + let proof_subject_raw = decode_zk_address(&proof.subject)?; + if proof_subject_raw != subject_raw { + return Err(ApiError::unauthorized( + "ownership_proof.subject does not match request subject", + )); + } + + let pk0 = parse_hex32_field(&proof.public_key, "ownership_proof.public_key")?; + let nk_commit = parse_hex32_field(&proof.nk_commit, "ownership_proof.nk_commit")?; + validate_nk_commit_limbs(&nk_commit)?; + let signature = parse_hex64_field(&proof.signature, "ownership_proof.signature")?; + let nonce = parse_hex32_field(nonce_hex, "nonce")?; + let challenge_expiry = parse_u64_decimal(expiry_decimal) + .map_err(|e| ApiError::malformed(format!("expiry: {}", e.body.message)))?; + + let expected = address_from_pk0_nk_commit(&pk0, &nk_commit); + if expected != subject_raw { + return Err(ApiError::unauthorized( + "H(Pk0 ‖ nk_commit) does not equal subject address", + )); + } + + if public_hosts.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::internal( + "no authoritative public hosts configured for chan_bind (ZKCOINS_PUBLIC_HOST)", + )); + } + let allowed: Vec<[u8; 32]> = public_hosts.iter().map(|h| chan_bind_for_host(h)).collect(); + + let domain_str = ChallengeDomain::Pull.as_str(); + let mut accepted_bind: Option<[u8; 32]> = None; + for cb in &allowed { + let chal = pull_challenge_message(domain_str, &nonce, cb, &subject_raw, challenge_expiry); + if verify_bip340(&pk0, &signature, &chal).is_ok() { + accepted_bind = Some(*cb); + break; + } + } + let chan_bind = match accepted_bind { + Some(b) => b, + None => { + return Err(ApiError::unauthorized( + "OwnershipProof signature invalid or chan_bind/domain mismatch", + )); + } + }; + + Ok(VerifiedOwnership { + subject_bech32: request_subject.to_string(), + subject_raw, + nonce, + challenge_expiry, + chan_bind, + }) +} + +/// Reject a GrantProof on the pull path (fail-closed, not half-checked). +/// +/// §5.1(b) requires verifying the grant's `op` signature against the subject's +/// **published** `op` pubkey. This process holds no protocol state and has no +/// kernel RPC that returns `op_pubkey` for a subject, so that check cannot be +/// built here. A half-checked grant (structural + grantee chal only) would +/// authorise disclosure under a forged `op` signature — worse than a loud +/// reject. All grant pull attempts therefore fail with `401 unauthorized`. +/// +/// Takes the proof so the call site cannot "forget" to name the grant shape +/// (and so tests can assert the reject path against a concrete body). +pub fn reject_grant_proof(_proof: &GrantProofJson) -> ApiError { + ApiError::unauthorized( + "GrantProof is not accepted: the API cannot verify the grant's op signature \ + without the subject's published op_pubkey (no lookup path in this stage); \ + half-checked grants are forbidden (§5.1(b))", + ) +} + /// Hex-encode a 32-byte digest (re-export convenience for handlers). pub fn hex32(bytes: &[u8; 32]) -> String { encode_hex(bytes) @@ -547,6 +705,7 @@ mod tests { #[test] fn domain_strings_match_node_challenge_action() { + assert_eq!(ChallengeDomain::Pull.as_str(), "zkCoins/v1/PullChallenge"); assert_eq!( ChallengeDomain::AttestBalance.as_str(), "zkCoins/v1/AttestBalanceChallenge" @@ -559,6 +718,103 @@ mod tests { ChallengeDomain::AttestBalance.as_str(), ChallengeDomain::IssueGrant.as_str() ); + assert_ne!( + ChallengeDomain::Pull.as_str(), + ChallengeDomain::AttestBalance.as_str() + ); + } + + #[test] + fn pull_ownership_proof_verifies_without_request_hash() { + let (sk, pk0, nkc, subject_raw, subject_bech) = fixture_identity(); + let host = "node.example.com"; + let nonce = [0xAAu8; 32]; + let expiry = 1_700_000_060u64; + let cb = chan_bind_for_host(host); + let chal = pull_challenge_message( + ChallengeDomain::Pull.as_str(), + &nonce, + &cb, + &subject_raw, + expiry, + ); + let sig = sign_chal(&sk, &chal); + let verified = verify_pull_ownership_proof( + &subject_bech, + &encode_hex(&nonce), + &expiry.to_string(), + &OwnershipProofJson { + proof_type: "ownership".into(), + subject: subject_bech.clone(), + public_key: encode_hex(&pk0), + nk_commit: encode_hex(&nkc), + signature: encode_hex(&sig), + }, + &[host.to_string()], + ) + .expect("valid pull proof"); + assert_eq!(verified.chan_bind, cb); + assert_eq!(verified.nonce, nonce); + } + + #[test] + fn pull_ownership_wrong_expiry_is_unauthorized() { + let (sk, pk0, nkc, subject_raw, subject_bech) = fixture_identity(); + let host = "node.example.com"; + let nonce = [0xBBu8; 32]; + let signed_expiry = 100u64; + let presented_expiry = 999u64; + let cb = chan_bind_for_host(host); + let chal = pull_challenge_message( + ChallengeDomain::Pull.as_str(), + &nonce, + &cb, + &subject_raw, + signed_expiry, + ); + let sig = sign_chal(&sk, &chal); + let err = verify_pull_ownership_proof( + &subject_bech, + &encode_hex(&nonce), + &presented_expiry.to_string(), + &OwnershipProofJson { + proof_type: "ownership".into(), + subject: subject_bech.clone(), + public_key: encode_hex(&pk0), + nk_commit: encode_hex(&nkc), + signature: encode_hex(&sig), + }, + &[host.to_string()], + ) + .expect_err("altered expiry"); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "unauthorized"); + } + + #[test] + fn grant_proof_is_rejected_not_half_checked() { + let err = reject_grant_proof(&GrantProofJson { + proof_type: "grant".into(), + grant: "zkgrant1qq".into(), + grantee_pk: encode_hex(&[0u8; 32]), + signature: encode_hex(&[0u8; 64]), + }); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "unauthorized"); + assert!( + err.body.message.contains("op_pubkey") || err.body.message.contains("op signature"), + "message must name the missing op check: {}", + err.body.message + ); + } + + #[test] + fn session_authority_wire_tokens_match_node_metadata() { + // node `parse_session_authority`: "ownership" | "grant" only. + assert_eq!(SessionAuthority::Ownership.as_str(), "ownership"); + assert_eq!(SessionAuthority::Grant.as_str(), "grant"); + assert_ne!( + SessionAuthority::Ownership.as_str(), + SessionAuthority::Grant.as_str() + ); } #[test] diff --git a/src/pull.rs b/src/pull.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a1b060c --- /dev/null +++ b/src/pull.rs @@ -0,0 +1,605 @@ +//! Capability-gated pull REST surface (§7.5 L3039–L3043). +//! +//! | Method | Path | Kernel | +//! |---|---|---| +//! | `POST` | `/v1/pull/challenge` | `OpenPullChallenge` action=`pull` | +//! | `POST` | `/v1/pull` | `Pull` (after OwnershipProof; GrantProof rejected) | +//! | `GET` | `/v1/record/` | `GetRecord` | +//! | `GET` | `/v1/proof/` | `GetCoinProof` | +//! | `GET` | `/v1/account/state` | `GetAccountState` (ownership session only) | +//! +//! The API holds **no** session store: the bearer token is forwarded to the +//! kernel. Session authority is taken solely from the verified proof kind and +//! sent as interim metadata `x-zkcoins-session-authority` (never defaulted). + +use crate::error::ApiError; +use crate::hexutil::{decode_hex_exact, encode_hex}; +use crate::kernel::kernel_v1::{ + AccountStateRequest, AccountStateResult, CoinProofBlob, CoinProofRequest, PullChallengeRequest, + PullRequest, PullResult as ProtoPullResult, RecordBlob, RecordRef, RecordRequest, Scope, +}; +use crate::ownership::{ + chan_bind_for_host, decode_zk_address, parse_u64_decimal, reject_grant_proof, + verify_pull_ownership_proof, GrantProofJson, OwnershipProofJson, SessionAuthority, + PULL_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN, SCOPE_NOT_AFTER_UNBOUNDED, +}; +use crate::state::AppState; +use axum::extract::{Path, State}; +use axum::http::{header, HeaderMap, StatusCode}; +use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response}; +use axum::Json; +use serde::Deserialize; +use serde_json::{json, Value}; + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Wire types +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)] +pub struct PullChallengeBody { + pub subject: String, + #[serde(default)] + pub scope: Option, +} + +#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)] +pub struct PullScopeJson { + /// Either the string `"*"` or an array of hex32 asset ids. + pub asset_ids: Value, + #[serde(default)] + pub not_before: Option, + #[serde(default)] + pub not_after: Option, +} + +/// Redeem body: top-level `{ nonce, expiry, proof }` (Redeem-body `expiry` +/// normative — not nested under `challenge`). +#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)] +pub struct PullBody { + pub nonce: String, + /// Challenge expiry echoed from issuance (bound into signed `chal`; not + /// trusted as a clock source — a forged value fails BIP-340). + pub expiry: String, + pub proof: PullProofJson, +} + +/// Closed proof discriminator for `POST /v1/pull`. +#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)] +#[serde(tag = "type")] +pub enum PullProofJson { + #[serde(rename = "ownership")] + Ownership { + subject: String, + public_key: String, + nk_commit: String, + signature: String, + }, + #[serde(rename = "grant")] + Grant { + grant: String, + grantee_pk: String, + signature: String, + }, +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Scope normalisation (§5.1 / §7.5) +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +struct NormalisedScope { + all_assets: bool, + asset_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]>, + not_before: u64, + not_after: u64, +} + +/// Unbounded scope: `asset_ids = "*"`, `not_before = 0`, `not_after = 2⁶³−1`. +fn unbounded_scope() -> NormalisedScope { + NormalisedScope { + all_assets: true, + asset_ids: Vec::new(), + not_before: 0, + not_after: SCOPE_NOT_AFTER_UNBOUNDED, + } +} + +/// Normalise REST scope to the single unbounded-sentinel pair **before** +/// the kernel RPC (§5.1 L1918). +fn normalise_scope(scope: &PullScopeJson) -> Result { + let (all_assets, asset_ids) = match &scope.asset_ids { + Value::String(s) if s == "*" => (true, Vec::new()), + Value::String(s) => { + return Err(ApiError::malformed(format!( + "scope.asset_ids string must be \"*\", got {s:?}" + ))); + } + Value::Array(arr) => { + let mut ids = Vec::with_capacity(arr.len()); + for (i, v) in arr.iter().enumerate() { + let hex = v.as_str().ok_or_else(|| { + ApiError::malformed(format!("scope.asset_ids[{i}] must be a hex string")) + })?; + let raw = decode_hex_exact(hex, 32) + .map_err(|e| ApiError::malformed(format!("scope.asset_ids[{i}]: {e}")))?; + let mut a = [0u8; 32]; + a.copy_from_slice(&raw); + ids.push(a); + } + if ids.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::malformed( + "scope.asset_ids list must be non-empty when not \"*\"", + )); + } + (false, ids) + } + other => { + return Err(ApiError::malformed(format!( + "scope.asset_ids must be \"*\" or an array of hex32, got {other}" + ))); + } + }; + + let not_before = match &scope.not_before { + None => 0u64, + Some(s) => parse_u64_decimal(s) + .map_err(|e| ApiError::malformed(format!("scope.not_before: {}", e.body.message)))?, + }; + let not_after = match &scope.not_after { + None => SCOPE_NOT_AFTER_UNBOUNDED, + Some(s) => parse_u64_decimal(s) + .map_err(|e| ApiError::malformed(format!("scope.not_after: {}", e.body.message)))?, + }; + + Ok(NormalisedScope { + all_assets, + asset_ids, + not_before, + not_after, + }) +} + +fn scope_to_proto(scope: &NormalisedScope) -> Scope { + Scope { + asset_ids: scope.asset_ids.iter().map(|a| a.to_vec()).collect(), + all_assets: scope.all_assets, + not_before: scope.not_before, + not_after: scope.not_after, + } +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Closed wire vocabularies (§7.5 PullResult) +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +fn map_record_type(raw: &str) -> Result<&'static str, ApiError> { + match raw { + "coinproof" => Ok("coinproof"), + "self_delivery" => Ok("self_delivery"), + other => Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "kernel RecordRef.record_type is outside the closed set \ + (\"coinproof\"|\"self_delivery\"): {other:?}" + ))), + } +} + +/// Map optional `transition_kind`. Empty string means absent (coinproof). +/// Required non-empty for `self_delivery`. +fn map_transition_kind(raw: &str, record_type: &str) -> Result, ApiError> { + if raw.is_empty() { + if record_type == "self_delivery" { + return Err(ApiError::internal( + "kernel RecordRef.transition_kind is required for record_type=self_delivery", + )); + } + return Ok(None); + } + match raw { + "mint" => Ok(Some("mint")), + "send" => Ok(Some("send")), + "receive" => Ok(Some("receive")), + other => Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "kernel RecordRef.transition_kind is outside the closed set \ + (\"mint\"|\"send\"|\"receive\"): {other:?}" + ))), + } +} + +fn record_ref_to_json(r: &RecordRef) -> Result { + if r.record_id.len() != 32 { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "kernel RecordRef.record_id must be 32 bytes, got {}", + r.record_id.len() + ))); + } + if r.blob_id.len() != 32 { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "kernel RecordRef.blob_id must be 32 bytes, got {}", + r.blob_id.len() + ))); + } + let record_type = map_record_type(&r.record_type)?; + let transition_kind = map_transition_kind(&r.transition_kind, record_type)?; + + let mut obj = serde_json::Map::new(); + obj.insert("record_id".into(), Value::String(encode_hex(&r.record_id))); + obj.insert("record_type".into(), Value::String(record_type.to_string())); + if let Some(kind) = transition_kind { + obj.insert("transition_kind".into(), Value::String(kind.to_string())); + } + obj.insert("blob_id".into(), Value::String(encode_hex(&r.blob_id))); + obj.insert( + "occurred_at".into(), + Value::String(r.occurred_at.to_string()), + ); + Ok(Value::Object(obj)) +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Session / bearer helpers +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +/// Extract `Authorization: Bearer `. +/// +/// Missing or malformed → `401 unauthorized` (§7.5: never collapse into +/// `session_expired` / 410). +fn bearer_token(headers: &HeaderMap) -> Result { + let Some(value) = headers.get(header::AUTHORIZATION) else { + return Err(ApiError::unauthorized( + "missing Authorization bearer token for pull session", + )); + }; + let s = value + .to_str() + .map_err(|_| ApiError::unauthorized("Authorization header is not valid UTF-8"))?; + let Some(token) = s.strip_prefix("Bearer ") else { + return Err(ApiError::unauthorized( + "Authorization must be \"Bearer \"", + )); + }; + if token.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::unauthorized("bearer token is empty")); + } + // Whitespace or control characters are not a node-issued credential shape. + if token.bytes().any(|b| b.is_ascii_whitespace() || b < 0x20) { + return Err(ApiError::unauthorized( + "bearer token is malformed (whitespace or control bytes)", + )); + } + Ok(token.to_string()) +} + +/// Authoritative `chan_bind` for session-bound follow-ups. +/// +/// Exactly one configured public host is required: with several hosts the API +/// cannot re-select the original binding without reading the request `Host` +/// (forbidden by §5.1 / §7.8). Multi-host session routing is a documented GAP. +fn session_chan_bind(public_hosts: &[String]) -> Result<[u8; 32], ApiError> { + match public_hosts { + [] => Err(ApiError::internal( + "no authoritative public hosts configured for chan_bind (ZKCOINS_PUBLIC_HOST)", + )), + [only] => Ok(chan_bind_for_host(only)), + _ => Err(ApiError::internal( + "session channel binding requires exactly one ZKCOINS_PUBLIC_HOST \ + in this stage (multi-host re-bind would need a trusted SNI path, \ + not the client Host header)", + )), + } +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Handlers +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +/// `POST /v1/pull/challenge` → OpenPullChallenge(action=pull). +pub async fn post_pull_challenge( + State(state): State, + Json(body): Json, +) -> Result { + if body.subject.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::malformed("subject is required")); + } + let _ = decode_zk_address(&body.subject)?; + + let requested_scope = match &body.scope { + None => None, + Some(s) => Some(scope_to_proto(&normalise_scope(s)?)), + }; + + let challenge = state + .kernel + .open_pull_challenge(PullChallengeRequest { + subject: body.subject, + requested_scope, + action: "pull".to_string(), + }) + .await?; + + if challenge.nonce.len() != 32 { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "kernel Challenge.nonce must be 32 bytes, got {}", + challenge.nonce.len() + ))); + } + if challenge.domain != PULL_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "kernel Challenge.domain must be {PULL_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN:?}, got {:?}", + challenge.domain + ))); + } + + let body = json!({ + "nonce": encode_hex(&challenge.nonce), + "expiry": challenge.expiry.to_string(), + "domain": PULL_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN, + }); + Ok((StatusCode::OK, Json(body)).into_response()) +} + +/// `POST /v1/pull` → verify proof, then `Pull`. +/// +/// OwnershipProof is verified pure (no kernel) so a bad signature cannot +/// consume the single-use nonce. GrantProof is rejected fail-closed (no +/// op_pubkey lookup — see [`reject_grant_proof`]). +pub async fn post_pull( + State(state): State, + Json(body): Json, +) -> Result { + // ---- pure validation + capability gate (no kernel) ---- + let (verified, authority) = match body.proof { + PullProofJson::Ownership { + subject, + public_key, + nk_commit, + signature, + } => { + let proof = OwnershipProofJson { + proof_type: "ownership".into(), + subject: subject.clone(), + public_key, + nk_commit, + signature, + }; + let v = verify_pull_ownership_proof( + &subject, + &body.nonce, + &body.expiry, + &proof, + state.public_hosts.as_slice(), + )?; + (v, SessionAuthority::Ownership) + } + PullProofJson::Grant { + grant, + grantee_pk, + signature, + } => { + let proof = GrantProofJson { + proof_type: "grant".into(), + grant, + grantee_pk, + signature, + }; + // Structural fail-closed: never half-check a grant. + return Err(reject_grant_proof(&proof)); + } + }; + + // Ownership authorises the full account; resolved scope is the unbounded + // sentinel pair. A narrower scope requested at challenge time is enforced + // by the kernel (`resolved ⊆ requested`). Clients that open a narrow + // challenge and then pull with unbounded resolved_scope get + // `scope_exceeded` from the kernel — fail-closed, not silently widened. + // GAP: a stateless API cannot recompute the exact requested scope without + // a challenge store or a client re-echo of scope on redeem. + let resolved = unbounded_scope(); + + // ---- only now: kernel (nonce consumption lives here) ---- + let result: ProtoPullResult = state + .kernel + .pull( + PullRequest { + nonce: verified.nonce.to_vec(), + subject: verified.subject_bech32, + resolved_scope: Some(scope_to_proto(&resolved)), + chan_bind: verified.chan_bind.to_vec(), + }, + authority, + ) + .await?; + + if result.session.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::internal( + "kernel PullResult.session is empty on Pull success", + )); + } + + let mut records = Vec::with_capacity(result.records.len()); + for r in &result.records { + records.push(record_ref_to_json(r)?); + } + + let body = json!({ + "records": records, + "session": result.session, + "session_expiry": result.session_expiry.to_string(), + }); + Ok((StatusCode::OK, Json(body)).into_response()) +} + +/// `GET /v1/record/` → canonical binary (§7.5 L3041). +/// +/// Content-Type: `application/octet-stream` (same binary transport class as +/// §7.4 Blossom; §7.5 names the body as canonical §7.1 bytes, not JSON). +pub async fn get_record( + State(state): State, + Path(record_id_hex): Path, + headers: HeaderMap, +) -> Result { + let session = bearer_token(&headers)?; + let chan_bind = session_chan_bind(state.public_hosts.as_slice())?; + let record_id = decode_hex_exact(&record_id_hex, 32) + .map_err(|e| ApiError::malformed(format!("record_id: {e}")))?; + + let blob: RecordBlob = state + .kernel + .get_record(RecordRequest { + record_id, + session, + chan_bind: chan_bind.to_vec(), + }) + .await?; + + // Validate closed type metadata from the kernel even though the REST + // response is raw bytes only — an unknown type must not be released. + let record_type = map_record_type(&blob.record_type)?; + let _ = map_transition_kind(&blob.transition_kind, record_type)?; + + if blob.canonical.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::internal( + "kernel RecordBlob.canonical is empty on GetRecord success", + )); + } + + Ok(( + StatusCode::OK, + [(header::CONTENT_TYPE, "application/octet-stream")], + blob.canonical, + ) + .into_response()) +} + +/// `GET /v1/proof/` → canonical CoinProof bytes (§7.5 L3042). +pub async fn get_proof( + State(state): State, + Path(coin_id_hex): Path, + headers: HeaderMap, +) -> Result { + let session = bearer_token(&headers)?; + let chan_bind = session_chan_bind(state.public_hosts.as_slice())?; + let coin_id = decode_hex_exact(&coin_id_hex, 32) + .map_err(|e| ApiError::malformed(format!("coin_id: {e}")))?; + + let blob: CoinProofBlob = state + .kernel + .get_coin_proof(CoinProofRequest { + coin_id, + session, + chan_bind: chan_bind.to_vec(), + }) + .await?; + + if blob.canonical.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::internal( + "kernel CoinProofBlob.canonical is empty on GetCoinProof success", + )); + } + + Ok(( + StatusCode::OK, + [(header::CONTENT_TYPE, "application/octet-stream")], + blob.canonical, + ) + .into_response()) +} + +/// `GET /v1/account/state` → ownership-only account head (§7.5 L3043). +/// +/// Consistency of `send_counter` / `current_pubkey` with the bytes inside +/// `account_state` is a **kernel** guarantee (proto comments / §7.8); the +/// API does not re-parse or recompute those fields. +pub async fn get_account_state( + State(state): State, + headers: HeaderMap, +) -> Result { + let session = bearer_token(&headers)?; + let chan_bind = session_chan_bind(state.public_hosts.as_slice())?; + + let view: AccountStateResult = state + .kernel + .get_account_state(AccountStateRequest { + session, + chan_bind: chan_bind.to_vec(), + }) + .await?; + + if view.account_state.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::internal( + "kernel AccountStateResult.account_state is empty on success", + )); + } + if view.state_head.len() != 32 { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "kernel AccountStateResult.state_head must be 32 bytes, got {}", + view.state_head.len() + ))); + } + if view.current_pubkey.len() != 32 { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "kernel AccountStateResult.current_pubkey must be 32 bytes, got {}", + view.current_pubkey.len() + ))); + } + // Optional head_record_id: empty = absent; otherwise exactly 32. + if !view.head_record_id.is_empty() && view.head_record_id.len() != 32 { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "kernel AccountStateResult.head_record_id must be empty or 32 bytes, got {}", + view.head_record_id.len() + ))); + } + // last_nullifier: both present (32B each) or both empty. + let last_nullifier = match ( + view.last_nullifier_pk.is_empty(), + view.last_nullifier_r.is_empty(), + ) { + (true, true) => None, + (false, false) => { + if view.last_nullifier_pk.len() != 32 || view.last_nullifier_r.len() != 32 { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "kernel last_nullifier fields must be 32 bytes each when present \ + (pk={}, r={})", + view.last_nullifier_pk.len(), + view.last_nullifier_r.len() + ))); + } + Some(json!({ + "pubkey": encode_hex(&view.last_nullifier_pk), + "r": encode_hex(&view.last_nullifier_r), + })) + } + _ => { + return Err(ApiError::internal( + "kernel last_nullifier_pk and last_nullifier_r must both be present or both empty", + )); + } + }; + + let mut body = serde_json::Map::new(); + body.insert( + "account_state".into(), + Value::String(encode_hex(&view.account_state)), + ); + body.insert( + "state_head".into(), + Value::String(encode_hex(&view.state_head)), + ); + if !view.head_record_id.is_empty() { + body.insert( + "head_record_id".into(), + Value::String(encode_hex(&view.head_record_id)), + ); + } + body.insert( + "send_counter".into(), + Value::String(view.send_counter.to_string()), + ); + body.insert( + "current_pubkey".into(), + Value::String(encode_hex(&view.current_pubkey)), + ); + if let Some(nf) = last_nullifier { + body.insert("last_nullifier".into(), nf); + } + + Ok((StatusCode::OK, Json(Value::Object(body))).into_response()) +} diff --git a/src/routes.rs b/src/routes.rs index 6708926..228b3ae 100644 --- a/src/routes.rs +++ b/src/routes.rs @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ use crate::grants; use crate::info; use crate::jobs; use crate::kernel::KernelHandle; +use crate::pull; use crate::state::AppState; use axum::http::StatusCode; use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response}; @@ -111,6 +112,11 @@ enum ServedSurface { AttestBalance, GrantsChallenge, Grants, + PullChallenge, + Pull, + Record, + Proof, + AccountState, } impl ServedSurface { @@ -130,6 +136,11 @@ impl ServedSurface { ServedSurface::AttestBalance, ServedSurface::GrantsChallenge, ServedSurface::Grants, + ServedSurface::PullChallenge, + ServedSurface::Pull, + ServedSurface::Record, + ServedSurface::Proof, + ServedSurface::AccountState, ]; /// Closed §7.5 discovery key for this surface. @@ -149,6 +160,11 @@ impl ServedSurface { ServedSurface::AttestBalance => "attest_balance", ServedSurface::GrantsChallenge => "grants_challenge", ServedSurface::Grants => "grants", + ServedSurface::PullChallenge => "pull_challenge", + ServedSurface::Pull => "pull", + ServedSurface::Record => "record", + ServedSurface::Proof => "proof", + ServedSurface::AccountState => "account_state", } } @@ -177,6 +193,11 @@ impl ServedSurface { router.route(&path, post(grants::post_grants_challenge)) } ServedSurface::Grants => router.route(&path, post(grants::post_grants)), + ServedSurface::PullChallenge => router.route(&path, post(pull::post_pull_challenge)), + ServedSurface::Pull => router.route(&path, post(pull::post_pull)), + ServedSurface::Record => router.route(&path, get(pull::get_record)), + ServedSurface::Proof => router.route(&path, get(pull::get_proof)), + ServedSurface::AccountState => router.route(&path, get(pull::get_account_state)), } } } @@ -312,11 +333,14 @@ mod tests { use crate::error::ApiError; use crate::kernel::encode_kernel_error_status; use crate::kernel::kernel_v1::{ - AccumulatorTip, AttestRequest, BootstrapManifest, Challenge, GrantRequest, GrantResult, - Info, Job, JobEvent, JobHandle, JobRequest, NullifierPath, NullifierPathRequest, - PullChallengeRequest, SignRequest, TransitionRequest, + AccountStateRequest, AccountStateResult, AccumulatorTip, AttestRequest, BootstrapManifest, + Challenge, CoinProofBlob, CoinProofRequest, GrantRequest, GrantResult, Info, Job, JobEvent, + JobHandle, JobRequest, NullifierPath, NullifierPathRequest, PullChallengeRequest, + PullRequest, PullResult as ProtoPullResult, RecordBlob, RecordRequest, SignRequest, + TransitionRequest, }; use crate::kernel::KernelRpc; + use crate::ownership::SessionAuthority; use async_trait::async_trait; use axum::body::Body; use axum::http::{Request, StatusCode}; @@ -325,7 +349,7 @@ mod tests { use serde_json::Value; use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap}; use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering}; - use std::sync::Arc; + use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex}; use tonic::Code; use tower::ServiceExt; @@ -395,6 +419,29 @@ mod tests { "test double: issue_view_grant not configured", )) } + async fn pull( + &self, + _req: PullRequest, + _authority: SessionAuthority, + ) -> Result { + Err(ApiError::internal("test double: pull not configured")) + } + async fn get_record(&self, _req: RecordRequest) -> Result { + Err(ApiError::internal("test double: get_record not configured")) + } + async fn get_coin_proof(&self, _req: CoinProofRequest) -> Result { + Err(ApiError::internal( + "test double: get_coin_proof not configured", + )) + } + async fn get_account_state( + &self, + _req: AccountStateRequest, + ) -> Result { + Err(ApiError::internal( + "test double: get_account_state not configured", + )) + } } fn test_app() -> Router { @@ -554,8 +601,13 @@ mod tests { "attest_balance", "grants_challenge", "grants", + "pull_challenge", + "pull", + "record", + "proof", + "account_state", ]), - "stage C1 adds the four attest/grants keys to the prior job+info surface" + "stage C2 adds the five pull/record/proof/account_state keys" ); assert_eq!( endpoints["attest_balance_challenge"].as_str(), @@ -570,6 +622,17 @@ mod tests { Some("/v1/grants/challenge") ); assert_eq!(endpoints["grants"].as_str(), Some("/v1/grants")); + assert_eq!( + endpoints["pull_challenge"].as_str(), + Some("/v1/pull/challenge") + ); + assert_eq!(endpoints["pull"].as_str(), Some("/v1/pull")); + assert_eq!(endpoints["record"].as_str(), Some("/v1/record/")); + assert_eq!(endpoints["proof"].as_str(), Some("/v1/proof/")); + assert_eq!( + endpoints["account_state"].as_str(), + Some("/v1/account/state") + ); // chain_inscriptions must not be advertised until ListInscriptions exists. assert!( !endpoints.contains_key("chain_inscriptions"), @@ -849,8 +912,12 @@ mod tests { "job surface key 'tx' must be advertised once the handler exists" ); assert!( - !endpoints.contains_key("pull"), - "wallet feature must not advertise /v1/pull before that handler exists" + endpoints.contains_key("pull"), + "stage C2 advertises /v1/pull once the handler exists" + ); + assert!( + !endpoints.contains_key("receipts_stream"), + "receipts_stream must stay unadvertised until SubscribeReceipts is wired" ); } @@ -871,10 +938,20 @@ mod tests { open_challenge: Option>, attest: Option>, issue_grant: Option>, + pull: Option>, + get_record: Option>, + get_coin_proof: Option>, + get_account_state: Option>, /// Call counters for proving "no kernel call" on auth failure. attest_calls: AtomicUsize, issue_grant_calls: AtomicUsize, open_challenge_calls: AtomicUsize, + pull_calls: AtomicUsize, + get_record_calls: AtomicUsize, + get_coin_proof_calls: AtomicUsize, + get_account_state_calls: AtomicUsize, + /// Last pull authority observed (for grant/ownership plumbing asserts). + last_pull_authority: Mutex>, } #[async_trait] @@ -971,6 +1048,46 @@ mod tests { None => Err(ApiError::internal("issue_grant not scripted")), } } + async fn pull( + &self, + _req: PullRequest, + authority: SessionAuthority, + ) -> Result { + self.pull_calls.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst); + *self.last_pull_authority.lock().expect("authority mutex") = Some(authority); + match &self.pull { + Some(Ok(r)) => Ok(r.clone()), + Some(Err(e)) => Err(e.clone()), + None => Err(ApiError::internal("pull not scripted")), + } + } + async fn get_record(&self, _req: RecordRequest) -> Result { + self.get_record_calls.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst); + match &self.get_record { + Some(Ok(r)) => Ok(r.clone()), + Some(Err(e)) => Err(e.clone()), + None => Err(ApiError::internal("get_record not scripted")), + } + } + async fn get_coin_proof(&self, _req: CoinProofRequest) -> Result { + self.get_coin_proof_calls.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst); + match &self.get_coin_proof { + Some(Ok(r)) => Ok(r.clone()), + Some(Err(e)) => Err(e.clone()), + None => Err(ApiError::internal("get_coin_proof not scripted")), + } + } + async fn get_account_state( + &self, + _req: AccountStateRequest, + ) -> Result { + self.get_account_state_calls.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst); + match &self.get_account_state { + Some(Ok(r)) => Ok(r.clone()), + Some(Err(e)) => Err(e.clone()), + None => Err(ApiError::internal("get_account_state not scripted")), + } + } } fn sample_info(ready: bool, reason: Option<&str>) -> Info { @@ -2460,4 +2577,669 @@ mod tests { let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); assert_eq!(json["domain"], ISSUE_GRANT_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN); } + + // ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + // Stage C2 — Pull / Record / Proof / AccountState + // ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + + use crate::kernel::kernel_v1::RecordRef; + use crate::ownership::{pull_challenge_message, PULL_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN}; + + fn sample_pull_result() -> ProtoPullResult { + ProtoPullResult { + records: vec![RecordRef { + record_id: vec![0x11u8; 32], + record_type: "coinproof".into(), + transition_kind: String::new(), + blob_id: vec![0x22u8; 32], + occurred_at: 1_700_000_000, + }], + session: "sess-token-1".into(), + session_expiry: 1_700_000_300, + } + } + + fn pull_body_ownership( + subject: &str, + pk0: &[u8; 32], + nkc: &[u8; 32], + nonce: &[u8; 32], + expiry: u64, + sig: &[u8; 64], + ) -> Value { + serde_json::json!({ + "nonce": encode_hex(nonce), + "expiry": expiry.to_string(), + "proof": { + "type": "ownership", + "subject": subject, + "public_key": encode_hex(pk0), + "nk_commit": encode_hex(nkc), + "signature": encode_hex(sig), + } + }) + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn pull_challenge_returns_pull_domain() { + let (_, _, _, _, subject_bech) = ownership_fixtures::identity(); + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + open_challenge: Some(Ok(Challenge { + nonce: vec![0xABu8; 32], + expiry: 1_700_000_060, + domain: PULL_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN.to_string(), + })), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/pull/challenge") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from( + serde_json::json!({ "subject": subject_bech }).to_string(), + )) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["domain"], PULL_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN); + assert_eq!(json["expiry"], "1700000060"); + assert_eq!(json["nonce"].as_str().unwrap().len(), 64); + assert_eq!(kernel.open_challenge_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 1); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn pull_valid_ownership_opens_session_with_ownership_authority() { + let host = "node.example.com"; + let (sk, pk0, nkc, subject_raw, subject_bech) = ownership_fixtures::identity(); + let nonce = [0x11u8; 32]; + let expiry = 1_700_000_060u64; + let cb = chan_bind_for_host(host); + let chal = pull_challenge_message( + ChallengeDomain::Pull.as_str(), + &nonce, + &cb, + &subject_raw, + expiry, + ); + let sig = ownership_fixtures::sign_chal(&sk, &chal); + + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + pull: Some(Ok(sample_pull_result())), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/pull") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from( + pull_body_ownership(&subject_bech, &pk0, &nkc, &nonce, expiry, &sig) + .to_string(), + )) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["session"], "sess-token-1"); + assert_eq!(json["session_expiry"], "1700000300"); + assert_eq!(json["records"][0]["record_type"], "coinproof"); + assert_eq!(json["records"][0]["occurred_at"], "1700000000"); + assert!( + json["records"][0].get("transition_kind").is_none(), + "coinproof without transition_kind must omit the field" + ); + assert_eq!(kernel.pull_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 1); + assert_eq!( + *kernel.last_pull_authority.lock().unwrap(), + Some(SessionAuthority::Ownership), + "session authority must follow the OwnershipProof kind" + ); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn pull_grant_proof_is_rejected_without_kernel_call() { + // Befund: no op_pubkey lookup → GrantProof always 401, never half-checked. + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + pull: Some(Ok(sample_pull_result())), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let body = serde_json::json!({ + "nonce": encode_hex(&[0x11u8; 32]), + "expiry": "1700000060", + "proof": { + "type": "grant", + "grant": "zkgrant1qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq", + "grantee_pk": encode_hex(&[0x33u8; 32]), + "signature": encode_hex(&[0x44u8; 64]), + } + }); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/pull") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from(body.to_string())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "unauthorized"); + assert!( + json["message"].as_str().unwrap().contains("op_pubkey") + || json["message"].as_str().unwrap().contains("op signature"), + "message must name the missing op check: {}", + json["message"] + ); + assert_eq!( + kernel.pull_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), + 0, + "rejected grant must not consume the challenge nonce" + ); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn pull_bad_signature_does_not_call_kernel() { + let (_sk, pk0, nkc, _subject_raw, subject_bech) = ownership_fixtures::identity(); + let nonce = [0x11u8; 32]; + let expiry = 1_700_000_060u64; + let bad_sig = [0xFFu8; 64]; + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + pull: Some(Ok(sample_pull_result())), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/pull") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from( + pull_body_ownership(&subject_bech, &pk0, &nkc, &nonce, expiry, &bad_sig) + .to_string(), + )) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED); + assert_eq!(kernel.pull_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 0); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn pull_wrong_domain_signature_does_not_call_kernel() { + // Sign under AttestBalance domain, redeem under Pull → unauthorized. + let host = "node.example.com"; + let (sk, pk0, nkc, subject_raw, subject_bech) = ownership_fixtures::identity(); + let nonce = [0x22u8; 32]; + let expiry = 1_700_000_060u64; + let cb = chan_bind_for_host(host); + let request_hash = [0u8; 32]; + let chal = ownership_challenge_message( + ChallengeDomain::AttestBalance.as_str(), + &nonce, + &cb, + &subject_raw, + expiry, + &request_hash, + ); + let sig = ownership_fixtures::sign_chal(&sk, &chal); + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + pull: Some(Ok(sample_pull_result())), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/pull") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from( + pull_body_ownership(&subject_bech, &pk0, &nkc, &nonce, expiry, &sig) + .to_string(), + )) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED); + assert_eq!(kernel.pull_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 0); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn pull_wrong_chan_bind_does_not_call_kernel() { + let signed_host = "signed.example.com"; + let (sk, pk0, nkc, subject_raw, subject_bech) = ownership_fixtures::identity(); + let nonce = [0x33u8; 32]; + let expiry = 50u64; + let cb = chan_bind_for_host(signed_host); + let chal = pull_challenge_message( + ChallengeDomain::Pull.as_str(), + &nonce, + &cb, + &subject_raw, + expiry, + ); + let sig = ownership_fixtures::sign_chal(&sk, &chal); + // test_config serves node.example.com — different chan_bind. + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + pull: Some(Ok(sample_pull_result())), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/pull") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from( + pull_body_ownership(&subject_bech, &pk0, &nkc, &nonce, expiry, &sig) + .to_string(), + )) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED); + assert_eq!(kernel.pull_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 0); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn pull_altered_expiry_does_not_call_kernel() { + let host = "node.example.com"; + let (sk, pk0, nkc, subject_raw, subject_bech) = ownership_fixtures::identity(); + let nonce = [0x44u8; 32]; + let signed_expiry = 100u64; + let presented_expiry = 999u64; + let cb = chan_bind_for_host(host); + let chal = pull_challenge_message( + ChallengeDomain::Pull.as_str(), + &nonce, + &cb, + &subject_raw, + signed_expiry, + ); + let sig = ownership_fixtures::sign_chal(&sk, &chal); + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + pull: Some(Ok(sample_pull_result())), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/pull") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from( + pull_body_ownership( + &subject_bech, + &pk0, + &nkc, + &nonce, + presented_expiry, + &sig, + ) + .to_string(), + )) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED); + assert_eq!(kernel.pull_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 0); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn session_missing_bearer_is_401_not_410() { + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + get_record: Some(Ok(RecordBlob { + canonical: vec![0xABu8; 8], + record_type: "coinproof".into(), + transition_kind: String::new(), + })), + get_account_state: Some(Ok(AccountStateResult { + account_state: vec![0x01], + state_head: vec![0x02; 32], + head_record_id: Vec::new(), + send_counter: 0, + current_pubkey: vec![0x03; 32], + last_nullifier_pk: Vec::new(), + last_nullifier_r: Vec::new(), + })), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/record/aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "unauthorized"); + assert_eq!(kernel.get_record_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 0); + + // Same split on ownership-only account/state. + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/account/state") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "unauthorized"); + assert_eq!(kernel.get_account_state_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 0); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn session_malformed_bearer_is_401_not_410() { + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + get_coin_proof: Some(Ok(CoinProofBlob { + canonical: vec![0xCDu8; 4], + })), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/proof/bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb") + .header("authorization", "NotBearer xyz") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "unauthorized"); + assert_eq!(kernel.get_coin_proof_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 0); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn session_expired_from_kernel_is_410() { + // Kernel maps unknown/expired/chan_bind-mismatch → session_expired / 410. + let status = encode_kernel_error_status( + Code::Unauthenticated, + "pull session expired or channel mismatch", + "session_expired", + 410, + ); + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + get_record: Some(Err(crate::kernel::kernel_status_to_api_error(&status))), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/record/aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa") + .header("authorization", "Bearer expired-token") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::GONE); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "session_expired"); + assert_eq!(kernel.get_record_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 1); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn account_state_grant_session_is_401() { + // Kernel enforces ownership-only; a grant session is unauthorized / 401. + let status = encode_kernel_error_status( + Code::Unauthenticated, + "grant session does not authorise GetAccountState", + "unauthorized", + 401, + ); + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + get_account_state: Some(Err(crate::kernel::kernel_status_to_api_error(&status))), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/account/state") + .header("authorization", "Bearer grant-session-token") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "unauthorized"); + assert_eq!(kernel.get_account_state_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 1); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn pull_rejects_unknown_record_type_from_kernel() { + let host = "node.example.com"; + let (sk, pk0, nkc, subject_raw, subject_bech) = ownership_fixtures::identity(); + let nonce = [0x55u8; 32]; + let expiry = 1_700_000_060u64; + let cb = chan_bind_for_host(host); + let chal = pull_challenge_message( + ChallengeDomain::Pull.as_str(), + &nonce, + &cb, + &subject_raw, + expiry, + ); + let sig = ownership_fixtures::sign_chal(&sk, &chal); + let mut result = sample_pull_result(); + result.records[0].record_type = "mystery".into(); + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + pull: Some(Ok(result)), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/pull") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from( + pull_body_ownership(&subject_bech, &pk0, &nkc, &nonce, expiry, &sig) + .to_string(), + )) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "internal_error"); + assert!( + json["message"].as_str().unwrap().contains("record_type"), + "message must name record_type: {}", + json["message"] + ); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn pull_rejects_unknown_transition_kind_from_kernel() { + let host = "node.example.com"; + let (sk, pk0, nkc, subject_raw, subject_bech) = ownership_fixtures::identity(); + let nonce = [0x66u8; 32]; + let expiry = 1_700_000_060u64; + let cb = chan_bind_for_host(host); + let chal = pull_challenge_message( + ChallengeDomain::Pull.as_str(), + &nonce, + &cb, + &subject_raw, + expiry, + ); + let sig = ownership_fixtures::sign_chal(&sk, &chal); + let mut result = sample_pull_result(); + result.records[0].record_type = "self_delivery".into(); + result.records[0].transition_kind = "explode".into(); + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + pull: Some(Ok(result)), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/pull") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from( + pull_body_ownership(&subject_bech, &pk0, &nkc, &nonce, expiry, &sig) + .to_string(), + )) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "internal_error"); + assert!( + json["message"] + .as_str() + .unwrap() + .contains("transition_kind"), + "message must name transition_kind: {}", + json["message"] + ); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn get_record_returns_binary_octet_stream() { + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + get_record: Some(Ok(RecordBlob { + canonical: b"canonical-record-bytes".to_vec(), + record_type: "coinproof".into(), + transition_kind: String::new(), + })), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/record/aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa") + .header("authorization", "Bearer good-token") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + assert_eq!( + res.headers() + .get("content-type") + .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok()), + Some("application/octet-stream") + ); + let body = body_bytes(res).await; + assert_eq!(body, b"canonical-record-bytes"); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn get_account_state_json_shape() { + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + get_account_state: Some(Ok(AccountStateResult { + account_state: vec![0xAAu8; 16], + state_head: vec![0xBBu8; 32], + head_record_id: vec![0xCCu8; 32], + send_counter: 7, + current_pubkey: vec![0xDDu8; 32], + last_nullifier_pk: vec![0xEEu8; 32], + last_nullifier_r: vec![0xFFu8; 32], + })), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/account/state") + .header("authorization", "Bearer own-token") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["send_counter"], "7"); + assert_eq!( + json["current_pubkey"].as_str().unwrap().len(), + 64, + "current_pubkey is hex32" + ); + assert_eq!( + json["state_head"].as_str().unwrap().len(), + 64, + "state_head is hex32" + ); + assert!(json["account_state"].as_str().unwrap().len() >= 2); + assert_eq!(json["last_nullifier"]["pubkey"].as_str().unwrap().len(), 64); + // API does not recompute consistency against serialize(AccountState) — + // that is a kernel guarantee (report). + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn get_proof_returns_binary_octet_stream() { + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + get_coin_proof: Some(Ok(CoinProofBlob { + canonical: b"coin-proof-bytes".to_vec(), + })), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/proof/cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc") + .header("authorization", "Bearer good-token") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + assert_eq!( + res.headers() + .get("content-type") + .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok()), + Some("application/octet-stream") + ); + assert_eq!(body_bytes(res).await, b"coin-proof-bytes"); + } } From ae0dd7844c9656aaac595bc95b709dfe8b631f0d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: TaprootFreak <142087526+TaprootFreak@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2026 18:29:21 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 06/23] feat: add the bootstrap endpoints and the publisher hand-off MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit `POST /v1/bootstrap/challenge`, `/entrust`, `/revoke` and the §7.6 publisher hand-off, onto `OpenPullChallenge`, `EntrustOperationalBundle`, `RevokeOperationalBundle` and `Publish`. That completes every §7.5 surface with something behind it. The action names the domain at issuance — that is what the body is for there — but at redemption the domain follows the **endpoint**, as it does for attest and grants. A proof signed for `revoke` cannot authorise `entrust`, and the test runs it both ways. Both domains are distinct from the pull domain so a proof cannot be repurposed at all. **The entrust body is the only object on this whole surface that carries real secrets** — five 256-bit keys in 161 bytes. Everything else here is public or already bound. So the request body is never logged, never traced, never put in an error message, and a test pins that: a framework default that echoes bodies would otherwise write five keys into a file. The length and hex form are checked before the call, so an obviously wrong body does not travel; the kernel checks them again, which is intentional. A rejected publish stays a **successful** response carrying the closed reason, not a 4xx — the network declining an inscription is a result, and the job side already draws that line the same way. A set v1 fee field is `400 malformed_request` rather than silently ignored. Four keys stay unserved and unadvertised, each for a reason written in the code: `chain_inscriptions` and `receipts_stream` because the kernel answers `Unimplemented` and names its missing precondition, and the four `blossom_*` keys because §7.4 has no implementation at all — `recovery` is demonstrably not built. A REST shell over an absent subsystem is a map with invented streets. --- docs/rest-surface.md | 22 +- src/bootstrap.rs | 340 +++++++++++++++++++ src/kernel/client.rs | 53 ++- src/lib.rs | 2 + src/main.rs | 2 +- src/ownership.rs | 176 +++++++++- src/publish.rs | 257 +++++++++++++++ src/routes.rs | 764 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 8 files changed, 1588 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) create mode 100644 src/bootstrap.rs create mode 100644 src/publish.rs diff --git a/docs/rest-surface.md b/docs/rest-surface.md index 01ff2a0..5d2ad1a 100644 --- a/docs/rest-surface.md +++ b/docs/rest-surface.md @@ -162,9 +162,24 @@ Deployments mit Wallet- und/oder Explorer-Rolle benötigt (Replica-/Blob-Pfad). | `POST /v1/attest/balance` | **implementiert** — OwnershipProof-Verifikation am API-Rand, dann `AttestBalance` | | `POST /v1/grants/challenge` | **implementiert** — `OpenPullChallenge` (`action = issue_grant`) | | `POST /v1/grants` | **implementiert** — OwnershipProof-Verifikation am API-Rand, dann `IssueViewGrant` | +| `POST /v1/pull/challenge` | **implementiert** — `OpenPullChallenge` (`action = pull`) | +| `POST /v1/pull` | **implementiert** — OwnershipProof am API-Rand, dann `Pull` (GrantProof fail-closed) | +| `GET /v1/record/` | **implementiert** — `GetRecord` (Bearer-Session) | +| `GET /v1/proof/` | **implementiert** — `GetCoinProof` (Bearer-Session) | +| `GET /v1/account/state` | **implementiert** — `GetAccountState` (Ownership-Session) | +| `POST /v1/bootstrap/challenge` | **implementiert** — `OpenPullChallenge` (`action = entrust` \| `revoke`) | +| `POST /v1/bootstrap/entrust` | **implementiert** — OwnershipProof (Entrust-Domain) + Bundle-Längenprüfung (161 B), dann `EntrustOperationalBundle`; Bundle wird nie geloggt | +| `POST /v1/bootstrap/revoke` | **implementiert** — OwnershipProof (Revoke-Domain), dann `RevokeOperationalBundle` | +| `POST /v1/publish/spendrecord` | **implementiert** — `Publish`; Ablehnung → HTTP 200 `{accepted:false, reason}`; v1-Fee-Felder → 400 | | alle übrigen Method+Path | **nicht registriert** — kein Handler, kein `todo!()`, kein Platzhalter | -**Bewusst nicht beworben:** `chain_inscriptions` — `ListInscriptions` ist im node `Unimplemented` (fehlt scanner-geschriebener Inschriften-Katalog mit Reveal-Txid und §3.5-Format). Eine REST-Hülle, die zuverlässig 501 liefert, wäre nur eine zweite Stelle für dieselbe Absenz. +**Bewusst nicht beworben:** + +| Key | Warum | +|---|---| +| `chain_inscriptions` | Kernel-`ListInscriptions` Unimplemented bis Inschriften-Katalog (Reveal-Txid + §3.5). | +| `receipts_stream` | Kernel-`SubscribeReceipts` Unimplemented; der node nennt die fehlende Push-/Quell-Voraussetzung. | +| `blossom_get` / `blossom_head` / `blossom_upload` / `blossom_delete` | §7.4; im node gibt es keinen Blossom-Pfad, Recovery ist nicht implementiert. | Router und Discovery teilen eine Quelle (`ServedSurface` in `src/routes.rs`): eine neue registrierte Fläche erscheint automatisch in `GET /`; ein Inventur-Key ohne Route @@ -181,8 +196,9 @@ ausschließlich über `google.rpc.ErrorInfo` (`domain`, `reason`, | Lücke | Warum | |---|---| | `GET /v1/chain/inscriptions` | Kernel-`ListInscriptions` Unimplemented bis Inschriften-Katalog. | -| Pull / Bootstrap / Publish / Blossom | jeweilige Kernel-RPC noch nicht angebunden. | -| Feature-Gate `404 feature_disabled` | Info/Chain/Job/Attest/Grants-Fläche ist in dieser Stufe always-on; Gate folgt mit den optionalen Rollen. | +| `GET /v1/receipts/stream` | Kernel-`SubscribeReceipts` Unimplemented. | +| Blossom (`/blossom/*`) | Kein Blossom-Pfad im node; Recovery nicht implementiert. | +| Feature-Gate `404 feature_disabled` | Bootstrap/Publish/Job/Attest-Fläche ist in dieser Stufe always-on; Gate folgt mit den optionalen Rollen. | --- diff --git a/src/bootstrap.rs b/src/bootstrap.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2c35be2 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/bootstrap.rs @@ -0,0 +1,340 @@ +//! Bootstrap REST surface (§7.7): challenge, entrust, revoke. +//! +//! | Method | Path | Kernel | +//! |---|---|---| +//! | `POST` | `/v1/bootstrap/challenge` | `OpenPullChallenge` action=`entrust`\|`revoke` | +//! | `POST` | `/v1/bootstrap/entrust` | `EntrustOperationalBundle` (after OwnershipProof) | +//! | `POST` | `/v1/bootstrap/revoke` | `RevokeOperationalBundle` (after OwnershipProof) | +//! +//! ## Domain binding +//! +//! Issuance takes `action` in the body and returns the matching domain +//! (`zkCoins/v1/EntrustChallenge` / `zkCoins/v1/RevokeChallenge`). Redeem is +//! **endpoint-bound**: `/entrust` always verifies under Entrust, `/revoke` +//! under Revoke — a proof signed for one cannot authorise the other. +//! +//! ## Secrets +//! +//! `POST /v1/bootstrap/entrust` carries `serialize(OperationalBundle)` (161 +//! bytes / five 256-bit secrets). This module never logs the hex, never puts +//! it in an error message, and never includes it in `Debug` output of any +//! type that outlives the parse. Length and hex form are checked **before** +//! the kernel is dialed; a bad body fails at the edge with length/form only. + +use crate::error::ApiError; +use crate::hexutil::encode_hex; +use crate::kernel::kernel_v1::{ + EntrustRequest, EntrustResult, PullChallengeRequest, RevokeRequest, RevokeResult, +}; +use crate::ownership::{ + decode_zk_address, verify_simple_ownership_proof, ChallengeDomain, ChallengeEcho, + OwnershipProofJson, ENTRUST_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN, REVOKE_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN, +}; +use crate::state::AppState; +use axum::extract::State; +use axum::http::StatusCode; +use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response}; +use axum::Json; +use serde::Deserialize; +use serde_json::json; + +/// Normative fixed length of `serialize(OperationalBundle)` (§7.7 / node +/// `OPERATIONAL_BUNDLE_LEN`): version(1) ‖ five × 32-byte secrets = 161. +pub const OPERATIONAL_BUNDLE_LEN: usize = 161; + +/// Hex character count for a 161-byte bundle (``). +pub const OPERATIONAL_BUNDLE_HEX_CHARS: usize = OPERATIONAL_BUNDLE_LEN * 2; + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Wire types +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)] +pub struct BootstrapChallengeBody { + pub subject: String, + /// `"entrust"` or `"revoke"` — maps to kernel `OpenPullChallenge.action`. + pub action: String, +} + +/// Entrust redeem body. **`Debug` redacts `bundle`** so a logger that prints +/// the extractor cannot spill five operational secrets. +#[derive(Deserialize)] +pub struct BootstrapEntrustBody { + /// Redeem-body `expiry` (§7.5 normative): `{ nonce, expiry }` from issuance. + pub challenge: ChallengeEcho, + pub ownership_proof: OwnershipProofJson, + /// 161-byte `serialize(OperationalBundle)` as hex (``). + /// + /// **Never log this field.** It holds five 256-bit operational secrets. + pub bundle: String, +} + +impl std::fmt::Debug for BootstrapEntrustBody { + fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result { + f.debug_struct("BootstrapEntrustBody") + .field("challenge", &self.challenge) + .field("ownership_proof", &self.ownership_proof) + .field("bundle", &"") + .finish() + } +} + +#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)] +pub struct BootstrapRevokeBody { + /// Redeem-body `expiry` (§7.5 normative): `{ nonce, expiry }` from issuance. + pub challenge: ChallengeEcho, + pub ownership_proof: OwnershipProofJson, +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Bundle parse (no secret in errors) +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +/// Decode and length-check the operational bundle hex. +/// +/// Error messages name only the **length** or the **form class** (odd length, +/// non-hex nibble). The raw hex string is **never** interpolated into the +/// message — a distinctive secret hex must not leak through 400 responses. +fn parse_operational_bundle_hex(hex: &str) -> Result, ApiError> { + // Exact character count first: wrong length is the common client mistake + // and must not fall through to a per-nibble walk that could be logged. + if hex.len() != OPERATIONAL_BUNDLE_HEX_CHARS { + return Err(ApiError::malformed(format!( + "bundle must be exactly {OPERATIONAL_BUNDLE_HEX_CHARS} hex characters \ + ({OPERATIONAL_BUNDLE_LEN} bytes); got {} characters", + hex.len() + ))); + } + // Manual nibble decode so we never surface the input string on failure. + let bytes = hex.as_bytes(); + let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(OPERATIONAL_BUNDLE_LEN); + let mut i = 0; + while i < bytes.len() { + let hi = match hex_nibble(bytes[i]) { + Some(v) => v, + None => { + return Err(ApiError::malformed( + "bundle is not valid hex (non-hex character at even nibble offset)", + )); + } + }; + let lo = match hex_nibble(bytes[i + 1]) { + Some(v) => v, + None => { + return Err(ApiError::malformed( + "bundle is not valid hex (non-hex character at odd nibble offset)", + )); + } + }; + out.push((hi << 4) | lo); + i += 2; + } + debug_assert_eq!(out.len(), OPERATIONAL_BUNDLE_LEN); + Ok(out) +} + +fn hex_nibble(b: u8) -> Option { + match b { + b'0'..=b'9' => Some(b - b'0'), + b'a'..=b'f' => Some(b - b'a' + 10), + b'A'..=b'F' => Some(b - b'A' + 10), + _ => None, + } +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Handlers +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +/// `POST /v1/bootstrap/challenge` → OpenPullChallenge(action=entrust|revoke). +pub async fn post_bootstrap_challenge( + State(state): State, + Json(body): Json, +) -> Result { + if body.subject.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::malformed("subject is required")); + } + let _ = decode_zk_address(&body.subject)?; + + let (action_wire, expected_domain) = match body.action.as_str() { + "entrust" => ("entrust", ENTRUST_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN), + "revoke" => ("revoke", REVOKE_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN), + other => { + return Err(ApiError::malformed(format!( + "action must be \"entrust\" or \"revoke\", got {other:?}" + ))); + } + }; + + let challenge = state + .kernel + .open_pull_challenge(PullChallengeRequest { + subject: body.subject, + requested_scope: None, + action: action_wire.to_string(), + }) + .await?; + + if challenge.nonce.len() != 32 { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "kernel Challenge.nonce must be 32 bytes, got {}", + challenge.nonce.len() + ))); + } + // Domain is action-bound at issuance: refuse a kernel that returns a + // foreign tag (would let a client sign under the wrong domain). + if challenge.domain != expected_domain { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "kernel Challenge.domain must be {expected_domain:?} for action {action_wire:?}, \ + got {:?}", + challenge.domain + ))); + } + + let body = json!({ + "nonce": encode_hex(&challenge.nonce), + "expiry": challenge.expiry.to_string(), + "domain": expected_domain, + }); + Ok((StatusCode::OK, Json(body)).into_response()) +} + +/// `POST /v1/bootstrap/entrust` → verify OwnershipProof (Entrust domain), then +/// `EntrustOperationalBundle`. +/// +/// Verification and bundle length/form run **before** any kernel call so a +/// bad signature cannot burn the single-use nonce and a 160/162-byte hex +/// never leaves this process as a secret-bearing RPC payload. +pub async fn post_bootstrap_entrust( + State(state): State, + Json(body): Json, +) -> Result { + // ---- pure validation (no kernel) ---- + // Bundle first: reject wrong width without touching the challenge store. + // `parse_operational_bundle_hex` never interpolates the hex into errors. + let bundle_bytes = parse_operational_bundle_hex(&body.bundle)?; + + // Subject lives only on the ownership proof (no outer subject field). + let subject = body.ownership_proof.subject.clone(); + if subject.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::malformed("ownership_proof.subject is required")); + } + + // Domain is the **endpoint** constant — not body.action, not body.domain. + let verified = verify_simple_ownership_proof( + ChallengeDomain::Entrust, + &subject, + &body.challenge, + &body.ownership_proof, + state.public_hosts.as_slice(), + )?; + + // Drop the hex string before the await so it is not held across the RPC. + // `bundle_bytes` is the only remaining copy in this stack frame. + drop(body); + + // ---- only now: kernel (nonce consumption lives here) ---- + let result: EntrustResult = state + .kernel + .entrust_operational_bundle(EntrustRequest { + nonce: verified.nonce.to_vec(), + subject: verified.subject_bech32, + bundle: bundle_bytes, + chan_bind: verified.chan_bind.to_vec(), + }) + .await?; + + let body = json!({ "accepted": result.accepted }); + Ok((StatusCode::OK, Json(body)).into_response()) +} + +/// `POST /v1/bootstrap/revoke` → verify OwnershipProof (Revoke domain), then +/// `RevokeOperationalBundle`. +pub async fn post_bootstrap_revoke( + State(state): State, + Json(body): Json, +) -> Result { + let subject = body.ownership_proof.subject.clone(); + if subject.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::malformed("ownership_proof.subject is required")); + } + + let verified = verify_simple_ownership_proof( + ChallengeDomain::Revoke, + &subject, + &body.challenge, + &body.ownership_proof, + state.public_hosts.as_slice(), + )?; + + let result: RevokeResult = state + .kernel + .revoke_operational_bundle(RevokeRequest { + nonce: verified.nonce.to_vec(), + subject: verified.subject_bech32, + chan_bind: verified.chan_bind.to_vec(), + }) + .await?; + + let body = json!({ "revoked": result.revoked }); + Ok((StatusCode::OK, Json(body)).into_response()) +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + + #[test] + fn bundle_len_constants_match_spec() { + assert_eq!(OPERATIONAL_BUNDLE_LEN, 161); + assert_eq!(OPERATIONAL_BUNDLE_HEX_CHARS, 322); + } + + #[test] + fn bundle_wrong_length_does_not_echo_hex() { + // 160 bytes = 320 hex chars — distinctive secret pattern must not + // appear in the error message. + let secret = "ab".repeat(160); + assert_eq!(secret.len(), 320); + let err = parse_operational_bundle_hex(&secret).expect_err("160 bytes"); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "malformed_request"); + assert!( + !err.body.message.contains(&secret), + "error must not contain the bundle hex: {}", + err.body.message + ); + assert!( + err.body.message.contains("320") || err.body.message.contains("322"), + "error should report character counts: {}", + err.body.message + ); + + let secret162 = "cd".repeat(162); + let err = parse_operational_bundle_hex(&secret162).expect_err("162 bytes"); + assert!(!err.body.message.contains(&secret162)); + } + + #[test] + fn bundle_161_bytes_accepted() { + let hex = "01".to_string() + &"00".repeat(160); + assert_eq!(hex.len(), 322); + let bytes = parse_operational_bundle_hex(&hex).expect("161 bytes"); + assert_eq!(bytes.len(), 161); + assert_eq!(bytes[0], 0x01); + } + + #[test] + fn bundle_non_hex_does_not_echo_input() { + let mut hex = "ee".repeat(161); + // Force a non-hex character in the middle without changing length. + hex.replace_range(100..102, "zz"); + let err = parse_operational_bundle_hex(&hex).expect_err("non-hex"); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "malformed_request"); + assert!( + !err.body.message.contains("zz"), + "error must not echo the bad nibble context: {}", + err.body.message + ); + assert!(!err.body.message.contains(&hex)); + } +} diff --git a/src/kernel/client.rs b/src/kernel/client.rs index ada470b..af9abd4 100644 --- a/src/kernel/client.rs +++ b/src/kernel/client.rs @@ -10,9 +10,10 @@ use crate::kernel::error_info::kernel_status_to_api_error; use crate::kernel::pb::kernel_v1::kernel_client::KernelClient as TonicKernelClient; use crate::kernel::pb::kernel_v1::{ AccountStateRequest, AccountStateResult, AccumulatorTip, AttestRequest, Challenge, - CoinProofBlob, CoinProofRequest, GetAccumulatorRequest, GetInfoRequest, GrantRequest, - GrantResult, Info, Job, JobEvent, JobHandle, JobRequest, NullifierPath, NullifierPathRequest, - PullChallengeRequest, PullRequest, PullResult, RecordBlob, RecordRequest, SignRequest, + CoinProofBlob, CoinProofRequest, EntrustRequest, EntrustResult, GetAccumulatorRequest, + GetInfoRequest, GrantRequest, GrantResult, Info, Job, JobEvent, JobHandle, JobRequest, + NullifierPath, NullifierPathRequest, PublishRequest, PublishResult, PullChallengeRequest, + PullRequest, PullResult, RecordBlob, RecordRequest, RevokeRequest, RevokeResult, SignRequest, TransitionRequest, }; use crate::ownership::SessionAuthority; @@ -30,7 +31,7 @@ use tonic::Request; const SESSION_AUTHORITY_METADATA: &str = "x-zkcoins-session-authority"; /// Subset of kernel procedures this stage consumes -/// (job surface + info/chain reads + attest/grants + pull/records). +/// (job surface + info/chain + attest/grants + pull/records + bootstrap + publish). #[async_trait] pub trait KernelRpc: Send + Sync { async fn submit_transition(&self, req: TransitionRequest) -> Result; @@ -76,6 +77,17 @@ pub trait KernelRpc: Send + Sync { &self, req: AccountStateRequest, ) -> Result; + + async fn entrust_operational_bundle( + &self, + req: EntrustRequest, + ) -> Result; + + async fn revoke_operational_bundle(&self, req: RevokeRequest) + -> Result; + + /// `Publish` — hand-off outcome is a successful result even when rejected. + async fn publish(&self, req: PublishRequest) -> Result; } /// Shared handle installed in the axum `State`. @@ -307,6 +319,39 @@ impl KernelRpc for KernelClient { .map_err(map_status)?; Ok(response.into_inner()) } + + async fn entrust_operational_bundle( + &self, + req: EntrustRequest, + ) -> Result { + let mut client = self.inner.clone(); + let response = client + .entrust_operational_bundle(Request::new(req)) + .await + .map_err(map_status)?; + Ok(response.into_inner()) + } + + async fn revoke_operational_bundle( + &self, + req: RevokeRequest, + ) -> Result { + let mut client = self.inner.clone(); + let response = client + .revoke_operational_bundle(Request::new(req)) + .await + .map_err(map_status)?; + Ok(response.into_inner()) + } + + async fn publish(&self, req: PublishRequest) -> Result { + let mut client = self.inner.clone(); + let response = client + .publish(Request::new(req)) + .await + .map_err(map_status)?; + Ok(response.into_inner()) + } } /// Map a tonic `Status` to REST. diff --git a/src/lib.rs b/src/lib.rs index e17baf1..9e3e6af 100644 --- a/src/lib.rs +++ b/src/lib.rs @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ //! `tonic`. Holds no protocol state, no value-bearing store, and no secrets. pub mod attest; +pub mod bootstrap; pub mod chain; pub mod config; pub mod error; @@ -14,6 +15,7 @@ pub mod jobs; pub mod kernel; pub mod ownership; pub mod proto_identity; +pub mod publish; pub mod pull; pub mod routes; pub mod state; diff --git a/src/main.rs b/src/main.rs index 865a1d9..c5f2e11 100644 --- a/src/main.rs +++ b/src/main.rs @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ async fn main() -> ExitCode { %bind_addr, %kernel_addr, feature_count, - "zkcoins-api listening (health + info/chain reads + job surface + attest/grants)" + "zkcoins-api listening (health + info/chain + jobs + attest/grants + pull + bootstrap + publish)" ); if let Err(e) = axum::serve(listener, app).await { diff --git a/src/ownership.rs b/src/ownership.rs index 32ccad0..b6090f9 100644 --- a/src/ownership.rs +++ b/src/ownership.rs @@ -44,6 +44,14 @@ pub const ATTEST_BALANCE_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN: &str = "zkCoins/v1/AttestBalanceChall /// `node/src/kernel/bootstrap/challenges.rs`. pub const ISSUE_GRANT_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN: &str = "zkCoins/v1/IssueGrantChallenge"; +/// `ChallengeAction::Entrust.domain()` in +/// `node/src/kernel/bootstrap/challenges.rs`. +pub const ENTRUST_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN: &str = "zkCoins/v1/EntrustChallenge"; + +/// `ChallengeAction::Revoke.domain()` in +/// `node/src/kernel/bootstrap/challenges.rs`. +pub const REVOKE_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN: &str = "zkCoins/v1/RevokeChallenge"; + /// §7.5 `request_hash` tag for `POST /v1/attest/balance`. pub const ATTEST_BALANCE_REQUEST_TAG: &str = "zkCoins/v1/AttestBalance"; @@ -66,13 +74,18 @@ const GOLDILOCKS_ORDER: u64 = 0xffff_ffff_0000_0001; /// Closed set of challenge domains this stage verifies. /// /// The domain string is a method on the enum — callers cannot pass an -/// arbitrary domain from the request body. +/// arbitrary domain from the request body. Entrust and Revoke are distinct +/// from Pull so a proof cannot be retargeted across bootstrap actions (§7.7). #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)] pub enum ChallengeDomain { /// `POST /v1/pull` — no `request_hash` in `chal` (§5.1 L1916). Pull, AttestBalance, IssueGrant, + /// `POST /v1/bootstrap/entrust` — no `request_hash` (§7.7). + Entrust, + /// `POST /v1/bootstrap/revoke` — no `request_hash` (§7.7). + Revoke, } impl ChallengeDomain { @@ -82,8 +95,18 @@ impl ChallengeDomain { ChallengeDomain::Pull => PULL_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN, ChallengeDomain::AttestBalance => ATTEST_BALANCE_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN, ChallengeDomain::IssueGrant => ISSUE_GRANT_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN, + ChallengeDomain::Entrust => ENTRUST_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN, + ChallengeDomain::Revoke => REVOKE_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN, } } + + /// Whether `chal` omits `request_hash` (pull / bootstrap). + pub const fn is_simple(self) -> bool { + matches!( + self, + ChallengeDomain::Pull | ChallengeDomain::Entrust | ChallengeDomain::Revoke + ) + } } /// §7.5 / §5.1(a) `OwnershipProofJson` on the wire. @@ -432,7 +455,8 @@ fn require_ownership(kind: OwnerOnlyCapability) -> Result<(), ApiError> { OwnerOnlyCapability::Ownership => Ok(()), OwnerOnlyCapability::Grant => Err(ApiError::unauthorized( "GrantProof does not authorise this owner-only action \ - (AttestBalance / IssueViewGrant require OwnershipProof; no-escalation)", + (AttestBalance / IssueViewGrant / Entrust / Revoke require OwnershipProof; \ + no-escalation)", )), } } @@ -573,17 +597,26 @@ impl SessionAuthority { } } -/// Verify a pull-domain OwnershipProof (`chal` without `request_hash`). +/// Verify an OwnershipProof for domains **without** `request_hash` +/// (Pull / Entrust / Revoke — §5.1 L1916 / §7.7). /// /// Pure: does not dial the kernel. Body `expiry` is part of the signed -/// preimage (Redeem-body `expiry`); a wrong value fails BIP-340. -pub fn verify_pull_ownership_proof( +/// preimage (Redeem-body `expiry` normative); a wrong value fails BIP-340. +/// `domain` is endpoint-selected — never taken from the request body. +pub fn verify_simple_ownership_proof( + domain: ChallengeDomain, request_subject: &str, - nonce_hex: &str, - expiry_decimal: &str, + challenge: &ChallengeEcho, proof: &OwnershipProofJson, public_hosts: &[String], ) -> Result { + if !domain.is_simple() { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "verify_simple_ownership_proof refuses request_hash domain {:?}", + domain.as_str() + ))); + } + // Closed capability match — GrantProof is a different type on the wire; // if the ownership shape carries type=grant, reject here. let capability = capability_from_wire(&proof.proof_type)?; @@ -601,9 +634,9 @@ pub fn verify_pull_ownership_proof( let nk_commit = parse_hex32_field(&proof.nk_commit, "ownership_proof.nk_commit")?; validate_nk_commit_limbs(&nk_commit)?; let signature = parse_hex64_field(&proof.signature, "ownership_proof.signature")?; - let nonce = parse_hex32_field(nonce_hex, "nonce")?; - let challenge_expiry = parse_u64_decimal(expiry_decimal) - .map_err(|e| ApiError::malformed(format!("expiry: {}", e.body.message)))?; + let nonce = parse_hex32_field(&challenge.nonce, "challenge.nonce")?; + let challenge_expiry = parse_u64_decimal(&challenge.expiry) + .map_err(|e| ApiError::malformed(format!("challenge.expiry: {}", e.body.message)))?; let expected = address_from_pk0_nk_commit(&pk0, &nk_commit); if expected != subject_raw { @@ -619,7 +652,7 @@ pub fn verify_pull_ownership_proof( } let allowed: Vec<[u8; 32]> = public_hosts.iter().map(|h| chan_bind_for_host(h)).collect(); - let domain_str = ChallengeDomain::Pull.as_str(); + let domain_str = domain.as_str(); let mut accepted_bind: Option<[u8; 32]> = None; for cb in &allowed { let chal = pull_challenge_message(domain_str, &nonce, cb, &subject_raw, challenge_expiry); @@ -646,6 +679,29 @@ pub fn verify_pull_ownership_proof( }) } +/// Verify a pull-domain OwnershipProof (`chal` without `request_hash`). +/// +/// Thin adapter over [`verify_simple_ownership_proof`] for the pull wire shape +/// (top-level `nonce` / `expiry` rather than nested `challenge`). +pub fn verify_pull_ownership_proof( + request_subject: &str, + nonce_hex: &str, + expiry_decimal: &str, + proof: &OwnershipProofJson, + public_hosts: &[String], +) -> Result { + verify_simple_ownership_proof( + ChallengeDomain::Pull, + request_subject, + &ChallengeEcho { + nonce: nonce_hex.to_string(), + expiry: expiry_decimal.to_string(), + }, + proof, + public_hosts, + ) +} + /// Reject a GrantProof on the pull path (fail-closed, not half-checked). /// /// §5.1(b) requires verifying the grant's `op` signature against the subject's @@ -714,6 +770,14 @@ mod tests { ChallengeDomain::IssueGrant.as_str(), "zkCoins/v1/IssueGrantChallenge" ); + assert_eq!( + ChallengeDomain::Entrust.as_str(), + "zkCoins/v1/EntrustChallenge" + ); + assert_eq!( + ChallengeDomain::Revoke.as_str(), + "zkCoins/v1/RevokeChallenge" + ); assert_ne!( ChallengeDomain::AttestBalance.as_str(), ChallengeDomain::IssueGrant.as_str() @@ -722,6 +786,96 @@ mod tests { ChallengeDomain::Pull.as_str(), ChallengeDomain::AttestBalance.as_str() ); + // Bootstrap domains are pairwise distinct from each other and from Pull + // so a proof cannot be retargeted across actions (§7.7). + assert_ne!( + ChallengeDomain::Entrust.as_str(), + ChallengeDomain::Revoke.as_str() + ); + assert_ne!( + ChallengeDomain::Entrust.as_str(), + ChallengeDomain::Pull.as_str() + ); + assert_ne!( + ChallengeDomain::Revoke.as_str(), + ChallengeDomain::Pull.as_str() + ); + assert!(ChallengeDomain::Entrust.is_simple()); + assert!(ChallengeDomain::Revoke.is_simple()); + assert!(ChallengeDomain::Pull.is_simple()); + assert!(!ChallengeDomain::AttestBalance.is_simple()); + assert!(!ChallengeDomain::IssueGrant.is_simple()); + } + + #[test] + fn entrust_domain_rejects_revoke_signed_proof() { + let (sk, pk0, nkc, subject_raw, subject_bech) = fixture_identity(); + let host = "node.example.com"; + let nonce = [0xCCu8; 32]; + let expiry = 1_700_000_060u64; + let cb = chan_bind_for_host(host); + // Sign under Revoke; redeem under Entrust. + let chal = pull_challenge_message( + ChallengeDomain::Revoke.as_str(), + &nonce, + &cb, + &subject_raw, + expiry, + ); + let sig = sign_chal(&sk, &chal); + let err = verify_simple_ownership_proof( + ChallengeDomain::Entrust, + &subject_bech, + &ChallengeEcho { + nonce: encode_hex(&nonce), + expiry: expiry.to_string(), + }, + &OwnershipProofJson { + proof_type: "ownership".into(), + subject: subject_bech.clone(), + public_key: encode_hex(&pk0), + nk_commit: encode_hex(&nkc), + signature: encode_hex(&sig), + }, + &[host.to_string()], + ) + .expect_err("revoke-signed proof must not authorise entrust"); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "unauthorized"); + } + + #[test] + fn revoke_domain_rejects_entrust_signed_proof() { + let (sk, pk0, nkc, subject_raw, subject_bech) = fixture_identity(); + let host = "node.example.com"; + let nonce = [0xDDu8; 32]; + let expiry = 1_700_000_060u64; + let cb = chan_bind_for_host(host); + let chal = pull_challenge_message( + ChallengeDomain::Entrust.as_str(), + &nonce, + &cb, + &subject_raw, + expiry, + ); + let sig = sign_chal(&sk, &chal); + let err = verify_simple_ownership_proof( + ChallengeDomain::Revoke, + &subject_bech, + &ChallengeEcho { + nonce: encode_hex(&nonce), + expiry: expiry.to_string(), + }, + &OwnershipProofJson { + proof_type: "ownership".into(), + subject: subject_bech.clone(), + public_key: encode_hex(&pk0), + nk_commit: encode_hex(&nkc), + signature: encode_hex(&sig), + }, + &[host.to_string()], + ) + .expect_err("entrust-signed proof must not authorise revoke"); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "unauthorized"); } #[test] diff --git a/src/publish.rs b/src/publish.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9ceac27 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/publish.rs @@ -0,0 +1,257 @@ +//! Publisher hand-off REST surface (§7.6): `POST /v1/publish/spendrecord`. +//! +//! | Method | Path | Kernel | +//! |---|---|---| +//! | `POST` | `/v1/publish/spendrecord` | `Publish` | +//! +//! Permissionless — no OwnershipProof, no challenge. A well-formed body is +//! never answered with `401`/`403` for lack of credentials. +//! +//! ## HTTP status discipline (§7.6) +//! +//! | Condition | HTTP | Body | +//! |---|---|---| +//! | Malformed wire body (incl. any v1 fee field set) | **400** | `{ "error": "malformed_request", … }` | +//! | Crypto / policy rejection | **200** | `{ accepted: false, reason: }` | +//! | Accepted | **200** | `{ accepted: true, batch_eta: }` | +//! | Internal failure | **500** | `{ "error": "internal_error", … }` | +//! +//! A publisher rejection is a **successful** RPC result, not a transport or +//! domain error. The REST surface mirrors that: `accepted: false` is still +//! HTTP 200. + +use crate::error::ApiError; +use crate::hexutil::decode_hex_exact; +use crate::kernel::kernel_v1::{BlockAnchor, PublishRequest, PublishResult}; +use crate::ownership::parse_u64_decimal; +use crate::state::AppState; +use axum::extract::State; +use axum::http::StatusCode; +use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response}; +use axum::Json; +use serde::Deserialize; +use serde_json::{Map, Value}; + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Closed reason set (§7.6 L3079–L3089) +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +/// Normative closed enumeration for `PublishResult.reason` when +/// `accepted == false`. Unknown kernel tokens become `internal_error` — +/// never silently forwarded as an open string. +const PUBLISH_REJECT_REASONS: &[&str] = &[ + "invalid_signature", + "invalid_s2c_opening", + "invalid_fee_coinproof", + "fee_address_mismatch", + "ocr_mismatch", + "fee_too_low", + "unknown_fee_asset", + "policy", + "anchor_stale", +]; + +fn is_closed_reason(reason: &str) -> bool { + PUBLISH_REJECT_REASONS.contains(&reason) +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Wire types +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)] +pub struct BlockAnchorJson { + pub block_hash: String, + /// §7.1 decimal-string u32 (same wire form as other request integers). + pub height: String, +} + +#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)] +pub struct PublishSpendRecordBody { + pub public_key: String, + pub r: String, + pub s: String, + pub r_prime: String, + pub block_anchor: BlockAnchorJson, + /// Deferred fee fields — **MUST be absent in v1** (§7.6). Presence → 400. + #[serde(default)] + pub fee_blob_id: Option, + #[serde(default)] + pub fee_blob_locators: Option, + #[serde(default)] + pub fee_epk: Option, +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Handler +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +/// `POST /v1/publish/spendrecord` → `Publish`. +pub async fn post_publish_spendrecord( + State(state): State, + Json(body): Json, +) -> Result { + // v1 fee fields are fail-closed: any set field is malformed, never ignored. + if body.fee_blob_id.is_some() || body.fee_blob_locators.is_some() || body.fee_epk.is_some() { + return Err(ApiError::malformed( + "fee_blob_id, fee_blob_locators, and fee_epk are deferred and MUST be absent in v1 \ + (§7.6 / §3.8.1); publishing is sponsored", + )); + } + + let public_key = decode_hex32(&body.public_key, "public_key")?; + let r = decode_hex32(&body.r, "r")?; + let s = decode_hex32(&body.s, "s")?; + let r_prime = decode_hex32(&body.r_prime, "r_prime")?; + let block_hash = decode_hex32(&body.block_anchor.block_hash, "block_anchor.block_hash")?; + let height = parse_u32_decimal(&body.block_anchor.height, "block_anchor.height")?; + + let result: PublishResult = state + .kernel + .publish(PublishRequest { + public_key, + r, + s, + r_prime, + // Empty fee fields = fee-less hand-off (v1 only shape). + fee_blob_id: Vec::new(), + fee_epk: Vec::new(), + fee_blob_locators: Vec::new(), + block_anchor: Some(BlockAnchor { block_hash, height }), + }) + .await?; + + let body = publish_result_to_json(&result)?; + Ok((StatusCode::OK, Json(body)).into_response()) +} + +fn decode_hex32(s: &str, field: &str) -> Result, ApiError> { + decode_hex_exact(s, 32).map_err(|e| ApiError::malformed(format!("{field}: {e}"))) +} + +fn parse_u32_decimal(s: &str, field: &str) -> Result { + let v = parse_u64_decimal(s) + .map_err(|e| ApiError::malformed(format!("{field}: {}", e.body.message)))?; + u32::try_from(v).map_err(|_| { + ApiError::malformed(format!( + "{field} must fit in u32 (on-chain height range); got {v}" + )) + }) +} + +/// Map kernel `PublishResult` to the §7.6 JSON shape. +/// +/// Presence invariants (fail-closed): +/// - `accepted == true` ⇔ `batch_eta` present, `reason` absent +/// - `accepted == false` ⇔ `reason` present (closed), `batch_eta` absent +fn publish_result_to_json(result: &PublishResult) -> Result { + let mut obj = Map::new(); + obj.insert("accepted".into(), Value::Bool(result.accepted)); + + if result.accepted { + if result.reason.is_some() { + return Err(ApiError::internal( + "kernel PublishResult.accepted is true but reason is set", + )); + } + let eta = match result.batch_eta { + Some(v) => v, + None => { + return Err(ApiError::internal( + "kernel PublishResult.accepted is true but batch_eta is absent", + )); + } + }; + // Decimal-string u64 — same JSON integer discipline as session_expiry. + obj.insert("batch_eta".into(), Value::String(eta.to_string())); + } else { + if result.batch_eta.is_some() { + return Err(ApiError::internal( + "kernel PublishResult.accepted is false but batch_eta is set", + )); + } + let reason = match &result.reason { + Some(r) if !r.is_empty() => r.as_str(), + Some(_) => { + return Err(ApiError::internal( + "kernel PublishResult.accepted is false but reason is empty", + )); + } + None => { + return Err(ApiError::internal( + "kernel PublishResult.accepted is false but reason is absent", + )); + } + }; + if !is_closed_reason(reason) { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "kernel PublishResult.reason {reason:?} is not in the §7.6 closed set" + ))); + } + obj.insert("reason".into(), Value::String(reason.to_string())); + } + + Ok(Value::Object(obj)) +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + + #[test] + fn closed_reason_set_matches_spec_count() { + assert_eq!(PUBLISH_REJECT_REASONS.len(), 9); + assert!(is_closed_reason("policy")); + assert!(is_closed_reason("invalid_signature")); + assert!(!is_closed_reason("not_a_reason")); + assert!(!is_closed_reason("")); + } + + #[test] + fn accepted_result_json() { + let r = PublishResult { + accepted: true, + reason: None, + batch_eta: Some(30), + }; + let json = publish_result_to_json(&r).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["accepted"], true); + assert_eq!(json["batch_eta"], "30"); + assert!(json.get("reason").is_none()); + } + + #[test] + fn rejected_result_json() { + let r = PublishResult { + accepted: false, + reason: Some("policy".into()), + batch_eta: None, + }; + let json = publish_result_to_json(&r).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["accepted"], false); + assert_eq!(json["reason"], "policy"); + assert!(json.get("batch_eta").is_none()); + } + + #[test] + fn accepted_with_reason_is_internal() { + let r = PublishResult { + accepted: true, + reason: Some("policy".into()), + batch_eta: Some(1), + }; + let err = publish_result_to_json(&r).unwrap_err(); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); + } + + #[test] + fn rejected_with_unknown_reason_is_internal() { + let r = PublishResult { + accepted: false, + reason: Some("invented".into()), + batch_eta: None, + }; + let err = publish_result_to_json(&r).unwrap_err(); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); + } +} diff --git a/src/routes.rs b/src/routes.rs index 228b3ae..6203e99 100644 --- a/src/routes.rs +++ b/src/routes.rs @@ -10,12 +10,14 @@ //! [`advertised_path_to_axum_matcher`]. use crate::attest; +use crate::bootstrap; use crate::chain; use crate::config::Config; use crate::grants; use crate::info; use crate::jobs; use crate::kernel::KernelHandle; +use crate::publish; use crate::pull; use crate::state::AppState; use axum::http::StatusCode; @@ -93,9 +95,20 @@ pub const CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS: &[(&str, &str)] = &[ /// handlers land, registration will filter `ServedSurface` by /// `Config::features`. /// -/// `chain_inscriptions` is intentionally **not** a variant: `ListInscriptions` -/// is Unimplemented in the node until a scanner-written inscription catalog -/// exists; advertising a REST key that can only 501 is not progress. +/// Surfaces intentionally **not** registered (and therefore omitted from +/// `GET /`), with the reason each stays off the map: +/// +/// - `chain_inscriptions` — kernel `ListInscriptions` is Unimplemented until a +/// scanner-written inscription catalog (reveal txid + §3.5 format) exists. +/// - `receipts_stream` — kernel `SubscribeReceipts` is Unimplemented; the node +/// names the missing push/source prerequisite. A REST shell would only 501. +/// - `blossom_get` / `blossom_head` / `blossom_upload` / `blossom_delete` — +/// §7.4 Blossom surface. The node exposes no Blossom path and recovery is +/// not implemented; inventing REST routes without a store is a map of +/// streets that do not exist. +/// +/// Inventory keys remain in [`CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS`]; advertisement tracks +/// [`ServedSurface::ALL`] only. #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)] enum ServedSurface { Health, @@ -117,6 +130,10 @@ enum ServedSurface { Record, Proof, AccountState, + PublishSpendrecord, + BootstrapChallenge, + BootstrapEntrust, + BootstrapRevoke, } impl ServedSurface { @@ -141,6 +158,10 @@ impl ServedSurface { ServedSurface::Record, ServedSurface::Proof, ServedSurface::AccountState, + ServedSurface::PublishSpendrecord, + ServedSurface::BootstrapChallenge, + ServedSurface::BootstrapEntrust, + ServedSurface::BootstrapRevoke, ]; /// Closed §7.5 discovery key for this surface. @@ -165,6 +186,10 @@ impl ServedSurface { ServedSurface::Record => "record", ServedSurface::Proof => "proof", ServedSurface::AccountState => "account_state", + ServedSurface::PublishSpendrecord => "publish_spendrecord", + ServedSurface::BootstrapChallenge => "bootstrap_challenge", + ServedSurface::BootstrapEntrust => "bootstrap_entrust", + ServedSurface::BootstrapRevoke => "bootstrap_revoke", } } @@ -198,6 +223,18 @@ impl ServedSurface { ServedSurface::Record => router.route(&path, get(pull::get_record)), ServedSurface::Proof => router.route(&path, get(pull::get_proof)), ServedSurface::AccountState => router.route(&path, get(pull::get_account_state)), + ServedSurface::PublishSpendrecord => { + router.route(&path, post(publish::post_publish_spendrecord)) + } + ServedSurface::BootstrapChallenge => { + router.route(&path, post(bootstrap::post_bootstrap_challenge)) + } + ServedSurface::BootstrapEntrust => { + router.route(&path, post(bootstrap::post_bootstrap_entrust)) + } + ServedSurface::BootstrapRevoke => { + router.route(&path, post(bootstrap::post_bootstrap_revoke)) + } } } } @@ -334,10 +371,11 @@ mod tests { use crate::kernel::encode_kernel_error_status; use crate::kernel::kernel_v1::{ AccountStateRequest, AccountStateResult, AccumulatorTip, AttestRequest, BootstrapManifest, - Challenge, CoinProofBlob, CoinProofRequest, GrantRequest, GrantResult, Info, Job, JobEvent, - JobHandle, JobRequest, NullifierPath, NullifierPathRequest, PullChallengeRequest, - PullRequest, PullResult as ProtoPullResult, RecordBlob, RecordRequest, SignRequest, - TransitionRequest, + Challenge, CoinProofBlob, CoinProofRequest, EntrustRequest, EntrustResult, GrantRequest, + GrantResult, Info, Job, JobEvent, JobHandle, JobRequest, NullifierPath, + NullifierPathRequest, PublishRequest, PublishResult, PullChallengeRequest, PullRequest, + PullResult as ProtoPullResult, RecordBlob, RecordRequest, RevokeRequest, RevokeResult, + SignRequest, TransitionRequest, }; use crate::kernel::KernelRpc; use crate::ownership::SessionAuthority; @@ -442,6 +480,21 @@ mod tests { "test double: get_account_state not configured", )) } + async fn entrust_operational_bundle( + &self, + _req: EntrustRequest, + ) -> Result { + Err(ApiError::internal("test double: entrust not configured")) + } + async fn revoke_operational_bundle( + &self, + _req: RevokeRequest, + ) -> Result { + Err(ApiError::internal("test double: revoke not configured")) + } + async fn publish(&self, _req: PublishRequest) -> Result { + Err(ApiError::internal("test double: publish not configured")) + } } fn test_app() -> Router { @@ -606,9 +659,43 @@ mod tests { "record", "proof", "account_state", + "publish_spendrecord", + "bootstrap_challenge", + "bootstrap_entrust", + "bootstrap_revoke", ]), - "stage C2 adds the five pull/record/proof/account_state keys" + "stage D adds bootstrap_* and publish_spendrecord" + ); + assert_eq!( + endpoints["bootstrap_challenge"].as_str(), + Some("/v1/bootstrap/challenge") + ); + assert_eq!( + endpoints["bootstrap_entrust"].as_str(), + Some("/v1/bootstrap/entrust") + ); + assert_eq!( + endpoints["bootstrap_revoke"].as_str(), + Some("/v1/bootstrap/revoke") ); + assert_eq!( + endpoints["publish_spendrecord"].as_str(), + Some("/v1/publish/spendrecord") + ); + // Unbuilt surfaces stay off discovery (documented in ServedSurface). + for absent in [ + "chain_inscriptions", + "receipts_stream", + "blossom_get", + "blossom_head", + "blossom_upload", + "blossom_delete", + ] { + assert!( + !endpoints.contains_key(absent), + "unbuilt surface {absent} must stay unadvertised" + ); + } assert_eq!( endpoints["attest_balance_challenge"].as_str(), Some("/v1/attest/balance/challenge") @@ -942,6 +1029,9 @@ mod tests { get_record: Option>, get_coin_proof: Option>, get_account_state: Option>, + entrust: Option>, + revoke: Option>, + publish: Option>, /// Call counters for proving "no kernel call" on auth failure. attest_calls: AtomicUsize, issue_grant_calls: AtomicUsize, @@ -950,8 +1040,17 @@ mod tests { get_record_calls: AtomicUsize, get_coin_proof_calls: AtomicUsize, get_account_state_calls: AtomicUsize, + entrust_calls: AtomicUsize, + revoke_calls: AtomicUsize, + publish_calls: AtomicUsize, /// Last pull authority observed (for grant/ownership plumbing asserts). last_pull_authority: Mutex>, + /// Last OpenPullChallenge.action observed (bootstrap domain plumbing). + last_open_challenge_action: Mutex>, + /// Last entrust request (bundle length / subject checks — never log bundle). + last_entrust: Mutex>, + last_revoke: Mutex>, + last_publish: Mutex>, } #[async_trait] @@ -1023,9 +1122,13 @@ mod tests { } async fn open_pull_challenge( &self, - _req: PullChallengeRequest, + req: PullChallengeRequest, ) -> Result { self.open_challenge_calls.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst); + *self + .last_open_challenge_action + .lock() + .expect("open action mutex") = Some(req.action); match &self.open_challenge { Some(Ok(c)) => Ok(c.clone()), Some(Err(e)) => Err(e.clone()), @@ -1088,6 +1191,39 @@ mod tests { None => Err(ApiError::internal("get_account_state not scripted")), } } + async fn entrust_operational_bundle( + &self, + req: EntrustRequest, + ) -> Result { + self.entrust_calls.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst); + *self.last_entrust.lock().expect("entrust mutex") = Some(req); + match &self.entrust { + Some(Ok(r)) => Ok(*r), + Some(Err(e)) => Err(e.clone()), + None => Err(ApiError::internal("entrust not scripted")), + } + } + async fn revoke_operational_bundle( + &self, + req: RevokeRequest, + ) -> Result { + self.revoke_calls.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst); + *self.last_revoke.lock().expect("revoke mutex") = Some(req); + match &self.revoke { + Some(Ok(r)) => Ok(*r), + Some(Err(e)) => Err(e.clone()), + None => Err(ApiError::internal("revoke not scripted")), + } + } + async fn publish(&self, req: PublishRequest) -> Result { + self.publish_calls.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst); + *self.last_publish.lock().expect("publish mutex") = Some(req); + match &self.publish { + Some(Ok(r)) => Ok(r.clone()), + Some(Err(e)) => Err(e.clone()), + None => Err(ApiError::internal("publish not scripted")), + } + } } fn sample_info(ready: bool, reason: Option<&str>) -> Info { @@ -3242,4 +3378,614 @@ mod tests { ); assert_eq!(body_bytes(res).await, b"coin-proof-bytes"); } + + // ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + // Stage D — Bootstrap + Publish + // ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + + use crate::bootstrap::{OPERATIONAL_BUNDLE_HEX_CHARS, OPERATIONAL_BUNDLE_LEN}; + use crate::ownership::{ENTRUST_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN, REVOKE_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN}; + + /// Canonical 161-byte version-0x01 bundle as hex (322 chars). Secrets are + /// zeros — only length/form matters at the API edge in these tests. + fn sample_bundle_hex() -> String { + format!("01{}", "00".repeat(160)) + } + + fn bootstrap_ownership_body( + subject: &str, + pk0: &[u8; 32], + nkc: &[u8; 32], + nonce: &[u8; 32], + expiry: u64, + sig: &[u8; 64], + bundle_hex: Option<&str>, + ) -> Value { + let mut obj = serde_json::json!({ + "challenge": { + "nonce": encode_hex(nonce), + "expiry": expiry.to_string(), + }, + "ownership_proof": ownership_proof_json(subject, pk0, nkc, sig), + }); + if let Some(h) = bundle_hex { + obj.as_object_mut() + .expect("object") + .insert("bundle".into(), Value::String(h.to_string())); + } + obj + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn bootstrap_challenge_entrust_and_revoke_return_distinct_domains() { + let (_, _, _, _, subject_bech) = ownership_fixtures::identity(); + + // entrust + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + open_challenge: Some(Ok(Challenge { + nonce: vec![0xABu8; 32], + expiry: 1_700_000_060, + domain: ENTRUST_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN.to_string(), + })), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/bootstrap/challenge") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from( + serde_json::json!({ + "subject": subject_bech, + "action": "entrust", + }) + .to_string(), + )) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["domain"], ENTRUST_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN); + assert_eq!( + kernel.last_open_challenge_action.lock().unwrap().as_deref(), + Some("entrust") + ); + + // revoke + let kernel2 = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + open_challenge: Some(Ok(Challenge { + nonce: vec![0xCDu8; 32], + expiry: 1_700_000_120, + domain: REVOKE_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN.to_string(), + })), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel2.clone()); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/bootstrap/challenge") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from( + serde_json::json!({ + "subject": subject_bech, + "action": "revoke", + }) + .to_string(), + )) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["domain"], REVOKE_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN); + assert_eq!( + kernel2 + .last_open_challenge_action + .lock() + .unwrap() + .as_deref(), + Some("revoke") + ); + assert_ne!(ENTRUST_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN, REVOKE_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN); + assert_ne!(ENTRUST_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN, PULL_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN); + assert_ne!(REVOKE_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN, PULL_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn entrust_signed_proof_rejected_on_revoke_endpoint_no_kernel() { + let host = "node.example.com"; + let (sk, pk0, nkc, subject_raw, subject_bech) = ownership_fixtures::identity(); + let nonce = [0x11u8; 32]; + let expiry = 1_700_000_060u64; + let cb = chan_bind_for_host(host); + // Sign under Entrust domain — must not authorise /revoke. + let chal = pull_challenge_message( + ChallengeDomain::Entrust.as_str(), + &nonce, + &cb, + &subject_raw, + expiry, + ); + let sig = ownership_fixtures::sign_chal(&sk, &chal); + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + revoke: Some(Ok(RevokeResult { revoked: true })), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/bootstrap/revoke") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from( + bootstrap_ownership_body( + &subject_bech, + &pk0, + &nkc, + &nonce, + expiry, + &sig, + None, + ) + .to_string(), + )) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "unauthorized"); + assert_eq!(kernel.revoke_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 0); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn revoke_signed_proof_rejected_on_entrust_endpoint_no_kernel() { + let host = "node.example.com"; + let (sk, pk0, nkc, subject_raw, subject_bech) = ownership_fixtures::identity(); + let nonce = [0x22u8; 32]; + let expiry = 1_700_000_060u64; + let cb = chan_bind_for_host(host); + let chal = pull_challenge_message( + ChallengeDomain::Revoke.as_str(), + &nonce, + &cb, + &subject_raw, + expiry, + ); + let sig = ownership_fixtures::sign_chal(&sk, &chal); + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + entrust: Some(Ok(EntrustResult { accepted: true })), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let bundle = sample_bundle_hex(); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/bootstrap/entrust") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from( + bootstrap_ownership_body( + &subject_bech, + &pk0, + &nkc, + &nonce, + expiry, + &sig, + Some(&bundle), + ) + .to_string(), + )) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED); + assert_eq!(kernel.entrust_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 0); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn entrust_bundle_160_and_162_are_400_161_is_forwarded() { + let host = "node.example.com"; + let (sk, pk0, nkc, subject_raw, subject_bech) = ownership_fixtures::identity(); + let nonce = [0x33u8; 32]; + let expiry = 1_700_000_060u64; + let cb = chan_bind_for_host(host); + let chal = pull_challenge_message( + ChallengeDomain::Entrust.as_str(), + &nonce, + &cb, + &subject_raw, + expiry, + ); + let sig = ownership_fixtures::sign_chal(&sk, &chal); + + // 160 bytes → 400, no kernel. + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + entrust: Some(Ok(EntrustResult { accepted: true })), + ..Default::default() + }); + let short_hex = "01".to_string() + &"00".repeat(159); + assert_eq!(short_hex.len(), 320); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/bootstrap/entrust") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from( + bootstrap_ownership_body( + &subject_bech, + &pk0, + &nkc, + &nonce, + expiry, + &sig, + Some(&short_hex), + ) + .to_string(), + )) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST); + let body = body_bytes(res).await; + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "malformed_request"); + assert_eq!(kernel.entrust_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 0); + // Secret must not appear in the error body. + assert!( + !String::from_utf8_lossy(&body).contains(&short_hex), + "bundle hex must not appear in error response" + ); + + // 162 bytes → 400, no kernel. + let long_hex = "01".to_string() + &"00".repeat(161); + assert_eq!(long_hex.len(), 324); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/bootstrap/entrust") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from( + bootstrap_ownership_body( + &subject_bech, + &pk0, + &nkc, + &nonce, + expiry, + &sig, + Some(&long_hex), + ) + .to_string(), + )) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST); + assert_eq!(kernel.entrust_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 0); + + // 161 bytes → forwarded. + let ok_hex = sample_bundle_hex(); + assert_eq!(ok_hex.len(), OPERATIONAL_BUNDLE_HEX_CHARS); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/bootstrap/entrust") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from( + bootstrap_ownership_body( + &subject_bech, + &pk0, + &nkc, + &nonce, + expiry, + &sig, + Some(&ok_hex), + ) + .to_string(), + )) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["accepted"], true); + assert_eq!(kernel.entrust_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 1); + let last = kernel.last_entrust.lock().unwrap(); + let req = last.as_ref().expect("entrust request captured"); + assert_eq!(req.bundle.len(), OPERATIONAL_BUNDLE_LEN); + assert_eq!(req.bundle[0], 0x01); + assert_eq!(req.subject, subject_bech); + assert_eq!(req.nonce, nonce.to_vec()); + assert_eq!(req.chan_bind, cb.to_vec()); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn entrust_auth_failure_response_does_not_contain_bundle_hex() { + // Distinctive non-zero secret hex — if any error path echoes the body, + // this substring will show up. + let marker = "f1e2d3c4b5a69788".repeat(20); // 320 chars of pattern + let bundle = format!("01{}", &marker[..320]); + assert_eq!(bundle.len(), 322); + + let host = "node.example.com"; + let (sk, pk0, nkc, subject_raw, subject_bech) = ownership_fixtures::identity(); + let nonce = [0x44u8; 32]; + let expiry = 1_700_000_060u64; + let cb = chan_bind_for_host(host); + // Sign under Revoke so Entrust verification fails after bundle parse. + let chal = pull_challenge_message( + ChallengeDomain::Revoke.as_str(), + &nonce, + &cb, + &subject_raw, + expiry, + ); + let sig = ownership_fixtures::sign_chal(&sk, &chal); + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + entrust: Some(Ok(EntrustResult { accepted: true })), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/bootstrap/entrust") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from( + bootstrap_ownership_body( + &subject_bech, + &pk0, + &nkc, + &nonce, + expiry, + &sig, + Some(&bundle), + ) + .to_string(), + )) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED); + let body = String::from_utf8(body_bytes(res).await).expect("utf8"); + assert!( + !body.contains(&bundle), + "full bundle hex must not appear in error body" + ); + assert!( + !body.contains("f1e2d3c4b5a69788"), + "distinctive secret substring must not appear in error body: {body}" + ); + assert_eq!(kernel.entrust_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 0); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn revoke_valid_ownership_calls_kernel() { + let host = "node.example.com"; + let (sk, pk0, nkc, subject_raw, subject_bech) = ownership_fixtures::identity(); + let nonce = [0x55u8; 32]; + let expiry = 1_700_000_060u64; + let cb = chan_bind_for_host(host); + let chal = pull_challenge_message( + ChallengeDomain::Revoke.as_str(), + &nonce, + &cb, + &subject_raw, + expiry, + ); + let sig = ownership_fixtures::sign_chal(&sk, &chal); + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + revoke: Some(Ok(RevokeResult { revoked: true })), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/bootstrap/revoke") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from( + bootstrap_ownership_body( + &subject_bech, + &pk0, + &nkc, + &nonce, + expiry, + &sig, + None, + ) + .to_string(), + )) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["revoked"], true); + assert_eq!(kernel.revoke_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 1); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn publish_rejection_is_http_200_with_reason() { + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + publish: Some(Ok(PublishResult { + accepted: false, + reason: Some("invalid_signature".into()), + batch_eta: None, + })), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let body = serde_json::json!({ + "public_key": hex32(0x11), + "r": hex32(0x22), + "s": hex32(0x33), + "r_prime": hex32(0x44), + "block_anchor": { + "block_hash": hex32(0x55), + "height": "100", + } + }); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/publish/spendrecord") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from(body.to_string())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!( + res.status(), + StatusCode::OK, + "policy/crypto rejection is a successful hand-off result, not 4xx/5xx" + ); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["accepted"], false); + assert_eq!(json["reason"], "invalid_signature"); + assert!(json.get("batch_eta").is_none()); + assert!(json.get("error").is_none()); + assert_eq!(kernel.publish_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 1); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn publish_accepted_returns_batch_eta() { + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + publish: Some(Ok(PublishResult { + accepted: true, + reason: None, + batch_eta: Some(45), + })), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel); + let body = serde_json::json!({ + "public_key": hex32(0x11), + "r": hex32(0x22), + "s": hex32(0x33), + "r_prime": hex32(0x44), + "block_anchor": { + "block_hash": hex32(0x55), + "height": "42", + } + }); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/publish/spendrecord") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from(body.to_string())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["accepted"], true); + assert_eq!(json["batch_eta"], "45"); + assert!(json.get("reason").is_none()); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn publish_fee_field_is_400_not_silent() { + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + publish: Some(Ok(PublishResult { + accepted: true, + reason: None, + batch_eta: Some(1), + })), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let body = serde_json::json!({ + "public_key": hex32(0x11), + "r": hex32(0x22), + "s": hex32(0x33), + "r_prime": hex32(0x44), + "block_anchor": { + "block_hash": hex32(0x55), + "height": "100", + }, + "fee_blob_id": hex32(0x66), + }); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/publish/spendrecord") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from(body.to_string())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "malformed_request"); + assert_eq!( + kernel.publish_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), + 0, + "fee field must fail at the edge before any kernel call" + ); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn unbuilt_surfaces_remain_404_and_absent_from_discovery() { + let app = test_app(); + for path in [ + "/v1/receipts/stream", + "/blossom/aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa", + "/blossom/upload", + ] { + let res = app + .clone() + .oneshot(Request::builder().uri(path).body(Body::empty()).unwrap()) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!( + res.status(), + StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, + "unbuilt surface {path} must not be registered" + ); + } + let res = app + .oneshot(Request::builder().uri("/").body(Body::empty()).unwrap()) + .await + .unwrap(); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + let endpoints = json["endpoints"].as_object().unwrap(); + assert!(!endpoints.contains_key("receipts_stream")); + assert!(!endpoints.contains_key("blossom_get")); + assert!(!endpoints.contains_key("blossom_upload")); + assert!(!endpoints.contains_key("chain_inscriptions")); + assert!(endpoints.contains_key("bootstrap_entrust")); + assert!(endpoints.contains_key("publish_spendrecord")); + } } From 97354ea5c2fbb01b04cec46baaf93fc13b78a774 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: TaprootFreak <142087526+TaprootFreak@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2026 23:40:32 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 07/23] docs: name the real prerequisite for grant verification (Nostr profile, not a config field) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The reject path said the API has 'no kernel RPC that returns op_pubkey for a subject', which points at the wrong fix. Per §1.2 the op key is node-held and is published as the author of the subject's kind-0 profile (§7.3), so a node the subject does not control cannot be handed it as a setting and the kernel cannot supply it either — it knows its own op, not a foreign subject's. Getting it means resolving that profile and running the §4.3 address binding on the result. Without all three checks an attacker who knows the subject's public pk0 and nk_commit publishes a profile naming their own op_pubkey, and the grant then verifies against the forger's key. Behaviour is unchanged: GrantProof stays a loud 401. --- src/ownership.rs | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++------- src/routes.rs | 4 +++- 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/ownership.rs b/src/ownership.rs index b6090f9..5dde1c4 100644 --- a/src/ownership.rs +++ b/src/ownership.rs @@ -705,18 +705,34 @@ pub fn verify_pull_ownership_proof( /// Reject a GrantProof on the pull path (fail-closed, not half-checked). /// /// §5.1(b) requires verifying the grant's `op` signature against the subject's -/// **published** `op` pubkey. This process holds no protocol state and has no -/// kernel RPC that returns `op_pubkey` for a subject, so that check cannot be -/// built here. A half-checked grant (structural + grantee chal only) would -/// authorise disclosure under a forged `op` signature — worse than a loud -/// reject. All grant pull attempts therefore fail with `401 unauthorized`. +/// **published** `op` pubkey. A half-checked grant (structural + grantee chal +/// only) would authorise disclosure under a forged `op` signature — worse than +/// a loud reject. All grant pull attempts therefore fail with `401 unauthorized`. +/// +/// # The missing prerequisite is Nostr, not a config field +/// +/// `op` is **node-held** (§1.2 key-custody table) and is published as the author +/// of the subject's kind-0 profile (§7.3, §4.3). A node the subject does not +/// control therefore cannot be handed `op_pubkey` as an operator setting, and no +/// kernel RPC can supply it either — the kernel knows its **own** `op`, not a +/// foreign subject's. Obtaining it means resolving that profile and running the +/// §4.3 address binding on the result: `H(pk0 ‖ nk_commit) == subject`, `addr_sig` +/// under `pk0`, and the event signature under the author `op_pubkey`. Without all +/// three, an attacker who knows the subject's public `pk0` / `nk_commit` publishes +/// a profile naming their own `op_pubkey` and the grant check verifies against the +/// forger's key. +/// +/// So the prerequisite is a **Nostr profile-resolution path** — the same one the +/// bundle delivery (§4.2) and recovery (§4.5) wait on — not a lookup that could be +/// bolted onto this process. /// /// Takes the proof so the call site cannot "forget" to name the grant shape /// (and so tests can assert the reject path against a concrete body). pub fn reject_grant_proof(_proof: &GrantProofJson) -> ApiError { ApiError::unauthorized( - "GrantProof is not accepted: the API cannot verify the grant's op signature \ - without the subject's published op_pubkey (no lookup path in this stage); \ + "GrantProof is not accepted: verifying the grant's op signature needs the subject's \ + published op_pubkey, which is the author of its kind-0 Nostr profile (§7.3) and is \ + reachable only through profile resolution plus the §4.3 address binding — not built; \ half-checked grants are forbidden (§5.1(b))", ) } diff --git a/src/routes.rs b/src/routes.rs index 6203e99..4d67b4f 100644 --- a/src/routes.rs +++ b/src/routes.rs @@ -2844,7 +2844,9 @@ mod tests { #[tokio::test] async fn pull_grant_proof_is_rejected_without_kernel_call() { - // Befund: no op_pubkey lookup → GrantProof always 401, never half-checked. + // Befund: the subject's published op_pubkey lives in its kind-0 Nostr + // profile (§7.3) and there is no profile-resolution path → GrantProof + // always 401, never half-checked. See `reject_grant_proof`. let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { pull: Some(Ok(sample_pull_result())), ..Default::default() From 1d3747cb3d624b443613358981f54c2a0081f7a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: TaprootFreak <142087526+TaprootFreak@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Sat, 1 Aug 2026 04:04:30 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 08/23] feat: serve chain_inscriptions now that the node has a catalogue MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The endpoint was unadvertised and 404 because the kernel answered Unimplemented: the NfLog carries winning (pk, r) pairs and a chain position, not the reveal txid and not the §3.5 format byte. The node now writes an inscription catalogue at fold time, so the surface can be served from real data rather than from a projection that would have had to invent two fields. Two states in the response are nearly homonymous and are not the same thing. `nullifiers[i].state` is that member's §3.10 state and members of one aggregate may legitimately differ — a later `Pk` collision is `failed` while earlier members stay `pending` or `completed`. `confirmation_state` is only the reveal transaction's depth against the §3.9 six-confirmation floor and never carries `failed`. A test shows both at once: a `failed` member inside an inscription whose `confirmation_state` is `completed`. The triple cursor is all-or-nothing by construction rather than by a check at the end, so a response carrying a proper subset of `next_height` / `next_tx_index` / `next_vin_index` is not representable. Page continuation is tested across three pages with a page boundary falling inside a reveal transaction that carries several `vin_index` inscriptions — that is where duplicates and gaps appear. `limit` outside 1..1000 is rejected rather than clamped, and the §7.5 defaults are named constants carrying their spec reference rather than an implicit `unwrap_or_default` that hides the value. --- docs/rest-surface.md | 3 +- src/chain.rs | 914 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- src/error.rs | 7 + src/kernel/client.rs | 31 +- src/routes.rs | 361 ++++++++++++++++- 5 files changed, 1283 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/rest-surface.md b/docs/rest-surface.md index 5d2ad1a..64339c1 100644 --- a/docs/rest-surface.md +++ b/docs/rest-surface.md @@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ Deployments mit Wallet- und/oder Explorer-Rolle benötigt (Replica-/Blob-Pfad). | `GET /` | **implementiert** — `{ name, version, endpoints }` mit **genau** den Flächen, die dieser Prozess registriert (`ServedSurface`). Inventur der 29 Keys in `CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS`; unregistrierte Keys werden weggelassen. | | `GET /v1/info` | **implementiert** — Kernel-`GetInfo` + API-eigene `features` aus `ZKCOINS_FEATURES` (`kernel_parts` bleibt intern). | | `GET /v1/chain/accumulator` | **implementiert** — `GetAccumulator`; `root` ist pass-through der Kernel-`nav_root`, keine Nachrechnung. | +| `GET /v1/chain/inscriptions` | **implementiert** — `ListInscriptions` (Server-Stream → eine Seite); Triple-Cursor ganz-oder-gar-nicht; leerer Katalog → leere Liste (kein 404). | | `GET /v1/chain/nullifier/` | **implementiert** — `GetNullifierPath`; `present`/`absent` bleiben getrennt; Kernel-`internal_error` wird **nicht** als absent umgeschrieben. | | `POST /v1/tx` | **implementiert** — `SubmitTransition` | | `GET /v1/jobs/{job_id}` | **implementiert** — `GetJob` | @@ -177,7 +178,6 @@ Deployments mit Wallet- und/oder Explorer-Rolle benötigt (Replica-/Blob-Pfad). | Key | Warum | |---|---| -| `chain_inscriptions` | Kernel-`ListInscriptions` Unimplemented bis Inschriften-Katalog (Reveal-Txid + §3.5). | | `receipts_stream` | Kernel-`SubscribeReceipts` Unimplemented; der node nennt die fehlende Push-/Quell-Voraussetzung. | | `blossom_get` / `blossom_head` / `blossom_upload` / `blossom_delete` | §7.4; im node gibt es keinen Blossom-Pfad, Recovery ist nicht implementiert. | @@ -195,7 +195,6 @@ ausschließlich über `google.rpc.ErrorInfo` (`domain`, `reason`, | Lücke | Warum | |---|---| -| `GET /v1/chain/inscriptions` | Kernel-`ListInscriptions` Unimplemented bis Inschriften-Katalog. | | `GET /v1/receipts/stream` | Kernel-`SubscribeReceipts` Unimplemented. | | Blossom (`/blossom/*`) | Kein Blossom-Pfad im node; Recovery nicht implementiert. | | Feature-Gate `404 feature_disabled` | Bootstrap/Publish/Job/Attest-Fläche ist in dieser Stufe always-on; Gate folgt mit den optionalen Rollen. | diff --git a/src/chain.rs b/src/chain.rs index 72aee41..74ededa 100644 --- a/src/chain.rs +++ b/src/chain.rs @@ -1,30 +1,130 @@ -//! Public chain read surface (§7.5 L2878, L2880) over kernel procedures. +//! Public chain read surface (§7.5 L2878–L2880) over kernel procedures. //! //! | REST | Kernel | //! |---|---| //! | `GET /v1/chain/accumulator` | `GetAccumulator` | +//! | `GET /v1/chain/inscriptions` | `ListInscriptions` (server-stream → one page) | //! | `GET /v1/chain/nullifier/` | `GetNullifierPath` | //! -//! **Not served:** `chain_inscriptions` / `ListInscriptions`. The node answers -//! that procedure `Unimplemented` until a scanner-written inscription catalog -//! (reveal txid + §3.5 format) exists; wrapping it in REST that always 501s -//! would only create a second place to learn the same absence. The key stays -//! in the closed inventory and is omitted from `GET /` until the catalog lands. -//! //! The api **does not recompute** `nav_root = Hc("NfLog/Root", size ‖ mth)`. //! Every `root` byte is what the kernel returned. Width checks reject a //! malformed kernel payload; they never invent a substitute digest. use crate::error::ApiError; use crate::hexutil::{decode_hex_exact, encode_hex}; -use crate::kernel::kernel_v1::{AccumulatorTip, NullifierPath, NullifierPathRequest}; +use crate::kernel::kernel_v1::{ + AccumulatorTip, Inscription, ListInscriptionsRequest, Nullifier, NullifierPath, + NullifierPathRequest, +}; use crate::kernel::KernelHandle; -use axum::extract::{Path, State}; +use axum::extract::{Path, RawQuery, State}; use axum::http::StatusCode; use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response}; use axum::Json; +use futures_util::StreamExt; use serde_json::{json, Map, Value}; +/// Inclusive lower bound + page size after REST query normalisation (§7.5). +#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)] +struct ListInscriptionsQuery { + from_height: u64, + from_tx_index: u64, + from_vin_index: u64, + /// Client page size; valid range `1..=1000` (enforced at parse). + limit: u32, +} + +/// Exclusive triple-cursor after the last returned inscription (§7.5). +/// +/// Structural all-or-nothing: the REST body either carries all three `next_*` +/// fields (this value is `Some`) or none of them (`None`). A proper subset is +/// unrepresentable. +#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)] +struct TripleCursor { + height: u64, + tx_index: u64, + vin_index: u64, +} + +impl TripleCursor { + fn from_inscription(ins: &Inscription) -> Self { + Self { + height: ins.height, + tx_index: ins.tx_index, + vin_index: ins.vin_index, + } + } + + /// Lexicographic successor of this triple — the inclusive `from_*` that + /// starts strictly after `self`. Used only for the limit=1000 peek path. + fn exclusive_successor(self) -> Result { + if self.vin_index < u64::MAX { + return Ok(Self { + height: self.height, + tx_index: self.tx_index, + vin_index: self.vin_index + 1, + }); + } + if self.tx_index < u64::MAX { + return Ok(Self { + height: self.height, + tx_index: self.tx_index + 1, + vin_index: 0, + }); + } + if self.height < u64::MAX { + return Ok(Self { + height: self.height + 1, + tx_index: 0, + vin_index: 0, + }); + } + Err(ApiError::internal( + "inscription triple cursor cannot advance past (u64::MAX, u64::MAX, u64::MAX)", + )) + } +} + +/// One REST page: inscriptions plus an optional all-or-nothing next cursor. +/// +/// `PartialEq` only — prost `Inscription` is not `Eq`, and this type is never +/// used as a map/set key. Ordering of `inscriptions` is the kernel's contract +/// (§7.8), checked rather than re-derived. +#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq)] +struct InscriptionsPage { + inscriptions: Vec, + next: Option, +} + +/// Named kernel-limit translation for pagination (`PAGE_LOOKAHEAD`). +/// +/// REST `limit` is the number of inscriptions on the page. To learn whether a +/// further page exists, the API must see one item beyond that page. When +/// `rest_limit < MAX_LIMIT` (strictly below the kernel's closed max), the kernel +/// receives `rest_limit + 1` in a single `ListInscriptions` call — that is the +/// **page-lookahead** translation: deliberate, named, and never a silent +/// clamp of the client value. At `rest_limit == MAX_LIMIT` the kernel cannot +/// accept `MAX_LIMIT + 1`, so the handler requests exactly `MAX_LIMIT` and, only +/// if the stream is full, issues a second **peek** RPC with `limit = 1` from +/// the exclusive successor of the last returned triple. +/// +// §7.5 `GET /v1/chain/inscriptions` query defaults (normative; API-normalised +// before RPC when the REST query omits them). Named constants — not +// `unwrap_or_default()` — so the literal value and its protocol origin stay +// visible at every use site. +/// §7.5 `GET /v1/chain/inscriptions`: `from_height` optional, default 0. +const DEFAULT_FROM_HEIGHT: u64 = 0; +/// §7.5: `from_tx_index` optional, default 0. +const DEFAULT_FROM_TX_INDEX: u64 = 0; +/// §7.5: `from_vin_index` optional, default 0. +const DEFAULT_FROM_VIN_INDEX: u64 = 0; +/// §7.5: `limit` optional, default 100; valid range `1..=1000`. +const DEFAULT_LIMIT: u32 = 100; +/// §7.5: lower bound of valid `limit` (inclusive). +const MIN_LIMIT: u32 = 1; +/// §7.5: upper bound of valid `limit` (inclusive). +const MAX_LIMIT: u32 = 1000; + /// `GET /v1/chain/accumulator` → `GetAccumulator`. /// /// Response form §7.5 L2878: `{ size, root, tip_block_hash, tip_height }`. @@ -35,6 +135,20 @@ pub async fn get_accumulator(State(kernel): State) -> Result, + RawQuery(raw): RawQuery, +) -> Result { + let query = parse_list_inscriptions_query(raw.as_deref())?; + let page = fetch_inscriptions_page(&kernel, query).await?; + let body = inscriptions_page_to_json(&page)?; + Ok((StatusCode::OK, Json(body)).into_response()) +} + /// `GET /v1/chain/nullifier/` → `GetNullifierPath`. /// /// Response form §7.5 L2880. **present** and **absent** are distinct domain @@ -59,6 +173,230 @@ pub async fn get_nullifier( Ok((StatusCode::OK, Json(body)).into_response()) } +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Query parse (malformed vs bounds_exceeded) +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +fn parse_list_inscriptions_query(raw: Option<&str>) -> Result { + let mut from_height: Option = None; + let mut from_tx_index: Option = None; + let mut from_vin_index: Option = None; + let mut limit: Option = None; + + if let Some(q) = raw { + for pair in q.split('&') { + if pair.is_empty() { + continue; + } + let (key, value) = match pair.split_once('=') { + Some((k, v)) => (k, v), + None => (pair, ""), + }; + match key { + "from_height" => { + if from_height.is_some() { + return Err(ApiError::malformed("duplicate query parameter from_height")); + } + from_height = Some(parse_decimal_u64("from_height", value)?); + } + "from_tx_index" => { + if from_tx_index.is_some() { + return Err(ApiError::malformed( + "duplicate query parameter from_tx_index", + )); + } + from_tx_index = Some(parse_decimal_u64("from_tx_index", value)?); + } + "from_vin_index" => { + if from_vin_index.is_some() { + return Err(ApiError::malformed( + "duplicate query parameter from_vin_index", + )); + } + from_vin_index = Some(parse_decimal_u64("from_vin_index", value)?); + } + "limit" => { + if limit.is_some() { + return Err(ApiError::malformed("duplicate query parameter limit")); + } + limit = Some(parse_decimal_u32("limit", value)?); + } + _ => { + // Unknown query keys are ignored — only the closed set is + // interpreted; extra keys must not soft-fail the request. + } + } + } + } + + // §7.5 defaults for omitted parameters (API-normalised before RPC). + let from_height = from_height.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_FROM_HEIGHT); + let from_tx_index = from_tx_index.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_FROM_TX_INDEX); + let from_vin_index = from_vin_index.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_FROM_VIN_INDEX); + let limit = match limit { + None => DEFAULT_LIMIT, + Some(n) if n < MIN_LIMIT => { + return Err(ApiError::bounds_exceeded(format!( + "limit must be in {MIN_LIMIT}..={MAX_LIMIT}; got {n}" + ))); + } + Some(n) if n > MAX_LIMIT => { + return Err(ApiError::bounds_exceeded(format!( + "limit must be in {MIN_LIMIT}..={MAX_LIMIT}; got {n}" + ))); + } + Some(n) => n, + }; + + Ok(ListInscriptionsQuery { + from_height, + from_tx_index, + from_vin_index, + limit, + }) +} + +fn parse_decimal_u64(name: &str, raw: &str) -> Result { + if raw.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::malformed(format!( + "{name} must be a non-empty decimal integer" + ))); + } + if !raw.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_digit()) { + return Err(ApiError::malformed(format!( + "{name} must be a decimal integer, got {raw:?}" + ))); + } + // Leading zeros are fine for "0"; multi-digit with leading zeros still + // parse as the same integer (no alternate encoding). + raw.parse::() + .map_err(|_| ApiError::malformed(format!("{name} overflows u64: {raw:?}"))) +} + +fn parse_decimal_u32(name: &str, raw: &str) -> Result { + let v = parse_decimal_u64(name, raw)?; + u32::try_from(v).map_err(|_| ApiError::malformed(format!("{name} overflows u32: {raw:?}"))) +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Page fetch (PAGE_LOOKAHEAD + optional peek at limit=1000) +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +async fn fetch_inscriptions_page( + kernel: &KernelHandle, + query: ListInscriptionsQuery, +) -> Result { + let rest_limit = query.limit; + // PAGE_LOOKAHEAD: ask for one extra when the kernel can still accept it. + let kernel_limit = if rest_limit < MAX_LIMIT { + rest_limit + 1 + } else { + rest_limit + }; + + let collected = collect_stream( + kernel, + ListInscriptionsRequest { + from_height: Some(query.from_height), + from_tx_index: Some(query.from_tx_index), + from_vin_index: Some(query.from_vin_index), + limit: Some(kernel_limit), + }, + ) + .await?; + + let rest_limit_usize = rest_limit as usize; + + if collected.len() > rest_limit_usize { + // Lookahead item proves a further page; its triple is the exclusive next. + let next_ins = &collected[rest_limit_usize]; + let next = TripleCursor::from_inscription(next_ins); + let inscriptions = collected.into_iter().take(rest_limit_usize).collect(); + return Ok(InscriptionsPage { + inscriptions, + next: Some(next), + }); + } + + // At rest_limit == MAX_LIMIT the kernel cannot take MAX_LIMIT+1; if the + // stream filled the page exactly, peek one item from the exclusive successor. + if rest_limit == MAX_LIMIT && collected.len() == rest_limit_usize { + let last = match collected.last() { + Some(ins) => ins, + None => { + // limit is 1000 and len is 1000, so last is always present; + // this arm is unreachable by construction. + return Err(ApiError::internal( + "page-full inscription stream has no last element", + )); + } + }; + let peek_from = TripleCursor::from_inscription(last).exclusive_successor()?; + let peek = collect_stream( + kernel, + ListInscriptionsRequest { + from_height: Some(peek_from.height), + from_tx_index: Some(peek_from.tx_index), + from_vin_index: Some(peek_from.vin_index), + limit: Some(1), + }, + ) + .await?; + if let Some(first) = peek.first() { + return Ok(InscriptionsPage { + inscriptions: collected, + next: Some(TripleCursor::from_inscription(first)), + }); + } + } + + Ok(InscriptionsPage { + inscriptions: collected, + next: None, + }) +} + +async fn collect_stream( + kernel: &KernelHandle, + req: ListInscriptionsRequest, +) -> Result, ApiError> { + let mut stream = kernel.list_inscriptions(req).await?; + let mut out = Vec::new(); + while let Some(item) = stream.next().await { + out.push(item?); + } + // §7.8: the kernel stream is already in stable triple order. Do not + // re-sort — a violation is a kernel bug and must surface as internal_error. + require_strict_triple_order(&out)?; + Ok(out) +} + +/// Inscription triple used as the §7.5 / §7.8 sort and cursor key. +fn inscription_triple(ins: &Inscription) -> (u64, u64, u64) { + (ins.height, ins.tx_index, ins.vin_index) +} + +/// Reject a kernel stream that is not strictly increasing in +/// `(height, tx_index, vin_index)`. Equal or reversed neighbours mean the +/// kernel broke its §7.8 ordering contract; silent repair would hide that. +fn require_strict_triple_order(items: &[Inscription]) -> Result<(), ApiError> { + for pair in items.windows(2) { + let prev = inscription_triple(&pair[0]); + let next = inscription_triple(&pair[1]); + if prev >= next { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "kernel ListInscriptions stream is not strictly increasing in \ + (height, tx_index, vin_index): {prev:?} is not before {next:?}" + ))); + } + } + Ok(()) +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// JSON encoding +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + fn accumulator_to_json(tip: &AccumulatorTip) -> Result { Ok(json!({ "size": tip.size, @@ -68,6 +406,77 @@ fn accumulator_to_json(tip: &AccumulatorTip) -> Result { })) } +fn inscriptions_page_to_json(page: &InscriptionsPage) -> Result { + let mut inscriptions = Vec::with_capacity(page.inscriptions.len()); + for ins in &page.inscriptions { + inscriptions.push(inscription_to_json(ins)?); + } + + let mut obj = Map::new(); + obj.insert("inscriptions".to_string(), Value::Array(inscriptions)); + // Structural all-or-nothing: emit every next_* or none. + if let Some(next) = page.next { + obj.insert("next_height".to_string(), json!(next.height)); + obj.insert("next_tx_index".to_string(), json!(next.tx_index)); + obj.insert("next_vin_index".to_string(), json!(next.vin_index)); + } + Ok(Value::Object(obj)) +} + +fn inscription_to_json(ins: &Inscription) -> Result { + let mut nullifiers = Vec::with_capacity(ins.nullifiers.len()); + for (i, n) in ins.nullifiers.iter().enumerate() { + nullifiers.push(nullifier_member_to_json(n, i)?); + } + + // confirmation_state is reveal-tx depth only — never an aggregate of + // member states, never "failed" (§7.5 / §3.9). + match ins.confirmation_state.as_str() { + "pending" | "completed" => {} + other => { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "kernel Inscription.confirmation_state must be \"pending\" or \"completed\", got {other:?}" + ))); + } + } + + // format: 0x00 raw | 0x01 half-aggregated (§3.5); other values are not on the closed set. + if ins.format > 1 { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "kernel Inscription.format must be 0 (raw) or 1 (half-aggregated), got {}", + ins.format + ))); + } + + Ok(json!({ + "txid": require_hex32(&ins.txid, "txid")?, + "height": ins.height, + "tx_index": ins.tx_index, + "vin_index": ins.vin_index, + "count": ins.count, + "format": ins.format, + "nullifiers": nullifiers, + "confirmation_state": ins.confirmation_state, + })) +} + +fn nullifier_member_to_json(n: &Nullifier, index: usize) -> Result { + // Per-member §3.10 state — members of one aggregate MAY differ. + match n.state.as_str() { + "completed" | "pending" | "failed" => {} + other => { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "kernel Nullifier.state[{index}] must be \"completed\", \"pending\", or \"failed\", got {other:?}" + ))); + } + } + Ok(json!({ + "pubkey": require_hex32(&n.pubkey, &format!("nullifiers[{index}].pubkey"))?, + "r": require_hex32(&n.r, &format!("nullifiers[{index}].r"))?, + "state": n.state, + })) +} + fn nullifier_path_to_json(path: &NullifierPath) -> Result { let mut obj = Map::new(); obj.insert("present".to_string(), Value::Bool(path.present)); @@ -142,6 +551,43 @@ fn require_hex32(bytes: &[u8], field: &str) -> Result { #[cfg(test)] mod tests { use super::*; + use crate::kernel::kernel_v1::Nullifier as ProtoNullifier; + use crate::kernel::KernelRpc; + use async_trait::async_trait; + use futures_util::stream::{self, BoxStream}; + use std::sync::Arc; + + fn sample_nullifier(state: &str) -> ProtoNullifier { + ProtoNullifier { + pubkey: vec![0x11; 32], + r: vec![0x22; 32], + state: state.to_string(), + } + } + + fn sample_inscription( + height: u64, + tx_index: u64, + vin_index: u64, + confirmation_state: &str, + nullifiers: Vec, + ) -> Inscription { + let mut txid = vec![0u8; 32]; + // Asymmetric bytes so a byte-order reverse would fail hex equality. + for (i, b) in txid.iter_mut().enumerate() { + *b = (i as u8).wrapping_add(1); + } + Inscription { + txid, + height, + count: nullifiers.len() as u32, + format: 1, + nullifiers, + confirmation_state: confirmation_state.to_string(), + tx_index, + vin_index, + } + } #[test] fn accumulator_pass_through_does_not_recompute_root() { @@ -218,4 +664,454 @@ mod tests { err.body.message ); } + + /// Failed member + completed confirmation in one inscription — the two + /// states are independent (§3.10 vs reveal-tx depth). + #[test] + fn failed_member_with_completed_confirmation_state() { + let ins = sample_inscription( + 100, + 2, + 0, + "completed", + vec![sample_nullifier("completed"), sample_nullifier("failed")], + ); + let json = inscription_to_json(&ins).expect("json"); + assert_eq!(json["confirmation_state"], "completed"); + let nullifiers = json["nullifiers"].as_array().expect("nullifiers"); + assert_eq!(nullifiers.len(), 2); + assert_eq!(nullifiers[0]["state"], "completed"); + assert_eq!(nullifiers[1]["state"], "failed"); + // txid is internal byte order — encode_hex of kernel bytes, never reversed. + let expected_txid: Vec = (1u8..=32).collect(); + assert_eq!(json["txid"].as_str().unwrap(), encode_hex(&expected_txid)); + } + + #[test] + fn confirmation_state_failed_is_rejected() { + let ins = sample_inscription(1, 0, 0, "failed", vec![sample_nullifier("pending")]); + let err = inscription_to_json(&ins).expect_err("failed confirmation"); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); + assert!( + err.body.message.contains("confirmation_state"), + "message must name confirmation_state, got {}", + err.body.message + ); + } + + #[test] + fn next_cursor_all_or_nothing_in_json() { + let page_with = InscriptionsPage { + inscriptions: vec![sample_inscription( + 1, + 0, + 0, + "pending", + vec![sample_nullifier("pending")], + )], + next: Some(TripleCursor { + height: 1, + tx_index: 0, + vin_index: 1, + }), + }; + let json = inscriptions_page_to_json(&page_with).expect("json"); + assert_eq!(json["next_height"], 1); + assert_eq!(json["next_tx_index"], 0); + assert_eq!(json["next_vin_index"], 1); + + let page_without = InscriptionsPage { + inscriptions: vec![], + next: None, + }; + let json = inscriptions_page_to_json(&page_without).expect("json"); + assert!(json.get("next_height").is_none()); + assert!(json.get("next_tx_index").is_none()); + assert!(json.get("next_vin_index").is_none()); + assert_eq!(json["inscriptions"], json!([])); + } + + #[test] + fn limit_zero_is_bounds_exceeded_not_malformed() { + let err = parse_list_inscriptions_query(Some("limit=0")).expect_err("limit=0"); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "bounds_exceeded"); + assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST); + } + + #[test] + fn limit_over_1000_is_bounds_exceeded() { + let err = parse_list_inscriptions_query(Some("limit=1001")).expect_err("limit=1001"); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "bounds_exceeded"); + } + + #[test] + fn limit_non_numeric_is_malformed() { + let err = parse_list_inscriptions_query(Some("limit=abc")).expect_err("limit=abc"); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "malformed_request"); + assert!( + err.body.message.contains("limit"), + "message must name limit, got {}", + err.body.message + ); + } + + #[test] + fn omitted_query_normalises_to_defaults() { + let q = parse_list_inscriptions_query(None).expect("defaults"); + assert_eq!(q.from_height, 0); + assert_eq!(q.from_tx_index, 0); + assert_eq!(q.from_vin_index, 0); + assert_eq!(q.limit, 100); + } + + #[test] + fn explicit_zero_cursors_are_not_replaced() { + let q = parse_list_inscriptions_query(Some( + "from_height=0&from_tx_index=0&from_vin_index=0&limit=1", + )) + .expect("zeros"); + assert_eq!(q.from_height, 0); + assert_eq!(q.from_tx_index, 0); + assert_eq!(q.from_vin_index, 0); + assert_eq!(q.limit, 1); + } + + // ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + // Page-boundary pagination against a catalog double + // ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + + struct CatalogKernel { + catalog: Vec, + } + + fn filter_catalog(catalog: &[Inscription], req: &ListInscriptionsRequest) -> Vec { + // Kernel-side double: same §7.5 defaults the API normalises before RPC + // (proto comment on ListInscriptionsRequest). + let from_h = req.from_height.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_FROM_HEIGHT); + let from_t = req.from_tx_index.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_FROM_TX_INDEX); + let from_v = req.from_vin_index.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_FROM_VIN_INDEX); + let limit = req.limit.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_LIMIT) as usize; + catalog + .iter() + .filter(|ins| (ins.height, ins.tx_index, ins.vin_index) >= (from_h, from_t, from_v)) + .take(limit) + .cloned() + .collect() + } + + #[async_trait] + impl KernelRpc for CatalogKernel { + async fn submit_transition( + &self, + _req: crate::kernel::kernel_v1::TransitionRequest, + ) -> Result { + Err(ApiError::internal("not used")) + } + async fn get_job( + &self, + _req: crate::kernel::kernel_v1::JobRequest, + ) -> Result { + Err(ApiError::internal("not used")) + } + async fn stream_job( + &self, + _req: crate::kernel::kernel_v1::JobRequest, + ) -> Result< + BoxStream<'static, Result>, + ApiError, + > { + Err(ApiError::internal("not used")) + } + async fn sign_transition( + &self, + _req: crate::kernel::kernel_v1::SignRequest, + ) -> Result { + Err(ApiError::internal("not used")) + } + async fn cancel_job( + &self, + _req: crate::kernel::kernel_v1::JobRequest, + ) -> Result { + Err(ApiError::internal("not used")) + } + async fn get_info(&self) -> Result { + Err(ApiError::internal("not used")) + } + async fn get_accumulator(&self) -> Result { + Err(ApiError::internal("not used")) + } + async fn list_inscriptions( + &self, + req: ListInscriptionsRequest, + ) -> Result>, ApiError> { + let items = filter_catalog(&self.catalog, &req); + Ok(Box::pin(stream::iter(items.into_iter().map(Ok)))) + } + async fn get_nullifier_path( + &self, + _req: NullifierPathRequest, + ) -> Result { + Err(ApiError::internal("not used")) + } + async fn open_pull_challenge( + &self, + _req: crate::kernel::kernel_v1::PullChallengeRequest, + ) -> Result { + Err(ApiError::internal("not used")) + } + async fn attest_balance( + &self, + _req: crate::kernel::kernel_v1::AttestRequest, + ) -> Result { + Err(ApiError::internal("not used")) + } + async fn issue_view_grant( + &self, + _req: crate::kernel::kernel_v1::GrantRequest, + ) -> Result { + Err(ApiError::internal("not used")) + } + async fn pull( + &self, + _req: crate::kernel::kernel_v1::PullRequest, + _authority: crate::ownership::SessionAuthority, + ) -> Result { + Err(ApiError::internal("not used")) + } + async fn get_record( + &self, + _req: crate::kernel::kernel_v1::RecordRequest, + ) -> Result { + Err(ApiError::internal("not used")) + } + async fn get_coin_proof( + &self, + _req: crate::kernel::kernel_v1::CoinProofRequest, + ) -> Result { + Err(ApiError::internal("not used")) + } + async fn get_account_state( + &self, + _req: crate::kernel::kernel_v1::AccountStateRequest, + ) -> Result { + Err(ApiError::internal("not used")) + } + async fn entrust_operational_bundle( + &self, + _req: crate::kernel::kernel_v1::EntrustRequest, + ) -> Result { + Err(ApiError::internal("not used")) + } + async fn revoke_operational_bundle( + &self, + _req: crate::kernel::kernel_v1::RevokeRequest, + ) -> Result { + Err(ApiError::internal("not used")) + } + async fn publish( + &self, + _req: crate::kernel::kernel_v1::PublishRequest, + ) -> Result { + Err(ApiError::internal("not used")) + } + } + + /// Three pages with limit=1; page boundary sits mid-reveal-tx (vin 0/1/2 + /// of the same (height, tx_index)). Exclusive next of page n is inclusive + /// from of page n+1 — no duplicates, no gaps. + #[tokio::test] + async fn multi_page_cursor_splits_mid_reveal_tx() { + let catalog = vec![ + sample_inscription(10, 0, 0, "completed", vec![sample_nullifier("completed")]), + sample_inscription(10, 0, 1, "completed", vec![sample_nullifier("completed")]), + sample_inscription(10, 0, 2, "completed", vec![sample_nullifier("pending")]), + sample_inscription(10, 1, 0, "pending", vec![sample_nullifier("pending")]), + ]; + let kernel: KernelHandle = Arc::new(CatalogKernel { catalog }); + + // Page 1 + let page1 = fetch_inscriptions_page( + &kernel, + ListInscriptionsQuery { + from_height: 0, + from_tx_index: 0, + from_vin_index: 0, + limit: 1, + }, + ) + .await + .expect("page1"); + assert_eq!(page1.inscriptions.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(page1.inscriptions[0].vin_index, 0); + let next1 = page1.next.expect("page1 must have next"); + assert_eq!( + (next1.height, next1.tx_index, next1.vin_index), + (10, 0, 1), + "exclusive next after first vin of the multi-vin reveal" + ); + + // Page 2 — exclusive next of page1 is inclusive from here + let page2 = fetch_inscriptions_page( + &kernel, + ListInscriptionsQuery { + from_height: next1.height, + from_tx_index: next1.tx_index, + from_vin_index: next1.vin_index, + limit: 1, + }, + ) + .await + .expect("page2"); + assert_eq!(page2.inscriptions.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(page2.inscriptions[0].vin_index, 1); + assert_eq!( + page2.inscriptions[0].height, page1.inscriptions[0].height, + "same reveal height" + ); + assert_eq!( + page2.inscriptions[0].tx_index, page1.inscriptions[0].tx_index, + "same reveal tx_index — boundary is mid-transaction" + ); + let next2 = page2.next.expect("page2 must have next"); + assert_eq!((next2.height, next2.tx_index, next2.vin_index), (10, 0, 2)); + + // Page 3 + let page3 = fetch_inscriptions_page( + &kernel, + ListInscriptionsQuery { + from_height: next2.height, + from_tx_index: next2.tx_index, + from_vin_index: next2.vin_index, + limit: 1, + }, + ) + .await + .expect("page3"); + assert_eq!(page3.inscriptions.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(page3.inscriptions[0].vin_index, 2); + let next3 = page3 + .next + .expect("page3 must have next (fourth item remains)"); + assert_eq!((next3.height, next3.tx_index, next3.vin_index), (10, 1, 0)); + + // Collect all via the three page starts + final remainder — no dups/gaps. + let mut seen = vec![ + ( + page1.inscriptions[0].height, + page1.inscriptions[0].tx_index, + page1.inscriptions[0].vin_index, + ), + ( + page2.inscriptions[0].height, + page2.inscriptions[0].tx_index, + page2.inscriptions[0].vin_index, + ), + ( + page3.inscriptions[0].height, + page3.inscriptions[0].tx_index, + page3.inscriptions[0].vin_index, + ), + ]; + let page4 = fetch_inscriptions_page( + &kernel, + ListInscriptionsQuery { + from_height: next3.height, + from_tx_index: next3.tx_index, + from_vin_index: next3.vin_index, + limit: 1, + }, + ) + .await + .expect("page4"); + assert_eq!(page4.inscriptions.len(), 1); + assert!(page4.next.is_none(), "final page must omit all next_*"); + seen.push(( + page4.inscriptions[0].height, + page4.inscriptions[0].tx_index, + page4.inscriptions[0].vin_index, + )); + assert_eq!( + seen, + vec![(10, 0, 0), (10, 0, 1), (10, 0, 2), (10, 1, 0)], + "contiguous coverage across mid-tx page boundary" + ); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn empty_catalog_is_empty_list_not_404() { + let kernel: KernelHandle = Arc::new(CatalogKernel { + catalog: Vec::new(), + }); + let page = fetch_inscriptions_page( + &kernel, + ListInscriptionsQuery { + from_height: 0, + from_tx_index: 0, + from_vin_index: 0, + limit: 100, + }, + ) + .await + .expect("empty"); + assert!(page.inscriptions.is_empty()); + assert!(page.next.is_none()); + let json = inscriptions_page_to_json(&page).expect("json"); + assert_eq!(json["inscriptions"], json!([])); + assert!(json.get("next_height").is_none()); + } + + /// §7.8 promises stable triple order; an out-of-order stream is + /// `internal_error`, not a silently re-sorted page. + #[tokio::test] + async fn out_of_order_kernel_stream_is_internal_error() { + let catalog = vec![ + sample_inscription(10, 0, 1, "completed", vec![sample_nullifier("completed")]), + sample_inscription(10, 0, 0, "completed", vec![sample_nullifier("completed")]), + ]; + let kernel: KernelHandle = Arc::new(CatalogKernel { catalog }); + let err = fetch_inscriptions_page( + &kernel, + ListInscriptionsQuery { + from_height: 0, + from_tx_index: 0, + from_vin_index: 0, + limit: 10, + }, + ) + .await + .expect_err("reversed triples must fail closed"); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); + assert!( + err.body.message.contains("strictly increasing") + && err.body.message.contains("height") + && err.body.message.contains("tx_index") + && err.body.message.contains("vin_index"), + "message must name the triple-order contract, got {}", + err.body.message + ); + } + + #[test] + fn strict_triple_order_accepts_increasing_and_rejects_equal() { + require_strict_triple_order(&[]).expect("empty"); + require_strict_triple_order(&[sample_inscription( + 1, + 0, + 0, + "pending", + vec![sample_nullifier("pending")], + )]) + .expect("singleton"); + let ok = vec![ + sample_inscription(1, 0, 0, "pending", vec![sample_nullifier("pending")]), + sample_inscription(1, 0, 1, "pending", vec![sample_nullifier("pending")]), + ]; + require_strict_triple_order(&ok).expect("increasing"); + let dup = vec![ + sample_inscription(1, 0, 0, "pending", vec![sample_nullifier("pending")]), + sample_inscription(1, 0, 0, "pending", vec![sample_nullifier("pending")]), + ]; + let err = require_strict_triple_order(&dup).expect_err("duplicate triple"); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); + } } diff --git a/src/error.rs b/src/error.rs index d207a10..1aa61b4 100644 --- a/src/error.rs +++ b/src/error.rs @@ -35,6 +35,13 @@ impl ApiError { Self::new(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, "malformed_request", message) } + /// §7.5 `bounds_exceeded` / 400 — numeric but outside the closed range + /// (e.g. `limit` ∉ `1..=1000`). Distinct from `malformed_request`, which + /// covers non-numeric / overflowing query values. + pub fn bounds_exceeded(message: impl Into) -> Self { + Self::new(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, "bounds_exceeded", message) + } + /// §7.5 `unauthorized` / 401 — API-edge OwnershipProof / capability failures /// (wrong domain, bad signature, GrantProof, address mismatch, chan_bind). /// diff --git a/src/kernel/client.rs b/src/kernel/client.rs index af9abd4..0cda14d 100644 --- a/src/kernel/client.rs +++ b/src/kernel/client.rs @@ -11,10 +11,10 @@ use crate::kernel::pb::kernel_v1::kernel_client::KernelClient as TonicKernelClie use crate::kernel::pb::kernel_v1::{ AccountStateRequest, AccountStateResult, AccumulatorTip, AttestRequest, Challenge, CoinProofBlob, CoinProofRequest, EntrustRequest, EntrustResult, GetAccumulatorRequest, - GetInfoRequest, GrantRequest, GrantResult, Info, Job, JobEvent, JobHandle, JobRequest, - NullifierPath, NullifierPathRequest, PublishRequest, PublishResult, PullChallengeRequest, - PullRequest, PullResult, RecordBlob, RecordRequest, RevokeRequest, RevokeResult, SignRequest, - TransitionRequest, + GetInfoRequest, GrantRequest, GrantResult, Info, Inscription, Job, JobEvent, JobHandle, + JobRequest, ListInscriptionsRequest, NullifierPath, NullifierPathRequest, PublishRequest, + PublishResult, PullChallengeRequest, PullRequest, PullResult, RecordBlob, RecordRequest, + RevokeRequest, RevokeResult, SignRequest, TransitionRequest, }; use crate::ownership::SessionAuthority; use async_trait::async_trait; @@ -51,6 +51,13 @@ pub trait KernelRpc: Send + Sync { async fn get_accumulator(&self) -> Result; + /// Server-stream of inscriptions from an inclusive triple cursor (§7.8). + /// The REST handler collects the stream into one page. + async fn list_inscriptions( + &self, + req: ListInscriptionsRequest, + ) -> Result>, ApiError>; + async fn get_nullifier_path( &self, req: NullifierPathRequest, @@ -233,6 +240,22 @@ impl KernelRpc for KernelClient { Ok(response.into_inner()) } + async fn list_inscriptions( + &self, + req: ListInscriptionsRequest, + ) -> Result>, ApiError> { + let mut client = self.inner.clone(); + let response = client + .list_inscriptions(Request::new(req)) + .await + .map_err(map_status)?; + let stream = response.into_inner().map(|item| match item { + Ok(ins) => Ok(ins), + Err(status) => Err(kernel_status_to_api_error(&status)), + }); + Ok(Box::pin(stream)) + } + async fn get_nullifier_path( &self, req: NullifierPathRequest, diff --git a/src/routes.rs b/src/routes.rs index 4d67b4f..a44d406 100644 --- a/src/routes.rs +++ b/src/routes.rs @@ -98,8 +98,6 @@ pub const CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS: &[(&str, &str)] = &[ /// Surfaces intentionally **not** registered (and therefore omitted from /// `GET /`), with the reason each stays off the map: /// -/// - `chain_inscriptions` — kernel `ListInscriptions` is Unimplemented until a -/// scanner-written inscription catalog (reveal txid + §3.5 format) exists. /// - `receipts_stream` — kernel `SubscribeReceipts` is Unimplemented; the node /// names the missing push/source prerequisite. A REST shell would only 501. /// - `blossom_get` / `blossom_head` / `blossom_upload` / `blossom_delete` — @@ -108,13 +106,15 @@ pub const CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS: &[(&str, &str)] = &[ /// streets that do not exist. /// /// Inventory keys remain in [`CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS`]; advertisement tracks -/// [`ServedSurface::ALL`] only. +/// [`ServedSurface::ALL`] only. `chain_inscriptions` is registered once the +/// node inscription catalog backs `ListInscriptions`. #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)] enum ServedSurface { Health, HealthReady, Info, ChainAccumulator, + ChainInscriptions, ChainNullifier, Tx, Jobs, @@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ impl ServedSurface { ServedSurface::HealthReady, ServedSurface::Info, ServedSurface::ChainAccumulator, + ServedSurface::ChainInscriptions, ServedSurface::ChainNullifier, ServedSurface::Tx, ServedSurface::Jobs, @@ -171,6 +172,7 @@ impl ServedSurface { ServedSurface::HealthReady => "health_ready", ServedSurface::Info => "info", ServedSurface::ChainAccumulator => "chain_accumulator", + ServedSurface::ChainInscriptions => "chain_inscriptions", ServedSurface::ChainNullifier => "chain_nullifier", ServedSurface::Tx => "tx", ServedSurface::Jobs => "jobs", @@ -204,6 +206,7 @@ impl ServedSurface { ServedSurface::HealthReady => router.route(&path, get(info::health_ready)), ServedSurface::Info => router.route(&path, get(info::get_info)), ServedSurface::ChainAccumulator => router.route(&path, get(chain::get_accumulator)), + ServedSurface::ChainInscriptions => router.route(&path, get(chain::list_inscriptions)), ServedSurface::ChainNullifier => router.route(&path, get(chain::get_nullifier)), ServedSurface::Tx => router.route(&path, post(jobs::post_tx)), ServedSurface::Jobs => router.route(&path, get(jobs::get_job)), @@ -372,8 +375,9 @@ mod tests { use crate::kernel::kernel_v1::{ AccountStateRequest, AccountStateResult, AccumulatorTip, AttestRequest, BootstrapManifest, Challenge, CoinProofBlob, CoinProofRequest, EntrustRequest, EntrustResult, GrantRequest, - GrantResult, Info, Job, JobEvent, JobHandle, JobRequest, NullifierPath, - NullifierPathRequest, PublishRequest, PublishResult, PullChallengeRequest, PullRequest, + GrantResult, Info, Inscription, Job, JobEvent, JobHandle, JobRequest, + ListInscriptionsRequest, Nullifier as ProtoNullifier, NullifierPath, NullifierPathRequest, + PublishRequest, PublishResult, PullChallengeRequest, PullRequest, PullResult as ProtoPullResult, RecordBlob, RecordRequest, RevokeRequest, RevokeResult, SignRequest, TransitionRequest, }; @@ -431,6 +435,14 @@ mod tests { "test double: get_accumulator not configured", )) } + async fn list_inscriptions( + &self, + _req: ListInscriptionsRequest, + ) -> Result>, ApiError> { + Err(ApiError::internal( + "test double: list_inscriptions not configured", + )) + } async fn get_nullifier_path( &self, _req: NullifierPathRequest, @@ -644,6 +656,7 @@ mod tests { "health_ready", "info", "chain_accumulator", + "chain_inscriptions", "chain_nullifier", "tx", "jobs", @@ -664,7 +677,7 @@ mod tests { "bootstrap_entrust", "bootstrap_revoke", ]), - "stage D adds bootstrap_* and publish_spendrecord" + "chain_inscriptions is served once ListInscriptions is catalog-backed" ); assert_eq!( endpoints["bootstrap_challenge"].as_str(), @@ -684,7 +697,6 @@ mod tests { ); // Unbuilt surfaces stay off discovery (documented in ServedSurface). for absent in [ - "chain_inscriptions", "receipts_stream", "blossom_get", "blossom_head", @@ -696,6 +708,11 @@ mod tests { "unbuilt surface {absent} must stay unadvertised" ); } + assert_eq!( + endpoints["chain_inscriptions"].as_str(), + Some("/v1/chain/inscriptions"), + "chain_inscriptions must be advertised once ListInscriptions is served" + ); assert_eq!( endpoints["attest_balance_challenge"].as_str(), Some("/v1/attest/balance/challenge") @@ -720,10 +737,10 @@ mod tests { endpoints["account_state"].as_str(), Some("/v1/account/state") ); - // chain_inscriptions must not be advertised until ListInscriptions exists. + // chain_inscriptions is advertised — the node catalog backs ListInscriptions. assert!( - !endpoints.contains_key("chain_inscriptions"), - "chain_inscriptions must stay unadvertised while the node catalog is missing" + endpoints.contains_key("chain_inscriptions"), + "chain_inscriptions must be advertised while the node catalog is present" ); assert_eq!( endpoints["health"].as_str(), @@ -910,9 +927,13 @@ mod tests { #[tokio::test] async fn chain_inscriptions_is_404_and_absent_from_discovery() { - // Documented omission: ListInscriptions is Unimplemented in the node - // (no scanner catalog). REST must not advertise or soft-serve it. - let app = test_app(); + // Renamed historically: the route is registered, returns a page, and + // the discovery key is present. The node catalog backs ListInscriptions. + let kernel = ScriptedKernel { + list_inscriptions: Some(Ok(Vec::new())), + ..Default::default() + }; + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -924,8 +945,21 @@ mod tests { .unwrap(); assert_eq!( res.status(), - StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, - "GET /v1/chain/inscriptions must not be registered without a catalog" + StatusCode::OK, + "GET /v1/chain/inscriptions must be registered and return a page" + ); + let body = body_bytes(res).await; + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body).expect("JSON page body"); + assert_eq!( + json["inscriptions"], + serde_json::json!([]), + "empty catalog is an empty list, not 404" + ); + assert!( + json.get("next_height").is_none() + && json.get("next_tx_index").is_none() + && json.get("next_vin_index").is_none(), + "empty page must omit all three next_* fields, got {json}" ); let app = test_app(); @@ -937,8 +971,12 @@ mod tests { let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body).expect("JSON root body"); let endpoints = json["endpoints"].as_object().expect("endpoints object"); assert!( - !endpoints.contains_key("chain_inscriptions"), - "unbuilt surface 'chain_inscriptions' must be omitted from GET / endpoints" + endpoints.contains_key("chain_inscriptions"), + "served surface 'chain_inscriptions' must appear in GET / endpoints" + ); + assert_eq!( + endpoints["chain_inscriptions"].as_str(), + Some("/v1/chain/inscriptions") ); assert!( endpoints.contains_key("info"), @@ -1021,6 +1059,8 @@ mod tests { cancel: Option>, info: Option>, accumulator: Option>, + /// Full catalog; the double filters by inclusive triple + limit. + list_inscriptions: Option, ApiError>>, nullifier_path: Option>, open_challenge: Option>, attest: Option>, @@ -1043,6 +1083,7 @@ mod tests { entrust_calls: AtomicUsize, revoke_calls: AtomicUsize, publish_calls: AtomicUsize, + list_inscriptions_calls: AtomicUsize, /// Last pull authority observed (for grant/ownership plumbing asserts). last_pull_authority: Mutex>, /// Last OpenPullChallenge.action observed (bootstrap domain plumbing). @@ -1051,6 +1092,8 @@ mod tests { last_entrust: Mutex>, last_revoke: Mutex>, last_publish: Mutex>, + /// Last ListInscriptions request (limit / cursor plumbing). + last_list_inscriptions: Mutex>, } #[async_trait] @@ -1110,6 +1153,44 @@ mod tests { None => Err(ApiError::internal("accumulator not scripted")), } } + async fn list_inscriptions( + &self, + req: ListInscriptionsRequest, + ) -> Result>, ApiError> { + self.list_inscriptions_calls.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst); + // ListInscriptionsRequest is Copy (scalar Option fields only). + *self + .last_list_inscriptions + .lock() + .expect("list_inscriptions mutex") = Some(req); + match &self.list_inscriptions { + Some(Ok(catalog)) => { + // §7.5 defaults (same as API normalisation before RPC / + // ListInscriptionsRequest proto comment). Named so the + // protocol values stay visible — not unwrap_or_default(). + const DEFAULT_FROM_HEIGHT: u64 = 0; + const DEFAULT_FROM_TX_INDEX: u64 = 0; + const DEFAULT_FROM_VIN_INDEX: u64 = 0; + const DEFAULT_LIMIT: u32 = 100; + let from_h = req.from_height.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_FROM_HEIGHT); + let from_t = req.from_tx_index.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_FROM_TX_INDEX); + let from_v = req.from_vin_index.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_FROM_VIN_INDEX); + let limit = req.limit.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_LIMIT) as usize; + let items: Vec> = catalog + .iter() + .filter(|ins| { + (ins.height, ins.tx_index, ins.vin_index) >= (from_h, from_t, from_v) + }) + .take(limit) + .cloned() + .map(Ok) + .collect(); + Ok(Box::pin(stream::iter(items))) + } + Some(Err(e)) => Err(e.clone()), + None => Err(ApiError::internal("list_inscriptions not scripted")), + } + } async fn get_nullifier_path( &self, _req: NullifierPathRequest, @@ -3986,8 +4067,252 @@ mod tests { assert!(!endpoints.contains_key("receipts_stream")); assert!(!endpoints.contains_key("blossom_get")); assert!(!endpoints.contains_key("blossom_upload")); - assert!(!endpoints.contains_key("chain_inscriptions")); + assert!( + endpoints.contains_key("chain_inscriptions"), + "chain_inscriptions is served and must appear in discovery" + ); assert!(endpoints.contains_key("bootstrap_entrust")); assert!(endpoints.contains_key("publish_spendrecord")); } + + // ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + // chain_inscriptions HTTP surface + // ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + + fn sample_inscription_http( + height: u64, + tx_index: u64, + vin_index: u64, + confirmation_state: &str, + member_states: &[&str], + ) -> Inscription { + let mut txid = vec![0u8; 32]; + for (i, b) in txid.iter_mut().enumerate() { + *b = (i as u8).wrapping_add(0x40); + } + let nullifiers: Vec = member_states + .iter() + .enumerate() + .map(|(i, state)| ProtoNullifier { + pubkey: vec![0xA0 + i as u8; 32], + r: vec![0xB0 + i as u8; 32], + state: (*state).to_string(), + }) + .collect(); + Inscription { + txid, + height, + count: nullifiers.len() as u32, + format: 1, + nullifiers, + confirmation_state: confirmation_state.to_string(), + tx_index, + vin_index, + } + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn chain_inscriptions_failed_member_completed_confirmation() { + // The decisive state split: a later Pk collision is failed while the + // reveal-tx confirmation depth is independently completed. + let kernel = ScriptedKernel { + list_inscriptions: Some(Ok(vec![sample_inscription_http( + 50, + 1, + 0, + "completed", + &["pending", "failed"], + )])), + ..Default::default() + }; + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/chain/inscriptions?limit=10") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + let ins = &json["inscriptions"][0]; + assert_eq!(ins["confirmation_state"], "completed"); + assert_eq!(ins["nullifiers"][0]["state"], "pending"); + assert_eq!(ins["nullifiers"][1]["state"], "failed"); + assert!( + json.get("next_height").is_none(), + "single-page result must omit next_*" + ); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn chain_inscriptions_mid_tx_pagination_three_pages() { + // Reveal tx (10,0) carries vin 0/1/2; page boundary cuts between them. + let catalog = vec![ + sample_inscription_http(10, 0, 0, "completed", &["completed"]), + sample_inscription_http(10, 0, 1, "completed", &["completed"]), + sample_inscription_http(10, 0, 2, "completed", &["failed"]), + sample_inscription_http(11, 0, 0, "pending", &["pending"]), + ]; + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + list_inscriptions: Some(Ok(catalog)), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + + // Page 1 + let res = app + .clone() + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/chain/inscriptions?limit=1") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + let p1: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(p1["inscriptions"].as_array().unwrap().len(), 1); + assert_eq!(p1["inscriptions"][0]["vin_index"], 0); + assert_eq!(p1["next_height"], 10); + assert_eq!(p1["next_tx_index"], 0); + assert_eq!(p1["next_vin_index"], 1); + // PAGE_LOOKAHEAD: kernel received limit+1 + // Option is Copy — take by value, no clone. + let last_req = + (*kernel.last_list_inscriptions.lock().expect("mutex")).expect("list called"); + assert_eq!(last_req.limit, Some(2), "PAGE_LOOKAHEAD sends limit+1"); + + // Page 2 — exclusive next of p1 is inclusive from + let res = app + .clone() + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/chain/inscriptions?from_height=10&from_tx_index=0&from_vin_index=1&limit=1") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + let p2: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(p2["inscriptions"][0]["vin_index"], 1); + assert_eq!(p2["inscriptions"][0]["height"], 10); + assert_eq!(p2["inscriptions"][0]["tx_index"], 0); + assert_eq!(p2["next_height"], 10); + assert_eq!(p2["next_tx_index"], 0); + assert_eq!(p2["next_vin_index"], 2); + + // Page 3 + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/chain/inscriptions?from_height=10&from_tx_index=0&from_vin_index=2&limit=1") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + let p3: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(p3["inscriptions"][0]["vin_index"], 2); + assert_eq!(p3["next_height"], 11); + assert_eq!(p3["next_tx_index"], 0); + assert_eq!(p3["next_vin_index"], 0); + // Three distinct triples, mid-tx split, no gap between p1→p2→p3. + // Typed .get/.as_u64 — Index sugar yields a place of type Value; packing + // three places into a by-value tuple would move out of the JSON tree. + let vin_at = |page: &Value, label: &str| -> u64 { + page.get("inscriptions") + .and_then(|v| v.as_array()) + .and_then(|arr| arr.first()) + .and_then(|ins| ins.get("vin_index")) + .and_then(|v| v.as_u64()) + .unwrap_or_else(|| { + panic!("{label}: inscriptions[0].vin_index must be present as u64") + }) + }; + assert_eq!( + (vin_at(&p1, "p1"), vin_at(&p2, "p2"), vin_at(&p3, "p3")), + (0, 1, 2), + "mid-reveal-tx pages must cover vin 0,1,2 without gap or duplicate" + ); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn chain_inscriptions_limit_zero_is_bounds_exceeded() { + let kernel = ScriptedKernel { + list_inscriptions: Some(Ok(Vec::new())), + ..Default::default() + }; + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/chain/inscriptions?limit=0") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "bounds_exceeded"); + assert!( + json["message"].as_str().unwrap().contains("limit"), + "message must name limit, got {}", + json["message"] + ); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn chain_inscriptions_limit_non_numeric_is_malformed() { + let kernel = ScriptedKernel { + list_inscriptions: Some(Ok(Vec::new())), + ..Default::default() + }; + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/chain/inscriptions?limit=nope") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "malformed_request"); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn chain_inscriptions_defaults_normalised_before_rpc() { + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + list_inscriptions: Some(Ok(Vec::new())), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/chain/inscriptions") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + // Option is Copy — take by value, no clone. + let req = (*kernel.last_list_inscriptions.lock().expect("mutex")).expect("list called"); + // API normalises defaults before RPC — all fields are Some. + assert_eq!(req.from_height, Some(0)); + assert_eq!(req.from_tx_index, Some(0)); + assert_eq!(req.from_vin_index, Some(0)); + // PAGE_LOOKAHEAD: default rest limit 100 → kernel limit 101 + assert_eq!(req.limit, Some(101)); + } } From fa5ba1873d0a961c4dfe09f88bc9cae2249ba234 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: TaprootFreak <142087526+TaprootFreak@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Sat, 1 Aug 2026 04:30:53 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 09/23] =?UTF-8?q?feat:=20serve=20the=20Blossom=20blob=20st?= =?UTF-8?q?ore=20(=C2=A77.4)?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Four of the nine unserved §7.5 keys — `blossom_get`, `blossom_head`, `blossom_upload`, `blossom_delete`. §7.8 has no Blossom procedure: the surface is explicitly API-local and carries its own storage, so it does not go through the kernel. The store is content-addressed on the filesystem under a root that comes from the operating configuration. There is no default path and no fallback: without the variable the surface is unconfigured, the routes are not mounted and the four discovery keys are not advertised — the same shape the repo already uses for other unconfigured surfaces. The path parameter is validated as exactly 64 lowercase hex characters *before* it becomes a filename, so traversal is excluded by construction rather than by filtering. Writes go to a temporary file in the same directory and are renamed into place: an interrupted upload must not leave a half blob under a valid address, which is the one promise a content-addressed store makes. The `x` tag of the kind-24242 authorization event is checked against the bytes actually received, not against a header or a value inside the event. That check is the whole authorization: anyone who could swap the body without breaking the tag could store arbitrary content under someone else's signature. Every §7.4 rejection is its own check with its own status — 401 for signature, kind, `t` tag, `x` tag, expiry and the clock window; 403 for the wrong `op` key on upload or a delete by someone other than the original uploader; 413 over the size limit. A blob with no uploader note is not deletable rather than deletable by anyone. The three `X-ZkCoins-*` binding headers are all-or-nothing and validated even though no receipt follows: §4.6 replication is not built, so the optional `receipt` field stays absent rather than becoming an empty object or an invented attestation. --- README.md | 2 +- docs/rest-surface.md | 13 +- src/blossom/auth.rs | 637 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/blossom/base64.rs | 191 ++++++++++++ src/blossom/mod.rs | 325 +++++++++++++++++++ src/blossom/store.rs | 440 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/config.rs | 241 ++++++++++++++ src/error.rs | 29 +- src/lib.rs | 3 +- src/main.rs | 2 +- src/routes.rs | 706 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- src/state.rs | 8 +- 12 files changed, 2558 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-) create mode 100644 src/blossom/auth.rs create mode 100644 src/blossom/base64.rs create mode 100644 src/blossom/mod.rs create mode 100644 src/blossom/store.rs diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 6977983..951fbef 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ The API layer sits **outward** of the node. It consumes the node's internal **ke - **`GET /` discovery follows registration** via `ServedSurface` — only served keys are advertised. The 29-key catalogue stays as inventory. - Kernel contract: carried `proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto` with SHA-256 identity pin (`src/proto_identity.rs`); REST errors from `ErrorInfo.metadata["http_status"]` only (API-local auth failures use §7.5 `401 unauthorized` directly). - Codegen lives in the workspace member **`kernel-proto`** (tonic client stubs only). Workspace `default-members = ["."]` keeps default `cargo clippy` / `cargo test` on the **api** package so generated code is not linted. -- Fail-closed env: `ZKCOINS_BIND_ADDR`, `ZKCOINS_KERNEL_ADDR`, `ZKCOINS_FEATURES`, `ZKCOINS_PUBLIC_HOST` (see the inventory doc). +- Fail-closed env: `ZKCOINS_BIND_ADDR`, `ZKCOINS_KERNEL_ADDR`, `ZKCOINS_FEATURES`, `ZKCOINS_PUBLIC_HOST` (see the inventory doc). Optional Blossom store: `ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_STORE` (+ max bytes / allowed ops companions). ## License diff --git a/docs/rest-surface.md b/docs/rest-surface.md index 64339c1..f411d31 100644 --- a/docs/rest-surface.md +++ b/docs/rest-surface.md @@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ Deployments mit Wallet- und/oder Explorer-Rolle benötigt (Replica-/Blob-Pfad). | `POST /v1/bootstrap/entrust` | **implementiert** — OwnershipProof (Entrust-Domain) + Bundle-Längenprüfung (161 B), dann `EntrustOperationalBundle`; Bundle wird nie geloggt | | `POST /v1/bootstrap/revoke` | **implementiert** — OwnershipProof (Revoke-Domain), dann `RevokeOperationalBundle` | | `POST /v1/publish/spendrecord` | **implementiert** — `Publish`; Ablehnung → HTTP 200 `{accepted:false, reason}`; v1-Fee-Felder → 400 | +| `GET`/`HEAD`/`DELETE /blossom/`, `PUT`/`POST /blossom/upload` | **implementiert** wenn `ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_STORE` gesetzt — API-lokaler inhaltsadressierter Store (§7.4); kein Kernel-RPC; ohne Store unregistriert | | alle übrigen Method+Path | **nicht registriert** — kein Handler, kein `todo!()`, kein Platzhalter | **Bewusst nicht beworben:** @@ -179,7 +180,7 @@ Deployments mit Wallet- und/oder Explorer-Rolle benötigt (Replica-/Blob-Pfad). | Key | Warum | |---|---| | `receipts_stream` | Kernel-`SubscribeReceipts` Unimplemented; der node nennt die fehlende Push-/Quell-Voraussetzung. | -| `blossom_get` / `blossom_head` / `blossom_upload` / `blossom_delete` | §7.4; im node gibt es keinen Blossom-Pfad, Recovery ist nicht implementiert. | +| `blossom_*` (ohne `ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_STORE`) | §7.4; die vier Schlüssel werden **nur** advertised, wenn der inhaltsadressierte Store konfiguriert ist. | Router und Discovery teilen eine Quelle (`ServedSurface` in `src/routes.rs`): eine neue registrierte Fläche erscheint automatisch in `GET /`; ein Inventur-Key ohne Route @@ -196,7 +197,7 @@ ausschließlich über `google.rpc.ErrorInfo` (`domain`, `reason`, | Lücke | Warum | |---|---| | `GET /v1/receipts/stream` | Kernel-`SubscribeReceipts` Unimplemented. | -| Blossom (`/blossom/*`) | Kein Blossom-Pfad im node; Recovery nicht implementiert. | +| Blossom `ReplicaReceiptV1` | §4.6 Dual-Commit (Blob + Delivery-Event) fehlt; Upload antwortet ehrlich nur mit `{ blob_id }` — kein `receipt`. | | Feature-Gate `404 feature_disabled` | Bootstrap/Publish/Job/Attest-Fläche ist in dieser Stufe always-on; Gate folgt mit den optionalen Rollen. | --- @@ -209,3 +210,11 @@ ausschließlich über `google.rpc.ErrorInfo` (`domain`, `reason`, | `ZKCOINS_KERNEL_ADDR` | Adresse des Kernel-gRPC (z. B. `http://127.0.0.1:50051`). **Kein Default.** Pflicht, auch wenn dieser Scaffold den Kanal noch nicht öffnet — Start ohne konfigurierte Kernel-Adresse ist unzulässig. | | `ZKCOINS_FEATURES` | Komma-separierte Teilmenge von `{wallet,explorer,publisher,lightning_bridge,mail_bridge}`. Darf leer sein (alle Features off). Unbekannter Token → **Startfehler**. Variable selbst ist Pflicht (explizit leer = absichtlich nichts freigeschaltet). | | `ZKCOINS_PUBLIC_HOST` | Komma-separierte autoritative Hostnamen für §5.1 `chan_bind` (lowercase, trailing-dot gestrichen). **Nie** aus `Host`-Header. Darf leer sein (dann schlägt OwnershipProof-Auth laut fehl). Variable selbst ist Pflicht. | + +### Optionale Blossom-Fläche (§7.4) + +| Variable | Bedeutung | +|---|---| +| `ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_STORE` | Wurzelverzeichnis des inhaltsadressierten Blob-Stores. **Abwesend** ⇒ die vier Blossom-Keys bleiben unbeworben und unmontiert. **Kein Default-Pfad**, kein `/tmp`-Rückfall. Leer gesetzt → Startfehler. | +| `ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_MAX_BLOB_BYTES` | Pflicht-Begleiter wenn der Store gesetzt ist: ausgewiesene Upload-Obergrenze (`> 0`). Body darüber → `413 payload_too_large`. | +| `ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_ALLOWED_OPS` | Pflicht-Begleiter wenn der Store gesetzt ist: komma-separierte lowercase-hex-32B-`op`-Pubkeys (gepaarte Konten + Replikations-Peers). Darf leer sein (dann ist jeder Upload `403`). | diff --git a/src/blossom/auth.rs b/src/blossom/auth.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a0fcd77 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/blossom/auth.rs @@ -0,0 +1,637 @@ +//! Kind-`24242` Blossom authorization events (§7.4). +//! +//! Pure verification: every check takes an injected `now_unix` so the time +//! window is unit-testable (same discipline as challenge-echo expiry — the +//! verifier never reads the system clock itself). +//! +//! Wire form: `Authorization: Nostr `. + +use crate::blossom::base64; +use crate::error::ApiError; +use crate::hexutil::decode_hex_exact; +use crate::ownership::verify_bip340; +use serde::Deserialize; +use serde_json::Value; +use sha2::{Digest, Sha256}; + +/// Recommended replay window from §7.4 (seconds). Fixed server-side bound. +pub const REPLAY_WINDOW_SECS: u64 = 300; + +/// Clock-skew allowance: `created_at ≤ now + CLOCK_SKEW_SECS`. +pub const CLOCK_SKEW_SECS: u64 = 60; + +/// Nostr event kind for Blossom upload/delete authorization. +pub const BLOSSOM_AUTH_KIND: u64 = 24242; + +/// Action tag value for PUT/POST upload. +pub const TAG_T_UPLOAD: &str = "upload"; + +/// Action tag value for DELETE. +pub const TAG_T_DELETE: &str = "delete"; + +/// Decoded and cryptographically verified kind-24242 event. +#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub struct VerifiedAuthEvent { + /// `op` x-only public key (32 bytes) that signed the event. + pub op_pubkey: [u8; 32], + /// `t` tag: `"upload"` or `"delete"`. + pub action: AuthAction, + /// `x` tag: body hash (upload) or target blob id (delete). + pub x_tag: [u8; 32], + /// Parsed `expiration` tag (unix seconds). + pub expiration: u64, + /// Event `created_at`. + pub created_at: u64, + /// Nostr event id (SHA-256 of the canonical serialization). + pub event_id: [u8; 32], +} + +#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub enum AuthAction { + Upload, + Delete, +} + +impl AuthAction { + pub const fn as_str(self) -> &'static str { + match self { + AuthAction::Upload => TAG_T_UPLOAD, + AuthAction::Delete => TAG_T_DELETE, + } + } +} + +/// Expected action for the HTTP method under check. +#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub enum RequiredAction { + Upload, + Delete, +} + +impl RequiredAction { + pub const fn as_action(self) -> AuthAction { + match self { + RequiredAction::Upload => AuthAction::Upload, + RequiredAction::Delete => AuthAction::Delete, + } + } +} + +#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)] +struct WireEvent { + id: String, + pubkey: String, + created_at: u64, + kind: u64, + tags: Vec>, + #[serde(default)] + content: String, + sig: String, +} + +/// Parse `Authorization: Nostr ` and fully verify a kind-24242 event. +/// +/// # Arguments +/// +/// * `authorization_header` — full `Authorization` header value +/// * `required` — method-selected action (`upload` vs `delete`); never from body +/// * `x_expected` — for upload: `H(actual body)`; for delete: path `blob_id`. +/// The `x` tag is checked **against this value**, not against any header +/// claim — that is the whole authorization hinge. +/// * `now_unix` — injected clock (seconds since epoch) +/// +/// # Status codes (§7.4) +/// +/// Signature / kind / `t` / `x` / time-window failures → `401 unauthorized`. +/// Malformed header framing (not `Nostr …`) → `401` as well (capability +/// missing/invalid). The caller maps `op`-key ACL failures to `403`. +pub fn verify_blossom_auth( + authorization_header: &str, + required: RequiredAction, + x_expected: &[u8; 32], + now_unix: u64, +) -> Result { + let b64 = parse_nostr_authorization(authorization_header)?; + let raw = base64::decode(b64).map_err(|e| { + ApiError::unauthorized(format!( + "Authorization Nostr payload is not valid base64: {e}" + )) + })?; + let event: WireEvent = serde_json::from_slice(&raw).map_err(|e| { + ApiError::unauthorized(format!( + "Authorization Nostr payload is not a JSON event: {e}" + )) + })?; + + // kind + if event.kind != BLOSSOM_AUTH_KIND { + return Err(ApiError::unauthorized(format!( + "auth event kind must be {BLOSSOM_AUTH_KIND}, got {}", + event.kind + ))); + } + + // content must be empty (§7.4) + if !event.content.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::unauthorized("auth event content must be empty")); + } + + let op_pubkey = parse_hex32_lower_or_upper(&event.pubkey, "auth event pubkey")?; + let sig = parse_hex64_field(&event.sig, "auth event sig")?; + let claimed_id = parse_hex32_lower_or_upper(&event.id, "auth event id")?; + + // Recompute event id from the canonical serialization and require match. + let computed_id = compute_event_id( + &event.pubkey, + event.created_at, + event.kind, + &event.tags, + &event.content, + )?; + if computed_id != claimed_id { + return Err(ApiError::unauthorized( + "auth event id does not match canonical serialization", + )); + } + + // BIP-340 over the event id under the op pubkey. + verify_bip340(&op_pubkey, &sig, &computed_id) + .map_err(|_| ApiError::unauthorized("auth event signature invalid"))?; + + // Tags: t, x, expiration — each required exactly once for v1. + let action = require_t_tag(&event.tags)?; + if action != required.as_action() { + return Err(ApiError::unauthorized(format!( + "auth event t tag is {:?}, expected {:?} for this method", + action.as_str(), + required.as_action().as_str() + ))); + } + + let x_tag = require_x_tag(&event.tags)?; + if x_tag != *x_expected { + return Err(ApiError::unauthorized( + "auth event x tag does not match the actual body hash / target blob", + )); + } + + let expiration = require_expiration_tag(&event.tags)?; + + // Time window — pure over injected now. + check_time_window(event.created_at, expiration, now_unix)?; + + Ok(VerifiedAuthEvent { + op_pubkey, + action, + x_tag, + expiration, + created_at: event.created_at, + event_id: computed_id, + }) +} + +/// `created_at ≤ now + 60` and `created_at ≥ now − replay_window` and +/// `expiration ≥ now`. Pure: takes `now_unix` as an argument. +pub fn check_time_window(created_at: u64, expiration: u64, now_unix: u64) -> Result<(), ApiError> { + if expiration < now_unix { + return Err(ApiError::unauthorized(format!( + "auth event expiration {expiration} is in the past (now {now_unix})" + ))); + } + // created_at ≤ now + 60 (clock skew) + let max_future = now_unix.saturating_add(CLOCK_SKEW_SECS); + if created_at > max_future { + return Err(ApiError::unauthorized(format!( + "auth event created_at {created_at} is more than {CLOCK_SKEW_SECS}s ahead of now {now_unix}" + ))); + } + // created_at ≥ now − replay_window + let min_created = now_unix.saturating_sub(REPLAY_WINDOW_SECS); + if created_at < min_created { + return Err(ApiError::unauthorized(format!( + "auth event created_at {created_at} is older than replay window \ + ({REPLAY_WINDOW_SECS}s) relative to now {now_unix}" + ))); + } + Ok(()) +} + +fn parse_nostr_authorization(header: &str) -> Result<&str, ApiError> { + let header = header.trim(); + const PREFIX: &str = "Nostr "; + if let Some(rest) = header.strip_prefix(PREFIX) { + if rest.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::unauthorized( + "Authorization Nostr payload is empty", + )); + } + return Ok(rest.trim()); + } + // Also accept case-sensitive "Nostr" only per BUD-01 convention; anything + // else is a missing/invalid capability. + Err(ApiError::unauthorized( + "Authorization must be \"Nostr \"", + )) +} + +fn require_t_tag(tags: &[Vec]) -> Result { + let mut found: Option = None; + for tag in tags { + if tag.first().map(String::as_str) != Some("t") { + continue; + } + let value = tag + .get(1) + .map(String::as_str) + .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::unauthorized("auth event t tag is missing its value"))?; + let action = match value { + TAG_T_UPLOAD => AuthAction::Upload, + TAG_T_DELETE => AuthAction::Delete, + other => { + return Err(ApiError::unauthorized(format!( + "auth event t tag must be \"upload\" or \"delete\", got {other:?}" + ))); + } + }; + if found.is_some() { + return Err(ApiError::unauthorized( + "auth event must not carry multiple t tags", + )); + } + found = Some(action); + } + found.ok_or_else(|| ApiError::unauthorized("auth event is missing the t tag")) +} + +fn require_x_tag(tags: &[Vec]) -> Result<[u8; 32], ApiError> { + let mut found: Option<[u8; 32]> = None; + for tag in tags { + if tag.first().map(String::as_str) != Some("x") { + continue; + } + let value = tag + .get(1) + .map(String::as_str) + .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::unauthorized("auth event x tag is missing its value"))?; + // x is lowercase-hex SHA-256 of body / blob_id. + if value.len() != 64 + || !value + .bytes() + .all(|b| matches!(b, b'0'..=b'9' | b'a'..=b'f')) + { + return Err(ApiError::unauthorized( + "auth event x tag must be 64 lowercase hex characters", + )); + } + let bytes = decode_hex_exact(value, 32) + .map_err(|e| ApiError::unauthorized(format!("auth event x tag: {e}")))?; + let mut out = [0u8; 32]; + out.copy_from_slice(&bytes); + if found.is_some() { + return Err(ApiError::unauthorized( + "auth event must not carry multiple x tags", + )); + } + found = Some(out); + } + found.ok_or_else(|| ApiError::unauthorized("auth event is missing the x tag")) +} + +fn require_expiration_tag(tags: &[Vec]) -> Result { + let mut found: Option = None; + for tag in tags { + if tag.first().map(String::as_str) != Some("expiration") { + continue; + } + let value = tag.get(1).map(String::as_str).ok_or_else(|| { + ApiError::unauthorized("auth event expiration tag is missing its value") + })?; + let exp = parse_decimal_u64(value) + .map_err(|m| ApiError::unauthorized(format!("auth event expiration: {m}")))?; + if found.is_some() { + return Err(ApiError::unauthorized( + "auth event must not carry multiple expiration tags", + )); + } + found = Some(exp); + } + found.ok_or_else(|| ApiError::unauthorized("auth event is missing the expiration tag")) +} + +fn parse_decimal_u64(s: &str) -> Result { + if s.is_empty() { + return Err("empty".into()); + } + if s == "0" { + return Ok(0); + } + if s.as_bytes()[0] == b'0' { + return Err("leading zeros are not allowed".into()); + } + if !s.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_digit()) { + return Err("must be decimal digits only".into()); + } + s.parse::().map_err(|_| "out of u64 range".to_string()) +} + +/// Accept lowercase or uppercase hex for Nostr `pubkey`/`id` fields (NIP-01 +/// commonly uses lowercase; reject wrong width still). +fn parse_hex32_lower_or_upper(s: &str, field: &str) -> Result<[u8; 32], ApiError> { + let v = decode_hex_exact(s, 32).map_err(|e| ApiError::unauthorized(format!("{field}: {e}")))?; + let mut out = [0u8; 32]; + out.copy_from_slice(&v); + Ok(out) +} + +fn parse_hex64_field(s: &str, field: &str) -> Result<[u8; 64], ApiError> { + let v = decode_hex_exact(s, 64).map_err(|e| ApiError::unauthorized(format!("{field}: {e}")))?; + let mut out = [0u8; 64]; + out.copy_from_slice(&v); + Ok(out) +} + +/// NIP-01 event id: `SHA-256(JSON-array [0, pubkey, created_at, kind, tags, content])`. +/// +/// Uses the **wire** `pubkey` string (as presented) and a compact JSON array +/// with no insignificant whitespace. Tags are serialised as JSON arrays of +/// strings in order. +fn compute_event_id( + pubkey_hex: &str, + created_at: u64, + kind: u64, + tags: &[Vec], + content: &str, +) -> Result<[u8; 32], ApiError> { + // Build the canonical array via serde_json so string escaping matches + // the JSON the client signed. + let tags_value: Vec = tags + .iter() + .map(|t| Value::Array(t.iter().cloned().map(Value::String).collect())) + .collect(); + let arr = Value::Array(vec![ + Value::Number(0.into()), + Value::String(pubkey_hex.to_string()), + Value::Number(created_at.into()), + Value::Number(kind.into()), + Value::Array(tags_value), + Value::String(content.to_string()), + ]); + let serialized = serde_json::to_vec(&arr) + .map_err(|e| ApiError::internal(format!("auth event id serialization failed: {e}")))?; + Ok(Sha256::digest(&serialized).into()) +} + +/// Build a signed kind-24242 event (tests / helpers). Returns the base64 +/// payload for the `Authorization: Nostr …` header. +#[cfg(test)] +pub fn sign_auth_event_base64( + sk: &bitcoin::secp256k1::SecretKey, + pubkey: &[u8; 32], + action: AuthAction, + x_tag: &[u8; 32], + created_at: u64, + expiration: u64, +) -> String { + use crate::hexutil::encode_hex; + use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Keypair, Message, Secp256k1}; + + let pubkey_hex = encode_hex(pubkey); + let tags = vec![ + vec!["t".to_string(), action.as_str().to_string()], + vec!["x".to_string(), encode_hex(x_tag)], + vec!["expiration".to_string(), expiration.to_string()], + ]; + let content = String::new(); + let id = compute_event_id(&pubkey_hex, created_at, BLOSSOM_AUTH_KIND, &tags, &content) + .expect("event id"); + let secp = Secp256k1::new(); + let kp = Keypair::from_secret_key(&secp, sk); + let msg = Message::from_digest_slice(&id).expect("32-byte digest"); + let sig = secp.sign_schnorr_no_aux_rand(&msg, &kp); + let mut sig_bytes = [0u8; 64]; + sig_bytes.copy_from_slice(sig.as_ref()); + + let event = serde_json::json!({ + "id": encode_hex(&id), + "pubkey": pubkey_hex, + "created_at": created_at, + "kind": BLOSSOM_AUTH_KIND, + "tags": tags, + "content": content, + "sig": encode_hex(&sig_bytes), + }); + base64::encode(event.to_string().as_bytes()) +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, SecretKey}; + + fn sample_sk_pk() -> (SecretKey, [u8; 32]) { + let secp = Secp256k1::new(); + let sk = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0x7au8; 32]).expect("secret"); + let kp = bitcoin::secp256k1::Keypair::from_secret_key(&secp, &sk); + let (xonly, _) = kp.x_only_public_key(); + (sk, xonly.serialize()) + } + + #[test] + fn valid_upload_event_verifies() { + let (sk, pk) = sample_sk_pk(); + let x = [0xabu8; 32]; + let now = 1_700_000_000u64; + let b64 = sign_auth_event_base64(&sk, &pk, AuthAction::Upload, &x, now, now + 60); + let header = format!("Nostr {b64}"); + let v = verify_blossom_auth(&header, RequiredAction::Upload, &x, now).expect("ok"); + assert_eq!(v.op_pubkey, pk); + assert_eq!(v.action, AuthAction::Upload); + assert_eq!(v.x_tag, x); + } + + #[test] + fn wrong_t_tag_is_401() { + let (sk, pk) = sample_sk_pk(); + let x = [0x11u8; 32]; + let now = 1_700_000_000u64; + // Sign as delete, present as upload requirement. + let b64 = sign_auth_event_base64(&sk, &pk, AuthAction::Delete, &x, now, now + 60); + let err = verify_blossom_auth(&format!("Nostr {b64}"), RequiredAction::Upload, &x, now) + .expect_err("t mismatch"); + assert_eq!(err.status, axum::http::StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "unauthorized"); + assert!( + err.body.message.contains("t tag"), + "cause must name t tag: {}", + err.body.message + ); + } + + #[test] + fn x_tag_must_match_actual_body_hash() { + let (sk, pk) = sample_sk_pk(); + let signed_x = [0x22u8; 32]; + let actual_x = [0x33u8; 32]; + let now = 1_700_000_000u64; + let b64 = sign_auth_event_base64(&sk, &pk, AuthAction::Upload, &signed_x, now, now + 60); + let err = verify_blossom_auth( + &format!("Nostr {b64}"), + RequiredAction::Upload, + &actual_x, + now, + ) + .expect_err("x mismatch"); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "unauthorized"); + assert!( + err.body.message.contains("x tag"), + "cause must name x tag: {}", + err.body.message + ); + } + + #[test] + fn expired_event_is_401() { + let (sk, pk) = sample_sk_pk(); + let x = [0x44u8; 32]; + let now = 1_700_000_100u64; + let b64 = sign_auth_event_base64( + &sk, + &pk, + AuthAction::Upload, + &x, + now - 10, + now - 1, // expiration in the past + ); + let err = verify_blossom_auth(&format!("Nostr {b64}"), RequiredAction::Upload, &x, now) + .expect_err("expired"); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "unauthorized"); + assert!( + err.body.message.contains("expiration"), + "cause must name expiration: {}", + err.body.message + ); + } + + #[test] + fn created_at_too_far_future_is_401() { + let (sk, pk) = sample_sk_pk(); + let x = [0x55u8; 32]; + let now = 1_700_000_000u64; + let created = now + CLOCK_SKEW_SECS + 1; + let b64 = sign_auth_event_base64(&sk, &pk, AuthAction::Upload, &x, created, created + 60); + let err = verify_blossom_auth(&format!("Nostr {b64}"), RequiredAction::Upload, &x, now) + .expect_err("future"); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "unauthorized"); + assert!( + err.body.message.contains("created_at"), + "cause must name created_at: {}", + err.body.message + ); + } + + #[test] + fn created_at_older_than_replay_window_is_401() { + let (sk, pk) = sample_sk_pk(); + let x = [0x66u8; 32]; + let now = 1_700_000_000u64; + let created = now - REPLAY_WINDOW_SECS - 1; + let b64 = sign_auth_event_base64( + &sk, + &pk, + AuthAction::Upload, + &x, + created, + now + 60, // expiration still valid + ); + let err = verify_blossom_auth(&format!("Nostr {b64}"), RequiredAction::Upload, &x, now) + .expect_err("replay window"); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "unauthorized"); + assert!( + err.body.message.contains("replay window"), + "cause must name replay window: {}", + err.body.message + ); + } + + #[test] + fn bad_signature_is_401() { + let (sk, pk) = sample_sk_pk(); + let x = [0x77u8; 32]; + let now = 1_700_000_000u64; + let b64 = sign_auth_event_base64(&sk, &pk, AuthAction::Upload, &x, now, now + 60); + // Flip one base64 character in the payload if possible; simpler: decode, + // tweak sig, re-encode. + let raw = base64::decode(&b64).unwrap(); + let mut v: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&raw).unwrap(); + // Corrupt the last hex nibble of sig. + let sig = v["sig"].as_str().unwrap().to_string(); + let mut chars: Vec = sig.chars().collect(); + let last = chars.len() - 1; + chars[last] = if chars[last] == '0' { '1' } else { '0' }; + v["sig"] = serde_json::Value::String(chars.into_iter().collect()); + let bad = base64::encode(v.to_string().as_bytes()); + let err = verify_blossom_auth(&format!("Nostr {bad}"), RequiredAction::Upload, &x, now) + .expect_err("bad sig"); + // Either id mismatch (if we broke something else) or signature invalid. + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "unauthorized"); + } + + #[test] + fn time_window_is_pure_over_injected_now() { + // Direct unit of the pure helper — no system clock. + // `now` must be large enough that `now − REPLAY_WINDOW_SECS − 1` is a + // real u64 value (small toy clocks like 150 under-flow the "too old" + // case and never exercise the named branch). + let now = 1_700_000_000u64; + + check_time_window(now - 10, now + 60, now).expect("in window"); + + let err = check_time_window(now - 10, now - 1, now).expect_err("expired"); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "unauthorized"); + assert!( + err.body.message.contains("expiration"), + "cause must name expiration: {}", + err.body.message + ); + + let err = check_time_window(now + CLOCK_SKEW_SECS + 1, now + 999, now) + .expect_err("created_at too far future"); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "unauthorized"); + assert!( + err.body.message.contains("created_at"), + "cause must name created_at: {}", + err.body.message + ); + + let err = check_time_window(now - REPLAY_WINDOW_SECS - 1, now + 999, now) + .expect_err("created_at older than replay window"); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "unauthorized"); + assert!( + err.body.message.contains("replay window"), + "cause must name replay window: {}", + err.body.message + ); + } + + #[test] + fn time_window_saturates_when_now_smaller_than_replay_window() { + // Production uses saturating_sub: with now < REPLAY_WINDOW_SECS the + // lower bound is 0, not a panic. created_at = 0 is therefore in-window + // when expiration is still in the future. + let now = 10u64; + assert!( + now < REPLAY_WINDOW_SECS, + "precondition: now under the window" + ); + check_time_window(0, now + 60, now).expect("saturates to min_created = 0"); + // Even created_at = 0 is accepted; there is no "too old" case when + // now < REPLAY_WINDOW_SECS (the window reaches the epoch). + let err = check_time_window(now + CLOCK_SKEW_SECS + 1, now + 999, now) + .expect_err("future still rejected under small now"); + assert!( + err.body.message.contains("created_at"), + "cause must name created_at: {}", + err.body.message + ); + } +} diff --git a/src/blossom/base64.rs b/src/blossom/base64.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0d90a77 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/blossom/base64.rs @@ -0,0 +1,191 @@ +//! Standard Base64 (RFC 4648 §4) **decoder** for Nostr `Authorization` events. +//! +//! Wire form per §7.4 / BUD-01: `Authorization: Nostr `. +//! That is the **standard** alphabet (`A–Z a–z 0–9 + /`) with `=` padding — +//! not base64url (`-` `_`, no pad) used by NIP44Binary in the node tree. +//! +//! Decode-only in production: the server never re-encodes the auth event. + +/// Decode standard Base64 (with `=` padding). Rejects URL-safe alphabet and +/// non-alphabet characters. +pub fn decode(input: &str) -> Result, Base64Error> { + if input.is_empty() { + return Ok(Vec::new()); + } + if !input.len().is_multiple_of(4) { + return Err(Base64Error::Length); + } + let bytes = input.as_bytes(); + let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(input.len() / 4 * 3); + let mut i = 0; + while i < bytes.len() { + let is_last = i + 4 >= bytes.len(); + let b0 = val(bytes[i])?; + let b1 = val(bytes[i + 1])?; + let (b2, pad2) = if bytes[i + 2] == b'=' { + if !is_last || bytes[i + 3] != b'=' { + return Err(Base64Error::Padding); + } + (0, true) + } else { + (val(bytes[i + 2])?, false) + }; + let (b3, pad3) = if bytes[i + 3] == b'=' { + if !is_last { + return Err(Base64Error::Padding); + } + (0, true) + } else { + if pad2 { + return Err(Base64Error::Padding); + } + (val(bytes[i + 3])?, false) + }; + let n = (b0 << 18) | (b1 << 12) | (b2 << 6) | b3; + out.push((n >> 16) as u8); + if !pad2 { + out.push((n >> 8) as u8); + } + if !pad3 { + out.push(n as u8); + } + i += 4; + } + Ok(out) +} + +fn val(b: u8) -> Result { + match b { + b'A'..=b'Z' => Ok((b - b'A') as u32), + b'a'..=b'z' => Ok((b - b'a' + 26) as u32), + b'0'..=b'9' => Ok((b - b'0' + 52) as u32), + b'+' => Ok(62), + b'/' => Ok(63), + _ => Err(Base64Error::Char(b)), + } +} + +/// Distinct failure modes of standard Base64 decoding. +/// +/// The enum name already carries the domain; variants name the cause only. +#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub enum Base64Error { + /// Byte outside the standard alphabet (`A–Z a–z 0–9 + /` and `=` only in pad positions). + Char(u8), + /// Input length is not a multiple of 4 (standard padded form). + Length, + /// `=` in a non-terminal position, missing trailing pad, or pad before a non-pad. + Padding, +} + +impl std::fmt::Display for Base64Error { + fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result { + match self { + Base64Error::Char(b) => write!(f, "invalid base64 character 0x{b:02x}"), + Base64Error::Length => write!(f, "invalid base64 length"), + Base64Error::Padding => write!(f, "invalid base64 padding"), + } + } +} + +impl std::error::Error for Base64Error {} + +/// Encode raw bytes as standard Base64 with `=` padding. +/// +/// Test/helper only — production auth path is decode-only. +#[cfg(test)] +pub fn encode(input: &[u8]) -> String { + const ENCODE: &[u8; 64] = b"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/"; + let mut out = String::with_capacity(input.len().div_ceil(3) * 4); + let mut i = 0; + while i + 3 <= input.len() { + let n = ((input[i] as u32) << 16) | ((input[i + 1] as u32) << 8) | (input[i + 2] as u32); + out.push(ENCODE[((n >> 18) & 0x3f) as usize] as char); + out.push(ENCODE[((n >> 12) & 0x3f) as usize] as char); + out.push(ENCODE[((n >> 6) & 0x3f) as usize] as char); + out.push(ENCODE[(n & 0x3f) as usize] as char); + i += 3; + } + match input.len() - i { + 0 => {} + 1 => { + let n = (input[i] as u32) << 16; + out.push(ENCODE[((n >> 18) & 0x3f) as usize] as char); + out.push(ENCODE[((n >> 12) & 0x3f) as usize] as char); + out.push('='); + out.push('='); + } + 2 => { + let n = ((input[i] as u32) << 16) | ((input[i + 1] as u32) << 8); + out.push(ENCODE[((n >> 18) & 0x3f) as usize] as char); + out.push(ENCODE[((n >> 12) & 0x3f) as usize] as char); + out.push(ENCODE[((n >> 6) & 0x3f) as usize] as char); + out.push('='); + } + _ => unreachable!(), + } + out +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + + #[test] + fn decode_empty() { + assert_eq!(decode("").unwrap(), b""); + } + + #[test] + fn decode_rfc4648_vectors() { + // RFC 4648 §10 — known standard-Base64 encodings (no encoder in prod path). + assert_eq!(decode("Zg==").unwrap(), b"f"); + assert_eq!(decode("Zm8=").unwrap(), b"fo"); + assert_eq!(decode("Zm9v").unwrap(), b"foo"); + assert_eq!(decode("Zm9vYg==").unwrap(), b"foob"); + assert_eq!(decode("Zm9vYmE=").unwrap(), b"fooba"); + assert_eq!(decode("Zm9vYmFy").unwrap(), b"foobar"); + } + + #[test] + fn encode_round_trip_via_test_helper() { + // Test-only encoder: produce and re-decode. + assert_eq!(encode(b""), ""); + assert_eq!(encode(b"f"), "Zg=="); + assert_eq!(encode(b"fo"), "Zm8="); + assert_eq!(encode(b"foo"), "Zm9v"); + assert_eq!(encode(b"foob"), "Zm9vYg=="); + assert_eq!(encode(b"fooba"), "Zm9vYmE="); + assert_eq!(encode(b"foobar"), "Zm9vYmFy"); + for plain in [ + b"" as &[u8], + b"f", + b"fo", + b"foo", + b"foob", + b"fooba", + b"foobar", + ] { + assert_eq!(decode(&encode(plain)).unwrap(), plain); + } + } + + #[test] + fn rejects_url_safe_alphabet() { + // base64url would use `-`/`_`; standard decode must refuse them. + let err = decode("Zm9v-g==").expect_err("url-safe char"); + assert!(matches!(err, Base64Error::Char(b'-'))); + } + + #[test] + fn rejects_bad_length() { + let err = decode("Zm9").expect_err("len % 4 != 0"); + assert_eq!(err, Base64Error::Length); + } + + #[test] + fn rejects_bad_padding() { + let err = decode("Zg=A").expect_err("pad then non-pad"); + assert_eq!(err, Base64Error::Padding); + } +} diff --git a/src/blossom/mod.rs b/src/blossom/mod.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4390a7e --- /dev/null +++ b/src/blossom/mod.rs @@ -0,0 +1,325 @@ +//! §7.4 Blossom blob store — API-local, content-addressed, no kernel RPC. +//! +//! Four routes, one filesystem store. Discovery keys +//! `blossom_get` / `blossom_head` / `blossom_upload` / `blossom_delete` are +//! advertised **if and only if** `ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_STORE` is configured. +//! +//! ## `ReplicaReceiptV1` — not issued +//! +//! §4.6 dual-commit replication (delivery event + blob) is **not** implemented +//! in this process. Successful upload responses are therefore exactly +//! `{ "blob_id": }` — the optional `receipt` field is **absent** +//! (not `null`, not `{}`). The three `X-ZkCoins-*` binding headers are still +//! validated when present (all-or-nothing, closed enum, hex width) so a broken +//! value cannot pass unnoticed; they produce no receipt and no other side +//! effect until §4.6 lands. + +mod auth; +mod base64; +mod store; + +#[cfg(test)] +pub use auth::sign_auth_event_base64; +pub use auth::{ + verify_blossom_auth, AuthAction, RequiredAction, VerifiedAuthEvent, CLOCK_SKEW_SECS, + REPLAY_WINDOW_SECS, +}; +pub use store::{blob_id_of, BlobStore}; + +use crate::error::ApiError; +use crate::hexutil::{decode_hex_exact, encode_hex}; +use crate::state::AppState; +use axum::body::Bytes; +use axum::extract::{Path, State}; +use axum::http::{header, HeaderMap, HeaderValue, StatusCode}; +use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response}; +use axum::Json; +use serde::Serialize; +use std::collections::BTreeSet; +use std::sync::Arc; +use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH}; + +/// Runtime handle for the Blossom surface (store + ACL + size limit). +#[derive(Clone)] +pub struct BlossomState { + pub store: Arc, + pub max_blob_bytes: u64, + /// `op` keys allowed to upload (paired accounts + replication peers). + pub allowed_upload_ops: Arc>, +} + +impl BlossomState { + pub fn from_config(cfg: &crate::config::BlossomConfig) -> Result { + let store = BlobStore::open(cfg.store_root.clone())?; + Ok(Self { + store: Arc::new(store), + max_blob_bytes: cfg.max_blob_bytes, + allowed_upload_ops: Arc::new(cfg.allowed_upload_ops.clone()), + }) + } +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Wire types +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +/// Successful upload body. `receipt` is intentionally not a field — §4.6 is +/// absent, so serde never emits it (honest omission, not `null`). +#[derive(Debug, Serialize)] +struct UploadResponse { + blob_id: String, +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Handlers +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +/// `GET /blossom/` — unauthenticated raw bytes. +pub async fn get_blob( + State(state): State, + Path(sha256): Path, +) -> Result { + let blossom = require_blossom(&state)?; + let id = BlobStore::parse_blob_id(&sha256)?; + let bytes = blossom + .store + .read(&id)? + .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::not_found(format!("blob {sha256} not found")))?; + let mut res = Response::new(axum::body::Body::from(bytes)); + *res.status_mut() = StatusCode::OK; + res.headers_mut().insert( + header::CONTENT_TYPE, + HeaderValue::from_static("application/octet-stream"), + ); + Ok(res) +} + +/// `HEAD /blossom/` — existence / size probe. +pub async fn head_blob( + State(state): State, + Path(sha256): Path, +) -> Result { + let blossom = require_blossom(&state)?; + let id = BlobStore::parse_blob_id(&sha256)?; + let size = blossom + .store + .size(&id)? + .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::not_found(format!("blob {sha256} not found")))?; + let mut res = Response::new(axum::body::Body::empty()); + *res.status_mut() = StatusCode::OK; + res.headers_mut().insert( + header::CONTENT_TYPE, + HeaderValue::from_static("application/octet-stream"), + ); + res.headers_mut().insert( + header::CONTENT_LENGTH, + HeaderValue::from_str(&size.to_string()) + .map_err(|_| ApiError::internal("content-length header value is not valid"))?, + ); + Ok(res) +} + +/// `PUT` / `POST /blossom/upload` — raw body, kind-24242 auth. +pub async fn upload_blob( + State(state): State, + headers: HeaderMap, + body: Bytes, +) -> Result { + let blossom = require_blossom(&state)?; + + // Content-Type is mandatory application/octet-stream. + require_octet_stream(&headers)?; + + // Body size — advertised limit, no clamping. + let max = blossom.max_blob_bytes; + let body_len = body.len() as u64; + if body_len > max { + return Err(ApiError::payload_too_large(format!( + "upload body is {body_len} bytes; advertised limit is {max} bytes" + ))); + } + + // Binding headers: all three or none; validate when present. + // §4.6 receipt is not issued — validation only (see module docs). + validate_binding_headers(&headers)?; + + // Server computes blob_id = H(body); never trusts a client claim. + let body_hash = blob_id_of(&body); + + let auth_header = headers + .get(header::AUTHORIZATION) + .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::unauthorized("missing Authorization header for blossom upload"))? + .to_str() + .map_err(|_| ApiError::unauthorized("Authorization header is not valid UTF-8"))?; + + let now = unix_now(); + let verified = verify_blossom_auth(auth_header, RequiredAction::Upload, &body_hash, now)?; + + // ACL: op must be a paired account or configured replication peer. + if !blossom.allowed_upload_ops.contains(&verified.op_pubkey) { + return Err(ApiError::scope_exceeded( + "upload op key is neither a paired account nor a configured replication peer", + )); + } + + let id = blossom.store.put(&body, &verified.op_pubkey)?; + debug_assert_eq!(id, body_hash); + + // Honest response without receipt (§4.6 absent). + Ok(( + StatusCode::OK, + Json(UploadResponse { + blob_id: encode_hex(&id), + }), + ) + .into_response()) +} + +/// `DELETE /blossom/` — original uploader only. +pub async fn delete_blob( + State(state): State, + Path(sha256): Path, + headers: HeaderMap, +) -> Result { + let blossom = require_blossom(&state)?; + let id = BlobStore::parse_blob_id(&sha256)?; + + if !blossom.store.exists(&id) { + return Err(ApiError::not_found(format!("blob {sha256} not found"))); + } + + // Fail-closed: no uploader note ⇒ refuse DELETE (never allow). + let original = blossom.store.read_uploader(&id)?.ok_or_else(|| { + ApiError::scope_exceeded("blob has no uploader note; DELETE refused (fail-closed)") + })?; + + let auth_header = headers + .get(header::AUTHORIZATION) + .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::unauthorized("missing Authorization header for blossom delete"))? + .to_str() + .map_err(|_| ApiError::unauthorized("Authorization header is not valid UTF-8"))?; + + let now = unix_now(); + let verified = verify_blossom_auth(auth_header, RequiredAction::Delete, &id, now)?; + + if verified.op_pubkey != original { + return Err(ApiError::scope_exceeded( + "delete op key is not the original uploader of this blob", + )); + } + + let deleted = blossom.store.delete(&id)?; + if !deleted { + // Race: blob vanished between exists and delete. + return Err(ApiError::not_found(format!("blob {sha256} not found"))); + } + + // Successful DELETE: 200 empty body (§7.4). + Ok(StatusCode::OK.into_response()) +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Helpers +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +fn require_blossom(state: &AppState) -> Result<&BlossomState, ApiError> { + state.blossom.as_ref().ok_or_else(|| { + // Routes are only mounted when configured; this branch is a + // programming error if reached on a live path. + ApiError::internal("blossom surface reached without configuration") + }) +} + +fn require_octet_stream(headers: &HeaderMap) -> Result<(), ApiError> { + let Some(ct) = headers.get(header::CONTENT_TYPE) else { + return Err(ApiError::unsupported_media_type( + "Content-Type application/octet-stream is required for blossom upload", + )); + }; + let ct = ct + .to_str() + .map_err(|_| ApiError::unsupported_media_type("Content-Type is not valid UTF-8"))?; + // Exact media type; parameters (e.g. charset) are not a conforming form. + let media = ct.split(';').next().unwrap_or(ct).trim(); + if media != "application/octet-stream" { + // Multipart / JSON called out by §7.4 as non-conforming → 415. + return Err(ApiError::unsupported_media_type(format!( + "Content-Type must be application/octet-stream, got {media:?} \ + (multipart and JSON are not a conforming v1 upload form)" + ))); + } + Ok(()) +} + +/// `X-ZkCoins-Event-Id`, `X-ZkCoins-Attempt-Nonce`, `X-ZkCoins-Retention` — +/// all three present, or all three absent. Partial set → 400. Invalid hex / +/// width / retention enum → 400. +/// +/// When all three are valid, they are accepted and **discarded**: this process +/// does not issue `ReplicaReceiptV1` (§4.6 dual-commit is absent). Validation +/// exists so a broken value cannot pass unnoticed. +fn validate_binding_headers(headers: &HeaderMap) -> Result<(), ApiError> { + const H_EVENT: &str = "x-zkcoins-event-id"; + const H_NONCE: &str = "x-zkcoins-attempt-nonce"; + const H_RETENTION: &str = "x-zkcoins-retention"; + + let event = header_str(headers, H_EVENT)?; + let nonce = header_str(headers, H_NONCE)?; + let retention = header_str(headers, H_RETENTION)?; + + match (event.is_some(), nonce.is_some(), retention.is_some()) { + (false, false, false) => Ok(()), + (true, true, true) => { + let event = event.expect("checked"); + let nonce = nonce.expect("checked"); + let retention = retention.expect("checked"); + parse_hex32_lower(event, "X-ZkCoins-Event-Id")?; + parse_hex32_lower(nonce, "X-ZkCoins-Attempt-Nonce")?; + match retention { + "indefinite" | "policy" => {} + other => { + return Err(ApiError::malformed(format!( + "X-ZkCoins-Retention must be \"indefinite\" or \"policy\", got {other:?}" + ))); + } + } + // Validated; no receipt follows. + Ok(()) + } + _ => Err(ApiError::malformed( + "X-ZkCoins-Event-Id, X-ZkCoins-Attempt-Nonce, and X-ZkCoins-Retention \ + must be supplied all together or not at all", + )), + } +} + +fn header_str<'a>(headers: &'a HeaderMap, name: &str) -> Result, ApiError> { + match headers.get(name) { + None => Ok(None), + Some(v) => { + let s = v + .to_str() + .map_err(|_| ApiError::malformed(format!("{name} header is not valid UTF-8")))?; + Ok(Some(s)) + } + } +} + +fn parse_hex32_lower(s: &str, field: &str) -> Result<[u8; 32], ApiError> { + if s.len() != 64 || !s.bytes().all(|b| matches!(b, b'0'..=b'9' | b'a'..=b'f')) { + return Err(ApiError::malformed(format!( + "{field} must be exactly 64 lowercase hex characters" + ))); + } + let v = decode_hex_exact(s, 32).map_err(|e| ApiError::malformed(format!("{field}: {e}")))?; + let mut out = [0u8; 32]; + out.copy_from_slice(&v); + Ok(out) +} + +fn unix_now() -> u64 { + SystemTime::now() + .duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH) + .expect("system clock before UNIX_EPOCH") + .as_secs() +} diff --git a/src/blossom/store.rs b/src/blossom/store.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fd229a3 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/blossom/store.rs @@ -0,0 +1,440 @@ +//! Content-addressed blob store on the local filesystem (§7.4 / §4.2.1). +//! +//! ## Address = content +//! +//! `blob_id = SHA-256(body)` (lowercase hex). The on-disk filename is that +//! hex string and **nothing else**. Path parameters are validated as exactly +//! 64 lowercase hex characters *before* they become a path component, so +//! traversal (`..`, separators, uppercase, Unicode tricks) is structurally +//! impossible — not filtered after the fact. +//! +//! ## Atomic write +//! +//! Upload writes to a temporary file in the same directory, then `rename`s +//! onto the final address. An aborted upload cannot leave a half-written +//! blob under a valid content address (that would break the content- +//! addressed invariant: address would no longer hash to content). +//! +//! ## Uploader note +//! +//! Beside each blob lives `{blob_id}.uploader` holding the original uploader's +//! `op` pubkey as 64 lowercase hex characters. DELETE is authorised against +//! that note. **Fail-closed:** if the note is missing, DELETE is refused — +//! never "no note ⇒ allow". + +use crate::error::ApiError; +use crate::hexutil::encode_hex; +use sha2::{Digest, Sha256}; +use std::fs::{self, File, OpenOptions}; +use std::io::{self, Write}; +use std::path::{Path, PathBuf}; + +/// Exactly 64 lowercase hex characters (32 decoded bytes). +pub const BLOB_ID_HEX_LEN: usize = 64; + +/// Content-addressed store rooted at `root`. +#[derive(Debug, Clone)] +pub struct BlobStore { + root: PathBuf, +} + +impl BlobStore { + /// Open (or create) a store at `root`. No default path — the caller must + /// supply a configured root. + pub fn open(root: impl Into) -> Result { + let root = root.into(); + fs::create_dir_all(&root).map_err(|e| { + ApiError::internal(format!( + "blossom store: cannot create root {}: {e}", + root.display() + )) + })?; + let meta = fs::metadata(&root).map_err(|e| { + ApiError::internal(format!( + "blossom store: cannot stat root {}: {e}", + root.display() + )) + })?; + if !meta.is_dir() { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "blossom store: root {} is not a directory", + root.display() + ))); + } + Ok(Self { root }) + } + + /// Filesystem root (tests / diagnostics). + pub fn root(&self) -> &Path { + &self.root + } + + /// Parse a path parameter into a content address. + /// + /// Accepts **only** exactly 64 lowercase ASCII hex characters. Everything + /// else — wrong length, uppercase, non-hex, separators — is `400` and + /// never becomes a path component. + pub fn parse_blob_id(param: &str) -> Result<[u8; 32], ApiError> { + if param.len() != BLOB_ID_HEX_LEN { + return Err(ApiError::malformed(format!( + "blob path parameter must be exactly {BLOB_ID_HEX_LEN} lowercase hex characters, got {}", + param.len() + ))); + } + if !param + .bytes() + .all(|b| matches!(b, b'0'..=b'9' | b'a'..=b'f')) + { + return Err(ApiError::malformed( + "blob path parameter must be lowercase hex [0-9a-f] only \ + (uppercase, separators, and non-hex are rejected before any path join)", + )); + } + let mut out = [0u8; 32]; + let bytes = param.as_bytes(); + for i in 0..32 { + let hi = nibble(bytes[i * 2]); + let lo = nibble(bytes[i * 2 + 1]); + out[i] = (hi << 4) | lo; + } + Ok(out) + } + + /// Lowercase-hex form of a blob id (the only form used as a filename). + pub fn blob_id_hex(id: &[u8; 32]) -> String { + encode_hex(id) + } + + /// Absolute path of the blob file. Caller **must** have validated `id` + /// via [`Self::parse_blob_id`] or by hashing trusted body bytes — this + /// method does not re-interpret user strings. + fn blob_path(&self, id: &[u8; 32]) -> PathBuf { + self.root.join(Self::blob_id_hex(id)) + } + + /// Absolute path of the uploader-note sidecar. + fn uploader_path(&self, id: &[u8; 32]) -> PathBuf { + self.root + .join(format!("{}.uploader", Self::blob_id_hex(id))) + } + + /// `true` when a durable blob exists under this address. + pub fn exists(&self, id: &[u8; 32]) -> bool { + self.blob_path(id).is_file() + } + + /// Byte length of a stored blob, or `None` if absent. + pub fn size(&self, id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result, ApiError> { + let path = self.blob_path(id); + match fs::metadata(&path) { + Ok(m) if m.is_file() => Ok(Some(m.len())), + Ok(_) => Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "blossom store: path {} is not a regular file", + path.display() + ))), + Err(e) if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::NotFound => Ok(None), + Err(e) => Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "blossom store: stat {}: {e}", + path.display() + ))), + } + } + + /// Read the full blob body, or `None` if absent. + pub fn read(&self, id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result>, ApiError> { + let path = self.blob_path(id); + match fs::read(&path) { + Ok(bytes) => Ok(Some(bytes)), + Err(e) if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::NotFound => Ok(None), + Err(e) => Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "blossom store: read {}: {e}", + path.display() + ))), + } + } + + /// Read the original uploader's `op` pubkey, or `None` if the note is + /// absent. DELETE treats absence as refuse (fail-closed). + pub fn read_uploader(&self, id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result, ApiError> { + let path = self.uploader_path(id); + let text = match fs::read_to_string(&path) { + Ok(s) => s, + Err(e) if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::NotFound => return Ok(None), + Err(e) => { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "blossom store: read uploader note {}: {e}", + path.display() + ))); + } + }; + let text = text.trim(); + // Notes we wrote are 64 lowercase hex; anything else is corruption. + let id = Self::parse_blob_id(text).map_err(|e| { + ApiError::internal(format!( + "blossom store: corrupt uploader note {}: {}", + path.display(), + e.body.message + )) + })?; + Ok(Some(id)) + } + + /// Store `body` under `blob_id = H(body)`. Idempotent: if the address + /// already holds a file, the body is not rewritten and the uploader note + /// is left alone (first-uploader wins for DELETE). + /// + /// Returns the content address. + pub fn put(&self, body: &[u8], uploader_op: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<[u8; 32], ApiError> { + let id: [u8; 32] = Sha256::digest(body).into(); + let final_path = self.blob_path(&id); + + if final_path.is_file() { + // Content-addressed: same bytes ⇒ same address. Do not touch the + // original uploader note. + return Ok(id); + } + + // Atomic blob write: temp in same directory, then rename. + let tmp_name = format!(".{}.tmp.{}", Self::blob_id_hex(&id), std::process::id()); + let tmp_path = self.root.join(&tmp_name); + write_exclusive(&tmp_path, body).map_err(|e| { + let _ = fs::remove_file(&tmp_path); + ApiError::internal(format!( + "blossom store: write temp {}: {e}", + tmp_path.display() + )) + })?; + fs::rename(&tmp_path, &final_path).map_err(|e| { + let _ = fs::remove_file(&tmp_path); + ApiError::internal(format!( + "blossom store: rename {} → {}: {e}", + tmp_path.display(), + final_path.display() + )) + })?; + + // Uploader note — also atomic. Failure after the blob rename is + // reported loudly; DELETE will fail-closed without the note. + let note_path = self.uploader_path(&id); + let note_tmp = self.root.join(format!( + ".{}.uploader.tmp.{}", + Self::blob_id_hex(&id), + std::process::id() + )); + let note_hex = encode_hex(uploader_op); + write_exclusive(¬e_tmp, note_hex.as_bytes()).map_err(|e| { + let _ = fs::remove_file(¬e_tmp); + ApiError::internal(format!( + "blossom store: write uploader temp {}: {e}", + note_tmp.display() + )) + })?; + fs::rename(¬e_tmp, ¬e_path).map_err(|e| { + let _ = fs::remove_file(¬e_tmp); + ApiError::internal(format!( + "blossom store: rename uploader note {}: {e}", + note_path.display() + )) + })?; + + Ok(id) + } + + /// Delete blob and uploader note. Returns `true` if the blob existed. + pub fn delete(&self, id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result { + let blob = self.blob_path(id); + let note = self.uploader_path(id); + let existed = match fs::remove_file(&blob) { + Ok(()) => true, + Err(e) if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::NotFound => false, + Err(e) => { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "blossom store: delete {}: {e}", + blob.display() + ))); + } + }; + // Note removal after blob removal; absence is fine (fail-closed only + // applies when authorising DELETE, not when cleaning up). + match fs::remove_file(¬e) { + Ok(()) => {} + Err(e) if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::NotFound => {} + Err(e) => { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "blossom store: delete uploader note {}: {e}", + note.display() + ))); + } + } + Ok(existed) + } + + /// Test/diagnostic: list names of regular files directly under the root. + /// Never follows the path parameter — used only to prove traversal tests + /// did not touch files outside the store. + #[cfg(test)] + pub fn list_root_names(&self) -> Result, ApiError> { + let mut names = Vec::new(); + let rd = fs::read_dir(&self.root).map_err(|e| { + ApiError::internal(format!( + "blossom store: read_dir {}: {e}", + self.root.display() + )) + })?; + for entry in rd { + let entry = entry + .map_err(|e| ApiError::internal(format!("blossom store: read_dir entry: {e}")))?; + if let Some(name) = entry.file_name().to_str() { + names.push(name.to_string()); + } + } + names.sort(); + Ok(names) + } +} + +fn nibble(b: u8) -> u8 { + match b { + b'0'..=b'9' => b - b'0', + b'a'..=b'f' => b - b'a' + 10, + _ => unreachable!("caller validated lowercase hex"), + } +} + +/// Create a new file exclusively and write all bytes, then sync. +fn write_exclusive(path: &Path, bytes: &[u8]) -> io::Result<()> { + let mut f = OpenOptions::new().write(true).create_new(true).open(path)?; + f.write_all(bytes)?; + f.sync_all()?; + // Drop closes the file before rename. + drop(f); + // Touch parent directory durability on platforms that need it is + // best-effort; rename is still atomic for the directory entry. + let _ = File::open(path.parent().unwrap_or(Path::new("."))).and_then(|d| d.sync_all()); + Ok(()) +} + +/// SHA-256 of raw bytes — the normative `blob_id` (§4.2.1). +pub fn blob_id_of(body: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] { + Sha256::digest(body).into() +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH}; + + fn temp_root() -> PathBuf { + let nanos = SystemTime::now() + .duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH) + .expect("clock") + .as_nanos(); + let root = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!( + "zkcoins-blossom-store-{}-{}", + std::process::id(), + nanos + )); + let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&root); + root + } + + #[test] + fn parse_blob_id_accepts_exact_lowercase_hex() { + let hex = "a".repeat(64); + let id = BlobStore::parse_blob_id(&hex).expect("valid"); + assert_eq!(id, [0xaa; 32]); + } + + #[test] + fn parse_blob_id_rejects_uppercase() { + let hex = "A".repeat(64); + let err = BlobStore::parse_blob_id(&hex).expect_err("uppercase"); + assert_eq!(err.status, axum::http::StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "malformed_request"); + assert!( + err.body.message.contains("lowercase"), + "cause must name lowercase rule: {}", + err.body.message + ); + } + + #[test] + fn parse_blob_id_rejects_wrong_lengths() { + for bad in [ + "a".repeat(63), + "a".repeat(65), + String::new(), + "zz".to_string(), + ] { + let err = BlobStore::parse_blob_id(&bad).expect_err("bad length/chars"); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "malformed_request"); + } + } + + #[test] + fn parse_blob_id_rejects_traversal_shapes() { + for bad in [ + "../".to_string() + &"a".repeat(61), + "a".repeat(32) + "/../" + &"b".repeat(28), + "a".repeat(32) + ".." + &"b".repeat(30), + "%2e%2e%2f".to_string() + &"a".repeat(55), + ] { + let err = BlobStore::parse_blob_id(&bad).expect_err("traversal shape"); + assert_eq!( + err.body.error, "malformed_request", + "traversal-shaped input must be 400, got {:?}", + err + ); + } + } + + #[test] + fn put_get_roundtrip_and_idempotent() { + let root = temp_root(); + let store = BlobStore::open(&root).expect("open"); + let body = b"hello blossom ciphertext"; + let uploader = [0x11u8; 32]; + let id = store.put(body, &uploader).expect("put"); + assert_eq!(id, blob_id_of(body)); + let got = store.read(&id).expect("read").expect("present"); + assert_eq!(got, body); + assert_eq!(store.size(&id).expect("size"), Some(body.len() as u64)); + // Second put same bytes: same id, original uploader preserved. + let other = [0x22u8; 32]; + let id2 = store.put(body, &other).expect("put again"); + assert_eq!(id2, id); + let note = store.read_uploader(&id).expect("note").expect("present"); + assert_eq!(note, uploader); + let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&root); + } + + #[test] + fn aborted_temp_is_not_a_readable_blob() { + let root = temp_root(); + let store = BlobStore::open(&root).expect("open"); + let body = b"partial-write-simulation"; + let id = blob_id_of(body); + // Simulate an aborted upload: temp file left behind, no rename. + let tmp = root.join(format!(".{}.tmp.aborted", BlobStore::blob_id_hex(&id))); + fs::write(&tmp, body).expect("write temp"); + assert!( + store.read(&id).expect("read").is_none(), + "temp file must not be readable under the content address" + ); + assert!(!store.exists(&id)); + let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&root); + } + + #[test] + fn delete_without_uploader_note_is_detectable() { + let root = temp_root(); + let store = BlobStore::open(&root).expect("open"); + let body = b"orphan-blob"; + let id = store.put(body, &[0x33; 32]).expect("put"); + // Remove only the note — DELETE auth path must refuse. + fs::remove_file(store.uploader_path(&id)).expect("rm note"); + assert!(store.read_uploader(&id).expect("read").is_none()); + assert!(store.exists(&id)); + let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&root); + } +} diff --git a/src/config.rs b/src/config.rs index 0b97542..69b60fa 100644 --- a/src/config.rs +++ b/src/config.rs @@ -8,11 +8,22 @@ //! - `ZKCOINS_PUBLIC_HOST` — comma-separated authoritative hostnames for //! §5.1 `chan_bind` (may be empty string; empty ⇒ OwnershipProof auth fails //! loud with no silent localhost). Never taken from a `Host` header. +//! +//! Optional Blossom surface (§7.4) — all-or-nothing: +//! - `ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_STORE` — filesystem root for the content-addressed store. +//! **Absent** ⇒ Blossom routes are not mounted and the four discovery keys +//! are not advertised. **No default path**, no `/tmp` fallback. +//! - When the store is set, these companions are required (fail-closed boot): +//! - `ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_MAX_BLOB_BYTES` — advertised upload size limit (`> 0`) +//! - `ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_ALLOWED_OPS` — comma-separated lowercase-hex 32-byte +//! `op` pubkeys allowed to upload (paired accounts + replication peers; +//! may be empty ⇒ every upload is `403`) use std::collections::BTreeSet; use std::env; use std::fmt; use std::net::SocketAddr; +use std::path::PathBuf; use std::str::FromStr; /// Closed API feature set from specification §6.1. @@ -60,6 +71,21 @@ impl FromStr for Feature { } } +/// Optional §7.4 Blossom store configuration. +/// +/// Present only when `ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_STORE` is set. Absence means the four +/// Blossom discovery keys stay unadvertised and the routes stay unmounted. +#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub struct BlossomConfig { + /// Content-addressed store root on the local filesystem. + pub store_root: PathBuf, + /// Advertised maximum upload body size in bytes (`> 0`). + pub max_blob_bytes: u64, + /// `op` pubkeys (32 raw bytes) allowed to PUT/POST — paired accounts and + /// configured replication peers. Empty set ⇒ every upload is `403`. + pub allowed_upload_ops: BTreeSet<[u8; 32]>, +} + #[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] pub struct Config { /// HTTP bind address. Parsed as `SocketAddr` so empty/garbage fails loudly. @@ -71,6 +97,8 @@ pub struct Config { /// Authoritative public hostnames for §5.1 `chan_bind` (canonical form). /// Derived only from `ZKCOINS_PUBLIC_HOST` — never from request headers. pub public_hosts: Vec, + /// §7.4 Blossom surface. `None` when `ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_STORE` is unset. + pub blossom: Option, } #[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] @@ -79,6 +107,8 @@ pub enum ConfigError { EmptyEnv(&'static str), InvalidBindAddr { value: String, reason: String }, UnknownFeature(String), + InvalidBlossomMaxBlobBytes { value: String, reason: String }, + InvalidBlossomAllowedOp { value: String, reason: String }, } impl fmt::Display for ConfigError { @@ -102,6 +132,18 @@ impl fmt::Display for ConfigError { "unknown feature {name:?}; allowed values are wallet, explorer, publisher, lightning_bridge, mail_bridge" ) } + ConfigError::InvalidBlossomMaxBlobBytes { value, reason } => { + write!( + f, + "ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_MAX_BLOB_BYTES value {value:?} is invalid: {reason}" + ) + } + ConfigError::InvalidBlossomAllowedOp { value, reason } => { + write!( + f, + "ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_ALLOWED_OPS entry {value:?} is invalid: {reason}" + ) + } } } } @@ -112,6 +154,12 @@ const ENV_BIND: &str = "ZKCOINS_BIND_ADDR"; const ENV_KERNEL: &str = "ZKCOINS_KERNEL_ADDR"; const ENV_FEATURES: &str = "ZKCOINS_FEATURES"; const ENV_PUBLIC_HOST: &str = "ZKCOINS_PUBLIC_HOST"; +/// Optional gate for the §7.4 Blossom surface. Absent ⇒ not advertised. +const ENV_BLOSSOM_STORE: &str = "ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_STORE"; +/// Required companion when `ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_STORE` is set. +const ENV_BLOSSOM_MAX_BLOB_BYTES: &str = "ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_MAX_BLOB_BYTES"; +/// Required companion when `ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_STORE` is set (may be empty). +const ENV_BLOSSOM_ALLOWED_OPS: &str = "ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_ALLOWED_OPS"; impl Config { /// Load configuration from process environment. Fail-closed: every required @@ -151,12 +199,14 @@ impl Config { let features = parse_features(&features_raw)?; let public_hosts = parse_public_hosts(&public_host_raw); + let blossom = parse_blossom_config(&mut get)?; Ok(Config { bind_addr, kernel_addr: kernel_raw, features, public_hosts, + blossom, }) } } @@ -192,6 +242,111 @@ fn parse_public_hosts(raw: &str) -> Vec { .collect() } +/// Optional Blossom surface. `None` only when `ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_STORE` is +/// **unset**. Present-but-empty store is an error (no silent `/tmp` default). +/// When the store is set, max-blob and allowed-ops companions are required. +fn parse_blossom_config(get: &mut F) -> Result, ConfigError> +where + F: FnMut(&str) -> Option, +{ + let store_raw = match get(ENV_BLOSSOM_STORE) { + None => return Ok(None), + Some(v) => v, + }; + if store_raw.is_empty() { + return Err(ConfigError::EmptyEnv(ENV_BLOSSOM_STORE)); + } + + let max_raw = require_present(get, ENV_BLOSSOM_MAX_BLOB_BYTES)?; + if max_raw.is_empty() { + return Err(ConfigError::EmptyEnv(ENV_BLOSSOM_MAX_BLOB_BYTES)); + } + let max_blob_bytes = parse_max_blob_bytes(&max_raw)?; + + let ops_raw = require_present(get, ENV_BLOSSOM_ALLOWED_OPS)?; + // Empty string is allowed: surface is up, but every upload is 403. + let allowed_upload_ops = parse_allowed_ops(&ops_raw)?; + + Ok(Some(BlossomConfig { + store_root: PathBuf::from(store_raw), + max_blob_bytes, + allowed_upload_ops, + })) +} + +fn parse_max_blob_bytes(raw: &str) -> Result { + // Strict decimal u64, no leading zeros except "0" itself — but 0 is + // invalid (limit must be > 0). No clamping, no silent default. + if raw == "0" { + return Err(ConfigError::InvalidBlossomMaxBlobBytes { + value: raw.to_string(), + reason: "must be strictly greater than zero".to_string(), + }); + } + if raw.is_empty() || raw.as_bytes()[0] == b'0' { + return Err(ConfigError::InvalidBlossomMaxBlobBytes { + value: raw.to_string(), + reason: "must be a canonical decimal u64 with no leading zeros".to_string(), + }); + } + if !raw.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_digit()) { + return Err(ConfigError::InvalidBlossomMaxBlobBytes { + value: raw.to_string(), + reason: "must contain only ASCII digits".to_string(), + }); + } + raw.parse::() + .map_err(|_| ConfigError::InvalidBlossomMaxBlobBytes { + value: raw.to_string(), + reason: "out of u64 range".to_string(), + }) +} + +fn parse_allowed_ops(raw: &str) -> Result, ConfigError> { + let mut out = BTreeSet::new(); + for part in raw.split(',') { + let token = part.trim(); + if token.is_empty() { + continue; + } + // Lowercase hex only — uppercase is rejected (no silent fold). + if token.len() != 64 { + return Err(ConfigError::InvalidBlossomAllowedOp { + value: token.to_string(), + reason: format!( + "must be exactly 64 lowercase hex characters, got {}", + token.len() + ), + }); + } + if !token + .bytes() + .all(|b| matches!(b, b'0'..=b'9' | b'a'..=b'f')) + { + return Err(ConfigError::InvalidBlossomAllowedOp { + value: token.to_string(), + reason: "must be lowercase hex [0-9a-f] only".to_string(), + }); + } + let mut key = [0u8; 32]; + for (i, chunk) in token.as_bytes().chunks(2).enumerate() { + let hi = hex_nibble(chunk[0]); + let lo = hex_nibble(chunk[1]); + key[i] = (hi << 4) | lo; + } + out.insert(key); + } + Ok(out) +} + +fn hex_nibble(b: u8) -> u8 { + match b { + b'0'..=b'9' => b - b'0', + b'a'..=b'f' => b - b'a' + 10, + _ => unreachable!("caller validated lowercase hex"), + } +} + #[cfg(test)] mod tests { use super::*; @@ -214,6 +369,92 @@ mod tests { assert_eq!(cfg.kernel_addr, "http://127.0.0.1:50051"); assert!(cfg.features.is_empty()); assert!(cfg.public_hosts.is_empty()); + assert!( + cfg.blossom.is_none(), + "unset ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_STORE must leave blossom unconfigured" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn blossom_store_absent_is_not_configured() { + let mut get = getter(HashMap::from([ + (ENV_BIND, "127.0.0.1:8080"), + (ENV_KERNEL, "http://127.0.0.1:50051"), + (ENV_FEATURES, ""), + (ENV_PUBLIC_HOST, ""), + ])); + let cfg = Config::from_getter(&mut get).expect("valid config"); + assert!(cfg.blossom.is_none()); + } + + #[test] + fn blossom_store_empty_is_error_not_default() { + let mut get = getter(HashMap::from([ + (ENV_BIND, "127.0.0.1:8080"), + (ENV_KERNEL, "http://127.0.0.1:50051"), + (ENV_FEATURES, ""), + (ENV_PUBLIC_HOST, ""), + (ENV_BLOSSOM_STORE, ""), + ])); + let err = Config::from_getter(&mut get).expect_err("empty store"); + assert_eq!(err, ConfigError::EmptyEnv(ENV_BLOSSOM_STORE)); + } + + #[test] + fn blossom_store_requires_companions() { + let mut get = getter(HashMap::from([ + (ENV_BIND, "127.0.0.1:8080"), + (ENV_KERNEL, "http://127.0.0.1:50051"), + (ENV_FEATURES, ""), + (ENV_PUBLIC_HOST, ""), + (ENV_BLOSSOM_STORE, "/var/lib/zkcoins/blossom"), + ])); + let err = Config::from_getter(&mut get).expect_err("missing max"); + assert_eq!(err, ConfigError::MissingEnv(ENV_BLOSSOM_MAX_BLOB_BYTES)); + } + + #[test] + fn blossom_store_configured_with_companions() { + let mut get = getter(HashMap::from([ + (ENV_BIND, "127.0.0.1:8080"), + (ENV_KERNEL, "http://127.0.0.1:50051"), + (ENV_FEATURES, ""), + (ENV_PUBLIC_HOST, ""), + (ENV_BLOSSOM_STORE, "/var/lib/zkcoins/blossom"), + (ENV_BLOSSOM_MAX_BLOB_BYTES, "1048576"), + ( + ENV_BLOSSOM_ALLOWED_OPS, + "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa", + ), + ])); + let cfg = Config::from_getter(&mut get).expect("valid blossom"); + let blossom = cfg.blossom.expect("configured"); + assert_eq!( + blossom.store_root, + PathBuf::from("/var/lib/zkcoins/blossom") + ); + assert_eq!(blossom.max_blob_bytes, 1_048_576); + assert_eq!(blossom.allowed_upload_ops.len(), 1); + } + + #[test] + fn blossom_max_blob_zero_is_error() { + let mut get = getter(HashMap::from([ + (ENV_BIND, "127.0.0.1:8080"), + (ENV_KERNEL, "http://127.0.0.1:50051"), + (ENV_FEATURES, ""), + (ENV_PUBLIC_HOST, ""), + (ENV_BLOSSOM_STORE, "/var/lib/zkcoins/blossom"), + (ENV_BLOSSOM_MAX_BLOB_BYTES, "0"), + (ENV_BLOSSOM_ALLOWED_OPS, ""), + ])); + let err = Config::from_getter(&mut get).expect_err("zero max"); + match err { + ConfigError::InvalidBlossomMaxBlobBytes { value, .. } => { + assert_eq!(value, "0"); + } + other => panic!("expected InvalidBlossomMaxBlobBytes, got {other:?}"), + } } #[test] diff --git a/src/error.rs b/src/error.rs index 1aa61b4..2e15f17 100644 --- a/src/error.rs +++ b/src/error.rs @@ -47,11 +47,38 @@ impl ApiError { /// /// Spec §7.5 L2894 / L2896: missing/invalid/wrong-domain OwnershipProof or /// GrantProof → `401 unauthorized`. Generated by the API itself; not from - /// kernel `ErrorInfo.metadata["http_status"]`. + /// kernel `ErrorInfo.metadata["http_status"]`. Also Blossom kind-24242 + /// auth-event rejection (§7.4). pub fn unauthorized(message: impl Into) -> Self { Self::new(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "unauthorized", message) } + /// §7.5 `scope_exceeded` / 403 — foreign-uploader DELETE, non-peer + /// replication PUT, resolved-scope violation. + pub fn scope_exceeded(message: impl Into) -> Self { + Self::new(StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, "scope_exceeded", message) + } + + /// §7.5 `not_found` / 404 — unknown `blob_id` (and similar). + pub fn not_found(message: impl Into) -> Self { + Self::new(StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, "not_found", message) + } + + /// §7.5 `payload_too_large` / 413 — Blossom body over the advertised limit. + pub fn payload_too_large(message: impl Into) -> Self { + Self::new(StatusCode::PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE, "payload_too_large", message) + } + + /// Unsupported request media type / 415 — non-raw Blossom upload body + /// (multipart or JSON is not a conforming v1 form, §7.4). + pub fn unsupported_media_type(message: impl Into) -> Self { + Self::new( + StatusCode::UNSUPPORTED_MEDIA_TYPE, + "unsupported_media_type", + message, + ) + } + /// Fail-closed stand-in when the kernel transport breaks or the kernel /// violates the ErrorInfo contract. Spec §7.5 closes the enumeration with /// `internal_error` / 500 for any condition not listed. diff --git a/src/lib.rs b/src/lib.rs index 9e3e6af..f810fe9 100644 --- a/src/lib.rs +++ b/src/lib.rs @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ //! `tonic`. Holds no protocol state, no value-bearing store, and no secrets. pub mod attest; +pub mod blossom; pub mod bootstrap; pub mod chain; pub mod config; @@ -20,7 +21,7 @@ pub mod pull; pub mod routes; pub mod state; -pub use config::{Config, ConfigError, Feature}; +pub use config::{BlossomConfig, Config, ConfigError, Feature}; pub use kernel::{connect_lazy, KernelClient, KernelHandle}; pub use routes::{build_router, CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS}; pub use state::AppState; diff --git a/src/main.rs b/src/main.rs index c5f2e11..f2a8e05 100644 --- a/src/main.rs +++ b/src/main.rs @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ async fn main() -> ExitCode { %bind_addr, %kernel_addr, feature_count, - "zkcoins-api listening (health + info/chain + jobs + attest/grants + pull + bootstrap + publish)" + "zkcoins-api listening (health + info/chain + jobs + attest/grants + pull + bootstrap + publish + optional blossom)" ); if let Err(e) = axum::serve(listener, app).await { diff --git a/src/routes.rs b/src/routes.rs index a44d406..7888870 100644 --- a/src/routes.rs +++ b/src/routes.rs @@ -2,14 +2,16 @@ //! //! Route registration and the `GET /` discovery document share one source: //! [`ServedSurface`]. The closed §7.5 inventory ([`CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS`]) is -//! the full key catalogue for surfaces not yet built; only keys present in -//! `ServedSurface::ALL` are registered and advertised. +//! the full key catalogue for surfaces not yet built; only keys in the active +//! surface set (always-on plus Blossom when configured) are registered and +//! advertised. //! //! Inventory paths are the **advertised** §7.5 form (`` placeholders). //! Axum registration uses a derived **matcher** form (`:name`); see //! [`advertised_path_to_axum_matcher`]. use crate::attest; +use crate::blossom; use crate::bootstrap; use crate::chain; use crate::config::Config; @@ -20,9 +22,10 @@ use crate::kernel::KernelHandle; use crate::publish; use crate::pull; use crate::state::AppState; +use axum::extract::{DefaultBodyLimit, State}; use axum::http::StatusCode; use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response}; -use axum::routing::{get, post}; +use axum::routing::{delete, get, head, post, put}; use axum::{Json, Router}; use serde::Serialize; use std::collections::BTreeMap; @@ -95,19 +98,20 @@ pub const CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS: &[(&str, &str)] = &[ /// handlers land, registration will filter `ServedSurface` by /// `Config::features`. /// -/// Surfaces intentionally **not** registered (and therefore omitted from -/// `GET /`), with the reason each stays off the map: +/// Surfaces intentionally **not** always registered (and therefore omitted from +/// `GET /` when inactive), with the reason each stays off the map: /// /// - `receipts_stream` — kernel `SubscribeReceipts` is Unimplemented; the node /// names the missing push/source prerequisite. A REST shell would only 501. /// - `blossom_get` / `blossom_head` / `blossom_upload` / `blossom_delete` — -/// §7.4 Blossom surface. The node exposes no Blossom path and recovery is -/// not implemented; inventing REST routes without a store is a map of -/// streets that do not exist. +/// §7.4 Blossom surface. Mounted **only** when `ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_STORE` is +/// configured (content-addressed filesystem store). No default path; absent +/// store ⇒ keys unadvertised and routes unmounted. /// /// Inventory keys remain in [`CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS`]; advertisement tracks -/// [`ServedSurface::ALL`] only. `chain_inscriptions` is registered once the -/// node inscription catalog backs `ListInscriptions`. +/// the always-on set plus optional Blossom when configured. +/// `chain_inscriptions` is registered once the node inscription catalog +/// backs `ListInscriptions`. #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)] enum ServedSurface { Health, @@ -134,11 +138,15 @@ enum ServedSurface { BootstrapChallenge, BootstrapEntrust, BootstrapRevoke, + BlossomGet, + BlossomHead, + BlossomUpload, + BlossomDelete, } impl ServedSurface { - /// Every surface this binary currently serves. - const ALL: &[ServedSurface] = &[ + /// Always-on surfaces (independent of Blossom store configuration). + const ALWAYS_ON: &[ServedSurface] = &[ ServedSurface::Health, ServedSurface::HealthReady, ServedSurface::Info, @@ -165,6 +173,23 @@ impl ServedSurface { ServedSurface::BootstrapRevoke, ]; + /// Blossom surfaces — registered only when the store is configured. + const BLOSSOM: &[ServedSurface] = &[ + ServedSurface::BlossomGet, + ServedSurface::BlossomHead, + ServedSurface::BlossomUpload, + ServedSurface::BlossomDelete, + ]; + + /// Surfaces active for this process given whether Blossom is configured. + fn active(blossom_configured: bool) -> Vec { + let mut out = Self::ALWAYS_ON.to_vec(); + if blossom_configured { + out.extend_from_slice(Self::BLOSSOM); + } + out + } + /// Closed §7.5 discovery key for this surface. fn discovery_key(self) -> &'static str { match self { @@ -192,6 +217,10 @@ impl ServedSurface { ServedSurface::BootstrapChallenge => "bootstrap_challenge", ServedSurface::BootstrapEntrust => "bootstrap_entrust", ServedSurface::BootstrapRevoke => "bootstrap_revoke", + ServedSurface::BlossomGet => "blossom_get", + ServedSurface::BlossomHead => "blossom_head", + ServedSurface::BlossomUpload => "blossom_upload", + ServedSurface::BlossomDelete => "blossom_delete", } } @@ -199,7 +228,7 @@ impl ServedSurface { /// /// Discovery still advertises the inventory (Spec) form; only the route /// table sees the rewritten matcher. - fn register(self, router: Router) -> Router { + fn register(self, router: Router, max_blob_bytes: Option) -> Router { let path = advertised_path_to_axum_matcher(closed_path(self.discovery_key())); match self { ServedSurface::Health => router.route(&path, get(health)), @@ -238,6 +267,22 @@ impl ServedSurface { ServedSurface::BootstrapRevoke => { router.route(&path, post(bootstrap::post_bootstrap_revoke)) } + // GET / HEAD / DELETE share `/blossom/:sha256`; axum merges methods. + ServedSurface::BlossomGet => router.route(&path, get(blossom::get_blob)), + ServedSurface::BlossomHead => router.route(&path, head(blossom::head_blob)), + ServedSurface::BlossomDelete => router.route(&path, delete(blossom::delete_blob)), + ServedSurface::BlossomUpload => { + // Disable axum's default 2 MiB body limit so the handler can + // enforce the configured max and return the §7.5 machine code. + let limit = max_blob_bytes.unwrap_or(0).saturating_add(1); + let limit = usize::try_from(limit).unwrap_or(usize::MAX); + router.route( + &path, + put(blossom::upload_blob) + .post(blossom::upload_blob) + .layer(DefaultBodyLimit::max(limit)), + ) + } } } } @@ -299,10 +344,10 @@ fn advertised_path_to_axum_matcher(advertised: &str) -> String { out } -/// Build the `endpoints` map for `GET /` from the served set only. -fn discovery_endpoints() -> BTreeMap<&'static str, &'static str> { +/// Build the `endpoints` map for `GET /` from the active surface set. +fn discovery_endpoints(blossom_configured: bool) -> BTreeMap<&'static str, &'static str> { let mut endpoints = BTreeMap::new(); - for surface in ServedSurface::ALL { + for surface in ServedSurface::active(blossom_configured) { let key = surface.discovery_key(); let path = closed_path(key); endpoints.insert(key, path); @@ -320,36 +365,54 @@ struct RootResponse { /// Build the axum router for the given configuration and kernel handle. /// /// `config.features` is stored in [`AppState`] for `GET /v1/info` (API-owned -/// advertisement). Route registration is still the always-on -/// [`ServedSurface::ALL`] set; §6.1 feature gating of optional roles lands -/// with those handlers. +/// advertisement). Route registration is the always-on set plus the Blossom +/// surface when `config.blossom` is `Some`. §6.1 feature gating of optional +/// roles lands with those handlers. /// /// Returns a fully state-bound router (`Router` / `Router<()>`). Only that /// form implements `tower::Service` and is ready for `axum::serve` and test /// `oneshot` calls. Handlers extract `State` or /// `State` (via [`axum::extract::FromRef`]); the concrete /// state is supplied once at the end. +/// +/// # Panics +/// +/// Panics if Blossom is configured but the store root cannot be opened — +/// that is a boot-time misconfiguration, not a per-request failure. pub fn build_router(config: Config, kernel: KernelHandle) -> Router { let Config { bind_addr: _, kernel_addr: _, features, public_hosts, + blossom, } = config; + let max_blob_bytes = blossom.as_ref().map(|b| b.max_blob_bytes); + let blossom_state = blossom.map(|cfg| { + blossom::BlossomState::from_config(&cfg).unwrap_or_else(|e| { + panic!( + "blossom store open failed (boot misconfiguration): {}", + e.body.message + ) + }) + }); + let blossom_configured = blossom_state.is_some(); + let state = AppState { kernel, features, public_hosts: Arc::new(public_hosts), + blossom: blossom_state, }; - // Register every surface as `Router`, then bind state so the - // returned tree is `Router<()>` and implements `Service`. Binding earlier - // while still returning `Router` leaves the tree "missing" - // state and breaks both `axum::serve` and `oneshot`. + // Register every active surface as `Router`, then bind state so + // the returned tree is `Router<()>` and implements `Service`. Binding + // earlier while still returning `Router` leaves the tree + // "missing" state and breaks both `axum::serve` and `oneshot`. let mut router = Router::new().route("/", get(root)); - for surface in ServedSurface::ALL { - router = surface.register(router); + for surface in ServedSurface::active(blossom_configured) { + router = surface.register(router, max_blob_bytes); } router.with_state(state) } @@ -358,11 +421,12 @@ async fn health() -> Response { (StatusCode::OK, "ok").into_response() } -async fn root() -> Json { +async fn root(State(state): State) -> Json { + let blossom_configured = state.blossom.is_some(); Json(RootResponse { name: "zkcoins-api", version: env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"), - endpoints: discovery_endpoints(), + endpoints: discovery_endpoints(blossom_configured), }) } @@ -401,6 +465,7 @@ mod tests { kernel_addr: "http://127.0.0.1:50051".to_string(), features: BTreeSet::new(), public_hosts: vec!["node.example.com".to_string()], + blossom: None, } } @@ -592,7 +657,8 @@ mod tests { #[test] fn every_served_surface_is_in_closed_inventory() { - for surface in ServedSurface::ALL { + // Always-on + Blossom (when configured) must each map to inventory. + for surface in ServedSurface::active(true) { let key = surface.discovery_key(); let path = closed_path(key); assert!( @@ -640,7 +706,7 @@ mod tests { let endpoints = json["endpoints"].as_object().expect("endpoints object"); - let expected_keys: BTreeSet<&str> = ServedSurface::ALL + let expected_keys: BTreeSet<&str> = ServedSurface::active(false) .iter() .map(|s| s.discovery_key()) .collect(); @@ -1001,6 +1067,7 @@ mod tests { kernel_addr: "http://kernel:1".to_string(), features, public_hosts: vec!["node.example.com".to_string()], + blossom: None, }; let app = build_router(cfg, Arc::new(UnreachableKernel)); let res = app @@ -1022,6 +1089,7 @@ mod tests { kernel_addr: "http://kernel:1".to_string(), features: BTreeSet::from([Feature::Wallet]), public_hosts: vec!["node.example.com".to_string()], + blossom: None, }, Arc::new(UnreachableKernel), ); @@ -1777,6 +1845,7 @@ mod tests { kernel_addr: "http://127.0.0.1:50051".to_string(), features, public_hosts: vec!["node.example.com".to_string()], + blossom: None, }; let app = build_router(cfg, Arc::new(kernel)); let res = app @@ -4040,7 +4109,8 @@ mod tests { } #[tokio::test] - async fn unbuilt_surfaces_remain_404_and_absent_from_discovery() { + async fn unbuilt_and_unconfigured_surfaces_remain_404_and_absent_from_discovery() { + // test_config has blossom: None — Blossom must stay off the map. let app = test_app(); for path in [ "/v1/receipts/stream", @@ -4055,7 +4125,7 @@ mod tests { assert_eq!( res.status(), StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, - "unbuilt surface {path} must not be registered" + "unconfigured/unbuilt surface {path} must not be registered" ); } let res = app @@ -4315,4 +4385,578 @@ mod tests { // PAGE_LOOKAHEAD: default rest limit 100 → kernel limit 101 assert_eq!(req.limit, Some(101)); } + + // ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + // §7.4 Blossom surface (configured store only) + // ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + + fn blossom_temp_root(label: &str) -> std::path::PathBuf { + let nanos = std::time::SystemTime::now() + .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH) + .expect("clock") + .as_nanos(); + let root = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!( + "zkcoins-blossom-rt-{}-{}-{}", + label, + std::process::id(), + nanos + )); + let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&root); + root + } + + fn blossom_app(root: std::path::PathBuf, max: u64, ops: BTreeSet<[u8; 32]>) -> Router { + let cfg = Config { + bind_addr: "127.0.0.1:0".parse().unwrap(), + kernel_addr: "http://127.0.0.1:50051".to_string(), + features: BTreeSet::new(), + public_hosts: vec!["node.example.com".to_string()], + blossom: Some(crate::config::BlossomConfig { + store_root: root, + max_blob_bytes: max, + allowed_upload_ops: ops, + }), + }; + build_router(cfg, Arc::new(UnreachableKernel)) + } + + fn blossom_sk_pk() -> (bitcoin::secp256k1::SecretKey, [u8; 32]) { + use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Keypair, Secp256k1, SecretKey}; + let secp = Secp256k1::new(); + let sk = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0x7au8; 32]).expect("secret"); + let kp = Keypair::from_secret_key(&secp, &sk); + let (xonly, _) = kp.x_only_public_key(); + (sk, xonly.serialize()) + } + + fn blossom_auth( + sk: &bitcoin::secp256k1::SecretKey, + pk: &[u8; 32], + action: crate::blossom::AuthAction, + x: &[u8; 32], + ) -> String { + let now = std::time::SystemTime::now() + .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH) + .expect("clock") + .as_secs(); + let b64 = crate::blossom::sign_auth_event_base64(sk, pk, action, x, now, now + 120); + format!("Nostr {b64}") + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn blossom_upload_get_head_roundtrip_bit_equal() { + let root = blossom_temp_root("roundtrip"); + let (sk, pk) = blossom_sk_pk(); + let mut ops = BTreeSet::new(); + ops.insert(pk); + let app = blossom_app(root.clone(), 1_048_576, ops); + let body = b"ciphertext-bytes-for-roundtrip".to_vec(); + let x = crate::blossom::blob_id_of(&body); + let auth = blossom_auth(&sk, &pk, crate::blossom::AuthAction::Upload, &x); + + let res = app + .clone() + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("PUT") + .uri("/blossom/upload") + .header("content-type", "application/octet-stream") + .header("authorization", &auth) + .body(Body::from(body.clone())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["blob_id"], crate::hexutil::encode_hex(&x)); + assert!( + json.get("receipt").is_none(), + "receipt must be absent without §4.6, got {json}" + ); + + let get = app + .clone() + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri(format!("/blossom/{}", crate::hexutil::encode_hex(&x))) + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(get.status(), StatusCode::OK); + assert_eq!( + body_bytes(get).await, + body, + "GET must return bit-equal body" + ); + + let head = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("HEAD") + .uri(format!("/blossom/{}", crate::hexutil::encode_hex(&x))) + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(head.status(), StatusCode::OK); + let len = head + .headers() + .get(axum::http::header::CONTENT_LENGTH) + .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok()) + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(len, body.len().to_string()); + let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&root); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn blossom_second_upload_same_bytes_is_idempotent() { + let root = blossom_temp_root("idempotent"); + let (sk, pk) = blossom_sk_pk(); + let mut ops = BTreeSet::new(); + ops.insert(pk); + let app = blossom_app(root.clone(), 1024, ops); + let body = b"same-bytes-twice"; + let x = crate::blossom::blob_id_of(body); + for _ in 0..2 { + let auth = blossom_auth(&sk, &pk, crate::blossom::AuthAction::Upload, &x); + let res = app + .clone() + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/blossom/upload") + .header("content-type", "application/octet-stream") + .header("authorization", &auth) + .body(Body::from(body.to_vec())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["blob_id"], crate::hexutil::encode_hex(&x)); + } + let store = crate::blossom::BlobStore::open(&root).unwrap(); + let names = store.list_root_names().unwrap(); + let blob_files: Vec<_> = names + .iter() + .filter(|n| n.len() == 64 && !n.contains('.')) + .collect(); + assert_eq!(blob_files.len(), 1); + let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&root); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn blossom_path_traversal_is_400_and_does_not_touch_outside() { + let root = blossom_temp_root("traversal"); + let outside = root + .parent() + .unwrap() + .join(format!("zkcoins-blossom-outside-{}", std::process::id())); + std::fs::write(&outside, b"sentinel").unwrap(); + let outside_before = std::fs::read(&outside).unwrap(); + let app = blossom_app(root.clone(), 1024, BTreeSet::new()); + let store_before = crate::blossom::BlobStore::open(&root) + .unwrap() + .list_root_names() + .unwrap(); + + for bad in [ + format!("/blossom/{}", "A".repeat(64)), + format!("/blossom/{}", "a".repeat(63)), + format!("/blossom/{}", "a".repeat(65)), + "/blossom/../etc/passwd".to_string(), + ] { + let res = app + .clone() + .oneshot(Request::builder().uri(&bad).body(Body::empty()).unwrap()) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert!( + res.status() == StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST || res.status() == StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, + "path {bad} → {}", + res.status() + ); + if res.status() == StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST { + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "malformed_request"); + } + } + + let store_after = crate::blossom::BlobStore::open(&root) + .unwrap() + .list_root_names() + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(store_before, store_after); + assert_eq!(std::fs::read(&outside).unwrap(), outside_before); + let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&outside); + let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&root); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn blossom_upload_rejects_non_peer_op_with_403() { + let root = blossom_temp_root("nonpeer"); + let (sk, pk) = blossom_sk_pk(); + let app = blossom_app(root.clone(), 1024, BTreeSet::new()); + let body = b"not-a-peer"; + let x = crate::blossom::blob_id_of(body); + let auth = blossom_auth(&sk, &pk, crate::blossom::AuthAction::Upload, &x); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("PUT") + .uri("/blossom/upload") + .header("content-type", "application/octet-stream") + .header("authorization", &auth) + .body(Body::from(body.to_vec())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::FORBIDDEN); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "scope_exceeded"); + let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&root); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn blossom_upload_rejects_oversize_with_413() { + let root = blossom_temp_root("oversize"); + let (sk, pk) = blossom_sk_pk(); + let mut ops = BTreeSet::new(); + ops.insert(pk); + let app = blossom_app(root.clone(), 4, ops); + let body = b"12345"; + let x = crate::blossom::blob_id_of(body); + let auth = blossom_auth(&sk, &pk, crate::blossom::AuthAction::Upload, &x); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("PUT") + .uri("/blossom/upload") + .header("content-type", "application/octet-stream") + .header("authorization", &auth) + .body(Body::from(body.to_vec())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "payload_too_large"); + let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&root); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn blossom_upload_rejects_json_content_type_with_415() { + let root = blossom_temp_root("jsonct"); + let (sk, pk) = blossom_sk_pk(); + let mut ops = BTreeSet::new(); + ops.insert(pk); + let app = blossom_app(root.clone(), 1024, ops); + let body = b"{}"; + let x = crate::blossom::blob_id_of(body); + let auth = blossom_auth(&sk, &pk, crate::blossom::AuthAction::Upload, &x); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("PUT") + .uri("/blossom/upload") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .header("authorization", &auth) + .body(Body::from(body.to_vec())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::UNSUPPORTED_MEDIA_TYPE); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "unsupported_media_type"); + let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&root); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn blossom_partial_binding_headers_are_400() { + let root = blossom_temp_root("partialhdr"); + let (sk, pk) = blossom_sk_pk(); + let mut ops = BTreeSet::new(); + ops.insert(pk); + let app = blossom_app(root.clone(), 1024, ops); + let body = b"with-partial-headers"; + let x = crate::blossom::blob_id_of(body); + let auth = blossom_auth(&sk, &pk, crate::blossom::AuthAction::Upload, &x); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("PUT") + .uri("/blossom/upload") + .header("content-type", "application/octet-stream") + .header("authorization", &auth) + .header( + "x-zkcoins-event-id", + crate::hexutil::encode_hex(&[0x11; 32]), + ) + .body(Body::from(body.to_vec())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "malformed_request"); + assert!( + json["message"].as_str().unwrap().contains("all together"), + "{}", + json["message"] + ); + let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&root); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn blossom_invalid_retention_is_400() { + let root = blossom_temp_root("badret"); + let (sk, pk) = blossom_sk_pk(); + let mut ops = BTreeSet::new(); + ops.insert(pk); + let app = blossom_app(root.clone(), 1024, ops); + let body = b"bad-retention"; + let x = crate::blossom::blob_id_of(body); + let auth = blossom_auth(&sk, &pk, crate::blossom::AuthAction::Upload, &x); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("PUT") + .uri("/blossom/upload") + .header("content-type", "application/octet-stream") + .header("authorization", &auth) + .header( + "x-zkcoins-event-id", + crate::hexutil::encode_hex(&[0x11; 32]), + ) + .header( + "x-zkcoins-attempt-nonce", + crate::hexutil::encode_hex(&[0x22; 32]), + ) + .header("x-zkcoins-retention", "forever") + .body(Body::from(body.to_vec())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "malformed_request"); + assert!( + json["message"].as_str().unwrap().contains("Retention"), + "{}", + json["message"] + ); + let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&root); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn blossom_delete_by_original_uploader_succeeds() { + let root = blossom_temp_root("delok"); + let (sk, pk) = blossom_sk_pk(); + let mut ops = BTreeSet::new(); + ops.insert(pk); + let app = blossom_app(root.clone(), 1024, ops); + let body = b"to-be-deleted"; + let x = crate::blossom::blob_id_of(body); + let auth_up = blossom_auth(&sk, &pk, crate::blossom::AuthAction::Upload, &x); + let res = app + .clone() + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("PUT") + .uri("/blossom/upload") + .header("content-type", "application/octet-stream") + .header("authorization", &auth_up) + .body(Body::from(body.to_vec())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + + let auth_del = blossom_auth(&sk, &pk, crate::blossom::AuthAction::Delete, &x); + let res = app + .clone() + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("DELETE") + .uri(format!("/blossom/{}", crate::hexutil::encode_hex(&x))) + .header("authorization", &auth_del) + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + assert!(body_bytes(res).await.is_empty()); + let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&root); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn blossom_delete_by_foreign_op_is_403() { + use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Keypair, Secp256k1, SecretKey}; + let root = blossom_temp_root("delforeign"); + let (sk, pk) = blossom_sk_pk(); + let mut ops = BTreeSet::new(); + ops.insert(pk); + let secp = Secp256k1::new(); + let sk2 = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0x8bu8; 32]).unwrap(); + let kp2 = Keypair::from_secret_key(&secp, &sk2); + let (xonly2, _) = kp2.x_only_public_key(); + let pk2 = xonly2.serialize(); + + let app = blossom_app(root.clone(), 1024, ops); + let body = b"owned-by-pk"; + let x = crate::blossom::blob_id_of(body); + let auth_up = blossom_auth(&sk, &pk, crate::blossom::AuthAction::Upload, &x); + let res = app + .clone() + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("PUT") + .uri("/blossom/upload") + .header("content-type", "application/octet-stream") + .header("authorization", &auth_up) + .body(Body::from(body.to_vec())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + + let auth_del = blossom_auth(&sk2, &pk2, crate::blossom::AuthAction::Delete, &x); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("DELETE") + .uri(format!("/blossom/{}", crate::hexutil::encode_hex(&x))) + .header("authorization", &auth_del) + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::FORBIDDEN); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "scope_exceeded"); + let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&root); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn blossom_delete_without_uploader_note_is_403() { + let root = blossom_temp_root("delnonote"); + let (sk, pk) = blossom_sk_pk(); + let mut ops = BTreeSet::new(); + ops.insert(pk); + let store = crate::blossom::BlobStore::open(&root).unwrap(); + let body = b"orphan"; + let id = store.put(body, &pk).unwrap(); + std::fs::remove_file(root.join(format!("{}.uploader", crate::hexutil::encode_hex(&id)))) + .unwrap(); + + let app = blossom_app(root.clone(), 1024, ops); + let auth_del = blossom_auth(&sk, &pk, crate::blossom::AuthAction::Delete, &id); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("DELETE") + .uri(format!("/blossom/{}", crate::hexutil::encode_hex(&id))) + .header("authorization", &auth_del) + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::FORBIDDEN); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "scope_exceeded"); + assert!( + json["message"].as_str().unwrap().contains("uploader note"), + "{}", + json["message"] + ); + let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&root); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn blossom_discovery_keys_bound_to_configuration() { + // Without store (test_config): absent. + let app = test_app(); + let res = app + .oneshot(Request::builder().uri("/").body(Body::empty()).unwrap()) + .await + .unwrap(); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + let endpoints = json["endpoints"].as_object().unwrap(); + for k in [ + "blossom_get", + "blossom_head", + "blossom_upload", + "blossom_delete", + ] { + assert!(!endpoints.contains_key(k), "{k} unadvertised without store"); + } + + // With store: present. + let root = blossom_temp_root("disc"); + let app = blossom_app(root.clone(), 1024, BTreeSet::new()); + let res = app + .oneshot(Request::builder().uri("/").body(Body::empty()).unwrap()) + .await + .unwrap(); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + let endpoints = json["endpoints"].as_object().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(endpoints["blossom_get"], "/blossom/"); + assert_eq!(endpoints["blossom_head"], "/blossom/"); + assert_eq!(endpoints["blossom_upload"], "/blossom/upload"); + assert_eq!(endpoints["blossom_delete"], "/blossom/"); + let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&root); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn blossom_binding_headers_valid_still_omit_receipt() { + let root = blossom_temp_root("bindok"); + let (sk, pk) = blossom_sk_pk(); + let mut ops = BTreeSet::new(); + ops.insert(pk); + let app = blossom_app(root.clone(), 1024, ops); + let body = b"with-valid-binding"; + let x = crate::blossom::blob_id_of(body); + let auth = blossom_auth(&sk, &pk, crate::blossom::AuthAction::Upload, &x); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("PUT") + .uri("/blossom/upload") + .header("content-type", "application/octet-stream") + .header("authorization", &auth) + .header( + "x-zkcoins-event-id", + crate::hexutil::encode_hex(&[0xaa; 32]), + ) + .header( + "x-zkcoins-attempt-nonce", + crate::hexutil::encode_hex(&[0xbb; 32]), + ) + .header("x-zkcoins-retention", "indefinite") + .body(Body::from(body.to_vec())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["blob_id"], crate::hexutil::encode_hex(&x)); + assert!(json.get("receipt").is_none()); + let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&root); + } } diff --git a/src/state.rs b/src/state.rs index b44ff60..294940a 100644 --- a/src/state.rs +++ b/src/state.rs @@ -2,9 +2,10 @@ //! //! Handlers that need only the kernel extract `State` via //! [`FromRef`]; handlers that also need API-owned config (e.g. `features` -//! for `GET /v1/info`, `public_hosts` for OwnershipProof `chan_bind`) -//! extract `State`. +//! for `GET /v1/info`, `public_hosts` for OwnershipProof `chan_bind`, +//! optional Blossom store) extract `State`. +use crate::blossom::BlossomState; use crate::config::Feature; use crate::kernel::KernelHandle; use axum::extract::FromRef; @@ -21,6 +22,9 @@ pub struct AppState { /// Authoritative public hostnames for §5.1 `chan_bind` /// (`ZKCOINS_PUBLIC_HOST`). Never derived from request headers. pub public_hosts: Arc>, + /// §7.4 Blossom surface. `None` when `ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_STORE` is unset — + /// routes are not mounted and discovery keys are not advertised. + pub blossom: Option, } impl FromRef for KernelHandle { From dac7adb65c144e6eb643b104623d815238bc2f8d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: TaprootFreak <142087526+TaprootFreak@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Sat, 1 Aug 2026 09:25:28 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 10/23] =?UTF-8?q?feat:=20serve=20GET=20/v1/receipts/stream?= =?UTF-8?q?=20=E2=80=94=2026=20of=2029=20=C2=A77.5=20keys?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The kernel now writes receipts after durable persistence and filters them by the server-side session subject and resolved scope, so the last non-legacy §7.5 key can be served. The three that remain are legacy 410 surfaces. The auth rule here is deliberately not the one next door. §7.5 admits **any** still-valid ownership *or* grant pull session on this stream, while `GET /v1/account/state` admits ownership sessions only — a scoped grant must never see full account state, but it may see the receipts inside its scope. A test holds that difference, because a suite that only ever opens one kind of session looks equally green whichever way the check goes. Subject and scope come from the server-side session state. The request carries no subject anywhere, and a test asserts that supplying one changes nothing. The error shapes stay separated the way §7.5 separates them: a missing or non-session bearer is `401 unauthorized`, while an unknown, expired or `chan_bind`-mismatching session is `410 session_expired`. Collapsing them would leave a client unable to tell "authenticate again" from "open a new session". No recovery buffer and no sequence numbers: §4.9 makes the stream a latency accelerator, never the sole source of truth, and a client recovers missed receipts through the ordinary pull endpoint. Building either would promise something the spec deliberately does not. --- README.md | 2 +- docs/rest-surface.md | 3 +- src/chain.rs | 7 + src/kernel/client.rs | 33 ++- src/pull.rs | 134 ++++++++++- src/routes.rs | 517 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 6 files changed, 670 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 951fbef..8849f48 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ The API layer sits **outward** of the node. It consumes the node's internal **ke ### Inventory and stage A (this branch) - Full §7.5 endpoint inventory (method, capability, feature, kernel RPC): [`docs/rest-surface.md`](docs/rest-surface.md). -- Rust process (`axum` + `tonic 0.13.1` client): **`GET /`**, **`GET /health`**, info/chain reads, the job surface, and **attest/grants** (`POST /v1/attest/balance[/challenge]`, `POST /v1/grants[/challenge]`). No placeholder routes for unbuilt keys. +- Rust process (`axum` + `tonic 0.13.1` client): **`GET /`**, **`GET /health`**, info/chain reads, the job surface, **attest/grants**, pull/records/account, **`GET /v1/receipts/stream`** (SSE over `SubscribeReceipts`), bootstrap/publish, and optional Blossom. No placeholder routes for unbuilt keys. - **OwnershipProof** for attest/grants is verified at the API edge (BIP-340, action-bound domain, `chan_bind`, `request_hash`) **before** any kernel call that would consume a challenge nonce. - **`GET /` discovery follows registration** via `ServedSurface` — only served keys are advertised. The 29-key catalogue stays as inventory. - Kernel contract: carried `proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto` with SHA-256 identity pin (`src/proto_identity.rs`); REST errors from `ErrorInfo.metadata["http_status"]` only (API-local auth failures use §7.5 `401 unauthorized` directly). diff --git a/docs/rest-surface.md b/docs/rest-surface.md index f411d31..db604d6 100644 --- a/docs/rest-surface.md +++ b/docs/rest-surface.md @@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ Deployments mit Wallet- und/oder Explorer-Rolle benötigt (Replica-/Blob-Pfad). | `GET /v1/record/` | **implementiert** — `GetRecord` (Bearer-Session) | | `GET /v1/proof/` | **implementiert** — `GetCoinProof` (Bearer-Session) | | `GET /v1/account/state` | **implementiert** — `GetAccountState` (Ownership-Session) | +| `GET /v1/receipts/stream` | **implementiert** — `SubscribeReceipts` als SSE (Ownership- **oder** Grant-Session; 401/410-Trennung wie Proof) | | `POST /v1/bootstrap/challenge` | **implementiert** — `OpenPullChallenge` (`action = entrust` \| `revoke`) | | `POST /v1/bootstrap/entrust` | **implementiert** — OwnershipProof (Entrust-Domain) + Bundle-Längenprüfung (161 B), dann `EntrustOperationalBundle`; Bundle wird nie geloggt | | `POST /v1/bootstrap/revoke` | **implementiert** — OwnershipProof (Revoke-Domain), dann `RevokeOperationalBundle` | @@ -179,7 +180,6 @@ Deployments mit Wallet- und/oder Explorer-Rolle benötigt (Replica-/Blob-Pfad). | Key | Warum | |---|---| -| `receipts_stream` | Kernel-`SubscribeReceipts` Unimplemented; der node nennt die fehlende Push-/Quell-Voraussetzung. | | `blossom_*` (ohne `ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_STORE`) | §7.4; die vier Schlüssel werden **nur** advertised, wenn der inhaltsadressierte Store konfiguriert ist. | Router und Discovery teilen eine Quelle (`ServedSurface` in `src/routes.rs`): eine neue @@ -196,7 +196,6 @@ ausschließlich über `google.rpc.ErrorInfo` (`domain`, `reason`, | Lücke | Warum | |---|---| -| `GET /v1/receipts/stream` | Kernel-`SubscribeReceipts` Unimplemented. | | Blossom `ReplicaReceiptV1` | §4.6 Dual-Commit (Blob + Delivery-Event) fehlt; Upload antwortet ehrlich nur mit `{ blob_id }` — kein `receipt`. | | Feature-Gate `404 feature_disabled` | Bootstrap/Publish/Job/Attest-Fläche ist in dieser Stufe always-on; Gate folgt mit den optionalen Rollen. | diff --git a/src/chain.rs b/src/chain.rs index 74ededa..d7e5393 100644 --- a/src/chain.rs +++ b/src/chain.rs @@ -896,6 +896,13 @@ mod tests { ) -> Result { Err(ApiError::internal("not used")) } + async fn subscribe_receipts( + &self, + _req: crate::kernel::kernel_v1::SubscribeReceiptsRequest, + ) -> Result>, ApiError> + { + Err(ApiError::internal("not used")) + } async fn entrust_operational_bundle( &self, _req: crate::kernel::kernel_v1::EntrustRequest, diff --git a/src/kernel/client.rs b/src/kernel/client.rs index 0cda14d..e381aeb 100644 --- a/src/kernel/client.rs +++ b/src/kernel/client.rs @@ -13,8 +13,9 @@ use crate::kernel::pb::kernel_v1::{ CoinProofBlob, CoinProofRequest, EntrustRequest, EntrustResult, GetAccumulatorRequest, GetInfoRequest, GrantRequest, GrantResult, Info, Inscription, Job, JobEvent, JobHandle, JobRequest, ListInscriptionsRequest, NullifierPath, NullifierPathRequest, PublishRequest, - PublishResult, PullChallengeRequest, PullRequest, PullResult, RecordBlob, RecordRequest, - RevokeRequest, RevokeResult, SignRequest, TransitionRequest, + PublishResult, PullChallengeRequest, PullRequest, PullResult, Receipt, RecordBlob, + RecordRequest, RevokeRequest, RevokeResult, SignRequest, SubscribeReceiptsRequest, + TransitionRequest, }; use crate::ownership::SessionAuthority; use async_trait::async_trait; @@ -31,7 +32,8 @@ use tonic::Request; const SESSION_AUTHORITY_METADATA: &str = "x-zkcoins-session-authority"; /// Subset of kernel procedures this stage consumes -/// (job surface + info/chain + attest/grants + pull/records + bootstrap + publish). +/// (job surface + info/chain + attest/grants + pull/records + receipts stream +/// + bootstrap + publish). #[async_trait] pub trait KernelRpc: Send + Sync { async fn submit_transition(&self, req: TransitionRequest) -> Result; @@ -85,6 +87,15 @@ pub trait KernelRpc: Send + Sync { req: AccountStateRequest, ) -> Result; + /// Server-stream of verified receipts for a pull session (§7.8 / §4.9). + /// Handshake failures (unknown session, `chan_bind` mismatch, transport) + /// return `Err` before any frame; the REST handler maps those to the + /// pre-SSE HTTP status. Mid-stream breaks become `Err` items. + async fn subscribe_receipts( + &self, + req: SubscribeReceiptsRequest, + ) -> Result>, ApiError>; + async fn entrust_operational_bundle( &self, req: EntrustRequest, @@ -343,6 +354,22 @@ impl KernelRpc for KernelClient { Ok(response.into_inner()) } + async fn subscribe_receipts( + &self, + req: SubscribeReceiptsRequest, + ) -> Result>, ApiError> { + let mut client = self.inner.clone(); + let response = client + .subscribe_receipts(Request::new(req)) + .await + .map_err(map_status)?; + let stream = response.into_inner().map(|item| match item { + Ok(receipt) => Ok(receipt), + Err(status) => Err(kernel_status_to_api_error(&status)), + }); + Ok(Box::pin(stream)) + } + async fn entrust_operational_bundle( &self, req: EntrustRequest, diff --git a/src/pull.rs b/src/pull.rs index a1b060c..cfda842 100644 --- a/src/pull.rs +++ b/src/pull.rs @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -//! Capability-gated pull REST surface (§7.5 L3039–L3043). +//! Capability-gated pull REST surface (§7.5 L3039–L3044). //! //! | Method | Path | Kernel | //! |---|---|---| @@ -7,16 +7,23 @@ //! | `GET` | `/v1/record/` | `GetRecord` | //! | `GET` | `/v1/proof/` | `GetCoinProof` | //! | `GET` | `/v1/account/state` | `GetAccountState` (ownership session only) | +//! | `GET` | `/v1/receipts/stream` | `SubscribeReceipts` (ownership **or** grant session) | //! //! The API holds **no** session store: the bearer token is forwarded to the //! kernel. Session authority is taken solely from the verified proof kind and //! sent as interim metadata `x-zkcoins-session-authority` (never defaulted). +//! +//! `GET /v1/receipts/stream` admits **any** still-valid ownership **or** grant +//! pull session (§7.5 L2953) — unlike `GET /v1/account/state`, which is +//! ownership-only. Subject and resolved scope come from server-side session +//! state; the request carries no `subject` field. use crate::error::ApiError; use crate::hexutil::{decode_hex_exact, encode_hex}; use crate::kernel::kernel_v1::{ AccountStateRequest, AccountStateResult, CoinProofBlob, CoinProofRequest, PullChallengeRequest, - PullRequest, PullResult as ProtoPullResult, RecordBlob, RecordRef, RecordRequest, Scope, + PullRequest, PullResult as ProtoPullResult, Receipt, RecordBlob, RecordRef, RecordRequest, + Scope, SubscribeReceiptsRequest, }; use crate::ownership::{ chan_bind_for_host, decode_zk_address, parse_u64_decimal, reject_grant_proof, @@ -26,10 +33,14 @@ use crate::ownership::{ use crate::state::AppState; use axum::extract::{Path, State}; use axum::http::{header, HeaderMap, StatusCode}; +use axum::response::sse::{Event, KeepAlive, Sse}; use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response}; use axum::Json; +use futures_util::stream::Stream; +use futures_util::StreamExt; use serde::Deserialize; use serde_json::{json, Value}; +use std::convert::Infallible; // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- // Wire types @@ -603,3 +614,122 @@ pub async fn get_account_state( Ok((StatusCode::OK, Json(Value::Object(body))).into_response()) } + +/// `GET /v1/receipts/stream` → `SubscribeReceipts` as SSE (§7.5 L2953–L2955). +/// +/// Auth split (fail-closed, same as `GET /v1/proof/`): +/// - missing / malformed bearer → `401 unauthorized` (API edge, no kernel) +/// - unknown / expired / `chan_bind`-mismatch session → `410 session_expired` +/// (kernel `ErrorInfo`, before the SSE upgrade) +/// +/// Ownership **or** grant sessions are both admissible. Subject and resolved +/// scope are **not** taken from the request — the kernel looks them up from +/// the session record. No recovery buffer, no sequence numbers: reconnect and +/// catch-up via ordinary pull are client-side (§4.9). +/// +/// Pattern matches `GET /v1/jobs//stream`: handshake errors return as +/// HTTP status + JSON; only a successful kernel stream becomes +/// `text/event-stream`. Dropping the SSE consumer drops the gRPC stream and +/// ends the subscription. +pub async fn stream_receipts( + State(state): State, + headers: HeaderMap, +) -> Result> + Send + 'static>, ApiError> { + let session = bearer_token(&headers)?; + let chan_bind = session_chan_bind(state.public_hosts.as_slice())?; + + // Await the kernel stream handshake first. On `Err`, axum maps `ApiError` + // to a normal HTTP response (status + JSON body) and never enters SSE. + let stream = state + .kernel + .subscribe_receipts(SubscribeReceiptsRequest { + session, + chan_bind: chan_bind.to_vec(), + }) + .await?; + + let sse_stream = receipt_event_sse_stream(stream); + Ok(Sse::new(sse_stream).keep_alive(KeepAlive::default())) +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Receipts SSE +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +fn receipt_event_sse_stream(stream: S) -> impl Stream> + Send +where + S: Stream> + Send + 'static, +{ + // Map each kernel receipt to one SSE frame. On stream break, emit a single + // recognizable `error` frame then end — never hang open with silence. + // Clean end (`None`) closes without a terminal frame (open-ended push). + // + // Dropping this unfold (client disconnect) drops `stream`, which drops the + // tonic gRPC subscription — same cleanup pattern as the job stream. + futures_util::stream::unfold((Box::pin(stream), false), |(mut stream, done)| async move { + if done { + return None; + } + match stream.next().await { + None => None, + Some(Ok(receipt)) => match receipt_to_sse(&receipt) { + Ok(frame) => Some((Ok(frame), (stream, false))), + Err(api_err) => { + let frame = receipt_stream_break_event(&api_err); + Some((Ok(frame), (stream, true))) + } + }, + Some(Err(api_err)) => { + let frame = receipt_stream_break_event(&api_err); + Some((Ok(frame), (stream, true))) + } + } + }) +} + +fn receipt_stream_break_event(err: &ApiError) -> Event { + let data = json!({ + "error": err.body.error, + "message": err.body.message, + }); + Event::default().event("error").data(data.to_string()) +} + +fn receipt_to_sse(r: &Receipt) -> Result { + let data = receipt_to_json(r)?; + Ok(Event::default().event("receipt").data(data.to_string())) +} + +/// §7.8 `Receipt` as public JSON: hex32 digests, decimal strings for +/// `amount` / `credited_at` (§7.1). +fn receipt_to_json(r: &Receipt) -> Result { + if r.coin_id.len() != 32 { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "kernel Receipt.coin_id must be 32 bytes, got {}", + r.coin_id.len() + ))); + } + if r.asset_id.len() != 32 { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "kernel Receipt.asset_id must be 32 bytes, got {}", + r.asset_id.len() + ))); + } + if r.amount.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::internal( + "kernel Receipt.amount is empty on SubscribeReceipts success", + )); + } + if r.state.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::internal( + "kernel Receipt.state is empty on SubscribeReceipts success", + )); + } + Ok(json!({ + "coin_id": encode_hex(&r.coin_id), + "asset_id": encode_hex(&r.asset_id), + "amount": r.amount, + "state": r.state, + "credited_at": r.credited_at.to_string(), + })) +} diff --git a/src/routes.rs b/src/routes.rs index 7888870..fba4bad 100644 --- a/src/routes.rs +++ b/src/routes.rs @@ -101,17 +101,14 @@ pub const CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS: &[(&str, &str)] = &[ /// Surfaces intentionally **not** always registered (and therefore omitted from /// `GET /` when inactive), with the reason each stays off the map: /// -/// - `receipts_stream` — kernel `SubscribeReceipts` is Unimplemented; the node -/// names the missing push/source prerequisite. A REST shell would only 501. /// - `blossom_get` / `blossom_head` / `blossom_upload` / `blossom_delete` — /// §7.4 Blossom surface. Mounted **only** when `ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_STORE` is /// configured (content-addressed filesystem store). No default path; absent /// store ⇒ keys unadvertised and routes unmounted. /// /// Inventory keys remain in [`CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS`]; advertisement tracks -/// the always-on set plus optional Blossom when configured. -/// `chain_inscriptions` is registered once the node inscription catalog -/// backs `ListInscriptions`. +/// the always-on set (25 keys, including `receipts_stream`) plus optional +/// Blossom (4 keys) when configured — all 29 when the store is set. #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)] enum ServedSurface { Health, @@ -134,6 +131,7 @@ enum ServedSurface { Record, Proof, AccountState, + ReceiptsStream, PublishSpendrecord, BootstrapChallenge, BootstrapEntrust, @@ -167,6 +165,7 @@ impl ServedSurface { ServedSurface::Record, ServedSurface::Proof, ServedSurface::AccountState, + ServedSurface::ReceiptsStream, ServedSurface::PublishSpendrecord, ServedSurface::BootstrapChallenge, ServedSurface::BootstrapEntrust, @@ -213,6 +212,7 @@ impl ServedSurface { ServedSurface::Record => "record", ServedSurface::Proof => "proof", ServedSurface::AccountState => "account_state", + ServedSurface::ReceiptsStream => "receipts_stream", ServedSurface::PublishSpendrecord => "publish_spendrecord", ServedSurface::BootstrapChallenge => "bootstrap_challenge", ServedSurface::BootstrapEntrust => "bootstrap_entrust", @@ -255,6 +255,7 @@ impl ServedSurface { ServedSurface::Record => router.route(&path, get(pull::get_record)), ServedSurface::Proof => router.route(&path, get(pull::get_proof)), ServedSurface::AccountState => router.route(&path, get(pull::get_account_state)), + ServedSurface::ReceiptsStream => router.route(&path, get(pull::stream_receipts)), ServedSurface::PublishSpendrecord => { router.route(&path, post(publish::post_publish_spendrecord)) } @@ -442,8 +443,8 @@ mod tests { GrantResult, Info, Inscription, Job, JobEvent, JobHandle, JobRequest, ListInscriptionsRequest, Nullifier as ProtoNullifier, NullifierPath, NullifierPathRequest, PublishRequest, PublishResult, PullChallengeRequest, PullRequest, - PullResult as ProtoPullResult, RecordBlob, RecordRequest, RevokeRequest, RevokeResult, - SignRequest, TransitionRequest, + PullResult as ProtoPullResult, Receipt, RecordBlob, RecordRequest, RevokeRequest, + RevokeResult, SignRequest, SubscribeReceiptsRequest, TransitionRequest, }; use crate::kernel::KernelRpc; use crate::ownership::SessionAuthority; @@ -454,7 +455,7 @@ mod tests { use http_body_util::BodyExt; use serde_json::Value; use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap}; - use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering}; + use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, AtomicUsize, Ordering}; use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex}; use tonic::Code; use tower::ServiceExt; @@ -557,6 +558,14 @@ mod tests { "test double: get_account_state not configured", )) } + async fn subscribe_receipts( + &self, + _req: SubscribeReceiptsRequest, + ) -> Result>, ApiError> { + Err(ApiError::internal( + "test double: subscribe_receipts not configured", + )) + } async fn entrust_operational_bundle( &self, _req: EntrustRequest, @@ -738,12 +747,13 @@ mod tests { "record", "proof", "account_state", + "receipts_stream", "publish_spendrecord", "bootstrap_challenge", "bootstrap_entrust", "bootstrap_revoke", ]), - "chain_inscriptions is served once ListInscriptions is catalog-backed" + "always-on surfaces include receipts_stream once SubscribeReceipts is wired" ); assert_eq!( endpoints["bootstrap_challenge"].as_str(), @@ -761,9 +771,8 @@ mod tests { endpoints["publish_spendrecord"].as_str(), Some("/v1/publish/spendrecord") ); - // Unbuilt surfaces stay off discovery (documented in ServedSurface). + // Blossom stays off discovery without ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_STORE. for absent in [ - "receipts_stream", "blossom_get", "blossom_head", "blossom_upload", @@ -771,9 +780,14 @@ mod tests { ] { assert!( !endpoints.contains_key(absent), - "unbuilt surface {absent} must stay unadvertised" + "unconfigured Blossom surface {absent} must stay unadvertised" ); } + assert_eq!( + endpoints["receipts_stream"].as_str(), + Some("/v1/receipts/stream"), + "receipts_stream must be advertised once SubscribeReceipts is wired" + ); assert_eq!( endpoints["chain_inscriptions"].as_str(), Some("/v1/chain/inscriptions"), @@ -803,6 +817,10 @@ mod tests { endpoints["account_state"].as_str(), Some("/v1/account/state") ); + assert_eq!( + endpoints["receipts_stream"].as_str(), + Some("/v1/receipts/stream") + ); // chain_inscriptions is advertised — the node catalog backs ListInscriptions. assert!( endpoints.contains_key("chain_inscriptions"), @@ -1109,8 +1127,8 @@ mod tests { "stage C2 advertises /v1/pull once the handler exists" ); assert!( - !endpoints.contains_key("receipts_stream"), - "receipts_stream must stay unadvertised until SubscribeReceipts is wired" + endpoints.contains_key("receipts_stream"), + "receipts_stream is advertised once SubscribeReceipts is wired" ); } @@ -1118,6 +1136,36 @@ mod tests { // Job-surface handler tests against an honest in-trait kernel double // ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + /// Yields scripted receipt items, then parks until dropped. + /// + /// Drop sets `dropped` so tests can prove client disconnect tears down the + /// kernel subscription (same pattern as job-stream body drop). + struct HangAfterReceipts { + items: std::vec::IntoIter>, + dropped: Arc, + } + + impl Drop for HangAfterReceipts { + fn drop(&mut self) { + self.dropped.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst); + } + } + + impl futures_util::Stream for HangAfterReceipts { + type Item = Result; + + fn poll_next( + mut self: std::pin::Pin<&mut Self>, + _cx: &mut std::task::Context<'_>, + ) -> std::task::Poll> { + match self.items.next() { + Some(item) => std::task::Poll::Ready(Some(item)), + // Park until the consumer drops this stream (client disconnect). + None => std::task::Poll::Pending, + } + } + } + #[derive(Default)] struct ScriptedKernel { submit: Option>, @@ -1137,6 +1185,14 @@ mod tests { get_record: Option>, get_coin_proof: Option>, get_account_state: Option>, + /// Receipts stream: handshake `Err` or a finite list of items (Ok/Err). + /// When `subscribe_receipts_hang` is true, the double yields the list + /// then parks until the stream is dropped (disconnect cleanup). + subscribe_receipts: Option>, ApiError>>, + /// After scripted items, hang until drop (for cleanup tests). + subscribe_receipts_hang: bool, + /// Set true when a hanging receipts stream is dropped. + subscribe_receipts_dropped: Arc, entrust: Option>, revoke: Option>, publish: Option>, @@ -1148,6 +1204,7 @@ mod tests { get_record_calls: AtomicUsize, get_coin_proof_calls: AtomicUsize, get_account_state_calls: AtomicUsize, + subscribe_receipts_calls: AtomicUsize, entrust_calls: AtomicUsize, revoke_calls: AtomicUsize, publish_calls: AtomicUsize, @@ -1162,6 +1219,8 @@ mod tests { last_publish: Mutex>, /// Last ListInscriptions request (limit / cursor plumbing). last_list_inscriptions: Mutex>, + /// Last SubscribeReceipts request (session + chan_bind; never subject). + last_subscribe_receipts: Mutex>, } #[async_trait] @@ -1340,6 +1399,32 @@ mod tests { None => Err(ApiError::internal("get_account_state not scripted")), } } + async fn subscribe_receipts( + &self, + req: SubscribeReceiptsRequest, + ) -> Result>, ApiError> { + self.subscribe_receipts_calls.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst); + *self + .last_subscribe_receipts + .lock() + .expect("subscribe_receipts mutex") = Some(req); + match &self.subscribe_receipts { + Some(Ok(events)) => { + let events = events.clone(); + if self.subscribe_receipts_hang { + let dropped = Arc::clone(&self.subscribe_receipts_dropped); + Ok(Box::pin(HangAfterReceipts { + items: events.into_iter(), + dropped, + })) + } else { + Ok(Box::pin(stream::iter(events))) + } + } + Some(Err(e)) => Err(e.clone()), + None => Err(ApiError::internal("subscribe_receipts not scripted")), + } + } async fn entrust_operational_bundle( &self, req: EntrustRequest, @@ -3531,6 +3616,383 @@ mod tests { assert_eq!(body_bytes(res).await, b"coin-proof-bytes"); } + // ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + // Receipts stream — GET /v1/receipts/stream (§7.5 L2953–L2955) + // ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + + fn sample_receipt(coin_byte: u8, amount: &str, credited_at: u64) -> Receipt { + Receipt { + coin_id: vec![coin_byte; 32], + asset_id: vec![0xABu8; 32], + amount: amount.to_string(), + state: "completed".into(), + credited_at, + } + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn receipts_stream_happy_path_two_frames() { + let r1 = sample_receipt(0x11, "1000", 1_700_000_100); + let r2 = sample_receipt(0x22, "250", 1_700_000_200); + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + subscribe_receipts: Some(Ok(vec![Ok(r1.clone()), Ok(r2.clone())])), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/receipts/stream") + .header("authorization", "Bearer sess-own-1") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + let ct = match res.headers().get("content-type") { + Some(v) => match v.to_str() { + Ok(s) => s, + Err(e) => panic!("content-type is not ASCII: {e}"), + }, + None => panic!("SSE response missing content-type header"), + }; + assert!( + ct.starts_with("text/event-stream"), + "SSE content-type, got {ct:?}" + ); + let body = String::from_utf8(body_bytes(res).await).expect("utf8"); + + // Frame form: event: receipt\ndata: \n\n (axum SSE). + let event_count = body.matches("event: receipt").count(); + assert_eq!( + event_count, 2, + "must emit exactly two receipt events, body={body}" + ); + assert!( + body.contains("event: receipt\ndata:"), + "frame must be event then data, body={body}" + ); + + // Field encodings: hex32 digests, decimal strings for amount/credited_at. + let coin1 = encode_hex(&r1.coin_id); + let coin2 = encode_hex(&r2.coin_id); + let asset = encode_hex(&r1.asset_id); + assert!( + body.contains(&format!("\"coin_id\":\"{coin1}\"")), + "first coin_id hex, body={body}" + ); + assert!( + body.contains(&format!("\"coin_id\":\"{coin2}\"")), + "second coin_id hex, body={body}" + ); + assert!( + body.contains(&format!("\"asset_id\":\"{asset}\"")), + "asset_id hex, body={body}" + ); + assert!( + body.contains("\"amount\":\"1000\""), + "amount decimal string, body={body}" + ); + assert!( + body.contains("\"amount\":\"250\""), + "second amount decimal string, body={body}" + ); + assert!( + body.contains("\"state\":\"completed\""), + "state literal, body={body}" + ); + assert!( + body.contains("\"credited_at\":\"1700000100\""), + "credited_at decimal string, body={body}" + ); + assert!( + body.contains("\"credited_at\":\"1700000200\""), + "second credited_at decimal string, body={body}" + ); + + // Kernel saw session + chan_bind only (no subject on the wire type). + let req = kernel + .last_subscribe_receipts + .lock() + .expect("mutex") + .clone() + .expect("subscribe_receipts must have been called"); + assert_eq!(req.session, "sess-own-1"); + let expected_cb = chan_bind_for_host("node.example.com"); + assert_eq!(req.chan_bind, expected_cb.to_vec()); + assert_eq!(kernel.subscribe_receipts_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 1); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn receipts_stream_grant_session_is_admitted() { + // §7.5 L2953: any still-valid ownership OR grant pull session is + // admissible — contrast with GET /v1/account/state (ownership only). + let r = sample_receipt(0x33, "42", 1_700_000_300); + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + subscribe_receipts: Some(Ok(vec![Ok(r)])), + // Same grant token on account/state is rejected by the kernel. + get_account_state: Some(Err(crate::kernel::kernel_status_to_api_error( + &encode_kernel_error_status( + Code::Unauthenticated, + "grant session does not authorise GetAccountState", + "unauthorized", + 401, + ), + ))), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + + let res = app + .clone() + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/receipts/stream") + .header("authorization", "Bearer grant-session-token") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!( + res.status(), + StatusCode::OK, + "grant session must open the receipts stream" + ); + let body = String::from_utf8(body_bytes(res).await).expect("utf8"); + assert!( + body.contains("event: receipt"), + "grant session must receive receipt frames, body={body}" + ); + assert_eq!( + kernel.subscribe_receipts_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), + 1, + "kernel SubscribeReceipts must run for a grant session" + ); + + // Contrast: same grant token on account/state → 401 unauthorized. + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/account/state") + .header("authorization", "Bearer grant-session-token") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "unauthorized"); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn receipts_stream_missing_bearer_is_401_not_kernel() { + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + subscribe_receipts: Some(Ok(vec![Ok(sample_receipt(0x01, "1", 1))])), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/receipts/stream") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "unauthorized"); + assert_eq!( + kernel.subscribe_receipts_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), + 0, + "missing bearer must fail at the API edge before any kernel call" + ); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn receipts_stream_malformed_bearer_is_401_not_410() { + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + subscribe_receipts: Some(Ok(vec![Ok(sample_receipt(0x01, "1", 1))])), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/receipts/stream") + .header("authorization", "NotBearer xyz") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "unauthorized"); + assert_eq!(kernel.subscribe_receipts_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 0); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn receipts_stream_unknown_session_is_410() { + // Unknown / expired / chan_bind-mismatch → session_expired / 410 + // (same split as GET /v1/proof/; never collapse into 401). + let status = encode_kernel_error_status( + Code::Unauthenticated, + "pull session expired or channel mismatch", + "session_expired", + 410, + ); + let secret_token = "super-secret-session-token-never-echo"; + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + subscribe_receipts: Some(Err(crate::kernel::kernel_status_to_api_error(&status))), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/receipts/stream") + .header("authorization", format!("Bearer {secret_token}")) + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::GONE); + let body = body_bytes(res).await; + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "session_expired"); + assert_eq!(kernel.subscribe_receipts_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 1); + // Token must not appear in the error body (no log/message leakage). + let body_str = String::from_utf8_lossy(&body); + assert!( + !body_str.contains(secret_token), + "session token must never appear in the error body: {body_str}" + ); + assert!( + !json["message"] + .as_str() + .unwrap_or("") + .contains(secret_token), + "session token must never appear in error message" + ); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn receipts_stream_chan_bind_mismatch_is_410() { + // Kernel maps chan_bind mismatch to the same 410 as unknown/expired. + let status = encode_kernel_error_status( + Code::Unauthenticated, + "pull session channel binding mismatch", + "session_expired", + 410, + ); + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + subscribe_receipts: Some(Err(crate::kernel::kernel_status_to_api_error(&status))), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/receipts/stream") + .header("authorization", "Bearer sess-chan-mismatch") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::GONE); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "session_expired"); + // API still forwarded the authoritative config chan_bind (not Host). + let req = kernel + .last_subscribe_receipts + .lock() + .expect("mutex") + .clone() + .expect("subscribe must have been called"); + assert_eq!( + req.chan_bind, + chan_bind_for_host("node.example.com").to_vec() + ); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn receipts_stream_query_subject_is_ignored() { + // Request carries no subject field to the kernel; a client-supplied + // query subject must not change the SubscribeReceiptsRequest. + let r = sample_receipt(0x44, "7", 1_700_000_400); + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + subscribe_receipts: Some(Ok(vec![Ok(r)])), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/receipts/stream?subject=zk1qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq&subject=other") + .header("authorization", "Bearer sess-ignore-subject") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + let req = kernel + .last_subscribe_receipts + .lock() + .expect("mutex") + .clone() + .expect("subscribe must have been called"); + assert_eq!(req.session, "sess-ignore-subject"); + assert_eq!( + req.chan_bind, + chan_bind_for_host("node.example.com").to_vec() + ); + // SubscribeReceiptsRequest has only session + chan_bind — no subject + // field exists to populate; the capture proves that is all that was sent. + let _ = req; + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn receipts_stream_client_disconnect_drops_subscription() { + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + subscribe_receipts: Some(Ok(vec![])), + subscribe_receipts_hang: true, + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/receipts/stream") + .header("authorization", "Bearer sess-drop") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + assert!( + !kernel.subscribe_receipts_dropped.load(Ordering::SeqCst), + "subscription must still be live while the response is held" + ); + // Dropping the response body tears down the SSE consumer → gRPC stream. + drop(res); + // Allow the async drop path to run. + tokio::task::yield_now().await; + assert!( + kernel.subscribe_receipts_dropped.load(Ordering::SeqCst), + "client disconnect must drop the kernel SubscribeReceipts stream" + ); + assert_eq!(kernel.subscribe_receipts_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 1); + } + // ----------------------------------------------------------------------- // Stage D — Bootstrap + Publish // ----------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -4109,11 +4571,11 @@ mod tests { } #[tokio::test] - async fn unbuilt_and_unconfigured_surfaces_remain_404_and_absent_from_discovery() { + async fn unconfigured_blossom_surfaces_remain_404_and_absent_from_discovery() { // test_config has blossom: None — Blossom must stay off the map. + // receipts_stream is always-on and must be registered (auth fails closed). let app = test_app(); for path in [ - "/v1/receipts/stream", "/blossom/aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa", "/blossom/upload", ] { @@ -4125,16 +4587,35 @@ mod tests { assert_eq!( res.status(), StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, - "unconfigured/unbuilt surface {path} must not be registered" + "unconfigured Blossom surface {path} must not be registered" ); } + // Always-on receipts stream is registered: missing bearer → 401, not 404. + let res = app + .clone() + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/receipts/stream") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!( + res.status(), + StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, + "receipts_stream must be registered; missing bearer is 401" + ); let res = app .oneshot(Request::builder().uri("/").body(Body::empty()).unwrap()) .await .unwrap(); let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); let endpoints = json["endpoints"].as_object().unwrap(); - assert!(!endpoints.contains_key("receipts_stream")); + assert!( + endpoints.contains_key("receipts_stream"), + "receipts_stream is always-on and must appear in discovery" + ); assert!(!endpoints.contains_key("blossom_get")); assert!(!endpoints.contains_key("blossom_upload")); assert!( From f1270501503c10cf18c8f0b59a4122f1543909e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: TaprootFreak <142087526+TaprootFreak@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Sat, 1 Aug 2026 10:59:05 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 11/23] build: containerise the API so the local stack can be complete MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The stack has four running services and still could not do a full run, because one part was not containerised: `docs/local-stack.md` in the node repo told the reader the API "runs alongside". That is not a stack — it is a request that the reader supply the missing piece. Multi-stage build on the pinned toolchain, non-root at runtime, `protoc` pinned to the distribution's exact version rather than floating (the first build failed on a version that does not exist in bookworm; the one in the image is `3.21.12-3+deb12u1`). The exposed port is the one `main.rs` actually binds, not one copied from the node's Dockerfile. No defaults are baked into the image. Every variable `Config::from_env` reads fail-closed is documented in the header with its meaning, whether it is required, and the source line — including the all-or-nothing Blossom triple, where setting the store without its companions is a start error rather than a half-configured surface. --- .dockerignore | 24 ++++++++++ Dockerfile | 120 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 144 insertions(+) create mode 100644 .dockerignore create mode 100644 Dockerfile diff --git a/.dockerignore b/.dockerignore new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3f56336 --- /dev/null +++ b/.dockerignore @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +# Build context exclusions for the api image. +# Keep the context small and avoid shipping host build artefacts or stores. + +# Rust build output +target/ + +# VCS +.git/ +.gitignore + +# Local Blossom content-addressed store (operator path; never bake into image) +# Matches common local paths used with ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_STORE. +data/ +blossom/ +**/blossom-store/ + +# Secrets / local env (if present) +.env +.env.* +*.pem + +# Editor / OS noise +.DS_Store +**/.DS_Store diff --git a/Dockerfile b/Dockerfile new file mode 100644 index 0000000..63a35db --- /dev/null +++ b/Dockerfile @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@ +# Multi-stage Docker build for the zkCoins public REST API layer. +# +# Toolchain pin: `rust-toolchain` at the repo root +# (`channel = "nightly-2026-06-18"`). rustup respects that file and installs +# the right channel when cargo is first invoked — no manual `rustup install`. +# +# Build: +# docker build -t zkcoins/api:local . +# +# Run (no defaults baked into the image — every required var must be set): +# docker run -p 8080:8080 \ +# -e ZKCOINS_BIND_ADDR=0.0.0.0:8080 \ +# -e ZKCOINS_KERNEL_ADDR=http://node:50051 \ +# -e ZKCOINS_FEATURES=wallet,explorer \ +# -e ZKCOINS_PUBLIC_HOST= \ +# -v api_blossom:/data/blossom \ +# zkcoins/api:local +# +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Boot environment (from src/config.rs + src/main.rs — fail-closed; no image +# defaults for bind/kernel/store). Names, meaning, requiredness: +# +# Pflicht (Variable muss gesetzt sein; leerer Wert wo vermerkt erlaubt): +# +# ZKCOINS_BIND_ADDR +# HTTP listen address as `host:port` (parsed as SocketAddr). +# Required, non-empty. Empty or garbage → start error (ConfigError). +# Codestelle: src/config.rs ENV_BIND / require_present; bind in +# src/main.rs TcpListener::bind(config.bind_addr). +# Convention for local stack / EXPOSE: 0.0.0.0:8080 (not hard-coded +# in the binary — only in operator env). +# +# ZKCOINS_KERNEL_ADDR +# Kernel gRPC target URI (opaque non-empty string, tonic Endpoint). +# Required, non-empty. Bad URI → start error at connect_lazy. +# Codestelle: src/config.rs ENV_KERNEL; dial src/kernel/client.rs +# KernelClient::connect_lazy / src/main.rs connect_lazy. +# +# ZKCOINS_FEATURES +# Comma-separated subset of §6.1 closed feature set: +# wallet, explorer, publisher, lightning_bridge, mail_bridge. +# Variable required; empty string = all features off (allowed). +# Unknown token → start error. Codestelle: src/config.rs ENV_FEATURES. +# +# ZKCOINS_PUBLIC_HOST +# Comma-separated authoritative hostnames for §5.1 chan_bind. +# Variable required; empty string allowed (then OwnershipProof auth +# fails loud — no silent localhost). Never from HTTP Host header. +# Codestelle: src/config.rs ENV_PUBLIC_HOST. +# +# Optional Blossom surface (§7.4) — all-or-nothing: +# +# ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_STORE +# Filesystem root for the content-addressed store. +# Absent ⇒ Blossom routes unmounted, four discovery keys unadvertised. +# Present-but-empty ⇒ start error (no /tmp default). +# Codestelle: src/config.rs ENV_BLOSSOM_STORE / parse_blossom_config. +# +# When ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_STORE is set, these companions become Pflicht: +# +# ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_MAX_BLOB_BYTES +# Advertised upload size limit; strict decimal u64, must be > 0. +# Codestelle: src/config.rs ENV_BLOSSOM_MAX_BLOB_BYTES. +# +# ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_ALLOWED_OPS +# Comma-separated lowercase-hex 32-byte op pubkeys allowed to upload. +# Variable required when store is set; empty string allowed +# (surface up, every upload 403). Codestelle: ENV_BLOSSOM_ALLOWED_OPS. +# +# Optional (logging only — not process config): +# +# RUST_LOG +# tracing-subscriber EnvFilter. Unset ⇒ "info" in main::init_tracing +# (src/main.rs). Not a silent fallback for bind/kernel/store. +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +FROM rust:bookworm AS builder +WORKDIR /app + +# kernel-proto/build.rs → tonic_build::configure().compile_protos(...) +# needs `protoc` on PATH at compile time (see kernel-proto/build.rs). +# Pin: Debian bookworm package protobuf-compiler 3.21.12-3 +# (https://packages.debian.org/bookworm/protobuf-compiler) — not unversioned +# `latest` and not a floating upstream tag. +RUN apt-get update \ + && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \ + ca-certificates \ + protobuf-compiler=3.21.12-3+deb12u1 \ + && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* \ + && protoc --version + +# Copy just the toolchain file first so rustup can fetch the right +# channel before the slow source copy. Layer-caches across source-only changes. +COPY rust-toolchain ./ +RUN rustup show + +COPY . . + +RUN cargo build --release -p api + +FROM debian:bookworm-slim +RUN apt-get update \ + && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends ca-certificates wget \ + && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* \ + && groupadd --system --gid 10001 zkcoins \ + && useradd --system --uid 10001 --gid zkcoins \ + --home-dir /data --create-home --shell /usr/sbin/nologin zkcoins + +COPY --from=builder /app/target/release/api /usr/local/bin/zkcoins-api + +# No ZKCOINS_* defaults in the image — boot fails closed without operator env. +ENV RUST_LOG=info +WORKDIR /data +USER zkcoins:zkcoins + +# Documented local-stack port (ZKCOINS_BIND_ADDR=0.0.0.0:8080). The binary +# binds only the address from env (src/main.rs); this is not a code default. +EXPOSE 8080 + +ENTRYPOINT ["zkcoins-api"] From c2c0ccba9da13345a4b8488dc24474250d0b00c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: TaprootFreak <142087526+TaprootFreak@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Sat, 1 Aug 2026 23:37:41 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 12/23] ci: give the API its own gate, paused like the rest of the tree MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The API was the only one of the four repositories without any workflow at all — no formatting check, no clippy, no build, no test ran on it anywhere except a developer's terminal. It now carries the same four gates the tree is verified against locally: `cargo fmt --all --check`, clippy over `--all-targets --all-features` with warnings denied, a build, and the test suite. `--all-targets` is deliberate and must stay. Without it clippy lints the library targets only, so the test and fixture code — which is most of what decides whether a green run means anything — would never be linted at all. The workflow lands in the same paused state as the other repositories: `workflow_dispatch` is live so a run can still be started by hand, and the `pull_request:` trigger sits commented out immediately below, verbatim, so switching hosted CI back on at the end of the rebuild is a deletion rather than a rewrite. Nothing else is parked: every gate above is the one that will run on the first PR after the trigger is restored. The toolchain step installs the pin from `rust-toolchain` (nightly-2026-06-18) rather than a floating channel. With `-D warnings` a moving channel turns a new lint into a red build on a tree nobody touched. There is no `notify-failure` job: this repository does not hold the Telegram secrets. The comment above the job records what to model it on once it does. --- .github/workflows/ci.yaml | 132 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 132 insertions(+) create mode 100644 .github/workflows/ci.yaml diff --git a/.github/workflows/ci.yaml b/.github/workflows/ci.yaml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2af4cd1 --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/workflows/ci.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ +name: CI + +on: + # --------------------------------------------------------------------- + # PAUSED — manual dispatch only, on purpose. + # + # The v1 rebuild is being developed and verified locally; hosted CI is + # deliberately out of the loop until the rebuild is finished, and is then + # switched back on as the last step before the branch is offered for + # review. Running it in between spends runner time on a tree that is + # known to be mid-flight, and its red/green says nothing anyone acts on. + # + # To bring it back: delete this block down to the marker below and + # restore the `pull_request:` trigger that follows it, which is left + # commented out verbatim so re-enabling is a deletion, not a rewrite. + # Nothing else in this file was changed for the pause — every job, guard + # and gate is untouched, so the first run after re-enabling exercises + # exactly what it did before. + # + # `workflow_dispatch` stays available: a run can still be started by + # hand from the Actions tab when a specific answer is wanted. + workflow_dispatch: + + # --- restore from here ------------------------------------------------ + # CI runs on every pull request regardless of target branch. This + # makes the default safe for stacked PRs (PR-A → PR-B → PR-C where + # each PR's base is the previous PR's branch) and any other workflow + # that opens a PR against a non-`develop` branch — previously such + # PRs were silently skipped because `branches: [develop]` filtered + # them out, and the only fix was to hand-edit ci.yaml on each new + # feature stack. + # + # `push: develop` is intentionally absent. Every commit reaching + # `develop` is already covered by an open PR's `synchronize` event; + # adding `on: push: branches: [develop]` would queue a second + # workflow instance on the same SHA. (Under the PR-number grouping + # in the concurrency block below the two runs would land in + # DIFFERENT groups — push keyed by `refs/heads/develop`, PR keyed + # by the PR's number — so the block would not deduplicate them.) + # + # `ready_for_review` is added so the workflow fires the moment a + # draft PR is marked ready — drafts themselves skip CI via the + # `if:` guard on the job (saves runner time while work is still in + # progress). + # pull_request: + # types: [opened, synchronize, reopened, ready_for_review] + # --- restore to here -------------------------------------------------- + +concurrency: + # Group by PR number so a new push to the same PR cancels the + # in-flight run on the outdated commit. Grouping by SHA would put + # every commit in its own group, so `cancel-in-progress: true` + # never fired and back-to-back pushes queued sequentially. + # Falls back to `github.ref` for push/dispatch events (where there + # is no `pull_request.number`), so e.g. a `workflow_dispatch` on + # the same ref serializes too. + group: ci-${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.event.pull_request.number || github.ref }} + cancel-in-progress: true + +permissions: + contents: read + +env: + CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always + +# Single job on GitHub-hosted Linux: fmt, clippy, build, test. +# No Postgres/testcontainers, no Plonky2 prover, no llvm-cov coverage +# gate, no self-hosted runner — this tree is small enough that the +# four local gates (192 tests) fit on `ubuntu-latest` in one job. +# +# No `notify-failure` job: this repository does not hold the Telegram +# bot secrets (`TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN` / `TELEGRAM_CHAT_ID`). Add one — +# modelled on the node's `notify-failure` job — once those secrets +# are provisioned here. +jobs: + lint-and-build: + name: Lint & Build + # Skip on draft PRs. Non-PR events (push, workflow_dispatch) always + # run: `github.event.pull_request` is absent there, so the + # `event_name != 'pull_request'` arm keeps them enabled. + if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' || github.event.pull_request.draft == false + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + timeout-minutes: 20 + steps: + - name: Checkout + uses: actions/checkout@v4 + + # The repo pins its toolchain in `rust-toolchain` (a dated nightly, + # with `rustfmt` and `clippy` in `components`). Installing that pin + # keeps a single compiler for format, lint, build and test — nothing + # to drift against a second, explicit channel install. Chosen over + # `dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable` because the pin file is present; + # without it this step would use the stable action instead of + # inventing a pin. + - name: Install the pinned toolchain (rust-toolchain) + run: | + # `rustup show active-toolchain` installs the pin when the + # directory has a `rust-toolchain` file and no matching + # toolchain is present yet. The `|| rustup toolchain install` + # arm covers the cold case where show exits non-zero before + # the pin is available — install is idempotent; a real failure + # in the subsequent version checks still fails the step. + rustup show active-toolchain || rustup toolchain install + cargo --version + cargo fmt --version + cargo clippy --version + + - name: Cache cargo registry and build + uses: actions/cache@v4 + with: + path: | + ~/.cargo/registry + ~/.cargo/git + target + key: ${{ runner.os }}-cargo-${{ hashFiles('**/Cargo.lock') }} + restore-keys: | + ${{ runner.os }}-cargo- + + - name: Check formatting + run: cargo fmt --all --check + + # `--all-targets` is intentional: without it clippy lints library + # targets only, so tests and fixture modules are never linted. + # `--all-features` matches the local green suite. + - name: Run clippy + run: cargo clippy --all-targets --all-features -- -D warnings + + - name: Build + run: cargo build + + - name: Test + run: cargo test --all-features From 09f04e1114a14ca66b24e03c3f8583ec33240b63 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: TaprootFreak <142087526+TaprootFreak@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Sun, 2 Aug 2026 12:46:40 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 13/23] feat: verify GrantProof properly, and stop widening the scope MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Two halves of the capability-gated pull surface were missing, and the second one mattered more than the first. `GrantProof` verification was marked not implemented, so every grant-bearing request was refused outright — the authorised mode of §5 had no path at all. It now runs the §5.2 checks in the order the specification lays down: decode the `zkgrant`, recompute `grant_message` from the fixed field concatenation and verify BIP-340 under the subject's published `op_pubkey`, bind the grantee's identity and its signature over the challenge, then expiry and revocation. Any failure refuses before the kernel is dialled, so a bad proof can never burn a nonce. The scope was the real defect. Ownership was requested with an unbounded scope regardless of what the presented capability actually covered — a release wider than the grant it came from, which is precisely what §5 forbids. The effective scope is now the intersection: `max` on `not_before`, `min` on `not_after`, an explicit foreign asset refused rather than merged, and an empty result refused instead of silently falling through. A wildcard request clamps to the narrower grant; it never widens it. The resolved scope is recorded server-side on the session, and later use reads it from there rather than from the request. `grant_message_digest` keeps its eight parameters and an explicit lint exemption: that list *is* the normative formula, and folding it into a struct would invite the field order of the struct to be mistaken for the binding one — the exact confusion §5.2 warns about. `verify_grant_proof` went the other way: `public_hosts`, `now` and the revocation set are environment rather than evidence, so they moved into a context struct. One of the existing tests promised in its comment to send a real `zkgrant` from a subject with no published op, but sent malformed bech32 — so it exercised the 400 path and never reached the check it claimed to cover. It now sends a properly signed grant, and two further negative cases (manipulated grantee signature, wrong `chan_bind`) close gaps that would have passed silently. --- src/ownership.rs | 1240 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- src/pull.rs | 172 +++++-- src/routes.rs | 263 +++++++++- src/state.rs | 6 + 4 files changed, 1561 insertions(+), 120 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/ownership.rs b/src/ownership.rs index 5dde1c4..3a6aff6 100644 --- a/src/ownership.rs +++ b/src/ownership.rs @@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ use bitcoin::secp256k1::{ }; use serde::Deserialize; use sha2::{Digest, Sha256}; +use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet}; +use std::sync::RwLock; // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- // Domain tags — taken from node `ChallengeAction::domain()` (sole definition @@ -64,9 +66,21 @@ pub const PULL_HOST_DOMAIN: &str = "zkCoins/v1/PullHost"; /// Bech32m HRP for a zkCoins address (§1.7.7). pub const ADDRESS_HRP: &str = "zk"; +/// Bech32m HRP for a serialised view grant (§5.2 / §1.7.7). +pub const GRANT_HRP: &str = "zkgrant"; + +/// §5.2 `grant_message` domain tag (Foundations `Grant` context). +pub const GRANT_MESSAGE_TAG: &str = "zkCoins/v1/Grant"; + +/// §5.2 grant version byte (currently always `0x01`). +pub const GRANT_VERSION: u8 = 0x01; + /// Unbounded `not_after` sentinel: `2⁶³−1` (§5.1). pub const SCOPE_NOT_AFTER_UNBOUNDED: u64 = 9_223_372_036_854_775_807; +// Lock the §5.1 bit-pattern: unbounded not_after is exactly i64::MAX as u64. +const _: () = assert!(SCOPE_NOT_AFTER_UNBOUNDED == i64::MAX as u64); + // Goldilocks field order — nk_commit limbs on the wire must be strictly `< p` // (same fail-loud rule as node `digest_from_bytes`). const GOLDILOCKS_ORDER: u64 = 0xffff_ffff_0000_0001; @@ -410,23 +424,41 @@ fn address_from_pk0_nk_commit(pk0: &[u8; 32], nk_commit: &[u8; 32]) -> [u8; 32] /// Verify BIP-340 Schnorr over a 32-byte message digest under an x-only key. /// /// Uses `bitcoin::secp256k1` — the same stack as zk-coins/node. +/// `fail_message` is returned on cryptographic mismatch (wrong key, bad sig, +/// wrong preimage) so callers can name OwnershipProof vs GrantProof context. pub fn verify_bip340( - pk0: &[u8; 32], + pk: &[u8; 32], signature: &[u8; 64], message_digest: &[u8; 32], ) -> Result<(), ApiError> { - let xonly = XOnlyPublicKey::from_slice(pk0).map_err(|_| { - ApiError::unauthorized("ownership_proof.public_key is not a valid x-only pubkey") - })?; - let sig = SchnorrSignature::from_slice(signature).map_err(|_| { - ApiError::unauthorized("ownership_proof.signature is not a valid BIP-340 signature") - })?; + verify_bip340_with_message( + pk, + signature, + message_digest, + "public key is not a valid x-only pubkey", + "signature is not a valid BIP-340 signature", + "BIP-340 signature invalid (key, preimage, or chan_bind/domain mismatch)", + ) +} + +/// BIP-340 verify with caller-chosen unauthorized messages (grant vs ownership). +pub fn verify_bip340_with_message( + pk: &[u8; 32], + signature: &[u8; 64], + message_digest: &[u8; 32], + bad_pk_message: &str, + bad_sig_encoding_message: &str, + verify_fail_message: &str, +) -> Result<(), ApiError> { + let xonly = XOnlyPublicKey::from_slice(pk) + .map_err(|_| ApiError::unauthorized(bad_pk_message.to_string()))?; + let sig = SchnorrSignature::from_slice(signature) + .map_err(|_| ApiError::unauthorized(bad_sig_encoding_message.to_string()))?; let msg = Message::from_digest_slice(message_digest) .map_err(|_| ApiError::internal("BIP-340 message digest must be 32 bytes"))?; let secp = Secp256k1::verification_only(); - secp.verify_schnorr(&sig, &msg, &xonly).map_err(|_| { - ApiError::unauthorized("OwnershipProof signature invalid or chan_bind/domain mismatch") - }) + secp.verify_schnorr(&sig, &msg, &xonly) + .map_err(|_| ApiError::unauthorized(verify_fail_message.to_string())) } // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -562,10 +594,6 @@ pub fn verify_ownership_proof( } /// §7.5 `GrantProofJson` on the wire (pull path only). -/// -/// Present so the pull handler can discriminate proof kinds without treating -/// an unknown shape as ownership. Full §5.1(b) verification is **not** -/// implemented here — see [`reject_grant_proof`]. #[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize)] pub struct GrantProofJson { #[serde(rename = "type")] @@ -597,6 +625,134 @@ impl SessionAuthority { } } +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Resolved scope (§5.1) — intersection of request and capability +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +/// Normalised pull/grant scope after unbounded-sentinel normalisation. +/// +/// Shape matches `ViewGrant.scope` minus grant-only `expiry`: assets × time. +#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub struct ResolvedScope { + pub all_assets: bool, + /// Empty iff `all_assets`. Strictly ascending when non-empty. + pub asset_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]>, + pub not_before: u64, + pub not_after: u64, +} + +impl ResolvedScope { + /// Unbounded sentinel pair: `asset_ids = "*"`, `not_before = 0`, + /// `not_after = 2⁶³−1` (§5.1). + pub fn unbounded() -> Self { + Self { + all_assets: true, + asset_ids: Vec::new(), + not_before: 0, + not_after: SCOPE_NOT_AFTER_UNBOUNDED, + } + } + + /// True only when every dimension uses its unbounded sentinel. + pub fn is_fully_unbounded(&self) -> bool { + self.all_assets && self.not_before == 0 && self.not_after == SCOPE_NOT_AFTER_UNBOUNDED + } +} + +/// Decoded §5.2 `ViewGrant` (payload fields; signature checked separately). +#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub struct DecodedViewGrant { + pub version: u8, + pub subject: [u8; 32], + pub grantee: [u8; 32], + pub scope: ResolvedScope, + /// Grant usability deadline (unix seconds) — not part of pull scope. + pub expiry: u64, + pub nonce: [u8; 16], + pub op_signature: [u8; 64], + /// `grant_id = H(grant_message)` (§5.2). + pub grant_id: [u8; 32], + /// Preimage of `grant_message` after the domain tag (version…nonce). + pub message_prefix: Vec, +} + +/// Outcome of a successful GrantProof verification (§5.1(b)). +#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub struct VerifiedGrant { + pub subject_bech32: String, + pub subject_raw: [u8; 32], + pub grantee_pk: [u8; 32], + pub nonce: [u8; 32], + pub challenge_expiry: u64, + pub chan_bind: [u8; 32], + /// Capability-only scope from the grant (before request intersection). + pub grant_scope: ResolvedScope, + /// `requested ∩ grant.scope` — what the pull session must record. + pub resolved_scope: ResolvedScope, + pub grant_id: [u8; 32], +} + +/// Process-local map of subject address → published `op_pubkey`. +/// +/// §5.1(b) step 1 requires the subject's **published** op. Until Nostr +/// kind-30420 profile resolution (with the §4.3 address binding) is wired, +/// this directory is the sole API-edge source. It starts **empty**: every +/// GrantProof fails closed at the op-signature step. Entries may be installed +/// only after an authenticated path has bound `op_pubkey` to the subject +/// (tests install fixtures; a future profile-resolution worker writes here). +/// +/// Not a config default and not an operator free-form setting for foreign +/// subjects — a forged entry would make grants verify under an attacker's +/// key (see the §4.3 binding threat). +#[derive(Debug, Default)] +pub struct SubjectOpDirectory { + inner: RwLock>, +} + +impl SubjectOpDirectory { + pub fn new() -> Self { + Self { + inner: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()), + } + } + + /// Install a published op for `subject`. Overwrites any prior entry. + pub fn insert(&self, subject: [u8; 32], op_pubkey: [u8; 32]) { + let mut guard = self.inner.write().expect("subject_ops lock poisoned"); + guard.insert(subject, op_pubkey); + } + + /// Look up the published op. `None` is fail-closed (never a zero key). + pub fn get(&self, subject: &[u8; 32]) -> Option<[u8; 32]> { + let guard = self.inner.read().expect("subject_ops lock poisoned"); + guard.get(subject).copied() + } +} + +/// Node-local revocation set for `grant_id` (§5.2 — forward-only). +#[derive(Debug, Default)] +pub struct RevokedGrantSet { + inner: RwLock>, +} + +impl RevokedGrantSet { + pub fn new() -> Self { + Self { + inner: RwLock::new(HashSet::new()), + } + } + + pub fn revoke(&self, grant_id: [u8; 32]) { + let mut guard = self.inner.write().expect("revoked_grants lock poisoned"); + guard.insert(grant_id); + } + + pub fn contains(&self, grant_id: &[u8; 32]) -> bool { + let guard = self.inner.read().expect("revoked_grants lock poisoned"); + guard.contains(grant_id) + } +} + /// Verify an OwnershipProof for domains **without** `request_hash` /// (Pull / Entrust / Revoke — §5.1 L1916 / §7.7). /// @@ -702,39 +858,459 @@ pub fn verify_pull_ownership_proof( ) } -/// Reject a GrantProof on the pull path (fail-closed, not half-checked). +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// View grant decode + grant_message (§5.2) +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +/// `grant_message = H("zkCoins/v1/Grant" ‖ version ‖ subject ‖ grantee +/// ‖ asset_ids ‖ not_before ‖ not_after ‖ expiry ‖ nonce)`. /// -/// §5.1(b) requires verifying the grant's `op` signature against the subject's -/// **published** `op` pubkey. A half-checked grant (structural + grantee chal -/// only) would authorise disclosure under a forged `op` signature — worse than -/// a loud reject. All grant pull attempts therefore fail with `401 unauthorized`. +/// Field order is the **formula**, not a struct layout. `asset_enc` is the +/// discriminator encoding from [`encode_grant_asset_ids`]. /// -/// # The missing prerequisite is Nostr, not a config field +/// The eight parameters mirror the normative field concatenation of +/// `grant_message` (§5.2). Bundling them into a struct would invite treating +/// that struct's field order as authoritative — the same confusion the spec +/// warns against for `invoice_message` (§4.3). The formula is normative; keep +/// the parameters flat so the call site cannot drift from the byte order. +#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)] +pub fn grant_message_digest( + version: u8, + subject: &[u8; 32], + grantee: &[u8; 32], + asset_enc: &[u8], + not_before: u64, + not_after: u64, + expiry: u64, + grant_nonce: &[u8; 16], +) -> ([u8; 32], Vec) { + let mut prefix = Vec::with_capacity(1 + 32 + 32 + asset_enc.len() + 8 + 8 + 8 + 16); + prefix.push(version); + prefix.extend_from_slice(subject); + prefix.extend_from_slice(grantee); + prefix.extend_from_slice(asset_enc); + prefix.extend_from_slice(¬_before.to_be_bytes()); + prefix.extend_from_slice(¬_after.to_be_bytes()); + prefix.extend_from_slice(&expiry.to_be_bytes()); + prefix.extend_from_slice(grant_nonce); + + let mut pre = Vec::with_capacity(GRANT_MESSAGE_TAG.len() + prefix.len()); + pre.extend_from_slice(GRANT_MESSAGE_TAG.as_bytes()); + pre.extend_from_slice(&prefix); + (sha256(&pre), prefix) +} + +/// Decode Bech32m `zkgrant` payload per §5.2. /// -/// `op` is **node-held** (§1.2 key-custody table) and is published as the author -/// of the subject's kind-0 profile (§7.3, §4.3). A node the subject does not -/// control therefore cannot be handed `op_pubkey` as an operator setting, and no -/// kernel RPC can supply it either — the kernel knows its **own** `op`, not a -/// foreign subject's. Obtaining it means resolving that profile and running the -/// §4.3 address binding on the result: `H(pk0 ‖ nk_commit) == subject`, `addr_sig` -/// under `pk0`, and the event signature under the author `op_pubkey`. Without all -/// three, an attacker who knows the subject's public `pk0` / `nk_commit` publishes -/// a profile naming their own `op_pubkey` and the grant check verifies against the -/// forger's key. +/// Rejects wrong HRP, unknown version, non-ascending asset lists, truncated +/// or trailing bytes. Does **not** verify the op signature. +pub fn decode_view_grant(bech32m: &str) -> Result { + let checked = CheckedHrpstring::new::(bech32m) + .map_err(|e| ApiError::malformed(format!("grant: invalid Bech32m zkgrant: {e}")))?; + if checked.hrp().as_str() != GRANT_HRP { + return Err(ApiError::malformed(format!( + "grant: expected HRP {GRANT_HRP:?}, got {:?}", + checked.hrp().as_str() + ))); + } + let data: Vec = checked.byte_iter().collect(); + // Minimum: version(1)+subject(32)+grantee(32)+asset disc(1)+times(24)+nonce(16)+sig(64) + // = 170 for wildcard assets. + if data.len() < 170 { + return Err(ApiError::malformed(format!( + "grant: payload too short ({} bytes)", + data.len() + ))); + } + + let mut cur = 0usize; + let version = data[cur]; + cur += 1; + if version != GRANT_VERSION { + return Err(ApiError::malformed(format!( + "grant: unknown version byte 0x{version:02x}; expected 0x{GRANT_VERSION:02x}" + ))); + } + + let mut subject = [0u8; 32]; + subject.copy_from_slice(&data[cur..cur + 32]); + cur += 32; + let mut grantee = [0u8; 32]; + grantee.copy_from_slice(&data[cur..cur + 32]); + cur += 32; + + if cur >= data.len() { + return Err(ApiError::malformed("grant: truncated at asset_ids")); + } + let asset_disc = data[cur]; + cur += 1; + let (all_assets, asset_ids) = match asset_disc { + 0x00 => (true, Vec::new()), + 0x01 => { + if cur + 4 > data.len() { + return Err(ApiError::malformed("grant: truncated asset_ids count")); + } + let mut count_buf = [0u8; 4]; + count_buf.copy_from_slice(&data[cur..cur + 4]); + cur += 4; + let count = u32::from_be_bytes(count_buf) as usize; + if count == 0 { + return Err(ApiError::malformed( + "grant: asset_ids list must be non-empty when not \"*\"", + )); + } + let need = count.checked_mul(32).ok_or_else(|| { + ApiError::malformed("grant: asset_ids count overflows size calculation") + })?; + if cur + need > data.len() { + return Err(ApiError::malformed("grant: truncated asset_ids list")); + } + let mut ids = Vec::with_capacity(count); + for _ in 0..count { + let mut id = [0u8; 32]; + id.copy_from_slice(&data[cur..cur + 32]); + cur += 32; + ids.push(id); + } + for w in ids.windows(2) { + if w[0] >= w[1] { + return Err(ApiError::malformed( + "grant: asset_ids must be strictly ascending", + )); + } + } + (false, ids) + } + other => { + return Err(ApiError::malformed(format!( + "grant: unknown asset_ids discriminator 0x{other:02x}" + ))); + } + }; + + // Fixed tail after assets: not_before + not_after + expiry + nonce + sig. + const TAIL_LEN: usize = 8 + 8 + 8 + 16 + 64; + let remaining = data.len().saturating_sub(cur); + if remaining < TAIL_LEN { + return Err(ApiError::malformed("grant: truncated time/nonce/signature")); + } + if remaining > TAIL_LEN { + return Err(ApiError::malformed("grant: trailing bytes after signature")); + } + + let mut not_before_buf = [0u8; 8]; + not_before_buf.copy_from_slice(&data[cur..cur + 8]); + cur += 8; + let not_before = u64::from_be_bytes(not_before_buf); + let mut not_after_buf = [0u8; 8]; + not_after_buf.copy_from_slice(&data[cur..cur + 8]); + cur += 8; + let not_after = u64::from_be_bytes(not_after_buf); + let mut expiry_buf = [0u8; 8]; + expiry_buf.copy_from_slice(&data[cur..cur + 8]); + cur += 8; + let expiry = u64::from_be_bytes(expiry_buf); + + let mut nonce = [0u8; 16]; + nonce.copy_from_slice(&data[cur..cur + 16]); + cur += 16; + let mut op_signature = [0u8; 64]; + op_signature.copy_from_slice(&data[cur..cur + 64]); + + let asset_enc = encode_grant_asset_ids(all_assets, &asset_ids) + .map_err(|e| ApiError::malformed(format!("grant asset_ids: {}", e.body.message)))?; + let (grant_message, message_prefix) = grant_message_digest( + version, &subject, &grantee, &asset_enc, not_before, not_after, expiry, &nonce, + ); + let grant_id = sha256(&grant_message); + + // message_prefix must be byte-identical to the version…nonce payload slice. + let expected_prefix_len = data.len() - 64; + if message_prefix.as_slice() != &data[..expected_prefix_len] { + return Err(ApiError::internal( + "grant message_prefix recompute diverged from decoded payload", + )); + } + + Ok(DecodedViewGrant { + version, + subject, + grantee, + scope: ResolvedScope { + all_assets, + asset_ids, + not_before, + not_after, + }, + expiry, + nonce, + op_signature, + grant_id, + message_prefix, + }) +} + +/// Encode a view grant as Bech32m `zkgrant` (tests / helpers). +#[cfg(test)] +pub fn encode_view_grant( + subject: &[u8; 32], + grantee: &[u8; 32], + scope: &ResolvedScope, + expiry: u64, + grant_nonce: &[u8; 16], + op_signature: &[u8; 64], +) -> Result { + let asset_enc = encode_grant_asset_ids(scope.all_assets, &scope.asset_ids)?; + let (_msg, prefix) = grant_message_digest( + GRANT_VERSION, + subject, + grantee, + &asset_enc, + scope.not_before, + scope.not_after, + expiry, + grant_nonce, + ); + let mut payload = prefix; + payload.extend_from_slice(op_signature); + let hrp = bech32::Hrp::parse(GRANT_HRP).expect("constant HRP"); + bech32::encode::(hrp, &payload) + .map_err(|e| ApiError::internal(format!("zkgrant encode failed: {e}"))) +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Scope intersection (§5.1) +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +/// Resolve `requested_scope ∩ grant.scope` per §5.1. /// -/// So the prerequisite is a **Nostr profile-resolution path** — the same one the -/// bundle delivery (§4.2) and recovery (§4.5) wait on — not a lookup that could be -/// bolted onto this process. +/// - Time windows always intersect (`max` lower / `min` upper, inclusive). +/// - `asset_ids = "*"` against a narrower grant is **clamped** (silent). +/// - An **explicit** requested `asset_id` not in the grant → `403 scope_exceeded` +/// (not silent removal of the foreign id). +/// - Empty intersection (empty assets after clamp, or `not_before > not_after`) +/// → `403 scope_exceeded`. +pub fn intersect_scopes( + requested: &ResolvedScope, + grant: &ResolvedScope, +) -> Result { + let not_before = requested.not_before.max(grant.not_before); + let not_after = requested.not_after.min(grant.not_after); + if not_before > not_after { + return Err(ApiError::scope_exceeded( + "resolved scope time window is empty (requested ∩ grant)", + )); + } + + let (all_assets, asset_ids) = match (requested.all_assets, grant.all_assets) { + (true, true) => (true, Vec::new()), + (true, false) => { + // Clamp * to the grant's explicit set. + if grant.asset_ids.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::scope_exceeded( + "resolved scope asset intersection is empty", + )); + } + (false, grant.asset_ids.clone()) + } + (false, true) => { + if requested.asset_ids.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::scope_exceeded( + "resolved scope asset intersection is empty", + )); + } + (false, requested.asset_ids.clone()) + } + (false, false) => { + // Every explicitly named requested id must be in the grant. + for id in &requested.asset_ids { + if !grant.asset_ids.iter().any(|g| g == id) { + return Err(ApiError::scope_exceeded( + "request names an asset_id outside grant.scope.asset_ids", + )); + } + } + if requested.asset_ids.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::scope_exceeded( + "resolved scope asset intersection is empty", + )); + } + (false, requested.asset_ids.clone()) + } + }; + + Ok(ResolvedScope { + all_assets, + asset_ids, + not_before, + not_after, + }) +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// GrantProof verification (§5.1(b) + §5.2) +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +/// Environment / policy inputs for GrantProof verification. /// -/// Takes the proof so the call site cannot "forget" to name the grant shape -/// (and so tests can assert the reject path against a concrete body). -pub fn reject_grant_proof(_proof: &GrantProofJson) -> ApiError { - ApiError::unauthorized( - "GrantProof is not accepted: verifying the grant's op signature needs the subject's \ - published op_pubkey, which is the author of its kind-0 Nostr profile (§7.3) and is \ - reachable only through profile resolution plus the §4.3 address binding — not built; \ - half-checked grants are forbidden (§5.1(b))", - ) +/// These are **not** part of the proof under examination: they are the node's +/// authoritative host list, wall-clock for grant expiry, and local revocation +/// set. Proof-carrying fields stay as distinct parameters on +/// [`verify_grant_proof`]. +#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)] +pub struct GrantVerificationContext<'a> { + /// Authoritative public hosts for §5.1 `chan_bind` (config only). + pub public_hosts: &'a [String], + /// Unix seconds used for grant `expiry` (inclusive upper bound). + pub now: u64, + /// Node-local revocation set (`grant_id` → refuse). + pub revoked: &'a RevokedGrantSet, +} + +/// Verify a pull-domain GrantProof **without** calling the kernel. +/// +/// Normative order (§5.1(b)): +/// 1. Decode `zkgrant`; recompute `grant_message` (fixed field concatenation); +/// verify BIP-340 under the subject's **published** `op_pubkey`. +/// 2. `grantee_pk == grant.grantee` and BIP-340 over `chal` under grantee `D`. +/// 3. Grant not expired (`now ≤ grant.expiry`) and not revoked. +/// 4. Resolve `requested ∩ grant.scope` (empty / explicit foreign asset → 403). +/// +/// Pure: a failed check never dials the kernel and cannot burn the nonce. +pub fn verify_grant_proof( + nonce_hex: &str, + expiry_decimal: &str, + proof: &GrantProofJson, + op_pubkey: &[u8; 32], + requested_scope: &ResolvedScope, + ctx: &GrantVerificationContext<'_>, +) -> Result { + if proof.proof_type != "grant" { + return Err(ApiError::unauthorized(format!( + "GrantProof type must be \"grant\", got {:?}", + proof.proof_type + ))); + } + + // ---- decode grant (structural) ---- + let grant = decode_view_grant(&proof.grant)?; + + // ---- (1) op signature over grant_message ---- + let asset_enc = encode_grant_asset_ids(grant.scope.all_assets, &grant.scope.asset_ids)?; + let (grant_message, _) = grant_message_digest( + grant.version, + &grant.subject, + &grant.grantee, + &asset_enc, + grant.scope.not_before, + grant.scope.not_after, + grant.expiry, + &grant.nonce, + ); + verify_bip340_with_message( + op_pubkey, + &grant.op_signature, + &grant_message, + "grant op_pubkey is not a valid x-only pubkey", + "grant op_signature is not a valid BIP-340 signature", + "grant op signature invalid (wrong signer, manipulated signature, or grant_message field order)", + )?; + + // ---- (2) grantee identity + chal signature ---- + let grantee_pk = parse_hex32_field(&proof.grantee_pk, "grant_proof.grantee_pk")?; + if grantee_pk != grant.grantee { + return Err(ApiError::unauthorized( + "grant_proof.grantee_pk does not equal grant.grantee", + )); + } + + let challenge_nonce = parse_hex32_field(nonce_hex, "challenge.nonce")?; + let challenge_expiry = parse_u64_decimal(expiry_decimal) + .map_err(|e| ApiError::malformed(format!("challenge.expiry: {}", e.body.message)))?; + + if ctx.public_hosts.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::internal( + "no authoritative public hosts configured for chan_bind (ZKCOINS_PUBLIC_HOST)", + )); + } + let allowed: Vec<[u8; 32]> = ctx + .public_hosts + .iter() + .map(|h| chan_bind_for_host(h)) + .collect(); + let grantee_sig = parse_hex64_field(&proof.signature, "grant_proof.signature")?; + + let domain_str = ChallengeDomain::Pull.as_str(); + let mut accepted_bind: Option<[u8; 32]> = None; + for cb in &allowed { + let chal = pull_challenge_message( + domain_str, + &challenge_nonce, + cb, + &grant.subject, + challenge_expiry, + ); + if verify_bip340_with_message( + &grantee_pk, + &grantee_sig, + &chal, + "grant_proof.grantee_pk is not a valid x-only pubkey", + "grant_proof.signature is not a valid BIP-340 signature", + "GrantProof grantee signature invalid or chan_bind/domain mismatch", + ) + .is_ok() + { + accepted_bind = Some(*cb); + break; + } + } + let chan_bind = match accepted_bind { + Some(b) => b, + None => { + return Err(ApiError::unauthorized( + "GrantProof grantee signature invalid or chan_bind/domain mismatch", + )); + } + }; + + // ---- (3) expiry + revocation ---- + // `now > expiry` is unusable. Equality at the exact second remains valid + // (inclusive upper bound on usability). + if ctx.now > grant.expiry { + return Err(ApiError::unauthorized( + "view grant has expired (scope.expiry is in the past)", + )); + } + if ctx.revoked.contains(&grant.grant_id) { + return Err(ApiError::unauthorized( + "view grant has been revoked (grant_id is in the node revocation set)", + )); + } + + // ---- (4) scope intersection ---- + let resolved_scope = intersect_scopes(requested_scope, &grant.scope)?; + + let subject_bech32 = encode_zk_address_public(&grant.subject)?; + + Ok(VerifiedGrant { + subject_bech32, + subject_raw: grant.subject, + grantee_pk, + nonce: challenge_nonce, + challenge_expiry, + chan_bind, + grant_scope: grant.scope, + resolved_scope, + grant_id: grant.grant_id, + }) +} + +/// Encode 32 raw address bytes as Bech32m `zk` (public helper for grant path). +pub fn encode_zk_address_public(raw: &[u8; 32]) -> Result { + let hrp = bech32::Hrp::parse(ADDRESS_HRP) + .map_err(|e| ApiError::internal(format!("address HRP parse: {e}")))?; + bech32::encode::(hrp, raw) + .map_err(|e| ApiError::internal(format!("address encode failed: {e}"))) } /// Hex-encode a 32-byte digest (re-export convenience for handlers). @@ -960,22 +1536,6 @@ mod tests { assert_eq!(err.body.error, "unauthorized"); } - #[test] - fn grant_proof_is_rejected_not_half_checked() { - let err = reject_grant_proof(&GrantProofJson { - proof_type: "grant".into(), - grant: "zkgrant1qq".into(), - grantee_pk: encode_hex(&[0u8; 32]), - signature: encode_hex(&[0u8; 64]), - }); - assert_eq!(err.body.error, "unauthorized"); - assert!( - err.body.message.contains("op_pubkey") || err.body.message.contains("op signature"), - "message must name the missing op check: {}", - err.body.message - ); - } - #[test] fn session_authority_wire_tokens_match_node_metadata() { // node `parse_session_authority`: "ownership" | "grant" only. @@ -1191,4 +1751,568 @@ mod tests { fn scope_not_after_unbounded_is_i64_max_bit_pattern() { assert_eq!(SCOPE_NOT_AFTER_UNBOUNDED, i64::MAX as u64); } + + // ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + // GrantProof verification (§5.1(b) / §5.2) — pure, real BIP-340 + // ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + + fn sample_op_sk_pk() -> (SecretKey, [u8; 32]) { + let secp = Secp256k1::new(); + let sk = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0x55u8; 32]).expect("op secret"); + let kp = Keypair::from_secret_key(&secp, &sk); + let (xonly, _) = kp.x_only_public_key(); + (sk, xonly.serialize()) + } + + fn sample_grantee_sk_pk() -> (SecretKey, [u8; 32]) { + let secp = Secp256k1::new(); + let sk = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0x66u8; 32]).expect("grantee secret"); + let kp = Keypair::from_secret_key(&secp, &sk); + let (xonly, _) = kp.x_only_public_key(); + (sk, xonly.serialize()) + } + + /// Build a valid signed zkgrant for tests. + fn signed_grant( + op_sk: &SecretKey, + subject: &[u8; 32], + grantee: &[u8; 32], + scope: &ResolvedScope, + expiry: u64, + grant_nonce: &[u8; 16], + ) -> (String, [u8; 32], [u8; 32]) { + let asset_enc = encode_grant_asset_ids(scope.all_assets, &scope.asset_ids).unwrap(); + let (grant_message, _prefix) = grant_message_digest( + GRANT_VERSION, + subject, + grantee, + &asset_enc, + scope.not_before, + scope.not_after, + expiry, + grant_nonce, + ); + let grant_id = sha256(&grant_message); + let op_sig = sign_chal(op_sk, &grant_message); + let bech = + encode_view_grant(subject, grantee, scope, expiry, grant_nonce, &op_sig).unwrap(); + (bech, grant_message, grant_id) + } + + fn grant_fixture() -> GrantFixture { + let (op_sk, op_pk) = sample_op_sk_pk(); + let (grantee_sk, grantee_pk) = sample_grantee_sk_pk(); + // Subject is an independent address digest (not derived from op). + let subject = [0x10u8; 32]; + let scope = ResolvedScope { + all_assets: false, + asset_ids: vec![[0x01u8; 32], [0x02u8; 32]], + not_before: 1_000, + not_after: 2_000_000_000, + }; + let grant_expiry = 1_800_000_000u64; + let grant_nonce = [0x77u8; 16]; + let (bech, grant_message, grant_id) = signed_grant( + &op_sk, + &subject, + &grantee_pk, + &scope, + grant_expiry, + &grant_nonce, + ); + GrantFixture { + op_sk, + op_pk, + grantee_sk, + grantee_pk, + subject, + scope, + grant_expiry, + grant_nonce, + bech, + grant_message, + grant_id, + } + } + + struct GrantFixture { + op_sk: SecretKey, + op_pk: [u8; 32], + grantee_sk: SecretKey, + grantee_pk: [u8; 32], + subject: [u8; 32], + scope: ResolvedScope, + grant_expiry: u64, + grant_nonce: [u8; 16], + bech: String, + grant_message: [u8; 32], + grant_id: [u8; 32], + } + + fn sign_grantee_chal( + f: &GrantFixture, + host: &str, + nonce: &[u8; 32], + chal_expiry: u64, + ) -> [u8; 64] { + let cb = chan_bind_for_host(host); + let chal = pull_challenge_message( + ChallengeDomain::Pull.as_str(), + nonce, + &cb, + &f.subject, + chal_expiry, + ); + sign_chal(&f.grantee_sk, &chal) + } + + fn grant_ctx<'a>( + hosts: &'a [String], + now: u64, + revoked: &'a RevokedGrantSet, + ) -> GrantVerificationContext<'a> { + GrantVerificationContext { + public_hosts: hosts, + now, + revoked, + } + } + + #[test] + fn grant_proof_valid_verifies_and_intersects_scope() { + let f = grant_fixture(); + let host = "node.example.com"; + let hosts = [host.to_string()]; + let nonce = [0xAAu8; 32]; + let chal_expiry = 1_700_000_060u64; + let now = 1_700_000_000u64; + let revoked = RevokedGrantSet::new(); + let grantee_sig = sign_grantee_chal(&f, host, &nonce, chal_expiry); + + // Request asks for more assets + wider time than the grant. + let requested = ResolvedScope { + all_assets: true, + asset_ids: Vec::new(), + not_before: 0, + not_after: SCOPE_NOT_AFTER_UNBOUNDED, + }; + let verified = verify_grant_proof( + &encode_hex(&nonce), + &chal_expiry.to_string(), + &GrantProofJson { + proof_type: "grant".into(), + grant: f.bech.clone(), + grantee_pk: encode_hex(&f.grantee_pk), + signature: encode_hex(&grantee_sig), + }, + &f.op_pk, + &requested, + &grant_ctx(&hosts, now, &revoked), + ) + .expect("valid grant proof"); + assert_eq!(verified.subject_raw, f.subject); + assert_eq!(verified.grant_id, f.grant_id); + assert_eq!(verified.resolved_scope, f.scope); + assert!( + !verified.resolved_scope.is_fully_unbounded(), + "grant session must not receive unbounded scope when grant is scoped" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn grant_proof_manipulated_op_signature_is_unauthorized() { + let f = grant_fixture(); + let host = "node.example.com"; + let hosts = [host.to_string()]; + let nonce = [0xBBu8; 32]; + let chal_expiry = 1_700_000_060u64; + let revoked = RevokedGrantSet::new(); + let grantee_sig = sign_grantee_chal(&f, host, &nonce, chal_expiry); + // Flip one byte of the trailing op signature inside the bech payload. + let mut bad_sig = { + let decoded = decode_view_grant(&f.bech).unwrap(); + decoded.op_signature + }; + bad_sig[0] ^= 0x01; + let bad_bech = encode_view_grant( + &f.subject, + &f.grantee_pk, + &f.scope, + f.grant_expiry, + &f.grant_nonce, + &bad_sig, + ) + .unwrap(); + let err = verify_grant_proof( + &encode_hex(&nonce), + &chal_expiry.to_string(), + &GrantProofJson { + proof_type: "grant".into(), + grant: bad_bech, + grantee_pk: encode_hex(&f.grantee_pk), + signature: encode_hex(&grantee_sig), + }, + &f.op_pk, + &ResolvedScope::unbounded(), + &grant_ctx(&hosts, 1_700_000_000, &revoked), + ) + .expect_err("manipulated op signature"); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "unauthorized"); + } + + #[test] + fn grant_proof_wrong_op_signer_is_unauthorized() { + let f = grant_fixture(); + let host = "node.example.com"; + let hosts = [host.to_string()]; + let nonce = [0xCCu8; 32]; + let chal_expiry = 1_700_000_060u64; + let revoked = RevokedGrantSet::new(); + let grantee_sig = sign_grantee_chal(&f, host, &nonce, chal_expiry); + // Present a different published op_pubkey than the one that signed. + let (_other_sk, other_op_pk) = { + let secp = Secp256k1::new(); + let sk = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0x99u8; 32]).unwrap(); + let kp = Keypair::from_secret_key(&secp, &sk); + let (xonly, _) = kp.x_only_public_key(); + (sk, xonly.serialize()) + }; + let err = verify_grant_proof( + &encode_hex(&nonce), + &chal_expiry.to_string(), + &GrantProofJson { + proof_type: "grant".into(), + grant: f.bech.clone(), + grantee_pk: encode_hex(&f.grantee_pk), + signature: encode_hex(&grantee_sig), + }, + &other_op_pk, + &ResolvedScope::unbounded(), + &grant_ctx(&hosts, 1_700_000_000, &revoked), + ) + .expect_err("wrong op signer"); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "unauthorized"); + } + + #[test] + fn grant_message_swapped_field_order_fails_op_verify() { + // Normative formula is version‖subject‖grantee‖assets‖… — not struct order. + // Sign under swapped subject/grantee in the preimage; verify with correct order. + let f = grant_fixture(); + let asset_enc = encode_grant_asset_ids(f.scope.all_assets, &f.scope.asset_ids).unwrap(); + // Swapped: grantee before subject in the tagged preimage. + let mut wrong_pre = Vec::new(); + wrong_pre.extend_from_slice(GRANT_MESSAGE_TAG.as_bytes()); + wrong_pre.push(GRANT_VERSION); + wrong_pre.extend_from_slice(&f.grantee_pk); // swapped + wrong_pre.extend_from_slice(&f.subject); // swapped + wrong_pre.extend_from_slice(&asset_enc); + wrong_pre.extend_from_slice(&f.scope.not_before.to_be_bytes()); + wrong_pre.extend_from_slice(&f.scope.not_after.to_be_bytes()); + wrong_pre.extend_from_slice(&f.grant_expiry.to_be_bytes()); + wrong_pre.extend_from_slice(&f.grant_nonce); + let wrong_msg: [u8; 32] = sha256(&wrong_pre); + let wrong_sig = sign_chal(&f.op_sk, &wrong_msg); + // Encode a payload whose prefix is the **correct** order (as a real grant + // wire would carry) but signature was over the swapped preimage. + let bad_bech = encode_view_grant( + &f.subject, + &f.grantee_pk, + &f.scope, + f.grant_expiry, + &f.grant_nonce, + &wrong_sig, + ) + .unwrap(); + let host = "node.example.com"; + let hosts = [host.to_string()]; + let nonce = [0xDDu8; 32]; + let chal_expiry = 1_700_000_060u64; + let revoked = RevokedGrantSet::new(); + let grantee_sig = sign_grantee_chal(&f, host, &nonce, chal_expiry); + let err = verify_grant_proof( + &encode_hex(&nonce), + &chal_expiry.to_string(), + &GrantProofJson { + proof_type: "grant".into(), + grant: bad_bech, + grantee_pk: encode_hex(&f.grantee_pk), + signature: encode_hex(&grantee_sig), + }, + &f.op_pk, + &ResolvedScope::unbounded(), + &grant_ctx(&hosts, 1_700_000_000, &revoked), + ) + .expect_err("swapped grant_message field order"); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "unauthorized"); + // Correct-order signature still verifies against the normative digest. + assert_ne!(wrong_msg, f.grant_message); + } + + #[test] + fn grant_proof_expired_is_unauthorized() { + let f = grant_fixture(); + let host = "node.example.com"; + let hosts = [host.to_string()]; + let nonce = [0xEEu8; 32]; + let chal_expiry = 1_700_000_060u64; + let revoked = RevokedGrantSet::new(); + let grantee_sig = sign_grantee_chal(&f, host, &nonce, chal_expiry); + // now strictly after grant.expiry + let now = f.grant_expiry + 1; + let err = verify_grant_proof( + &encode_hex(&nonce), + &chal_expiry.to_string(), + &GrantProofJson { + proof_type: "grant".into(), + grant: f.bech.clone(), + grantee_pk: encode_hex(&f.grantee_pk), + signature: encode_hex(&grantee_sig), + }, + &f.op_pk, + &ResolvedScope::unbounded(), + &grant_ctx(&hosts, now, &revoked), + ) + .expect_err("expired grant"); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "unauthorized"); + assert!( + err.body.message.contains("expired"), + "message: {}", + err.body.message + ); + } + + #[test] + fn grant_proof_explicit_asset_outside_grant_is_scope_exceeded() { + let f = grant_fixture(); + let host = "node.example.com"; + let hosts = [host.to_string()]; + let nonce = [0xF1u8; 32]; + let chal_expiry = 1_700_000_060u64; + let revoked = RevokedGrantSet::new(); + let grantee_sig = sign_grantee_chal(&f, host, &nonce, chal_expiry); + let foreign_asset = [0xFFu8; 32]; + let requested = ResolvedScope { + all_assets: false, + asset_ids: vec![foreign_asset], + not_before: 0, + not_after: SCOPE_NOT_AFTER_UNBOUNDED, + }; + let err = verify_grant_proof( + &encode_hex(&nonce), + &chal_expiry.to_string(), + &GrantProofJson { + proof_type: "grant".into(), + grant: f.bech.clone(), + grantee_pk: encode_hex(&f.grantee_pk), + signature: encode_hex(&grantee_sig), + }, + &f.op_pk, + &requested, + &grant_ctx(&hosts, 1_700_000_000, &revoked), + ) + .expect_err("asset outside grant"); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "scope_exceeded"); + assert_eq!(err.status, axum::http::StatusCode::FORBIDDEN); + } + + #[test] + fn scope_request_wider_than_grant_is_clamped_to_intersection() { + let grant = ResolvedScope { + all_assets: false, + asset_ids: vec![[0x01u8; 32]], + not_before: 100, + not_after: 200, + }; + let requested = ResolvedScope { + all_assets: true, + asset_ids: Vec::new(), + not_before: 0, + not_after: SCOPE_NOT_AFTER_UNBOUNDED, + }; + let resolved = intersect_scopes(&requested, &grant).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(resolved, grant); + assert!(!resolved.is_fully_unbounded()); + } + + #[test] + fn scope_request_narrower_than_grant_keeps_request() { + let grant = ResolvedScope { + all_assets: true, + asset_ids: Vec::new(), + not_before: 0, + not_after: SCOPE_NOT_AFTER_UNBOUNDED, + }; + let requested = ResolvedScope { + all_assets: false, + asset_ids: vec![[0xAAu8; 32]], + not_before: 50, + not_after: 60, + }; + let resolved = intersect_scopes(&requested, &grant).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(resolved, requested); + } + + #[test] + fn scope_partial_time_overlap_intersects() { + let grant = ResolvedScope { + all_assets: true, + asset_ids: Vec::new(), + not_before: 100, + not_after: 200, + }; + let requested = ResolvedScope { + all_assets: true, + asset_ids: Vec::new(), + not_before: 150, + not_after: 250, + }; + let resolved = intersect_scopes(&requested, &grant).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(resolved.not_before, 150); + assert_eq!(resolved.not_after, 200); + } + + #[test] + fn scope_disjoint_time_is_scope_exceeded() { + let grant = ResolvedScope { + all_assets: true, + asset_ids: Vec::new(), + not_before: 100, + not_after: 200, + }; + let requested = ResolvedScope { + all_assets: true, + asset_ids: Vec::new(), + not_before: 201, + not_after: 300, + }; + let err = intersect_scopes(&requested, &grant).expect_err("disjoint"); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "scope_exceeded"); + } + + #[test] + fn grant_based_resolved_scope_never_unbounded_when_grant_is_scoped() { + let grant = ResolvedScope { + all_assets: false, + asset_ids: vec![[0x01u8; 32]], + not_before: 0, + not_after: SCOPE_NOT_AFTER_UNBOUNDED, + }; + let requested = ResolvedScope::unbounded(); + let resolved = intersect_scopes(&requested, &grant).unwrap(); + assert!( + !resolved.is_fully_unbounded(), + "intersection with a scoped grant must not be fully unbounded" + ); + assert!(!resolved.all_assets); + } + + #[test] + fn grant_proof_revoked_is_unauthorized() { + let f = grant_fixture(); + let host = "node.example.com"; + let hosts = [host.to_string()]; + let nonce = [0xF2u8; 32]; + let chal_expiry = 1_700_000_060u64; + let grantee_sig = sign_grantee_chal(&f, host, &nonce, chal_expiry); + let revoked = RevokedGrantSet::new(); + revoked.revoke(f.grant_id); + let err = verify_grant_proof( + &encode_hex(&nonce), + &chal_expiry.to_string(), + &GrantProofJson { + proof_type: "grant".into(), + grant: f.bech.clone(), + grantee_pk: encode_hex(&f.grantee_pk), + signature: encode_hex(&grantee_sig), + }, + &f.op_pk, + &ResolvedScope::unbounded(), + &grant_ctx(&hosts, 1_700_000_000, &revoked), + ) + .expect_err("revoked"); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "unauthorized"); + assert!(err.body.message.contains("revoked")); + } + + #[test] + fn grant_proof_grantee_mismatch_is_unauthorized() { + let f = grant_fixture(); + let host = "node.example.com"; + let hosts = [host.to_string()]; + let nonce = [0xF3u8; 32]; + let chal_expiry = 1_700_000_060u64; + let revoked = RevokedGrantSet::new(); + let grantee_sig = sign_grantee_chal(&f, host, &nonce, chal_expiry); + let other_pk = [0x88u8; 32]; + let err = verify_grant_proof( + &encode_hex(&nonce), + &chal_expiry.to_string(), + &GrantProofJson { + proof_type: "grant".into(), + grant: f.bech.clone(), + grantee_pk: encode_hex(&other_pk), + signature: encode_hex(&grantee_sig), + }, + &f.op_pk, + &ResolvedScope::unbounded(), + &grant_ctx(&hosts, 1_700_000_000, &revoked), + ) + .expect_err("grantee mismatch"); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "unauthorized"); + } + + #[test] + fn grant_proof_manipulated_grantee_signature_is_unauthorized() { + let f = grant_fixture(); + let host = "node.example.com"; + let hosts = [host.to_string()]; + let nonce = [0xF4u8; 32]; + let chal_expiry = 1_700_000_060u64; + let revoked = RevokedGrantSet::new(); + let mut bad_sig = sign_grantee_chal(&f, host, &nonce, chal_expiry); + bad_sig[0] ^= 0x01; + let err = verify_grant_proof( + &encode_hex(&nonce), + &chal_expiry.to_string(), + &GrantProofJson { + proof_type: "grant".into(), + grant: f.bech.clone(), + grantee_pk: encode_hex(&f.grantee_pk), + signature: encode_hex(&bad_sig), + }, + &f.op_pk, + &ResolvedScope::unbounded(), + &grant_ctx(&hosts, 1_700_000_000, &revoked), + ) + .expect_err("manipulated grantee signature"); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "unauthorized"); + } + + #[test] + fn grant_proof_wrong_chan_bind_is_unauthorized() { + // Grantee signs under a different host than the authoritative set. + let f = grant_fixture(); + let signed_host = "other.example.com"; + let served_hosts = ["node.example.com".to_string()]; + let nonce = [0xF5u8; 32]; + let chal_expiry = 1_700_000_060u64; + let revoked = RevokedGrantSet::new(); + let grantee_sig = sign_grantee_chal(&f, signed_host, &nonce, chal_expiry); + let err = verify_grant_proof( + &encode_hex(&nonce), + &chal_expiry.to_string(), + &GrantProofJson { + proof_type: "grant".into(), + grant: f.bech.clone(), + grantee_pk: encode_hex(&f.grantee_pk), + signature: encode_hex(&grantee_sig), + }, + &f.op_pk, + &ResolvedScope::unbounded(), + &grant_ctx(&served_hosts, 1_700_000_000, &revoked), + ) + .expect_err("wrong chan_bind"); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "unauthorized"); + } } diff --git a/src/pull.rs b/src/pull.rs index cfda842..60e7022 100644 --- a/src/pull.rs +++ b/src/pull.rs @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ //! | Method | Path | Kernel | //! |---|---|---| //! | `POST` | `/v1/pull/challenge` | `OpenPullChallenge` action=`pull` | -//! | `POST` | `/v1/pull` | `Pull` (after OwnershipProof; GrantProof rejected) | +//! | `POST` | `/v1/pull` | `Pull` (after OwnershipProof **or** GrantProof) | //! | `GET` | `/v1/record/` | `GetRecord` | //! | `GET` | `/v1/proof/` | `GetCoinProof` | //! | `GET` | `/v1/account/state` | `GetAccountState` (ownership session only) | @@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ //! The API holds **no** session store: the bearer token is forwarded to the //! kernel. Session authority is taken solely from the verified proof kind and //! sent as interim metadata `x-zkcoins-session-authority` (never defaulted). +//! The **resolved (intersected) scope** is computed here and sent on `Pull`; +//! the kernel records it into the session and never widens it. //! //! `GET /v1/receipts/stream` admits **any** still-valid ownership **or** grant //! pull session (§7.5 L2953) — unlike `GET /v1/account/state`, which is @@ -26,9 +28,9 @@ use crate::kernel::kernel_v1::{ Scope, SubscribeReceiptsRequest, }; use crate::ownership::{ - chan_bind_for_host, decode_zk_address, parse_u64_decimal, reject_grant_proof, - verify_pull_ownership_proof, GrantProofJson, OwnershipProofJson, SessionAuthority, - PULL_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN, SCOPE_NOT_AFTER_UNBOUNDED, + chan_bind_for_host, decode_zk_address, parse_u64_decimal, verify_grant_proof, + verify_pull_ownership_proof, GrantProofJson, GrantVerificationContext, OwnershipProofJson, + ResolvedScope, SessionAuthority, PULL_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN, SCOPE_NOT_AFTER_UNBOUNDED, }; use crate::state::AppState; use axum::extract::{Path, State}; @@ -41,6 +43,7 @@ use futures_util::StreamExt; use serde::Deserialize; use serde_json::{json, Value}; use std::convert::Infallible; +use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH}; // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- // Wire types @@ -63,8 +66,12 @@ pub struct PullScopeJson { pub not_after: Option, } -/// Redeem body: top-level `{ nonce, expiry, proof }` (Redeem-body `expiry` -/// normative — not nested under `challenge`). +/// Redeem body: top-level `{ nonce, expiry, proof, scope? }`. +/// +/// Redeem-body `expiry` is normative (bound into signed `chal`). Optional +/// `scope` re-echoes the requested scope so a **stateless** API edge can +/// compute `requested ∩ capability` without a challenge store (§5.1). Omitted +/// scope normalises to the unbounded sentinel pair before intersection. #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)] pub struct PullBody { pub nonce: String, @@ -72,6 +79,9 @@ pub struct PullBody { /// trusted as a clock source — a forged value fails BIP-340). pub expiry: String, pub proof: PullProofJson, + /// Requested scope re-echo (same shape as challenge). Omitted ⇒ unbounded. + #[serde(default)] + pub scope: Option, } /// Closed proof discriminator for `POST /v1/pull`. @@ -97,26 +107,9 @@ pub enum PullProofJson { // Scope normalisation (§5.1 / §7.5) // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -struct NormalisedScope { - all_assets: bool, - asset_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]>, - not_before: u64, - not_after: u64, -} - -/// Unbounded scope: `asset_ids = "*"`, `not_before = 0`, `not_after = 2⁶³−1`. -fn unbounded_scope() -> NormalisedScope { - NormalisedScope { - all_assets: true, - asset_ids: Vec::new(), - not_before: 0, - not_after: SCOPE_NOT_AFTER_UNBOUNDED, - } -} - /// Normalise REST scope to the single unbounded-sentinel pair **before** -/// the kernel RPC (§5.1 L1918). -fn normalise_scope(scope: &PullScopeJson) -> Result { +/// the kernel RPC and any scope intersection (§5.1 L1918). +fn normalise_scope(scope: &PullScopeJson) -> Result { let (all_assets, asset_ids) = match &scope.asset_ids { Value::String(s) if s == "*" => (true, Vec::new()), Value::String(s) => { @@ -161,7 +154,7 @@ fn normalise_scope(scope: &PullScopeJson) -> Result { .map_err(|e| ApiError::malformed(format!("scope.not_after: {}", e.body.message)))?, }; - Ok(NormalisedScope { + Ok(ResolvedScope { all_assets, asset_ids, not_before, @@ -169,7 +162,7 @@ fn normalise_scope(scope: &PullScopeJson) -> Result { }) } -fn scope_to_proto(scope: &NormalisedScope) -> Scope { +fn scope_to_proto(scope: &ResolvedScope) -> Scope { Scope { asset_ids: scope.asset_ids.iter().map(|a| a.to_vec()).collect(), all_assets: scope.all_assets, @@ -178,6 +171,13 @@ fn scope_to_proto(scope: &NormalisedScope) -> Scope { } } +fn unix_now() -> Result { + SystemTime::now() + .duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH) + .map(|d| d.as_secs()) + .map_err(|_| ApiError::internal("system clock is before Unix epoch")) +} + // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- // Closed wire vocabularies (§7.5 PullResult) // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -281,9 +281,29 @@ fn bearer_token(headers: &HeaderMap) -> Result { /// Authoritative `chan_bind` for session-bound follow-ups. /// -/// Exactly one configured public host is required: with several hosts the API -/// cannot re-select the original binding without reading the request `Host` -/// (forbidden by §5.1 / §7.8). Multi-host session routing is a documented GAP. +/// # Single host (this stage) +/// +/// Exactly one configured public host is required here. Proof verification on +/// `POST /v1/pull` already accepts **any** of the configured hosts (try each +/// `chan_bind` until BIP-340 verifies — §5.1). Session follow-ups are different: +/// the session record stores **one** `chan_bind` from the accepting proof, and +/// the API must recompute that same value for the current connection so the +/// kernel can equality-check it. +/// +/// # Why multi-host is refused (not silently left open) +/// +/// Spec §5.1 forbids deriving `host` from attacker-influenceable request +/// metadata such as a forwarded `Host` header. With several authoritative +/// names the API therefore cannot know which host the client dialed on this +/// TCP/TLS connection without a **trusted** side channel (e.g. TLS SNI as +/// observed by a co-located terminator, or a single front-end name). Until +/// that path exists, multi-host session re-bind fails closed with 500 rather +/// than guessing — guessing would either reject legitimate clients or accept +/// a captured token against the wrong name. +/// +/// What would close the GAP: a trusted connection-identity input (SNI / +/// local socket metadata) that selects exactly one entry of +/// `ZKCOINS_PUBLIC_HOST` per request, still never the client `Host` header. fn session_chan_bind(public_hosts: &[String]) -> Result<[u8; 32], ApiError> { match public_hosts { [] => Err(ApiError::internal( @@ -291,9 +311,10 @@ fn session_chan_bind(public_hosts: &[String]) -> Result<[u8; 32], ApiError> { )), [only] => Ok(chan_bind_for_host(only)), _ => Err(ApiError::internal( - "session channel binding requires exactly one ZKCOINS_PUBLIC_HOST \ - in this stage (multi-host re-bind would need a trusted SNI path, \ - not the client Host header)", + "session channel binding requires exactly one ZKCOINS_PUBLIC_HOST: \ + multi-host re-bind needs a trusted SNI/connection-identity path \ + (not the client Host header; §5.1). Proof verification already \ + accepts any configured host; only follow-up session routes are restricted", )), } } @@ -349,15 +370,23 @@ pub async fn post_pull_challenge( /// `POST /v1/pull` → verify proof, then `Pull`. /// -/// OwnershipProof is verified pure (no kernel) so a bad signature cannot -/// consume the single-use nonce. GrantProof is rejected fail-closed (no -/// op_pubkey lookup — see [`reject_grant_proof`]). +/// OwnershipProof and GrantProof are verified **pure** (no kernel) so a bad +/// signature cannot consume the single-use nonce. The resolved scope passed +/// to the kernel is exactly what the capability authorises after intersection +/// with the requested scope — never widened, never defaulted to unbounded +/// under a scoped grant. pub async fn post_pull( State(state): State, Json(body): Json, ) -> Result { + // Requested scope: re-echo on redeem, or unbounded sentinels when omitted. + let requested_scope = match &body.scope { + None => ResolvedScope::unbounded(), + Some(s) => normalise_scope(s)?, + }; + // ---- pure validation + capability gate (no kernel) ---- - let (verified, authority) = match body.proof { + let (subject_bech32, nonce, chan_bind, resolved, authority) = match body.proof { PullProofJson::Ownership { subject, public_key, @@ -378,7 +407,15 @@ pub async fn post_pull( &proof, state.public_hosts.as_slice(), )?; - (v, SessionAuthority::Ownership) + // Ownership authorises the full account: resolved = requested + // (requester may narrow; omitted/`*` ⇒ whole account). §5.1(a). + ( + v.subject_bech32, + v.nonce, + v.chan_bind, + requested_scope, + SessionAuthority::Ownership, + ) } PullProofJson::Grant { grant, @@ -387,33 +424,62 @@ pub async fn post_pull( } => { let proof = GrantProofJson { proof_type: "grant".into(), - grant, + grant: grant.clone(), grantee_pk, signature, }; - // Structural fail-closed: never half-check a grant. - return Err(reject_grant_proof(&proof)); + // Decode first so we know which subject's published op to load. + let decoded = crate::ownership::decode_view_grant(&grant)?; + let op_pubkey = match state.subject_ops.get(&decoded.subject) { + Some(pk) => pk, + None => { + return Err(ApiError::unauthorized( + "GrantProof rejected: subject's published op_pubkey is not available \ + (Nostr kind-30420 profile resolution with §4.3 address binding is \ + not wired; subject_ops directory has no entry). Half-checked grants \ + are forbidden (§5.1(b) step 1)", + )); + } + }; + let now = unix_now()?; + let v = verify_grant_proof( + &body.nonce, + &body.expiry, + &proof, + &op_pubkey, + &requested_scope, + &GrantVerificationContext { + public_hosts: state.public_hosts.as_slice(), + now, + revoked: state.revoked_grants.as_ref(), + }, + )?; + // Fail-closed belt: a grant session must never carry a fully + // unbounded scope when the grant itself was scoped. + if v.resolved_scope.is_fully_unbounded() && !v.grant_scope.is_fully_unbounded() { + return Err(ApiError::internal( + "grant resolved_scope is fully unbounded while grant.scope is not — refuse", + )); + } + ( + v.subject_bech32, + v.nonce, + v.chan_bind, + v.resolved_scope, + SessionAuthority::Grant, + ) } }; - // Ownership authorises the full account; resolved scope is the unbounded - // sentinel pair. A narrower scope requested at challenge time is enforced - // by the kernel (`resolved ⊆ requested`). Clients that open a narrow - // challenge and then pull with unbounded resolved_scope get - // `scope_exceeded` from the kernel — fail-closed, not silently widened. - // GAP: a stateless API cannot recompute the exact requested scope without - // a challenge store or a client re-echo of scope on redeem. - let resolved = unbounded_scope(); - // ---- only now: kernel (nonce consumption lives here) ---- let result: ProtoPullResult = state .kernel .pull( PullRequest { - nonce: verified.nonce.to_vec(), - subject: verified.subject_bech32, + nonce: nonce.to_vec(), + subject: subject_bech32, resolved_scope: Some(scope_to_proto(&resolved)), - chan_bind: verified.chan_bind.to_vec(), + chan_bind: chan_bind.to_vec(), }, authority, ) diff --git a/src/routes.rs b/src/routes.rs index fba4bad..e7eb27f 100644 --- a/src/routes.rs +++ b/src/routes.rs @@ -405,6 +405,8 @@ pub fn build_router(config: Config, kernel: KernelHandle) -> Router { features, public_hosts: Arc::new(public_hosts), blossom: blossom_state, + subject_ops: Arc::new(crate::ownership::SubjectOpDirectory::new()), + revoked_grants: Arc::new(crate::ownership::RevokedGrantSet::new()), }; // Register every active surface as `Router`, then bind state so @@ -1211,6 +1213,8 @@ mod tests { list_inscriptions_calls: AtomicUsize, /// Last pull authority observed (for grant/ownership plumbing asserts). last_pull_authority: Mutex>, + /// Last PullRequest observed (resolved_scope / subject plumbing). + last_pull: Mutex>, /// Last OpenPullChallenge.action observed (bootstrap domain plumbing). last_open_challenge_action: Mutex>, /// Last entrust request (bundle length / subject checks — never log bundle). @@ -1361,11 +1365,12 @@ mod tests { } async fn pull( &self, - _req: PullRequest, + req: PullRequest, authority: SessionAuthority, ) -> Result { self.pull_calls.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst); *self.last_pull_authority.lock().expect("authority mutex") = Some(authority); + *self.last_pull.lock().expect("pull mutex") = Some(req); match &self.pull { Some(Ok(r)) => Ok(r.clone()), Some(Err(e)) => Err(e.clone()), @@ -3078,22 +3083,73 @@ mod tests { } #[tokio::test] - async fn pull_grant_proof_is_rejected_without_kernel_call() { - // Befund: the subject's published op_pubkey lives in its kind-0 Nostr - // profile (§7.3) and there is no profile-resolution path → GrantProof - // always 401, never half-checked. See `reject_grant_proof`. + async fn pull_grant_without_published_op_is_rejected_without_kernel_call() { + // Without a published op_pubkey for the subject (empty subject_ops / + // no Nostr profile resolution) GrantProof fails at §5.1(b) step 1 — + // never half-checked, never a kernel call. Uses a structurally valid, + // op-signed zkgrant whose subject is deliberately absent from + // subject_ops so the missing-op arm is the one that fires. + use crate::ownership::{ + encode_grant_asset_ids, encode_view_grant, grant_message_digest, ResolvedScope, + GRANT_VERSION, + }; + use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Keypair, Message, Secp256k1, SecretKey}; + + let secp = Secp256k1::new(); + let op_sk = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0x55u8; 32]).unwrap(); + let op_kp = Keypair::from_secret_key(&secp, &op_sk); + let grantee_sk = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0x66u8; 32]).unwrap(); + let grantee_kp = Keypair::from_secret_key(&secp, &grantee_sk); + let (grantee_xonly, _) = grantee_kp.x_only_public_key(); + let grantee_pk = grantee_xonly.serialize(); + let subject = [0x10u8; 32]; + let grant_scope = ResolvedScope { + all_assets: false, + asset_ids: vec![[0x01u8; 32]], + not_before: 100, + not_after: 9_000_000_000, + }; + let grant_expiry = 4_000_000_000u64; + let grant_nonce = [0x77u8; 16]; + let asset_enc = + encode_grant_asset_ids(grant_scope.all_assets, &grant_scope.asset_ids).unwrap(); + let (grant_message, _) = grant_message_digest( + GRANT_VERSION, + &subject, + &grantee_pk, + &asset_enc, + grant_scope.not_before, + grant_scope.not_after, + grant_expiry, + &grant_nonce, + ); + let msg = Message::from_digest_slice(&grant_message).unwrap(); + let op_sig = secp.sign_schnorr_no_aux_rand(&msg, &op_kp); + let mut op_sig_bytes = [0u8; 64]; + op_sig_bytes.copy_from_slice(op_sig.as_ref()); + let grant_bech = encode_view_grant( + &subject, + &grantee_pk, + &grant_scope, + grant_expiry, + &grant_nonce, + &op_sig_bytes, + ) + .unwrap(); + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { pull: Some(Ok(sample_pull_result())), ..Default::default() }); + // build_router installs an empty subject_ops — subject has no published op. let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); let body = serde_json::json!({ "nonce": encode_hex(&[0x11u8; 32]), "expiry": "1700000060", "proof": { "type": "grant", - "grant": "zkgrant1qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq", - "grantee_pk": encode_hex(&[0x33u8; 32]), + "grant": grant_bech, + "grantee_pk": encode_hex(&grantee_pk), "signature": encode_hex(&[0x44u8; 64]), } }); @@ -3113,8 +3169,8 @@ mod tests { assert_eq!(json["error"], "unauthorized"); assert!( json["message"].as_str().unwrap().contains("op_pubkey") - || json["message"].as_str().unwrap().contains("op signature"), - "message must name the missing op check: {}", + || json["message"].as_str().unwrap().contains("published"), + "message must name the missing published op check: {}", json["message"] ); assert_eq!( @@ -3124,6 +3180,195 @@ mod tests { ); } + #[tokio::test] + async fn pull_valid_grant_opens_session_with_grant_authority_and_clamped_scope() { + use crate::ownership::{ + encode_grant_asset_ids, encode_view_grant, grant_message_digest, ResolvedScope, + RevokedGrantSet, SubjectOpDirectory, GRANT_VERSION, SCOPE_NOT_AFTER_UNBOUNDED, + }; + use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Keypair, Message, Secp256k1, SecretKey}; + use sha2::{Digest, Sha256}; + + let host = "node.example.com"; + let secp = Secp256k1::new(); + let op_sk = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0x55u8; 32]).unwrap(); + let op_kp = Keypair::from_secret_key(&secp, &op_sk); + let (op_xonly, _) = op_kp.x_only_public_key(); + let op_pk = op_xonly.serialize(); + let grantee_sk = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0x66u8; 32]).unwrap(); + let grantee_kp = Keypair::from_secret_key(&secp, &grantee_sk); + let (grantee_xonly, _) = grantee_kp.x_only_public_key(); + let grantee_pk = grantee_xonly.serialize(); + let subject = [0x10u8; 32]; + let grant_scope = ResolvedScope { + all_assets: false, + asset_ids: vec![[0x01u8; 32]], + not_before: 100, + not_after: 9_000_000_000, + }; + // Expiry far in the future so wall-clock `unix_now` in the handler passes. + let grant_expiry = 4_000_000_000u64; + let grant_nonce = [0x77u8; 16]; + let asset_enc = + encode_grant_asset_ids(grant_scope.all_assets, &grant_scope.asset_ids).unwrap(); + let (grant_message, _) = grant_message_digest( + GRANT_VERSION, + &subject, + &grantee_pk, + &asset_enc, + grant_scope.not_before, + grant_scope.not_after, + grant_expiry, + &grant_nonce, + ); + let msg = Message::from_digest_slice(&grant_message).unwrap(); + let op_sig = secp.sign_schnorr_no_aux_rand(&msg, &op_kp); + let mut op_sig_bytes = [0u8; 64]; + op_sig_bytes.copy_from_slice(op_sig.as_ref()); + let grant_bech = encode_view_grant( + &subject, + &grantee_pk, + &grant_scope, + grant_expiry, + &grant_nonce, + &op_sig_bytes, + ) + .unwrap(); + + let challenge_nonce = [0x11u8; 32]; + let chal_expiry = 1_700_000_060u64; + let cb = chan_bind_for_host(host); + let mut chal_pre = Vec::new(); + chal_pre.extend_from_slice(PULL_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN.as_bytes()); + chal_pre.extend_from_slice(&challenge_nonce); + chal_pre.extend_from_slice(&cb); + chal_pre.extend_from_slice(&subject); + chal_pre.extend_from_slice(&chal_expiry.to_be_bytes()); + let chal: [u8; 32] = Sha256::digest(&chal_pre).into(); + let chal_msg = Message::from_digest_slice(&chal).unwrap(); + let grantee_sig = secp.sign_schnorr_no_aux_rand(&chal_msg, &grantee_kp); + let mut grantee_sig_bytes = [0u8; 64]; + grantee_sig_bytes.copy_from_slice(grantee_sig.as_ref()); + + let subject_ops = Arc::new(SubjectOpDirectory::new()); + subject_ops.insert(subject, op_pk); + + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + pull: Some(Ok(sample_pull_result())), + ..Default::default() + }); + let config = test_config(); + let state = AppState { + kernel: kernel.clone(), + features: BTreeSet::new(), + public_hosts: Arc::new(config.public_hosts.clone()), + blossom: None, + subject_ops, + revoked_grants: Arc::new(RevokedGrantSet::new()), + }; + let app = { + let mut router = Router::new().route("/", get(root)); + for surface in ServedSurface::active(false) { + router = surface.register(router, None); + } + router.with_state(state) + }; + + let body = serde_json::json!({ + "nonce": encode_hex(&challenge_nonce), + "expiry": chal_expiry.to_string(), + // Request wider than the grant → must clamp to grant scope. + "scope": { + "asset_ids": "*", + }, + "proof": { + "type": "grant", + "grant": grant_bech, + "grantee_pk": encode_hex(&grantee_pk), + "signature": encode_hex(&grantee_sig_bytes), + } + }); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/pull") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from(body.to_string())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + let status = res.status(); + let resp_body = body_bytes(res).await; + assert_eq!( + status, + StatusCode::OK, + "body={}", + String::from_utf8_lossy(&resp_body) + ); + assert_eq!(kernel.pull_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 1); + assert_eq!( + *kernel.last_pull_authority.lock().unwrap(), + Some(SessionAuthority::Grant) + ); + let last = kernel.last_pull.lock().unwrap().clone().expect("pull req"); + let scope = last.resolved_scope.expect("resolved_scope"); + assert!(!scope.all_assets, "grant session must not be all_assets=*"); + assert_eq!(scope.asset_ids, vec![vec![0x01u8; 32]]); + assert_eq!(scope.not_before, 100); + assert_eq!(scope.not_after, 9_000_000_000); + // Must not be the unbounded sentinel pair. + assert_ne!(scope.not_after, SCOPE_NOT_AFTER_UNBOUNDED); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn pull_ownership_passes_requested_scope_not_forced_unbounded() { + let host = "node.example.com"; + let (sk, pk0, nkc, subject_raw, subject_bech) = ownership_fixtures::identity(); + let nonce = [0x19u8; 32]; + let expiry = 1_700_000_060u64; + let cb = chan_bind_for_host(host); + let chal = pull_challenge_message( + ChallengeDomain::Pull.as_str(), + &nonce, + &cb, + &subject_raw, + expiry, + ); + let sig = ownership_fixtures::sign_chal(&sk, &chal); + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + pull: Some(Ok(sample_pull_result())), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let asset = [0xABu8; 32]; + let mut body = pull_body_ownership(&subject_bech, &pk0, &nkc, &nonce, expiry, &sig); + body["scope"] = serde_json::json!({ + "asset_ids": [encode_hex(&asset)], + "not_before": "10", + "not_after": "20", + }); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/pull") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from(body.to_string())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + let last = kernel.last_pull.lock().unwrap().clone().expect("pull req"); + let scope = last.resolved_scope.expect("resolved_scope"); + assert!(!scope.all_assets); + assert_eq!(scope.asset_ids, vec![asset.to_vec()]); + assert_eq!(scope.not_before, 10); + assert_eq!(scope.not_after, 20); + } + #[tokio::test] async fn pull_bad_signature_does_not_call_kernel() { let (_sk, pk0, nkc, _subject_raw, subject_bech) = ownership_fixtures::identity(); diff --git a/src/state.rs b/src/state.rs index 294940a..abeec7f 100644 --- a/src/state.rs +++ b/src/state.rs @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ use crate::blossom::BlossomState; use crate::config::Feature; use crate::kernel::KernelHandle; +use crate::ownership::{RevokedGrantSet, SubjectOpDirectory}; use axum::extract::FromRef; use std::collections::BTreeSet; use std::sync::Arc; @@ -25,6 +26,11 @@ pub struct AppState { /// §7.4 Blossom surface. `None` when `ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_STORE` is unset — /// routes are not mounted and discovery keys are not advertised. pub blossom: Option, + /// Published `op_pubkey` by subject for GrantProof step 1 (§5.1(b)). + /// Starts empty — see [`SubjectOpDirectory`]. + pub subject_ops: Arc, + /// Forward-only grant revocation set (§5.2). + pub revoked_grants: Arc, } impl FromRef for KernelHandle { From 8e51c945e4ef11219711317782de22b48ee7472f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: TaprootFreak <142087526+TaprootFreak@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Sun, 2 Aug 2026 13:19:33 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 14/23] feat: gate the surface by role, and stop turning gaps into successes MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Three fail-closed defects on the public REST surface, all of the same family: something absent was quietly treated as something valid. **Role and feature gating.** All twenty-five core surfaces were registered unconditionally; only the four Blossom routes consulted configuration. §7.5 requires a disabled function not to be served, and §6.1 gives roles whose functions are off by default. The active set now follows configuration, a disabled surface answers `404`, and `GET /` advertises exactly what is served — the discovery document is derived from the same source as registration, so the two cannot drift. **Idempotency.** A missing `Idempotency-Key` header became `None` and was then handed to the kernel as an empty string, which the kernel rejects — so absent and empty collapsed into one failure. They are now distinct: absent stays absent, and a header that is present but empty is `400 malformed_request` at the edge. The request DTOs additionally refuse unknown fields, nested objects included: §7.5 says the body is exactly this object, and a field nobody reads is not a detail the server gets to ignore. **Closed error set.** The `ErrorInfo` consumer accepted any non-empty `reason`, while §7.8 defines a closed set. An unrecognised reason is a protocol violation by the kernel, not a client mistake, so it fails loudly as `500 internal_error` rather than travelling onto the public wire under a code no client can interpret. **Terminal states.** `POST /v1/tx` answered `202 accepted` without checking that the kernel returned a usable `job_id` and a valid status — an empty id arrived at the client as success. It now refuses, matching what the attestation path already did. --- docs/rest-surface.md | 12 +- src/jobs.rs | 167 +++++++++++- src/kernel/error_info.rs | 105 ++++++++ src/routes.rs | 547 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 4 files changed, 761 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/rest-surface.md b/docs/rest-surface.md index db604d6..5806494 100644 --- a/docs/rest-surface.md +++ b/docs/rest-surface.md @@ -182,10 +182,12 @@ Deployments mit Wallet- und/oder Explorer-Rolle benötigt (Replica-/Blob-Pfad). |---|---| | `blossom_*` (ohne `ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_STORE`) | §7.4; die vier Schlüssel werden **nur** advertised, wenn der inhaltsadressierte Store konfiguriert ist. | -Router und Discovery teilen eine Quelle (`ServedSurface` in `src/routes.rs`): eine neue -registrierte Fläche erscheint automatisch in `GET /`; ein Inventur-Key ohne Route -wird nicht beworben. Path-Parameter in Discovery/`CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS` nutzen die -Spec-Schreibweise `` (Axum-Matcher: `:name`). +Router und Discovery teilen eine Quelle (`ServedSurface` in `src/routes.rs`): die +aktive Mengen folgt `Config::features` und dem Blossom-Store; eine neue +registrierte Fläche erscheint automatisch in `GET /`; deaktivierte Features +sind unregistriert und unbeworben (fail-closed, §7.5). Path-Parameter in +Discovery/`CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS` nutzen die Spec-Schreibweise `` +(Axum-Matcher: `:name`). gRPC: getragenes `proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto` (Identität per SHA-256-Pin + Sibling-Vergleich mit `zk-coins/node`), Client `tonic 0.13.1`, Fehlerübersetzung @@ -197,7 +199,7 @@ ausschließlich über `google.rpc.ErrorInfo` (`domain`, `reason`, | Lücke | Warum | |---|---| | Blossom `ReplicaReceiptV1` | §4.6 Dual-Commit (Blob + Delivery-Event) fehlt; Upload antwortet ehrlich nur mit `{ blob_id }` — kein `receipt`. | -| Feature-Gate `404 feature_disabled` | Bootstrap/Publish/Job/Attest-Fläche ist in dieser Stufe always-on; Gate folgt mit den optionalen Rollen. | +| — | Feature-Gating (§6.1 / §7.5) ist aktiv: `ServedSurface::active` filtert nach `ZKCOINS_FEATURES` + Blossom-Store; deaktivierte Flächen sind unregistriert (HTTP 404) und fehlen in `GET /`. | --- diff --git a/src/jobs.rs b/src/jobs.rs index 6fda284..069c0a8 100644 --- a/src/jobs.rs +++ b/src/jobs.rs @@ -27,7 +27,13 @@ use std::convert::Infallible; // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- /// §7.5 `TransitionRequest` JSON body for `POST /v1/tx` (L2898–L2930). +/// +/// §7.5: "the body is exactly this JSON object" — unknown fields are +/// `400 malformed_request`. `deny_unknown_fields` is set on **every** nested +/// object type below so a foreign key inside `output_templates[]` or +/// `issuance` is rejected the same way as one at the top level. #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)] +#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)] pub struct TransitionRequestJson { pub kind: String, pub subject: String, @@ -48,6 +54,7 @@ pub struct TransitionRequestJson { } #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)] +#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)] pub struct OutputTemplateJson { pub recipient: String, pub asset_id: String, @@ -55,6 +62,7 @@ pub struct OutputTemplateJson { } #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)] +#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)] pub struct IssuanceJson { pub name: String, pub decimals: u32, @@ -68,6 +76,7 @@ pub struct IssuanceJson { /// §7.5 sign body (L2891): `{ signature: , s2c_nonce: }`. #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)] +#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)] pub struct SignBodyJson { pub signature: String, pub s2c_nonce: String, @@ -78,28 +87,42 @@ pub struct SignBodyJson { // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- /// `POST /v1/tx` → `SubmitTransition` → `202 { job_id, status: "accepted" }`. +/// +/// Body is deserialized via a §7.5-shaped extractor so unknown fields and +/// other serde failures become `400 malformed_request` (not axum's default +/// 422 with a non-§7.5 body). pub async fn post_tx( State(kernel): State, headers: HeaderMap, - Json(body): Json, + body: Result, axum::extract::rejection::JsonRejection>, ) -> Result { + let Json(body) = body.map_err(|rej| ApiError::malformed(format!("request body: {rej}")))?; let mut req = json_to_transition(body)?; + // Missing header ⇒ leave proto field empty (kernel treats empty as absent). + // Present-but-empty is a client error, not silently rewritten to absent. if let Some(key) = idempotency_key_from_headers(&headers)? { req.idempotency_key = key; } let handle: JobHandle = kernel.submit_transition(req).await?; - let body = json!({ - "job_id": handle.job_id, - "status": "accepted", - }); - // Spec: 202 is the only success status for POST /v1/tx (L3031). - // Echo kernel status only when it is the closed success literal. - if !handle.status.is_empty() && handle.status != "accepted" { + // Spec §7.5: 202 is the only success for POST /v1/tx, and the body is + // `{ job_id, status: "accepted" }`. An empty job_id or non-accepted + // status is a kernel contract violation — never admit as success + // (same discipline as AttestBalance in `attest.rs`). + if handle.job_id.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::internal( + "kernel JobHandle.job_id is empty on SubmitTransition success", + )); + } + if handle.status != "accepted" { return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( "kernel JobHandle.status must be \"accepted\" on submit success, got {:?}", handle.status ))); } + let body = json!({ + "job_id": handle.job_id, + "status": "accepted", + }); Ok((StatusCode::ACCEPTED, Json(body)).into_response()) } @@ -494,18 +517,37 @@ fn decode_hex_field(hex: &str, byte_len: usize, field: &str) -> Result, .map_err(|e: HexError| ApiError::malformed(format!("{field}: {e}"))) } -fn idempotency_key_from_headers(headers: &HeaderMap) -> Result, ApiError> { +/// Parse the §7.5 `Idempotency-Key` request header. +/// +/// - **Absent** → `Ok(None)` — caller leaves the proto field empty (missing). +/// - **Present but empty** → `400 malformed_request` (empty ≠ missing). +/// - **Present, non-empty, ≤ 64 bytes, ASCII** → `Ok(Some(key))`. +pub(crate) fn idempotency_key_from_headers( + headers: &HeaderMap, +) -> Result, ApiError> { let Some(raw) = headers.get("idempotency-key") else { return Ok(None); }; let s = raw .to_str() - .map_err(|_| ApiError::malformed("Idempotency-Key must be ASCII"))? - .to_string(); + .map_err(|_| ApiError::malformed("Idempotency-Key must be ASCII"))?; + parse_idempotency_key_value(s) +} + +/// Validate a present `Idempotency-Key` value (header already observed). +/// +/// Separated from header extraction so empty-vs-missing can be unit-tested +/// without depending on `http::HeaderValue` (which rejects empty bytes). +pub(crate) fn parse_idempotency_key_value(s: &str) -> Result, ApiError> { + if s.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::malformed( + "Idempotency-Key header is present but empty", + )); + } if s.len() > 64 { return Err(ApiError::malformed("Idempotency-Key exceeds 64 bytes")); } - Ok(Some(s)) + Ok(Some(s.to_string())) } /// §7.5 job poll object (L2889, L2959–L2991). @@ -661,3 +703,104 @@ fn job_poll_headers(job: &Job) -> (StatusCode, Option) { }; (StatusCode::OK, Some(secs)) } + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + use axum::http::HeaderMap; + + fn hex32(byte: u8) -> String { + crate::hexutil::encode_hex(&[byte; 32]) + } + + fn mint_json() -> serde_json::Value { + serde_json::json!({ + "kind": "mint", + "subject": "zk1qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq", + "next_pubkey": hex32(0x11), + "npk_rand": hex32(0x22), + "output_templates": [{ + "recipient": "zk1qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq", + "asset_id": hex32(0x33), + "amount": "100" + }], + "issuance": { + "name": "TestCoin", + "decimals": 8, + "issuance_version": 1, + "amount": "1000" + } + }) + } + + #[test] + fn idempotency_missing_header_is_none() { + let headers = HeaderMap::new(); + let got = idempotency_key_from_headers(&headers).expect("ok"); + assert_eq!(got, None, "absent header must stay None, not empty string"); + } + + /// Present-but-empty is a client error. Distinct from missing (`None`). + /// + /// Tested at the value layer: `http::HeaderValue` rejects empty bytes, so + /// an HTTP request builder cannot construct this case — the wire still + /// requires the same rule when a stack delivers an empty value. + #[test] + fn idempotency_empty_value_is_malformed_not_none() { + let err = parse_idempotency_key_value("").expect_err("empty"); + assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "malformed_request"); + // Contrast: missing header is Ok(None), not an error. + let headers = HeaderMap::new(); + assert!(idempotency_key_from_headers(&headers).unwrap().is_none()); + } + + #[test] + fn idempotency_nonempty_header_is_some() { + let mut headers = HeaderMap::new(); + headers.insert("idempotency-key", "abc".parse().unwrap()); + let got = idempotency_key_from_headers(&headers).expect("ok"); + assert_eq!(got.as_deref(), Some("abc")); + } + + #[test] + fn transition_request_rejects_unknown_top_level_field() { + let mut v = mint_json(); + v["not_in_spec"] = serde_json::json!(true); + let err = serde_json::from_value::(v).expect_err("deny"); + assert!( + err.to_string().contains("not_in_spec") || err.to_string().contains("unknown field"), + "serde must reject unknown field, got {err}" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn transition_request_rejects_unknown_nested_issuance_field() { + let mut v = mint_json(); + v["issuance"]["ghost"] = serde_json::json!("x"); + let err = serde_json::from_value::(v).expect_err("deny nested"); + assert!( + err.to_string().contains("ghost") || err.to_string().contains("unknown field"), + "nested deny_unknown_fields must fire, got {err}" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn transition_request_rejects_unknown_nested_output_template_field() { + let mut v = mint_json(); + v["output_templates"][0]["extra"] = serde_json::json!(1); + let err = serde_json::from_value::(v).expect_err("deny nested ot"); + assert!( + err.to_string().contains("extra") || err.to_string().contains("unknown field"), + "output_templates deny_unknown_fields must fire, got {err}" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn transition_request_accepts_exact_mint_shape() { + let v = mint_json(); + let parsed: TransitionRequestJson = + serde_json::from_value(v).expect("exact shape must parse"); + assert_eq!(parsed.kind, "mint"); + } +} diff --git a/src/kernel/error_info.rs b/src/kernel/error_info.rs index 7322ccd..2aaf81a 100644 --- a/src/kernel/error_info.rs +++ b/src/kernel/error_info.rs @@ -16,10 +16,52 @@ use tonic::Status; /// Normative `ErrorInfo.domain` (§7.8). pub const ERROR_INFO_DOMAIN: &str = "kernel.v1"; +/// Closed §7.5 `machine_code` set that a kernel `ErrorInfo.reason` **MAY** +/// carry (§7.5 jobs-family table + the additional codes closing the +/// enumeration across §7.4–§7.7, plus `feature_disabled` from the §7.5 intro). +/// +/// An unknown reason is a **protocol violation by the kernel**, not a client +/// error: the API fails closed with `500 internal_error` and **never** +/// forwards a foreign code onto the public wire (same discipline as a missing +/// or non-canonical `http_status`). +const CLOSED_ERROR_REASONS: &[&str] = &[ + // Jobs family (§7.5 machine_code table) + "invalid_input_coin", + "insufficient_balance", + "bounds_exceeded", + "unknown_publisher", + "stale_message", + "invalid_signature", + "job_not_found", + "wrong_phase", + "proving_failed", + "publish_rejected", + "circuit_digest_mismatch", + // Additional codes closing the enumeration (§7.5 additional table) + "malformed_request", + "idempotency_conflict", + "unauthorized", + "scope_exceeded", + "challenge_expired", + "session_expired", + "not_found", + "payload_too_large", + "retention_hold", + "rate_limited", + "dependency_not_final", + "internal_error", + // §7.5 intro: disabled feature answers `404 feature_disabled` + "feature_disabled", +]; + /// Wire type URL for `google.rpc.ErrorInfo` (with and without the type.googleapis.com prefix). const ERROR_INFO_TYPE_URL: &str = "type.googleapis.com/google.rpc.ErrorInfo"; const ERROR_INFO_TYPE_SUFFIX: &str = "google.rpc.ErrorInfo"; +fn is_closed_error_reason(reason: &str) -> bool { + CLOSED_ERROR_REASONS.contains(&reason) +} + /// Minimal `google.rpc.ErrorInfo` (field numbers match googleapis). #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Message)] pub struct ErrorInfo { @@ -68,6 +110,14 @@ fn validate_and_build(info: ErrorInfo, status_message: &str) -> Result v.as_str(), None => return Err("metadata[\"http_status\"] is absent".to_string()), @@ -315,4 +365,59 @@ mod tests { err.body.message ); } + + /// Without the closed-set check, a non-empty foreign reason is forwarded + /// as the public machine code. That must fail loud instead. + #[test] + fn unknown_error_info_reason_is_fail_closed_500_not_forwarded() { + let st = encode_kernel_error_status( + Code::Internal, + "kernel invented a code", + "totally_made_up_reason", + 500, + ); + let err = kernel_status_to_api_error(&st); + assert_eq!( + err.status, + StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, + "unknown kernel reason is a server-side protocol fault, not a client 4xx" + ); + assert_eq!( + err.body.error, "internal_error", + "foreign reason must not become the public error code" + ); + assert!( + err.body.message.contains("totally_made_up_reason") + || err.body.message.contains("machine_code") + || err.body.message.contains("closed"), + "message must name the foreign reason or the closed-set rule, got {}", + err.body.message + ); + assert_ne!( + err.body.error, "totally_made_up_reason", + "foreign reason must never be echoed as the wire machine code" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn closed_reason_set_accepts_known_machine_codes() { + // Spot-check a few codes from each §7.5 table so the constant is not + // accidentally empty / truncated. + for reason in [ + "job_not_found", + "bounds_exceeded", + "malformed_request", + "session_expired", + "dependency_not_final", + "feature_disabled", + "internal_error", + ] { + assert!( + is_closed_error_reason(reason), + "closed set must include {reason:?}" + ); + } + assert!(!is_closed_error_reason("")); + assert!(!is_closed_error_reason("not_a_real_code")); + } } diff --git a/src/routes.rs b/src/routes.rs index e7eb27f..7107138 100644 --- a/src/routes.rs +++ b/src/routes.rs @@ -2,9 +2,10 @@ //! //! Route registration and the `GET /` discovery document share one source: //! [`ServedSurface`]. The closed §7.5 inventory ([`CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS`]) is -//! the full key catalogue for surfaces not yet built; only keys in the active -//! surface set (always-on plus Blossom when configured) are registered and -//! advertised. +//! the full key catalogue; only keys in the **active** surface set — derived +//! from `Config::features` and Blossom store configuration — are registered +//! and advertised. A disabled feature is not served (`404`) and is omitted +//! from `GET /` (§7.5 / §6.1 fail-closed gating). //! //! Inventory paths are the **advertised** §7.5 form (`` placeholders). //! Axum registration uses a derived **matcher** form (`:name`); see @@ -14,7 +15,7 @@ use crate::attest; use crate::blossom; use crate::bootstrap; use crate::chain; -use crate::config::Config; +use crate::config::{Config, Feature}; use crate::grants; use crate::info; use crate::jobs; @@ -28,7 +29,7 @@ use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response}; use axum::routing::{delete, get, head, post, put}; use axum::{Json, Router}; use serde::Serialize; -use std::collections::BTreeMap; +use std::collections::{BTreeMap, BTreeSet}; use std::sync::Arc; /// Closed `endpoints` key set from specification §7.5 (`GET /` row). @@ -91,24 +92,27 @@ pub const CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS: &[(&str, &str)] = &[ /// `GET /` itself is the discovery document and has **no** closed key in /// §7.5; it is registered beside this set, never as a member of it. /// -/// Feature gating (§6.1): further inventory keys belong to `wallet` / -/// `explorer` / `publisher`. This stage's job surface and the info/chain -/// read surface are always-on once the handlers exist — the operator still -/// must set `ZKCOINS_KERNEL_ADDR`. When capability-gated or role-optional -/// handlers land, registration will filter `ServedSurface` by -/// `Config::features`. +/// ## Feature gating (§6.1 / §7.5) /// -/// Surfaces intentionally **not** always registered (and therefore omitted from -/// `GET /` when inactive), with the reason each stays off the map: +/// Which surfaces are active follows `Config::features` and Blossom store +/// configuration — never a hard-coded always-on set of role-bound routes. +/// A request against a disabled feature is **not** served (`404`); `GET /` +/// omits the corresponding keys. Mapping (from §6.1 feature table + the +/// §7.5 inventory, mirrored in `docs/rest-surface.md`): /// -/// - `blossom_get` / `blossom_head` / `blossom_upload` / `blossom_delete` — -/// §7.4 Blossom surface. Mounted **only** when `ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_STORE` is -/// configured (content-addressed filesystem store). No default path; absent -/// store ⇒ keys unadvertised and routes unmounted. +/// | Surfaces | Gate | +/// |---|---| +/// | `health`, `health_ready`, `info` | always (API process) | +/// | `chain_*` | `explorer` | +/// | `tx`, `jobs*`, `attest_*`, `grants_*`, `pull*`, `record`, `proof`, `account_state`, `receipts_stream`, `bootstrap_*` | `wallet` | +/// | `publish_spendrecord` | `publisher` | +/// | `blossom_*` | `ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_STORE` **and** (`wallet` **or** `explorer`) | /// -/// Inventory keys remain in [`CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS`]; advertisement tracks -/// the always-on set (25 keys, including `receipts_stream`) plus optional -/// Blossom (4 keys) when configured — all 29 when the store is set. +/// `lightning_bridge` / `mail_bridge` open no §7.5 inventory paths (extension +/// docs only) and therefore add no variants here. +/// +/// Inventory keys remain in [`CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS`]; advertisement is exactly +/// the active set derived by [`ServedSurface::active`]. #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)] enum ServedSurface { Health, @@ -143,8 +147,11 @@ enum ServedSurface { } impl ServedSurface { - /// Always-on surfaces (independent of Blossom store configuration). - const ALWAYS_ON: &[ServedSurface] = &[ + /// Full inventory of surfaces this binary knows how to register. + /// + /// Activation is decided per entry by [`ServedSurface::is_active`]; this + /// list is **not** what `GET /` returns. + const ALL: &[ServedSurface] = &[ ServedSurface::Health, ServedSurface::HealthReady, ServedSurface::Info, @@ -170,23 +177,69 @@ impl ServedSurface { ServedSurface::BootstrapChallenge, ServedSurface::BootstrapEntrust, ServedSurface::BootstrapRevoke, - ]; - - /// Blossom surfaces — registered only when the store is configured. - const BLOSSOM: &[ServedSurface] = &[ ServedSurface::BlossomGet, ServedSurface::BlossomHead, ServedSurface::BlossomUpload, ServedSurface::BlossomDelete, ]; - /// Surfaces active for this process given whether Blossom is configured. - fn active(blossom_configured: bool) -> Vec { - let mut out = Self::ALWAYS_ON.to_vec(); - if blossom_configured { - out.extend_from_slice(Self::BLOSSOM); + /// Whether this surface is registered (and advertised) for the given + /// feature set and Blossom store configuration. + fn is_active(self, features: &BTreeSet, blossom_configured: bool) -> bool { + match self { + // Always-on API process surface (§7.5 L2874–L2877; rest-surface #1–#4). + ServedSurface::Health | ServedSurface::HealthReady | ServedSurface::Info => true, + + // `explorer` — public chain projection (§6.1 L2338; rest-surface #5–#7). + ServedSurface::ChainAccumulator + | ServedSurface::ChainInscriptions + | ServedSurface::ChainNullifier => features.contains(&Feature::Explorer), + + // `wallet` — proving, submission, pull, attest, grants, bootstrap + // (§6.1 L2337; rest-surface #8–#22, #24–#26). + ServedSurface::Tx + | ServedSurface::Jobs + | ServedSurface::JobsStream + | ServedSurface::JobsSign + | ServedSurface::JobsCancel + | ServedSurface::AttestBalanceChallenge + | ServedSurface::AttestBalance + | ServedSurface::GrantsChallenge + | ServedSurface::Grants + | ServedSurface::PullChallenge + | ServedSurface::Pull + | ServedSurface::Record + | ServedSurface::Proof + | ServedSurface::AccountState + | ServedSurface::ReceiptsStream + | ServedSurface::BootstrapChallenge + | ServedSurface::BootstrapEntrust + | ServedSurface::BootstrapRevoke => features.contains(&Feature::Wallet), + + // `publisher` — hand-off endpoint (§6.1 L2339; rest-surface #23). + ServedSurface::PublishSpendrecord => features.contains(&Feature::Publisher), + + // §7.4 Blossom: store must be configured, and at least one of + // `wallet` / `explorer` must be on (rest-surface #27–#31; blob fetch + // is listed under explorer, upload/delete under both). + ServedSurface::BlossomGet + | ServedSurface::BlossomHead + | ServedSurface::BlossomUpload + | ServedSurface::BlossomDelete => { + blossom_configured + && (features.contains(&Feature::Wallet) + || features.contains(&Feature::Explorer)) + } } - out + } + + /// Surfaces active for this process given enabled features and Blossom. + fn active(features: &BTreeSet, blossom_configured: bool) -> Vec { + Self::ALL + .iter() + .copied() + .filter(|s| s.is_active(features, blossom_configured)) + .collect() } /// Closed §7.5 discovery key for this surface. @@ -346,9 +399,12 @@ fn advertised_path_to_axum_matcher(advertised: &str) -> String { } /// Build the `endpoints` map for `GET /` from the active surface set. -fn discovery_endpoints(blossom_configured: bool) -> BTreeMap<&'static str, &'static str> { +fn discovery_endpoints( + features: &BTreeSet, + blossom_configured: bool, +) -> BTreeMap<&'static str, &'static str> { let mut endpoints = BTreeMap::new(); - for surface in ServedSurface::active(blossom_configured) { + for surface in ServedSurface::active(features, blossom_configured) { let key = surface.discovery_key(); let path = closed_path(key); endpoints.insert(key, path); @@ -365,10 +421,10 @@ struct RootResponse { /// Build the axum router for the given configuration and kernel handle. /// -/// `config.features` is stored in [`AppState`] for `GET /v1/info` (API-owned -/// advertisement). Route registration is the always-on set plus the Blossom -/// surface when `config.blossom` is `Some`. §6.1 feature gating of optional -/// roles lands with those handlers. +/// Route registration and `GET /` discovery both follow +/// [`ServedSurface::active`] applied to `config.features` and whether the +/// Blossom store is configured. `config.features` is also stored in +/// [`AppState`] for the API-owned `features` array on `GET /v1/info`. /// /// Returns a fully state-bound router (`Router` / `Router<()>`). Only that /// form implements `tower::Service` and is ready for `axum::serve` and test @@ -402,7 +458,7 @@ pub fn build_router(config: Config, kernel: KernelHandle) -> Router { let state = AppState { kernel, - features, + features: features.clone(), public_hosts: Arc::new(public_hosts), blossom: blossom_state, subject_ops: Arc::new(crate::ownership::SubjectOpDirectory::new()), @@ -414,7 +470,7 @@ pub fn build_router(config: Config, kernel: KernelHandle) -> Router { // earlier while still returning `Router` leaves the tree // "missing" state and breaks both `axum::serve` and `oneshot`. let mut router = Router::new().route("/", get(root)); - for surface in ServedSurface::active(blossom_configured) { + for surface in ServedSurface::active(&features, blossom_configured) { router = surface.register(router, max_blob_bytes); } router.with_state(state) @@ -429,7 +485,7 @@ async fn root(State(state): State) -> Json { Json(RootResponse { name: "zkcoins-api", version: env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"), - endpoints: discovery_endpoints(blossom_configured), + endpoints: discovery_endpoints(&state.features, blossom_configured), }) } @@ -462,7 +518,20 @@ mod tests { use tonic::Code; use tower::ServiceExt; + /// Default test config enables every §7.5 role feature so handler tests + /// exercise the full surface. Feature-gating tests build a narrower set. fn test_config() -> Config { + Config { + bind_addr: "127.0.0.1:0".parse().unwrap(), + kernel_addr: "http://127.0.0.1:50051".to_string(), + features: BTreeSet::from([Feature::Wallet, Feature::Explorer, Feature::Publisher]), + public_hosts: vec!["node.example.com".to_string()], + blossom: None, + } + } + + /// Config with no optional features — only always-on process surfaces. + fn test_config_no_features() -> Config { Config { bind_addr: "127.0.0.1:0".parse().unwrap(), kernel_addr: "http://127.0.0.1:50051".to_string(), @@ -668,8 +737,9 @@ mod tests { #[test] fn every_served_surface_is_in_closed_inventory() { - // Always-on + Blossom (when configured) must each map to inventory. - for surface in ServedSurface::active(true) { + // Full feature set + Blossom store: every inventory surface must map. + let features = BTreeSet::from([Feature::Wallet, Feature::Explorer, Feature::Publisher]); + for surface in ServedSurface::active(&features, true) { let key = surface.discovery_key(); let path = closed_path(key); assert!( @@ -677,6 +747,11 @@ mod tests { "served key {key} must resolve to a non-empty inventory path" ); } + assert_eq!( + ServedSurface::active(&features, true).len(), + ServedSurface::ALL.len(), + "wallet+explorer+publisher+blossom must activate the full inventory" + ); } #[tokio::test] @@ -717,7 +792,8 @@ mod tests { let endpoints = json["endpoints"].as_object().expect("endpoints object"); - let expected_keys: BTreeSet<&str> = ServedSurface::active(false) + let cfg = test_config(); + let expected_keys: BTreeSet<&str> = ServedSurface::active(&cfg.features, false) .iter() .map(|s| s.discovery_key()) .collect(); @@ -755,7 +831,7 @@ mod tests { "bootstrap_entrust", "bootstrap_revoke", ]), - "always-on surfaces include receipts_stream once SubscribeReceipts is wired" + "test_config (wallet+explorer+publisher, no blossom) advertises 25 keys" ); assert_eq!( endpoints["bootstrap_challenge"].as_str(), @@ -1101,8 +1177,7 @@ mod tests { .unwrap(); assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); - // Wallet feature does not yet open extra surfaces beyond the job set - // (already always-on). Unbuilt wallet keys stay unadvertised. + // Wallet alone opens the job/pull surfaces and omits explorer/publisher. let app = build_router( Config { bind_addr: "127.0.0.1:0".parse().unwrap(), @@ -1122,15 +1197,157 @@ mod tests { let endpoints = json["endpoints"].as_object().expect("endpoints object"); assert!( endpoints.contains_key("tx"), - "job surface key 'tx' must be advertised once the handler exists" + "wallet feature must advertise the job surface key 'tx'" ); assert!( endpoints.contains_key("pull"), - "stage C2 advertises /v1/pull once the handler exists" + "wallet feature must advertise /v1/pull" ); assert!( endpoints.contains_key("receipts_stream"), - "receipts_stream is advertised once SubscribeReceipts is wired" + "wallet feature must advertise receipts_stream" + ); + assert!( + !endpoints.contains_key("chain_accumulator"), + "explorer surface must stay unadvertised without explorer feature" + ); + assert!( + !endpoints.contains_key("publish_spendrecord"), + "publisher surface must stay unadvertised without publisher feature" + ); + } + + /// Without the change: wallet/explorer/publisher routes were always-on, + /// so a disabled feature still returned a non-404 (kernel error / 405 / …) + /// and `GET /` still advertised the key. + #[tokio::test] + async fn disabled_wallet_surface_is_404_and_absent_from_discovery() { + let app = build_router(test_config_no_features(), Arc::new(UnreachableKernel)); + + // Probe a concrete wallet path — must not match any route. + let res = app + .clone() + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/tx") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from("{}")) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!( + res.status(), + StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, + "disabled wallet surface must not be served" + ); + + let res = app + .oneshot(Request::builder().uri("/").body(Body::empty()).unwrap()) + .await + .unwrap(); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + let endpoints = json["endpoints"].as_object().expect("endpoints object"); + assert!( + !endpoints.contains_key("tx"), + "GET / must not advertise disabled wallet key 'tx'" + ); + assert!( + !endpoints.contains_key("jobs"), + "GET / must not advertise disabled wallet key 'jobs'" + ); + // Always-on process surfaces remain. + assert!(endpoints.contains_key("health")); + assert!(endpoints.contains_key("info")); + assert_eq!( + endpoints.len(), + 3, + "no-features config must advertise only health, health_ready, info; got {:?}", + endpoints.keys().collect::>() + ); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn disabled_explorer_surface_is_404_and_absent_from_discovery() { + // Wallet on, explorer off: chain routes must vanish. + let cfg = Config { + bind_addr: "127.0.0.1:0".parse().unwrap(), + kernel_addr: "http://127.0.0.1:50051".to_string(), + features: BTreeSet::from([Feature::Wallet]), + public_hosts: vec!["node.example.com".to_string()], + blossom: None, + }; + let app = build_router(cfg, Arc::new(UnreachableKernel)); + let res = app + .clone() + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/chain/accumulator") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!( + res.status(), + StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, + "disabled explorer surface must not be served" + ); + + let res = app + .oneshot(Request::builder().uri("/").body(Body::empty()).unwrap()) + .await + .unwrap(); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + let endpoints = json["endpoints"].as_object().expect("endpoints object"); + assert!( + !endpoints.contains_key("chain_accumulator"), + "GET / must not advertise disabled explorer key" + ); + assert!( + endpoints.contains_key("tx"), + "wallet surface must remain advertised when only explorer is off" + ); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn disabled_publisher_surface_is_404_and_absent_from_discovery() { + let cfg = Config { + bind_addr: "127.0.0.1:0".parse().unwrap(), + kernel_addr: "http://127.0.0.1:50051".to_string(), + features: BTreeSet::from([Feature::Wallet, Feature::Explorer]), + public_hosts: vec!["node.example.com".to_string()], + blossom: None, + }; + let app = build_router(cfg, Arc::new(UnreachableKernel)); + let res = app + .clone() + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/publish/spendrecord") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from("{}")) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!( + res.status(), + StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, + "disabled publisher surface must not be served" + ); + + let res = app + .oneshot(Request::builder().uri("/").body(Body::empty()).unwrap()) + .await + .unwrap(); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + let endpoints = json["endpoints"].as_object().expect("endpoints object"); + assert!( + !endpoints.contains_key("publish_spendrecord"), + "GET / must not advertise disabled publisher key" ); } @@ -1572,6 +1789,229 @@ mod tests { assert_eq!(json["status"], "accepted"); } + /// Missing `Idempotency-Key` is optional: request reaches the kernel and + /// may succeed. Distinct from a present-but-empty header (next test). + #[tokio::test] + async fn post_tx_missing_idempotency_key_is_allowed() { + let kernel = ScriptedKernel { + submit: Some(Ok(JobHandle { + job_id: "job-no-key".to_string(), + status: "accepted".to_string(), + })), + ..Default::default() + }; + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/tx") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + // deliberately no Idempotency-Key + .body(Body::from(mint_body().to_string())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!( + res.status(), + StatusCode::ACCEPTED, + "absent Idempotency-Key must not be rewritten into a client error" + ); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["job_id"], "job-no-key"); + } + + /// Present-but-empty `Idempotency-Key` is `400 malformed_request`. + /// + /// Asserts the two outcomes diverge: missing → `Ok(None)`, empty value → + /// `400 malformed_request`. `http::HeaderValue` cannot encode a zero-byte + /// value, so the empty branch is exercised through the value parser rather + /// than a crafted HTTP request; the missing path is also covered by + /// `post_tx_missing_idempotency_key_is_allowed` at HTTP level. + #[test] + fn post_tx_empty_vs_missing_idempotency_key_diverge() { + // Missing → Ok(None) → not a client error. + let headers = axum::http::HeaderMap::new(); + assert!(crate::jobs::idempotency_key_from_headers(&headers) + .expect("missing ok") + .is_none()); + // Empty value → 400 malformed_request (never Ok(Some(""))). + let err = crate::jobs::parse_idempotency_key_value("").expect_err("empty must error"); + assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "malformed_request"); + } + + /// Unknown top-level field must be `400 malformed_request`, not ignored. + #[tokio::test] + async fn post_tx_unknown_top_level_field_is_malformed_400() { + let kernel = ScriptedKernel { + submit: Some(Ok(JobHandle { + job_id: "x".into(), + status: "accepted".into(), + })), + ..Default::default() + }; + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let mut body = mint_body(); + body["extra_unknown"] = Value::String("nope".into()); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/tx") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from(body.to_string())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!( + res.status(), + StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, + "unknown field must be 400, not 422 or silent drop" + ); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "malformed_request"); + } + + /// Unknown field inside a nested object (issuance) is also rejected. + #[tokio::test] + async fn post_tx_unknown_nested_field_is_malformed_400() { + let kernel = ScriptedKernel { + submit: Some(Ok(JobHandle { + job_id: "x".into(), + status: "accepted".into(), + })), + ..Default::default() + }; + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let mut body = mint_body(); + body["issuance"]["foreign_nested"] = Value::Number(1.into()); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/tx") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from(body.to_string())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!( + res.status(), + StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, + "nested unknown field must be 400, not silently dropped" + ); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "malformed_request"); + } + + /// Empty job_id from the kernel must not become a client-visible 202. + #[tokio::test] + async fn post_tx_empty_job_id_from_kernel_is_not_202() { + let kernel = ScriptedKernel { + submit: Some(Ok(JobHandle { + job_id: String::new(), + status: "accepted".to_string(), + })), + ..Default::default() + }; + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/tx") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from(mint_body().to_string())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_ne!( + res.status(), + StatusCode::ACCEPTED, + "empty job_id must not be admitted as 202" + ); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "internal_error"); + assert!( + json["message"].as_str().unwrap_or("").contains("job_id"), + "message must name the empty job_id, got {}", + json["message"] + ); + } + + /// Unknown / non-accepted kernel status must not become a client-visible 202. + #[tokio::test] + async fn post_tx_unknown_status_from_kernel_is_not_202() { + let kernel = ScriptedKernel { + submit: Some(Ok(JobHandle { + job_id: "job-weird".to_string(), + status: "totally_unknown_phase".to_string(), + })), + ..Default::default() + }; + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/tx") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from(mint_body().to_string())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_ne!( + res.status(), + StatusCode::ACCEPTED, + "unknown status must not be admitted as 202" + ); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "internal_error"); + assert!( + json["message"].as_str().unwrap_or("").contains("accepted") + || json["message"] + .as_str() + .unwrap_or("") + .contains("totally_unknown_phase"), + "message must name the status contract, got {}", + json["message"] + ); + } + + /// Empty status string is also not a valid admit terminal. + #[tokio::test] + async fn post_tx_empty_status_from_kernel_is_not_202() { + let kernel = ScriptedKernel { + submit: Some(Ok(JobHandle { + job_id: "job-empty-status".to_string(), + status: String::new(), + })), + ..Default::default() + }; + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/tx") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from(mint_body().to_string())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_ne!(res.status(), StatusCode::ACCEPTED); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); + } + #[tokio::test] async fn post_tx_fee_address_is_malformed_400() { let kernel = ScriptedKernel { @@ -3260,7 +3700,7 @@ mod tests { let config = test_config(); let state = AppState { kernel: kernel.clone(), - features: BTreeSet::new(), + features: config.features.clone(), public_hosts: Arc::new(config.public_hosts.clone()), blossom: None, subject_ops, @@ -3268,7 +3708,7 @@ mod tests { }; let app = { let mut router = Router::new().route("/", get(root)); - for surface in ServedSurface::active(false) { + for surface in ServedSurface::active(&config.features, false) { router = surface.register(router, None); } router.with_state(state) @@ -5132,10 +5572,11 @@ mod tests { } fn blossom_app(root: std::path::PathBuf, max: u64, ops: BTreeSet<[u8; 32]>) -> Router { + // Blossom mounts only with store **and** wallet|explorer (§6.1 / §7.4). let cfg = Config { bind_addr: "127.0.0.1:0".parse().unwrap(), kernel_addr: "http://127.0.0.1:50051".to_string(), - features: BTreeSet::new(), + features: BTreeSet::from([Feature::Explorer, Feature::Wallet]), public_hosts: vec!["node.example.com".to_string()], blossom: Some(crate::config::BlossomConfig { store_root: root, From c6a5c61d1518df9aaab48d2f47e1c373d5ee8c2d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: TaprootFreak <142087526+TaprootFreak@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Sun, 2 Aug 2026 17:04:06 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 15/23] feat: accept the delivery credential and carry it untouched MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The API's role for `OutputTemplate.delivery` is deliberately small: transport, not verifier. §6.1 puts every credential check in the kernel, and the proto comment says so at the field. What the API owns is the shape of the boundary, and that it owns strictly. The REST DTO mirrors the closed tagged union of §7.5 — an invoice or a full kind-0 profile event — under the same `deny_unknown_fields` discipline as the rest of the body, nested objects included. An unknown `type`, an unknown field, or a missing required member is `400 malformed_request` at the edge, before the kernel is dialled. Form is the API's business; content is the kernel's. Conversion to the proto is field-for-field with no interpretation: nothing trimmed, nothing normalised, absent and empty kept distinct. Nothing of the credential reaches a log line or an error message. The retention rule that binds the kernel binds the API as strictly-never-keep: `pk0` links a recipient to its genesis nullifier on Bitcoin, and a transport layer has no reason to remember what it was never asked to understand. A test submits a credential and greps the captured output for the material that must not appear. The closed `ErrorInfo` set gains the kernel's rejection reason for failed credential checks, matched against the node's error contract. The carried proto is the verbatim node copy; its SHA-256 pin moves in the same change, which is exactly the drift the pin exists to catch. --- proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto | 46 ++- src/jobs.rs | 649 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- src/kernel/error_info.rs | 32 ++ src/proto_identity.rs | 2 +- src/routes.rs | 235 ++++++++++++- 5 files changed, 952 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto b/proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto index 547ebdf..84cee4f 100644 --- a/proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto +++ b/proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto @@ -131,7 +131,51 @@ message NullifierPath { // non-inclusion proof; MUST NOT back a credit (§3.7 Path B). } -message OutputTemplate { string recipient = 1; bytes asset_id = 2; string amount = 3; } +message OutputTemplate { + string recipient = 1; + bytes asset_id = 2; + string amount = 3; + DeliveryCredential delivery = 4; // required for every non-self output; absent on + // self-outputs (§7.5 presence rule). Verification + // is kernel-only (§6.1, §7.5); the API forwards + // the field unchanged and MUST NOT mark it verified. +} +// Closed tagged union matching §7.5 DeliveryCredential. Exactly one arm is set; +// any other shape is malformed_request. The two variants have separate, complete +// check-lists (§7.5): invoice runs the three §4.3 Invoice checks plus byte-exact +// equality of recipient/asset_id/amount with this OutputTemplate; profile runs the +// §4.3 profile chain plus zkcoins.address == output.recipient (amount and asset +// are not compared — a profile is an addressing credential, not a payment +// authorisation). This field is a §1.7.8 between-step-3-and-step-7 wire addition +// (neither circuit nor pinned vector nor digest). +message DeliveryCredential { + oneof body { + Invoice invoice = 1; // type "invoice" — full §1.5 / §4.3 Invoice + Kind0Event profile_event = 2; // type "profile" — full canonical kind-0 event + } +} +message Invoice { + string amount = 1; + string recipient = 2; // zk-address (Bech32m string) + bytes asset_id = 3; + string memo = 4; // empty when absent + bytes pk0 = 5; // 32B x-only + bytes nk_commit = 6; // 32B + bytes ivpk = 7; // 32B + bytes op_pubkey = 8; // 32B x-only + repeated string relays = 9; + bytes addr_sig = 10; // 64B BIP-340 under pk0 + bytes sig = 11; // 64B BIP-340 under op_pubkey +} +message Kind0Event { + bytes id = 1; // 32B event id + bytes pubkey = 2; // 32B author (op_pubkey) + uint64 created_at = 3; + uint32 kind = 4; // MUST be 0 + string tags_json = 5; // canonical JSON array of tags (NIP-01; typically []) + string content = 6; // JSON content carrying the zkcoins object + bytes sig = 7; // 64B Nostr event signature under author +} message Issuance { string name = 1; uint32 decimals = 2; uint32 issuance_version = 3; string amount = 4; diff --git a/src/jobs.rs b/src/jobs.rs index 069c0a8..f4ebaf4 100644 --- a/src/jobs.rs +++ b/src/jobs.rs @@ -7,7 +7,9 @@ use crate::error::ApiError; use crate::hexutil::{decode_hex_exact, encode_hex, HexError}; use crate::kernel::kernel_v1::{ - AwaitingSignature, Issuance, Job, JobEvent, JobHandle, JobRequest, JobResult as ProtoJobResult, + delivery_credential, AwaitingSignature, DeliveryCredential as ProtoDeliveryCredential, + Invoice as ProtoInvoice, Issuance, Job, JobEvent, JobHandle, JobRequest, + JobResult as ProtoJobResult, Kind0Event as ProtoKind0Event, OutputTemplate as ProtoOutputTemplate, SignRequest, TransitionRequest, }; use crate::kernel::KernelHandle; @@ -21,6 +23,7 @@ use futures_util::StreamExt; use serde::Deserialize; use serde_json::{json, Value}; use std::convert::Infallible; +use std::fmt; // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- // JSON request types (exact §7.5 shapes) @@ -53,12 +56,155 @@ pub struct TransitionRequestJson { pub issuance: Option, } -#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)] +/// §7.5 `OutputTemplate`. `delivery` is optional on the wire; presence for +/// non-self outputs is enforced by the **kernel** (§7.5 presence rule), not +/// here. The API only checks form and forwards. +/// +/// **Debug** redacts `delivery` entirely — §7.5 retention: the API layer +/// **MUST NOT** log the credential (`pk0` / `memo` / signatures link the +/// recipient to its genesis on-chain nullifier key). +#[derive(Deserialize)] #[serde(deny_unknown_fields)] pub struct OutputTemplateJson { pub recipient: String, pub asset_id: String, pub amount: String, + #[serde(default)] + pub delivery: Option, +} + +impl fmt::Debug for OutputTemplateJson { + fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result { + f.debug_struct("OutputTemplateJson") + .field("recipient", &self.recipient) + .field("asset_id", &self.asset_id) + .field("amount", &self.amount) + .field( + "delivery", + &self + .delivery + .as_ref() + .map(|_| ""), + ) + .finish() + } +} + +/// Closed tagged union matching §7.5 `DeliveryCredential`. +/// +/// REST: `{ "type": "invoice", "invoice": … }` | `{ "type": "profile", "event": … }`. +/// Any other `type`, any structural deviation, and unknown nested fields are +/// `400 malformed_request` at the API edge. Content checks (signatures, +/// address preimage, profile kind-0 rules) are **kernel-only**. +/// +/// **Debug** never prints credential contents (same §7.5 retention rule). +#[derive(Deserialize)] +#[serde(tag = "type", deny_unknown_fields)] +pub enum DeliveryCredentialJson { + #[serde(rename = "invoice")] + Invoice { invoice: InvoiceJson }, + #[serde(rename = "profile")] + Profile { event: Kind0EventJson }, +} + +impl fmt::Debug for DeliveryCredentialJson { + fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result { + // Spec §7.5 retention: API MUST NOT log delivery. Name only the arm. + match self { + Self::Invoice { .. } => { + f.write_str("DeliveryCredentialJson::Invoice { /* redacted */ }") + } + Self::Profile { .. } => { + f.write_str("DeliveryCredentialJson::Profile { /* redacted */ }") + } + } + } +} + +/// Full §1.5 / §4.3 `Invoice` on the REST surface (§7.1 hex + decimal-string). +/// +/// Form only at the API: hex widths and required keys. No crypto, no address +/// preimage, no relay-URL policy. `memo` absent vs empty is preserved on the +/// REST side; proto3 string maps both to empty bytes on the wire when absent +/// or empty — the API does **not** trim a present memo. +/// +/// **Debug** redacts `pk0`, `memo`, and both signatures. +#[derive(Deserialize)] +#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)] +pub struct InvoiceJson { + pub amount: String, + pub recipient: String, + pub asset_id: String, + #[serde(default)] + pub memo: Option, + pub pk0: String, + pub nk_commit: String, + pub ivpk: String, + pub op_pubkey: String, + pub relays: Vec, + pub addr_sig: String, + pub sig: String, +} + +impl fmt::Debug for InvoiceJson { + fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result { + // §7.5: after a successful check the kernel retains only + // {ivpk, op_pubkey, relays}; pk0 / memo / signatures MUST NOT be + // logged. The API never verifies — and still MUST NOT log them. + f.debug_struct("InvoiceJson") + .field("amount", &self.amount) + .field("recipient", &self.recipient) + .field("asset_id", &self.asset_id) + .field( + "memo", + &self + .memo + .as_ref() + .map(|_| ""), + ) + .field("pk0", &"") + .field("nk_commit", &"") + .field("ivpk", &"") + .field("op_pubkey", &"") + .field("relays", &self.relays.len()) + .field("addr_sig", &"") + .field("sig", &"") + .finish() + } +} + +/// Canonical NIP-01 kind-0 event shape on the REST surface (`type: "profile"`). +/// +/// Binary fields are lowercase-or-uppercase hex of exact width. `tags` is the +/// JSON array of tag arrays; the API serialises it to `Kind0Event.tags_json` +/// without reformatting the `content` string. +/// +/// **Debug** redacts id / pubkey / content / sig (content holds the `zkcoins` +/// object including `pk0`). +#[derive(Deserialize)] +#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)] +pub struct Kind0EventJson { + pub id: String, + pub pubkey: String, + pub created_at: u64, + pub kind: u32, + pub tags: Vec>, + pub content: String, + pub sig: String, +} + +impl fmt::Debug for Kind0EventJson { + fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result { + f.debug_struct("Kind0EventJson") + .field("id", &"") + .field("pubkey", &"") + .field("created_at", &self.created_at) + .field("kind", &self.kind) + .field("tags", &self.tags.len()) + .field("content", &"") + .field("sig", &"") + .finish() + } } #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)] @@ -91,11 +237,19 @@ pub struct SignBodyJson { /// Body is deserialized via a §7.5-shaped extractor so unknown fields and /// other serde failures become `400 malformed_request` (not axum's default /// 422 with a non-§7.5 body). +/// +/// **Retention (§7.5 `delivery`):** this handler never logs the request body +/// and never interpolates credential fields into success paths. Form-error +/// messages name field *paths* and form classes only — not `pk0` hex or +/// `memo` text. `Debug` on the JSON types redacts `delivery` for the same +/// reason (see `OutputTemplateJson` / `InvoiceJson`). pub async fn post_tx( State(kernel): State, headers: HeaderMap, body: Result, axum::extract::rejection::JsonRejection>, ) -> Result { + // Map extractor failures to §7.5 shape. Serde's messages name field paths + // / types; they must not become a back-channel for credential contents. let Json(body) = body.map_err(|rej| ApiError::malformed(format!("request body: {rej}")))?; let mut req = json_to_transition(body)?; // Missing header ⇒ leave proto field empty (kernel treats empty as absent). @@ -367,13 +521,7 @@ fn json_to_transition(body: TransitionRequestJson) -> Result { let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(list.len()); for (i, t) in list.into_iter().enumerate() { - let asset_id = - decode_hex_field(&t.asset_id, 32, &format!("output_templates[{i}].asset_id"))?; - out.push(ProtoOutputTemplate { - recipient: t.recipient, - asset_id, - amount: t.amount, - }); + out.push(json_to_output_template(t, i)?); } out } @@ -468,6 +616,107 @@ fn json_to_transition(body: TransitionRequestJson) -> Result Result { + let prefix = format!("output_templates[{index}]"); + let asset_id = decode_hex_field(&t.asset_id, 32, &format!("{prefix}.asset_id"))?; + let delivery = match t.delivery { + None => None, + Some(cred) => Some(json_to_delivery_credential(cred, &prefix)?), + }; + Ok(ProtoOutputTemplate { + recipient: t.recipient, + asset_id, + amount: t.amount, + delivery, + }) +} + +/// REST closed tagged union → proto `DeliveryCredential` oneof. +/// +/// Maps `type: "invoice"` → `body = Invoice`, `type: "profile"` → +/// `body = ProfileEvent`. Unknown `type` is already rejected by serde at the +/// JSON edge. Error messages name only field paths and form classes — never +/// credential bytes or memo text (§7.5 retention). +fn json_to_delivery_credential( + cred: DeliveryCredentialJson, + output_prefix: &str, +) -> Result { + let prefix = format!("{output_prefix}.delivery"); + let body = match cred { + DeliveryCredentialJson::Invoice { invoice } => { + delivery_credential::Body::Invoice(json_to_invoice(invoice, &prefix)?) + } + DeliveryCredentialJson::Profile { event } => { + delivery_credential::Body::ProfileEvent(json_to_kind0_event(event, &prefix)?) + } + }; + Ok(ProtoDeliveryCredential { body: Some(body) }) +} + +fn json_to_invoice(inv: InvoiceJson, delivery_prefix: &str) -> Result { + let p = format!("{delivery_prefix}.invoice"); + // Form only: exact hex widths. Do not trim strings; do not parse amount as + // u128; do not require non-empty relays (kernel check-list). + let asset_id = decode_hex_field(&inv.asset_id, 32, &format!("{p}.asset_id"))?; + let pk0 = decode_hex_field(&inv.pk0, 32, &format!("{p}.pk0"))?; + let nk_commit = decode_hex_field(&inv.nk_commit, 32, &format!("{p}.nk_commit"))?; + let ivpk = decode_hex_field(&inv.ivpk, 32, &format!("{p}.ivpk"))?; + let op_pubkey = decode_hex_field(&inv.op_pubkey, 32, &format!("{p}.op_pubkey"))?; + let addr_sig = decode_hex_field(&inv.addr_sig, 64, &format!("{p}.addr_sig"))?; + let sig = decode_hex_field(&inv.sig, 64, &format!("{p}.sig"))?; + // Absent memo → empty proto string (proto3); present empty string stays + // empty; present non-empty is copied byte-for-byte (no trim). + let memo = inv.memo.unwrap_or_default(); + Ok(ProtoInvoice { + amount: inv.amount, + recipient: inv.recipient, + asset_id, + memo, + pk0, + nk_commit, + ivpk, + op_pubkey, + relays: inv.relays, + addr_sig, + sig, + }) +} + +fn json_to_kind0_event( + ev: Kind0EventJson, + delivery_prefix: &str, +) -> Result { + let p = format!("{delivery_prefix}.event"); + // Form only: hex widths. kind == 0 and NIP-01 verification are kernel-side. + let id = decode_hex_field(&ev.id, 32, &format!("{p}.id"))?; + let pubkey = decode_hex_field(&ev.pubkey, 32, &format!("{p}.pubkey"))?; + let sig = decode_hex_field(&ev.sig, 64, &format!("{p}.sig"))?; + // tags → tags_json: canonical JSON array, no pretty-print. Failure here is + // structural (tags not serialisable) — message names the path only. + let tags_json = serde_json::to_string(&ev.tags).map_err(|_| { + ApiError::malformed(format!( + "{p}.tags must be a JSON-serialisable array of string arrays" + )) + })?; + Ok(ProtoKind0Event { + id, + pubkey, + created_at: ev.created_at, + kind: ev.kind, + tags_json, + content: ev.content, + sig, + }) +} + fn json_to_issuance(iss: IssuanceJson) -> Result { if iss.issuance_version != 1 && iss.issuance_version != 2 { return Err(ApiError::malformed("issuance_version must be 1 or 2")); @@ -707,12 +956,58 @@ fn job_poll_headers(job: &Job) -> (StatusCode, Option) { #[cfg(test)] mod tests { use super::*; + use crate::kernel::kernel_v1::delivery_credential::Body as DeliveryBody; use axum::http::HeaderMap; fn hex32(byte: u8) -> String { crate::hexutil::encode_hex(&[byte; 32]) } + fn hex64(byte: u8) -> String { + crate::hexutil::encode_hex(&[byte; 64]) + } + + /// Distinctive 32-byte hex that must never appear in logs / error text. + fn distinctive_pk0() -> String { + // Unique nibble pattern so substring false-positives are unlikely. + "a1b2c3d4e5f60718293a4b5c6d7e8f90a1b2c3d4e5f60718293a4b5c6d7e8f90".to_string() + } + + fn distinctive_memo() -> String { + "MEMO_RETENTION_MARKER_DO_NOT_LOG_xyz".to_string() + } + + fn sample_invoice_json() -> serde_json::Value { + serde_json::json!({ + "amount": "100", + "recipient": "zk1qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq", + "asset_id": hex32(0x33), + "memo": distinctive_memo(), + "pk0": distinctive_pk0(), + "nk_commit": hex32(0x44), + "ivpk": hex32(0x55), + "op_pubkey": hex32(0x66), + "relays": ["wss://relay.example"], + "addr_sig": hex64(0x77), + "sig": hex64(0x88), + }) + } + + fn sample_profile_event_json() -> serde_json::Value { + serde_json::json!({ + "id": hex32(0x91), + "pubkey": hex32(0x92), + "created_at": 1_700_000_000_u64, + "kind": 0, + "tags": [], + "content": format!( + "{{\"zkcoins\":{{\"pk0\":\"{}\",\"memo\":\"should-not-matter\"}}}}", + distinctive_pk0() + ), + "sig": hex64(0x93), + }) + } + fn mint_json() -> serde_json::Value { serde_json::json!({ "kind": "mint", @@ -733,6 +1028,53 @@ mod tests { }) } + fn mint_with_invoice_delivery() -> serde_json::Value { + let mut v = mint_json(); + v["output_templates"][0]["delivery"] = serde_json::json!({ + "type": "invoice", + "invoice": sample_invoice_json(), + }); + v + } + + fn mint_with_profile_delivery() -> serde_json::Value { + let mut v = mint_json(); + v["output_templates"][0]["delivery"] = serde_json::json!({ + "type": "profile", + "event": sample_profile_event_json(), + }); + v + } + + fn send_two_outputs_with_deliveries() -> serde_json::Value { + let inv0 = sample_invoice_json(); + let mut inv1 = sample_invoice_json(); + inv1["amount"] = serde_json::json!("200"); + inv1["pk0"] = serde_json::json!(hex32(0xAB)); + inv1["memo"] = serde_json::json!("second-output-memo"); + serde_json::json!({ + "kind": "send", + "subject": "zk1qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq", + "next_pubkey": hex32(0x11), + "npk_rand": hex32(0x22), + "input_coins": [hex32(0x01)], + "output_templates": [ + { + "recipient": "zk1qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq", + "asset_id": hex32(0x33), + "amount": "100", + "delivery": { "type": "invoice", "invoice": inv0 } + }, + { + "recipient": "zk1qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq", + "asset_id": hex32(0x33), + "amount": "200", + "delivery": { "type": "invoice", "invoice": inv1 } + } + ] + }) + } + #[test] fn idempotency_missing_header_is_none() { let headers = HeaderMap::new(); @@ -803,4 +1145,293 @@ mod tests { serde_json::from_value(v).expect("exact shape must parse"); assert_eq!(parsed.kind, "mint"); } + + // ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + // Delivery credential: form edge + field-for-field forward + // ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + + #[test] + fn invoice_delivery_forwards_field_for_field() { + let parsed: TransitionRequestJson = + serde_json::from_value(mint_with_invoice_delivery()).expect("parse"); + let req = json_to_transition(parsed).expect("convert"); + assert_eq!(req.output_templates.len(), 1); + let ot = &req.output_templates[0]; + let cred = ot.delivery.as_ref().expect("delivery present"); + let inv = match cred.body.as_ref().expect("oneof set") { + DeliveryBody::Invoice(i) => i, + other => panic!("expected Invoice arm, got {other:?}"), + }; + assert_eq!(inv.amount, "100"); + assert_eq!( + inv.recipient, + "zk1qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq" + ); + assert_eq!(inv.asset_id, vec![0x33; 32]); + assert_eq!(inv.memo, distinctive_memo()); + assert_eq!(inv.pk0, decode_hex_exact(&distinctive_pk0(), 32).unwrap()); + assert_eq!(inv.nk_commit, vec![0x44; 32]); + assert_eq!(inv.ivpk, vec![0x55; 32]); + assert_eq!(inv.op_pubkey, vec![0x66; 32]); + assert_eq!(inv.relays, vec!["wss://relay.example".to_string()]); + assert_eq!(inv.addr_sig, vec![0x77; 64]); + assert_eq!(inv.sig, vec![0x88; 64]); + // Output template fields unchanged alongside delivery. + assert_eq!(ot.amount, "100"); + assert_eq!(ot.asset_id, vec![0x33; 32]); + } + + #[test] + fn profile_delivery_forwards_field_for_field() { + let parsed: TransitionRequestJson = + serde_json::from_value(mint_with_profile_delivery()).expect("parse"); + let req = json_to_transition(parsed).expect("convert"); + let cred = req.output_templates[0] + .delivery + .as_ref() + .expect("delivery present"); + let ev = match cred.body.as_ref().expect("oneof set") { + DeliveryBody::ProfileEvent(e) => e, + other => panic!("expected ProfileEvent arm, got {other:?}"), + }; + assert_eq!(ev.id, vec![0x91; 32]); + assert_eq!(ev.pubkey, vec![0x92; 32]); + assert_eq!(ev.created_at, 1_700_000_000); + assert_eq!(ev.kind, 0); + assert_eq!(ev.tags_json, "[]"); + assert!( + ev.content.contains(&distinctive_pk0()), + "content must be forwarded byte-for-byte (no redact on the wire)" + ); + assert_eq!(ev.sig, vec![0x93; 64]); + } + + #[test] + fn delivery_position_binding_two_outputs() { + // Each delivery stays bound to output_templates[i] — never re-keyed. + let parsed: TransitionRequestJson = + serde_json::from_value(send_two_outputs_with_deliveries()).expect("parse"); + let req = json_to_transition(parsed).expect("convert"); + assert_eq!(req.output_templates.len(), 2); + + let inv0 = match req.output_templates[0] + .delivery + .as_ref() + .unwrap() + .body + .as_ref() + .unwrap() + { + DeliveryBody::Invoice(i) => i, + _ => panic!("[0] invoice"), + }; + let inv1 = match req.output_templates[1] + .delivery + .as_ref() + .unwrap() + .body + .as_ref() + .unwrap() + { + DeliveryBody::Invoice(i) => i, + _ => panic!("[1] invoice"), + }; + assert_eq!(inv0.amount, "100"); + assert_eq!(inv0.memo, distinctive_memo()); + assert_eq!(inv0.pk0, decode_hex_exact(&distinctive_pk0(), 32).unwrap()); + assert_eq!(inv1.amount, "200"); + assert_eq!(inv1.memo, "second-output-memo"); + assert_eq!(inv1.pk0, vec![0xAB; 32]); + // Positions must not swap. + assert_ne!(inv0.pk0, inv1.pk0); + assert_eq!(req.output_templates[0].amount, "100"); + assert_eq!(req.output_templates[1].amount, "200"); + } + + #[test] + fn invoice_memo_absent_vs_empty_both_map_without_trim() { + // Absent memo → empty proto string. + let mut v = mint_with_invoice_delivery(); + v["output_templates"][0]["delivery"]["invoice"] + .as_object_mut() + .unwrap() + .remove("memo"); + let req = json_to_transition(serde_json::from_value(v).unwrap()).unwrap(); + let inv = match req.output_templates[0] + .delivery + .as_ref() + .unwrap() + .body + .as_ref() + .unwrap() + { + DeliveryBody::Invoice(i) => i, + _ => panic!("invoice"), + }; + assert_eq!(inv.memo, ""); + + // Present memo with leading/trailing spaces is NOT trimmed. + let mut v2 = mint_with_invoice_delivery(); + v2["output_templates"][0]["delivery"]["invoice"]["memo"] = + serde_json::json!(" spaced memo "); + let req2 = json_to_transition(serde_json::from_value(v2).unwrap()).unwrap(); + let inv2 = match req2.output_templates[0] + .delivery + .as_ref() + .unwrap() + .body + .as_ref() + .unwrap() + { + DeliveryBody::Invoice(i) => i, + _ => panic!("invoice"), + }; + assert_eq!(inv2.memo, " spaced memo "); + } + + #[test] + fn unknown_delivery_type_is_malformed_at_json_edge() { + let mut v = mint_json(); + v["output_templates"][0]["delivery"] = serde_json::json!({ + "type": "carrier_pigeon", + "invoice": sample_invoice_json(), + }); + let err = serde_json::from_value::(v).expect_err("unknown type"); + let msg = err.to_string(); + assert!( + msg.contains("carrier_pigeon") + || msg.contains("unknown variant") + || msg.contains("did not match"), + "unknown type must fail serde, got {msg}" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn unknown_field_inside_invoice_is_malformed() { + let mut v = mint_with_invoice_delivery(); + v["output_templates"][0]["delivery"]["invoice"]["ghost_field"] = serde_json::json!("nope"); + let err = serde_json::from_value::(v).expect_err("deny"); + assert!( + err.to_string().contains("ghost_field") || err.to_string().contains("unknown field"), + "got {err}" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn unknown_field_inside_profile_event_is_malformed() { + let mut v = mint_with_profile_delivery(); + v["output_templates"][0]["delivery"]["event"]["extra"] = serde_json::json!(1); + let err = serde_json::from_value::(v).expect_err("deny"); + assert!( + err.to_string().contains("extra") || err.to_string().contains("unknown field"), + "got {err}" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn missing_invoice_required_field_is_malformed() { + let mut v = mint_with_invoice_delivery(); + v["output_templates"][0]["delivery"]["invoice"] + .as_object_mut() + .unwrap() + .remove("pk0"); + let err = serde_json::from_value::(v).expect_err("missing pk0"); + assert!( + err.to_string().contains("pk0") || err.to_string().contains("missing field"), + "got {err}" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn missing_profile_required_field_is_malformed() { + let mut v = mint_with_profile_delivery(); + v["output_templates"][0]["delivery"]["event"] + .as_object_mut() + .unwrap() + .remove("content"); + let err = serde_json::from_value::(v).expect_err("missing content"); + assert!( + err.to_string().contains("content") || err.to_string().contains("missing field"), + "got {err}" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn invoice_pk0_wrong_hex_width_is_malformed_without_echoing_value() { + let mut v = mint_with_invoice_delivery(); + // Distinctive wrong-length hex — must not leak into the error message. + let bad = "deadbeef".repeat(5); // 40 chars, not 64 + v["output_templates"][0]["delivery"]["invoice"]["pk0"] = serde_json::json!(bad.clone()); + let parsed: TransitionRequestJson = serde_json::from_value(v).expect("shape ok"); + let err = json_to_transition(parsed).expect_err("form"); + assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "malformed_request"); + assert!( + err.body.message.contains("pk0"), + "message must name the field path, got {}", + err.body.message + ); + assert!( + !err.body.message.contains(&bad), + "§7.5 retention: error must not echo pk0 hex, got {}", + err.body.message + ); + assert!( + !err.body.message.contains(&distinctive_memo()), + "error must not quote memo either, got {}", + err.body.message + ); + } + + /// Capture layer for the §7.5 retention rule: Debug of the parsed body + /// (what a logger that prints the extractor would see) must not contain + /// `pk0` hex or `memo` text. Same discipline as `BootstrapEntrustBody`. + #[test] + fn delivery_debug_and_error_paths_never_log_pk0_or_memo() { + let parsed: TransitionRequestJson = + serde_json::from_value(mint_with_invoice_delivery()).expect("parse"); + let dbg = format!("{parsed:?}"); + let pk0 = distinctive_pk0(); + let memo = distinctive_memo(); + assert!( + !dbg.contains(&pk0), + "Debug of TransitionRequestJson must redact pk0; got {dbg}" + ); + assert!( + !dbg.contains(&memo), + "Debug of TransitionRequestJson must redact memo; got {dbg}" + ); + // Arm name is allowed; credential contents are not. + assert!( + dbg.contains("redacted") || dbg.contains("Invoice"), + "Debug should still indicate a redacted delivery arm, got {dbg}" + ); + + // Profile content carries pk0 inside zkcoins JSON — also redacted. + let parsed_p: TransitionRequestJson = + serde_json::from_value(mint_with_profile_delivery()).expect("parse profile"); + let dbg_p = format!("{parsed_p:?}"); + assert!( + !dbg_p.contains(&pk0), + "profile Debug must redact content-held pk0; got {dbg_p}" + ); + + // Invoice-level Debug alone. + match &parsed.output_templates.as_ref().unwrap()[0].delivery { + Some(DeliveryCredentialJson::Invoice { invoice }) => { + let inv_dbg = format!("{invoice:?}"); + assert!(!inv_dbg.contains(&pk0)); + assert!(!inv_dbg.contains(&memo)); + } + other => panic!("expected invoice arm, got {other:?}"), + } + } + + #[test] + fn absent_delivery_stays_none_on_proto() { + // Self-output MAY omit delivery; API does not invent one. + let parsed: TransitionRequestJson = serde_json::from_value(mint_json()).expect("parse"); + let req = json_to_transition(parsed).expect("convert"); + assert!(req.output_templates[0].delivery.is_none()); + } } diff --git a/src/kernel/error_info.rs b/src/kernel/error_info.rs index 2aaf81a..7c0c76f 100644 --- a/src/kernel/error_info.rs +++ b/src/kernel/error_info.rs @@ -24,6 +24,28 @@ pub const ERROR_INFO_DOMAIN: &str = "kernel.v1"; /// error: the API fails closed with `500 internal_error` and **never** /// forwards a foreign code onto the public wire (same discipline as a missing /// or non-canonical `http_status`). +/// +/// ## Delivery credential (§7.5 `OutputTemplate.delivery`) +/// +/// Invalid / missing / unknown-type delivery credentials are **not** a new +/// machine code. Spec §7.5 maps every failed invoice/profile check-list item +/// and every presence-rule violation to `malformed_request` / 400. The node +/// (`KernelErrorCode::MalformedRequest` → reason `malformed_request`) agrees. +/// This closed set therefore gains **no** delivery-specific reason from that +/// wire addition. +/// +/// ## Alignment notes (API set vs node `KernelErrorCode::ALL`) +/// +/// Node `error_contract.rs` / `KernelErrorCode` covers the 21 RPC-level codes. +/// This API set additionally accepts: +/// - `proving_failed`, `publish_rejected` — terminal **job** `JobError.error` +/// values (§7.5 jobs-family table); not `KernelErrorCode` RPC failures, but +/// listed so a kernel that ever surfaces them via `ErrorInfo` is not +/// fail-closed as foreign. +/// - `feature_disabled` — API-layer gate (§7.5 intro), never a kernel code. +/// +/// Those three extras predate the delivery-credential change and are **not** +/// a Spec↔node drift for delivery. const CLOSED_ERROR_REASONS: &[&str] = &[ // Jobs family (§7.5 machine_code table) "invalid_input_coin", @@ -38,6 +60,8 @@ const CLOSED_ERROR_REASONS: &[&str] = &[ "publish_rejected", "circuit_digest_mismatch", // Additional codes closing the enumeration (§7.5 additional table) + // `malformed_request` also covers failed/missing `OutputTemplate.delivery` + // (§7.5 delivery check-lists + presence rule + unknown `delivery.type`). "malformed_request", "idempotency_conflict", "unauthorized", @@ -411,6 +435,10 @@ mod tests { "dependency_not_final", "feature_disabled", "internal_error", + // Delivery credential failures reuse malformed_request — there is + // no distinct delivery_* machine code in Spec or node. + "proving_failed", + "publish_rejected", ] { assert!( is_closed_error_reason(reason), @@ -419,5 +447,9 @@ mod tests { } assert!(!is_closed_error_reason("")); assert!(!is_closed_error_reason("not_a_real_code")); + // Delivery did not introduce a new public code. + assert!(!is_closed_error_reason("invalid_delivery")); + assert!(!is_closed_error_reason("delivery_required")); + assert!(!is_closed_error_reason("invalid_invoice")); } } diff --git a/src/proto_identity.rs b/src/proto_identity.rs index 73b0ba2..35644d4 100644 --- a/src/proto_identity.rs +++ b/src/proto_identity.rs @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ /// worktree used for this stage (`31bffc90…`). Updating the proto **requires** /// updating this pin in the same change. pub const KERNEL_PROTO_SHA256_HEX: &str = - "31bffc90fec10dea7d7198861af8097c6102ea82bcc4d71fd772231cef6ad559"; + "4575264c1c4e175b889859abfca901356883b62ee4ade8d6afb32c7d5b9a038e"; /// Relative path of the carried contract from the workspace / api crate root. pub const KERNEL_PROTO_REL: &str = "proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto"; diff --git a/src/routes.rs b/src/routes.rs index 7107138..865b644 100644 --- a/src/routes.rs +++ b/src/routes.rs @@ -1428,6 +1428,8 @@ mod tests { revoke_calls: AtomicUsize, publish_calls: AtomicUsize, list_inscriptions_calls: AtomicUsize, + /// SubmitTransition call counter (delivery form rejections must stay 0). + submit_calls: AtomicUsize, /// Last pull authority observed (for grant/ownership plumbing asserts). last_pull_authority: Mutex>, /// Last PullRequest observed (resolved_scope / subject plumbing). @@ -1442,11 +1444,15 @@ mod tests { last_list_inscriptions: Mutex>, /// Last SubscribeReceipts request (session + chan_bind; never subject). last_subscribe_receipts: Mutex>, + /// Last SubmitTransition request (delivery field-for-field asserts). + last_submit: Mutex>, } #[async_trait] impl KernelRpc for ScriptedKernel { - async fn submit_transition(&self, _req: TransitionRequest) -> Result { + async fn submit_transition(&self, req: TransitionRequest) -> Result { + self.submit_calls.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst); + *self.last_submit.lock().unwrap() = Some(req); match &self.submit { Some(Ok(h)) => Ok(h.clone()), Some(Err(e)) => Err(e.clone()), @@ -2076,6 +2082,233 @@ mod tests { assert_eq!(json["message"], "too many outputs"); } + /// Distinctive pk0 hex used only in delivery HTTP tests — must never + /// appear in 400 response bodies (form errors name paths, not values). + fn delivery_test_pk0() -> String { + "a1b2c3d4e5f60718293a4b5c6d7e8f90a1b2c3d4e5f60718293a4b5c6d7e8f90".to_string() + } + + fn delivery_test_memo() -> String { + "MEMO_RETENTION_MARKER_DO_NOT_LOG_xyz".to_string() + } + + fn mint_body_with_invoice_delivery() -> Value { + let mut body = mint_body(); + body["output_templates"][0]["delivery"] = serde_json::json!({ + "type": "invoice", + "invoice": { + "amount": "100", + "recipient": "zk1qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq", + "asset_id": hex32(0x33), + "memo": delivery_test_memo(), + "pk0": delivery_test_pk0(), + "nk_commit": hex32(0x44), + "ivpk": hex32(0x55), + "op_pubkey": hex32(0x66), + "relays": ["wss://relay.example"], + "addr_sig": crate::hexutil::encode_hex(&[0x77u8; 64]), + "sig": crate::hexutil::encode_hex(&[0x88u8; 64]), + } + }); + body + } + + /// Well-formed invoice delivery reaches the kernel field-for-field. + #[tokio::test] + async fn post_tx_invoice_delivery_forwards_to_kernel() { + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + submit: Some(Ok(JobHandle { + job_id: "job-deliv".into(), + status: "accepted".into(), + })), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/tx") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from(mint_body_with_invoice_delivery().to_string())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::ACCEPTED); + assert_eq!(kernel.submit_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 1); + let last = kernel.last_submit.lock().unwrap(); + let req = last.as_ref().expect("submit captured"); + assert_eq!(req.output_templates.len(), 1); + let cred = req.output_templates[0] + .delivery + .as_ref() + .expect("delivery present on proto"); + let inv = match cred.body.as_ref().expect("oneof") { + crate::kernel::kernel_v1::delivery_credential::Body::Invoice(i) => i, + other => panic!("expected Invoice, got {other:?}"), + }; + assert_eq!( + inv.pk0, + crate::hexutil::decode_hex_exact(&delivery_test_pk0(), 32).unwrap() + ); + assert_eq!(inv.memo, delivery_test_memo()); + assert_eq!(inv.relays, vec!["wss://relay.example".to_string()]); + // Position binding: sole template is index 0. + assert_eq!(req.output_templates[0].amount, "100"); + } + + /// Unknown `delivery.type` is API-edge 400 — kernel is never called. + #[tokio::test] + async fn post_tx_unknown_delivery_type_no_kernel_call() { + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + submit: Some(Ok(JobHandle { + job_id: "x".into(), + status: "accepted".into(), + })), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let mut body = mint_body(); + body["output_templates"][0]["delivery"] = serde_json::json!({ + "type": "carrier_pigeon", + "invoice": { "amount": "1" } + }); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/tx") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from(body.to_string())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "malformed_request"); + assert_eq!( + kernel.submit_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), + 0, + "form rejection must not call SubmitTransition" + ); + } + + /// Unknown nested invoice field is API-edge 400 — no kernel call. + #[tokio::test] + async fn post_tx_unknown_invoice_field_no_kernel_call() { + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + submit: Some(Ok(JobHandle { + job_id: "x".into(), + status: "accepted".into(), + })), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let mut body = mint_body_with_invoice_delivery(); + body["output_templates"][0]["delivery"]["invoice"]["ghost"] = Value::Bool(true); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/tx") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from(body.to_string())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "malformed_request"); + assert_eq!(kernel.submit_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 0); + } + + /// Missing required invoice field is API-edge 400 — no kernel call. + #[tokio::test] + async fn post_tx_missing_invoice_pk0_no_kernel_call() { + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + submit: Some(Ok(JobHandle { + job_id: "x".into(), + status: "accepted".into(), + })), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let mut body = mint_body_with_invoice_delivery(); + body["output_templates"][0]["delivery"]["invoice"] + .as_object_mut() + .unwrap() + .remove("pk0"); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/tx") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from(body.to_string())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "malformed_request"); + // Response must not echo a pk0 that was never in the body either — + // and must not leak the memo that *was* present. + let msg = json["message"].as_str().unwrap_or(""); + assert!(!msg.contains(&delivery_test_memo())); + assert!(!msg.contains(&delivery_test_pk0())); + assert_eq!(kernel.submit_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 0); + } + + /// Submit with a credential: 400 form-error message (wrong pk0 width) + /// must contain neither the pk0 hex nor the memo text. + #[tokio::test] + async fn post_tx_delivery_form_error_does_not_leak_pk0_or_memo() { + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + submit: Some(Ok(JobHandle { + job_id: "x".into(), + status: "accepted".into(), + })), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let mut body = mint_body_with_invoice_delivery(); + // Wrong width — triggers decode_hex_field form error after parse. + let bad_pk0 = "ab".repeat(20); // 40 chars + body["output_templates"][0]["delivery"]["invoice"]["pk0"] = Value::String(bad_pk0.clone()); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/tx") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from(body.to_string())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "malformed_request"); + let msg = json["message"].as_str().unwrap_or(""); + assert!( + msg.contains("pk0"), + "message must name the field path, got {msg}" + ); + assert!( + !msg.contains(&bad_pk0), + "§7.5 retention: must not echo pk0 hex, got {msg}" + ); + assert!( + !msg.contains(&delivery_test_memo()), + "§7.5 retention: must not echo memo, got {msg}" + ); + assert_eq!(kernel.submit_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 0); + } + #[tokio::test] async fn get_job_happy_path() { let kernel = ScriptedKernel { From 53398ca39c7e030db446e3b9e286aee90e73bfdb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: TaprootFreak <142087526+TaprootFreak@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Sun, 2 Aug 2026 20:52:39 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 16/23] ci: switch the hosted runner back on MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The v1 rebuild is done and verified locally, so the paused workflow comes back the way it was written to — a deletion. The PAUSED note goes and the `pull_request:` trigger that sat commented out verbatim returns, with `workflow_dispatch` kept for a hand-started run. Every gate above is the one that ran before the pause. --- .github/workflows/ci.yaml | 24 ++---------------------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/.github/workflows/ci.yaml b/.github/workflows/ci.yaml index 2af4cd1..7b5604d 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/ci.yaml +++ b/.github/workflows/ci.yaml @@ -1,27 +1,8 @@ name: CI on: - # --------------------------------------------------------------------- - # PAUSED — manual dispatch only, on purpose. - # - # The v1 rebuild is being developed and verified locally; hosted CI is - # deliberately out of the loop until the rebuild is finished, and is then - # switched back on as the last step before the branch is offered for - # review. Running it in between spends runner time on a tree that is - # known to be mid-flight, and its red/green says nothing anyone acts on. - # - # To bring it back: delete this block down to the marker below and - # restore the `pull_request:` trigger that follows it, which is left - # commented out verbatim so re-enabling is a deletion, not a rewrite. - # Nothing else in this file was changed for the pause — every job, guard - # and gate is untouched, so the first run after re-enabling exercises - # exactly what it did before. - # - # `workflow_dispatch` stays available: a run can still be started by - # hand from the Actions tab when a specific answer is wanted. workflow_dispatch: - # --- restore from here ------------------------------------------------ # CI runs on every pull request regardless of target branch. This # makes the default safe for stacked PRs (PR-A → PR-B → PR-C where # each PR's base is the previous PR's branch) and any other workflow @@ -42,9 +23,8 @@ on: # draft PR is marked ready — drafts themselves skip CI via the # `if:` guard on the job (saves runner time while work is still in # progress). - # pull_request: - # types: [opened, synchronize, reopened, ready_for_review] - # --- restore to here -------------------------------------------------- + pull_request: + types: [opened, synchronize, reopened, ready_for_review] concurrency: # Group by PR number so a new push to the same PR cancels the From 704d99b8b842f88607cde0d89e9979b72fae3ee1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: TaprootFreak <142087526+TaprootFreak@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Sun, 2 Aug 2026 22:24:15 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 17/23] fix: close the concrete findings a review raised, keep the honest ones honest MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit A review of the diff raised findings across three areas; these are the concrete ones (the API↔kernel verification-boundary findings are a separate, documented follow-up). Every `Json` handler now goes through one `JsonBody` extractor that maps axum's parse, content-type and body-limit rejections onto the closed §7.5 error surface — before, only `POST /v1/tx` did, so the rest leaked axum's own 400/415/422. A body over the limit stays `413 payload_too_large`, not `400`; only a genuine parse or content-type error is `400`. A deactivated but known route answers `404 feature_disabled` with the machine code its own docs promise, instead of a generic axum 404, while staying out of discovery. `build_router` returns a `Result` rather than `panic!`-ing on a store-open error, so `main` reports it like every other startup failure. `ApiError::internal` no longer puts the internal text — store paths, OS errors, kernel-contract detail — into the public 500 body; the cause is logged, the response is constant. Job-terminal states run through one validator (closed status set, status↔payload exclusivity, SSE event↔status correlation, attest requires `accepted`), and `unauthorized↔401` / `session_expired↔410` are validated as pairs so a contradictory kernel combination fails closed as 500. Blossom store writes use unique temp names and atomic no-replace, and blocking file I/O moves off the reactor via `spawn_blocking`. The `proto_identity` sibling-node comparison is documented as local-only (CI's real gate is pin==file), so an absent `../node` is a named skip, not a silent green. `memo`'s absent==empty is documented as the §1.5 normalisation it is, not "unchanged". --- .github/workflows/ci.yaml | 40 +-- README.md | 4 +- src/attest.rs | 13 +- src/blossom/mod.rs | 79 ++++- src/blossom/store.rs | 398 ++++++++++++++++++---- src/bootstrap.rs | 7 +- src/chain.rs | 27 +- src/error.rs | 71 +++- src/extract.rs | 153 +++++++++ src/grants.rs | 5 +- src/info.rs | 37 ++- src/jobs.rs | 384 +++++++++++++++++---- src/kernel/client.rs | 7 +- src/kernel/error_info.rs | 108 ++++-- src/lib.rs | 3 +- src/main.rs | 8 +- src/proto_identity.rs | 40 ++- src/publish.rs | 3 +- src/pull.rs | 5 +- src/routes.rs | 677 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 20 files changed, 1685 insertions(+), 384 deletions(-) create mode 100644 src/extract.rs diff --git a/.github/workflows/ci.yaml b/.github/workflows/ci.yaml index 7b5604d..7f91d4d 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/ci.yaml +++ b/.github/workflows/ci.yaml @@ -3,6 +3,16 @@ name: CI on: workflow_dispatch: + # Target-branch gate: every commit that lands on `develop` (direct push + # or merge) gets its own run. Grouped by commit SHA below so a simultaneous + # `pull_request` synchronize on the same SHA is deduplicated rather than + # queued twice. + push: + branches: [develop] + + # merge_group: required-check runs for merge queue entries (when enabled). + merge_group: + # CI runs on every pull request regardless of target branch. This # makes the default safe for stacked PRs (PR-A → PR-B → PR-C where # each PR's base is the previous PR's branch) and any other workflow @@ -11,14 +21,6 @@ on: # them out, and the only fix was to hand-edit ci.yaml on each new # feature stack. # - # `push: develop` is intentionally absent. Every commit reaching - # `develop` is already covered by an open PR's `synchronize` event; - # adding `on: push: branches: [develop]` would queue a second - # workflow instance on the same SHA. (Under the PR-number grouping - # in the concurrency block below the two runs would land in - # DIFFERENT groups — push keyed by `refs/heads/develop`, PR keyed - # by the PR's number — so the block would not deduplicate them.) - # # `ready_for_review` is added so the workflow fires the moment a # draft PR is marked ready — drafts themselves skip CI via the # `if:` guard on the job (saves runner time while work is still in @@ -27,14 +29,14 @@ on: types: [opened, synchronize, reopened, ready_for_review] concurrency: - # Group by PR number so a new push to the same PR cancels the - # in-flight run on the outdated commit. Grouping by SHA would put - # every commit in its own group, so `cancel-in-progress: true` - # never fired and back-to-back pushes queued sequentially. - # Falls back to `github.ref` for push/dispatch events (where there - # is no `pull_request.number`), so e.g. a `workflow_dispatch` on - # the same ref serializes too. - group: ci-${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.event.pull_request.number || github.ref }} + # Group by commit SHA so: + # - a `push` to develop and a `pull_request` event for the same SHA + # collapse into one in-flight run (`cancel-in-progress`); + # - re-runs of the same commit replace the previous attempt. + # Per-PR "cancel outdated intermediate commits" is not applied: each + # distinct SHA is a separate group (preferred for develop target-branch + # gates and SHA-stable required checks). + group: ci-${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.sha }} cancel-in-progress: true permissions: @@ -46,7 +48,7 @@ env: # Single job on GitHub-hosted Linux: fmt, clippy, build, test. # No Postgres/testcontainers, no Plonky2 prover, no llvm-cov coverage # gate, no self-hosted runner — this tree is small enough that the -# four local gates (192 tests) fit on `ubuntu-latest` in one job. +# local gates fit on `ubuntu-latest` in one job. # # No `notify-failure` job: this repository does not hold the Telegram # bot secrets (`TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN` / `TELEGRAM_CHAT_ID`). Add one — @@ -55,8 +57,8 @@ env: jobs: lint-and-build: name: Lint & Build - # Skip on draft PRs. Non-PR events (push, workflow_dispatch) always - # run: `github.event.pull_request` is absent there, so the + # Skip on draft PRs. Non-PR events (push, merge_group, workflow_dispatch) + # always run: `github.event.pull_request` is absent there, so the # `event_name != 'pull_request'` arm keeps them enabled. if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' || github.event.pull_request.draft == false runs-on: ubuntu-latest diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 8849f48..2d507cb 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -32,12 +32,12 @@ The API layer sits **outward** of the node. It consumes the node's internal **ke > **Status: scaffold.** The API surface is currently served by [`zk-coins/node`](https://github.com/zk-coins/node) directly; this repo will hold the standalone API layer once the kernel RPC contract stabilises. The full design is specified in [§6.1 (kernel and API)](https://docs.zkcoins.com/specification), [§7.5 (REST)](https://docs.zkcoins.com/specification), and [§7.8 (kernel RPC)](https://docs.zkcoins.com/specification). -### Inventory and stage A (this branch) +### Current surface - Full §7.5 endpoint inventory (method, capability, feature, kernel RPC): [`docs/rest-surface.md`](docs/rest-surface.md). - Rust process (`axum` + `tonic 0.13.1` client): **`GET /`**, **`GET /health`**, info/chain reads, the job surface, **attest/grants**, pull/records/account, **`GET /v1/receipts/stream`** (SSE over `SubscribeReceipts`), bootstrap/publish, and optional Blossom. No placeholder routes for unbuilt keys. - **OwnershipProof** for attest/grants is verified at the API edge (BIP-340, action-bound domain, `chan_bind`, `request_hash`) **before** any kernel call that would consume a challenge nonce. -- **`GET /` discovery follows registration** via `ServedSurface` — only served keys are advertised. The 29-key catalogue stays as inventory. +- **`GET /` discovery follows registration** via `ServedSurface` — only served keys are advertised. Known-but-disabled inventory paths answer `404 feature_disabled`. The 29-key catalogue stays as inventory. - Kernel contract: carried `proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto` with SHA-256 identity pin (`src/proto_identity.rs`); REST errors from `ErrorInfo.metadata["http_status"]` only (API-local auth failures use §7.5 `401 unauthorized` directly). - Codegen lives in the workspace member **`kernel-proto`** (tonic client stubs only). Workspace `default-members = ["."]` keeps default `cargo clippy` / `cargo test` on the **api** package so generated code is not linted. - Fail-closed env: `ZKCOINS_BIND_ADDR`, `ZKCOINS_KERNEL_ADDR`, `ZKCOINS_FEATURES`, `ZKCOINS_PUBLIC_HOST` (see the inventory doc). Optional Blossom store: `ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_STORE` (+ max bytes / allowed ops companions). diff --git a/src/attest.rs b/src/attest.rs index 603fe28..d8ddbe7 100644 --- a/src/attest.rs +++ b/src/attest.rs @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ //! already-authenticated subject plus `nonce` / `chan_bind`. use crate::error::ApiError; +use crate::extract::JsonBody; use crate::hexutil::{decode_hex_exact, encode_hex}; use crate::kernel::kernel_v1::{AttestRequest, JobHandle, PullChallengeRequest}; use crate::ownership::{ @@ -53,7 +54,7 @@ pub struct AttestBalanceBody { /// `POST /v1/attest/balance/challenge` → OpenPullChallenge(action=attest_balance). pub async fn post_attest_balance_challenge( State(state): State, - Json(body): Json, + JsonBody(body): JsonBody, ) -> Result { if body.subject.is_empty() { return Err(ApiError::malformed("subject is required")); @@ -99,7 +100,7 @@ pub async fn post_attest_balance_challenge( /// cannot consume the single-use challenge nonce. pub async fn post_attest_balance( State(state): State, - Json(body): Json, + JsonBody(body): JsonBody, ) -> Result { // ---- pure validation + OwnershipProof (no kernel) ---- let nav_ceiling = match &body.nav_ceiling { @@ -168,11 +169,19 @@ pub async fn post_attest_balance( .await?; // §7.5 L2894: `202 { job_id }` — no status field on this admit response. + // JobHandle.status must still be the admit terminal `"accepted"` (same + // contract as POST /v1/tx); any other value is a kernel protocol fault. if handle.job_id.is_empty() { return Err(ApiError::internal( "kernel JobHandle.job_id is empty on AttestBalance success", )); } + if handle.status != "accepted" { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "kernel JobHandle.status must be \"accepted\" on AttestBalance success, got {:?}", + handle.status + ))); + } let body = json!({ "job_id": handle.job_id }); Ok((StatusCode::ACCEPTED, Json(body)).into_response()) } diff --git a/src/blossom/mod.rs b/src/blossom/mod.rs index 4390a7e..eca365d 100644 --- a/src/blossom/mod.rs +++ b/src/blossom/mod.rs @@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ pub use auth::{ pub use store::{blob_id_of, BlobStore}; use crate::error::ApiError; +use crate::extract::LimitedBytes; use crate::hexutil::{decode_hex_exact, encode_hex}; use crate::state::AppState; -use axum::body::Bytes; use axum::extract::{Path, State}; use axum::http::{header, HeaderMap, HeaderValue, StatusCode}; use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response}; @@ -70,6 +70,53 @@ struct UploadResponse { blob_id: String, } +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Blocking store helpers (keep reactor threads free of sync fsync/read) +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +async fn store_read(store: Arc, id: [u8; 32]) -> Result>, ApiError> { + tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || store.read(&id)) + .await + .map_err(|e| ApiError::internal(format!("blossom store read join: {e}")))? +} + +async fn store_size(store: Arc, id: [u8; 32]) -> Result, ApiError> { + tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || store.size(&id)) + .await + .map_err(|e| ApiError::internal(format!("blossom store size join: {e}")))? +} + +async fn store_exists(store: Arc, id: [u8; 32]) -> Result { + tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || store.exists(&id)) + .await + .map_err(|e| ApiError::internal(format!("blossom store exists join: {e}"))) +} + +async fn store_read_uploader( + store: Arc, + id: [u8; 32], +) -> Result, ApiError> { + tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || store.read_uploader(&id)) + .await + .map_err(|e| ApiError::internal(format!("blossom store read_uploader join: {e}")))? +} + +async fn store_put( + store: Arc, + body: axum::body::Bytes, + uploader: [u8; 32], +) -> Result<[u8; 32], ApiError> { + tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || store.put(&body, &uploader)) + .await + .map_err(|e| ApiError::internal(format!("blossom store put join: {e}")))? +} + +async fn store_delete(store: Arc, id: [u8; 32]) -> Result { + tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || store.delete(&id)) + .await + .map_err(|e| ApiError::internal(format!("blossom store delete join: {e}")))? +} + // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- // Handlers // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -81,9 +128,8 @@ pub async fn get_blob( ) -> Result { let blossom = require_blossom(&state)?; let id = BlobStore::parse_blob_id(&sha256)?; - let bytes = blossom - .store - .read(&id)? + let bytes = store_read(Arc::clone(&blossom.store), id) + .await? .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::not_found(format!("blob {sha256} not found")))?; let mut res = Response::new(axum::body::Body::from(bytes)); *res.status_mut() = StatusCode::OK; @@ -101,9 +147,8 @@ pub async fn head_blob( ) -> Result { let blossom = require_blossom(&state)?; let id = BlobStore::parse_blob_id(&sha256)?; - let size = blossom - .store - .size(&id)? + let size = store_size(Arc::clone(&blossom.store), id) + .await? .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::not_found(format!("blob {sha256} not found")))?; let mut res = Response::new(axum::body::Body::empty()); *res.status_mut() = StatusCode::OK; @@ -123,14 +168,16 @@ pub async fn head_blob( pub async fn upload_blob( State(state): State, headers: HeaderMap, - body: Bytes, + LimitedBytes(body): LimitedBytes, ) -> Result { let blossom = require_blossom(&state)?; // Content-Type is mandatory application/octet-stream. require_octet_stream(&headers)?; - // Body size — advertised limit, no clamping. + // Body size — advertised limit, no clamping. The route-level body limit is + // set to the same max so axum buffering rejects far-oversized bodies; both + // paths map to §7.5 `payload_too_large` (handler check + LimitedBytes). let max = blossom.max_blob_bytes; let body_len = body.len() as u64; if body_len > max { @@ -162,7 +209,7 @@ pub async fn upload_blob( )); } - let id = blossom.store.put(&body, &verified.op_pubkey)?; + let id = store_put(Arc::clone(&blossom.store), body, verified.op_pubkey).await?; debug_assert_eq!(id, body_hash); // Honest response without receipt (§4.6 absent). @@ -184,14 +231,16 @@ pub async fn delete_blob( let blossom = require_blossom(&state)?; let id = BlobStore::parse_blob_id(&sha256)?; - if !blossom.store.exists(&id) { + if !store_exists(Arc::clone(&blossom.store), id).await? { return Err(ApiError::not_found(format!("blob {sha256} not found"))); } // Fail-closed: no uploader note ⇒ refuse DELETE (never allow). - let original = blossom.store.read_uploader(&id)?.ok_or_else(|| { - ApiError::scope_exceeded("blob has no uploader note; DELETE refused (fail-closed)") - })?; + let original = store_read_uploader(Arc::clone(&blossom.store), id) + .await? + .ok_or_else(|| { + ApiError::scope_exceeded("blob has no uploader note; DELETE refused (fail-closed)") + })?; let auth_header = headers .get(header::AUTHORIZATION) @@ -208,7 +257,7 @@ pub async fn delete_blob( )); } - let deleted = blossom.store.delete(&id)?; + let deleted = store_delete(Arc::clone(&blossom.store), id).await?; if !deleted { // Race: blob vanished between exists and delete. return Err(ApiError::not_found(format!("blob {sha256} not found"))); diff --git a/src/blossom/store.rs b/src/blossom/store.rs index fd229a3..85f0f63 100644 --- a/src/blossom/store.rs +++ b/src/blossom/store.rs @@ -8,12 +8,26 @@ //! traversal (`..`, separators, uppercase, Unicode tricks) is structurally //! impossible — not filtered after the fact. //! -//! ## Atomic write +//! ## Atomic write (no-replace) //! -//! Upload writes to a temporary file in the same directory, then `rename`s -//! onto the final address. An aborted upload cannot leave a half-written -//! blob under a valid content address (that would break the content- -//! addressed invariant: address would no longer hash to content). +//! Upload writes blob and uploader-note to unique temp files in the same +//! directory, then installs each final name with **hard-link create-new** +//! semantics (`hard_link` fails with `AlreadyExists` if the target is +//! present). That closes the TOCTOU between `is_file()` and `rename()`, and +//! never replaces an existing content-addressed object or note. +//! +//! Temp names include process id, a monotonic counter, and a time component +//! so concurrent puts never share a temp path. +//! +//! ## Blob + note pair +//! +//! A durable object is the pair `(blob, note)`. Install order is blob then +//! note; if note install fails after blob install, the blob we just created +//! is rolled back. A crash between the two can leave a blob without a note +//! — **incomplete**. `put` refuses while incomplete (no new note on an +//! orphan). Recovery on `open` removes incomplete pairs. A complete pair is +//! never reported for an incomplete address, so a foreign retry cannot +//! inherit DELETE ownership. //! //! ## Uploader note //! @@ -28,10 +42,14 @@ use sha2::{Digest, Sha256}; use std::fs::{self, File, OpenOptions}; use std::io::{self, Write}; use std::path::{Path, PathBuf}; +use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering}; +use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH}; /// Exactly 64 lowercase hex characters (32 decoded bytes). pub const BLOB_ID_HEX_LEN: usize = 64; +static TMP_SEQ: AtomicU64 = AtomicU64::new(0); + /// Content-addressed store rooted at `root`. #[derive(Debug, Clone)] pub struct BlobStore { @@ -40,7 +58,7 @@ pub struct BlobStore { impl BlobStore { /// Open (or create) a store at `root`. No default path — the caller must - /// supply a configured root. + /// supply a configured root. Runs incomplete-pair recovery before return. pub fn open(root: impl Into) -> Result { let root = root.into(); fs::create_dir_all(&root).map_err(|e| { @@ -61,7 +79,9 @@ impl BlobStore { root.display() ))); } - Ok(Self { root }) + let store = Self { root }; + store.recover_incomplete_pairs()?; + Ok(store) } /// Filesystem root (tests / diagnostics). @@ -118,13 +138,17 @@ impl BlobStore { .join(format!("{}.uploader", Self::blob_id_hex(id))) } - /// `true` when a durable blob exists under this address. + /// `true` when a **complete** durable pair (blob + note) exists. pub fn exists(&self, id: &[u8; 32]) -> bool { - self.blob_path(id).is_file() + self.blob_path(id).is_file() && self.uploader_path(id).is_file() } - /// Byte length of a stored blob, or `None` if absent. + /// Byte length of a stored blob, or `None` if the complete pair is absent. pub fn size(&self, id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result, ApiError> { + if !self.exists(id) { + // Incomplete orphan: not a readable object. + return Ok(None); + } let path = self.blob_path(id); match fs::metadata(&path) { Ok(m) if m.is_file() => Ok(Some(m.len())), @@ -140,8 +164,11 @@ impl BlobStore { } } - /// Read the full blob body, or `None` if absent. + /// Read the full blob body, or `None` if the complete pair is absent. pub fn read(&self, id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result>, ApiError> { + if !self.exists(id) { + return Ok(None); + } let path = self.blob_path(id); match fs::read(&path) { Ok(bytes) => Ok(Some(bytes)), @@ -179,65 +206,108 @@ impl BlobStore { Ok(Some(id)) } - /// Store `body` under `blob_id = H(body)`. Idempotent: if the address - /// already holds a file, the body is not rewritten and the uploader note - /// is left alone (first-uploader wins for DELETE). + /// Store `body` under `blob_id = H(body)`. Idempotent when a **complete** + /// pair already exists: body is not rewritten and the uploader note is + /// left alone (first-uploader wins for DELETE). + /// + /// Incomplete pairs (blob without note) are recovered away before install + /// so a retry never inherits foreign DELETE ownership. /// /// Returns the content address. pub fn put(&self, body: &[u8], uploader_op: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<[u8; 32], ApiError> { let id: [u8; 32] = Sha256::digest(body).into(); let final_path = self.blob_path(&id); + let note_path = self.uploader_path(&id); - if final_path.is_file() { - // Content-addressed: same bytes ⇒ same address. Do not touch the - // original uploader note. + // Complete pair: first-uploader wins; do not rewrite note. + if final_path.is_file() && note_path.is_file() { return Ok(id); } - // Atomic blob write: temp in same directory, then rename. - let tmp_name = format!(".{}.tmp.{}", Self::blob_id_hex(&id), std::process::id()); - let tmp_path = self.root.join(&tmp_name); - write_exclusive(&tmp_path, body).map_err(|e| { - let _ = fs::remove_file(&tmp_path); - ApiError::internal(format!( - "blossom store: write temp {}: {e}", - tmp_path.display() - )) - })?; - fs::rename(&tmp_path, &final_path).map_err(|e| { - let _ = fs::remove_file(&tmp_path); - ApiError::internal(format!( - "blossom store: rename {} → {}: {e}", - tmp_path.display(), - final_path.display() - )) - })?; + // Incomplete pair (blob xor note): do **not** attach a new uploader + // note — that would hand DELETE ownership to a foreign retry. Fail + // closed; `open` / operator recovery clears orphans. + if final_path.is_file() || note_path.is_file() { + return Err(ApiError::internal( + "blossom store: incomplete blob/note pair present; \ + refuse put so a foreign retry cannot claim DELETE ownership \ + (run store open recovery or remove the orphan)", + )); + } - // Uploader note — also atomic. Failure after the blob rename is - // reported loudly; DELETE will fail-closed without the note. - let note_path = self.uploader_path(&id); - let note_tmp = self.root.join(format!( - ".{}.uploader.tmp.{}", - Self::blob_id_hex(&id), - std::process::id() - )); + let tag = unique_tmp_tag(); + let hex = Self::blob_id_hex(&id); + let blob_tmp = self.root.join(format!(".{hex}.blob.tmp.{tag}")); + let note_tmp = self.root.join(format!(".{hex}.note.tmp.{tag}")); + + // Both temps first (unique names — no collision across concurrent puts). + if let Err(e) = write_exclusive(&blob_tmp, body) { + let _ = fs::remove_file(&blob_tmp); + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "blossom store: write blob temp {}: {e}", + blob_tmp.display() + ))); + } let note_hex = encode_hex(uploader_op); - write_exclusive(¬e_tmp, note_hex.as_bytes()).map_err(|e| { + if let Err(e) = write_exclusive(¬e_tmp, note_hex.as_bytes()) { + let _ = fs::remove_file(&blob_tmp); let _ = fs::remove_file(¬e_tmp); - ApiError::internal(format!( - "blossom store: write uploader temp {}: {e}", + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "blossom store: write note temp {}: {e}", note_tmp.display() - )) - })?; - fs::rename(¬e_tmp, ¬e_path).map_err(|e| { - let _ = fs::remove_file(¬e_tmp); - ApiError::internal(format!( - "blossom store: rename uploader note {}: {e}", - note_path.display() - )) - })?; + ))); + } + + // Install blob with no-replace. Concurrent winner may have finished a + // complete pair in the meantime. + match install_no_replace(&blob_tmp, &final_path) { + Ok(()) => {} + Err(e) if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::AlreadyExists => { + let _ = fs::remove_file(¬e_tmp); + // Another put won the blob slot. If they also installed the + // note, we are the idempotent loser — success, original note. + // If note is still missing, do not attach ours (ownership). + if note_path.is_file() { + return Ok(id); + } + return Err(ApiError::internal( + "blossom store: concurrent put left incomplete pair; retry after recovery", + )); + } + Err(e) => { + let _ = fs::remove_file(¬e_tmp); + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "blossom store: install blob {}: {e}", + final_path.display() + ))); + } + } - Ok(id) + // Install note; roll back our blob if this fails so we do not leave + // an incomplete pair that a foreign retry could claim as success. + match install_no_replace(¬e_tmp, ¬e_path) { + Ok(()) => Ok(id), + Err(e) if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::AlreadyExists => { + // Note appeared (shouldn't under normal exclusive install of + // the same id by us) — treat complete pair as success. + if note_path.is_file() { + Ok(id) + } else { + let _ = fs::remove_file(&final_path); + Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "blossom store: install note race on {}: {e}", + note_path.display() + ))) + } + } + Err(e) => { + let _ = fs::remove_file(&final_path); + Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "blossom store: install note {}: {e}", + note_path.display() + ))) + } + } } /// Delete blob and uploader note. Returns `true` if the blob existed. @@ -269,6 +339,59 @@ impl BlobStore { Ok(existed) } + /// Remove incomplete pairs under the store root (blob without note, or + /// note without blob). Temp files are left for the next put's unique + /// names / OS cleanup of abandoned temps is best-effort. + fn recover_incomplete_pairs(&self) -> Result<(), ApiError> { + let rd = fs::read_dir(&self.root).map_err(|e| { + ApiError::internal(format!( + "blossom store: read_dir {}: {e}", + self.root.display() + )) + })?; + let mut blob_hexes = Vec::new(); + let mut note_hexes = Vec::new(); + for entry in rd { + let entry = entry + .map_err(|e| ApiError::internal(format!("blossom store: read_dir entry: {e}")))?; + let name = match entry.file_name().into_string() { + Ok(s) => s, + Err(_) => continue, + }; + if name.len() == BLOB_ID_HEX_LEN + && name.bytes().all(|b| matches!(b, b'0'..=b'9' | b'a'..=b'f')) + { + if entry.path().is_file() { + blob_hexes.push(name); + } + continue; + } + if let Some(hex) = name.strip_suffix(".uploader") { + if hex.len() == BLOB_ID_HEX_LEN + && hex.bytes().all(|b| matches!(b, b'0'..=b'9' | b'a'..=b'f')) + && entry.path().is_file() + { + note_hexes.push(hex.to_string()); + } + } + } + for hex in &blob_hexes { + let note = self.root.join(format!("{hex}.uploader")); + if !note.is_file() { + let blob = self.root.join(hex); + let _ = fs::remove_file(&blob); + } + } + for hex in ¬e_hexes { + let blob = self.root.join(hex); + if !blob.is_file() { + let note = self.root.join(format!("{hex}.uploader")); + let _ = fs::remove_file(¬e); + } + } + Ok(()) + } + /// Test/diagnostic: list names of regular files directly under the root. /// Never follows the path parameter — used only to prove traversal tests /// did not touch files outside the store. @@ -301,19 +424,49 @@ fn nibble(b: u8) -> u8 { } } +fn unique_tmp_tag() -> String { + let seq = TMP_SEQ.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed); + let nanos = SystemTime::now() + .duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH) + .map(|d| d.as_nanos()) + .unwrap_or(0); + format!("{}-{}-{}", std::process::id(), nanos, seq) +} + /// Create a new file exclusively and write all bytes, then sync. fn write_exclusive(path: &Path, bytes: &[u8]) -> io::Result<()> { let mut f = OpenOptions::new().write(true).create_new(true).open(path)?; f.write_all(bytes)?; f.sync_all()?; - // Drop closes the file before rename. + // Drop closes the file before link/rename. drop(f); // Touch parent directory durability on platforms that need it is - // best-effort; rename is still atomic for the directory entry. + // best-effort; the directory entry install below is still atomic. let _ = File::open(path.parent().unwrap_or(Path::new("."))).and_then(|d| d.sync_all()); Ok(()) } +/// Install `tmp` at `final_path` only if `final_path` does not already exist. +/// +/// Uses `hard_link` (fails with `AlreadyExists` when the target is present) +/// then removes the temp. Never rename-over. +fn install_no_replace(tmp: &Path, final_path: &Path) -> io::Result<()> { + match fs::hard_link(tmp, final_path) { + Ok(()) => { + let _ = fs::remove_file(tmp); + Ok(()) + } + Err(e) if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::AlreadyExists => { + let _ = fs::remove_file(tmp); + Err(e) + } + Err(e) => { + let _ = fs::remove_file(tmp); + Err(e) + } + } +} + /// SHA-256 of raw bytes — the normative `blob_id` (§4.2.1). pub fn blob_id_of(body: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] { Sha256::digest(body).into() @@ -322,7 +475,8 @@ pub fn blob_id_of(body: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] { #[cfg(test)] mod tests { use super::*; - use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH}; + use std::sync::Arc; + use std::thread; fn temp_root() -> PathBuf { let nanos = SystemTime::now() @@ -414,8 +568,8 @@ mod tests { let store = BlobStore::open(&root).expect("open"); let body = b"partial-write-simulation"; let id = blob_id_of(body); - // Simulate an aborted upload: temp file left behind, no rename. - let tmp = root.join(format!(".{}.tmp.aborted", BlobStore::blob_id_hex(&id))); + // Simulate an aborted upload: temp file left behind, no install. + let tmp = root.join(format!(".{}.blob.tmp.aborted", BlobStore::blob_id_hex(&id))); fs::write(&tmp, body).expect("write temp"); assert!( store.read(&id).expect("read").is_none(), @@ -425,6 +579,40 @@ mod tests { let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&root); } + #[test] + fn incomplete_blob_without_note_refuses_put_and_open_recovers() { + let root = temp_root(); + let store = BlobStore::open(&root).expect("open"); + let body = b"orphan-blob-body"; + let id = blob_id_of(body); + // Simulate crash after blob install, before note. + fs::write(store.blob_path(&id), body).expect("orphan blob"); + assert!(store.read_uploader(&id).expect("read").is_none()); + assert!( + !store.exists(&id), + "incomplete pair must not count as exists" + ); + // Foreign retry must not claim DELETE ownership via a new note. + let uploader = [0x33u8; 32]; + let err = store + .put(body, &uploader) + .expect_err("put must refuse incomplete"); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); + assert!( + err.cause().unwrap_or("").contains("incomplete"), + "cause must name incomplete pair, got {:?}", + err.cause() + ); + // open recovery clears the orphan; a subsequent put may then succeed. + drop(store); + let store = BlobStore::open(&root).expect("re-open recovers"); + assert!(!store.blob_path(&id).is_file()); + let id2 = store.put(body, &uploader).expect("put after recovery"); + assert_eq!(id2, id); + assert_eq!(store.read_uploader(&id).unwrap().unwrap(), uploader); + let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&root); + } + #[test] fn delete_without_uploader_note_is_detectable() { let root = temp_root(); @@ -434,7 +622,93 @@ mod tests { // Remove only the note — DELETE auth path must refuse. fs::remove_file(store.uploader_path(&id)).expect("rm note"); assert!(store.read_uploader(&id).expect("read").is_none()); - assert!(store.exists(&id)); + // exists requires the complete pair. + assert!(!store.exists(&id)); + let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&root); + } + + #[test] + fn open_recovers_incomplete_pairs() { + let root = temp_root(); + fs::create_dir_all(&root).unwrap(); + let body = b"recover-me"; + let id = blob_id_of(body); + let hex = BlobStore::blob_id_hex(&id); + fs::write(root.join(&hex), body).unwrap(); + // No note — open must clear the orphan. + let store = BlobStore::open(&root).expect("open"); + assert!(!store.blob_path(&id).is_file()); + let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&root); + } + + /// Parallel puts of the **same** content by different uploaders: exactly + /// one note wins (first complete pair); no panic; both observe Ok. + #[test] + fn parallel_puts_same_bytes_single_uploader_note() { + let root = temp_root(); + let store = Arc::new(BlobStore::open(&root).expect("open")); + let body = b"parallel-same-bytes"; + let mut handles = Vec::new(); + for i in 0..8u8 { + let store = Arc::clone(&store); + handles.push(thread::spawn(move || { + let mut op = [0u8; 32]; + op[0] = i; + store.put(body, &op) + })); + } + let mut oks = 0; + for h in handles { + if h.join().expect("thread").is_ok() { + oks += 1; + } + } + assert!(oks >= 1, "at least one put must succeed"); + let id = blob_id_of(body); + let note = store + .read_uploader(&id) + .expect("note") + .expect("complete pair must have a note"); + // Note is some single uploader — stable after all joins. + assert_eq!(store.read(&id).unwrap().unwrap(), body); + // Second wave still preserves that note. + let late = store.put(body, &[0xff; 32]).expect("late put"); + assert_eq!(late, id); + assert_eq!( + store.read_uploader(&id).unwrap().unwrap(), + note, + "first complete uploader must win DELETE ownership" + ); + let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&root); + } + + /// Parallel puts of **different** content by different uploaders all + /// succeed with their own notes. + #[test] + fn parallel_puts_distinct_uploaders_and_bodies() { + let root = temp_root(); + let store = Arc::new(BlobStore::open(&root).expect("open")); + let mut handles = Vec::new(); + for i in 0..8u8 { + let store = Arc::clone(&store); + handles.push(thread::spawn(move || { + let body = vec![i; 32]; + let mut op = [0u8; 32]; + op[0] = i; + op[1] = 0xaa; + let id = store.put(&body, &op)?; + let note = store + .read_uploader(&id)? + .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::internal("missing note after put"))?; + if note != op { + return Err(ApiError::internal("note mismatch after put")); + } + Ok::<_, ApiError>(id) + })); + } + for h in handles { + h.join().expect("thread").expect("put"); + } let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&root); } } diff --git a/src/bootstrap.rs b/src/bootstrap.rs index 2c35be2..09c1dbf 100644 --- a/src/bootstrap.rs +++ b/src/bootstrap.rs @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ //! the kernel is dialed; a bad body fails at the edge with length/form only. use crate::error::ApiError; +use crate::extract::JsonBody; use crate::hexutil::encode_hex; use crate::kernel::kernel_v1::{ EntrustRequest, EntrustResult, PullChallengeRequest, RevokeRequest, RevokeResult, @@ -149,7 +150,7 @@ fn hex_nibble(b: u8) -> Option { /// `POST /v1/bootstrap/challenge` → OpenPullChallenge(action=entrust|revoke). pub async fn post_bootstrap_challenge( State(state): State, - Json(body): Json, + JsonBody(body): JsonBody, ) -> Result { if body.subject.is_empty() { return Err(ApiError::malformed("subject is required")); @@ -207,7 +208,7 @@ pub async fn post_bootstrap_challenge( /// never leaves this process as a secret-bearing RPC payload. pub async fn post_bootstrap_entrust( State(state): State, - Json(body): Json, + JsonBody(body): JsonBody, ) -> Result { // ---- pure validation (no kernel) ---- // Bundle first: reject wrong width without touching the challenge store. @@ -252,7 +253,7 @@ pub async fn post_bootstrap_entrust( /// `RevokeOperationalBundle`. pub async fn post_bootstrap_revoke( State(state): State, - Json(body): Json, + JsonBody(body): JsonBody, ) -> Result { let subject = body.ownership_proof.subject.clone(); if subject.is_empty() { diff --git a/src/chain.rs b/src/chain.rs index d7e5393..773f2df 100644 --- a/src/chain.rs +++ b/src/chain.rs @@ -658,10 +658,11 @@ mod tests { }; let err = accumulator_to_json(&tip).expect_err("bad root"); assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); + assert_eq!(err.body.message, crate::error::PUBLIC_INTERNAL_MESSAGE); assert!( - err.body.message.contains("root"), - "message must name the field, got {}", - err.body.message + err.cause().unwrap_or("").contains("root"), + "operator cause must name the field, got {:?}", + err.cause() ); } @@ -692,10 +693,11 @@ mod tests { let ins = sample_inscription(1, 0, 0, "failed", vec![sample_nullifier("pending")]); let err = inscription_to_json(&ins).expect_err("failed confirmation"); assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); + assert_eq!(err.body.message, crate::error::PUBLIC_INTERNAL_MESSAGE); assert!( - err.body.message.contains("confirmation_state"), - "message must name confirmation_state, got {}", - err.body.message + err.cause().unwrap_or("").contains("confirmation_state"), + "operator cause must name confirmation_state, got {:?}", + err.cause() ); } @@ -1088,13 +1090,14 @@ mod tests { .await .expect_err("reversed triples must fail closed"); assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); + assert_eq!(err.body.message, crate::error::PUBLIC_INTERNAL_MESSAGE); + let cause = err.cause().unwrap_or(""); assert!( - err.body.message.contains("strictly increasing") - && err.body.message.contains("height") - && err.body.message.contains("tx_index") - && err.body.message.contains("vin_index"), - "message must name the triple-order contract, got {}", - err.body.message + cause.contains("strictly increasing") + && cause.contains("height") + && cause.contains("tx_index") + && cause.contains("vin_index"), + "operator cause must name the triple-order contract, got {cause}" ); } diff --git a/src/error.rs b/src/error.rs index 2e15f17..dd04a32 100644 --- a/src/error.rs +++ b/src/error.rs @@ -12,11 +12,19 @@ pub struct ErrorBody { pub message: String, } +/// Public wire text for every `500 internal_error`. Internal diagnostics stay +/// off the wire (absolute paths, OS errors, kernel contract detail) and are +/// carried only in [`ApiError::cause`] / structured logs. +pub const PUBLIC_INTERNAL_MESSAGE: &str = "an internal error occurred"; + /// An HTTP error ready to return from a handler. #[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] pub struct ApiError { pub status: StatusCode, pub body: ErrorBody, + /// Operator-facing cause for logs / startup diagnostics. **Never** copied + /// into the HTTP body by [`IntoResponse`]. + pub(crate) cause: Option, } impl ApiError { @@ -27,6 +35,7 @@ impl ApiError { error: error.into(), message: message.into(), }, + cause: None, } } @@ -64,6 +73,13 @@ impl ApiError { Self::new(StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, "not_found", message) } + /// §7.5 intro / §6.1: known route whose role feature is off for this + /// deployment → `404 feature_disabled`. Distinct from a bare axum 404 for + /// a path that was never registered (including unconfigured Blossom). + pub fn feature_disabled(message: impl Into) -> Self { + Self::new(StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, "feature_disabled", message) + } + /// §7.5 `payload_too_large` / 413 — Blossom body over the advertised limit. pub fn payload_too_large(message: impl Into) -> Self { Self::new(StatusCode::PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE, "payload_too_large", message) @@ -82,8 +98,26 @@ impl ApiError { /// Fail-closed stand-in when the kernel transport breaks or the kernel /// violates the ErrorInfo contract. Spec §7.5 closes the enumeration with /// `internal_error` / 500 for any condition not listed. - pub fn internal(message: impl Into) -> Self { - Self::new(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, "internal_error", message) + /// + /// The public `message` is always [`PUBLIC_INTERNAL_MESSAGE`]. The + /// diagnostic string is stored in [`Self::cause`] and emitted via + /// `tracing` only — never forwarded onto the wire. + pub fn internal(cause: impl Into) -> Self { + let cause = cause.into(); + tracing::error!(cause = %cause, "internal_error"); + Self { + status: StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, + body: ErrorBody { + error: "internal_error".to_string(), + message: PUBLIC_INTERNAL_MESSAGE.to_string(), + }, + cause: Some(cause), + } + } + + /// Operator-facing cause when present (startup / tests). Not the wire body. + pub fn cause(&self) -> Option<&str> { + self.cause.as_deref() } } @@ -92,6 +126,39 @@ impl IntoResponse for ApiError { // Always a §7.5 JSON body — never a bare status with an empty body. // (Axum's default 404 fallback is status-only; handlers must not // look like that when they intentionally return an ApiError.) + // `cause` is intentionally dropped here. (self.status, Json(self.body)).into_response() } } + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + use http_body_util::BodyExt; + + #[tokio::test] + async fn internal_public_body_is_neutral_cause_stays_off_wire() { + let err = ApiError::internal( + "blossom store: cannot create root /var/lib/secret-path: permission denied", + ); + assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); + assert_eq!(err.body.message, PUBLIC_INTERNAL_MESSAGE); + assert!( + err.cause().expect("cause retained").contains("secret-path"), + "operator cause must retain the diagnostic" + ); + let res = err.clone().into_response(); + let bytes = res.into_body().collect().await.unwrap().to_bytes(); + let text = String::from_utf8(bytes.to_vec()).unwrap(); + assert!( + !text.contains("secret-path"), + "public body must not leak the path: {text}" + ); + assert!( + !text.contains("permission denied"), + "public body must not leak the OS error: {text}" + ); + assert!(text.contains(PUBLIC_INTERNAL_MESSAGE)); + } +} diff --git a/src/extract.rs b/src/extract.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f0125f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/extract.rs @@ -0,0 +1,153 @@ +//! Shared request extractors that map axum rejections into §7.5 `ApiError`. +//! +//! Axum's default `Json` / `Bytes` rejections answer with framework status +//! codes and non-§7.5 bodies (422 unprocessable, plain-text 413, …). Every +//! public handler that reads a JSON or limited raw body must go through these +//! extractors so clients always see the closed machine-code form. + +use crate::error::ApiError; +use async_trait::async_trait; +use axum::body::Bytes; +use axum::extract::rejection::{BytesRejection, JsonRejection}; +use axum::extract::{FromRequest, Request}; +use axum::http::StatusCode; +use axum::Json; +use serde::de::DeserializeOwned; + +/// JSON body extractor that translates every rejection into §7.5 JSON. +/// +/// Use in place of `axum::Json` on public handlers. +#[derive(Debug)] +pub struct JsonBody(pub T); + +// axum 0.7 / axum-core 0.4: `FromRequest` is an `#[async_trait]` trait — the +// impl must carry the same attribute so the lifetime/Send desugaring matches +// the trait declaration (otherwise E0195 and handlers never see the extractor). +#[async_trait] +impl FromRequest for JsonBody +where + T: DeserializeOwned, + S: Send + Sync, +{ + type Rejection = ApiError; + + async fn from_request(req: Request, state: &S) -> Result { + match Json::::from_request(req, state).await { + Ok(Json(value)) => Ok(JsonBody(value)), + Err(rejection) => Err(json_rejection_to_api_error(rejection)), + } + } +} + +/// Map an axum [`JsonRejection`] onto the closed §7.5 error surface. +/// +/// - Missing / wrong Content-Type → `400 malformed_request` +/// - Syntax / data errors → `400 malformed_request` +/// - Body length limit (DefaultBodyLimit) → `413 payload_too_large` +pub fn json_rejection_to_api_error(rejection: JsonRejection) -> ApiError { + match rejection { + JsonRejection::MissingJsonContentType(_) => { + ApiError::malformed("Content-Type must be application/json") + } + JsonRejection::JsonDataError(err) => ApiError::malformed(format!("request body: {err}")), + JsonRejection::JsonSyntaxError(err) => ApiError::malformed(format!("request body: {err}")), + JsonRejection::BytesRejection(err) => bytes_rejection_to_api_error(err), + other => ApiError::malformed(format!("request body: {other}")), + } +} + +/// Raw-body extractor with the same §7.5 rejection mapping as [`JsonBody`]. +/// +/// Used by Blossom upload so oversize bodies (including those far above the +/// configured max, not only `max + 1`) still answer with +/// `413 payload_too_large` and a JSON body — not axum's plain-text 413. +pub struct LimitedBytes(pub Bytes); + +#[async_trait] +impl FromRequest for LimitedBytes +where + S: Send + Sync, +{ + type Rejection = ApiError; + + async fn from_request(req: Request, state: &S) -> Result { + match Bytes::from_request(req, state).await { + Ok(bytes) => Ok(LimitedBytes(bytes)), + Err(rejection) => Err(bytes_rejection_to_api_error(rejection)), + } + } +} + +/// Map an axum [`BytesRejection`] (body buffer / length limit) to §7.5. +/// +/// axum 0.7 encodes both length-limit and unknown buffer failures under +/// `FailedToBufferBody` with the **same** Display body +/// (`"Failed to buffer the request body"`). The stable discriminator is +/// [`BytesRejection::status`]: `LengthLimitError` is 413, other buffer +/// failures are 400. Matching Display text collapses 413 into 400. +pub fn bytes_rejection_to_api_error(rejection: BytesRejection) -> ApiError { + if rejection.status() == StatusCode::PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE { + return ApiError::payload_too_large("request body exceeds the maximum allowed size"); + } + ApiError::malformed(format!("request body: {}", rejection.body_text())) +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + use axum::body::Body; + use axum::http::{Request, StatusCode}; + use serde::Deserialize; + + #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)] + struct Tiny { + x: u32, + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn json_body_missing_content_type_is_malformed_request() { + let req = Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/") + .body(Body::from(r#"{"x":1}"#)) + .unwrap(); + let err = JsonBody::::from_request(req, &()) + .await + .expect_err("missing content-type"); + assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "malformed_request"); + assert!( + err.body.message.contains("Content-Type") + || err.body.message.contains("application/json"), + "message must name content-type rule: {}", + err.body.message + ); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn json_body_syntax_error_is_malformed_request() { + let req = Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from("{not-json")) + .unwrap(); + let err = JsonBody::::from_request(req, &()) + .await + .expect_err("bad json"); + assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "malformed_request"); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn json_body_happy_path() { + let req = Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from(r#"{"x":7}"#)) + .unwrap(); + let JsonBody(v) = JsonBody::::from_request(req, &()).await.expect("ok"); + assert_eq!(v.x, 7); + } +} diff --git a/src/grants.rs b/src/grants.rs index c0a7117..ab21e46 100644 --- a/src/grants.rs +++ b/src/grants.rs @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ //! capability field — only the API edge can enforce this. use crate::error::ApiError; +use crate::extract::JsonBody; use crate::hexutil::{decode_hex_exact, encode_hex}; use crate::kernel::kernel_v1::{GrantRequest, PullChallengeRequest, Scope}; use crate::ownership::{ @@ -136,7 +137,7 @@ fn scope_to_proto(scope: &NormalisedScope) -> Scope { /// `POST /v1/grants/challenge` → OpenPullChallenge(action=issue_grant). pub async fn post_grants_challenge( State(state): State, - Json(body): Json, + JsonBody(body): JsonBody, ) -> Result { if body.subject.is_empty() { return Err(ApiError::malformed("subject is required")); @@ -176,7 +177,7 @@ pub async fn post_grants_challenge( /// `POST /v1/grants` → verify OwnershipProof, then IssueViewGrant. pub async fn post_grants( State(state): State, - Json(body): Json, + JsonBody(body): JsonBody, ) -> Result { // ---- pure validation + OwnershipProof (no kernel) ---- let subject_raw = decode_zk_address(&body.subject)?; diff --git a/src/info.rs b/src/info.rs index c706ed5..61badef 100644 --- a/src/info.rs +++ b/src/info.rs @@ -32,7 +32,15 @@ const READY_REASONS: &[&str] = &[ /// `GET /v1/info` → `GetInfo` + API-owned `features`. pub async fn get_info(State(state): State) -> Result { let info = state.kernel.get_info().await?; - let body = info_to_json(&info, &state.features)?; + // When Blossom is configured, advertise the API-enforced upload limit + // (`ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_MAX_BLOB_BYTES`), not the kernel's independent + // `Info.max_blob_bytes`. Clients must see the bound that PUT/POST + // `/blossom/upload` actually applies; publishing a higher kernel figure + // while the API rejects larger bodies would be inconsistent. Equality + // with the kernel is **not** required at boot — the REST surface is + // authoritative for the public limit when this process stores blobs. + let max_blob_override = state.blossom.as_ref().map(|b| b.max_blob_bytes); + let body = info_to_json(&info, &state.features, max_blob_override)?; Ok((StatusCode::OK, Json(body)).into_response()) } @@ -141,6 +149,7 @@ fn is_closed_ready_reason(reason: &str) -> bool { fn info_to_json( info: &Info, features: &std::collections::BTreeSet, + max_blob_bytes_override: Option, ) -> Result { let network = info.network.as_str(); match network { @@ -179,6 +188,13 @@ fn info_to_json( .map(|s| Value::String(s.to_string())) .collect(); + // Prefer the API Blossom limit when configured; otherwise the kernel value + // (informational — no local upload path without a store). + let max_blob_bytes = match max_blob_bytes_override { + Some(api_limit) => api_limit, + None => info.max_blob_bytes, + }; + Ok(json!({ "network": network, "protocol_version": "v1", @@ -186,7 +202,7 @@ fn info_to_json( "bootstrap_pubkey": bootstrap_pubkey, "relay_url": info.relay_url, "blossom_url": info.blossom_url, - "max_blob_bytes": info.max_blob_bytes, + "max_blob_bytes": max_blob_bytes, "finality_confirmations": info.finality_confirmations, "activation_height": info.activation_height, "max_tx_inputs": info.max_tx_inputs, @@ -327,10 +343,11 @@ mod tests { fn info_json_features_from_api_not_kernel_parts() { let info = sample_info(true, None); let features = BTreeSet::from([Feature::Wallet, Feature::Explorer]); - let json = info_to_json(&info, &features).expect("info"); + let json = info_to_json(&info, &features, None).expect("info"); assert_eq!(json["network"], "regtest"); assert_eq!(json["protocol_version"], "v1"); assert_eq!(json["features"], json!(["explorer", "wallet"])); + assert_eq!(json["max_blob_bytes"], 1_048_576); // kernel_parts must not leak onto the public surface. assert!(json.get("kernel_parts").is_none()); assert!(json.get("ready").is_none()); @@ -342,6 +359,20 @@ mod tests { ); } + /// Without the override, a lower API Blossom limit would leave clients + /// seeing the higher kernel figure while uploads reject at the API bound. + #[test] + fn info_json_prefers_api_max_blob_bytes_when_override_set() { + let info = sample_info(true, None); + assert_eq!(info.max_blob_bytes, 1_048_576); + let features = BTreeSet::new(); + let json = info_to_json(&info, &features, Some(4096)).expect("info"); + assert_eq!( + json["max_blob_bytes"], 4096, + "API-enforced limit must be advertised when Blossom is configured" + ); + } + #[test] fn readiness_ready_is_200_without_reason() { let info = sample_info(true, None); diff --git a/src/jobs.rs b/src/jobs.rs index f4ebaf4..30b2a49 100644 --- a/src/jobs.rs +++ b/src/jobs.rs @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ //! `POST /v1/jobs//cancel`. Axum registers the derived `:job_id` matcher. use crate::error::ApiError; +use crate::extract::JsonBody; use crate::hexutil::{decode_hex_exact, encode_hex, HexError}; use crate::kernel::kernel_v1::{ delivery_credential, AwaitingSignature, DeliveryCredential as ProtoDeliveryCredential, @@ -25,6 +26,162 @@ use serde_json::{json, Value}; use std::convert::Infallible; use std::fmt; +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Closed job status / error sets (§7.5 jobs family) +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +/// Closed `Job.status` vocabulary on the public poll / SSE surface. +const CLOSED_JOB_STATUSES: &[&str] = &[ + "accepted", + "proving", + "awaiting_signature", + "publishing", + "completed", + "failed", + "cancelled", +]; + +/// Closed terminal `JobError.error` machine codes (§7.5 jobs-family table). +const CLOSED_JOB_ERROR_CODES: &[&str] = &[ + "invalid_input_coin", + "insufficient_balance", + "bounds_exceeded", + "unknown_publisher", + "stale_message", + "invalid_signature", + "proving_failed", + "publish_rejected", + "circuit_digest_mismatch", + "idempotency_conflict", + "malformed_request", + "internal_error", +]; + +fn is_closed_job_status(status: &str) -> bool { + CLOSED_JOB_STATUSES.contains(&status) +} + +fn is_terminal_job_status(status: &str) -> bool { + matches!(status, "completed" | "failed" | "cancelled") +} + +fn is_closed_job_error_code(code: &str) -> bool { + CLOSED_JOB_ERROR_CODES.contains(&code) +} + +/// Validate a kernel `Job` against the closed status set, status↔payload +/// exclusivity, and terminal error-code vocabulary. Fail-closed as +/// `500 internal_error` on any contract breach (never forward foreign +/// statuses or error codes onto the public wire). +fn validate_job(job: &Job) -> Result<(), ApiError> { + if !is_closed_job_status(&job.status) { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "kernel Job.status is not a closed §7.5 job status: {:?}", + job.status + ))); + } + + let has_awaiting = job.awaiting_signature.is_some(); + let has_result = job.result.is_some(); + let has_error = job.error.is_some(); + + match job.status.as_str() { + "awaiting_signature" => { + if !has_awaiting { + return Err(ApiError::internal( + "job status is awaiting_signature but payload is absent", + )); + } + if has_result || has_error { + return Err(ApiError::internal( + "job status awaiting_signature must not carry result or error", + )); + } + } + "completed" => { + if !has_result { + return Err(ApiError::internal( + "job status is completed but result is absent", + )); + } + if has_awaiting || has_error { + return Err(ApiError::internal( + "job status completed must not carry awaiting_signature or error", + )); + } + } + "failed" | "cancelled" => { + if !has_error { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "job status is {} but error is absent", + job.status + ))); + } + if has_awaiting || has_result { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "job status {} must not carry awaiting_signature or result", + job.status + ))); + } + let err = job.error.as_ref().expect("checked has_error"); + if !is_closed_job_error_code(&err.error) { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "kernel JobError.error is not a closed job terminal code: {:?}", + err.error + ))); + } + } + // Non-terminal phases: no exclusive payloads. + "accepted" | "proving" | "publishing" => { + if has_awaiting || has_result || has_error { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "job status {} must not carry awaiting_signature, result, or error", + job.status + ))); + } + } + _ => unreachable!("closed set checked above"), + } + Ok(()) +} + +/// SSE event name ↔ job status correlation (§7.5 L2947 / L3033). +fn validate_sse_event_status(event_name: &str, job: &Job) -> Result<(), ApiError> { + validate_job(job)?; + match event_name { + "phase" => { + if is_terminal_job_status(&job.status) { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "SSE event \"phase\" must not carry terminal status {:?}", + job.status + ))); + } + } + "complete" => { + if job.status != "completed" { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "SSE event \"complete\" requires status \"completed\", got {:?}", + job.status + ))); + } + } + "error" => { + if job.status != "failed" && job.status != "cancelled" { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "SSE event \"error\" requires status failed|cancelled, got {:?}", + job.status + ))); + } + } + _ => { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "kernel JobEvent.event is not a §7.5 SSE name: {event_name:?}" + ))); + } + } + Ok(()) +} + // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- // JSON request types (exact §7.5 shapes) // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -124,9 +281,13 @@ impl fmt::Debug for DeliveryCredentialJson { /// Full §1.5 / §4.3 `Invoice` on the REST surface (§7.1 hex + decimal-string). /// /// Form only at the API: hex widths and required keys. No crypto, no address -/// preimage, no relay-URL policy. `memo` absent vs empty is preserved on the -/// REST side; proto3 string maps both to empty bytes on the wire when absent -/// or empty — the API does **not** trim a present memo. +/// preimage, no relay-URL policy. +/// +/// **`memo` (§1.5 normalisation):** Spec: "memo contributes the empty byte +/// string when absent". `None` and `Some("")` therefore both become the empty +/// proto string via `unwrap_or_default()`. Non-empty memo is copied +/// byte-for-byte (no trim). Forwarding is unchanged **except** for that +/// §1.5 memo normalisation — not a free-form "pass Option through". /// /// **Debug** redacts `pk0`, `memo`, and both signatures. #[derive(Deserialize)] @@ -234,9 +395,9 @@ pub struct SignBodyJson { /// `POST /v1/tx` → `SubmitTransition` → `202 { job_id, status: "accepted" }`. /// -/// Body is deserialized via a §7.5-shaped extractor so unknown fields and -/// other serde failures become `400 malformed_request` (not axum's default -/// 422 with a non-§7.5 body). +/// Body is deserialized via [`JsonBody`] so unknown fields, content-type +/// failures, and other serde rejections become `400 malformed_request` (not +/// axum's default 422 with a non-§7.5 body). /// /// **Retention (§7.5 `delivery`):** this handler never logs the request body /// and never interpolates credential fields into success paths. Form-error @@ -246,11 +407,8 @@ pub struct SignBodyJson { pub async fn post_tx( State(kernel): State, headers: HeaderMap, - body: Result, axum::extract::rejection::JsonRejection>, + JsonBody(body): JsonBody, ) -> Result { - // Map extractor failures to §7.5 shape. Serde's messages name field paths - // / types; they must not become a back-channel for credential contents. - let Json(body) = body.map_err(|rej| ApiError::malformed(format!("request body: {rej}")))?; let mut req = json_to_transition(body)?; // Missing header ⇒ leave proto field empty (kernel treats empty as absent). // Present-but-empty is a client error, not silently rewritten to absent. @@ -293,7 +451,7 @@ pub async fn get_job( job_id: job_id.clone(), }) .await?; - let (status_header, retry_after) = job_poll_headers(&job); + let (status_header, retry_after) = job_poll_headers(&job)?; let mut response = (status_header, Json(job_to_json(&job)?)).into_response(); if let Some(secs) = retry_after { response.headers_mut().insert( @@ -330,7 +488,7 @@ pub async fn stream_job( pub async fn post_sign( State(kernel): State, Path(job_id): Path, - Json(body): Json, + JsonBody(body): JsonBody, ) -> Result { if job_id.is_empty() { return Err(ApiError::malformed("job_id must not be empty")); @@ -424,11 +582,6 @@ fn stream_break_event(err: &ApiError) -> Event { fn job_event_to_sse(ev: &JobEvent) -> Result { let name = ev.event.as_str(); - if name != "phase" && name != "complete" && name != "error" { - return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( - "kernel JobEvent.event is not a §7.5 SSE name: {name:?}" - ))); - } let job = match &ev.job { Some(j) => j, None => { @@ -437,10 +590,12 @@ fn job_event_to_sse(ev: &JobEvent) -> Result { )); } }; + // Closed event name + status correlation + payload exclusivity. + validate_sse_event_status(name, job)?; let data = match name { "phase" => phase_event_data(job)?, "complete" | "error" => job_to_json(job)?, - _ => unreachable!("checked above"), + _ => unreachable!("validate_sse_event_status checked name"), }; Ok(Event::default().event(name).data(data.to_string())) } @@ -618,9 +773,10 @@ fn json_to_transition(body: TransitionRequestJson) -> Result Result Result, Api /// §7.5 job poll object (L2889, L2959–L2991). fn job_to_json(job: &Job) -> Result { + validate_job(job)?; + let mut obj = serde_json::Map::new(); obj.insert("job_id".to_string(), Value::String(job.job_id.clone())); obj.insert("kind".to_string(), Value::String(job.kind.clone())); obj.insert("status".to_string(), Value::String(job.status.clone())); // phase absent in terminal states (L2889). - let terminal = matches!(job.status.as_str(), "completed" | "failed" | "cancelled"); - if !terminal && !job.phase.is_empty() { + if !is_terminal_job_status(&job.status) && !job.phase.is_empty() { obj.insert("phase".to_string(), Value::String(job.phase.clone())); } obj.insert("progress".to_string(), json!(job.progress)); if job.status == "awaiting_signature" { - match &job.awaiting_signature { - Some(a) => { - obj.insert( - "awaiting_signature".to_string(), - awaiting_signature_json(a)?, - ); - } - None => { - return Err(ApiError::internal( - "job status is awaiting_signature but payload is absent", - )); - } - } + let a = job + .awaiting_signature + .as_ref() + .expect("validate_job checked"); + obj.insert( + "awaiting_signature".to_string(), + awaiting_signature_json(a)?, + ); } if job.status == "completed" { - match &job.result { - Some(r) => { - obj.insert("result".to_string(), job_result_json(r)?); - } - None => { - return Err(ApiError::internal( - "job status is completed but result is absent", - )); - } - } + let r = job.result.as_ref().expect("validate_job checked"); + obj.insert("result".to_string(), job_result_json(r)?); } if job.status == "failed" || job.status == "cancelled" { - match &job.error { - Some(e) => { - obj.insert( - "error".to_string(), - json!({ "error": e.error, "message": e.message }), - ); - } - None => { - return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( - "job status is {} but error is absent", - job.status - ))); - } - } + let e = job.error.as_ref().expect("validate_job checked"); + obj.insert( + "error".to_string(), + json!({ "error": e.error, "message": e.message }), + ); } Ok(Value::Object(obj)) @@ -941,16 +1076,19 @@ fn require_hex32(bytes: &[u8], field: &str) -> Result { } /// Poll headers: 200 always on success; Retry-After on non-terminal (L2944). -fn job_poll_headers(job: &Job) -> (StatusCode, Option) { - let terminal = matches!(job.status.as_str(), "completed" | "failed" | "cancelled"); - if terminal { - return (StatusCode::OK, None); +/// +/// Caller must already have [`validate_job`]'d — unknown status is not treated +/// as non-terminal (that would invent a retry schedule for foreign values). +fn job_poll_headers(job: &Job) -> Result<(StatusCode, Option), ApiError> { + validate_job(job)?; + if is_terminal_job_status(&job.status) { + return Ok((StatusCode::OK, None)); } let secs = match job.status.as_str() { "awaiting_signature" => 0, _ => 2, // proving / publishing / accepted — RECOMMENDED 2 (L2944) }; - (StatusCode::OK, Some(secs)) + Ok((StatusCode::OK, Some(secs))) } #[cfg(test)] @@ -1250,7 +1388,7 @@ mod tests { #[test] fn invoice_memo_absent_vs_empty_both_map_without_trim() { - // Absent memo → empty proto string. + // §1.5: absent memo → empty proto string (normalisation, not free pass-through). let mut v = mint_with_invoice_delivery(); v["output_templates"][0]["delivery"]["invoice"] .as_object_mut() @@ -1270,6 +1408,23 @@ mod tests { }; assert_eq!(inv.memo, ""); + // Present empty string also → empty (same §1.5 contribution). + let mut v_empty = mint_with_invoice_delivery(); + v_empty["output_templates"][0]["delivery"]["invoice"]["memo"] = serde_json::json!(""); + let req_empty = json_to_transition(serde_json::from_value(v_empty).unwrap()).unwrap(); + let inv_empty = match req_empty.output_templates[0] + .delivery + .as_ref() + .unwrap() + .body + .as_ref() + .unwrap() + { + DeliveryBody::Invoice(i) => i, + _ => panic!("invoice"), + }; + assert_eq!(inv_empty.memo, ""); + // Present memo with leading/trailing spaces is NOT trimmed. let mut v2 = mint_with_invoice_delivery(); v2["output_templates"][0]["delivery"]["invoice"]["memo"] = @@ -1289,6 +1444,99 @@ mod tests { assert_eq!(inv2.memo, " spaced memo "); } + fn sample_job(status: &str) -> Job { + Job { + job_id: "j1".into(), + kind: "mint".into(), + status: status.into(), + phase: String::new(), + progress: 0.0, + awaiting_signature: None, + result: None, + error: None, + } + } + + #[test] + fn validate_job_rejects_unknown_status() { + let job = sample_job("totally_unknown_phase"); + let err = validate_job(&job).expect_err("unknown status"); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); + assert!( + err.cause().unwrap_or("").contains("totally_unknown_phase") + || err.cause().unwrap_or("").contains("closed"), + "cause must name the foreign status, got {:?}", + err.cause() + ); + } + + #[test] + fn validate_job_rejects_unknown_terminal_error_code() { + let mut job = sample_job("failed"); + job.error = Some(crate::kernel::kernel_v1::JobError { + error: "not_a_real_job_error".into(), + message: "x".into(), + }); + let err = validate_job(&job).expect_err("foreign error code"); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); + assert!( + err.cause().unwrap_or("").contains("not_a_real_job_error") + || err.cause().unwrap_or("").contains("closed"), + "cause must name the foreign code, got {:?}", + err.cause() + ); + } + + #[test] + fn validate_job_enforces_status_payload_exclusivity() { + // completed without result + let job = sample_job("completed"); + assert!(validate_job(&job).is_err()); + + // accepted with error payload + let mut job = sample_job("accepted"); + job.error = Some(crate::kernel::kernel_v1::JobError { + error: "proving_failed".into(), + message: "x".into(), + }); + assert!(validate_job(&job).is_err()); + + // failed without error + let job = sample_job("failed"); + assert!(validate_job(&job).is_err()); + } + + #[test] + fn validate_sse_event_status_correlation() { + let mut proving = sample_job("proving"); + proving.phase = "witness".into(); + assert!(validate_sse_event_status("phase", &proving).is_ok()); + + // phase + terminal status is a contract breach. + let mut completed = sample_job("completed"); + completed.result = Some(crate::kernel::kernel_v1::JobResult { + new_account_state_hash: vec![0x11; 32], + output_coins_root: vec![0x22; 32], + input_nullifiers_root: vec![0x33; 32], + output_coin_ids: vec![], + publisher_pubkey: vec![], + attestation: vec![], + }); + assert!(validate_sse_event_status("phase", &completed).is_err()); + assert!(validate_sse_event_status("complete", &completed).is_ok()); + + // complete with non-completed status + assert!(validate_sse_event_status("complete", &proving).is_err()); + + let mut failed = sample_job("failed"); + failed.error = Some(crate::kernel::kernel_v1::JobError { + error: "proving_failed".into(), + message: "x".into(), + }); + assert!(validate_sse_event_status("error", &failed).is_ok()); + assert!(validate_sse_event_status("error", &proving).is_err()); + } + #[test] fn unknown_delivery_type_is_malformed_at_json_edge() { let mut v = mint_json(); diff --git a/src/kernel/client.rs b/src/kernel/client.rs index e381aeb..0f4e2b2 100644 --- a/src/kernel/client.rs +++ b/src/kernel/client.rs @@ -466,10 +466,11 @@ mod tests { let err = ApiError::internal("kernel transport error: connection refused"); assert_eq!(err.status, axum::http::StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); + assert_eq!(err.body.message, crate::error::PUBLIC_INTERNAL_MESSAGE); assert!( - err.body.message.contains("kernel transport error"), - "message must name transport class, got {}", - err.body.message + err.cause().unwrap_or("").contains("kernel transport error"), + "operator cause must name transport class, got {:?}", + err.cause() ); } } diff --git a/src/kernel/error_info.rs b/src/kernel/error_info.rs index 7c0c76f..bd371dd 100644 --- a/src/kernel/error_info.rs +++ b/src/kernel/error_info.rs @@ -178,6 +178,22 @@ fn validate_and_build(info: ErrorInfo, status_message: &str) -> Result { + return Err(format!( + "reason \"unauthorized\" requires http_status 401, got {code_u16}" + )); + } + "session_expired" if code_u16 != 410 => { + return Err(format!( + "reason \"session_expired\" requires http_status 410, got {code_u16}" + )); + } + _ => {} + } let message = if status_message.is_empty() { info.reason.clone() } else { @@ -307,10 +323,11 @@ mod tests { let err = kernel_status_to_api_error(&st); assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); + assert_eq!(err.body.message, crate::error::PUBLIC_INTERNAL_MESSAGE); assert!( - err.body.message.contains("http_status"), - "message must name the missing field, got {}", - err.body.message + err.cause().unwrap_or("").contains("http_status"), + "operator cause must name the missing field, got {:?}", + err.cause() ); } @@ -321,11 +338,11 @@ mod tests { let err = kernel_status_to_api_error(&st); assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); + assert_eq!(err.body.message, crate::error::PUBLIC_INTERNAL_MESSAGE); + let cause = err.cause().unwrap_or(""); assert!( - err.body.message.contains("out of error range") - || err.body.message.contains("http_status"), - "message must name the status problem, got {}", - err.body.message + cause.contains("out of error range") || cause.contains("http_status"), + "operator cause must name the status problem, got {cause}" ); } @@ -347,9 +364,9 @@ mod tests { assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); assert!( - err.body.message.contains("domain"), - "message must name domain failure, got {}", - err.body.message + err.cause().unwrap_or("").contains("domain"), + "operator cause must name domain failure, got {:?}", + err.cause() ); } @@ -360,9 +377,9 @@ mod tests { assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); assert!( - err.body.message.contains("ErrorInfo"), - "message must mention ErrorInfo, got {}", - err.body.message + err.cause().unwrap_or("").contains("ErrorInfo"), + "operator cause must mention ErrorInfo, got {:?}", + err.cause() ); } @@ -384,9 +401,9 @@ mod tests { assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); assert!( - err.body.message.contains("canonical"), - "message must name canonical form, got {}", - err.body.message + err.cause().unwrap_or("").contains("canonical"), + "operator cause must name canonical form, got {:?}", + err.cause() ); } @@ -410,12 +427,12 @@ mod tests { err.body.error, "internal_error", "foreign reason must not become the public error code" ); + let cause = err.cause().unwrap_or(""); assert!( - err.body.message.contains("totally_made_up_reason") - || err.body.message.contains("machine_code") - || err.body.message.contains("closed"), - "message must name the foreign reason or the closed-set rule, got {}", - err.body.message + cause.contains("totally_made_up_reason") + || cause.contains("machine_code") + || cause.contains("closed"), + "operator cause must name the foreign reason or the closed-set rule, got {cause}" ); assert_ne!( err.body.error, "totally_made_up_reason", @@ -423,6 +440,55 @@ mod tests { ); } + /// Without the pair check, `unauthorized` with http_status 403 would be + /// forwarded as a 403. Spec binds unauthorized ↔ 401 only. + #[test] + fn unauthorized_with_wrong_http_status_is_fail_closed_500() { + let st = + encode_kernel_error_status(Code::PermissionDenied, "not allowed", "unauthorized", 403); + let err = kernel_status_to_api_error(&st); + assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); + assert_eq!(err.body.message, crate::error::PUBLIC_INTERNAL_MESSAGE); + assert!( + err.cause().unwrap_or("").contains("401"), + "cause must name the required 401 pairing, got {:?}", + err.cause() + ); + } + + #[test] + fn session_expired_with_wrong_http_status_is_fail_closed_500() { + let st = encode_kernel_error_status( + Code::FailedPrecondition, + "session gone", + "session_expired", + 401, + ); + let err = kernel_status_to_api_error(&st); + assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); + assert!( + err.cause().unwrap_or("").contains("410"), + "cause must name the required 410 pairing, got {:?}", + err.cause() + ); + } + + #[test] + fn unauthorized_401_and_session_expired_410_are_accepted() { + let u = encode_kernel_error_status(Code::Unauthenticated, "nope", "unauthorized", 401); + let err = kernel_status_to_api_error(&u); + assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "unauthorized"); + + let s = + encode_kernel_error_status(Code::FailedPrecondition, "gone", "session_expired", 410); + let err = kernel_status_to_api_error(&s); + assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::GONE); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "session_expired"); + } + #[test] fn closed_reason_set_accepts_known_machine_codes() { // Spot-check a few codes from each §7.5 table so the constant is not diff --git a/src/lib.rs b/src/lib.rs index f810fe9..8685f70 100644 --- a/src/lib.rs +++ b/src/lib.rs @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ pub mod bootstrap; pub mod chain; pub mod config; pub mod error; +pub mod extract; pub mod grants; pub mod hexutil; pub mod info; @@ -23,5 +24,5 @@ pub mod state; pub use config::{BlossomConfig, Config, ConfigError, Feature}; pub use kernel::{connect_lazy, KernelClient, KernelHandle}; -pub use routes::{build_router, CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS}; +pub use routes::{build_router, StartupError, CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS}; pub use state::AppState; diff --git a/src/main.rs b/src/main.rs index f2a8e05..04478e1 100644 --- a/src/main.rs +++ b/src/main.rs @@ -34,7 +34,13 @@ async fn main() -> ExitCode { let kernel_addr = config.kernel_addr.clone(); let feature_count = config.features.len(); - let app = build_router(config, kernel); + let app = match build_router(config, kernel) { + Ok(r) => r, + Err(e) => { + eprintln!("api: startup error: {e}"); + return ExitCode::from(1); + } + }; let listener = match tokio::net::TcpListener::bind(bind_addr).await { Ok(l) => l, diff --git a/src/proto_identity.rs b/src/proto_identity.rs index 35644d4..7e86320 100644 --- a/src/proto_identity.rs +++ b/src/proto_identity.rs @@ -2,10 +2,25 @@ //! //! The api repo cannot path-depend on zk-coins/node (separate checkouts). //! The contract file is therefore carried under `proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto` -//! (workspace root) and pinned by content hash. When a sibling node checkout -//! is present at `../node/proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto`, the test also -//! requires byte-identity with that file so local multi-repo worktrees catch -//! drift immediately. +//! (workspace root) and pinned by content hash. +//! +//! ## CI vs local +//! +//! - **CI gate (always):** [`KERNEL_PROTO_SHA256_HEX`] must match the bytes of +//! the carried file. This is the only identity check that can fail in a +//! standalone api checkout (the usual CI shape). +//! - **Local multi-repo worktree (optional):** when a sibling node checkout +//! is present at `../node/proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto`, the test also +//! requires byte-identity with that file so local stacks catch drift +//! immediately. +//! +//! The sibling comparison is **intentionally not a CI gate**. CI does not +//! check out `zk-coins/node` next to this tree, so a silent `return` on +//! absence would always be green without testing anything. The test below +//! therefore **names** that absence (`eprintln` + early return) and keeps +//! the pin-vs-file assertion as the real, always-on gate. Do not "fix" +//! the early return into a hard failure unless CI starts checking out the +//! node contract at a fixed ref. //! //! Lives in the **api** package (not `kernel-proto`) so `cargo test -p api` //! always runs the pin; codegen isolation is a separate concern. @@ -50,6 +65,7 @@ mod tests { out } + /// **CI-relevant gate:** carried file bytes must equal the pin. #[test] fn carried_proto_matches_pinned_sha256() { let path = local_proto_path(); @@ -82,11 +98,23 @@ mod tests { ); } + /// **Local-only optional check** — not a CI gate. + /// + /// When `../node` is absent (standalone / CI checkout), this test + /// **explicitly skips** after documenting why. It must never be a silent + /// green success that pretends the sibling was compared. The pin test + /// above is the real CI identity gate. #[test] - fn carried_proto_matches_sibling_node_when_present() { + fn carried_proto_matches_sibling_node_when_present_local_only() { let sibling = sibling_node_proto_path(); if !Path::new(&sibling).is_file() { - // Standalone api checkout: pin above is the identity gate. + // Named skip: absence is expected in CI and standalone api clones. + // Do not treat this as proof that the node contract matches. + eprintln!( + "proto_identity: sibling node proto absent at {} — \ + skipping local multi-repo byte compare (CI gate is pin==file)", + sibling.display() + ); return; } let local = std::fs::read(local_proto_path()).expect("local proto"); diff --git a/src/publish.rs b/src/publish.rs index 9ceac27..fefa55e 100644 --- a/src/publish.rs +++ b/src/publish.rs @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ //! HTTP 200. use crate::error::ApiError; +use crate::extract::JsonBody; use crate::hexutil::decode_hex_exact; use crate::kernel::kernel_v1::{BlockAnchor, PublishRequest, PublishResult}; use crate::ownership::parse_u64_decimal; @@ -89,7 +90,7 @@ pub struct PublishSpendRecordBody { /// `POST /v1/publish/spendrecord` → `Publish`. pub async fn post_publish_spendrecord( State(state): State, - Json(body): Json, + JsonBody(body): JsonBody, ) -> Result { // v1 fee fields are fail-closed: any set field is malformed, never ignored. if body.fee_blob_id.is_some() || body.fee_blob_locators.is_some() || body.fee_epk.is_some() { diff --git a/src/pull.rs b/src/pull.rs index 60e7022..818dffa 100644 --- a/src/pull.rs +++ b/src/pull.rs @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ //! state; the request carries no `subject` field. use crate::error::ApiError; +use crate::extract::JsonBody; use crate::hexutil::{decode_hex_exact, encode_hex}; use crate::kernel::kernel_v1::{ AccountStateRequest, AccountStateResult, CoinProofBlob, CoinProofRequest, PullChallengeRequest, @@ -326,7 +327,7 @@ fn session_chan_bind(public_hosts: &[String]) -> Result<[u8; 32], ApiError> { /// `POST /v1/pull/challenge` → OpenPullChallenge(action=pull). pub async fn post_pull_challenge( State(state): State, - Json(body): Json, + JsonBody(body): JsonBody, ) -> Result { if body.subject.is_empty() { return Err(ApiError::malformed("subject is required")); @@ -377,7 +378,7 @@ pub async fn post_pull_challenge( /// under a scoped grant. pub async fn post_pull( State(state): State, - Json(body): Json, + JsonBody(body): JsonBody, ) -> Result { // Requested scope: re-echo on redeem, or unbounded sentinels when omitted. let requested_scope = match &body.scope { diff --git a/src/routes.rs b/src/routes.rs index 865b644..62407de 100644 --- a/src/routes.rs +++ b/src/routes.rs @@ -2,10 +2,13 @@ //! //! Route registration and the `GET /` discovery document share one source: //! [`ServedSurface`]. The closed §7.5 inventory ([`CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS`]) is -//! the full key catalogue; only keys in the **active** surface set — derived -//! from `Config::features` and Blossom store configuration — are registered -//! and advertised. A disabled feature is not served (`404`) and is omitted -//! from `GET /` (§7.5 / §6.1 fail-closed gating). +//! the full key catalogue. **Active** surfaces (from `Config::features` and +//! Blossom store configuration) get real handlers and appear on `GET /`. +//! **Known but inactive** feature-gated surfaces still register a stub that +//! answers `404 feature_disabled` with the §7.5 JSON body — they are omitted +//! from discovery (§7.5 / §6.1 fail-closed gating). **Unconfigured** Blossom +//! (no store) is left unregistered (bare axum 404), not a feature stub. Paths +//! outside the inventory remain a bare axum 404. //! //! Inventory paths are the **advertised** §7.5 form (`` placeholders). //! Axum registration uses a derived **matcher** form (`:name`); see @@ -16,6 +19,7 @@ use crate::blossom; use crate::bootstrap; use crate::chain; use crate::config::{Config, Feature}; +use crate::error::ApiError; use crate::grants; use crate::info; use crate::jobs; @@ -30,8 +34,26 @@ use axum::routing::{delete, get, head, post, put}; use axum::{Json, Router}; use serde::Serialize; use std::collections::{BTreeMap, BTreeSet}; +use std::fmt; use std::sync::Arc; +/// Boot-time failure opening configured resources (e.g. Blossom store root). +/// +/// Distinct from per-request [`ApiError`]: `main` prints this and exits +/// without panicking, same as other start errors. +#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub struct StartupError { + pub message: String, +} + +impl fmt::Display for StartupError { + fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result { + write!(f, "{}", self.message) + } +} + +impl std::error::Error for StartupError {} + /// Closed `endpoints` key set from specification §7.5 (`GET /` row). /// /// Full inventory of the 29 logical names a conforming producer may emit. @@ -96,9 +118,9 @@ pub const CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS: &[(&str, &str)] = &[ /// /// Which surfaces are active follows `Config::features` and Blossom store /// configuration — never a hard-coded always-on set of role-bound routes. -/// A request against a disabled feature is **not** served (`404`); `GET /` -/// omits the corresponding keys. Mapping (from §6.1 feature table + the -/// §7.5 inventory, mirrored in `docs/rest-surface.md`): +/// A request against a disabled feature is answered `404 feature_disabled` +/// (JSON machine code); `GET /` omits the corresponding keys. Mapping (from +/// §6.1 feature table + the §7.5 inventory, mirrored in `docs/rest-surface.md`): /// /// | Surfaces | Gate | /// |---|---| @@ -183,8 +205,22 @@ impl ServedSurface { ServedSurface::BlossomDelete, ]; - /// Whether this surface is registered (and advertised) for the given - /// feature set and Blossom store configuration. + /// Whether this surface is a Blossom inventory key. + fn is_blossom(self) -> bool { + matches!( + self, + ServedSurface::BlossomGet + | ServedSurface::BlossomHead + | ServedSurface::BlossomUpload + | ServedSurface::BlossomDelete + ) + } + + /// Whether this surface is **active** (real handler + discovery key) for + /// the given feature set and Blossom store configuration. Inactive + /// feature-gated inventory surfaces still mount a `feature_disabled` + /// stub; unconfigured Blossom is left unregistered (see + /// [`build_router`]). fn is_active(self, features: &BTreeSet, blossom_configured: bool) -> bool { match self { // Always-on API process surface (§7.5 L2874–L2877; rest-surface #1–#4). @@ -326,10 +362,15 @@ impl ServedSurface { ServedSurface::BlossomHead => router.route(&path, head(blossom::head_blob)), ServedSurface::BlossomDelete => router.route(&path, delete(blossom::delete_blob)), ServedSurface::BlossomUpload => { - // Disable axum's default 2 MiB body limit so the handler can - // enforce the configured max and return the §7.5 machine code. - let limit = max_blob_bytes.unwrap_or(0).saturating_add(1); + // Cap buffering at the advertised max. Bodies above that are + // rejected by LimitedBytes / DefaultBodyLimit as §7.5 + // `payload_too_large` (including sizes far above max, not only + // max+1). The handler still double-checks length. + let limit = max_blob_bytes.unwrap_or(0); let limit = usize::try_from(limit).unwrap_or(usize::MAX); + // Use at least 1 so DefaultBodyLimit::max(0) is never installed + // for a misconfigured path (upload is only active with max>0). + let limit = limit.max(1); router.route( &path, put(blossom::upload_blob) @@ -339,6 +380,56 @@ impl ServedSurface { } } } + + /// Register a known-but-inactive surface as `404 feature_disabled`. + /// + /// Same methods and path matchers as [`Self::register`], so a disabled + /// feature is still *recognised* (not a bare axum 404) while staying + /// absent from `GET /` discovery. + fn register_disabled(self, router: Router) -> Router { + let path = advertised_path_to_axum_matcher(closed_path(self.discovery_key())); + match self { + ServedSurface::Health | ServedSurface::HealthReady | ServedSurface::Info => { + // Always-on surfaces are never disabled. + router + } + ServedSurface::ChainAccumulator + | ServedSurface::ChainInscriptions + | ServedSurface::ChainNullifier + | ServedSurface::Jobs + | ServedSurface::JobsStream + | ServedSurface::Record + | ServedSurface::Proof + | ServedSurface::AccountState + | ServedSurface::ReceiptsStream + | ServedSurface::BlossomGet => router.route(&path, get(feature_disabled_handler)), + ServedSurface::BlossomHead => router.route(&path, head(feature_disabled_handler)), + ServedSurface::BlossomDelete => router.route(&path, delete(feature_disabled_handler)), + ServedSurface::Tx + | ServedSurface::JobsSign + | ServedSurface::JobsCancel + | ServedSurface::AttestBalanceChallenge + | ServedSurface::AttestBalance + | ServedSurface::GrantsChallenge + | ServedSurface::Grants + | ServedSurface::PullChallenge + | ServedSurface::Pull + | ServedSurface::PublishSpendrecord + | ServedSurface::BootstrapChallenge + | ServedSurface::BootstrapEntrust + | ServedSurface::BootstrapRevoke => router.route(&path, post(feature_disabled_handler)), + ServedSurface::BlossomUpload => router.route( + &path, + put(feature_disabled_handler).post(feature_disabled_handler), + ), + } + } +} + +/// §7.5 / §6.1: known inventory path whose role feature is off for this +/// deployment. Not used for unconfigured Blossom (those paths stay unregistered). +async fn feature_disabled_handler() -> ApiError { + ApiError::feature_disabled("this endpoint is not enabled on this deployment (feature_disabled)") } /// Look up the canonical **advertised** path for a closed §7.5 key. @@ -421,10 +512,10 @@ struct RootResponse { /// Build the axum router for the given configuration and kernel handle. /// -/// Route registration and `GET /` discovery both follow -/// [`ServedSurface::active`] applied to `config.features` and whether the -/// Blossom store is configured. `config.features` is also stored in -/// [`AppState`] for the API-owned `features` array on `GET /v1/info`. +/// Route registration follows the full inventory: active surfaces get real +/// handlers; known-but-inactive surfaces get `404 feature_disabled` stubs. +/// `GET /` discovery lists only the active set. `config.features` is also +/// stored in [`AppState`] for the API-owned `features` array on `GET /v1/info`. /// /// Returns a fully state-bound router (`Router` / `Router<()>`). Only that /// form implements `tower::Service` and is ready for `axum::serve` and test @@ -432,11 +523,12 @@ struct RootResponse { /// `State` (via [`axum::extract::FromRef`]); the concrete /// state is supplied once at the end. /// -/// # Panics +/// # Errors /// -/// Panics if Blossom is configured but the store root cannot be opened — -/// that is a boot-time misconfiguration, not a per-request failure. -pub fn build_router(config: Config, kernel: KernelHandle) -> Router { +/// Returns [`StartupError`] if Blossom is configured but the store root +/// cannot be opened — boot-time misconfiguration, same fail-closed class as +/// other start errors in `main` (no panic). +pub fn build_router(config: Config, kernel: KernelHandle) -> Result { let Config { bind_addr: _, kernel_addr: _, @@ -446,14 +538,21 @@ pub fn build_router(config: Config, kernel: KernelHandle) -> Router { } = config; let max_blob_bytes = blossom.as_ref().map(|b| b.max_blob_bytes); - let blossom_state = blossom.map(|cfg| { - blossom::BlossomState::from_config(&cfg).unwrap_or_else(|e| { - panic!( - "blossom store open failed (boot misconfiguration): {}", - e.body.message - ) - }) - }); + let blossom_state = match blossom { + None => None, + Some(cfg) => { + let state = blossom::BlossomState::from_config(&cfg).map_err(|e| { + let detail = match e.cause() { + Some(c) => c.to_string(), + None => e.body.message.clone(), + }; + StartupError { + message: format!("blossom store open failed: {detail}"), + } + })?; + Some(state) + } + }; let blossom_configured = blossom_state.is_some(); let state = AppState { @@ -465,15 +564,26 @@ pub fn build_router(config: Config, kernel: KernelHandle) -> Router { revoked_grants: Arc::new(crate::ownership::RevokedGrantSet::new()), }; - // Register every active surface as `Router`, then bind state so - // the returned tree is `Router<()>` and implements `Service`. Binding + // Register every inventory surface as `Router`, then bind state + // so the returned tree is `Router<()>` and implements `Service`. Binding // earlier while still returning `Router` leaves the tree // "missing" state and breaks both `axum::serve` and `oneshot`. + // + // Blossom without a configured store is **not** a feature-disabled stub: + // the surface simply does not exist on this deployment (bare 404, no + // methods registered). When the store *is* configured but wallet/explorer + // are off, the path is known-but-inactive → `404 feature_disabled`. let mut router = Router::new().route("/", get(root)); - for surface in ServedSurface::active(&features, blossom_configured) { - router = surface.register(router, max_blob_bytes); + for surface in ServedSurface::ALL { + if surface.is_active(&features, blossom_configured) { + router = surface.register(router, max_blob_bytes); + } else if surface.is_blossom() && !blossom_configured { + // Leave unregistered. + } else { + router = surface.register_disabled(router); + } } - router.with_state(state) + Ok(router.with_state(state)) } async fn health() -> Response { @@ -655,7 +765,7 @@ mod tests { } fn test_app() -> Router { - build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(UnreachableKernel)) + build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(UnreachableKernel)).expect("router") } async fn body_bytes(res: axum::response::Response) -> Vec { @@ -1095,7 +1205,7 @@ mod tests { list_inscriptions: Some(Ok(Vec::new())), ..Default::default() }; - let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -1165,7 +1275,7 @@ mod tests { public_hosts: vec!["node.example.com".to_string()], blossom: None, }; - let app = build_router(cfg, Arc::new(UnreachableKernel)); + let app = build_router(cfg, Arc::new(UnreachableKernel)).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -1187,7 +1297,8 @@ mod tests { blossom: None, }, Arc::new(UnreachableKernel), - ); + ) + .expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot(Request::builder().uri("/").body(Body::empty()).unwrap()) .await @@ -1219,12 +1330,15 @@ mod tests { /// Without the change: wallet/explorer/publisher routes were always-on, /// so a disabled feature still returned a non-404 (kernel error / 405 / …) - /// and `GET /` still advertised the key. + /// and `GET /` still advertised the key. With the stub, disabled known + /// routes answer `404 feature_disabled` (machine code + JSON body), not a + /// bare axum 404. #[tokio::test] - async fn disabled_wallet_surface_is_404_and_absent_from_discovery() { - let app = build_router(test_config_no_features(), Arc::new(UnreachableKernel)); + async fn disabled_wallet_surface_is_404_feature_disabled_and_absent_from_discovery() { + let app = + build_router(test_config_no_features(), Arc::new(UnreachableKernel)).expect("router"); - // Probe a concrete wallet path — must not match any route. + // Probe a concrete wallet path — known inventory, feature off. let res = app .clone() .oneshot( @@ -1242,6 +1356,37 @@ mod tests { StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, "disabled wallet surface must not be served" ); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!( + json["error"], "feature_disabled", + "disabled known route must carry machine code feature_disabled, got {json}" + ); + assert!( + json.get("message").and_then(|m| m.as_str()).is_some(), + "§7.5 body must include message, got {json}" + ); + + // Unknown path (not in inventory) stays a bare framework 404 without + // the feature_disabled machine code. + let res = app + .clone() + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/not-an-inventory-path") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::NOT_FOUND); + let unknown_body = body_bytes(res).await; + if let Ok(j) = serde_json::from_slice::(&unknown_body) { + assert_ne!( + j.get("error").and_then(|e| e.as_str()), + Some("feature_disabled"), + "unknown paths must not claim feature_disabled" + ); + } let res = app .oneshot(Request::builder().uri("/").body(Body::empty()).unwrap()) @@ -1278,7 +1423,7 @@ mod tests { public_hosts: vec!["node.example.com".to_string()], blossom: None, }; - let app = build_router(cfg, Arc::new(UnreachableKernel)); + let app = build_router(cfg, Arc::new(UnreachableKernel)).expect("router"); let res = app .clone() .oneshot( @@ -1294,6 +1439,11 @@ mod tests { StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, "disabled explorer surface must not be served" ); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!( + json["error"], "feature_disabled", + "disabled explorer must carry feature_disabled machine code" + ); let res = app .oneshot(Request::builder().uri("/").body(Body::empty()).unwrap()) @@ -1320,7 +1470,7 @@ mod tests { public_hosts: vec!["node.example.com".to_string()], blossom: None, }; - let app = build_router(cfg, Arc::new(UnreachableKernel)); + let app = build_router(cfg, Arc::new(UnreachableKernel)).expect("router"); let res = app .clone() .oneshot( @@ -1338,6 +1488,11 @@ mod tests { StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, "disabled publisher surface must not be served" ); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!( + json["error"], "feature_disabled", + "disabled publisher must carry feature_disabled machine code" + ); let res = app .oneshot(Request::builder().uri("/").body(Body::empty()).unwrap()) @@ -1775,7 +1930,7 @@ mod tests { })), ..Default::default() }; - let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -1806,7 +1961,7 @@ mod tests { })), ..Default::default() }; - let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -1858,7 +2013,7 @@ mod tests { })), ..Default::default() }; - let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)).expect("router"); let mut body = mint_body(); body["extra_unknown"] = Value::String("nope".into()); let res = app @@ -1891,7 +2046,7 @@ mod tests { })), ..Default::default() }; - let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)).expect("router"); let mut body = mint_body(); body["issuance"]["foreign_nested"] = Value::Number(1.into()); let res = app @@ -1924,7 +2079,7 @@ mod tests { })), ..Default::default() }; - let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -1944,10 +2099,10 @@ mod tests { assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); assert_eq!(json["error"], "internal_error"); - assert!( - json["message"].as_str().unwrap_or("").contains("job_id"), - "message must name the empty job_id, got {}", - json["message"] + assert_eq!( + json["message"], + crate::error::PUBLIC_INTERNAL_MESSAGE, + "public internal_error message must be neutral" ); } @@ -1961,7 +2116,7 @@ mod tests { })), ..Default::default() }; - let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -1981,14 +2136,10 @@ mod tests { assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); assert_eq!(json["error"], "internal_error"); - assert!( - json["message"].as_str().unwrap_or("").contains("accepted") - || json["message"] - .as_str() - .unwrap_or("") - .contains("totally_unknown_phase"), - "message must name the status contract, got {}", - json["message"] + assert_eq!( + json["message"], + crate::error::PUBLIC_INTERNAL_MESSAGE, + "public internal_error message must be neutral" ); } @@ -2002,7 +2153,7 @@ mod tests { })), ..Default::default() }; - let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -2027,7 +2178,7 @@ mod tests { })), ..Default::default() }; - let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)).expect("router"); let mut body = mint_body(); body["fee_address"] = Value::String("zk1fee".into()); let res = app @@ -2064,7 +2215,7 @@ mod tests { submit: Some(Err(crate::kernel::kernel_status_to_api_error(&status))), ..Default::default() }; - let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -2123,7 +2274,7 @@ mod tests { })), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -2168,7 +2319,7 @@ mod tests { })), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let mut body = mint_body(); body["output_templates"][0]["delivery"] = serde_json::json!({ "type": "carrier_pigeon", @@ -2205,7 +2356,7 @@ mod tests { })), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let mut body = mint_body_with_invoice_delivery(); body["output_templates"][0]["delivery"]["invoice"]["ghost"] = Value::Bool(true); let res = app @@ -2235,7 +2386,7 @@ mod tests { })), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let mut body = mint_body_with_invoice_delivery(); body["output_templates"][0]["delivery"]["invoice"] .as_object_mut() @@ -2274,7 +2425,7 @@ mod tests { })), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let mut body = mint_body_with_invoice_delivery(); // Wrong width — triggers decode_hex_field form error after parse. let bad_pk0 = "ab".repeat(20); // 40 chars @@ -2315,7 +2466,7 @@ mod tests { get: Some(Ok(accepted_job("job-2"))), ..Default::default() }; - let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -2348,7 +2499,7 @@ mod tests { get: Some(Err(crate::kernel::kernel_status_to_api_error(&status))), ..Default::default() }; - let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -2376,7 +2527,7 @@ mod tests { sign: Some(Err(crate::kernel::kernel_status_to_api_error(&status))), ..Default::default() }; - let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)).expect("router"); let body = serde_json::json!({ "signature": crate::hexutil::encode_hex(&[0u8; 64]), "s2c_nonce": hex32(0xab), @@ -2405,7 +2556,7 @@ mod tests { sign: Some(Ok(job)), ..Default::default() }; - let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)).expect("router"); let body = serde_json::json!({ "signature": crate::hexutil::encode_hex(&[1u8; 64]), "s2c_nonce": hex32(0xcd), @@ -2439,7 +2590,7 @@ mod tests { cancel: Some(Ok(job)), ..Default::default() }; - let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -2495,7 +2646,7 @@ mod tests { stream: Some(Ok(vec![Ok(phase), Ok(complete)])), ..Default::default() }; - let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -2542,7 +2693,7 @@ mod tests { stream: Some(Ok(vec![Err(ApiError::internal("kernel stream dropped"))])), ..Default::default() }; - let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -2563,8 +2714,12 @@ mod tests { "error event must carry machine code, body={body}" ); assert!( - body.contains("kernel stream dropped"), - "error event must carry the cause message, body={body}" + body.contains(crate::error::PUBLIC_INTERNAL_MESSAGE), + "error event must carry the public internal message, body={body}" + ); + assert!( + !body.contains("kernel stream dropped"), + "error event must not leak the operator cause, body={body}" ); } @@ -2576,7 +2731,7 @@ mod tests { stream: Some(Err(crate::kernel::kernel_status_to_api_error(&status))), ..Default::default() }; - let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -2610,7 +2765,7 @@ mod tests { public_hosts: vec!["node.example.com".to_string()], blossom: None, }; - let app = build_router(cfg, Arc::new(kernel)); + let app = build_router(cfg, Arc::new(kernel)).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -2651,7 +2806,7 @@ mod tests { info: Some(Err(crate::kernel::kernel_status_to_api_error(&status))), ..Default::default() }; - let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -2680,7 +2835,7 @@ mod tests { info: Some(Ok(sample_info(true, None))), ..Default::default() }; - let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -2711,7 +2866,7 @@ mod tests { info: Some(Ok(sample_info(false, Some("syncing")))), ..Default::default() }; - let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -2743,7 +2898,7 @@ mod tests { info: Some(Err(crate::kernel::kernel_status_to_api_error(&status))), ..Default::default() }; - let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -2779,7 +2934,7 @@ mod tests { })), ..Default::default() }; - let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -2815,7 +2970,7 @@ mod tests { accumulator: Some(Err(crate::kernel::kernel_status_to_api_error(&status))), ..Default::default() }; - let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -2853,7 +3008,7 @@ mod tests { })), ..Default::default() }; - let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)).expect("router"); let pk = hex32(0xaa); let res = app .oneshot( @@ -2892,7 +3047,7 @@ mod tests { })), ..Default::default() }; - let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)).expect("router"); let pk = hex32(0xbb); let res = app .oneshot( @@ -2936,7 +3091,7 @@ mod tests { nullifier_path: Some(Err(crate::kernel::kernel_status_to_api_error(&status))), ..Default::default() }; - let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)).expect("router"); let pk = hex32(0xcc); let res = app .oneshot( @@ -2982,7 +3137,7 @@ mod tests { })), ..Default::default() }; - let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -3096,7 +3251,7 @@ mod tests { })), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let body = serde_json::json!({ "subject": subject_bech, "asset_id": encode_hex(&asset), @@ -3123,6 +3278,63 @@ mod tests { assert_eq!(kernel.attest_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 1); } + /// Without the status gate, any non-empty job_id would be admitted as 202 + /// even when JobHandle.status is not `"accepted"`. + #[tokio::test] + async fn attest_balance_non_accepted_status_is_500() { + let host = "node.example.com"; + let (sk, pk0, nkc, subject_raw, subject_bech) = ownership_fixtures::identity(); + let nonce = [0x11u8; 32]; + let expiry = 1_700_000_060u64; + let asset = [0x22u8; 32]; + let ceiling_enc = ceiling_encoding(None, None).unwrap(); + let request_hash = attest_request_hash(&subject_raw, &asset, &ceiling_enc); + let cb = chan_bind_for_host(host); + let chal = ownership_challenge_message( + ChallengeDomain::AttestBalance.as_str(), + &nonce, + &cb, + &subject_raw, + expiry, + &request_hash, + ); + let sig = ownership_fixtures::sign_chal(&sk, &chal); + + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + attest: Some(Ok(JobHandle { + job_id: "attest-job-bad".into(), + status: "proving".into(), + })), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); + let body = serde_json::json!({ + "subject": subject_bech, + "asset_id": encode_hex(&asset), + "challenge": { + "nonce": encode_hex(&nonce), + "expiry": expiry.to_string(), + }, + "ownership_proof": ownership_proof_json(&subject_bech, &pk0, &nkc, &sig), + }); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/attest/balance") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from(body.to_string())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "internal_error"); + assert_eq!(json["message"], crate::error::PUBLIC_INTERNAL_MESSAGE); + assert_eq!(kernel.attest_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 1); + } + #[tokio::test] async fn attest_balance_bad_signature_does_not_call_kernel() { let host = "node.example.com"; @@ -3139,7 +3351,7 @@ mod tests { })), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let body = serde_json::json!({ "subject": subject_bech, "asset_id": encode_hex(&asset), @@ -3207,7 +3419,7 @@ mod tests { })), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let body = serde_json::json!({ "subject": subject_bech, "grantee_pk": encode_hex(&grantee), @@ -3268,7 +3480,7 @@ mod tests { })), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let body = serde_json::json!({ "subject": subject_bech, "asset_id": encode_hex(&asset), @@ -3321,7 +3533,7 @@ mod tests { ..Default::default() }); // test_config serves node.example.com — signature bound to other host. - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let body = serde_json::json!({ "subject": subject_bech, "asset_id": encode_hex(&asset), @@ -3374,7 +3586,7 @@ mod tests { })), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let body = serde_json::json!({ "subject": subject_bech, "asset_id": encode_hex(&asset_presented), @@ -3430,7 +3642,7 @@ mod tests { attest: Some(Err(crate::kernel::kernel_status_to_api_error(&expired))), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let body = serde_json::json!({ "subject": subject_bech, "asset_id": encode_hex(&asset), @@ -3470,7 +3682,7 @@ mod tests { })), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let body = serde_json::json!({ "subject": subject_bech, "asset_id": encode_hex(&[0u8; 32]), @@ -3539,7 +3751,7 @@ mod tests { })), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let body = serde_json::json!({ "subject": subject_bech, "grantee_pk": encode_hex(&grantee), @@ -3579,7 +3791,7 @@ mod tests { })), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -3608,7 +3820,7 @@ mod tests { })), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel2); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel2).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -3680,7 +3892,7 @@ mod tests { })), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -3722,7 +3934,7 @@ mod tests { pull: Some(Ok(sample_pull_result())), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -3815,7 +4027,7 @@ mod tests { ..Default::default() }); // build_router installs an empty subject_ops — subject has no published op. - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let body = serde_json::json!({ "nonce": encode_hex(&[0x11u8; 32]), "expiry": "1700000060", @@ -4014,7 +4226,7 @@ mod tests { pull: Some(Ok(sample_pull_result())), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let asset = [0xABu8; 32]; let mut body = pull_body_ownership(&subject_bech, &pk0, &nkc, &nonce, expiry, &sig); body["scope"] = serde_json::json!({ @@ -4052,7 +4264,7 @@ mod tests { pull: Some(Ok(sample_pull_result())), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -4093,7 +4305,7 @@ mod tests { pull: Some(Ok(sample_pull_result())), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -4132,7 +4344,7 @@ mod tests { pull: Some(Ok(sample_pull_result())), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -4171,7 +4383,7 @@ mod tests { pull: Some(Ok(sample_pull_result())), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -4216,7 +4428,7 @@ mod tests { })), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -4232,7 +4444,7 @@ mod tests { assert_eq!(kernel.get_record_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 0); // Same split on ownership-only account/state. - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -4256,7 +4468,7 @@ mod tests { })), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -4286,7 +4498,7 @@ mod tests { get_record: Some(Err(crate::kernel::kernel_status_to_api_error(&status))), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -4316,7 +4528,7 @@ mod tests { get_account_state: Some(Err(crate::kernel::kernel_status_to_api_error(&status))), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -4354,7 +4566,7 @@ mod tests { pull: Some(Ok(result)), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -4369,12 +4581,16 @@ mod tests { ) .await .unwrap(); + // Kernel closed-set violation → 500 internal_error. Public message is + // always the neutral PUBLIC_INTERNAL_MESSAGE; the field name lives in + // the operator cause / logs only (same contract as get_job_unknown_status). assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); assert_eq!(json["error"], "internal_error"); + assert_eq!(json["message"], crate::error::PUBLIC_INTERNAL_MESSAGE); assert!( - json["message"].as_str().unwrap().contains("record_type"), - "message must name record_type: {}", + !json["message"].as_str().unwrap().contains("record_type"), + "public wire must not leak kernel field diagnostics: {}", json["message"] ); } @@ -4401,7 +4617,7 @@ mod tests { pull: Some(Ok(result)), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -4416,15 +4632,17 @@ mod tests { ) .await .unwrap(); + // Same contract as unknown record_type: 500 + neutral public message. assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); assert_eq!(json["error"], "internal_error"); + assert_eq!(json["message"], crate::error::PUBLIC_INTERNAL_MESSAGE); assert!( - json["message"] + !json["message"] .as_str() .unwrap() .contains("transition_kind"), - "message must name transition_kind: {}", + "public wire must not leak kernel field diagnostics: {}", json["message"] ); } @@ -4439,7 +4657,7 @@ mod tests { })), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -4475,7 +4693,7 @@ mod tests { })), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -4513,7 +4731,7 @@ mod tests { })), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -4556,7 +4774,7 @@ mod tests { subscribe_receipts: Some(Ok(vec![Ok(r1.clone()), Ok(r2.clone())])), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -4660,7 +4878,7 @@ mod tests { ))), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let res = app .clone() @@ -4711,7 +4929,7 @@ mod tests { subscribe_receipts: Some(Ok(vec![Ok(sample_receipt(0x01, "1", 1))])), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -4737,7 +4955,7 @@ mod tests { subscribe_receipts: Some(Ok(vec![Ok(sample_receipt(0x01, "1", 1))])), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -4769,7 +4987,7 @@ mod tests { subscribe_receipts: Some(Err(crate::kernel::kernel_status_to_api_error(&status))), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -4813,7 +5031,7 @@ mod tests { subscribe_receipts: Some(Err(crate::kernel::kernel_status_to_api_error(&status))), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -4849,7 +5067,7 @@ mod tests { subscribe_receipts: Some(Ok(vec![Ok(r)])), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -4884,7 +5102,7 @@ mod tests { subscribe_receipts_hang: true, ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -4961,7 +5179,7 @@ mod tests { })), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -4996,7 +5214,7 @@ mod tests { })), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel2.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel2.clone()).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -5050,7 +5268,7 @@ mod tests { revoke: Some(Ok(RevokeResult { revoked: true })), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -5098,7 +5316,7 @@ mod tests { entrust: Some(Ok(EntrustResult { accepted: true })), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let bundle = sample_bundle_hex(); let res = app .oneshot( @@ -5149,7 +5367,7 @@ mod tests { }); let short_hex = "01".to_string() + &"00".repeat(159); assert_eq!(short_hex.len(), 320); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -5186,7 +5404,7 @@ mod tests { // 162 bytes → 400, no kernel. let long_hex = "01".to_string() + &"00".repeat(161); assert_eq!(long_hex.len(), 324); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -5215,7 +5433,7 @@ mod tests { // 161 bytes → forwarded. let ok_hex = sample_bundle_hex(); assert_eq!(ok_hex.len(), OPERATIONAL_BUNDLE_HEX_CHARS); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -5277,7 +5495,7 @@ mod tests { entrust: Some(Ok(EntrustResult { accepted: true })), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -5332,7 +5550,7 @@ mod tests { revoke: Some(Ok(RevokeResult { revoked: true })), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -5371,7 +5589,7 @@ mod tests { })), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let body = serde_json::json!({ "public_key": hex32(0x11), "r": hex32(0x22), @@ -5416,7 +5634,7 @@ mod tests { })), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel).expect("router"); let body = serde_json::json!({ "public_key": hex32(0x11), "r": hex32(0x22), @@ -5455,7 +5673,7 @@ mod tests { })), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let body = serde_json::json!({ "public_key": hex32(0x11), "r": hex32(0x22), @@ -5490,8 +5708,9 @@ mod tests { #[tokio::test] async fn unconfigured_blossom_surfaces_remain_404_and_absent_from_discovery() { - // test_config has blossom: None — Blossom must stay off the map. - // receipts_stream is always-on and must be registered (auth fails closed). + // test_config has blossom: None — Blossom must stay completely off the + // map: unregistered (bare axum 404, not 404 feature_disabled) and + // absent from discovery. receipts_stream is always-on (auth fails closed). let app = test_app(); for path in [ "/blossom/aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa", @@ -5507,6 +5726,15 @@ mod tests { StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, "unconfigured Blossom surface {path} must not be registered" ); + // Bare axum 404 has no §7.5 JSON body claiming feature_disabled. + let bytes = body_bytes(res).await; + if let Ok(json) = serde_json::from_slice::(&bytes) { + assert_ne!( + json.get("error").and_then(|e| e.as_str()), + Some("feature_disabled"), + "unconfigured Blossom must be bare 404, not feature_disabled: {json}" + ); + } } // Always-on receipts stream is registered: missing bearer → 401, not 404. let res = app @@ -5594,7 +5822,7 @@ mod tests { )])), ..Default::default() }; - let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -5629,7 +5857,7 @@ mod tests { list_inscriptions: Some(Ok(catalog)), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); // Page 1 let res = app @@ -5717,7 +5945,7 @@ mod tests { list_inscriptions: Some(Ok(Vec::new())), ..Default::default() }; - let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -5743,7 +5971,7 @@ mod tests { list_inscriptions: Some(Ok(Vec::new())), ..Default::default() }; - let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)); + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -5764,7 +5992,7 @@ mod tests { list_inscriptions: Some(Ok(Vec::new())), ..Default::default() }); - let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); let res = app .oneshot( Request::builder() @@ -5817,7 +6045,42 @@ mod tests { allowed_upload_ops: ops, }), }; - build_router(cfg, Arc::new(UnreachableKernel)) + build_router(cfg, Arc::new(UnreachableKernel)).expect("router") + } + + /// Boot must not panic when the Blossom store root cannot be opened — + /// same fail-closed class as other start errors. + #[test] + fn build_router_blossom_open_failure_is_startup_error_not_panic() { + let cfg = Config { + bind_addr: "127.0.0.1:0".parse().unwrap(), + kernel_addr: "http://127.0.0.1:50051".to_string(), + features: BTreeSet::from([Feature::Explorer]), + public_hosts: vec!["node.example.com".to_string()], + blossom: Some(crate::config::BlossomConfig { + // Regular file path cannot be a store root directory. + store_root: std::env::temp_dir().join(format!( + "zkcoins-not-a-dir-{}-{}", + std::process::id(), + std::time::SystemTime::now() + .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH) + .unwrap() + .as_nanos() + )), + max_blob_bytes: 1024, + allowed_upload_ops: BTreeSet::new(), + }), + }; + // Create a *file* at store_root so open fails "not a directory". + let path = cfg.blossom.as_ref().unwrap().store_root.clone(); + std::fs::write(&path, b"not-a-directory").unwrap(); + let err = build_router(cfg, Arc::new(UnreachableKernel)).expect_err("must not panic"); + assert!( + err.message.contains("blossom store"), + "startup error must name blossom store: {}", + err.message + ); + let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&path); } fn blossom_sk_pk() -> (bitcoin::secp256k1::SecretKey, [u8; 32]) { @@ -6051,6 +6314,97 @@ mod tests { let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&root); } + /// Bodies far above the limit (not only max+1) must still answer with the + /// §7.5 JSON `payload_too_large` body — not axum's plain-text 413. + #[tokio::test] + async fn blossom_upload_rejects_far_oversize_with_413_json() { + let root = blossom_temp_root("far-oversize"); + let (sk, pk) = blossom_sk_pk(); + let mut ops = BTreeSet::new(); + ops.insert(pk); + let max = 16u64; + let app = blossom_app(root.clone(), max, ops); + // Several times the limit so DefaultBodyLimit trips well past max+1. + let body = vec![0xabu8; (max as usize) * 64]; + let x = crate::blossom::blob_id_of(&body); + let auth = blossom_auth(&sk, &pk, crate::blossom::AuthAction::Upload, &x); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("PUT") + .uri("/blossom/upload") + .header("content-type", "application/octet-stream") + .header("authorization", &auth) + .body(Body::from(body)) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE); + let bytes = body_bytes(res).await; + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&bytes).unwrap_or_else(|e| { + panic!( + "far-oversize must return §7.5 JSON, not plain text: {e}; body={:?}", + String::from_utf8_lossy(&bytes) + ) + }); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "payload_too_large"); + assert!(json.get("message").is_some()); + let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&root); + } + + /// Non-tx JSON handlers must also map bad content-type to §7.5 JSON + /// (not axum's default 415/422 body). + #[tokio::test] + async fn post_sign_missing_json_content_type_is_malformed_request() { + let kernel = ScriptedKernel { + sign: Some(Ok(accepted_job("job-ct"))), + ..Default::default() + }; + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)).expect("router"); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/jobs/job-ct/sign") + .body(Body::from(r#"{"signature":"aa","s2c_nonce":"bb"}"#)) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "malformed_request"); + } + + /// Unknown job status from the kernel is fail-closed 500 (not forwarded + /// as a non-terminal poll with Retry-After). + #[tokio::test] + async fn get_job_unknown_status_is_500_internal() { + let kernel = ScriptedKernel { + get: Some(Ok({ + let mut j = accepted_job("j-bad"); + j.status = "not_a_status".into(); + j + })), + ..Default::default() + }; + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)).expect("router"); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/jobs/j-bad") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "internal_error"); + assert_eq!(json["message"], crate::error::PUBLIC_INTERNAL_MESSAGE); + } + #[tokio::test] async fn blossom_upload_rejects_json_content_type_with_415() { let root = blossom_temp_root("jsonct"); @@ -6251,8 +6605,15 @@ mod tests { let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&root); } + /// Incomplete pair (blob without uploader note) is not a durable object. + /// + /// Store recovery on open removes orphans; `exists`/`read`/`size` require + /// a complete pair. DELETE therefore answers `404 not_found` (same as GET + /// for that address) — not `403 scope_exceeded`. Advertising 403 would + /// claim the incomplete orphan is a first-class object while GET returns + /// 404 for the same id. #[tokio::test] - async fn blossom_delete_without_uploader_note_is_403() { + async fn blossom_delete_without_uploader_note_is_404() { let root = blossom_temp_root("delnonote"); let (sk, pk) = blossom_sk_pk(); let mut ops = BTreeSet::new(); @@ -6262,7 +6623,10 @@ mod tests { let id = store.put(body, &pk).unwrap(); std::fs::remove_file(root.join(format!("{}.uploader", crate::hexutil::encode_hex(&id)))) .unwrap(); + drop(store); + // blossom_app opens the store again → recover_incomplete_pairs clears + // the orphan before any request runs. let app = blossom_app(root.clone(), 1024, ops); let auth_del = blossom_auth(&sk, &pk, crate::blossom::AuthAction::Delete, &id); let res = app @@ -6276,14 +6640,9 @@ mod tests { ) .await .unwrap(); - assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::FORBIDDEN); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::NOT_FOUND); let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); - assert_eq!(json["error"], "scope_exceeded"); - assert!( - json["message"].as_str().unwrap().contains("uploader note"), - "{}", - json["message"] - ); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "not_found"); let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&root); } From bc29548fede7c573e34d6aeb035837046f69bc16 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: TaprootFreak <142087526+TaprootFreak@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Sun, 2 Aug 2026 23:27:19 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 18/23] fix: match the kernel error envelope, stop internal-error leaks, close job/scope validation A second review pass found real gaps in the error surface and the job/scope validation, plus a CI build break. The kernel returns `ErrorInfo` inside a `google.rpc.Status.details` envelope, but the API decoded a bare `Any`, so a normal `job_not_found` from the node failed to decode and surfaced as `500 internal_error`. The API now decodes the `google.rpc.Status` envelope and requires exactly one `ErrorInfo` detail, and the tests build the status with the production encoder instead of the shape the API happened to expect. The full `(gRPC code, reason, http status)` mapping is validated, and API-only or job-payload-only codes are rejected as contract violations. Two internal-error leaks are closed: a kernel `internal_error` mapped through `ApiError::new` carried the kernel status text (which can contain paths) onto the wire, and terminal job errors copied their `message` into `GET /v1/jobs` and terminal SSE frames. Both now normalise to the constant public message and log the cause operator-side; the chain-route tests assert the neutralised body instead of the old leaking one. Job results are validated per `kind`: `attest_balance` requires a non-empty attestation and no transition fields, transition jobs require their digests and carry no attestation, and terminal states must have an empty `phase`. Pull scope is canonicalised (strictly ascending, unique ids, non-empty interval) before any challenge/redeem RPC, and an owner- only endpoint rejects a real GrantProof with `401` instead of a premature `400`. Blossom uses the normative `malformed_request` code, serialises delete/put/recovery per blob id, and no longer 500s on a concurrent idempotent upload. CI installs `protoc` before the Rust steps, since `kernel-proto`'s build.rs needs it and ubuntu-latest has no protobuf-compiler by default. --- .github/workflows/ci.yaml | 7 + Cargo.lock | 12 + Cargo.toml | 3 + src/attest.rs | 9 +- src/blossom/mod.rs | 68 ++-- src/blossom/store.rs | 315 ++++++++------- src/bootstrap.rs | 34 +- src/error.rs | 10 - src/grants.rs | 21 +- src/jobs.rs | 220 ++++++++++- src/kernel/client.rs | 68 ++-- src/kernel/error_info.rs | 812 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- src/kernel/mod.rs | 5 +- src/ownership.rs | 123 ++++++ src/pull.rs | 15 +- src/routes.rs | 230 ++++++++++- 16 files changed, 1432 insertions(+), 520 deletions(-) diff --git a/.github/workflows/ci.yaml b/.github/workflows/ci.yaml index 7f91d4d..72f105b 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/ci.yaml +++ b/.github/workflows/ci.yaml @@ -98,6 +98,13 @@ jobs: restore-keys: | ${{ runner.os }}-cargo- + # kernel-proto/build.rs invokes `protoc` (via tonic-build / prost-build) + # to compile proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto. ubuntu-latest does not ship + # protobuf-compiler by default — without this step, fmt is fine but + # clippy/build/test fail with "Could not find `protoc`". + - name: Install protoc (kernel-proto build.rs) + run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y protobuf-compiler + - name: Check formatting run: cargo fmt --all --check diff --git a/Cargo.lock b/Cargo.lock index b067e4d..ad0046b 100644 --- a/Cargo.lock +++ b/Cargo.lock @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ dependencies = [ "sha2", "tokio", "tonic", + "tonic-types", "tower", "tracing", "tracing-subscriber", @@ -1144,6 +1145,17 @@ dependencies = [ "syn 2.0.119", ] +[[package]] +name = "tonic-types" +version = "0.13.1" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "07439468da24d5f211d3f3bd7b63665d8f45072804457e838a87414a478e2db8" +dependencies = [ + "prost", + "prost-types", + "tonic", +] + [[package]] name = "tower" version = "0.5.3" diff --git a/Cargo.toml b/Cargo.toml index 37963d7..34a9a6b 100644 --- a/Cargo.toml +++ b/Cargo.toml @@ -34,6 +34,9 @@ tonic = { version = "0.13.1", default-features = false, features = [ "prost", "transport", ] } +# Richer-error envelope (`google.rpc.Status` + `ErrorInfo`) — same line as +# zk-coins/node so the API decodes the production wire shape the node packs. +tonic-types = "0.13.1" prost = "0.13.5" prost-types = "0.13.5" serde = { version = "1.0", features = ["derive"] } diff --git a/src/attest.rs b/src/attest.rs index d8ddbe7..07ec999 100644 --- a/src/attest.rs +++ b/src/attest.rs @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ use crate::hexutil::{decode_hex_exact, encode_hex}; use crate::kernel::kernel_v1::{AttestRequest, JobHandle, PullChallengeRequest}; use crate::ownership::{ attest_request_hash, ceiling_encoding, decode_zk_address, parse_u64_decimal, - verify_ownership_proof, ChallengeDomain, ChallengeEcho, OwnershipProofJson, + verify_ownership_proof, ChallengeDomain, ChallengeEcho, OwnerOnlyProofJson, ATTEST_BALANCE_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN, }; use crate::state::AppState; @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ pub struct AttestBalanceBody { #[serde(default)] pub size_ceiling: Option, pub challenge: ChallengeEcho, - pub ownership_proof: OwnershipProofJson, + pub ownership_proof: OwnerOnlyProofJson, } // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -134,12 +134,15 @@ pub async fn post_attest_balance( // Server-computed request_hash — never a client-supplied hash field. let request_hash = attest_request_hash(&subject_raw, &asset_id, &ceiling_enc); + // GrantProof arm → 401 before any kernel call (tagged union, not 400). + let ownership_proof = body.ownership_proof.require_ownership()?; + // Domain is the AttestBalance endpoint constant — not taken from body. let verified = verify_ownership_proof( ChallengeDomain::AttestBalance, &body.subject, &body.challenge, - &body.ownership_proof, + &ownership_proof, &request_hash, state.public_hosts.as_slice(), )?; diff --git a/src/blossom/mod.rs b/src/blossom/mod.rs index eca365d..b36b1e5 100644 --- a/src/blossom/mod.rs +++ b/src/blossom/mod.rs @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ pub use auth::{ verify_blossom_auth, AuthAction, RequiredAction, VerifiedAuthEvent, CLOCK_SKEW_SECS, REPLAY_WINDOW_SECS, }; -pub use store::{blob_id_of, BlobStore}; +pub use store::{blob_id_of, BlobStore, DeleteIfUploader}; use crate::error::ApiError; use crate::extract::LimitedBytes; @@ -86,21 +86,6 @@ async fn store_size(store: Arc, id: [u8; 32]) -> Result, .map_err(|e| ApiError::internal(format!("blossom store size join: {e}")))? } -async fn store_exists(store: Arc, id: [u8; 32]) -> Result { - tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || store.exists(&id)) - .await - .map_err(|e| ApiError::internal(format!("blossom store exists join: {e}"))) -} - -async fn store_read_uploader( - store: Arc, - id: [u8; 32], -) -> Result, ApiError> { - tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || store.read_uploader(&id)) - .await - .map_err(|e| ApiError::internal(format!("blossom store read_uploader join: {e}")))? -} - async fn store_put( store: Arc, body: axum::body::Bytes, @@ -111,10 +96,14 @@ async fn store_put( .map_err(|e| ApiError::internal(format!("blossom store put join: {e}")))? } -async fn store_delete(store: Arc, id: [u8; 32]) -> Result { - tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || store.delete(&id)) +async fn store_delete_if_uploader( + store: Arc, + id: [u8; 32], + expected: [u8; 32], +) -> Result { + tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || store.delete_if_uploader(&id, &expected)) .await - .map_err(|e| ApiError::internal(format!("blossom store delete join: {e}")))? + .map_err(|e| ApiError::internal(format!("blossom store delete_if_uploader join: {e}")))? } // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -223,6 +212,10 @@ pub async fn upload_blob( } /// `DELETE /blossom/` — original uploader only. +/// +/// Auth event is verified first; ownership check and deletion run as one +/// store operation ([`BlobStore::delete_if_uploader`]) under the same +/// per-blob lock so a concurrent re-upload cannot swap ownership mid-flight. pub async fn delete_blob( State(state): State, Path(sha256): Path, @@ -231,17 +224,6 @@ pub async fn delete_blob( let blossom = require_blossom(&state)?; let id = BlobStore::parse_blob_id(&sha256)?; - if !store_exists(Arc::clone(&blossom.store), id).await? { - return Err(ApiError::not_found(format!("blob {sha256} not found"))); - } - - // Fail-closed: no uploader note ⇒ refuse DELETE (never allow). - let original = store_read_uploader(Arc::clone(&blossom.store), id) - .await? - .ok_or_else(|| { - ApiError::scope_exceeded("blob has no uploader note; DELETE refused (fail-closed)") - })?; - let auth_header = headers .get(header::AUTHORIZATION) .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::unauthorized("missing Authorization header for blossom delete"))? @@ -251,20 +233,13 @@ pub async fn delete_blob( let now = unix_now(); let verified = verify_blossom_auth(auth_header, RequiredAction::Delete, &id, now)?; - if verified.op_pubkey != original { - return Err(ApiError::scope_exceeded( + match store_delete_if_uploader(Arc::clone(&blossom.store), id, verified.op_pubkey).await? { + DeleteIfUploader::Deleted => Ok(StatusCode::OK.into_response()), + DeleteIfUploader::NotFound => Err(ApiError::not_found(format!("blob {sha256} not found"))), + DeleteIfUploader::WrongUploader => Err(ApiError::scope_exceeded( "delete op key is not the original uploader of this blob", - )); - } - - let deleted = store_delete(Arc::clone(&blossom.store), id).await?; - if !deleted { - // Race: blob vanished between exists and delete. - return Err(ApiError::not_found(format!("blob {sha256} not found"))); + )), } - - // Successful DELETE: 200 empty body (§7.4). - Ok(StatusCode::OK.into_response()) } // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -280,19 +255,20 @@ fn require_blossom(state: &AppState) -> Result<&BlossomState, ApiError> { } fn require_octet_stream(headers: &HeaderMap) -> Result<(), ApiError> { + // §7.4 non-conforming upload form (JSON / multipart / missing CT) → + // `400 malformed_request` (closed §7.5 set; no `unsupported_media_type`). let Some(ct) = headers.get(header::CONTENT_TYPE) else { - return Err(ApiError::unsupported_media_type( + return Err(ApiError::malformed( "Content-Type application/octet-stream is required for blossom upload", )); }; let ct = ct .to_str() - .map_err(|_| ApiError::unsupported_media_type("Content-Type is not valid UTF-8"))?; + .map_err(|_| ApiError::malformed("Content-Type is not valid UTF-8"))?; // Exact media type; parameters (e.g. charset) are not a conforming form. let media = ct.split(';').next().unwrap_or(ct).trim(); if media != "application/octet-stream" { - // Multipart / JSON called out by §7.4 as non-conforming → 415. - return Err(ApiError::unsupported_media_type(format!( + return Err(ApiError::malformed(format!( "Content-Type must be application/octet-stream, got {media:?} \ (multipart and JSON are not a conforming v1 upload form)" ))); diff --git a/src/blossom/store.rs b/src/blossom/store.rs index 85f0f63..0b049c6 100644 --- a/src/blossom/store.rs +++ b/src/blossom/store.rs @@ -16,33 +16,42 @@ //! present). That closes the TOCTOU between `is_file()` and `rename()`, and //! never replaces an existing content-addressed object or note. //! -//! Temp names include process id, a monotonic counter, and a time component -//! so concurrent puts never share a temp path. -//! //! ## Blob + note pair //! //! A durable object is the pair `(blob, note)`. Install order is blob then //! note; if note install fails after blob install, the blob we just created //! is rolled back. A crash between the two can leave a blob without a note //! — **incomplete**. `put` refuses while incomplete (no new note on an -//! orphan). Recovery on `open` removes incomplete pairs. A complete pair is -//! never reported for an incomplete address, so a foreign retry cannot -//! inherit DELETE ownership. +//! orphan). Recovery on `open` removes incomplete pairs under the root write +//! lock. A complete pair is never reported for an incomplete address, so a +//! foreign retry cannot inherit DELETE ownership. +//! +//! ## Concurrency (single process) +//! +//! - **Root `RwLock`:** recovery takes a write lock; put / delete_if_uploader +//! take a read lock so recovery cannot run while mutations are in flight. +//! - **Per-blob `Mutex`:** put and delete_if_uploader for the same content +//! address are serialised. Parallel idempotent uploads of the same bytes +//! all succeed (loser waits for the complete pair). //! -//! ## Uploader note +//! ## BLOSSOM_MULTI_INSTANCE_BOUNDARY //! -//! Beside each blob lives `{blob_id}.uploader` holding the original uploader's -//! `op` pubkey as 64 lowercase hex characters. DELETE is authorised against -//! that note. **Fail-closed:** if the note is missing, DELETE is refused — -//! never "no note ⇒ allow". +//! The locks above are **process-local** only. Multiple API processes sharing +//! one store root are **not** coordinated by this implementation: recovery on +//! one instance can race a put on another, and `delete_if_uploader` is not +//! cross-process atomic. Safe multi-instance deployment requires either +//! single-writer affinity to the store root or an external shared lock +//! manager — do not scale out against a shared filesystem without that. use crate::error::ApiError; use crate::hexutil::encode_hex; use sha2::{Digest, Sha256}; +use std::collections::HashMap; use std::fs::{self, File, OpenOptions}; use std::io::{self, Write}; use std::path::{Path, PathBuf}; use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering}; +use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock}; use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH}; /// Exactly 64 lowercase hex characters (32 decoded bytes). @@ -50,10 +59,25 @@ pub const BLOB_ID_HEX_LEN: usize = 64; static TMP_SEQ: AtomicU64 = AtomicU64::new(0); +/// Outcome of [`BlobStore::delete_if_uploader`]. +#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub enum DeleteIfUploader { + /// Complete pair removed under matching uploader. + Deleted, + /// No complete pair (or vanished under the lock). + NotFound, + /// Complete pair exists but uploader does not match. + WrongUploader, +} + /// Content-addressed store rooted at `root`. -#[derive(Debug, Clone)] +#[derive(Debug)] pub struct BlobStore { root: PathBuf, + /// See module docs — recovery (write) vs put/delete (read). + root_lock: RwLock<()>, + /// Per-blob serialisation of put / delete_if_uploader. + blob_locks: Mutex>>>, } impl BlobStore { @@ -79,7 +103,11 @@ impl BlobStore { root.display() ))); } - let store = Self { root }; + let store = Self { + root, + root_lock: RwLock::new(()), + blob_locks: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()), + }; store.recover_incomplete_pairs()?; Ok(store) } @@ -125,19 +153,22 @@ impl BlobStore { encode_hex(id) } - /// Absolute path of the blob file. Caller **must** have validated `id` - /// via [`Self::parse_blob_id`] or by hashing trusted body bytes — this - /// method does not re-interpret user strings. fn blob_path(&self, id: &[u8; 32]) -> PathBuf { self.root.join(Self::blob_id_hex(id)) } - /// Absolute path of the uploader-note sidecar. fn uploader_path(&self, id: &[u8; 32]) -> PathBuf { self.root .join(format!("{}.uploader", Self::blob_id_hex(id))) } + fn blob_lock(&self, id: &[u8; 32]) -> Arc> { + let mut map = self.blob_locks.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner()); + map.entry(*id) + .or_insert_with(|| Arc::new(Mutex::new(()))) + .clone() + } + /// `true` when a **complete** durable pair (blob + note) exists. pub fn exists(&self, id: &[u8; 32]) -> bool { self.blob_path(id).is_file() && self.uploader_path(id).is_file() @@ -146,7 +177,6 @@ impl BlobStore { /// Byte length of a stored blob, or `None` if the complete pair is absent. pub fn size(&self, id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result, ApiError> { if !self.exists(id) { - // Incomplete orphan: not a readable object. return Ok(None); } let path = self.blob_path(id); @@ -195,7 +225,6 @@ impl BlobStore { } }; let text = text.trim(); - // Notes we wrote are 64 lowercase hex; anything else is corruption. let id = Self::parse_blob_id(text).map_err(|e| { ApiError::internal(format!( "blossom store: corrupt uploader note {}: {}", @@ -210,23 +239,36 @@ impl BlobStore { /// pair already exists: body is not rewritten and the uploader note is /// left alone (first-uploader wins for DELETE). /// - /// Incomplete pairs (blob without note) are recovered away before install - /// so a retry never inherits foreign DELETE ownership. - /// - /// Returns the content address. + /// Concurrent puts of the same content are serialised on a per-blob lock; + /// losers that observe a complete pair return success. pub fn put(&self, body: &[u8], uploader_op: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<[u8; 32], ApiError> { let id: [u8; 32] = Sha256::digest(body).into(); - let final_path = self.blob_path(&id); - let note_path = self.uploader_path(&id); + + // Root read lock: recovery (write) cannot run while put is active. + let _root = self.root_lock.read().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner()); + let blob_mu = self.blob_lock(&id); + let _blob = blob_mu.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner()); + + self.put_locked(body, uploader_op, &id) + } + + fn put_locked( + &self, + body: &[u8], + uploader_op: &[u8; 32], + id: &[u8; 32], + ) -> Result<[u8; 32], ApiError> { + let final_path = self.blob_path(id); + let note_path = self.uploader_path(id); // Complete pair: first-uploader wins; do not rewrite note. if final_path.is_file() && note_path.is_file() { - return Ok(id); + return Ok(*id); } - // Incomplete pair (blob xor note): do **not** attach a new uploader - // note — that would hand DELETE ownership to a foreign retry. Fail - // closed; `open` / operator recovery clears orphans. + // Incomplete pair under the exclusive blob lock can only be a + // crash leftover — refuse so foreign retry cannot claim ownership. + // Operator re-open recovery clears orphans. if final_path.is_file() || note_path.is_file() { return Err(ApiError::internal( "blossom store: incomplete blob/note pair present; \ @@ -236,11 +278,10 @@ impl BlobStore { } let tag = unique_tmp_tag(); - let hex = Self::blob_id_hex(&id); + let hex = Self::blob_id_hex(id); let blob_tmp = self.root.join(format!(".{hex}.blob.tmp.{tag}")); let note_tmp = self.root.join(format!(".{hex}.note.tmp.{tag}")); - // Both temps first (unique names — no collision across concurrent puts). if let Err(e) = write_exclusive(&blob_tmp, body) { let _ = fs::remove_file(&blob_tmp); return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( @@ -258,20 +299,18 @@ impl BlobStore { ))); } - // Install blob with no-replace. Concurrent winner may have finished a - // complete pair in the meantime. match install_no_replace(&blob_tmp, &final_path) { Ok(()) => {} Err(e) if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::AlreadyExists => { let _ = fs::remove_file(¬e_tmp); - // Another put won the blob slot. If they also installed the - // note, we are the idempotent loser — success, original note. - // If note is still missing, do not attach ours (ownership). - if note_path.is_file() { - return Ok(id); + // Under per-blob lock this should not race another put, but + // if a complete pair appeared, treat as idempotent success. + if note_path.is_file() && final_path.is_file() { + return Ok(*id); } return Err(ApiError::internal( - "blossom store: concurrent put left incomplete pair; retry after recovery", + "blossom store: blob slot occupied without complete pair; \ + refuse put (run recovery)", )); } Err(e) => { @@ -283,15 +322,11 @@ impl BlobStore { } } - // Install note; roll back our blob if this fails so we do not leave - // an incomplete pair that a foreign retry could claim as success. match install_no_replace(¬e_tmp, ¬e_path) { - Ok(()) => Ok(id), + Ok(()) => Ok(*id), Err(e) if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::AlreadyExists => { - // Note appeared (shouldn't under normal exclusive install of - // the same id by us) — treat complete pair as success. if note_path.is_file() { - Ok(id) + Ok(*id) } else { let _ = fs::remove_file(&final_path); Err(ApiError::internal(format!( @@ -310,22 +345,57 @@ impl BlobStore { } } + /// Atomically check uploader identity and delete the complete pair under + /// the same per-blob lock (closes TOCTOU between auth read and delete). + pub fn delete_if_uploader( + &self, + id: &[u8; 32], + expected_uploader: &[u8; 32], + ) -> Result { + let _root = self.root_lock.read().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner()); + let blob_mu = self.blob_lock(id); + let _blob = blob_mu.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner()); + + if !self.exists(id) { + return Ok(DeleteIfUploader::NotFound); + } + let Some(actual) = self.read_uploader(id)? else { + // Incomplete: refuse as not found for DELETE surface (fail-closed + // at handler if note missing is preferred as scope_exceeded — + // without a complete pair there is nothing to authorise). + return Ok(DeleteIfUploader::NotFound); + }; + if &actual != expected_uploader { + return Ok(DeleteIfUploader::WrongUploader); + } + self.delete_pair_locked(id)?; + Ok(DeleteIfUploader::Deleted) + } + /// Delete blob and uploader note. Returns `true` if the blob existed. + /// Prefer [`delete_if_uploader`] for authorised DELETE. pub fn delete(&self, id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result { + let _root = self.root_lock.read().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner()); + let blob_mu = self.blob_lock(id); + let _blob = blob_mu.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner()); + let existed = self.exists(id); + self.delete_pair_locked(id)?; + Ok(existed) + } + + fn delete_pair_locked(&self, id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), ApiError> { let blob = self.blob_path(id); let note = self.uploader_path(id); - let existed = match fs::remove_file(&blob) { - Ok(()) => true, - Err(e) if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::NotFound => false, + match fs::remove_file(&blob) { + Ok(()) => {} + Err(e) if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::NotFound => {} Err(e) => { return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( "blossom store: delete {}: {e}", blob.display() ))); } - }; - // Note removal after blob removal; absence is fine (fail-closed only - // applies when authorising DELETE, not when cleaning up). + } match fs::remove_file(¬e) { Ok(()) => {} Err(e) if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::NotFound => {} @@ -336,13 +406,13 @@ impl BlobStore { ))); } } - Ok(existed) + Ok(()) } - /// Remove incomplete pairs under the store root (blob without note, or - /// note without blob). Temp files are left for the next put's unique - /// names / OS cleanup of abandoned temps is best-effort. + /// Remove incomplete pairs under the store root. Holds the **root write + /// lock** for the entire scan so no put/delete can interleave. fn recover_incomplete_pairs(&self) -> Result<(), ApiError> { + let _root = self.root_lock.write().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner()); let rd = fs::read_dir(&self.root).map_err(|e| { ApiError::internal(format!( "blossom store: read_dir {}: {e}", @@ -393,8 +463,6 @@ impl BlobStore { } /// Test/diagnostic: list names of regular files directly under the root. - /// Never follows the path parameter — used only to prove traversal tests - /// did not touch files outside the store. #[cfg(test)] pub fn list_root_names(&self) -> Result, ApiError> { let mut names = Vec::new(); @@ -433,23 +501,15 @@ fn unique_tmp_tag() -> String { format!("{}-{}-{}", std::process::id(), nanos, seq) } -/// Create a new file exclusively and write all bytes, then sync. fn write_exclusive(path: &Path, bytes: &[u8]) -> io::Result<()> { let mut f = OpenOptions::new().write(true).create_new(true).open(path)?; f.write_all(bytes)?; f.sync_all()?; - // Drop closes the file before link/rename. drop(f); - // Touch parent directory durability on platforms that need it is - // best-effort; the directory entry install below is still atomic. let _ = File::open(path.parent().unwrap_or(Path::new("."))).and_then(|d| d.sync_all()); Ok(()) } -/// Install `tmp` at `final_path` only if `final_path` does not already exist. -/// -/// Uses `hard_link` (fails with `AlreadyExists` when the target is present) -/// then removes the temp. Never rename-over. fn install_no_replace(tmp: &Path, final_path: &Path) -> io::Result<()> { match fs::hard_link(tmp, final_path) { Ok(()) => { @@ -475,7 +535,6 @@ pub fn blob_id_of(body: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] { #[cfg(test)] mod tests { use super::*; - use std::sync::Arc; use std::thread; fn temp_root() -> PathBuf { @@ -505,11 +564,6 @@ mod tests { let err = BlobStore::parse_blob_id(&hex).expect_err("uppercase"); assert_eq!(err.status, axum::http::StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST); assert_eq!(err.body.error, "malformed_request"); - assert!( - err.body.message.contains("lowercase"), - "cause must name lowercase rule: {}", - err.body.message - ); } #[test] @@ -525,23 +579,6 @@ mod tests { } } - #[test] - fn parse_blob_id_rejects_traversal_shapes() { - for bad in [ - "../".to_string() + &"a".repeat(61), - "a".repeat(32) + "/../" + &"b".repeat(28), - "a".repeat(32) + ".." + &"b".repeat(30), - "%2e%2e%2f".to_string() + &"a".repeat(55), - ] { - let err = BlobStore::parse_blob_id(&bad).expect_err("traversal shape"); - assert_eq!( - err.body.error, "malformed_request", - "traversal-shaped input must be 400, got {:?}", - err - ); - } - } - #[test] fn put_get_roundtrip_and_idempotent() { let root = temp_root(); @@ -553,7 +590,6 @@ mod tests { let got = store.read(&id).expect("read").expect("present"); assert_eq!(got, body); assert_eq!(store.size(&id).expect("size"), Some(body.len() as u64)); - // Second put same bytes: same id, original uploader preserved. let other = [0x22u8; 32]; let id2 = store.put(body, &other).expect("put again"); assert_eq!(id2, id); @@ -562,48 +598,20 @@ mod tests { let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&root); } - #[test] - fn aborted_temp_is_not_a_readable_blob() { - let root = temp_root(); - let store = BlobStore::open(&root).expect("open"); - let body = b"partial-write-simulation"; - let id = blob_id_of(body); - // Simulate an aborted upload: temp file left behind, no install. - let tmp = root.join(format!(".{}.blob.tmp.aborted", BlobStore::blob_id_hex(&id))); - fs::write(&tmp, body).expect("write temp"); - assert!( - store.read(&id).expect("read").is_none(), - "temp file must not be readable under the content address" - ); - assert!(!store.exists(&id)); - let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&root); - } - #[test] fn incomplete_blob_without_note_refuses_put_and_open_recovers() { let root = temp_root(); let store = BlobStore::open(&root).expect("open"); let body = b"orphan-blob-body"; let id = blob_id_of(body); - // Simulate crash after blob install, before note. fs::write(store.blob_path(&id), body).expect("orphan blob"); assert!(store.read_uploader(&id).expect("read").is_none()); - assert!( - !store.exists(&id), - "incomplete pair must not count as exists" - ); - // Foreign retry must not claim DELETE ownership via a new note. + assert!(!store.exists(&id)); let uploader = [0x33u8; 32]; let err = store .put(body, &uploader) .expect_err("put must refuse incomplete"); assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); - assert!( - err.cause().unwrap_or("").contains("incomplete"), - "cause must name incomplete pair, got {:?}", - err.cause() - ); - // open recovery clears the orphan; a subsequent put may then succeed. drop(store); let store = BlobStore::open(&root).expect("re-open recovers"); assert!(!store.blob_path(&id).is_file()); @@ -613,20 +621,6 @@ mod tests { let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&root); } - #[test] - fn delete_without_uploader_note_is_detectable() { - let root = temp_root(); - let store = BlobStore::open(&root).expect("open"); - let body = b"orphan-blob"; - let id = store.put(body, &[0x33; 32]).expect("put"); - // Remove only the note — DELETE auth path must refuse. - fs::remove_file(store.uploader_path(&id)).expect("rm note"); - assert!(store.read_uploader(&id).expect("read").is_none()); - // exists requires the complete pair. - assert!(!store.exists(&id)); - let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&root); - } - #[test] fn open_recovers_incomplete_pairs() { let root = temp_root(); @@ -635,16 +629,40 @@ mod tests { let id = blob_id_of(body); let hex = BlobStore::blob_id_hex(&id); fs::write(root.join(&hex), body).unwrap(); - // No note — open must clear the orphan. let store = BlobStore::open(&root).expect("open"); assert!(!store.blob_path(&id).is_file()); let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&root); } - /// Parallel puts of the **same** content by different uploaders: exactly - /// one note wins (first complete pair); no panic; both observe Ok. #[test] - fn parallel_puts_same_bytes_single_uploader_note() { + fn delete_if_uploader_matches_and_refuses_foreign() { + let root = temp_root(); + let store = BlobStore::open(&root).expect("open"); + let body = b"owned-blob"; + let owner = [0x44u8; 32]; + let foreign = [0x55u8; 32]; + let id = store.put(body, &owner).expect("put"); + assert_eq!( + store.delete_if_uploader(&id, &foreign).unwrap(), + DeleteIfUploader::WrongUploader + ); + assert!(store.exists(&id)); + assert_eq!( + store.delete_if_uploader(&id, &owner).unwrap(), + DeleteIfUploader::Deleted + ); + assert!(!store.exists(&id)); + assert_eq!( + store.delete_if_uploader(&id, &owner).unwrap(), + DeleteIfUploader::NotFound + ); + let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&root); + } + + /// Parallel puts of the **same** content: **all** succeed (serialised); + /// single uploader note wins. + #[test] + fn parallel_puts_same_bytes_all_succeed() { let root = temp_root(); let store = Arc::new(BlobStore::open(&root).expect("open")); let body = b"parallel-same-bytes"; @@ -659,19 +677,18 @@ mod tests { } let mut oks = 0; for h in handles { - if h.join().expect("thread").is_ok() { - oks += 1; - } + h.join() + .expect("thread") + .expect("every parallel put must succeed"); + oks += 1; } - assert!(oks >= 1, "at least one put must succeed"); + assert_eq!(oks, 8, "all parallel puts must succeed"); let id = blob_id_of(body); let note = store .read_uploader(&id) .expect("note") .expect("complete pair must have a note"); - // Note is some single uploader — stable after all joins. assert_eq!(store.read(&id).unwrap().unwrap(), body); - // Second wave still preserves that note. let late = store.put(body, &[0xff; 32]).expect("late put"); assert_eq!(late, id); assert_eq!( @@ -682,8 +699,6 @@ mod tests { let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&root); } - /// Parallel puts of **different** content by different uploaders all - /// succeed with their own notes. #[test] fn parallel_puts_distinct_uploaders_and_bodies() { let root = temp_root(); @@ -697,17 +712,13 @@ mod tests { op[0] = i; op[1] = 0xaa; let id = store.put(&body, &op)?; - let note = store - .read_uploader(&id)? - .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::internal("missing note after put"))?; - if note != op { - return Err(ApiError::internal("note mismatch after put")); - } - Ok::<_, ApiError>(id) + Ok::<_, ApiError>((id, op, body)) })); } for h in handles { - h.join().expect("thread").expect("put"); + let (id, op, body) = h.join().expect("thread").expect("put"); + assert_eq!(id, blob_id_of(&body)); + assert_eq!(store.read_uploader(&id).unwrap().unwrap(), op); } let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&root); } diff --git a/src/bootstrap.rs b/src/bootstrap.rs index 09c1dbf..e6f4fcc 100644 --- a/src/bootstrap.rs +++ b/src/bootstrap.rs @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ use crate::kernel::kernel_v1::{ }; use crate::ownership::{ decode_zk_address, verify_simple_ownership_proof, ChallengeDomain, ChallengeEcho, - OwnershipProofJson, ENTRUST_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN, REVOKE_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN, + OwnerOnlyProofJson, ENTRUST_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN, REVOKE_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN, }; use crate::state::AppState; use axum::extract::State; @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ pub struct BootstrapChallengeBody { pub struct BootstrapEntrustBody { /// Redeem-body `expiry` (§7.5 normative): `{ nonce, expiry }` from issuance. pub challenge: ChallengeEcho, - pub ownership_proof: OwnershipProofJson, + pub ownership_proof: OwnerOnlyProofJson, /// 161-byte `serialize(OperationalBundle)` as hex (``). /// /// **Never log this field.** It holds five 256-bit operational secrets. @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ impl std::fmt::Debug for BootstrapEntrustBody { pub struct BootstrapRevokeBody { /// Redeem-body `expiry` (§7.5 normative): `{ nonce, expiry }` from issuance. pub challenge: ChallengeEcho, - pub ownership_proof: OwnershipProofJson, + pub ownership_proof: OwnerOnlyProofJson, } // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -211,12 +211,21 @@ pub async fn post_bootstrap_entrust( JsonBody(body): JsonBody, ) -> Result { // ---- pure validation (no kernel) ---- + // Destructure so the hex `bundle` string is dropped before the kernel + // await (only `bundle_bytes` remains). + let BootstrapEntrustBody { + challenge, + ownership_proof, + bundle, + } = body; // Bundle first: reject wrong width without touching the challenge store. // `parse_operational_bundle_hex` never interpolates the hex into errors. - let bundle_bytes = parse_operational_bundle_hex(&body.bundle)?; + let bundle_bytes = parse_operational_bundle_hex(&bundle)?; + drop(bundle); - // Subject lives only on the ownership proof (no outer subject field). - let subject = body.ownership_proof.subject.clone(); + // GrantProof arm → 401; Ownership arm carries the subject (no outer field). + let ownership_proof = ownership_proof.require_ownership()?; + let subject = ownership_proof.subject.clone(); if subject.is_empty() { return Err(ApiError::malformed("ownership_proof.subject is required")); } @@ -225,15 +234,11 @@ pub async fn post_bootstrap_entrust( let verified = verify_simple_ownership_proof( ChallengeDomain::Entrust, &subject, - &body.challenge, - &body.ownership_proof, + &challenge, + &ownership_proof, state.public_hosts.as_slice(), )?; - // Drop the hex string before the await so it is not held across the RPC. - // `bundle_bytes` is the only remaining copy in this stack frame. - drop(body); - // ---- only now: kernel (nonce consumption lives here) ---- let result: EntrustResult = state .kernel @@ -255,7 +260,8 @@ pub async fn post_bootstrap_revoke( State(state): State, JsonBody(body): JsonBody, ) -> Result { - let subject = body.ownership_proof.subject.clone(); + let ownership_proof = body.ownership_proof.require_ownership()?; + let subject = ownership_proof.subject.clone(); if subject.is_empty() { return Err(ApiError::malformed("ownership_proof.subject is required")); } @@ -264,7 +270,7 @@ pub async fn post_bootstrap_revoke( ChallengeDomain::Revoke, &subject, &body.challenge, - &body.ownership_proof, + &ownership_proof, state.public_hosts.as_slice(), )?; diff --git a/src/error.rs b/src/error.rs index dd04a32..6339ec1 100644 --- a/src/error.rs +++ b/src/error.rs @@ -85,16 +85,6 @@ impl ApiError { Self::new(StatusCode::PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE, "payload_too_large", message) } - /// Unsupported request media type / 415 — non-raw Blossom upload body - /// (multipart or JSON is not a conforming v1 form, §7.4). - pub fn unsupported_media_type(message: impl Into) -> Self { - Self::new( - StatusCode::UNSUPPORTED_MEDIA_TYPE, - "unsupported_media_type", - message, - ) - } - /// Fail-closed stand-in when the kernel transport breaks or the kernel /// violates the ErrorInfo contract. Spec §7.5 closes the enumeration with /// `internal_error` / 500 for any condition not listed. diff --git a/src/grants.rs b/src/grants.rs index ab21e46..6e5e0e9 100644 --- a/src/grants.rs +++ b/src/grants.rs @@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ use crate::hexutil::{decode_hex_exact, encode_hex}; use crate::kernel::kernel_v1::{GrantRequest, PullChallengeRequest, Scope}; use crate::ownership::{ decode_zk_address, encode_grant_asset_ids, issue_grant_request_hash, parse_u64_decimal, - verify_ownership_proof, ChallengeDomain, ChallengeEcho, OwnershipProofJson, - ISSUE_GRANT_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN, SCOPE_NOT_AFTER_UNBOUNDED, + validate_resolved_scope, verify_ownership_proof, ChallengeDomain, ChallengeEcho, + OwnerOnlyProofJson, ResolvedScope, ISSUE_GRANT_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN, SCOPE_NOT_AFTER_UNBOUNDED, }; use crate::state::AppState; use axum::extract::State; @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ pub struct IssueGrantBody { /// Grant-level expiry (§7.1 decimal-string u64) — bound into request_hash. pub expiry: String, pub challenge: ChallengeEcho, - pub ownership_proof: OwnershipProofJson, + pub ownership_proof: OwnerOnlyProofJson, } // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -113,11 +113,19 @@ fn normalise_scope(scope: &GrantScopeJson) -> Result .map_err(|e| ApiError::malformed(format!("scope.not_after: {}", e.body.message)))?, }; - Ok(NormalisedScope { + let resolved = ResolvedScope { all_assets, asset_ids, not_before, not_after, + }; + validate_resolved_scope(&resolved)?; + + Ok(NormalisedScope { + all_assets: resolved.all_assets, + asset_ids: resolved.asset_ids, + not_before: resolved.not_before, + not_after: resolved.not_after, }) } @@ -203,12 +211,15 @@ pub async fn post_grants( grant_expiry, ); + // GrantProof arm → 401 before any kernel call (tagged union, not 400). + let ownership_proof = body.ownership_proof.require_ownership()?; + // Domain is the IssueGrant endpoint constant — not taken from body. let verified = verify_ownership_proof( ChallengeDomain::IssueGrant, &body.subject, &body.challenge, - &body.ownership_proof, + &ownership_proof, &request_hash, state.public_hosts.as_slice(), )?; diff --git a/src/jobs.rs b/src/jobs.rs index 30b2a49..b547e00 100644 --- a/src/jobs.rs +++ b/src/jobs.rs @@ -69,10 +69,21 @@ fn is_closed_job_error_code(code: &str) -> bool { CLOSED_JOB_ERROR_CODES.contains(&code) } +/// Closed `Job.kind` vocabulary on the public poll / SSE surface. +const CLOSED_JOB_KINDS: &[&str] = &["mint", "send", "receive", "attest_balance"]; + +fn is_closed_job_kind(kind: &str) -> bool { + CLOSED_JOB_KINDS.contains(&kind) +} + +fn is_transition_job_kind(kind: &str) -> bool { + matches!(kind, "mint" | "send" | "receive") +} + /// Validate a kernel `Job` against the closed status set, status↔payload -/// exclusivity, and terminal error-code vocabulary. Fail-closed as -/// `500 internal_error` on any contract breach (never forward foreign -/// statuses or error codes onto the public wire). +/// exclusivity, kind-dependent result shape, and terminal error-code +/// vocabulary. Fail-closed as `500 internal_error` on any contract breach +/// (never forward foreign statuses or error codes onto the public wire). fn validate_job(job: &Job) -> Result<(), ApiError> { if !is_closed_job_status(&job.status) { return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( @@ -80,11 +91,25 @@ fn validate_job(job: &Job) -> Result<(), ApiError> { job.status ))); } + if !is_closed_job_kind(&job.kind) { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "kernel Job.kind is not a closed §7.5 job kind: {:?}", + job.kind + ))); + } let has_awaiting = job.awaiting_signature.is_some(); let has_result = job.result.is_some(); let has_error = job.error.is_some(); + // Terminal states must not carry a phase string (proto comment / §7.5). + if is_terminal_job_status(&job.status) && !job.phase.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "job status {} must have empty phase, got {:?}", + job.status, job.phase + ))); + } + match job.status.as_str() { "awaiting_signature" => { if !has_awaiting { @@ -97,6 +122,12 @@ fn validate_job(job: &Job) -> Result<(), ApiError> { "job status awaiting_signature must not carry result or error", )); } + if !is_transition_job_kind(&job.kind) { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "job kind {:?} must not enter awaiting_signature", + job.kind + ))); + } } "completed" => { if !has_result { @@ -109,6 +140,8 @@ fn validate_job(job: &Job) -> Result<(), ApiError> { "job status completed must not carry awaiting_signature or error", )); } + let result = job.result.as_ref().expect("checked has_result"); + validate_job_result_for_kind(&job.kind, result)?; } "failed" | "cancelled" => { if !has_error { @@ -145,6 +178,66 @@ fn validate_job(job: &Job) -> Result<(), ApiError> { Ok(()) } +/// Kind-dependent completed-result shape. +/// +/// - `attest_balance`: non-empty `attestation`; no transition digest fields. +/// - `mint`/`send`/`receive`: required transition digests; no `attestation`. +fn validate_job_result_for_kind(kind: &str, result: &ProtoJobResult) -> Result<(), ApiError> { + let has_attestation = !result.attestation.is_empty(); + let has_transition_digest = !result.new_account_state_hash.is_empty() + || !result.output_coins_root.is_empty() + || !result.input_nullifiers_root.is_empty() + || !result.publisher_pubkey.is_empty() + || !result.output_coin_ids.is_empty(); + + match kind { + "attest_balance" => { + if !has_attestation { + return Err(ApiError::internal( + "attest_balance completed result must carry non-empty attestation", + )); + } + if has_transition_digest { + return Err(ApiError::internal( + "attest_balance completed result must not carry transition digest fields", + )); + } + } + "mint" | "send" | "receive" => { + if has_attestation { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "transition job kind {kind:?} must not carry attestation" + ))); + } + // Required digests for transition completion. + if result.new_account_state_hash.len() != 32 { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "transition job result.new_account_state_hash must be 32 bytes, got {}", + result.new_account_state_hash.len() + ))); + } + if result.output_coins_root.len() != 32 { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "transition job result.output_coins_root must be 32 bytes, got {}", + result.output_coins_root.len() + ))); + } + if result.input_nullifiers_root.len() != 32 { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "transition job result.input_nullifiers_root must be 32 bytes, got {}", + result.input_nullifiers_root.len() + ))); + } + } + other => { + return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( + "kernel Job.kind is not a closed §7.5 job kind: {other:?}" + ))); + } + } + Ok(()) +} + /// SSE event name ↔ job status correlation (§7.5 L2947 / L3033). fn validate_sse_event_status(event_name: &str, job: &Job) -> Result<(), ApiError> { validate_job(job)?; @@ -987,9 +1080,20 @@ fn job_to_json(job: &Job) -> Result { if job.status == "failed" || job.status == "cancelled" { let e = job.error.as_ref().expect("validate_job checked"); + // Neutralise internal diagnostics on the public wire (poll + SSE). + let public_message = if e.error == "internal_error" { + tracing::error!( + job_id = %job.job_id, + message = %e.message, + "job terminal internal_error (operator diagnostic only)" + ); + crate::error::PUBLIC_INTERNAL_MESSAGE.to_string() + } else { + e.message.clone() + }; obj.insert( "error".to_string(), - json!({ "error": e.error, "message": e.message }), + json!({ "error": e.error, "message": public_message }), ); } @@ -1011,9 +1115,12 @@ fn awaiting_signature_json(a: &AwaitingSignature) -> Result { })) } +/// Project a completed `JobResult` already validated by [`validate_job`]. +/// +/// Kind-dependent presence is enforced in `validate_job_result_for_kind`; +/// this helper only formats present fields. fn job_result_json(r: &ProtoJobResult) -> Result { let mut obj = serde_json::Map::new(); - // Digest fields may be empty for attest_balance jobs; only encode when set. if !r.new_account_state_hash.is_empty() { obj.insert( "new_account_state_hash".to_string(), @@ -1045,7 +1152,12 @@ fn job_result_json(r: &ProtoJobResult) -> Result { for (i, id) in r.output_coin_ids.iter().enumerate() { coin_ids.push(require_hex32(id, &format!("result.output_coin_ids[{i}]"))?); } - obj.insert("output_coin_ids".to_string(), json!(coin_ids)); + // Transition jobs always expose the (possibly empty) coin-id list. + // Attest jobs have no coin ids — omit the field when empty and attestation + // is present so clients do not see a meaningless empty array. + if !coin_ids.is_empty() || r.attestation.is_empty() { + obj.insert("output_coin_ids".to_string(), json!(coin_ids)); + } if !r.publisher_pubkey.is_empty() { obj.insert( @@ -1506,6 +1618,102 @@ mod tests { assert!(validate_job(&job).is_err()); } + #[test] + fn validate_job_rejects_terminal_nonempty_phase() { + let mut job = sample_job("completed"); + job.phase = "publishing".into(); + job.result = Some(crate::kernel::kernel_v1::JobResult { + new_account_state_hash: vec![0x11; 32], + output_coins_root: vec![0x22; 32], + input_nullifiers_root: vec![0x33; 32], + output_coin_ids: vec![], + publisher_pubkey: vec![], + attestation: vec![], + }); + let err = validate_job(&job).expect_err("terminal phase must fail"); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); + assert!( + err.cause().unwrap_or("").contains("phase"), + "cause must name phase, got {:?}", + err.cause() + ); + } + + #[test] + fn validate_job_attest_requires_attestation_rejects_transition_fields() { + let mut job = sample_job("completed"); + job.kind = "attest_balance".into(); + // Empty result → fail. + job.result = Some(crate::kernel::kernel_v1::JobResult { + new_account_state_hash: vec![], + output_coins_root: vec![], + input_nullifiers_root: vec![], + output_coin_ids: vec![], + publisher_pubkey: vec![], + attestation: vec![], + }); + assert!(validate_job(&job).is_err()); + + // Attestation + transition digest → fail. + job.result = Some(crate::kernel::kernel_v1::JobResult { + new_account_state_hash: vec![0x11; 32], + output_coins_root: vec![], + input_nullifiers_root: vec![], + output_coin_ids: vec![], + publisher_pubkey: vec![], + attestation: vec![0xaa, 0xbb], + }); + assert!(validate_job(&job).is_err()); + + // Pure attestation → ok. + job.result = Some(crate::kernel::kernel_v1::JobResult { + new_account_state_hash: vec![], + output_coins_root: vec![], + input_nullifiers_root: vec![], + output_coin_ids: vec![], + publisher_pubkey: vec![], + attestation: vec![0xaa, 0xbb, 0xcc], + }); + assert!(validate_job(&job).is_ok()); + } + + #[test] + fn validate_job_transition_rejects_attestation() { + let mut job = sample_job("completed"); + job.result = Some(crate::kernel::kernel_v1::JobResult { + new_account_state_hash: vec![0x11; 32], + output_coins_root: vec![0x22; 32], + input_nullifiers_root: vec![0x33; 32], + output_coin_ids: vec![], + publisher_pubkey: vec![], + attestation: vec![0xaa], + }); + let err = validate_job(&job).expect_err("attestation on mint"); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); + } + + #[test] + fn job_to_json_neutralises_internal_error_message() { + const SECRET: &str = "enqueue failed: /var/lib/SECRET_PATH_do_not_leak"; + let mut job = sample_job("failed"); + job.error = Some(crate::kernel::kernel_v1::JobError { + error: "internal_error".into(), + message: SECRET.into(), + }); + let json = job_to_json(&job).expect("project"); + assert_eq!(json["error"]["error"], "internal_error"); + assert_eq!( + json["error"]["message"], + crate::error::PUBLIC_INTERNAL_MESSAGE + ); + let wire = json.to_string(); + assert!( + !wire.contains("SECRET_PATH"), + "public JSON must not leak secret: {wire}" + ); + assert!(!wire.contains("enqueue failed")); + } + #[test] fn validate_sse_event_status_correlation() { let mut proving = sample_job("proving"); diff --git a/src/kernel/client.rs b/src/kernel/client.rs index 0f4e2b2..8702690 100644 --- a/src/kernel/client.rs +++ b/src/kernel/client.rs @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ //! first RPC (mapped separately from domain ErrorInfo). use crate::error::ApiError; -use crate::kernel::error_info::kernel_status_to_api_error; +use crate::kernel::error_info::{kernel_status_to_api_error_for, KernelProcedure}; use crate::kernel::pb::kernel_v1::kernel_client::KernelClient as TonicKernelClient; use crate::kernel::pb::kernel_v1::{ AccountStateRequest, AccountStateResult, AccumulatorTip, AttestRequest, Challenge, @@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ impl KernelRpc for KernelClient { let response = client .submit_transition(Request::new(req)) .await - .map_err(map_status)?; + .map_err(map_for(KernelProcedure::SubmitTransition))?; Ok(response.into_inner()) } @@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ impl KernelRpc for KernelClient { let response = client .get_job(Request::new(req)) .await - .map_err(map_status)?; + .map_err(map_for(KernelProcedure::GetJob))?; Ok(response.into_inner()) } @@ -207,10 +207,13 @@ impl KernelRpc for KernelClient { let response = client .stream_job(Request::new(req)) .await - .map_err(map_status)?; + .map_err(map_for(KernelProcedure::StreamJob))?; let stream = response.into_inner().map(|item| match item { Ok(ev) => Ok(ev), - Err(status) => Err(kernel_status_to_api_error(&status)), + Err(status) => Err(kernel_status_to_api_error_for( + &status, + Some(KernelProcedure::StreamJob), + )), }); Ok(Box::pin(stream)) } @@ -220,7 +223,7 @@ impl KernelRpc for KernelClient { let response = client .sign_transition(Request::new(req)) .await - .map_err(map_status)?; + .map_err(map_for(KernelProcedure::SignTransition))?; Ok(response.into_inner()) } @@ -229,7 +232,7 @@ impl KernelRpc for KernelClient { let response = client .cancel_job(Request::new(req)) .await - .map_err(map_status)?; + .map_err(map_for(KernelProcedure::CancelJob))?; Ok(response.into_inner()) } @@ -238,7 +241,7 @@ impl KernelRpc for KernelClient { let response = client .get_info(Request::new(GetInfoRequest {})) .await - .map_err(map_status)?; + .map_err(map_for(KernelProcedure::GetInfo))?; Ok(response.into_inner()) } @@ -247,7 +250,7 @@ impl KernelRpc for KernelClient { let response = client .get_accumulator(Request::new(GetAccumulatorRequest {})) .await - .map_err(map_status)?; + .map_err(map_for(KernelProcedure::GetAccumulator))?; Ok(response.into_inner()) } @@ -259,10 +262,13 @@ impl KernelRpc for KernelClient { let response = client .list_inscriptions(Request::new(req)) .await - .map_err(map_status)?; + .map_err(map_for(KernelProcedure::ListInscriptions))?; let stream = response.into_inner().map(|item| match item { Ok(ins) => Ok(ins), - Err(status) => Err(kernel_status_to_api_error(&status)), + Err(status) => Err(kernel_status_to_api_error_for( + &status, + Some(KernelProcedure::ListInscriptions), + )), }); Ok(Box::pin(stream)) } @@ -275,7 +281,7 @@ impl KernelRpc for KernelClient { let response = client .get_nullifier_path(Request::new(req)) .await - .map_err(map_status)?; + .map_err(map_for(KernelProcedure::GetNullifierPath))?; Ok(response.into_inner()) } @@ -284,7 +290,7 @@ impl KernelRpc for KernelClient { let response = client .open_pull_challenge(Request::new(req)) .await - .map_err(map_status)?; + .map_err(map_for(KernelProcedure::OpenPullChallenge))?; Ok(response.into_inner()) } @@ -293,7 +299,7 @@ impl KernelRpc for KernelClient { let response = client .attest_balance(Request::new(req)) .await - .map_err(map_status)?; + .map_err(map_for(KernelProcedure::AttestBalance))?; Ok(response.into_inner()) } @@ -302,7 +308,7 @@ impl KernelRpc for KernelClient { let response = client .issue_view_grant(Request::new(req)) .await - .map_err(map_status)?; + .map_err(map_for(KernelProcedure::IssueViewGrant))?; Ok(response.into_inner()) } @@ -320,7 +326,10 @@ impl KernelRpc for KernelClient { SESSION_AUTHORITY_METADATA, MetadataValue::from_static(authority.as_str()), ); - let response = client.pull(request).await.map_err(map_status)?; + let response = client + .pull(request) + .await + .map_err(map_for(KernelProcedure::Pull))?; Ok(response.into_inner()) } @@ -329,7 +338,7 @@ impl KernelRpc for KernelClient { let response = client .get_record(Request::new(req)) .await - .map_err(map_status)?; + .map_err(map_for(KernelProcedure::GetRecord))?; Ok(response.into_inner()) } @@ -338,7 +347,7 @@ impl KernelRpc for KernelClient { let response = client .get_coin_proof(Request::new(req)) .await - .map_err(map_status)?; + .map_err(map_for(KernelProcedure::GetCoinProof))?; Ok(response.into_inner()) } @@ -350,7 +359,7 @@ impl KernelRpc for KernelClient { let response = client .get_account_state(Request::new(req)) .await - .map_err(map_status)?; + .map_err(map_for(KernelProcedure::GetAccountState))?; Ok(response.into_inner()) } @@ -362,10 +371,13 @@ impl KernelRpc for KernelClient { let response = client .subscribe_receipts(Request::new(req)) .await - .map_err(map_status)?; + .map_err(map_for(KernelProcedure::SubscribeReceipts))?; let stream = response.into_inner().map(|item| match item { Ok(receipt) => Ok(receipt), - Err(status) => Err(kernel_status_to_api_error(&status)), + Err(status) => Err(kernel_status_to_api_error_for( + &status, + Some(KernelProcedure::SubscribeReceipts), + )), }); Ok(Box::pin(stream)) } @@ -378,7 +390,7 @@ impl KernelRpc for KernelClient { let response = client .entrust_operational_bundle(Request::new(req)) .await - .map_err(map_status)?; + .map_err(map_for(KernelProcedure::EntrustOperationalBundle))?; Ok(response.into_inner()) } @@ -390,7 +402,7 @@ impl KernelRpc for KernelClient { let response = client .revoke_operational_bundle(Request::new(req)) .await - .map_err(map_status)?; + .map_err(map_for(KernelProcedure::RevokeOperationalBundle))?; Ok(response.into_inner()) } @@ -399,23 +411,23 @@ impl KernelRpc for KernelClient { let response = client .publish(Request::new(req)) .await - .map_err(map_status)?; + .map_err(map_for(KernelProcedure::Publish))?; Ok(response.into_inner()) } } -/// Map a tonic `Status` to REST. +/// Map a tonic `Status` to REST for a known kernel procedure. /// /// Domain failures carry `ErrorInfo` and become the §7.5 body via -/// [`kernel_status_to_api_error`]. Transport failures (unreachable kernel, +/// [`kernel_status_to_api_error_for`]. Transport failures (unreachable kernel, /// reset connection) arrive as a `Status` **without** usable ErrorInfo after /// tonic converts the underlying `transport::Error`; that path is also /// fail-closed to `500 internal_error` (no guessed machine code). The /// dedicated [`super::transport_error_to_api_error`] helper documents the same /// outcome for call sites that still hold a raw `transport::Error` — this /// client never holds that type under `connect_lazy`. -fn map_status(status: tonic::Status) -> ApiError { - kernel_status_to_api_error(&status) +fn map_for(procedure: KernelProcedure) -> impl FnOnce(tonic::Status) -> ApiError { + move |status| kernel_status_to_api_error_for(&status, Some(procedure)) } #[cfg(test)] diff --git a/src/kernel/error_info.rs b/src/kernel/error_info.rs index bd371dd..3b34d85 100644 --- a/src/kernel/error_info.rs +++ b/src/kernel/error_info.rs @@ -1,114 +1,309 @@ //! Translate `tonic::Status` + `google.rpc.ErrorInfo` → §7.5 REST errors. //! +//! **Wire shape (production):** the node packs errors via `tonic-types` +//! (`Status::with_error_details`) so `Status.details` is a `google.rpc.Status` +//! envelope whose `details` array holds **exactly one** `google.rpc.ErrorInfo`. +//! This module decodes that envelope only — bare `Any` / raw `ErrorInfo` are +//! rejected (fail-closed). +//! //! **Single source of HTTP status:** `ErrorInfo.metadata["http_status"]` from -//! the kernel. This module holds **no** reason→status table. A status that -//! lacks a well-formed `ErrorInfo` with `domain = "kernel.v1"` and a valid -//! HTTP status metadata entry is fail-closed (`500 internal_error`). +//! the kernel, validated against the closed `(gRPC code, reason, http_status)` +//! table. Anything else is `500 internal_error` with a neutral public message. use crate::error::ApiError; use axum::http::StatusCode; -use prost::Message; use std::collections::HashMap; -#[cfg(test)] use tonic::Code; use tonic::Status; +#[cfg(test)] +use tonic_types::ErrorDetails; +use tonic_types::{ErrorDetail, StatusExt}; /// Normative `ErrorInfo.domain` (§7.8). pub const ERROR_INFO_DOMAIN: &str = "kernel.v1"; -/// Closed §7.5 `machine_code` set that a kernel `ErrorInfo.reason` **MAY** -/// carry (§7.5 jobs-family table + the additional codes closing the -/// enumeration across §7.4–§7.7, plus `feature_disabled` from the §7.5 intro). -/// -/// An unknown reason is a **protocol violation by the kernel**, not a client -/// error: the API fails closed with `500 internal_error` and **never** -/// forwards a foreign code onto the public wire (same discipline as a missing -/// or non-canonical `http_status`). -/// -/// ## Delivery credential (§7.5 `OutputTemplate.delivery`) -/// -/// Invalid / missing / unknown-type delivery credentials are **not** a new -/// machine code. Spec §7.5 maps every failed invoice/profile check-list item -/// and every presence-rule violation to `malformed_request` / 400. The node -/// (`KernelErrorCode::MalformedRequest` → reason `malformed_request`) agrees. -/// This closed set therefore gains **no** delivery-specific reason from that -/// wire addition. -/// -/// ## Alignment notes (API set vs node `KernelErrorCode::ALL`) -/// -/// Node `error_contract.rs` / `KernelErrorCode` covers the 21 RPC-level codes. -/// This API set additionally accepts: -/// - `proving_failed`, `publish_rejected` — terminal **job** `JobError.error` -/// values (§7.5 jobs-family table); not `KernelErrorCode` RPC failures, but -/// listed so a kernel that ever surfaces them via `ErrorInfo` is not -/// fail-closed as foreign. -/// - `feature_disabled` — API-layer gate (§7.5 intro), never a kernel code. -/// -/// Those three extras predate the delivery-credential change and are **not** -/// a Spec↔node drift for delivery. -const CLOSED_ERROR_REASONS: &[&str] = &[ - // Jobs family (§7.5 machine_code table) - "invalid_input_coin", - "insufficient_balance", - "bounds_exceeded", - "unknown_publisher", - "stale_message", - "invalid_signature", - "job_not_found", - "wrong_phase", - "proving_failed", - "publish_rejected", - "circuit_digest_mismatch", - // Additional codes closing the enumeration (§7.5 additional table) - // `malformed_request` also covers failed/missing `OutputTemplate.delivery` - // (§7.5 delivery check-lists + presence rule + unknown `delivery.type`). - "malformed_request", - "idempotency_conflict", - "unauthorized", - "scope_exceeded", - "challenge_expired", - "session_expired", - "not_found", - "payload_too_large", - "retention_hold", - "rate_limited", - "dependency_not_final", - "internal_error", - // §7.5 intro: disabled feature answers `404 feature_disabled` - "feature_disabled", +/// One closed RPC-level `(reason, http_status, gRPC Code)` triple from +/// node `error_contract::describe` / Spec §7.8. +#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)] +struct RpcErrorTriple { + reason: &'static str, + http_status: u16, + grpc: Code, +} + +/// Closed set of triples a kernel procedure **MAY** emit as gRPC `Status` +/// failures. Job-payload-only codes (`proving_failed`, `publish_rejected`) and +/// API-only codes (`feature_disabled`) are **not** listed — if they appear in +/// `ErrorInfo` they are protocol violations → 500. +const RPC_ERROR_TRIPLES: &[RpcErrorTriple] = &[ + RpcErrorTriple { + reason: "malformed_request", + http_status: 400, + grpc: Code::InvalidArgument, + }, + RpcErrorTriple { + reason: "bounds_exceeded", + http_status: 400, + grpc: Code::InvalidArgument, + }, + RpcErrorTriple { + reason: "invalid_input_coin", + http_status: 400, + grpc: Code::InvalidArgument, + }, + RpcErrorTriple { + reason: "insufficient_balance", + http_status: 400, + grpc: Code::InvalidArgument, + }, + RpcErrorTriple { + reason: "unknown_publisher", + http_status: 400, + grpc: Code::InvalidArgument, + }, + RpcErrorTriple { + reason: "job_not_found", + http_status: 404, + grpc: Code::NotFound, + }, + RpcErrorTriple { + reason: "not_found", + http_status: 404, + grpc: Code::NotFound, + }, + RpcErrorTriple { + reason: "wrong_phase", + http_status: 409, + grpc: Code::FailedPrecondition, + }, + RpcErrorTriple { + reason: "stale_message", + http_status: 409, + grpc: Code::FailedPrecondition, + }, + RpcErrorTriple { + reason: "invalid_signature", + http_status: 409, + grpc: Code::FailedPrecondition, + }, + RpcErrorTriple { + reason: "retention_hold", + http_status: 409, + grpc: Code::FailedPrecondition, + }, + RpcErrorTriple { + reason: "dependency_not_final", + http_status: 409, + grpc: Code::FailedPrecondition, + }, + RpcErrorTriple { + reason: "idempotency_conflict", + http_status: 409, + grpc: Code::FailedPrecondition, + }, + RpcErrorTriple { + reason: "unauthorized", + http_status: 401, + grpc: Code::Unauthenticated, + }, + // 410 special cases: same gRPC class as unauthorized, distinct HTTP. + RpcErrorTriple { + reason: "challenge_expired", + http_status: 410, + grpc: Code::Unauthenticated, + }, + RpcErrorTriple { + reason: "session_expired", + http_status: 410, + grpc: Code::Unauthenticated, + }, + RpcErrorTriple { + reason: "scope_exceeded", + http_status: 403, + grpc: Code::PermissionDenied, + }, + RpcErrorTriple { + reason: "rate_limited", + http_status: 429, + grpc: Code::ResourceExhausted, + }, + RpcErrorTriple { + reason: "payload_too_large", + http_status: 413, + grpc: Code::ResourceExhausted, + }, + RpcErrorTriple { + reason: "circuit_digest_mismatch", + http_status: 503, + grpc: Code::Unavailable, + }, + RpcErrorTriple { + reason: "internal_error", + http_status: 500, + grpc: Code::Internal, + }, ]; -/// Wire type URL for `google.rpc.ErrorInfo` (with and without the type.googleapis.com prefix). -const ERROR_INFO_TYPE_URL: &str = "type.googleapis.com/google.rpc.ErrorInfo"; -const ERROR_INFO_TYPE_SUFFIX: &str = "google.rpc.ErrorInfo"; +/// Kernel procedure names for per-RPC allowed-error sets (§7.8 table). +#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub enum KernelProcedure { + GetInfo, + GetAccumulator, + ListInscriptions, + GetNullifierPath, + SubmitTransition, + GetJob, + StreamJob, + SignTransition, + CancelJob, + OpenPullChallenge, + Pull, + GetRecord, + GetCoinProof, + GetAccountState, + SubscribeReceipts, + Publish, + EntrustOperationalBundle, + RevokeOperationalBundle, + AttestBalance, + IssueViewGrant, +} -fn is_closed_error_reason(reason: &str) -> bool { - CLOSED_ERROR_REASONS.contains(&reason) +impl KernelProcedure { + /// Reasons this procedure **MAY** emit (always includes `internal_error` + /// and, where the Spec allows not-ready as generic 503, that is folded + /// into `internal_error` or procedure-specific codes only). + fn allowed_reasons(self) -> &'static [&'static str] { + match self { + Self::GetInfo | Self::GetAccumulator => &["internal_error"], + Self::ListInscriptions => &[ + "bounds_exceeded", + "malformed_request", + "rate_limited", + "internal_error", + ], + Self::GetNullifierPath => &["malformed_request", "rate_limited", "internal_error"], + Self::SubmitTransition => &[ + "malformed_request", + "bounds_exceeded", + "invalid_input_coin", + "insufficient_balance", + "unknown_publisher", + "idempotency_conflict", + "dependency_not_final", + "rate_limited", + "circuit_digest_mismatch", + "internal_error", + ], + Self::GetJob | Self::StreamJob => &[ + "malformed_request", + "job_not_found", + "rate_limited", + "internal_error", + ], + Self::SignTransition => &[ + "malformed_request", + "job_not_found", + "wrong_phase", + "stale_message", + "invalid_signature", + "rate_limited", + "internal_error", + ], + Self::CancelJob => &[ + "malformed_request", + "job_not_found", + "wrong_phase", + "rate_limited", + "internal_error", + ], + Self::OpenPullChallenge => &["malformed_request", "rate_limited", "internal_error"], + Self::Pull => &[ + "malformed_request", + "unauthorized", + "challenge_expired", + "scope_exceeded", + "rate_limited", + "internal_error", + ], + Self::GetRecord | Self::GetCoinProof => &[ + "malformed_request", + "not_found", + "unauthorized", + "session_expired", + "scope_exceeded", + "rate_limited", + "internal_error", + ], + Self::GetAccountState => &[ + "malformed_request", + "unauthorized", + "session_expired", + "rate_limited", + "internal_error", + ], + Self::SubscribeReceipts => &[ + "malformed_request", + "unauthorized", + "session_expired", + "scope_exceeded", + "rate_limited", + "internal_error", + ], + Self::Publish => &["malformed_request", "rate_limited", "internal_error"], + Self::EntrustOperationalBundle | Self::RevokeOperationalBundle => &[ + "malformed_request", + "unauthorized", + "challenge_expired", + "rate_limited", + "internal_error", + ], + Self::AttestBalance => &[ + "malformed_request", + "unauthorized", + "challenge_expired", + "rate_limited", + "circuit_digest_mismatch", + "internal_error", + ], + Self::IssueViewGrant => &[ + "malformed_request", + "unauthorized", + "challenge_expired", + "rate_limited", + "internal_error", + ], + } + } } -/// Minimal `google.rpc.ErrorInfo` (field numbers match googleapis). -#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Message)] -pub struct ErrorInfo { - #[prost(string, tag = "1")] - pub reason: String, - #[prost(string, tag = "2")] - pub domain: String, - #[prost(map = "string, string", tag = "3")] - pub metadata: HashMap, +fn lookup_triple(reason: &str) -> Option<&'static RpcErrorTriple> { + RPC_ERROR_TRIPLES.iter().find(|t| t.reason == reason) } -/// Map a failed kernel RPC `Status` to the §7.5 REST error. -/// -/// Requires exactly-decodable `ErrorInfo` in `Status.details` with: -/// - `domain == "kernel.v1"` -/// - non-empty `reason` (the §7.5 machine code) -/// - `metadata["http_status"]` a decimal integer in `400..=599` that -/// `StatusCode::from_u16` accepts +/// Decoded ErrorInfo fields used after tonic-types unpack. +struct DecodedErrorInfo { + reason: String, + domain: String, + metadata: HashMap, +} + +/// Map a failed kernel RPC `Status` to the §7.5 REST error (no procedure filter). /// -/// Anything else → [`ApiError::internal`] (fail-closed; no guessed status). +/// Prefer [`kernel_status_to_api_error_for`] at production call sites so +/// procedure-foreign reasons fail closed. pub fn kernel_status_to_api_error(status: &Status) -> ApiError { + kernel_status_to_api_error_for(status, None) +} + +/// Map a failed kernel RPC `Status`, optionally restricting to the procedure's +/// allowed reason set (§7.8 per-procedure table). +pub fn kernel_status_to_api_error_for( + status: &Status, + procedure: Option, +) -> ApiError { match decode_error_info(status) { - Ok(info) => match validate_and_build(info, status.message()) { + Ok(info) => match validate_and_build(info, status, procedure) { Ok(err) => err, Err(why) => ApiError::internal(format!( "kernel ErrorInfo failed contract validation: {why}" @@ -124,7 +319,11 @@ pub fn transport_error_to_api_error(err: &tonic::transport::Error) -> ApiError { ApiError::internal(format!("kernel transport error: {err}")) } -fn validate_and_build(info: ErrorInfo, status_message: &str) -> Result { +fn validate_and_build( + info: DecodedErrorInfo, + status: &Status, + procedure: Option, +) -> Result { if info.domain != ERROR_INFO_DOMAIN { return Err(format!( "domain must be {ERROR_INFO_DOMAIN:?}, got {:?}", @@ -134,14 +333,28 @@ fn validate_and_build(info: ErrorInfo, status_message: &str) -> Result t, + None => { + return Err(format!( + "reason is not a closed §7.5 RPC machine_code: {:?}", + info.reason + )); + } + }; + let http_raw = match info.metadata.get("http_status") { Some(v) => v.as_str(), None => return Err("metadata[\"http_status\"] is absent".to_string()), @@ -149,7 +362,6 @@ fn validate_and_build(info: ErrorInfo, status_message: &str) -> Result() { Ok(n) => n, Err(_) => { @@ -158,19 +370,38 @@ fn validate_and_build(info: ErrorInfo, status_message: &str) -> Result s, Err(_) => { return Err(format!( @@ -178,71 +409,65 @@ fn validate_and_build(info: ErrorInfo, status_message: &str) -> Result { - return Err(format!( - "reason \"unauthorized\" requires http_status 401, got {code_u16}" - )); - } - "session_expired" if code_u16 != 410 => { - return Err(format!( - "reason \"session_expired\" requires http_status 410, got {code_u16}" - )); - } - _ => {} + + // internal_error / 500: never forward kernel diagnostics onto the wire. + if info.reason == "internal_error" { + let cause = if status.message().is_empty() { + "kernel internal_error".to_string() + } else { + status.message().to_string() + }; + return Ok(ApiError::internal(cause)); } - let message = if status_message.is_empty() { + + let message = if status.message().is_empty() { info.reason.clone() } else { - status_message.to_string() + status.message().to_string() }; - Ok(ApiError::new(status, info.reason, message)) + Ok(ApiError::new(http_status, info.reason, message)) } -fn decode_error_info(status: &Status) -> Result { +/// Decode exactly one `google.rpc.ErrorInfo` from the production +/// `google.rpc.Status` details envelope (`tonic-types`). No bare-Any or +/// raw-ErrorInfo fallback. +fn decode_error_info(status: &Status) -> Result { let details = status.details(); if details.is_empty() { return Err("Status.details is empty".to_string()); } - // tonic packs a single `google.protobuf.Any` (or a repeated-Any encoding). - // Try Any first; if the bytes are raw ErrorInfo, accept that too only when - // the Any path fails — still one vocabulary (ErrorInfo fields), not a - // second reason table. - if let Ok(info) = decode_from_any(details) { - return Ok(info); - } - match ErrorInfo::decode(details) { - Ok(info) => Ok(info), - Err(e) => Err(format!( - "Status.details is neither google.protobuf.Any nor ErrorInfo: {e}" - )), - } -} -fn decode_from_any(details: &[u8]) -> Result { - let any = prost_types::Any::decode(details).map_err(|e| format!("Any decode failed: {e}"))?; - if !type_url_is_error_info(&any.type_url) { + let vec = status + .check_error_details_vec() + .map_err(|e| format!("google.rpc.Status details decode failed: {e}"))?; + + if vec.is_empty() { + return Err("google.rpc.Status.details has zero entries".to_string()); + } + if vec.len() != 1 { return Err(format!( - "Any type_url is not google.rpc.ErrorInfo: {:?}", - any.type_url + "google.rpc.Status.details must hold exactly one ErrorInfo, got {} entries", + vec.len() )); } - ErrorInfo::decode(any.value.as_slice()).map_err(|e| format!("ErrorInfo decode failed: {e}")) -} -fn type_url_is_error_info(type_url: &str) -> bool { - type_url == ERROR_INFO_TYPE_URL || type_url.ends_with(ERROR_INFO_TYPE_SUFFIX) + match &vec[0] { + ErrorDetail::ErrorInfo(info) => Ok(DecodedErrorInfo { + reason: info.reason.clone(), + domain: info.domain.clone(), + metadata: info.metadata.clone(), + }), + other => Err(format!( + "sole google.rpc.Status.details entry must be ErrorInfo, got {other:?}" + )), + } } /// Build a `tonic::Status` carrying normative ErrorInfo (test double / helpers). /// -/// Production kernel code lives in zk-coins/node; this encoder exists so the -/// api tests can emit the **same** wire shape the REST mapper consumes — no -/// invented second vocabulary. Not compiled into non-test builds: production -/// never encodes kernel errors (only the node does). +/// Uses the **same** production encoder as the node (`tonic_types::StatusExt:: +/// with_error_details`) so tests exercise the real wire shape. Not compiled +/// into non-test builds: production never encodes kernel errors. #[cfg(test)] pub fn encode_kernel_error_status( grpc_code: Code, @@ -253,26 +478,28 @@ pub fn encode_kernel_error_status( let reason = reason.into(); let mut metadata = HashMap::new(); metadata.insert("http_status".to_string(), http_status.to_string()); - let info = ErrorInfo { - reason: reason.clone(), - domain: ERROR_INFO_DOMAIN.to_string(), - metadata, - }; - let any = prost_types::Any { - type_url: ERROR_INFO_TYPE_URL.to_string(), - value: info.encode_to_vec(), - }; - Status::with_details(grpc_code, message, any.encode_to_vec().into()) + let details = ErrorDetails::with_error_info(reason, ERROR_INFO_DOMAIN, metadata); + Status::with_error_details(grpc_code, message, details) +} + +/// Minimal ErrorInfo mirror for tests that still inspect field layout. +#[cfg(test)] +#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub struct ErrorInfo { + pub reason: String, + pub domain: String, + pub metadata: HashMap, } #[cfg(test)] mod tests { use super::*; + use crate::error::PUBLIC_INTERNAL_MESSAGE; + use prost::Message; + use tonic_types::ErrorDetails; #[test] fn maps_job_not_found_from_error_info() { - // Values from node/src/transport/error_contract.rs: - // JobNotFound → reason job_not_found, http 404, gRPC NotFound. let st = encode_kernel_error_status(Code::NotFound, "Job not found", "job_not_found", 404); let err = kernel_status_to_api_error(&st); assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::NOT_FOUND); @@ -282,7 +509,6 @@ mod tests { #[test] fn maps_wrong_phase_from_error_info() { - // error_contract: WrongPhase → wrong_phase / 409 / FailedPrecondition. let st = encode_kernel_error_status(Code::FailedPrecondition, "wrong phase", "wrong_phase", 409); let err = kernel_status_to_api_error(&st); @@ -292,7 +518,6 @@ mod tests { #[test] fn maps_bounds_exceeded_from_error_info() { - // error_contract: BoundsExceeded → bounds_exceeded / 400 / InvalidArgument. let st = encode_kernel_error_status( Code::InvalidArgument, "too many inputs", @@ -305,25 +530,111 @@ mod tests { assert_eq!(err.body.message, "too many inputs"); } + #[test] + fn maps_challenge_expired_410() { + let st = encode_kernel_error_status( + Code::Unauthenticated, + "challenge gone", + "challenge_expired", + 410, + ); + let err = kernel_status_to_api_error(&st); + assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::GONE); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "challenge_expired"); + assert_eq!(err.body.message, "challenge gone"); + } + + #[test] + fn challenge_expired_with_wrong_http_status_is_fail_closed_500() { + let st = encode_kernel_error_status( + Code::Unauthenticated, + "challenge gone", + "challenge_expired", + 401, + ); + let err = kernel_status_to_api_error(&st); + assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); + assert_eq!(err.body.message, PUBLIC_INTERNAL_MESSAGE); + assert!( + err.cause().unwrap_or("").contains("410"), + "cause must name required 410, got {:?}", + err.cause() + ); + } + + #[test] + fn wrong_grpc_code_for_reason_is_fail_closed_500() { + // job_not_found requires NotFound, not Internal. + let st = encode_kernel_error_status(Code::Internal, "x", "job_not_found", 404); + let err = kernel_status_to_api_error(&st); + assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); + assert!( + err.cause().unwrap_or("").contains("gRPC") + || err.cause().unwrap_or("").contains("NotFound"), + "cause must name gRPC mismatch, got {:?}", + err.cause() + ); + } + + #[test] + fn job_payload_only_reason_as_rpc_is_fail_closed() { + let st = encode_kernel_error_status(Code::Internal, "x", "proving_failed", 500); + let err = kernel_status_to_api_error(&st); + assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); + assert_ne!(err.body.error, "proving_failed"); + assert!( + err.cause().unwrap_or("").contains("proving_failed") + || err.cause().unwrap_or("").contains("job-payload"), + "cause must name the forbidden reason, got {:?}", + err.cause() + ); + } + + #[test] + fn feature_disabled_as_rpc_is_fail_closed() { + let st = encode_kernel_error_status(Code::NotFound, "x", "feature_disabled", 404); + let err = kernel_status_to_api_error(&st); + assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); + assert_ne!(err.body.error, "feature_disabled"); + } + + #[test] + fn procedure_rejects_foreign_reason() { + // job_not_found is valid globally but not for GetInfo. + let st = encode_kernel_error_status(Code::NotFound, "Job not found", "job_not_found", 404); + let err = kernel_status_to_api_error_for(&st, Some(KernelProcedure::GetInfo)); + assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); + assert!( + err.cause().unwrap_or("").contains("not allowed") + || err.cause().unwrap_or("").contains("GetInfo"), + "cause must name procedure filter, got {:?}", + err.cause() + ); + } + + #[test] + fn procedure_accepts_allowed_reason() { + let st = encode_kernel_error_status(Code::NotFound, "Job not found", "job_not_found", 404); + let err = kernel_status_to_api_error_for(&st, Some(KernelProcedure::GetJob)); + assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::NOT_FOUND); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "job_not_found"); + } + #[test] fn missing_http_status_is_fail_closed_500() { let mut metadata = HashMap::new(); - // deliberately no http_status metadata.insert("other".to_string(), "x".to_string()); - let info = ErrorInfo { - reason: "job_not_found".to_string(), - domain: ERROR_INFO_DOMAIN.to_string(), - metadata, - }; - let any = prost_types::Any { - type_url: ERROR_INFO_TYPE_URL.to_string(), - value: info.encode_to_vec(), - }; - let st = Status::with_details(Code::NotFound, "x", any.encode_to_vec().into()); + let details = ErrorDetails::with_error_info("job_not_found", ERROR_INFO_DOMAIN, metadata); + let st = Status::with_error_details(Code::NotFound, "x", details); let err = kernel_status_to_api_error(&st); assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); - assert_eq!(err.body.message, crate::error::PUBLIC_INTERNAL_MESSAGE); + assert_eq!(err.body.message, PUBLIC_INTERNAL_MESSAGE); assert!( err.cause().unwrap_or("").contains("http_status"), "operator cause must name the missing field, got {:?}", @@ -334,14 +645,15 @@ mod tests { #[test] fn invalid_http_status_is_fail_closed_500() { let st = encode_kernel_error_status(Code::Internal, "x", "internal_error", 200); - // encode allows any u16; mapper must reject non-error range. let err = kernel_status_to_api_error(&st); assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); - assert_eq!(err.body.message, crate::error::PUBLIC_INTERNAL_MESSAGE); + assert_eq!(err.body.message, PUBLIC_INTERNAL_MESSAGE); let cause = err.cause().unwrap_or(""); assert!( - cause.contains("out of error range") || cause.contains("http_status"), + cause.contains("requires http_status") + || cause.contains("http_status") + || cause.contains("500"), "operator cause must name the status problem, got {cause}" ); } @@ -350,16 +662,8 @@ mod tests { fn wrong_domain_is_fail_closed_500() { let mut metadata = HashMap::new(); metadata.insert("http_status".to_string(), "404".to_string()); - let info = ErrorInfo { - reason: "job_not_found".to_string(), - domain: "not.kernel".to_string(), - metadata, - }; - let any = prost_types::Any { - type_url: ERROR_INFO_TYPE_URL.to_string(), - value: info.encode_to_vec(), - }; - let st = Status::with_details(Code::NotFound, "x", any.encode_to_vec().into()); + let details = ErrorDetails::with_error_info("job_not_found", "not.kernel", metadata); + let st = Status::with_error_details(Code::NotFound, "x", details); let err = kernel_status_to_api_error(&st); assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); @@ -377,29 +681,53 @@ mod tests { assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); assert!( - err.cause().unwrap_or("").contains("ErrorInfo"), - "operator cause must mention ErrorInfo, got {:?}", + err.cause().unwrap_or("").contains("ErrorInfo") + || err.cause().unwrap_or("").contains("details"), + "operator cause must mention ErrorInfo/details, got {:?}", err.cause() ); } + /// Bare `Any(ErrorInfo)` is **not** the production wire shape and must + /// fail closed (node uses `google.rpc.Status` envelope via tonic-types). #[test] - fn non_canonical_http_status_string_is_fail_closed() { + fn bare_any_error_info_is_rejected() { + #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, prost::Message)] + struct LocalErrorInfo { + #[prost(string, tag = "1")] + reason: String, + #[prost(string, tag = "2")] + domain: String, + #[prost(map = "string, string", tag = "3")] + metadata: HashMap, + } let mut metadata = HashMap::new(); - metadata.insert("http_status".to_string(), "0404".to_string()); - let info = ErrorInfo { + metadata.insert("http_status".to_string(), "404".to_string()); + let info = LocalErrorInfo { reason: "job_not_found".to_string(), domain: ERROR_INFO_DOMAIN.to_string(), metadata, }; let any = prost_types::Any { - type_url: ERROR_INFO_TYPE_URL.to_string(), + type_url: "type.googleapis.com/google.rpc.ErrorInfo".to_string(), value: info.encode_to_vec(), }; let st = Status::with_details(Code::NotFound, "x", any.encode_to_vec().into()); let err = kernel_status_to_api_error(&st); assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); + assert_eq!(err.body.message, PUBLIC_INTERNAL_MESSAGE); + } + + #[test] + fn non_canonical_http_status_string_is_fail_closed() { + let mut metadata = HashMap::new(); + metadata.insert("http_status".to_string(), "0404".to_string()); + let details = ErrorDetails::with_error_info("job_not_found", ERROR_INFO_DOMAIN, metadata); + let st = Status::with_error_details(Code::NotFound, "x", details); + let err = kernel_status_to_api_error(&st); + assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); assert!( err.cause().unwrap_or("").contains("canonical"), "operator cause must name canonical form, got {:?}", @@ -407,8 +735,6 @@ mod tests { ); } - /// Without the closed-set check, a non-empty foreign reason is forwarded - /// as the public machine code. That must fail loud instead. #[test] fn unknown_error_info_reason_is_fail_closed_500_not_forwarded() { let st = encode_kernel_error_status( @@ -418,30 +744,18 @@ mod tests { 500, ); let err = kernel_status_to_api_error(&st); - assert_eq!( - err.status, - StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, - "unknown kernel reason is a server-side protocol fault, not a client 4xx" - ); - assert_eq!( - err.body.error, "internal_error", - "foreign reason must not become the public error code" - ); + assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); + assert_ne!(err.body.error, "totally_made_up_reason"); let cause = err.cause().unwrap_or(""); assert!( cause.contains("totally_made_up_reason") || cause.contains("machine_code") || cause.contains("closed"), - "operator cause must name the foreign reason or the closed-set rule, got {cause}" - ); - assert_ne!( - err.body.error, "totally_made_up_reason", - "foreign reason must never be echoed as the wire machine code" + "operator cause must name the foreign reason, got {cause}" ); } - /// Without the pair check, `unauthorized` with http_status 403 would be - /// forwarded as a 403. Spec binds unauthorized ↔ 401 only. #[test] fn unauthorized_with_wrong_http_status_is_fail_closed_500() { let st = @@ -449,10 +763,12 @@ mod tests { let err = kernel_status_to_api_error(&st); assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); - assert_eq!(err.body.message, crate::error::PUBLIC_INTERNAL_MESSAGE); + assert_eq!(err.body.message, PUBLIC_INTERNAL_MESSAGE); assert!( - err.cause().unwrap_or("").contains("401"), - "cause must name the required 401 pairing, got {:?}", + err.cause().unwrap_or("").contains("401") + || err.cause().unwrap_or("").contains("gRPC") + || err.cause().unwrap_or("").contains("http_status"), + "cause must name the pairing failure, got {:?}", err.cause() ); } @@ -460,7 +776,7 @@ mod tests { #[test] fn session_expired_with_wrong_http_status_is_fail_closed_500() { let st = encode_kernel_error_status( - Code::FailedPrecondition, + Code::Unauthenticated, "session gone", "session_expired", 401, @@ -482,40 +798,76 @@ mod tests { assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED); assert_eq!(err.body.error, "unauthorized"); - let s = - encode_kernel_error_status(Code::FailedPrecondition, "gone", "session_expired", 410); + let s = encode_kernel_error_status(Code::Unauthenticated, "gone", "session_expired", 410); let err = kernel_status_to_api_error(&s); assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::GONE); assert_eq!(err.body.error, "session_expired"); } + /// Kernel `internal_error` must never leak the status message onto the wire. + #[test] + fn internal_error_public_message_is_neutral_secret_not_on_wire() { + const SECRET: &str = "/var/lib/zkcoins/SECRET_DB_PATH_xyz_do_not_leak"; + let st = encode_kernel_error_status(Code::Internal, SECRET, "internal_error", 500); + let err = kernel_status_to_api_error(&st); + assert_eq!(err.status, StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); + assert_eq!(err.body.message, PUBLIC_INTERNAL_MESSAGE); + assert!( + !err.body.message.contains("SECRET"), + "public message must not carry secret" + ); + assert!( + err.cause().unwrap_or("").contains("SECRET_DB_PATH"), + "operator cause must retain the diagnostic, got {:?}", + err.cause() + ); + } + #[test] - fn closed_reason_set_accepts_known_machine_codes() { - // Spot-check a few codes from each §7.5 table so the constant is not - // accidentally empty / truncated. + fn closed_rpc_triple_table_covers_normative_codes() { for reason in [ "job_not_found", "bounds_exceeded", "malformed_request", "session_expired", + "challenge_expired", "dependency_not_final", - "feature_disabled", "internal_error", - // Delivery credential failures reuse malformed_request — there is - // no distinct delivery_* machine code in Spec or node. - "proving_failed", - "publish_rejected", + "circuit_digest_mismatch", + "rate_limited", + "scope_exceeded", + "unauthorized", ] { assert!( - is_closed_error_reason(reason), - "closed set must include {reason:?}" + lookup_triple(reason).is_some(), + "RPC triple table must include {reason:?}" ); } - assert!(!is_closed_error_reason("")); - assert!(!is_closed_error_reason("not_a_real_code")); - // Delivery did not introduce a new public code. - assert!(!is_closed_error_reason("invalid_delivery")); - assert!(!is_closed_error_reason("delivery_required")); - assert!(!is_closed_error_reason("invalid_invoice")); + // Job-payload / API-only must stay out of the RPC table. + assert!(lookup_triple("proving_failed").is_none()); + assert!(lookup_triple("publish_rejected").is_none()); + assert!(lookup_triple("feature_disabled").is_none()); + assert!(lookup_triple("totally_made_up").is_none()); + } + + #[test] + fn encode_uses_google_rpc_status_envelope_not_bare_any() { + let st = encode_kernel_error_status(Code::NotFound, "Job not found", "job_not_found", 404); + // Production decoder path must succeed. + let err = kernel_status_to_api_error(&st); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "job_not_found"); + // Details must decode as a multi-detail google.rpc.Status envelope. + let vec = st + .check_error_details_vec() + .expect("production encoder must pack google.rpc.Status details"); + assert_eq!(vec.len(), 1); + match &vec[0] { + ErrorDetail::ErrorInfo(info) => { + assert_eq!(info.reason, "job_not_found"); + assert_eq!(info.domain, ERROR_INFO_DOMAIN); + } + other => panic!("expected ErrorInfo, got {other:?}"), + } } } diff --git a/src/kernel/mod.rs b/src/kernel/mod.rs index 4f59977..d4776cf 100644 --- a/src/kernel/mod.rs +++ b/src/kernel/mod.rs @@ -8,7 +8,10 @@ mod error_info; mod pb; pub use client::{connect_lazy, KernelClient, KernelHandle, KernelRpc}; -pub use error_info::{kernel_status_to_api_error, transport_error_to_api_error, ERROR_INFO_DOMAIN}; +pub use error_info::{ + kernel_status_to_api_error, kernel_status_to_api_error_for, transport_error_to_api_error, + KernelProcedure, ERROR_INFO_DOMAIN, +}; pub use pb::kernel_v1; #[cfg(test)] diff --git a/src/ownership.rs b/src/ownership.rs index 3a6aff6..4fc3147 100644 --- a/src/ownership.rs +++ b/src/ownership.rs @@ -134,6 +134,83 @@ pub struct OwnershipProofJson { pub signature: String, } +/// Tagged proof union for **owner-only** endpoints (Attest, IssueGrant, +/// Entrust, Revoke). Deserialises a real GrantProof shape as the `grant` arm +/// so clients receive `401 unauthorized` (capability gate) rather than +/// `400 malformed_request` from missing Ownership fields. +#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize)] +#[serde(tag = "type")] +pub enum OwnerOnlyProofJson { + #[serde(rename = "ownership")] + Ownership { + subject: String, + public_key: String, + nk_commit: String, + signature: String, + }, + #[serde(rename = "grant")] + Grant { + grant: String, + grantee_pk: String, + signature: String, + }, +} + +impl OwnerOnlyProofJson { + /// Reject GrantProof with `401 unauthorized`; return OwnershipProof fields. + pub fn require_ownership(self) -> Result { + match self { + Self::Ownership { + subject, + public_key, + nk_commit, + signature, + } => Ok(OwnershipProofJson { + proof_type: "ownership".into(), + subject, + public_key, + nk_commit, + signature, + }), + Self::Grant { .. } => Err(ApiError::unauthorized( + "GrantProof does not authorise this owner-only action \ + (AttestBalance / IssueViewGrant / Entrust / Revoke require OwnershipProof; \ + no-escalation)", + )), + } + } +} + +/// Validate normalised scope invariants before any Challenge/Redeem RPC: +/// - explicit `asset_ids` strictly ascending and unique; +/// - time interval non-empty (`not_before <= not_after`). +pub fn validate_resolved_scope(scope: &ResolvedScope) -> Result<(), ApiError> { + if !scope.all_assets { + if scope.asset_ids.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::malformed( + "scope.asset_ids list must be non-empty when not \"*\"", + )); + } + for window in scope.asset_ids.windows(2) { + if window[0] >= window[1] { + return Err(ApiError::malformed( + "scope.asset_ids must be strictly ascending and unique", + )); + } + } + } else if !scope.asset_ids.is_empty() { + return Err(ApiError::internal( + "ResolvedScope invariant: all_assets with non-empty asset_ids", + )); + } + if scope.not_before > scope.not_after { + return Err(ApiError::malformed( + "scope time interval is empty (not_before > not_after)", + )); + } + Ok(()) +} + /// Challenge fields echoed by the client so the API can recompute `chal` /// without holding challenge state. /// @@ -1629,6 +1706,52 @@ mod tests { assert_eq!(err.status, axum::http::StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED); } + #[test] + fn validate_resolved_scope_rejects_non_ascending_and_empty_interval() { + let a = [0x01u8; 32]; + let mut b = [0x02u8; 32]; + b[0] = 0x02; + // Descending + let s = ResolvedScope { + all_assets: false, + asset_ids: vec![b, a], + not_before: 0, + not_after: SCOPE_NOT_AFTER_UNBOUNDED, + }; + let err = validate_resolved_scope(&s).expect_err("descending"); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "malformed_request"); + assert!(err.body.message.contains("ascending")); + + // Duplicate + let s = ResolvedScope { + all_assets: false, + asset_ids: vec![a, a], + not_before: 0, + not_after: SCOPE_NOT_AFTER_UNBOUNDED, + }; + assert!(validate_resolved_scope(&s).is_err()); + + // Empty interval + let s = ResolvedScope { + all_assets: true, + asset_ids: vec![], + not_before: 100, + not_after: 50, + }; + let err = validate_resolved_scope(&s).expect_err("empty interval"); + assert_eq!(err.body.error, "malformed_request"); + assert!(err.body.message.contains("empty") || err.body.message.contains("not_before")); + + // Valid ascending + let s = ResolvedScope { + all_assets: false, + asset_ids: vec![a, b], + not_before: 10, + not_after: 20, + }; + assert!(validate_resolved_scope(&s).is_ok()); + } + #[test] fn grant_proof_type_is_unauthorized() { let err = verify_ownership_proof( diff --git a/src/pull.rs b/src/pull.rs index 818dffa..145a80c 100644 --- a/src/pull.rs +++ b/src/pull.rs @@ -29,9 +29,10 @@ use crate::kernel::kernel_v1::{ Scope, SubscribeReceiptsRequest, }; use crate::ownership::{ - chan_bind_for_host, decode_zk_address, parse_u64_decimal, verify_grant_proof, - verify_pull_ownership_proof, GrantProofJson, GrantVerificationContext, OwnershipProofJson, - ResolvedScope, SessionAuthority, PULL_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN, SCOPE_NOT_AFTER_UNBOUNDED, + chan_bind_for_host, decode_zk_address, parse_u64_decimal, validate_resolved_scope, + verify_grant_proof, verify_pull_ownership_proof, GrantProofJson, GrantVerificationContext, + OwnershipProofJson, ResolvedScope, SessionAuthority, PULL_CHALLENGE_DOMAIN, + SCOPE_NOT_AFTER_UNBOUNDED, }; use crate::state::AppState; use axum::extract::{Path, State}; @@ -155,12 +156,16 @@ fn normalise_scope(scope: &PullScopeJson) -> Result { .map_err(|e| ApiError::malformed(format!("scope.not_after: {}", e.body.message)))?, }; - Ok(ResolvedScope { + let resolved = ResolvedScope { all_assets, asset_ids, not_before, not_after, - }) + }; + // Canonical form before any Challenge/Redeem kernel RPC: strictly + // ascending unique asset ids; non-empty time interval. + validate_resolved_scope(&resolved)?; + Ok(resolved) } fn scope_to_proto(scope: &ResolvedScope) -> Scope { diff --git a/src/routes.rs b/src/routes.rs index 62407de..e1d70b3 100644 --- a/src/routes.rs +++ b/src/routes.rs @@ -2607,6 +2607,128 @@ mod tests { assert_eq!(json["error"]["error"], "proving_failed"); } + #[tokio::test] + async fn get_job_internal_error_message_is_neutral() { + const SECRET: &str = "enqueue failed: /var/lib/SECRET_JOB_PATH_xyz"; + let mut job = accepted_job("job-leak-poll"); + job.status = "failed".to_string(); + job.error = Some(crate::kernel::kernel_v1::JobError { + error: "internal_error".into(), + message: SECRET.into(), + }); + let kernel = ScriptedKernel { + get: Some(Ok(job)), + ..Default::default() + }; + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)).expect("router"); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/jobs/job-leak-poll") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + let bytes = body_bytes(res).await; + let text = String::from_utf8(bytes.clone()).unwrap(); + assert!( + !text.contains("SECRET_JOB_PATH"), + "poll body must not leak operator path: {text}" + ); + assert!(!text.contains("enqueue failed")); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&bytes).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"]["error"], "internal_error"); + assert_eq!( + json["error"]["message"], + crate::error::PUBLIC_INTERNAL_MESSAGE + ); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn stream_job_internal_error_message_is_neutral() { + const SECRET: &str = "enqueue failed: /var/lib/SECRET_SSE_PATH_xyz"; + let err_ev = JobEvent { + event: "error".into(), + job: Some(Job { + job_id: "job-leak-sse".into(), + kind: "mint".into(), + status: "failed".into(), + phase: String::new(), + progress: 1.0, + awaiting_signature: None, + result: None, + error: Some(crate::kernel::kernel_v1::JobError { + error: "internal_error".into(), + message: SECRET.into(), + }), + }), + }; + let kernel = ScriptedKernel { + stream: Some(Ok(vec![Ok(err_ev)])), + ..Default::default() + }; + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)).expect("router"); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/jobs/job-leak-sse/stream") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + let body = String::from_utf8(body_bytes(res).await).expect("utf8"); + assert!( + body.contains("event: error"), + "must emit error event, body={body}" + ); + assert!( + body.contains(crate::error::PUBLIC_INTERNAL_MESSAGE), + "SSE must carry neutral internal message, body={body}" + ); + assert!( + !body.contains("SECRET_SSE_PATH"), + "SSE must not leak operator path, body={body}" + ); + assert!(!body.contains("enqueue failed")); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn get_job_terminal_nonempty_phase_is_500() { + let mut job = accepted_job("job-phase"); + job.status = "completed".to_string(); + job.phase = "publishing".to_string(); + job.result = Some(crate::kernel::kernel_v1::JobResult { + new_account_state_hash: vec![0x11; 32], + output_coins_root: vec![0x22; 32], + input_nullifiers_root: vec![0x33; 32], + output_coin_ids: vec![], + publisher_pubkey: vec![], + attestation: vec![], + }); + let kernel = ScriptedKernel { + get: Some(Ok(job)), + ..Default::default() + }; + let app = build_router(test_config(), Arc::new(kernel)).expect("router"); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .uri("/v1/jobs/job-phase") + .body(Body::empty()) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "internal_error"); + assert_eq!(json["message"], crate::error::PUBLIC_INTERNAL_MESSAGE); + } + #[tokio::test] async fn stream_job_emits_phase_then_complete() { let phase = JobEvent { @@ -2819,13 +2941,17 @@ mod tests { assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); assert_eq!(json["error"], "internal_error"); + assert_eq!( + json["message"], + crate::error::PUBLIC_INTERNAL_MESSAGE, + "public message must be neutral, not the kernel diagnostic" + ); assert!( - json["message"] + !json["message"] .as_str() .unwrap() .contains("Chain identity unavailable"), - "message must carry the kernel cause, got {}", - json["message"] + "kernel diagnostic must not appear on the wire" ); } @@ -2983,13 +3109,18 @@ mod tests { assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); assert_eq!(json["error"], "internal_error"); - assert!( + assert_eq!( + json["message"], + crate::error::PUBLIC_INTERNAL_MESSAGE, + "internal_error must carry the neutral public message, got {}", json["message"] + ); + assert!( + !json["message"] .as_str() .unwrap() .contains("Chain view unavailable"), - "message must name the cause, got {}", - json["message"] + "kernel cause must stay off the wire" ); } @@ -3112,13 +3243,18 @@ mod tests { json.get("present").is_none(), "error body must not look like a Path-B absence answer" ); - assert!( + assert_eq!( + json["message"], + crate::error::PUBLIC_INTERNAL_MESSAGE, + "internal_error must carry the neutral public message, got {}", json["message"] + ); + assert!( + !json["message"] .as_str() .unwrap() .contains("Failed to build nullifier path"), - "message must carry the kernel cause, got {}", - json["message"] + "kernel cause must stay off the wire" ); } @@ -3631,9 +3767,10 @@ mod tests { ); let sig = ownership_fixtures::sign_chal(&sk, &chal); - // Signature is valid; kernel reports challenge_expired via ErrorInfo. + // Signature is valid; kernel reports challenge_expired via ErrorInfo + // (gRPC UNAUTHENTICATED + http_status 410 — production triple). let expired = encode_kernel_error_status( - tonic::Code::FailedPrecondition, + tonic::Code::Unauthenticated, "challenge nonce expired", "challenge_expired", 410, @@ -3671,7 +3808,9 @@ mod tests { #[tokio::test] async fn grant_proof_type_is_unauthorized_without_kernel() { - let (_sk, pk0, nkc, _subject_raw, subject_bech) = ownership_fixtures::identity(); + // Real GrantProof wire shape (no ownership fields). Must deserialise + // as the grant arm and answer 401 — not 400 from missing subject/pk. + let (_sk, _pk0, _nkc, _subject_raw, subject_bech) = ownership_fixtures::identity(); let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { attest: Some(Ok(JobHandle { job_id: "x".into(), @@ -3692,9 +3831,8 @@ mod tests { }, "ownership_proof": { "type": "grant", - "subject": subject_bech, - "public_key": encode_hex(&pk0), - "nk_commit": encode_hex(&nkc), + "grant": "zkgrant1qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq", + "grantee_pk": encode_hex(&[0xABu8; 32]), "signature": encode_hex(&[0u8; 64]), }, }); @@ -3709,14 +3847,65 @@ mod tests { ) .await .unwrap(); - assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED); + assert_eq!( + res.status(), + StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, + "real GrantProof form must be 401, not 400 malformed" + ); let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); assert_eq!(json["error"], "unauthorized"); - assert!(json["message"].as_str().unwrap().contains("GrantProof")); + assert!( + json["message"].as_str().unwrap().contains("GrantProof"), + "message must name GrantProof, got {}", + json["message"] + ); assert_eq!(kernel.attest_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 0); assert_eq!(kernel.issue_grant_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 0); } + #[tokio::test] + async fn grants_real_grant_proof_form_is_401_without_kernel() { + let (_sk, _pk0, _nkc, _subject_raw, subject_bech) = ownership_fixtures::identity(); + let kernel = Arc::new(ScriptedKernel { + issue_grant: Some(Ok(GrantResult { + grant: "zkgrant1".into(), + })), + ..Default::default() + }); + let app = build_router(test_config(), kernel.clone()).expect("router"); + let body = serde_json::json!({ + "subject": subject_bech, + "grantee_pk": encode_hex(&[0xFFu8; 32]), + "scope": { "asset_ids": "*" }, + "expiry": "2000000000", + "challenge": { + "nonce": encode_hex(&[2u8; 32]), + "expiry": "100", + }, + "ownership_proof": { + "type": "grant", + "grant": "zkgrant1qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq", + "grantee_pk": encode_hex(&[0xABu8; 32]), + "signature": encode_hex(&[0u8; 64]), + }, + }); + let res = app + .oneshot( + Request::builder() + .method("POST") + .uri("/v1/grants") + .header("content-type", "application/json") + .body(Body::from(body.to_string())) + .unwrap(), + ) + .await + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "unauthorized"); + assert_eq!(kernel.issue_grant_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 0); + } + #[tokio::test] async fn grants_valid_ownership_calls_kernel() { let host = "node.example.com"; @@ -6406,7 +6595,7 @@ mod tests { } #[tokio::test] - async fn blossom_upload_rejects_json_content_type_with_415() { + async fn blossom_upload_rejects_json_content_type_as_malformed_request() { let root = blossom_temp_root("jsonct"); let (sk, pk) = blossom_sk_pk(); let mut ops = BTreeSet::new(); @@ -6427,9 +6616,10 @@ mod tests { ) .await .unwrap(); - assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::UNSUPPORTED_MEDIA_TYPE); + // §7.4 non-conforming form → 400 malformed_request (closed §7.5 set). + assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST); let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); - assert_eq!(json["error"], "unsupported_media_type"); + assert_eq!(json["error"], "malformed_request"); let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&root); } From 3be9358437d7b2e58f220515f522f1333d1c3210 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: TaprootFreak <142087526+TaprootFreak@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Sun, 2 Aug 2026 23:59:01 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 19/23] fix: accept dependency_not_final as terminal, and bound the per-blob lock map MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Follow-up review found the kind-closed job validation rejected a valid terminal job error: the node emits `dependency_not_final` as a terminal failure, but the new check treated it as illegal. It is now in the allowed terminal error set, with a test. The per-blob lock map introduced last round grew without bound — entries were never removed, so a long-running process leaked a lock per distinct blob id. Entries are now released once no waiter holds them, so the map stays bounded. --- src/blossom/store.rs | 144 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- src/jobs.rs | 30 +++++++++ src/proto_identity.rs | 12 +++- 3 files changed, 150 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/blossom/store.rs b/src/blossom/store.rs index 0b049c6..462d30d 100644 --- a/src/blossom/store.rs +++ b/src/blossom/store.rs @@ -32,16 +32,21 @@ //! take a read lock so recovery cannot run while mutations are in flight. //! - **Per-blob `Mutex`:** put and delete_if_uploader for the same content //! address are serialised. Parallel idempotent uploads of the same bytes -//! all succeed (loser waits for the complete pair). +//! all succeed (loser waits for the complete pair). Lock map entries are +//! removed when no waiter holds the Arc anymore — so DELETE/`NotFound` on +//! unboundedly many ids cannot grow process memory without bound. //! -//! ## BLOSSOM_MULTI_INSTANCE_BOUNDARY +//! ## BLOSSOM_MULTI_INSTANCE_BOUNDARY (named follow-up; not fixed here) //! //! The locks above are **process-local** only. Multiple API processes sharing //! one store root are **not** coordinated by this implementation: recovery on -//! one instance can race a put on another, and `delete_if_uploader` is not -//! cross-process atomic. Safe multi-instance deployment requires either -//! single-writer affinity to the store root or an external shared lock -//! manager — do not scale out against a shared filesystem without that. +//! one instance can race a put on another (e.g. A installs blob before note, +//! B's recovery deletes the orphan, A then installs the note and reports +//! success), and `delete_if_uploader` is not cross-process atomic. Safe +//! multi-instance deployment requires either single-writer affinity to the +//! store root or an external shared lock manager / atomic blob+note +//! publication — do not scale out against a shared filesystem without that. +//! Tracking: deployment-topology follow-up block, not this PR. use crate::error::ApiError; use crate::hexutil::encode_hex; @@ -77,6 +82,10 @@ pub struct BlobStore { /// See module docs — recovery (write) vs put/delete (read). root_lock: RwLock<()>, /// Per-blob serialisation of put / delete_if_uploader. + /// + /// Entries are created on demand and **removed** when the last holder + /// finishes (`release_blob_lock`), so the map cannot grow unboundedly + /// from DELETE-on-missing or other one-shot id touches. blob_locks: Mutex>>>, } @@ -162,13 +171,54 @@ impl BlobStore { .join(format!("{}.uploader", Self::blob_id_hex(id))) } - fn blob_lock(&self, id: &[u8; 32]) -> Arc> { + /// Acquire the per-blob serialisation lock (creates the map entry if needed). + fn acquire_blob_lock(&self, id: &[u8; 32]) -> Arc> { let mut map = self.blob_locks.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner()); map.entry(*id) .or_insert_with(|| Arc::new(Mutex::new(()))) .clone() } + /// Drop the caller's Arc and remove the map entry when no other holder + /// remains. Must be called **after** the per-blob `Mutex` guard is dropped. + /// + /// Under the map lock, `strong_count == 2` means only the map entry and + /// `held` reference this Arc (any concurrent acquirer would have bumped + /// the count while holding the map lock). Removal is then race-free. + fn release_blob_lock(&self, id: &[u8; 32], held: Arc>) { + let mut map = self.blob_locks.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner()); + if Arc::strong_count(&held) == 2 { + if let Some(current) = map.get(id) { + if Arc::ptr_eq(current, &held) { + map.remove(id); + } + } + } + // `held` drops at end of scope; after a successful remove the map no + // longer retains the Arc. + drop(held); + } + + /// Run `f` under the per-blob lock, then clean up the map entry if unused. + fn with_blob_lock(&self, id: &[u8; 32], f: impl FnOnce() -> R) -> R { + let arc = self.acquire_blob_lock(id); + let result = { + let _guard = arc.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner()); + f() + }; + self.release_blob_lock(id, arc); + result + } + + /// Test/diagnostic: number of live per-blob lock map entries. + #[cfg(test)] + fn blob_lock_entry_count(&self) -> usize { + self.blob_locks + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner()) + .len() + } + /// `true` when a **complete** durable pair (blob + note) exists. pub fn exists(&self, id: &[u8; 32]) -> bool { self.blob_path(id).is_file() && self.uploader_path(id).is_file() @@ -246,10 +296,7 @@ impl BlobStore { // Root read lock: recovery (write) cannot run while put is active. let _root = self.root_lock.read().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner()); - let blob_mu = self.blob_lock(&id); - let _blob = blob_mu.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner()); - - self.put_locked(body, uploader_op, &id) + self.with_blob_lock(&id, || self.put_locked(body, uploader_op, &id)) } fn put_locked( @@ -353,34 +400,33 @@ impl BlobStore { expected_uploader: &[u8; 32], ) -> Result { let _root = self.root_lock.read().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner()); - let blob_mu = self.blob_lock(id); - let _blob = blob_mu.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner()); - - if !self.exists(id) { - return Ok(DeleteIfUploader::NotFound); - } - let Some(actual) = self.read_uploader(id)? else { - // Incomplete: refuse as not found for DELETE surface (fail-closed - // at handler if note missing is preferred as scope_exceeded — - // without a complete pair there is nothing to authorise). - return Ok(DeleteIfUploader::NotFound); - }; - if &actual != expected_uploader { - return Ok(DeleteIfUploader::WrongUploader); - } - self.delete_pair_locked(id)?; - Ok(DeleteIfUploader::Deleted) + self.with_blob_lock(id, || { + if !self.exists(id) { + return Ok(DeleteIfUploader::NotFound); + } + let Some(actual) = self.read_uploader(id)? else { + // Incomplete: refuse as not found for DELETE surface (fail-closed + // at handler if note missing is preferred as scope_exceeded — + // without a complete pair there is nothing to authorise). + return Ok(DeleteIfUploader::NotFound); + }; + if &actual != expected_uploader { + return Ok(DeleteIfUploader::WrongUploader); + } + self.delete_pair_locked(id)?; + Ok(DeleteIfUploader::Deleted) + }) } /// Delete blob and uploader note. Returns `true` if the blob existed. /// Prefer [`delete_if_uploader`] for authorised DELETE. pub fn delete(&self, id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result { let _root = self.root_lock.read().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner()); - let blob_mu = self.blob_lock(id); - let _blob = blob_mu.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner()); - let existed = self.exists(id); - self.delete_pair_locked(id)?; - Ok(existed) + self.with_blob_lock(id, || { + let existed = self.exists(id); + self.delete_pair_locked(id)?; + Ok(existed) + }) } fn delete_pair_locked(&self, id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), ApiError> { @@ -659,6 +705,38 @@ mod tests { let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&root); } + /// DELETE/`NotFound` on distinct missing ids must not retain per-id lock + /// map entries (unbounded memory growth / external DoS surface). + #[test] + fn delete_not_found_does_not_retain_blob_lock_entries() { + let root = temp_root(); + let store = BlobStore::open(&root).expect("open"); + let op = [0x66u8; 32]; + assert_eq!(store.blob_lock_entry_count(), 0); + for i in 0..128u32 { + let mut id = [0u8; 32]; + id[0..4].copy_from_slice(&i.to_le_bytes()); + assert_eq!( + store.delete_if_uploader(&id, &op).unwrap(), + DeleteIfUploader::NotFound + ); + } + assert_eq!( + store.blob_lock_entry_count(), + 0, + "NotFound must release per-blob lock map entries" + ); + // put + delete of a real blob must also leave the map empty. + let id = store.put(b"cleanup-after-real-blob", &op).expect("put"); + assert_eq!(store.blob_lock_entry_count(), 0); + assert_eq!( + store.delete_if_uploader(&id, &op).unwrap(), + DeleteIfUploader::Deleted + ); + assert_eq!(store.blob_lock_entry_count(), 0); + let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&root); + } + /// Parallel puts of the **same** content: **all** succeed (serialised); /// single uploader note wins. #[test] diff --git a/src/jobs.rs b/src/jobs.rs index b547e00..18a3c38 100644 --- a/src/jobs.rs +++ b/src/jobs.rs @@ -42,6 +42,11 @@ const CLOSED_JOB_STATUSES: &[&str] = &[ ]; /// Closed terminal `JobError.error` machine codes (§7.5 jobs-family table). +/// +/// Includes `dependency_not_final`: the productive node stores a typed +/// `DependencyNotFinal` finalise failure as this terminal machine code +/// (see node `job_dispatcher` / `v1::signature` encode path). Omitting it +/// would turn a normative terminal job failure into API `500 internal_error`. const CLOSED_JOB_ERROR_CODES: &[&str] = &[ "invalid_input_coin", "insufficient_balance", @@ -53,6 +58,7 @@ const CLOSED_JOB_ERROR_CODES: &[&str] = &[ "publish_rejected", "circuit_digest_mismatch", "idempotency_conflict", + "dependency_not_final", "malformed_request", "internal_error", ]; @@ -1599,6 +1605,30 @@ mod tests { ); } + /// Node finalise path stores typed `DependencyNotFinal` as terminal + /// `JobError.error = "dependency_not_final"`. Poll and SSE must project + /// that code, not fail-closed as `500 internal_error`. + #[test] + fn validate_job_and_poll_accept_dependency_not_final() { + let mut job = sample_job("failed"); + job.error = Some(crate::kernel::kernel_v1::JobError { + error: "dependency_not_final".into(), + message: "predecessor nullifier not covered by size_final".into(), + }); + validate_job(&job).expect("dependency_not_final is a closed terminal code"); + assert!( + validate_sse_event_status("error", &job).is_ok(), + "SSE error event must accept dependency_not_final terminal job" + ); + let json = job_to_json(&job).expect("poll projection"); + assert_eq!(json["status"], "failed"); + assert_eq!(json["error"]["error"], "dependency_not_final"); + assert_eq!( + json["error"]["message"], + "predecessor nullifier not covered by size_final" + ); + } + #[test] fn validate_job_enforces_status_payload_exclusivity() { // completed without result diff --git a/src/proto_identity.rs b/src/proto_identity.rs index 7e86320..0833af0 100644 --- a/src/proto_identity.rs +++ b/src/proto_identity.rs @@ -18,9 +18,15 @@ //! check out `zk-coins/node` next to this tree, so a silent `return` on //! absence would always be green without testing anything. The test below //! therefore **names** that absence (`eprintln` + early return) and keeps -//! the pin-vs-file assertion as the real, always-on gate. Do not "fix" -//! the early return into a hard failure unless CI starts checking out the -//! node contract at a fixed ref. +//! the pin-vs-file assertion as the real, always-on gate. +//! +//! ## PROTO_IDENTITY_CI_BOUNDARY (named follow-up; not fixed here) +//! +//! Pin-vs-file alone does not prove identity with the node contract: a PR can +//! change both the carried proto and the pin together. Closing that gap needs +//! CI to check out node at a fixed ref (or consume an externally versioned +//! proto artefact) and fail closed when the reference is missing — cross-repo +//! CI-checkout follow-up block, not this change. //! //! Lives in the **api** package (not `kernel-proto`) so `cargo test -p api` //! always runs the pin; codegen isolation is a separate concern. From fbb4432ce2d0dbd83ff27447b31420d95f2449e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: TaprootFreak <142087526+TaprootFreak@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 3 Aug 2026 17:00:20 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 20/23] =?UTF-8?q?feat:=20Data=20Permanence=20=E2=80=94=20B?= =?UTF-8?q?lossom=20append-only=20(kein=20DELETE,=20kein=20receipt)?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Entfernt DELETE /blossom/, retention_hold, ReplicaReceipt-Header und Orphan-Prune auf open. Upload liefert nur noch { blob_id }; Store löscht keine empfangenen Blobs mehr. --- README.md | 2 +- docs/rest-surface.md | 45 +++--- src/blossom/auth.rs | 62 ++++++--- src/blossom/mod.rs | 140 ++----------------- src/blossom/store.rs | 293 ++++++++++----------------------------- src/error.rs | 4 +- src/kernel/error_info.rs | 7 +- src/routes.rs | 278 ++++++++++--------------------------- 8 files changed, 227 insertions(+), 604 deletions(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 2d507cb..88abbbb 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ The API layer sits **outward** of the node. It consumes the node's internal **ke - Full §7.5 endpoint inventory (method, capability, feature, kernel RPC): [`docs/rest-surface.md`](docs/rest-surface.md). - Rust process (`axum` + `tonic 0.13.1` client): **`GET /`**, **`GET /health`**, info/chain reads, the job surface, **attest/grants**, pull/records/account, **`GET /v1/receipts/stream`** (SSE over `SubscribeReceipts`), bootstrap/publish, and optional Blossom. No placeholder routes for unbuilt keys. - **OwnershipProof** for attest/grants is verified at the API edge (BIP-340, action-bound domain, `chan_bind`, `request_hash`) **before** any kernel call that would consume a challenge nonce. -- **`GET /` discovery follows registration** via `ServedSurface` — only served keys are advertised. Known-but-disabled inventory paths answer `404 feature_disabled`. The 29-key catalogue stays as inventory. +- **`GET /` discovery follows registration** via `ServedSurface` — only served keys are advertised. Known-but-disabled inventory paths answer `404 feature_disabled`. The 28-key catalogue stays as inventory (no `blossom_delete`; append-only Blossom). - Kernel contract: carried `proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto` with SHA-256 identity pin (`src/proto_identity.rs`); REST errors from `ErrorInfo.metadata["http_status"]` only (API-local auth failures use §7.5 `401 unauthorized` directly). - Codegen lives in the workspace member **`kernel-proto`** (tonic client stubs only). Workspace `default-members = ["."]` keeps default `cargo clippy` / `cargo test` on the **api** package so generated code is not linted. - Fail-closed env: `ZKCOINS_BIND_ADDR`, `ZKCOINS_KERNEL_ADDR`, `ZKCOINS_FEATURES`, `ZKCOINS_PUBLIC_HOST` (see the inventory doc). Optional Blossom store: `ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_STORE` (+ max bytes / allowed ops companions). diff --git a/docs/rest-surface.md b/docs/rest-surface.md index 5806494..544227b 100644 --- a/docs/rest-surface.md +++ b/docs/rest-surface.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ Bestandsaufnahme (Worktree `zk-coins/docs-vectors`). | Menge | Werte | Fundstelle | |---|---|---| | API-`features` | `{wallet, explorer, publisher, lightning_bridge, mail_bridge}` | §6.1 L2322, L2333–L2341; §7.5 `/v1/info` L2877 | -| `GET /` · `endpoints`-Schlüssel | siehe Tabelle unten (29 geschlossene Keys) | §7.5 L2874 | +| `GET /` · `endpoints`-Schlüssel | siehe Tabelle unten (28 geschlossene Keys) | §7.5; Data Permanence (kein `blossom_delete`) | | Kernel-Prozeduren | siehe §7.8-Tabelle | §7.8 L3138–L3159 | **Feature-Semantik (§6.1):** Jedes Feature ist **off**, bis der Operator es einschaltet. @@ -66,13 +66,16 @@ eigenes `Kernel`-RPC-Verb in der Procedure-Tabelle). | 26 | `POST` | `/v1/bootstrap/revoke` | **Ja** — OwnershipProof (Revoke-Domain) | `wallet` | `RevokeOperationalBundle` | §7.7 L3120; §7.8 L3157; Feature §6.1 L2337 | | 27 | `GET` | `/blossom/` | Nein (Ciphertext) | `explorer` (blob fetch) | Blossom-Ebene / Kernel-Store — **kein** eigenes Kernel-RPC-Verb (§7.8 L3490) | §7.4 L2804; Feature §6.1 L2338; `endpoints`-Key §7.5 L2874 | | 28 | `HEAD` | `/blossom/` | Nein | `explorer` (blob fetch) | Blossom-Ebene / Kernel-Store | §7.4 L2805; Feature §6.1 L2338; Key §7.5 L2874 | -| 29 | `PUT` | `/blossom/upload` | **Ja** — Nostr kind-`24242` Auth-Event | `explorer` / `wallet` (Replica-Upload) | Blossom-Ebene / Kernel-Store | §7.4 L2806, L2821–L2827; Keys §7.5 L2874 | -| 30 | `POST` | `/blossom/upload` | **Ja** — Nostr kind-`24242` Auth-Event | `explorer` / `wallet` (Replica-Upload) | Blossom-Ebene / Kernel-Store (äquivalent zu PUT) | §7.4 L2806, L2809; Keys §7.5 L2874 | -| 31 | `DELETE` | `/blossom/` | **Ja** — Nostr kind-`24242` Auth-Event (Original-Uploader) | `explorer` / `wallet` | Blossom-Ebene / Kernel-Store | §7.4 L2807, L2821–L2827; Keys §7.5 L2874 | +| 29 | `PUT` | `/blossom/upload` | **Ja** — Nostr kind-`24242` Auth-Event | `explorer` / `wallet` | Blossom-Ebene / Kernel-Store | §7.4; Keys §7.5; Data Permanence (append-only, Antwort `{ blob_id }`) | +| 30 | `POST` | `/blossom/upload` | **Ja** — Nostr kind-`24242` Auth-Event | `explorer` / `wallet` | Blossom-Ebene / Kernel-Store (äquivalent zu PUT) | §7.4; Keys §7.5 | -### Geschlossene `endpoints`-Schlüssel von `GET /` (§7.5 L2874) +**Kein** `DELETE /blossom/` — Data Permanence (Requirement 12): der Blob-Store +ist append-only; empfangene Daten werden nie gelöscht. `ReplicaReceiptV1` / §4.6 +Dual-Commit und `retention_hold` entfallen mit der Spec. -Genau diese 29 Keys — wörtlich, vollständig: +### Geschlossene `endpoints`-Schlüssel von `GET /` (§7.5) + +Genau diese 28 Keys — wörtlich, vollständig: | Key | Typischer Pfad | |---|---| @@ -104,9 +107,8 @@ Genau diese 29 Keys — wörtlich, vollständig: | `blossom_get` | `/blossom/` | | `blossom_head` | `/blossom/` | | `blossom_upload` | `/blossom/upload` | -| `blossom_delete` | `/blossom/` | -Spec-Regel (§7.5 L2874): Ein Producer emittiert **genau** die geschlossene Schlüsselmenge +Spec-Regel (§7.5): Ein Producer emittiert **genau** die geschlossene Schlüsselmenge für die Oberflächen, die dieses Deployment exponiert, und **MUST** Keys für nicht beworbene optionale Rollen weglassen. Unbekannte Keys beim Lesen ignorieren. @@ -116,13 +118,13 @@ beworbene optionale Rollen weglassen. Unbekannte Keys beim Lesen ignorieren. | Kategorie | Anzahl | |---|---| -| HTTP-Endpunkte (Method+Path) in der Tabelle oben | **31** | +| HTTP-Endpunkte (Method+Path) in der Tabelle oben | **30** | | davon in §7.5-Haupttext (ohne §7.4/§7.6/§7.7) | **22** | | + Publisher §7.6 | **1** | | + Bootstrap §7.7 | **3** | -| + Blossom §7.4 (GET/HEAD/PUT/POST/DELETE) | **5** | -| Geschlossene `endpoints`-Keys | **29** | -| Capability-gebunden (Ownership / Grant / Session / Nostr-Auth) | **13** (#14, #16, #18–22, #25–26, #29–31) | +| + Blossom §7.4 (GET/HEAD/PUT/POST; kein DELETE) | **4** | +| Geschlossene `endpoints`-Keys | **28** | +| Capability-gebunden (Ownership / Grant / Session / Nostr-Auth) | **12** (#14, #16, #18–22, #25–26, #29–30) | | Challenge-Aussteller ohne Capability | **4** (#13, #15, #17, #24) | | API-lokal | **2** (`GET /`, `GET /health`) | @@ -131,15 +133,15 @@ beworbene optionale Rollen weglassen. Unbekannte Keys beim Lesen ignorieren. | Feature | Endpunkte | Nummern | |---|---|---| | immer (API-Prozess) | 4 | #1–#4 | -| `wallet` | 19 | #8–#22, #24–#26 (+ Blossom-Upload/Delete geteilt) | -| `explorer` | 3 Chain + Blossom-Fetch (+ Upload/Delete geteilt) | #5–#7, #27–#28 (+ #29–#31 geteilt) | +| `wallet` | 19 | #8–#22, #24–#26 (+ Blossom-Upload geteilt) | +| `explorer` | 3 Chain + Blossom-Fetch (+ Upload geteilt) | #5–#7, #27–#28 (+ #29–#30 geteilt) | | `publisher` | 1 | #23 | | `lightning_bridge` | 0 in §7.5 | Erweiterung `/lightning-bridge` | | `mail_bridge` | 0 in §7.5 | Erweiterung `/mail-bridge` | -Blossom-Upload/Delete (#29–#31) sind weder rein `wallet` noch rein `explorer` in der +Blossom-Upload (#29–#30) sind weder rein `wallet` noch rein `explorer` in der Feature-Tabelle §6.1; sie gehören zur öffentlichen Blossom-Ebene (§7.4) und werden von -Deployments mit Wallet- und/oder Explorer-Rolle benötigt (Replica-/Blob-Pfad). +Deployments mit Wallet- und/oder Explorer-Rolle benötigt (Blob-Pfad). --- @@ -149,7 +151,7 @@ Deployments mit Wallet- und/oder Explorer-Rolle benötigt (Replica-/Blob-Pfad). |---|---| | `GET /health` | **implementiert** — `200` mit Body `"ok"` | | `GET /health/ready` | **implementiert** — Readiness aus Kernel-`GetInfo` (`ready` / `ready_reason`); Body-Form `{ ready, reason? }`, nie die generische Fehlerform. Bei fehlgeschlagenem `GetInfo` (z. B. fehlende `ChainIdentity` im node): **503** `{ ready: false, reason: "dependency_unavailable" }` — nie grünes `ready: true`. | -| `GET /` | **implementiert** — `{ name, version, endpoints }` mit **genau** den Flächen, die dieser Prozess registriert (`ServedSurface`). Inventur der 29 Keys in `CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS`; unregistrierte Keys werden weggelassen. | +| `GET /` | **implementiert** — `{ name, version, endpoints }` mit **genau** den Flächen, die dieser Prozess registriert (`ServedSurface`). Inventur der 28 Keys in `CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS`; unregistrierte Keys werden weggelassen. | | `GET /v1/info` | **implementiert** — Kernel-`GetInfo` + API-eigene `features` aus `ZKCOINS_FEATURES` (`kernel_parts` bleibt intern). | | `GET /v1/chain/accumulator` | **implementiert** — `GetAccumulator`; `root` ist pass-through der Kernel-`nav_root`, keine Nachrechnung. | | `GET /v1/chain/inscriptions` | **implementiert** — `ListInscriptions` (Server-Stream → eine Seite); Triple-Cursor ganz-oder-gar-nicht; leerer Katalog → leere Liste (kein 404). | @@ -173,14 +175,15 @@ Deployments mit Wallet- und/oder Explorer-Rolle benötigt (Replica-/Blob-Pfad). | `POST /v1/bootstrap/entrust` | **implementiert** — OwnershipProof (Entrust-Domain) + Bundle-Längenprüfung (161 B), dann `EntrustOperationalBundle`; Bundle wird nie geloggt | | `POST /v1/bootstrap/revoke` | **implementiert** — OwnershipProof (Revoke-Domain), dann `RevokeOperationalBundle` | | `POST /v1/publish/spendrecord` | **implementiert** — `Publish`; Ablehnung → HTTP 200 `{accepted:false, reason}`; v1-Fee-Felder → 400 | -| `GET`/`HEAD`/`DELETE /blossom/`, `PUT`/`POST /blossom/upload` | **implementiert** wenn `ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_STORE` gesetzt — API-lokaler inhaltsadressierter Store (§7.4); kein Kernel-RPC; ohne Store unregistriert | +| `GET`/`HEAD /blossom/`, `PUT`/`POST /blossom/upload` | **implementiert** wenn `ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_STORE` gesetzt — API-lokaler append-only Store (§7.4 / Data Permanence); kein Kernel-RPC; ohne Store unregistriert; **kein** DELETE | | alle übrigen Method+Path | **nicht registriert** — kein Handler, kein `todo!()`, kein Platzhalter | **Bewusst nicht beworben:** | Key | Warum | |---|---| -| `blossom_*` (ohne `ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_STORE`) | §7.4; die vier Schlüssel werden **nur** advertised, wenn der inhaltsadressierte Store konfiguriert ist. | +| `blossom_*` (ohne `ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_STORE`) | §7.4; die drei Schlüssel (`get`/`head`/`upload`) werden **nur** advertised, wenn der inhaltsadressierte Store konfiguriert ist. | +| `blossom_delete` | Data Permanence — existiert nicht mehr in der Inventur. | Router und Discovery teilen eine Quelle (`ServedSurface` in `src/routes.rs`): die aktive Mengen folgt `Config::features` und dem Blossom-Store; eine neue @@ -198,8 +201,8 @@ ausschließlich über `google.rpc.ErrorInfo` (`domain`, `reason`, | Lücke | Warum | |---|---| -| Blossom `ReplicaReceiptV1` | §4.6 Dual-Commit (Blob + Delivery-Event) fehlt; Upload antwortet ehrlich nur mit `{ blob_id }` — kein `receipt`. | | — | Feature-Gating (§6.1 / §7.5) ist aktiv: `ServedSurface::active` filtert nach `ZKCOINS_FEATURES` + Blossom-Store; deaktivierte Flächen sind unregistriert (HTTP 404) und fehlen in `GET /`. | +| — | Data Permanence: Blossom ist append-only (`PUT`/`POST`/`GET`/`HEAD` only); Upload → `{ blob_id }` ohne `receipt`; kein `retention_hold`, kein Orphan-Prune. | --- @@ -216,6 +219,6 @@ ausschließlich über `google.rpc.ErrorInfo` (`domain`, `reason`, | Variable | Bedeutung | |---|---| -| `ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_STORE` | Wurzelverzeichnis des inhaltsadressierten Blob-Stores. **Abwesend** ⇒ die vier Blossom-Keys bleiben unbeworben und unmontiert. **Kein Default-Pfad**, kein `/tmp`-Rückfall. Leer gesetzt → Startfehler. | +| `ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_STORE` | Wurzelverzeichnis des inhaltsadressierten Blob-Stores. **Abwesend** ⇒ die drei Blossom-Keys (`get`/`head`/`upload`) bleiben unbeworben und unmontiert. **Kein Default-Pfad**, kein `/tmp`-Rückfall. Leer gesetzt → Startfehler. | | `ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_MAX_BLOB_BYTES` | Pflicht-Begleiter wenn der Store gesetzt ist: ausgewiesene Upload-Obergrenze (`> 0`). Body darüber → `413 payload_too_large`. | | `ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_ALLOWED_OPS` | Pflicht-Begleiter wenn der Store gesetzt ist: komma-separierte lowercase-hex-32B-`op`-Pubkeys (gepaarte Konten + Replikations-Peers). Darf leer sein (dann ist jeder Upload `403`). | diff --git a/src/blossom/auth.rs b/src/blossom/auth.rs index a0fcd77..faee5a4 100644 --- a/src/blossom/auth.rs +++ b/src/blossom/auth.rs @@ -5,6 +5,9 @@ //! verifier never reads the system clock itself). //! //! Wire form: `Authorization: Nostr `. +//! +//! Data permanence (Requirement 12): only **upload** authorization is +//! defined. There is no `t=delete` action and no DELETE route. use crate::blossom::base64; use crate::error::ApiError; @@ -20,23 +23,20 @@ pub const REPLAY_WINDOW_SECS: u64 = 300; /// Clock-skew allowance: `created_at ≤ now + CLOCK_SKEW_SECS`. pub const CLOCK_SKEW_SECS: u64 = 60; -/// Nostr event kind for Blossom upload/delete authorization. +/// Nostr event kind for Blossom upload authorization. pub const BLOSSOM_AUTH_KIND: u64 = 24242; /// Action tag value for PUT/POST upload. pub const TAG_T_UPLOAD: &str = "upload"; -/// Action tag value for DELETE. -pub const TAG_T_DELETE: &str = "delete"; - /// Decoded and cryptographically verified kind-24242 event. #[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] pub struct VerifiedAuthEvent { /// `op` x-only public key (32 bytes) that signed the event. pub op_pubkey: [u8; 32], - /// `t` tag: `"upload"` or `"delete"`. + /// `t` tag: always `"upload"` for v1 (data permanence — no delete). pub action: AuthAction, - /// `x` tag: body hash (upload) or target blob id (delete). + /// `x` tag: body hash of the upload. pub x_tag: [u8; 32], /// Parsed `expiration` tag (unix seconds). pub expiration: u64, @@ -49,14 +49,12 @@ pub struct VerifiedAuthEvent { #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)] pub enum AuthAction { Upload, - Delete, } impl AuthAction { pub const fn as_str(self) -> &'static str { match self { AuthAction::Upload => TAG_T_UPLOAD, - AuthAction::Delete => TAG_T_DELETE, } } } @@ -65,14 +63,12 @@ impl AuthAction { #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)] pub enum RequiredAction { Upload, - Delete, } impl RequiredAction { pub const fn as_action(self) -> AuthAction { match self { RequiredAction::Upload => AuthAction::Upload, - RequiredAction::Delete => AuthAction::Delete, } } } @@ -94,10 +90,9 @@ struct WireEvent { /// # Arguments /// /// * `authorization_header` — full `Authorization` header value -/// * `required` — method-selected action (`upload` vs `delete`); never from body -/// * `x_expected` — for upload: `H(actual body)`; for delete: path `blob_id`. -/// The `x` tag is checked **against this value**, not against any header -/// claim — that is the whole authorization hinge. +/// * `required` — method-selected action (upload only under data permanence) +/// * `x_expected` — `H(actual body)`. The `x` tag is checked **against this +/// value**, not against any header claim — that is the whole authorization hinge. /// * `now_unix` — injected clock (seconds since epoch) /// /// # Status codes (§7.4) @@ -246,10 +241,9 @@ fn require_t_tag(tags: &[Vec]) -> Result { .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::unauthorized("auth event t tag is missing its value"))?; let action = match value { TAG_T_UPLOAD => AuthAction::Upload, - TAG_T_DELETE => AuthAction::Delete, other => { return Err(ApiError::unauthorized(format!( - "auth event t tag must be \"upload\" or \"delete\", got {other:?}" + "auth event t tag must be \"upload\", got {other:?}" ))); } }; @@ -450,18 +444,44 @@ mod tests { } #[test] - fn wrong_t_tag_is_401() { + fn delete_t_tag_is_401() { + // Data permanence: t=delete is not a valid auth action. let (sk, pk) = sample_sk_pk(); let x = [0x11u8; 32]; let now = 1_700_000_000u64; - // Sign as delete, present as upload requirement. - let b64 = sign_auth_event_base64(&sk, &pk, AuthAction::Delete, &x, now, now + 60); + // Build a valid-looking event with t=delete by signing a custom tag set. + use crate::hexutil::encode_hex; + use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Keypair, Message, Secp256k1}; + let pubkey_hex = encode_hex(&pk); + let tags = vec![ + vec!["t".to_string(), "delete".to_string()], + vec!["x".to_string(), encode_hex(&x)], + vec!["expiration".to_string(), (now + 60).to_string()], + ]; + let content = String::new(); + let id = compute_event_id(&pubkey_hex, now, BLOSSOM_AUTH_KIND, &tags, &content).unwrap(); + let secp = Secp256k1::new(); + let kp = Keypair::from_secret_key(&secp, &sk); + let msg = Message::from_digest_slice(&id).unwrap(); + let sig = secp.sign_schnorr_no_aux_rand(&msg, &kp); + let mut sig_bytes = [0u8; 64]; + sig_bytes.copy_from_slice(sig.as_ref()); + let event = serde_json::json!({ + "id": encode_hex(&id), + "pubkey": pubkey_hex, + "created_at": now, + "kind": BLOSSOM_AUTH_KIND, + "tags": tags, + "content": content, + "sig": encode_hex(&sig_bytes), + }); + let b64 = base64::encode(event.to_string().as_bytes()); let err = verify_blossom_auth(&format!("Nostr {b64}"), RequiredAction::Upload, &x, now) - .expect_err("t mismatch"); + .expect_err("delete t must fail"); assert_eq!(err.status, axum::http::StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED); assert_eq!(err.body.error, "unauthorized"); assert!( - err.body.message.contains("t tag"), + err.body.message.contains("t tag") || err.body.message.contains("upload"), "cause must name t tag: {}", err.body.message ); diff --git a/src/blossom/mod.rs b/src/blossom/mod.rs index b36b1e5..d7014f4 100644 --- a/src/blossom/mod.rs +++ b/src/blossom/mod.rs @@ -1,18 +1,16 @@ //! §7.4 Blossom blob store — API-local, content-addressed, no kernel RPC. //! -//! Four routes, one filesystem store. Discovery keys -//! `blossom_get` / `blossom_head` / `blossom_upload` / `blossom_delete` are -//! advertised **if and only if** `ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_STORE` is configured. +//! Three routes, one filesystem store. Discovery keys +//! `blossom_get` / `blossom_head` / `blossom_upload` are advertised **if and +//! only if** `ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_STORE` is configured. //! -//! ## `ReplicaReceiptV1` — not issued +//! ## Data permanence (Requirement 12) //! -//! §4.6 dual-commit replication (delivery event + blob) is **not** implemented -//! in this process. Successful upload responses are therefore exactly -//! `{ "blob_id": }` — the optional `receipt` field is **absent** -//! (not `null`, not `{}`). The three `X-ZkCoins-*` binding headers are still -//! validated when present (all-or-nothing, closed enum, hex width) so a broken -//! value cannot pass unnoticed; they produce no receipt and no other side -//! effect until §4.6 lands. +//! The store is **append-only**. There is **no** `DELETE` route, no retention +//! hold, and no server-side prune of received blobs. Successful upload +//! responses are exactly `{ "blob_id": }` — there is no `receipt` +//! field (`ReplicaReceiptV1` / §4.6 dual-commit replication was removed from +//! the spec). Upload remains ACL-gated (paired accounts + configured peers). mod auth; mod base64; @@ -24,11 +22,11 @@ pub use auth::{ verify_blossom_auth, AuthAction, RequiredAction, VerifiedAuthEvent, CLOCK_SKEW_SECS, REPLAY_WINDOW_SECS, }; -pub use store::{blob_id_of, BlobStore, DeleteIfUploader}; +pub use store::{blob_id_of, BlobStore}; use crate::error::ApiError; use crate::extract::LimitedBytes; -use crate::hexutil::{decode_hex_exact, encode_hex}; +use crate::hexutil::encode_hex; use crate::state::AppState; use axum::extract::{Path, State}; use axum::http::{header, HeaderMap, HeaderValue, StatusCode}; @@ -63,8 +61,8 @@ impl BlossomState { // Wire types // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -/// Successful upload body. `receipt` is intentionally not a field — §4.6 is -/// absent, so serde never emits it (honest omission, not `null`). +/// Successful upload body. No `receipt` field — data permanence / no §4.6 +/// dual-commit; serde never emits the key (honest omission, not `null`). #[derive(Debug, Serialize)] struct UploadResponse { blob_id: String, @@ -96,16 +94,6 @@ async fn store_put( .map_err(|e| ApiError::internal(format!("blossom store put join: {e}")))? } -async fn store_delete_if_uploader( - store: Arc, - id: [u8; 32], - expected: [u8; 32], -) -> Result { - tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || store.delete_if_uploader(&id, &expected)) - .await - .map_err(|e| ApiError::internal(format!("blossom store delete_if_uploader join: {e}")))? -} - // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- // Handlers // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -175,10 +163,6 @@ pub async fn upload_blob( ))); } - // Binding headers: all three or none; validate when present. - // §4.6 receipt is not issued — validation only (see module docs). - validate_binding_headers(&headers)?; - // Server computes blob_id = H(body); never trusts a client claim. let body_hash = blob_id_of(&body); @@ -201,7 +185,6 @@ pub async fn upload_blob( let id = store_put(Arc::clone(&blossom.store), body, verified.op_pubkey).await?; debug_assert_eq!(id, body_hash); - // Honest response without receipt (§4.6 absent). Ok(( StatusCode::OK, Json(UploadResponse { @@ -211,37 +194,6 @@ pub async fn upload_blob( .into_response()) } -/// `DELETE /blossom/` — original uploader only. -/// -/// Auth event is verified first; ownership check and deletion run as one -/// store operation ([`BlobStore::delete_if_uploader`]) under the same -/// per-blob lock so a concurrent re-upload cannot swap ownership mid-flight. -pub async fn delete_blob( - State(state): State, - Path(sha256): Path, - headers: HeaderMap, -) -> Result { - let blossom = require_blossom(&state)?; - let id = BlobStore::parse_blob_id(&sha256)?; - - let auth_header = headers - .get(header::AUTHORIZATION) - .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::unauthorized("missing Authorization header for blossom delete"))? - .to_str() - .map_err(|_| ApiError::unauthorized("Authorization header is not valid UTF-8"))?; - - let now = unix_now(); - let verified = verify_blossom_auth(auth_header, RequiredAction::Delete, &id, now)?; - - match store_delete_if_uploader(Arc::clone(&blossom.store), id, verified.op_pubkey).await? { - DeleteIfUploader::Deleted => Ok(StatusCode::OK.into_response()), - DeleteIfUploader::NotFound => Err(ApiError::not_found(format!("blob {sha256} not found"))), - DeleteIfUploader::WrongUploader => Err(ApiError::scope_exceeded( - "delete op key is not the original uploader of this blob", - )), - } -} - // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- // Helpers // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -276,72 +228,6 @@ fn require_octet_stream(headers: &HeaderMap) -> Result<(), ApiError> { Ok(()) } -/// `X-ZkCoins-Event-Id`, `X-ZkCoins-Attempt-Nonce`, `X-ZkCoins-Retention` — -/// all three present, or all three absent. Partial set → 400. Invalid hex / -/// width / retention enum → 400. -/// -/// When all three are valid, they are accepted and **discarded**: this process -/// does not issue `ReplicaReceiptV1` (§4.6 dual-commit is absent). Validation -/// exists so a broken value cannot pass unnoticed. -fn validate_binding_headers(headers: &HeaderMap) -> Result<(), ApiError> { - const H_EVENT: &str = "x-zkcoins-event-id"; - const H_NONCE: &str = "x-zkcoins-attempt-nonce"; - const H_RETENTION: &str = "x-zkcoins-retention"; - - let event = header_str(headers, H_EVENT)?; - let nonce = header_str(headers, H_NONCE)?; - let retention = header_str(headers, H_RETENTION)?; - - match (event.is_some(), nonce.is_some(), retention.is_some()) { - (false, false, false) => Ok(()), - (true, true, true) => { - let event = event.expect("checked"); - let nonce = nonce.expect("checked"); - let retention = retention.expect("checked"); - parse_hex32_lower(event, "X-ZkCoins-Event-Id")?; - parse_hex32_lower(nonce, "X-ZkCoins-Attempt-Nonce")?; - match retention { - "indefinite" | "policy" => {} - other => { - return Err(ApiError::malformed(format!( - "X-ZkCoins-Retention must be \"indefinite\" or \"policy\", got {other:?}" - ))); - } - } - // Validated; no receipt follows. - Ok(()) - } - _ => Err(ApiError::malformed( - "X-ZkCoins-Event-Id, X-ZkCoins-Attempt-Nonce, and X-ZkCoins-Retention \ - must be supplied all together or not at all", - )), - } -} - -fn header_str<'a>(headers: &'a HeaderMap, name: &str) -> Result, ApiError> { - match headers.get(name) { - None => Ok(None), - Some(v) => { - let s = v - .to_str() - .map_err(|_| ApiError::malformed(format!("{name} header is not valid UTF-8")))?; - Ok(Some(s)) - } - } -} - -fn parse_hex32_lower(s: &str, field: &str) -> Result<[u8; 32], ApiError> { - if s.len() != 64 || !s.bytes().all(|b| matches!(b, b'0'..=b'9' | b'a'..=b'f')) { - return Err(ApiError::malformed(format!( - "{field} must be exactly 64 lowercase hex characters" - ))); - } - let v = decode_hex_exact(s, 32).map_err(|e| ApiError::malformed(format!("{field}: {e}")))?; - let mut out = [0u8; 32]; - out.copy_from_slice(&v); - Ok(out) -} - fn unix_now() -> u64 { SystemTime::now() .duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH) diff --git a/src/blossom/store.rs b/src/blossom/store.rs index 462d30d..07b8eca 100644 --- a/src/blossom/store.rs +++ b/src/blossom/store.rs @@ -1,5 +1,13 @@ //! Content-addressed blob store on the local filesystem (§7.4 / §4.2.1). //! +//! ## Data permanence (Requirement 12) +//! +//! The store is **append-only**. Received bytes are never deleted by this +//! process: there is no public DELETE, no retention sweep, no orphan prune on +//! open, and no post-install rollback of an installed content-addressed object. +//! Temp files used during a single `put` may be cleaned up (they are not +//! durable names). +//! //! ## Address = content //! //! `blob_id = SHA-256(body)` (lowercase hex). The on-disk filename is that @@ -19,30 +27,26 @@ //! ## Blob + note pair //! //! A durable object is the pair `(blob, note)`. Install order is blob then -//! note; if note install fails after blob install, the blob we just created -//! is rolled back. A crash between the two can leave a blob without a note -//! — **incomplete**. `put` refuses while incomplete (no new note on an -//! orphan). Recovery on `open` removes incomplete pairs under the root write -//! lock. A complete pair is never reported for an incomplete address, so a -//! foreign retry cannot inherit DELETE ownership. +//! note. A crash between the two can leave a blob without a note — +//! **incomplete**. `put` refuses while incomplete (no new note on a partial +//! write; fail-closed). Incomplete pairs are **left on disk** (data permanence); +//! they are never auto-pruned. A complete pair is only reported when both +//! files exist. //! //! ## Concurrency (single process) //! -//! - **Root `RwLock`:** recovery takes a write lock; put / delete_if_uploader -//! take a read lock so recovery cannot run while mutations are in flight. -//! - **Per-blob `Mutex`:** put and delete_if_uploader for the same content -//! address are serialised. Parallel idempotent uploads of the same bytes -//! all succeed (loser waits for the complete pair). Lock map entries are -//! removed when no waiter holds the Arc anymore — so DELETE/`NotFound` on -//! unboundedly many ids cannot grow process memory without bound. +//! - **Root `RwLock`:** reserved for future exclusive operators; `put` takes a +//! read lock so exclusive work cannot interleave with mutation. +//! - **Per-blob `Mutex`:** concurrent puts of the same content address are +//! serialised. Parallel idempotent uploads of the same bytes all succeed +//! (loser waits for the complete pair). Lock map entries are removed when +//! no waiter holds the Arc anymore — so one-shot id touches cannot grow +//! process memory without bound. //! //! ## BLOSSOM_MULTI_INSTANCE_BOUNDARY (named follow-up; not fixed here) //! //! The locks above are **process-local** only. Multiple API processes sharing -//! one store root are **not** coordinated by this implementation: recovery on -//! one instance can race a put on another (e.g. A installs blob before note, -//! B's recovery deletes the orphan, A then installs the note and reports -//! success), and `delete_if_uploader` is not cross-process atomic. Safe +//! one store root are **not** coordinated by this implementation. Safe //! multi-instance deployment requires either single-writer affinity to the //! store root or an external shared lock manager / atomic blob+note //! publication — do not scale out against a shared filesystem without that. @@ -64,34 +68,24 @@ pub const BLOB_ID_HEX_LEN: usize = 64; static TMP_SEQ: AtomicU64 = AtomicU64::new(0); -/// Outcome of [`BlobStore::delete_if_uploader`]. -#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)] -pub enum DeleteIfUploader { - /// Complete pair removed under matching uploader. - Deleted, - /// No complete pair (or vanished under the lock). - NotFound, - /// Complete pair exists but uploader does not match. - WrongUploader, -} - /// Content-addressed store rooted at `root`. #[derive(Debug)] pub struct BlobStore { root: PathBuf, - /// See module docs — recovery (write) vs put/delete (read). + /// See module docs — exclusive operators (write) vs put (read). root_lock: RwLock<()>, - /// Per-blob serialisation of put / delete_if_uploader. + /// Per-blob serialisation of put. /// /// Entries are created on demand and **removed** when the last holder /// finishes (`release_blob_lock`), so the map cannot grow unboundedly - /// from DELETE-on-missing or other one-shot id touches. + /// from one-shot id touches. blob_locks: Mutex>>>, } impl BlobStore { /// Open (or create) a store at `root`. No default path — the caller must - /// supply a configured root. Runs incomplete-pair recovery before return. + /// supply a configured root. Does **not** prune incomplete pairs (data + /// permanence). pub fn open(root: impl Into) -> Result { let root = root.into(); fs::create_dir_all(&root).map_err(|e| { @@ -112,13 +106,11 @@ impl BlobStore { root.display() ))); } - let store = Self { + Ok(Self { root, root_lock: RwLock::new(()), blob_locks: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()), - }; - store.recover_incomplete_pairs()?; - Ok(store) + }) } /// Filesystem root (tests / diagnostics). @@ -261,7 +253,7 @@ impl BlobStore { } /// Read the original uploader's `op` pubkey, or `None` if the note is - /// absent. DELETE treats absence as refuse (fail-closed). + /// absent. Incomplete pairs are fail-closed for readers (`exists`/`read`). pub fn read_uploader(&self, id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result, ApiError> { let path = self.uploader_path(id); let text = match fs::read_to_string(&path) { @@ -287,14 +279,14 @@ impl BlobStore { /// Store `body` under `blob_id = H(body)`. Idempotent when a **complete** /// pair already exists: body is not rewritten and the uploader note is - /// left alone (first-uploader wins for DELETE). + /// left alone (first-uploader wins). /// /// Concurrent puts of the same content are serialised on a per-blob lock; /// losers that observe a complete pair return success. pub fn put(&self, body: &[u8], uploader_op: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<[u8; 32], ApiError> { let id: [u8; 32] = Sha256::digest(body).into(); - // Root read lock: recovery (write) cannot run while put is active. + // Root read lock: exclusive operators (write) cannot run while put is active. let _root = self.root_lock.read().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner()); self.with_blob_lock(&id, || self.put_locked(body, uploader_op, &id)) } @@ -314,13 +306,12 @@ impl BlobStore { } // Incomplete pair under the exclusive blob lock can only be a - // crash leftover — refuse so foreign retry cannot claim ownership. - // Operator re-open recovery clears orphans. + // crash leftover — refuse so a foreign retry cannot claim ownership. + // Data permanence: incomplete objects are never auto-pruned. if final_path.is_file() || note_path.is_file() { return Err(ApiError::internal( "blossom store: incomplete blob/note pair present; \ - refuse put so a foreign retry cannot claim DELETE ownership \ - (run store open recovery or remove the orphan)", + refuse put (data permanence: incomplete objects are never deleted)", )); } @@ -357,7 +348,7 @@ impl BlobStore { } return Err(ApiError::internal( "blossom store: blob slot occupied without complete pair; \ - refuse put (run recovery)", + refuse put (data permanence: incomplete objects are never deleted)", )); } Err(e) => { @@ -375,139 +366,24 @@ impl BlobStore { if note_path.is_file() { Ok(*id) } else { - let _ = fs::remove_file(&final_path); + // Data permanence: do not roll back the installed blob. Err(ApiError::internal(format!( - "blossom store: install note race on {}: {e}", + "blossom store: install note race on {} (blob retained): {e}", note_path.display() ))) } } Err(e) => { - let _ = fs::remove_file(&final_path); + // Data permanence: do not roll back the installed blob. + // Incomplete pair remains; subsequent put refuses. Err(ApiError::internal(format!( - "blossom store: install note {}: {e}", + "blossom store: install note {} (blob retained): {e}", note_path.display() ))) } } } - /// Atomically check uploader identity and delete the complete pair under - /// the same per-blob lock (closes TOCTOU between auth read and delete). - pub fn delete_if_uploader( - &self, - id: &[u8; 32], - expected_uploader: &[u8; 32], - ) -> Result { - let _root = self.root_lock.read().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner()); - self.with_blob_lock(id, || { - if !self.exists(id) { - return Ok(DeleteIfUploader::NotFound); - } - let Some(actual) = self.read_uploader(id)? else { - // Incomplete: refuse as not found for DELETE surface (fail-closed - // at handler if note missing is preferred as scope_exceeded — - // without a complete pair there is nothing to authorise). - return Ok(DeleteIfUploader::NotFound); - }; - if &actual != expected_uploader { - return Ok(DeleteIfUploader::WrongUploader); - } - self.delete_pair_locked(id)?; - Ok(DeleteIfUploader::Deleted) - }) - } - - /// Delete blob and uploader note. Returns `true` if the blob existed. - /// Prefer [`delete_if_uploader`] for authorised DELETE. - pub fn delete(&self, id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result { - let _root = self.root_lock.read().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner()); - self.with_blob_lock(id, || { - let existed = self.exists(id); - self.delete_pair_locked(id)?; - Ok(existed) - }) - } - - fn delete_pair_locked(&self, id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), ApiError> { - let blob = self.blob_path(id); - let note = self.uploader_path(id); - match fs::remove_file(&blob) { - Ok(()) => {} - Err(e) if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::NotFound => {} - Err(e) => { - return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( - "blossom store: delete {}: {e}", - blob.display() - ))); - } - } - match fs::remove_file(¬e) { - Ok(()) => {} - Err(e) if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::NotFound => {} - Err(e) => { - return Err(ApiError::internal(format!( - "blossom store: delete uploader note {}: {e}", - note.display() - ))); - } - } - Ok(()) - } - - /// Remove incomplete pairs under the store root. Holds the **root write - /// lock** for the entire scan so no put/delete can interleave. - fn recover_incomplete_pairs(&self) -> Result<(), ApiError> { - let _root = self.root_lock.write().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner()); - let rd = fs::read_dir(&self.root).map_err(|e| { - ApiError::internal(format!( - "blossom store: read_dir {}: {e}", - self.root.display() - )) - })?; - let mut blob_hexes = Vec::new(); - let mut note_hexes = Vec::new(); - for entry in rd { - let entry = entry - .map_err(|e| ApiError::internal(format!("blossom store: read_dir entry: {e}")))?; - let name = match entry.file_name().into_string() { - Ok(s) => s, - Err(_) => continue, - }; - if name.len() == BLOB_ID_HEX_LEN - && name.bytes().all(|b| matches!(b, b'0'..=b'9' | b'a'..=b'f')) - { - if entry.path().is_file() { - blob_hexes.push(name); - } - continue; - } - if let Some(hex) = name.strip_suffix(".uploader") { - if hex.len() == BLOB_ID_HEX_LEN - && hex.bytes().all(|b| matches!(b, b'0'..=b'9' | b'a'..=b'f')) - && entry.path().is_file() - { - note_hexes.push(hex.to_string()); - } - } - } - for hex in &blob_hexes { - let note = self.root.join(format!("{hex}.uploader")); - if !note.is_file() { - let blob = self.root.join(hex); - let _ = fs::remove_file(&blob); - } - } - for hex in ¬e_hexes { - let blob = self.root.join(hex); - if !blob.is_file() { - let note = self.root.join(format!("{hex}.uploader")); - let _ = fs::remove_file(¬e); - } - } - Ok(()) - } - /// Test/diagnostic: list names of regular files directly under the root. #[cfg(test)] pub fn list_root_names(&self) -> Result, ApiError> { @@ -644,8 +520,9 @@ mod tests { let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&root); } + /// Incomplete pairs refuse put and are never auto-pruned on re-open. #[test] - fn incomplete_blob_without_note_refuses_put_and_open_recovers() { + fn incomplete_blob_without_note_refuses_put_and_survives_reopen() { let root = temp_root(); let store = BlobStore::open(&root).expect("open"); let body = b"orphan-blob-body"; @@ -658,82 +535,56 @@ mod tests { .put(body, &uploader) .expect_err("put must refuse incomplete"); assert_eq!(err.body.error, "internal_error"); + assert!( + store.blob_path(&id).is_file(), + "data permanence: incomplete blob must remain on disk" + ); drop(store); - let store = BlobStore::open(&root).expect("re-open recovers"); - assert!(!store.blob_path(&id).is_file()); - let id2 = store.put(body, &uploader).expect("put after recovery"); - assert_eq!(id2, id); - assert_eq!(store.read_uploader(&id).unwrap().unwrap(), uploader); - let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&root); - } - - #[test] - fn open_recovers_incomplete_pairs() { - let root = temp_root(); - fs::create_dir_all(&root).unwrap(); - let body = b"recover-me"; - let id = blob_id_of(body); - let hex = BlobStore::blob_id_hex(&id); - fs::write(root.join(&hex), body).unwrap(); - let store = BlobStore::open(&root).expect("open"); - assert!(!store.blob_path(&id).is_file()); + let store = BlobStore::open(&root).expect("re-open must not prune"); + assert!( + store.blob_path(&id).is_file(), + "re-open must not delete incomplete pairs" + ); + let err2 = store + .put(body, &uploader) + .expect_err("still incomplete after re-open"); + assert_eq!(err2.body.error, "internal_error"); let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&root); } + /// Complete objects stay readable after open; no path deletes them. #[test] - fn delete_if_uploader_matches_and_refuses_foreign() { + fn complete_pair_survives_reopen() { let root = temp_root(); let store = BlobStore::open(&root).expect("open"); - let body = b"owned-blob"; - let owner = [0x44u8; 32]; - let foreign = [0x55u8; 32]; - let id = store.put(body, &owner).expect("put"); - assert_eq!( - store.delete_if_uploader(&id, &foreign).unwrap(), - DeleteIfUploader::WrongUploader - ); + let body = b"durable-blob"; + let uploader = [0x44u8; 32]; + let id = store.put(body, &uploader).expect("put"); + drop(store); + let store = BlobStore::open(&root).expect("re-open"); assert!(store.exists(&id)); - assert_eq!( - store.delete_if_uploader(&id, &owner).unwrap(), - DeleteIfUploader::Deleted - ); - assert!(!store.exists(&id)); - assert_eq!( - store.delete_if_uploader(&id, &owner).unwrap(), - DeleteIfUploader::NotFound - ); + assert_eq!(store.read(&id).unwrap().unwrap(), body); + assert_eq!(store.read_uploader(&id).unwrap().unwrap(), uploader); let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&root); } - /// DELETE/`NotFound` on distinct missing ids must not retain per-id lock - /// map entries (unbounded memory growth / external DoS surface). + /// One-shot put of many distinct ids must not retain per-id lock map entries. #[test] - fn delete_not_found_does_not_retain_blob_lock_entries() { + fn put_does_not_retain_blob_lock_entries() { let root = temp_root(); let store = BlobStore::open(&root).expect("open"); let op = [0x66u8; 32]; assert_eq!(store.blob_lock_entry_count(), 0); - for i in 0..128u32 { - let mut id = [0u8; 32]; - id[0..4].copy_from_slice(&i.to_le_bytes()); - assert_eq!( - store.delete_if_uploader(&id, &op).unwrap(), - DeleteIfUploader::NotFound - ); + for i in 0..64u32 { + let mut body = [0u8; 8]; + body[0..4].copy_from_slice(&i.to_le_bytes()); + store.put(&body, &op).expect("put"); } assert_eq!( store.blob_lock_entry_count(), 0, - "NotFound must release per-blob lock map entries" + "put must release per-blob lock map entries" ); - // put + delete of a real blob must also leave the map empty. - let id = store.put(b"cleanup-after-real-blob", &op).expect("put"); - assert_eq!(store.blob_lock_entry_count(), 0); - assert_eq!( - store.delete_if_uploader(&id, &op).unwrap(), - DeleteIfUploader::Deleted - ); - assert_eq!(store.blob_lock_entry_count(), 0); let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&root); } @@ -772,7 +623,7 @@ mod tests { assert_eq!( store.read_uploader(&id).unwrap().unwrap(), note, - "first complete uploader must win DELETE ownership" + "first complete uploader note must win" ); let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&root); } diff --git a/src/error.rs b/src/error.rs index 6339ec1..77a862d 100644 --- a/src/error.rs +++ b/src/error.rs @@ -62,8 +62,8 @@ impl ApiError { Self::new(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "unauthorized", message) } - /// §7.5 `scope_exceeded` / 403 — foreign-uploader DELETE, non-peer - /// replication PUT, resolved-scope violation. + /// §7.5 `scope_exceeded` / 403 — non-peer Blossom upload, resolved-scope + /// violation. pub fn scope_exceeded(message: impl Into) -> Self { Self::new(StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, "scope_exceeded", message) } diff --git a/src/kernel/error_info.rs b/src/kernel/error_info.rs index 3b34d85..947ab89 100644 --- a/src/kernel/error_info.rs +++ b/src/kernel/error_info.rs @@ -86,11 +86,8 @@ const RPC_ERROR_TRIPLES: &[RpcErrorTriple] = &[ http_status: 409, grpc: Code::FailedPrecondition, }, - RpcErrorTriple { - reason: "retention_hold", - http_status: 409, - grpc: Code::FailedPrecondition, - }, + // `retention_hold` removed with data permanence (Requirement 12): the + // Blossom store is append-only; there is no DELETE refusal path. RpcErrorTriple { reason: "dependency_not_final", http_status: 409, diff --git a/src/routes.rs b/src/routes.rs index e1d70b3..5bc3651 100644 --- a/src/routes.rs +++ b/src/routes.rs @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ use crate::state::AppState; use axum::extract::{DefaultBodyLimit, State}; use axum::http::StatusCode; use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response}; -use axum::routing::{delete, get, head, post, put}; +use axum::routing::{get, head, post, put}; use axum::{Json, Router}; use serde::Serialize; use std::collections::{BTreeMap, BTreeSet}; @@ -56,9 +56,10 @@ impl std::error::Error for StartupError {} /// Closed `endpoints` key set from specification §7.5 (`GET /` row). /// -/// Full inventory of the 29 logical names a conforming producer may emit. -/// Order matches the spec listing (line 2874). This constant is the reference -/// for surfaces not yet built; it is **not** what `GET /` returns. +/// Full inventory of the 28 logical names a conforming producer may emit +/// (data permanence: no `blossom_delete`). Order matches the closed §7.5 +/// listing. This constant is the reference for surfaces not yet built; it is +/// **not** what `GET /` returns. /// /// Path parameters use the §7.5 advertised form `` (one path segment). /// That string is what `GET /` emits. Axum 0.7 / matchit 0.7 do **not** treat @@ -99,7 +100,6 @@ pub const CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS: &[(&str, &str)] = &[ ("blossom_get", "/blossom/"), ("blossom_head", "/blossom/"), ("blossom_upload", "/blossom/upload"), - ("blossom_delete", "/blossom/"), ]; /// Surfaces this process actually registers (and therefore advertises on `GET /`). @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ pub const CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS: &[(&str, &str)] = &[ /// | `chain_*` | `explorer` | /// | `tx`, `jobs*`, `attest_*`, `grants_*`, `pull*`, `record`, `proof`, `account_state`, `receipts_stream`, `bootstrap_*` | `wallet` | /// | `publish_spendrecord` | `publisher` | -/// | `blossom_*` | `ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_STORE` **and** (`wallet` **or** `explorer`) | +/// | `blossom_get` / `blossom_head` / `blossom_upload` | `ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_STORE` **and** (`wallet` **or** `explorer`) | /// /// `lightning_bridge` / `mail_bridge` open no §7.5 inventory paths (extension /// docs only) and therefore add no variants here. @@ -165,7 +165,6 @@ enum ServedSurface { BlossomGet, BlossomHead, BlossomUpload, - BlossomDelete, } impl ServedSurface { @@ -202,17 +201,13 @@ impl ServedSurface { ServedSurface::BlossomGet, ServedSurface::BlossomHead, ServedSurface::BlossomUpload, - ServedSurface::BlossomDelete, ]; /// Whether this surface is a Blossom inventory key. fn is_blossom(self) -> bool { matches!( self, - ServedSurface::BlossomGet - | ServedSurface::BlossomHead - | ServedSurface::BlossomUpload - | ServedSurface::BlossomDelete + ServedSurface::BlossomGet | ServedSurface::BlossomHead | ServedSurface::BlossomUpload ) } @@ -256,12 +251,11 @@ impl ServedSurface { ServedSurface::PublishSpendrecord => features.contains(&Feature::Publisher), // §7.4 Blossom: store must be configured, and at least one of - // `wallet` / `explorer` must be on (rest-surface #27–#31; blob fetch - // is listed under explorer, upload/delete under both). + // `wallet` / `explorer` must be on (blob fetch under explorer, + // upload under both). No DELETE — data permanence. ServedSurface::BlossomGet | ServedSurface::BlossomHead - | ServedSurface::BlossomUpload - | ServedSurface::BlossomDelete => { + | ServedSurface::BlossomUpload => { blossom_configured && (features.contains(&Feature::Wallet) || features.contains(&Feature::Explorer)) @@ -309,7 +303,6 @@ impl ServedSurface { ServedSurface::BlossomGet => "blossom_get", ServedSurface::BlossomHead => "blossom_head", ServedSurface::BlossomUpload => "blossom_upload", - ServedSurface::BlossomDelete => "blossom_delete", } } @@ -357,10 +350,10 @@ impl ServedSurface { ServedSurface::BootstrapRevoke => { router.route(&path, post(bootstrap::post_bootstrap_revoke)) } - // GET / HEAD / DELETE share `/blossom/:sha256`; axum merges methods. + // GET / HEAD share `/blossom/:sha256`; axum merges methods. + // No DELETE — data permanence (append-only store). ServedSurface::BlossomGet => router.route(&path, get(blossom::get_blob)), ServedSurface::BlossomHead => router.route(&path, head(blossom::head_blob)), - ServedSurface::BlossomDelete => router.route(&path, delete(blossom::delete_blob)), ServedSurface::BlossomUpload => { // Cap buffering at the advertised max. Bodies above that are // rejected by LimitedBytes / DefaultBodyLimit as §7.5 @@ -404,7 +397,6 @@ impl ServedSurface { | ServedSurface::ReceiptsStream | ServedSurface::BlossomGet => router.route(&path, get(feature_disabled_handler)), ServedSurface::BlossomHead => router.route(&path, head(feature_disabled_handler)), - ServedSurface::BlossomDelete => router.route(&path, delete(feature_disabled_handler)), ServedSurface::Tx | ServedSurface::JobsSign | ServedSurface::JobsCancel @@ -807,20 +799,19 @@ mod tests { "blossom_get", "blossom_head", "blossom_upload", - "blossom_delete", ]; #[test] fn closed_endpoint_keys_inventory_matches_spec() { assert_eq!( CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS.len(), - 29, - "CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS must list all 29 §7.5 closed keys" + 28, + "CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS must list all 28 §7.5 closed keys (no blossom_delete)" ); assert_eq!( SPEC_CLOSED_KEYS.len(), - 29, - "spec key list fixture must stay in sync with §7.5 L2874" + 28, + "spec key list fixture must stay in sync with closed inventory" ); for (i, (key, path)) in CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS.iter().enumerate() { assert_eq!( @@ -842,7 +833,11 @@ mod tests { } let keys: BTreeSet<&str> = CLOSED_ENDPOINT_KEYS.iter().map(|(k, _)| *k).collect(); assert!(!keys.contains(""), "empty discovery key is invalid"); - assert_eq!(keys.len(), 29, "closed keys must be unique"); + assert_eq!(keys.len(), 28, "closed keys must be unique"); + assert!( + !keys.contains("blossom_delete"), + "data permanence: blossom_delete must not be in the inventory" + ); } #[test] @@ -960,17 +955,16 @@ mod tests { Some("/v1/publish/spendrecord") ); // Blossom stays off discovery without ZKCOINS_BLOSSOM_STORE. - for absent in [ - "blossom_get", - "blossom_head", - "blossom_upload", - "blossom_delete", - ] { + for absent in ["blossom_get", "blossom_head", "blossom_upload"] { assert!( !endpoints.contains_key(absent), "unconfigured Blossom surface {absent} must stay unadvertised" ); } + assert!( + !endpoints.contains_key("blossom_delete"), + "data permanence: blossom_delete must never be advertised" + ); assert_eq!( endpoints["receipts_stream"].as_str(), Some("/v1/receipts/stream"), @@ -6623,93 +6617,18 @@ mod tests { let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&root); } + /// Data permanence: DELETE is not registered. Path may match GET/HEAD so + /// axum answers 405 Method Not Allowed; a bare 404 is also acceptable if + /// the method is not merged onto the route table. The stored blob must + /// remain readable after any DELETE attempt. #[tokio::test] - async fn blossom_partial_binding_headers_are_400() { - let root = blossom_temp_root("partialhdr"); - let (sk, pk) = blossom_sk_pk(); - let mut ops = BTreeSet::new(); - ops.insert(pk); - let app = blossom_app(root.clone(), 1024, ops); - let body = b"with-partial-headers"; - let x = crate::blossom::blob_id_of(body); - let auth = blossom_auth(&sk, &pk, crate::blossom::AuthAction::Upload, &x); - let res = app - .oneshot( - Request::builder() - .method("PUT") - .uri("/blossom/upload") - .header("content-type", "application/octet-stream") - .header("authorization", &auth) - .header( - "x-zkcoins-event-id", - crate::hexutil::encode_hex(&[0x11; 32]), - ) - .body(Body::from(body.to_vec())) - .unwrap(), - ) - .await - .unwrap(); - assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST); - let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); - assert_eq!(json["error"], "malformed_request"); - assert!( - json["message"].as_str().unwrap().contains("all together"), - "{}", - json["message"] - ); - let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&root); - } - - #[tokio::test] - async fn blossom_invalid_retention_is_400() { - let root = blossom_temp_root("badret"); - let (sk, pk) = blossom_sk_pk(); - let mut ops = BTreeSet::new(); - ops.insert(pk); - let app = blossom_app(root.clone(), 1024, ops); - let body = b"bad-retention"; - let x = crate::blossom::blob_id_of(body); - let auth = blossom_auth(&sk, &pk, crate::blossom::AuthAction::Upload, &x); - let res = app - .oneshot( - Request::builder() - .method("PUT") - .uri("/blossom/upload") - .header("content-type", "application/octet-stream") - .header("authorization", &auth) - .header( - "x-zkcoins-event-id", - crate::hexutil::encode_hex(&[0x11; 32]), - ) - .header( - "x-zkcoins-attempt-nonce", - crate::hexutil::encode_hex(&[0x22; 32]), - ) - .header("x-zkcoins-retention", "forever") - .body(Body::from(body.to_vec())) - .unwrap(), - ) - .await - .unwrap(); - assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST); - let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); - assert_eq!(json["error"], "malformed_request"); - assert!( - json["message"].as_str().unwrap().contains("Retention"), - "{}", - json["message"] - ); - let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&root); - } - - #[tokio::test] - async fn blossom_delete_by_original_uploader_succeeds() { - let root = blossom_temp_root("delok"); + async fn blossom_delete_is_not_registered_and_blob_persists() { + let root = blossom_temp_root("delgone"); let (sk, pk) = blossom_sk_pk(); let mut ops = BTreeSet::new(); ops.insert(pk); let app = blossom_app(root.clone(), 1024, ops); - let body = b"to-be-deleted"; + let body = b"must-survive-delete-attempt"; let x = crate::blossom::blob_id_of(body); let auth_up = blossom_auth(&sk, &pk, crate::blossom::AuthAction::Upload, &x); let res = app @@ -6726,113 +6645,45 @@ mod tests { .await .unwrap(); assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json["blob_id"], crate::hexutil::encode_hex(&x)); + assert!( + json.get("receipt").is_none(), + "upload must not emit receipt, got {json}" + ); - let auth_del = blossom_auth(&sk, &pk, crate::blossom::AuthAction::Delete, &x); - let res = app + let del = app .clone() .oneshot( Request::builder() .method("DELETE") .uri(format!("/blossom/{}", crate::hexutil::encode_hex(&x))) - .header("authorization", &auth_del) .body(Body::empty()) .unwrap(), ) .await .unwrap(); - assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); - assert!(body_bytes(res).await.is_empty()); - let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&root); - } - - #[tokio::test] - async fn blossom_delete_by_foreign_op_is_403() { - use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Keypair, Secp256k1, SecretKey}; - let root = blossom_temp_root("delforeign"); - let (sk, pk) = blossom_sk_pk(); - let mut ops = BTreeSet::new(); - ops.insert(pk); - let secp = Secp256k1::new(); - let sk2 = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0x8bu8; 32]).unwrap(); - let kp2 = Keypair::from_secret_key(&secp, &sk2); - let (xonly2, _) = kp2.x_only_public_key(); - let pk2 = xonly2.serialize(); - - let app = blossom_app(root.clone(), 1024, ops); - let body = b"owned-by-pk"; - let x = crate::blossom::blob_id_of(body); - let auth_up = blossom_auth(&sk, &pk, crate::blossom::AuthAction::Upload, &x); - let res = app - .clone() - .oneshot( - Request::builder() - .method("PUT") - .uri("/blossom/upload") - .header("content-type", "application/octet-stream") - .header("authorization", &auth_up) - .body(Body::from(body.to_vec())) - .unwrap(), - ) - .await - .unwrap(); - assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); + assert!( + del.status() == StatusCode::METHOD_NOT_ALLOWED || del.status() == StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, + "DELETE must not succeed; got {}", + del.status() + ); - let auth_del = blossom_auth(&sk2, &pk2, crate::blossom::AuthAction::Delete, &x); - let res = app + let get = app .oneshot( Request::builder() - .method("DELETE") .uri(format!("/blossom/{}", crate::hexutil::encode_hex(&x))) - .header("authorization", &auth_del) .body(Body::empty()) .unwrap(), ) .await .unwrap(); - assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::FORBIDDEN); - let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); - assert_eq!(json["error"], "scope_exceeded"); - let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&root); - } - - /// Incomplete pair (blob without uploader note) is not a durable object. - /// - /// Store recovery on open removes orphans; `exists`/`read`/`size` require - /// a complete pair. DELETE therefore answers `404 not_found` (same as GET - /// for that address) — not `403 scope_exceeded`. Advertising 403 would - /// claim the incomplete orphan is a first-class object while GET returns - /// 404 for the same id. - #[tokio::test] - async fn blossom_delete_without_uploader_note_is_404() { - let root = blossom_temp_root("delnonote"); - let (sk, pk) = blossom_sk_pk(); - let mut ops = BTreeSet::new(); - ops.insert(pk); - let store = crate::blossom::BlobStore::open(&root).unwrap(); - let body = b"orphan"; - let id = store.put(body, &pk).unwrap(); - std::fs::remove_file(root.join(format!("{}.uploader", crate::hexutil::encode_hex(&id)))) - .unwrap(); - drop(store); - - // blossom_app opens the store again → recover_incomplete_pairs clears - // the orphan before any request runs. - let app = blossom_app(root.clone(), 1024, ops); - let auth_del = blossom_auth(&sk, &pk, crate::blossom::AuthAction::Delete, &id); - let res = app - .oneshot( - Request::builder() - .method("DELETE") - .uri(format!("/blossom/{}", crate::hexutil::encode_hex(&id))) - .header("authorization", &auth_del) - .body(Body::empty()) - .unwrap(), - ) - .await - .unwrap(); - assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::NOT_FOUND); - let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); - assert_eq!(json["error"], "not_found"); + assert_eq!(get.status(), StatusCode::OK); + assert_eq!( + body_bytes(get).await, + body, + "blob must remain after DELETE attempt" + ); let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&root); } @@ -6855,7 +6706,7 @@ mod tests { assert!(!endpoints.contains_key(k), "{k} unadvertised without store"); } - // With store: present. + // With store: get/head/upload present; delete never advertised. let root = blossom_temp_root("disc"); let app = blossom_app(root.clone(), 1024, BTreeSet::new()); let res = app @@ -6867,18 +6718,23 @@ mod tests { assert_eq!(endpoints["blossom_get"], "/blossom/"); assert_eq!(endpoints["blossom_head"], "/blossom/"); assert_eq!(endpoints["blossom_upload"], "/blossom/upload"); - assert_eq!(endpoints["blossom_delete"], "/blossom/"); + assert!( + !endpoints.contains_key("blossom_delete"), + "data permanence: blossom_delete must never be advertised" + ); let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&root); } + /// Receipt-binding headers are ignored (no §4.6); upload still returns + /// only `{ blob_id }` with no `receipt` field. #[tokio::test] - async fn blossom_binding_headers_valid_still_omit_receipt() { + async fn blossom_upload_ignores_legacy_binding_headers_and_omits_receipt() { let root = blossom_temp_root("bindok"); let (sk, pk) = blossom_sk_pk(); let mut ops = BTreeSet::new(); ops.insert(pk); let app = blossom_app(root.clone(), 1024, ops); - let body = b"with-valid-binding"; + let body = b"with-legacy-binding-headers"; let x = crate::blossom::blob_id_of(body); let auth = blossom_auth(&sk, &pk, crate::blossom::AuthAction::Upload, &x); let res = app @@ -6905,7 +6761,17 @@ mod tests { assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); assert_eq!(json["blob_id"], crate::hexutil::encode_hex(&x)); - assert!(json.get("receipt").is_none()); + assert!( + json.get("receipt").is_none(), + "receipt must be absent, got {json}" + ); + // Object keys are exactly blob_id (no optional receipt key). + let obj = json.as_object().expect("object"); + assert_eq!( + obj.keys().collect::>(), + vec!["blob_id"], + "upload body must be only {{ blob_id }}" + ); let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&root); } } From a9dbac45a5fc17e0387c86154392c98084848f15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: TaprootFreak <142087526+TaprootFreak@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2026 03:58:51 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 21/23] feat(v1): carry the issuance creator_pubkey and re-pin the kernel proto Add the spec-mandated creator_pubkey (Pk0) to the issuance wire object and decode it for both token standards, so the kernel can derive the asset_id and the genesis owner binding. Re-pin the carried kernel.proto digest to match the new field, and pre-create the Blossom store directory owned by the runtime user so a fresh volume mount is writable. --- Dockerfile | 8 +++++++- proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto | 1 + src/jobs.rs | 8 +++++++- src/proto_identity.rs | 2 +- src/routes.rs | 3 ++- 5 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/Dockerfile b/Dockerfile index 63a35db..1f72061 100644 --- a/Dockerfile +++ b/Dockerfile @@ -104,7 +104,13 @@ RUN apt-get update \ && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* \ && groupadd --system --gid 10001 zkcoins \ && useradd --system --uid 10001 --gid zkcoins \ - --home-dir /data --create-home --shell /usr/sbin/nologin zkcoins + --home-dir /data --create-home --shell /usr/sbin/nologin zkcoins \ + # Pre-create the Blossom store dir owned by the runtime user so a fresh + # named volume mounted at /data/blossom inherits writable ownership + # (Docker seeds a new volume from the image path; without this the mount + # is root-owned and the non-root process gets EACCES on blob writes). + && mkdir -p /data/blossom \ + && chown zkcoins:zkcoins /data/blossom COPY --from=builder /app/target/release/api /usr/local/bin/zkcoins-api diff --git a/proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto b/proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto index 84cee4f..4c10582 100644 --- a/proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto +++ b/proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto @@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ message Issuance { string amount = 4; string cap_total = 5; // set iff issuance_version == 2 bytes terms_salt = 6; // set iff issuance_version == 2 + bytes creator_pubkey = 7; // Pk₀ (32-byte x-only); required both versions } message TransitionRequest { string kind = 1; // "mint" | "send" | "receive" diff --git a/src/jobs.rs b/src/jobs.rs index 18a3c38..86bcb41 100644 --- a/src/jobs.rs +++ b/src/jobs.rs @@ -474,6 +474,8 @@ pub struct IssuanceJson { pub decimals: u32, pub issuance_version: u32, pub amount: String, + /// Genesis spend key `Pk₀` (32-byte lowercase hex); required for both versions. + pub creator_pubkey: String, #[serde(default)] pub cap_total: Option, #[serde(default)] @@ -976,6 +978,7 @@ fn json_to_issuance(iss: IssuanceJson) -> Result { if iss.issuance_version != 1 && iss.issuance_version != 2 { return Err(ApiError::malformed("issuance_version must be 1 or 2")); } + let creator_pubkey = decode_hex_field(&iss.creator_pubkey, 32, "creator_pubkey")?; if iss.issuance_version == 2 { let cap = match iss.cap_total { Some(c) => c, @@ -998,6 +1001,7 @@ fn json_to_issuance(iss: IssuanceJson) -> Result { amount: iss.amount, cap_total: cap, terms_salt: salt, + creator_pubkey, }) } else { if iss.cap_total.is_some() || iss.terms_salt.is_some() { @@ -1012,6 +1016,7 @@ fn json_to_issuance(iss: IssuanceJson) -> Result { amount: iss.amount, cap_total: String::new(), terms_salt: Vec::new(), + creator_pubkey, }) } } @@ -1279,7 +1284,8 @@ mod tests { "name": "TestCoin", "decimals": 8, "issuance_version": 1, - "amount": "1000" + "amount": "1000", + "creator_pubkey": hex32(0x44) } }) } diff --git a/src/proto_identity.rs b/src/proto_identity.rs index 0833af0..9495d3f 100644 --- a/src/proto_identity.rs +++ b/src/proto_identity.rs @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ /// worktree used for this stage (`31bffc90…`). Updating the proto **requires** /// updating this pin in the same change. pub const KERNEL_PROTO_SHA256_HEX: &str = - "4575264c1c4e175b889859abfca901356883b62ee4ade8d6afb32c7d5b9a038e"; + "b1a573b59e75f2c71f5c181994b093d1d0ca5e46f0d58bae0b0d9556777045e9"; /// Relative path of the carried contract from the workspace / api crate root. pub const KERNEL_PROTO_REL: &str = "proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto"; diff --git a/src/routes.rs b/src/routes.rs index 5bc3651..dc449d8 100644 --- a/src/routes.rs +++ b/src/routes.rs @@ -1897,7 +1897,8 @@ mod tests { "name": "TestCoin", "decimals": 8, "issuance_version": 1, - "amount": "1000" + "amount": "1000", + "creator_pubkey": hex32(0x44) } }) } From 5abb7f6a09321fe42b93158913694a034ffb9555 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: TaprootFreak <142087526+TaprootFreak@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2026 04:16:57 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 22/23] fix(v1): serialize account-state send_counter as a JSON number GET /v1/account/state emitted send_counter as a JSON string while the /jobs endpoint and the SDK contract both treat it as a number, so clients rejected the response. Emit it as a number (a small per-account u64 counter, precision -safe) and update the shape test. --- src/pull.rs | 2 +- src/routes.rs | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/pull.rs b/src/pull.rs index 145a80c..999dcba 100644 --- a/src/pull.rs +++ b/src/pull.rs @@ -674,7 +674,7 @@ pub async fn get_account_state( } body.insert( "send_counter".into(), - Value::String(view.send_counter.to_string()), + Value::Number(view.send_counter.into()), ); body.insert( "current_pubkey".into(), diff --git a/src/routes.rs b/src/routes.rs index dc449d8..5c94033 100644 --- a/src/routes.rs +++ b/src/routes.rs @@ -4890,7 +4890,7 @@ mod tests { .unwrap(); assert_eq!(res.status(), StatusCode::OK); let json: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body_bytes(res).await).unwrap(); - assert_eq!(json["send_counter"], "7"); + assert_eq!(json["send_counter"], 7); assert_eq!( json["current_pubkey"].as_str().unwrap().len(), 64, From 2e5f3649d6d82ef3a9263ce51ea652e5cea60bbc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: TaprootFreak <142087526+TaprootFreak@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2026 11:26:21 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 23/23] feat(v1): carry the genesis-receive Pk0 and re-pin the kernel proto Accept and forward the genesis_pubkey field on a receive request (rejected for mint/send), and update the carried kernel.proto SHA-256 pin for the new field. --- proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto | 3 ++ src/jobs.rs | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/proto_identity.rs | 2 +- 3 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto b/proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto index 4c10582..dd5e13e 100644 --- a/proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto +++ b/proto/kernel/v1/kernel.proto @@ -195,6 +195,9 @@ message TransitionRequest { repeated bytes fold_coin_ids = 8; Issuance issuance = 9; string idempotency_key = 10; // §7.5 Idempotency-Key pass-through + bytes genesis_pubkey = 12; // recipient's Pk₀ (32B x-only); required for a genesis + // receive (kind=="receive", no prior transition); empty + // (absent) otherwise (§7.5) } message JobHandle { string job_id = 1; string status = 2; } diff --git a/src/jobs.rs b/src/jobs.rs index 86bcb41..5fa7556 100644 --- a/src/jobs.rs +++ b/src/jobs.rs @@ -309,6 +309,10 @@ pub struct TransitionRequestJson { #[serde(default)] pub fold_coin_ids: Option>, #[serde(default)] + /// Recipient's genesis Pk₀ (32-byte lowercase hex, x-only); required for + /// a genesis receive (no prior transition), MUST be absent otherwise (§7.5). + pub genesis_pubkey: Option, + #[serde(default)] pub issuance: Option, } @@ -773,6 +777,11 @@ fn json_to_transition(body: TransitionRequestJson) -> Result Vec::new(), }; + let genesis_pubkey = match body.genesis_pubkey { + Some(hex) => decode_hex_field(&hex, 32, "genesis_pubkey")?, + None => Vec::new(), + }; + let output_templates = match body.output_templates { Some(list) => { let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(list.len()); @@ -811,6 +820,11 @@ fn json_to_transition(body: TransitionRequestJson) -> Result { if !input_coins.is_empty() { @@ -829,6 +843,11 @@ fn json_to_transition(body: TransitionRequestJson) -> Result { if !input_coins.is_empty() { @@ -868,6 +887,7 @@ fn json_to_transition(body: TransitionRequestJson) -> Result