

# **Building with Externalities: Local Governments and Wind Farms**

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## **Abstract**

Does local government regulation of new infrastructure with local externalities result in efficiency? Although local governments' choices can reflect local costs, political or contracting frictions may cause actual outcomes to deviate from the idealized benchmark of [Coase \(1960\)](#). I study this problem in the context of wind farms. I develop a model of interaction between wind developers and local government where wind farms are built only if they are both profitable *and* allowed by local governments, who weigh local costs against payments from developers. I estimate that the average household's cost of living three miles from a wind farm is around 7.5% of their home's value. I find that what is built appears to trade off more than \$7 of engineering profit for a \$1 increase in cost to households. This results in part because local governments must be paid roughly \$3 for every \$1 of externality to approve projects. Beyond this, I find that state regulations limiting payments to local governments further depress wind-farm construction. I compare the performance of alternative developer-government contract regulations in reaching the United States' net-zero carbon goals. I find that requiring wind developers to pay local governments 20% of the nearby homes' value leads to \$290 billion more in social welfare than when the developers cannot pay local governments.

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## 1 Introduction

“While policymakers may set lofty goals, the future of the American power grid is in fact being determined in town halls, county courthouses and community buildings across the country.”

David Gelles, *New York Times* (2022)

Plans to decarbonize the U.S. energy sector require developing around 250 million acres of land for wind farms (Merrill, 2021). A wind farm comprises about 80 turbines, each over 500 feet tall (DOE, 2024). Building a wind farm typically requires local government approval, and one in four planned wind farms is canceled due to local regulation (Nilson et al., 2024). For this reason, community opposition is often cited as a major obstacle to new wind development.<sup>1</sup> While local governments may be representing their constituents’ preferences by blocking wind farms, the magnitude of their welfare costs remains contested (Roth, 2021).

The challenge of developing projects that generate local negative externalities is not unique to wind farms, and has drawn sustained attention from journalists and policymakers (Klein and Thompson, 2025). Other “locally undesirable land uses” (Been, 1994) include housing developments, factories, nuclear plants, and data centers. An efficient spatial allocation of infrastructure must trade off private returns with externalities. Under the canonical Coase (1960) theorem, if bargaining is frictionless and property rights are complete, outcomes will be efficient. In the development context, local governments hold broad authority to determine what is built and to regulate construction that may impose externalities on their constituents. Realized development is thus a product of both political economy and contracting frictions. Constraints—such as limits on negotiating payments to local governments for fear of bribery, and asymmetric information—may preclude efficiency (Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983).

In this paper, I propose and estimate a model of wind farm development. In my model, local governments trade off externalities borne by their constituents with payments made to them, and may decide to block projects. Developers build any profitable project, but must make costly investments in planning before the local government decides whether to block it. This model suggests three potential frictions. First, local governments may over- or under-weight the externalities suffered by their constituents. Second, developer investment before negotiation may expose them to hold-up. Finally, regulations that restrict how developers can contract over payments to local governments may prevent socially efficient projects from being built. This can occur either because local governments obstruct development when they are inadequately compensated for local costs or because developers do not earn sufficient profit.

I use the estimated model to study counterfactual regulations and market designs that determine how developers contract with local governments. I evaluate scenarios where the federal government subsidizes

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<sup>1</sup>As noted by Demas (2023); Nilson et al. (2024); Plumer and Popovich (2024); and others.

the wind industry to a level consistent with net-zero goals, to directly consider the rules' effects on economic efficiency and incidence.<sup>2</sup> I consider alternative regulations such as property taxes that scale with the value of nearby homes, including both a Pigouvian tax and payments greater than the expected externality, as well as up-front negotiations. I benchmark them to an infeasible first-best. I find that the potential welfare gains of moving from the fixed-tax baseline to the infeasible first best are around \$100 billion. Requiring developers to pay governments a multiple of nearby homes' values comes close to this benchmark, giving \$75 billion in welfare gains.

I begin by documenting that the value of nearby homes is strongly predictive of whether a wind farm is constructed. Locations with \$100 million in home value within five miles are only one-third as likely to have a wind farm developed as locations with \$100 thousand in nearby home value, controlling for engineering profit. Moreover, wind farms built in higher home-value locations are about \$40 million more profitable, based on observable characteristics, than those built in low-value areas.

I seek to explain this wedge in the profitability of wind farms built in high and low value areas. Such a wedge could arise in a Coasian benchmark, if households experience large costs from nearby wind farms; in that case projects must still be profitable after compensating households. However, this wedge could also be due to frictions. First, if local governments' approval decisions are relatively inelastic, they may require payments exceeding externality costs to allow construction. Second, if developers are restricted from making such payments, they may be unable to build in many profitable, high-externality locations.

To assess the Coasian explanation, I estimate household-specific costs of living near wind farms using a revealed-preference approach. I show that wind farm construction reduces nearby home prices. A key empirical challenge is selection: places that allow wind farms may differ systematically from those that do not. To address this, I estimate event studies comparing homes at similar distances to a wind farm built five to ten years later.<sup>3</sup> I find an immediate and stable reduction of about twelve percentage points in home transaction prices within three miles of a wind farm, with effects that diminish at greater distances.

I estimate households' costs from wind farms to match treatment effects of wind farm entry on home prices and migration pattern. In my model, households have preferences over wind farms and the non-wind characteristics of census tracts. I estimate the model in two steps. First, I estimate the non-wind determinants of demand using annual tract-to-tract migration flows and a novel price instrument, exposure to nearby deaths. I then use pre-period demand curves for each treated location to study how the elasticity of demand influences market equilibrium after a wind farm is built. In "thin" markets with few potential in-migrants, home prices drop substantially and households engage in minimal re-sorting. In "thick" markets with many

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<sup>2</sup>This allows me to abstract away from the optimal quantity of wind production.

<sup>3</sup>My research design leverages quasi-exogenous variation in timing. As discussed in Gentzkow et al. (2011) the assumptions required to identify this effect are consistent with idiosyncratic variation in exactly *when* a successful wind farm is built given the multi-year gap between initiation and completion of a project.

potential in-migrants, home prices decline modestly and re-sorting is substantial. Using a deconvolution technique, I exploit variation in re-sorting in response to different price changes to recover the full distribution of costs. I find that on average households are willing to pay around 7.5% of their home's value to avoid a wind farm within three miles. There is substantial heterogeneity: about 13% of households would pay more than 25% of their homes' value to avoid a nearby wind farm.

Using the estimated distribution of household costs, I test whether the observed allocation of wind farms satisfies Coasian efficiency.<sup>4</sup> Following [Coase \(1960\)](#), deviations from a dollar-for-dollar trade-off between profit and externalities indicate market failures. Using engineering profitability measures, and imposing a free entry condition, I find that what is built trades off more than \$7 of profit for every \$1 of household cost.

I develop and estimate a structural model of households, local governments, and developers to explain this observed trade-off. I specify a two-period dynamic model of developer-local government interaction.<sup>5</sup> The estimates from this model allow me to quantify the market failures arising from political and contracting frictions separately, and evaluate alternative contracting rules and market designs.

I study how wind developers' ability to contract over transfers affects construction, leveraging variation in state regulations governing property tax payments to local governments. I implement a spatial regression discontinuity at state borders where tax treatment of wind farms differs. I find that projects are more likely to be built on the side of the border where wind farms do pay taxes than when they either cannot pay or may negotiate payment. In empty locations, where local approval may be less binding, this pattern reverses: fewer projects are built when developers must pay taxes. In locations with small externalities, tax subsidies to developers lead to more wind farms being built. The difference between these two results underscores that, in the full sample, the inability to compensate local governments dominates the subsidy effect.

I subsequently examine which potentially efficient sites are built as a function of their expected externality and the developers' property tax rules. I find that when developers cannot negotiate payments, there is a threshold level of externality beyond which wind farms become infeasible to build. This threshold is higher when developers pay taxes than when they do not, suggesting that local governments trade off tax revenue against externalities. No such threshold arises when developers are allowed to negotiate transfers. Despite the risk of hold-up, this flexibility allows some high-profit, high-externality sites to be developed.

I estimate the developer-local government model by matching which locations are planned and which ultimately are constructed. I find that communities' implied cost of wind exposure is about three times higher than my preference estimates, suggesting that the political economy frictions in representation are

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<sup>4</sup>This test involves an assumption that the costs to households are realized by homes within five miles of the site. This test does not identify whether the aggregate level of wind construction is efficient. If developer profit is insufficiently large from a social perspective, given their carbon externalities, this test will not capture that margin. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the average wind farm abates roughly \$56 million in social cost of carbon annually relative to the \$11 million in yearly cost of production tax credits ([EPA, 2015](#); [USGS, 2018](#); [EELP, 2025](#)).

<sup>5</sup>In this model, the dynamic investment decision allows for both the potential of hold-up in negotiation as well as for developers to find it not optimal to attempt to build in locations where there is a high likelihood of the local government blocking.

substantial. I find that investment costs are large and that much of the negotiated surplus accrues to the local government, making the risk of hold-up important empirically.

Finally, I use these estimates to evaluate a projected wind generation expansion consistent with a net-zero carbon energy sector (Larson et al., 2020) under alternative market designs. Engineering forecasts suggest that planned wind farms would impose around \$50 billion in costs on local communities. Many of these projected locations, however, may not be feasible, given community resistance. I analyze how different market designs affect the spatial allocation of wind farms. I first compare three existing tax treatments governing developers' payments. I find that social costs are about \$220 billion higher under tax exemption and \$125 billion higher under negotiation, relative to developers paying fixed taxes.

I then evaluate more complex alternative market designs. I consider posted prices tied to the average externality cost of a site and find that this approach generates a social cost \$5 billion higher than the current uniform tax. This reflects the fact that local governments' preferences deviate from a utilitarian money-metric benchmark. I then consider up-front negotiations, which reduces social costs by \$10 billion relative to the uniform tax. This is undermined, however, by the high take-it-or-leave-it transfers demanded by local governments. The first-best allocation, which is infeasible given private information, improves social welfare by \$100 billion relative to the uniform tax. I find that a simple policy of paying 20% of the value of nearby homes captures \$75 billion of these potential gains. This policy is straightforward to administer, as it relies only on information already collected by tax assessors.

My work contributes to several literatures in public and environmental economics and empirical industrial organization. It relates to a literature on the effects of wind development on nearby home prices.<sup>6</sup> I measure this effect using a comprehensive sample of U.S. properties and a control group that addresses selection into allowing a wind farm nearby. I find larger price effects than earlier work, with stable pre-trends. My estimated effects are similar to recent work studying wind farms in the U.K. and Germany (Jarvis, 2024; Quentel, 2025). This is likely attributable to two factors. First, I find that the prices of homes at moderate distances from wind farms decrease, so common ring-based designs are comparing treatments of different intensity rather than treatment to control. Second, I study wind farms rather than single turbines. I also contribute to work describing how local resistance affects wind development (Stokes et al. 2023; Jarvis, 2024) by developing and estimating a model of developer-government interaction.

This paper connects to a long literature on the costs and benefits of decentralized governance, specifically federalist systems (Oates, 1972).<sup>7</sup> I find that local governments make choices that trade off heterogeneous costs, both observable and unobservable, to their constituents with payments. Relative to a utilitarian social planner, however, local governments also over-weigh the local externalities relative to payments. A related

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<sup>6</sup>See Hoen et al. (2011); Heintzelman and Tuttle (2012); Lang et al. (2014); Gibbons (2015); Jensen et al. (2018); Sampson et al. (2020); Droles and Koster (2021); Guo et al. (2024); Jarvis (2024); Quentel (2025).

<sup>7</sup>See Inman and Rubinfeld (1997); Hoxby (2000); Lockwood (2002); Turner et al. (2014); Bordeu (2024).

literature studies how local governments compete for firms with tax subsidies.<sup>8</sup> This paper highlights how this process is different when firms impose negative externalities, and may instead wish to compensate local governments for them. I highlight the role of local taxation as facilitating Coasian transfers in these settings, connecting to a literature on state and local taxation and place-based policies.<sup>9</sup>

I also contribute to the literature on non-market valuation using revealed preferences from the housing market.<sup>10</sup> I use discrete choice models of demand to estimate preferences when prices are endogenously determined in market equilibrium, as in [Bayer et al. \(2007\)](#), [Diamond \(2016\)](#), and others. More broadly, I make two methodological contributions to the literature on flexibly estimating substitution patterns from revealed choices.<sup>11</sup> I incorporate state-dependence in discrete choice demand by allowing for heterogeneity across consumer types and realistic substitution patterns by conditioning on past-year choices ([Hendel and Nevo, 2006](#); [Handel, 2013](#)). Second, I introduce a new instrument—deaths in nearby tracts—that affects prices by increasing the supply of homes for sale in closely competing areas.

I develop a method for estimating a nonparametric distribution of preferences from revealed choices. My approach requires estimates of pre-treatment demand curves that predict differential incidence of an identical treatment on prices and re-sorting responses. I construct a measure of market “thickness” in the pre-period, which is analogous to a participation shifter in the empirical auctions literature ([Athey and Haile, 2002](#); [Athey et al., 2011](#); [Krasnokutskaya and Seim, 2011](#)). I identify and estimate preferences nonparametrically, leveraging a revealed preference condition and proof technique similar to [Agarwal et al. \(2023\)](#).

I contribute to the literature about the determinants of firm entry in empirical industrial organization. In particular, I model the regulator as a player in the game and estimate their preferences. I model this as a two-period game with a Markov-Perfect solution concept, following [Ericson and Pakes \(1995\)](#). I recover parameters to rationalize decisions, as in the second step of [Bajari et al. \(2007\)](#). This work also relates to the literature on geographic determinants of entry.<sup>12</sup> More specifically, it relates to [Ryan \(2012\)](#) and [Ryan \(2021\)](#) about the role of environmental regulation in entry decisions.

Finally, I estimate how developers and local governments negotiate over transfers. My model allows for two-sided private information, which may preclude some efficient trades, as in [Myerson and Satterthwaite \(1983\)](#). My method relates to empirical work measuring the value of information in negotiation ([Backus et al., 2020](#); [Grennan and Swanson, 2020](#); [Larsen, 2021](#)), as well as estimating the division of surplus in negotiation ([Crawford and Yurukoglu, 2012](#); [Grennan, 2013](#); [Collard-Wexler et al., 2019](#)).

<sup>8</sup>See [Black and Hoyt \(1989\)](#); [Glaeser \(2001\)](#); [Mast \(2020\)](#); [Slattery and Zidar \(2020\)](#); [Slattery \(2025\)](#).

<sup>9</sup>See [Glaeser and Gottlieb \(2008\)](#); [Busso et al. \(2013\)](#); [Kline and Moretti \(2014\)](#); [Suarez Serrato and Zidar \(2016\)](#); [Gaubert et al. \(2021\)](#).

<sup>10</sup>See [Black \(1999\)](#); [Davis \(2004\)](#); [Chay and Greenstone \(2005\)](#); [Greenstone and Gallagher \(2008\)](#); [Linden and Rockoff \(2008\)](#); [Cellini et al. \(2010\)](#); [Davis \(2011\)](#); [Muehlenbachs et al. \(2015\)](#); [Keiser and Shapiro \(2019\)](#).

<sup>11</sup>See [McFadden \(1973\)](#); [Ben-Akiva \(1973\)](#); [Berry et al. \(1995, 2004\)](#).

<sup>12</sup>See [Bresnahan and Reiss \(1990, 1991\)](#); [Berry \(1992\)](#); [Holmes \(1998\)](#); [Jia \(2008\)](#); [Holmes \(2011\)](#); [Houde \(2012\)](#).

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data, legal framework, and setting. Section 3 relates the value of nearby homes to construction decisions. Section 4 introduces and estimates a residential choice model to identify the cost of living near wind farms. Section 5 develops a model of the interaction of households, local governments, and developers, presents motivating facts, and solves and estimates the model. Section 6 uses these estimates to compare existing market designs to potential alternatives, and Section 7 concludes.

## 2 Data and setting

In this section I first outline the data sources underlying my empirical analysis. I then detail how I calculate the profits from construction in each location in the United States. Finally, I describe the institutional framework governing local approval, including communities' legal authority to block construction, the timeline of wind development, and how local governments trade off tax revenues against disamenities.

### 2.1 Data

**Wind turbines.** I use data from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), available through the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, on the universe of planned projects (Dick, n.d.). These data include detailed information on project timing as well as supplementary information on planned but unbuilt sites. I use data from the Lawrence Berkeley National Lab (LBNL) (Hoen et al., 2018), to identify the location and project name of all built wind turbines. The LBNL data are validated with satellite imagery.

**Home prices.** I obtain home sales data from CoreLogic, which cover nearly the full universe of property tax filings. Specifically, I use the ‘Deeds’ data, which records property transactions. These data span transactions from before 1900 until 2019. For nearly all transactions I observe the date and price. In most instances I also observe the acreage, building size, and number of bedrooms and bathrooms. I obtain the exact location of the homes from Geocodio. I record key summary statistics regarding this sample in Table A2. I use these data to measure home values near each point in the U.S., including properties that have not transacted recently. I describe this process in Appendix B.1.

**Residency decisions.** I use data from Infutor to record U.S. households' full address histories from 2000 to 2017.<sup>13</sup> This dataset links individuals to their full name, gender, age, address, and dates of residence. I use these address histories to construct census tract to census tract yearly migration flows, using the 2010 census tract borders. For discussion on data representativeness see Section A of Diamond et al. (2019).

**Location characteristics.** I use data from the 2000 Census and the 2010 American Communities Survey (ACS) on census tract racial demographics, employment by sector, income, and more.

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<sup>13</sup>Other papers that use this data include Diamond et al. (2019); Diamond et al. (2020); Van Nieuwerburgh (2022); Mast (2023); Asquith et al. (2023).

**Deaths.** I obtain data on local mortality from two sources. First, I use a link from the Social Security Death Master File (SSDMF) to Infutor as in [Bernstein et al. \(2022\)](#) to observe individuals' addresses at their time of death.<sup>14</sup> From the SSDMF-Infutor data I observe the name, age, and location of death of individuals who are reported dead up until 2013. Second, I use the Center for Disease Control's (CDC) multiple cause of death data. I observe left-censored counts of deaths in each year by county, and age group 10-year bins.<sup>15</sup>

**School finances.** I obtain data, measured at a yearly level, on school district finances and expenditures from the National Center for Educational Statistics' (NCES) Common Core of Data.

**Wind resources.** I use data from the National Renewable Energy Lab (NREL) on the hourly wind speeds, wind directions, and atmospheric pressure at a 100 meter height for all points in the continental United States ([Draxl et al., 2015](#)). NREL collected wind data for a full calendar year in over 126,000 locations in the United States. For locations between measurement areas, they approximate appropriately based upon the nearby measurements and detailed models of the geography and meteorology.

**Transmission grid.** I use data from LBNL on locations in the continental United States' distance to transmission interconnection ([Hoen et al., 2018](#)).<sup>16</sup>

**Road network.** I use Open Street Map to measure each point's distance, as the crow flies, from a non-residential road using OSMnx ([Boeing, 2017](#)). I use distance to non-residential roads, such that they are large enough to transport wind turbine components.<sup>17</sup>

**Electricity prices.** I obtain data on current hourly locational marginal prices (LMP), as well as projected future LMPs, for each of 134 balancing areas in the continental U.S. from Cambium, an NREL project. To a first approximation, LMPs are set to clear the market at nodal balancing areas, so producers in these zones tend to face identical prices when they sell their electricity.

**Power purchase agreements.** I obtain data on Power Purchase Agreements from the American Clean Energy Association.<sup>18</sup> Nearly every wind farm signs a long-term contract, on the order of 25 years, which is the useful life of these facilities, that codifies the prices they will receive for produced electricity. I observe the agreed-upon price for many of these contracts for successful projects.

**Renewable portfolio standards.** I use data from the Rocky Mountain Institute's Utility Transition Hub to measure state-level renewable portfolio standards (RPS) and the statutory level of renewables from this RPS. These policies mandate the fraction of electricity production that must come from renewable sources.

**Agricultural productivity.** I obtain data on agricultural productivity, specifically average per acre profit from the USDA's 2017 Census of Agriculture at the congressional district level.

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<sup>14</sup>I access a public use copy of Social Security Death Master File from [SSDMF.INFO](#) as in [Bernstein et al. \(2022\)](#).

<sup>15</sup>I use both death measures as an instrument for home prices, as I discuss further in Section [4.3.1](#).

<sup>16</sup>If a point is not available, I impute distance to transmission as the average of the nearest four points.

<sup>17</sup>More specifically, this means only considering roads that are of tertiary size or greater as defined [here](#).

<sup>18</sup>Many thanks to Luming Chen for sharing these data.

## 2.2 Engineering profitability

Wind farms' profits can be summarized succinctly. Fixed costs primarily reflect the costs of procuring turbines and constructing access roads and electrical lines to interconnect to the electricity grid. There are a variety of other costs, such as land lease costs and land preparation costs.<sup>19</sup> Once operational, wind farms incur variable operation and maintenance costs that depend on power generation. The revenues can also be described concisely. Nearly every wind farm signs a long-term Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) that specifies the price received for generated power for the usable life of the project.<sup>20</sup> Power generation is a non-linear function of hourly wind speeds and atmospheric conditions, as determined by engineering models.

These components can be combined into a net present value of development for a standard-sized wind farm at any U.S. location. I use siting tools built for developers by NREL that calculate net-present values, accounting for the cost of capital and typical corporate taxes.<sup>21</sup> Further detail is provided in Appendix B.2. Appendix Figure A1 maps estimated profitability across U.S. locations, as well as the likelihood of construction as implied by engineering profit. I restrict the sample to sites where the number of houses within one and two miles are below the 99th percentile of existing wind farms, ensuring the analytical sample focuses on realistically buildable locations.

## 2.3 Legal status

Local governments have wide discretion in determining land use, so long as the decisions are welfare-relevant and not arbitrary (Taft, 1926). As of 2025 there were over 450 documented wind rejections in the U.S. (Bryce, 2025). Further, as of 2019, there were over 275 documented ordinances regulating wind farms (Lopez et al., 2019). Additionally, both governments and individuals may sue to block wind farms' entry.

Wind developers generally have limited ability to contract over zoning approval. In many states, conditioning payment on approval is considered "illegal contract zoning" and is not permitted (Trager, 1963; Fraietta, 2012). The courts typically have held this to be illegal due to "fears of corruption or political favoritism" (Trager, 1963). It must be specially legislated for developers and communities to be permitted to contract or negotiate "fees in lieu of taxes" so as to not risk being considered illegal.

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<sup>19</sup>Typically, wind farms inter-mingle with other land uses. For instance, in the Midwest 94% of wind farms are built on cropland that remained in agricultural use after wind entry (Maguire et al., 2024). The footprints of each turbine are quite small, and the land lease costs are primarily driven by the disruption to the harvest when these generators are installed.

<sup>20</sup>In other work, such as Chen (2024), these PPA prices are endogenized from a Nash bargaining framework. I assume that the developers take PPA prices as given, as a function of the market price, forecast market price, and state RPS existence.

<sup>21</sup>I primarily use the *System Advisory Model* which is designed for use by developers. I utilize an API, pysam. I additionally use *LandBOSSE* to estimate different construction costs on observable characteristics.

## 2.4 Timeline of development

In Figure 7 I present a stylized timeline of wind development, based on developer interviews and existing documentation (LBNL, 2021; ABO, 2024). Developers first survey potential sites to assess their profitability and likelihood of successful approval. Once they identify a promising site, developers often contact local officials to gauge the likelihood they will be blocked. If local politics appear favorable, developers will proceed with the costly upfront investment such as signing land-leases, engineering the site, and securing PPAs. Once the site is fully planned, the final step is for the local government to allow construction.


## 2.5 Role of taxes

Developers claim to “like paying taxes” because it allows them to pay the community, which leads to more approval of wind farms. This trade-off has been highlighted in the press (AP, 2024) as well as in local news coverage about permitting decisions (Robledo, 2018; Draper, 2019; Gerber, 2020; Fey, 2023; Harward, 2023; Wildeman, 2024). In one district, the superintendent stated: “if we didn’t have the wind farms we probably would not have built a new high school” (Robledo, 2018). Elsewhere, it was determined that although the “most significant benefit is . . . property tax revenue”, the fact that they could not “mitigate 600 feet of tower” led the county planning commission to reject a planned wind farm (Benda, 2021).

## 3 Relationship between construction and home values

Places with higher potential costs to households have fewer wind farms built. Specifically, the value of homes within five miles is negatively associated with the likelihood of development. Figure 1 demonstrates this as a bin-scatter of construction rates at different levels of nearby home value, where I residualize for engineering profit and state fixed effects. Locations near less than \$100 thousand in homes are nearly times as likely to have a wind farm as those near \$100 million in home value. In Appendix Table A1 I show this relationship is robust to alternative geographic fixed effects.


Figure 1: Probability of construction and home values



Note: The value of homes within five miles is calculated from a hedonic price index using CoreLogic data. The probability of construction is residualized by profit and state from a probit, selecting only locations with profit over 10th percentile of profit of wind farms built in the state. Presented as a bin-scatter with 40 bins. The baseline rate of construction in this sample is 4.1%.

In locations with high externalities, only very profitable projects are built. The value of homes nearby is strongly linked to the built projects being observably more profitable. Figure 2 presents this fact as a bin-scatter, residualized by state. In locations near \$100 thousand of home value, the chosen projects' observable profitability is statistically indistinguishable from the population average. The locations near \$100 million in home values are around \$40 million more observably profitable than the average site at this level. This is despite the fact that average profitability of all possible sites is very slightly lower with higher values of nearby homes. In Appendix Figure A2 I present similar patterns with alternative geographic levels of residualization.

Figure 2: Profitability of selected sites and home values



Note: The value of homes within five miles is calculated from a hedonic price index using CoreLogic data. The profitability of a site is calculated using NREL's *System Advisory Model*, residualized by state. Presented as a bin-scatter with 30 bins. The baseline rate of construction is 2.0%.

**Discussion.** Several factors may explain why wind farms that are built near higher values of homes are more profitable. One possibility, consistent with the [Coase \(1960\)](#) theorem, is that households receive large utility costs from living near wind farms. Such disutility would tend to scale in the value of homes within five miles. If developers internalized their local externalities, then only more productive potential projects would be built. In Section 4, I quantify households' costs to assess how closely the green line in Figure 2 aligns with a Coasian benchmark.

Several potential market failures may also shape which projects are ultimately built. The first, political frictions, arises if governments' decisions are less responsive to compensation than a utilitarian money-metric benchmark would suggest. In this case, developers must pay more than the value of their local externality to secure approval. To assess this channel I estimate the preferences of local governments in Section 5. A second source of inefficiency, contracting frictions, arises when developers have difficulties in negotiating payments at all. When payments are inflexible, developers may be unable to make Coasian transfers, preventing high-externality projects from being built. In Section 5, I document the legal rules that constrain these transfers and analyze their effects on construction.

## 4 Costs of living near turbines

I introduce and estimate a model of residential demand that disentangles changes in home transaction prices and re-sorting to measure the costs to households of living near turbines. In the model, households make static discrete choices over where to live and have preferences over wind and non-wind location characteristics.<sup>22</sup> The model is identified and estimated in two steps. First, I recover demand for the non-wind characteristics of each treated location using pre-treatment data. Second, I estimate wind preferences to rationalize a series of observed price and re-sorting effects of wind entry.

### 4.1 Effects on home prices

I investigate how wind farm construction capitalizes in home prices. To measure this, I estimate an event study following the application of an eventually successful wind farm. The control group is homes that are eventually at the same distance from a wind turbine, five to ten years later. This estimation strategy assumes that the *timing* of wind farms' entry is quasi-exogenous, conditional on eventual construction.<sup>23</sup>

Properties are treated upon the first application for an eventually successful wind farm, which I define to be 10 or more turbines, within 20 miles.<sup>24</sup> It is possible that in subsequent years additional closer turbines are built near these properties. Since I only observe a home's price if it is sold, I estimate the dynamic treatment effect as a repeated cross-section. I use a stacked controls estimator, where I create a control group of houses that are treated between five and ten years after the treated group.<sup>25</sup>

$$\log(p_{i,t}) = \sum_{k \neq -1} \tau_k^d B_{i,t-a}^d + \beta X_i + \nu_{c(i)} + \phi_t + \mu_{C(i), g(t)} + \varepsilon_{i,t}. \quad (1)$$

For some property  $i$ ,  $p_{i,t}$  is the price at which it is transacted at time  $t$ .  $B_{i,t-g}$  is an indicator for the years from application time  $g$ .  $X_{i,t}$  are logged home characteristics: acres, bedrooms, bathrooms, age, and square-feet. I include census tract,  $c(i)$ , year  $t$ , and 3-year bin  $\times$  county, fixed effects as  $\nu_{c(i)}$ ,  $\phi_t$ , and  $\mu_{C(i), g(y)}$ .

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
<sup>22</sup>This allows for wind farms to affect the utility of living in a location in ways that are not solely attenuated by distance. This choice does not require the assumption that choice sets are continuous, as required by [Bajari and Benkard \(2005\)](#). A discrete choice framework allows me to measure the welfare effects on residents who are infra-marginal to moving, which hedonic frameworks do not accommodate ([Banzhaf, 2021](#)).

<sup>23</sup>Anecdotally, wind developers are over time building in places that were previously less profitable. This is consistent with evidence that exogenous characteristics can predict timing of wind construction in [Quental \(2025\)](#).

<sup>24</sup>In Appendix B.5 I discuss the relationship between application and eventual construction.

<sup>25</sup>My preferred interpretation is that prior to the wind farm's eventually successful application, households perceived the likelihood of a wind entry as close to zero. Three things support this: first, by the end of my sample period only 0.54% of all households in the United States are within three miles of a wind farm. This is approximately 2% of rural homes [FHFA \(2024\)](#). Second, over 75% of my treated group, given the need for control group, are treated in 2009 or before, prior to a large wind energy expansion. Finally, the flat pre-trends among the control and the treatment groups up to seven years prior does not suggest that there were large changes in the perceived probability of a wind farm being built amongst the treated group.

Figure 3: Effects of wind farm entry on property values within 10 miles



Note: Control group is homes near turbines that are treated five to ten years later at the same distance. Control for: census tract, year, and county  $\times$  3 year bin FE, log of acreage, bedrooms, bathrooms, age, and square-feet. Distance is from *first* built turbine. SE clustered by stack  $\times$  tract  $\times$  treatment  $\times$  distance bin.

I find large and stable decreases in home prices immediately upon application.<sup>26</sup> Figure 3 presents the results for homes by the distance from the initial closest turbine. I find the price decreases are largest for the closest homes, and diminish smoothly with distance. I present the pooled difference-in-difference effects by distance in Appendix Figure A3. I show that wind farm entry leads to an increase in the number of homes that are transacted in Appendix Figure A4.

## 4.2 Model of residential choice

### 4.2.1 Demand specification

**Setup.** I model the choice of where to live within a given state. In a given period  $t$ , there exists a set of homes  $\mathcal{J}_t$ , a subset of which sold in that period  $\mathcal{J}_t^s \subseteq \mathcal{J}_t$ .  $\mathcal{J}_t$  is partitionable into a set  $\mathcal{D}$  of census tracts. Options outside of the state are included as a single outside option with utility normalized to zero. Each household  $i \in \mathcal{I}$  is characterized by which tract and which home they lived in the period before,  $o(i, t) \in \mathcal{D}$  and  $j(i, t) \in \mathcal{J}_{t-1}$  respectively. Household  $i$  may choose between staying in their prior residence or moving

<sup>26</sup>There is a growing literature about the effects of wind construction on home prices. My estimation strategy differs from the literature in a manner which corrects for biases that depress the magnitude of other estimates. Many papers use as a control group a “donut” that is a little further away, comparing properties that are *both* treated but at different intensities. Figure A3 presents why this would lead to lower magnitudes. Other papers include fine geography  $\times$  time fixed effects. In areas with only one transaction in a given year or quarter, the price is collinear with this FE. This biases the effective sample toward properties in areas with high outside demand. Figure 4 Panel A and Figure A13 present why this would lead to smaller magnitudes.

to any  $j \in \mathcal{J}_t^s$ . Households take the set of homes for sale,  $\mathcal{J}_t^s \setminus j(i, t)$ , as given.<sup>27</sup> Each household must choose exactly one housing option at time  $t$ .

**Utility.** Household  $i$  in state  $s$  receives the following indirect utility from housing option  $j$  at time  $t$ , where  $j$  is within census tract  $d \in \mathcal{D}$ , and  $m_{i,j} = \mathbb{I}\{j \neq j(i, t)\}$  is an indicator for whether they are switching homes:

$$u_{i,j,d,t}^o = \underbrace{\omega_i w_{j,t}}_{\text{wind prefs}} - \underbrace{\alpha_i \log(p_{d,t})}_{\text{price}} + \underbrace{\gamma_{d,m_{i,j}}^o}_{\text{tract prefs.}} + \underbrace{\beta X_{d,t}}_{\text{chars.}} + \underbrace{\phi_{m_{i,j},s,t} + \mu_t^o}_{\text{FE}} + \underbrace{\xi_{d,m_{i,j},t}^o}_{\text{unobs.}} + \underbrace{\varepsilon_{i,m_{i,j},d,t}}_{\text{T1EV}}, \quad (2)$$

where  $\omega_i \sim W$  is a heterogeneous value for living near wind turbines and  $w_{j,t} = 1$  if and only if there is a wind farm within three miles of  $j$  at time  $t$ .  $\gamma_{d,m_{i,j}}^o$  are fixed effects for the average preferences for living in  $d$ , or switching homes within  $o$ , from prior residents of  $o = o(i, t)$ . Distaste for the log of the average home sale price,  $\log(p_{d,t})$ , is moderated by  $\alpha_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_I I_{o(i,t)}$  which is a function of origin tract  $o$ 's income in 2000,  $I_o$ .  $\xi_{d,m_{i,j},t}^o$  is a time-variant unobserved amenity of  $d$  to residents from  $o$ , and  $\varepsilon_{i,m_{i,j},d,t}$  are idiosyncratic errors distributed as type 1 extreme values.  $X_{d,t}$  contains home characteristics, including acreage, bedrooms, square-feet, and number of units, and location characteristics, including the number of deaths in the tract and an exposure measure to elderly individuals.<sup>28</sup>

This model builds on [Bayer et al. \(2007\)](#). I assume that households from a common origin tract share a mean utility from the non-wind amenities of staying in their endowed home or moving to any other tract in a given year. This amenity consists of: (i) a time-invariant component,  $\gamma_{d,m_{i,j}}^o$ ; (ii) time-varying observables,  $\beta X_{d,t}$ ; and (iii) fixed effects,  $\phi_{m_{i,j},s,t}$ ,  $\mu_t^o$ , that capture yearly variation in moving costs by state and the utility level of all options for households from  $o$ .<sup>29</sup> This structure captures household inertia, be it persistence preference heterogeneity or moving costs, as in [Handel \(2013\)](#). Furthermore, it allows households with similar revealed choices to share similar average preferences over observable and unobservable characteristics of destinations.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>27</sup>For the purposes of estimation, I allow households to choose between their prior house and all available tract  $\times$  wind farm nearness combinations.

<sup>28</sup>This controls for the non-random component of exposure to nearby deaths, which I use as a price instrument, introduced in Section 4.3.1, as described by [Borusyak and Hull \(2023\)](#).

<sup>29</sup>These origin-destination fixed effects are one of many ways to use consumer panel data to learn about substitution patterns. Other examples of this sort of data include yearly health insurance choices, car purchases, weekly grocery trips, and more. As [Berry and Haile \(2021\)](#) discuss, the practical concerns with directly using the simulated log-likelihood of choices with households' full choice histories become quite large given that with  $J$  choices and  $N$  periods there are  $(J+1)^N$  possible choice combinations. I coarsen this by only considering the most recent choice and avoid inferring households' preferences over observed and unobserved characteristics by pooling the total non-idiomatic components of the non-wind mean utilities within each group.

<sup>30</sup>I further explore the properties of this utility specification in Appendix C. In Appendix C.2 I compare the shares implied by fixed effects to specifications with location observables. In Appendix C.3, I show via Monte Carlo simulations that this estimator performs well at recovering price elasticities in settings where the true data generating process includes persistent preferences over unobservables. Lastly, I show empirically in C.4 that, conditioning on prior residence choice, the relationship between the

## 4.3 Identification

### 4.3.1 Identification of non-wind preferences

I begin by estimating all components of utility in Equation 2 other than  $\omega_i$  by only considering census tracts with no homes near wind farms in that period. I use the observed choices in this sample to recover all non  $\omega_i$  parameters. For any individual  $i$  at time  $t$ , the likelihood of choosing a combination  $m, d$  is given by the logit formulation from McFadden (1973),

$$\pi_{i,m,d,t}^{o(i,t)} = \frac{\exp(\delta_{m,d,t}^{o(i,t)})}{1 + \sum_{d' \in \mathcal{D}, m'} \exp(\delta_{m',d',t}^{o(i,t)})}, \quad (3)$$

where  $\delta_{m,d,t}^{o(i,t)} = -\alpha_i \log(p_{d,t}) + \gamma_{d,m}^o + \beta X_{d,t} + \phi_{m,s,t} + \mu_t^o + \xi_{d,m,t}^o$ .

The observed shares  $s_{m,d,t}^{o(i,t)}$  reflect both the true choice probabilities and finite-sample noise.<sup>31</sup> I construct moment inequalities that bound the true choice probabilities  $\pi_{i,m,d,t}^{o(i,t)}$  as a function of the observed shares. The two moment inequalities on average serve as conservative upper and lower bounds for  $\pi_{i,m,d,t}^{o(i,t)}$ , following Gandhi et al. (2023).<sup>32</sup> The moment conditions require the instruments to be uncorrelated with violations of these bounds. From Gandhi et al. (2023) the parameters of this model, particularly  $\alpha_0$  and  $\alpha_I$ , are point identified due to the existence of a few dominant options with predictably large shares  $s_{d,t}^o$  for which these bounds are close, and asymptotically converge to hold as equalities.<sup>33</sup>

**Instrumenting for  $\log(p_{d,t})$ .** In  $\delta_{m,d,t}^{o(i,t)}$  the sole endogenous variable is  $\log(p_{d,t})$ , which may be correlated with unobservable demand shocks  $\xi_{d,m,t}^o$ . In order to identify the disutility from price,  $\alpha_i$ , I require an instrument for home prices.<sup>34</sup> I construct a new instrument, which is a census tract  $d$ 's exposure to deaths in nearby tracts in year  $t$ . The intuition is that deaths increase the number of homes that are for sale. This instrument isolates shifts in the supply of homes for sales in tracts that are likely close substitutes. These shifts in supply in turn affect the price of the focal tract through competitive pressures in equilibrium. The moment inequality estimator requires at least two instruments, so I construct these using disparate data sources and formulations.

First, I use the Social Security Death Master File (SSDMF) to count the number of individuals who I measure as dying in a given census tract, as measured by matching the SSDMF to Infutor using the

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observable similarity of two locations and their cross-price elasticity is both economically and statistically small. This supports the assumption in Equation 2 of within-group logit substitution patterns.

<sup>31</sup>In my setting, each tract contains between 1,200 and 8,000 people and states contain on average over 1,400 tracts.

<sup>32</sup>In Appendix C.6 I provide more detail on the formulation of these moment conditions.

<sup>33</sup>One such choice is the option to remain in the same home as the year before, which 95.4% of households in my sample choose.

<sup>34</sup>Since the sole endogenous variable in this specification is  $\log(p_{d,t})$  and I estimate  $\alpha_0$  and  $\alpha_I$  using a set of two demeaned and excluded instruments, and their interactions with  $I_o$ , I achieve the “strong exclusion” property of Andrews et al. (2025). Causal summaries, such as the own-price elasticity, will thus be approximately correct given the strong identification shown by Gandhi et al. (2023) of my estimator via Proposition 3 of Andrews et al. (2025).

procedure in Bernstein et al. (2022). I construct the first instrument as a gravity measure of exposure to deaths of residents in the two nearest census tracts,

$$Z_{d,t}^1 = \sum_{d' \in \{d_1, d_2\}} \tilde{x}_{d',t}^{SS} / \delta(d, d')^2, \quad (4)$$

where  $d_1$  and  $d_2$  are the two closest census tracts,  $\tilde{x}_{d',t}^{SS}$  is the count of deaths in year  $t$  and tract  $d'$  from the SSDMF multiplied by the year prior's share of households from  $d$  moving to  $d'$ , and  $\delta(d, d')$  is the distance between the population centroid of  $d$  and  $d'$ . The distance weighting and the interaction with the prior period's share allows for the impact of deaths in adjacent tracts' to be mediated by two measures of substitutability, both of which are considered to be exogenous at the time of the choices at time  $t$ .

Second, I use county-level death counts from the Center for Disease Control (CDC) for individuals who are 75 or older. I consider the deaths of older individuals whose deaths may be particularly likely to trigger a home sale as well as being plausibly exogenous.<sup>35</sup> I use these to construct a shift-share instrument (Bartik, 1991; Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020). The count of deaths of older individuals in the county are "shifts", and the "shares" are a distance-weighted measure of the pre-period exposure to older people within the county. This exposure is measured as

$$C_{d,t} = \sum_{d' \in c, d' \neq d} e_{d',c} / \delta(d, d') \quad (5)$$

where  $e_{d',c}$  is the share of the county's elderly, as measured in Infutor, in tract  $d'$  within county  $c$ . I then construct a second instrument as

$$Z_{d,t}^2 = C_{d,t} \cdot \tilde{x}_{c,t}^{CDC}, \quad (6)$$

where  $\tilde{x}_{c,t}^{CDC}$  is the CDC's report of individuals above 75 who died in county  $c$  in year  $t$ . To maximize first-stage power, the instruments differ in both their rates of spatial decay as well as data-sources for  $\tilde{x}$ .<sup>36</sup>

To satisfy exclusion, it must be the case that the unobservable demand shocks  $\xi_{d,m_{i,j},t}^o$  are uncorrelated with both  $Z_{d,t}^1$  and  $Z_{d,t}^2$ . In Equation 2, I control directly for the observed deaths in tract  $d$  at time  $t$  as well as the potentially endogenous component of  $Z_{d,t}^2$ , the exposure to the county's elderly  $C_{d,t}$ , as well a generalization of tract fixed effects,  $\gamma_{d,m_{i,j}}^o$ . These controls isolate the effects of the time-series variation in  $Z_{d,t}^1$  and  $Z_{d,t}^2$  that is unrelated to both deaths in the focal tract as well as the age mix of nearby areas.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>35</sup>I consider deaths to older residents in the county, particularly when controlling for deaths in the focal tract, to be unlikely to be related to idiosyncratic factors related to the desirability of the tract in a given year.

<sup>36</sup>The estimator proposed by Gandhi et al. (2023) requires the discretization of at least two non-collinear instruments, motivating two independent sources of this death shock instrument. I provide more details on the discretization procedure in Section C.6.

<sup>37</sup>In both instruments the plausibly exogenous component,  $\tilde{x}$ , enters the instrument formulation linearly. Per Borusyak and Hull (2023) recentering and controlling for potentially endogenous determinants of  $Z$  is sufficient to remove the bias from potentially non-random exposure to the expected level of treatment. For instance, some tracts are closer to one another or have more deaths

### 4.3.2 Identification of wind preferences

I identify households' individually heterogeneous preferences for living near wind farms,  $\omega_i$ , to rationalize their choices in response to wind farm entry. For each treated location, I use estimated demand curves, consisting of the full vector of non-wind preferences, to examine how the demand elasticity shapes market equilibrium following wind farm entry. With preference heterogeneity, theory suggests that in “thin” markets with few potential in-migrants, the effect of wind entry should cause a large decrease in home prices and a small amount of re-sorting. Conversely, in “thick” markets, wind entry should cause smaller price decreases and greater re-sorting.<sup>38</sup>

After a wind farm is built households choose to live near the wind farm if doing so maximizes their utility. For ease of exposition, I define an intermediate distribution which is a transformation of the vector of non-wind preferences and data. A household  $i$ 's marginality,  $v_{i,d_w,m_{i,j},t} \sim V_{d_w,m,t}^o$ , to living in  $d_w$ , the homes in  $d$  near the wind farm, is the change in price of  $d_w$  at which  $i$  is perfectly indifferent to living there. If  $v_{i,d_w,m_{i,j},t} = 0.1$  then  $i$  would be indifferent to living in  $d_w$ , and their favorite non- $d_w$  option, if prices in  $d_w$  increased by 10%. An individuals' marginality can be written as

$$v_{i,d_w,m_{i,j},t} = \left[ \left( \delta_{m_{i,j},d_w,t}^{o(i,t)} + \varepsilon_{i,m,d,t} \right) - \max_{d' \neq d_w \text{ or } j' \neq j} \left( \delta_{m_{i,j},d',t}^{o(i,t)} + \varepsilon_{i,m_{i,j},d',t} \right) \right] / \alpha_i. \quad (7)$$

For periods  $t'$  after wind entry I define  $\tilde{V}_{d,m,t'}^{o,w}$  to be as in Equation 7 where  $\delta_{m_{i,j},d_w,t}^{o(i,t)}$  is replaced by  $\tilde{\delta}_{m_{i,j},d_w,t}^{o(i,t)}$  which is the counter-factual mean utility of  $d_w$  if a wind farm had *not* been built.

When a wind farm is built, the market re-equilibrates in each treated tract. This involves a treatment effect on price and the in- and out-migration rates of,  $\tau_{d_w}^P$ ,  $\tau_{d_w}^{q,\text{in}}$ ,  $\tau_{d_w}^{q,\text{out}}$ , unrelated to any changes in  $\xi_{d_w,m_{i,j},t}^o$ .<sup>39</sup> By revealed preference, household  $i$  chooses to live near a wind farm in  $d$  if and only if

$$\underbrace{\omega_i}_{\text{wind pref.}} + \underbrace{\tau_{d_w}^P}_{\text{price } \Delta} + \underbrace{\tilde{v}_{i,d_w,m,t'}^{o,w}}_{\text{c.f. marginality}} \geq 0, \quad (8)$$

where  $\tilde{v}_{i,d_w,m}^{o,w} \sim \tilde{V}_{d_w,m,t'}^{o,w}$ .

Households who lived near wind farms in the year prior will move out if their Equation 8 does not hold. The likelihood of this must then equal the incumbent move-out rate, yielding the following relationship

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on average. To address this, I re-center such that  $\mathbb{E}[Z_{d,t}^1 | d] = \mathbb{E}[Z_{d,t}^2 | d] = 0$ .

<sup>38</sup>In Appendix C.1 I provide further proof and graphical illustration of this theory.

<sup>39</sup>Since Equation 2 contains preferences for living near wind farms, this would be unobservable demand shocks unrelated to a wind farm.

governing the rate of out-migration:

$$\tau_{d_w}^{q, \text{out}} = \mathbb{P} \left( \omega_i + \tau_{d_w}^p + \tilde{v}_{i,d_w,0,t'}^{o,w} < 0 \right). \quad (9)$$

There are also  $N_o^{\text{out}}$  households who may move in to the treated area from other locations,  $o$ . Their average rate of in-migration is:

$$\tau_{d_w}^{q, \text{in}} = \sum_{o'} N_o^{\text{out}} \mathbb{P} \left( \omega_i + \tau_d^p + \tilde{v}_{i,d_w,1,t'}^{o',w} \geq 0 \right). \quad (10)$$

The full distribution of  $\omega_i$  is identified by using the revealed preference conditions in Equations 9 and 10, together with the associated treatment effects on price and out-migration rates and the distributions of marginality,  $\tilde{V}$ . The proof of identification, in Appendix C.1, relies only on mild regularity assumptions. Intuitively, identification comes from comparing how households re-sort in response to wind farm entry under *different* magnitudes of price changes. When prices fall sharply after a wind farm is built, the number of households that moves out identifies the share with very negative  $\omega_i$ . Conversely, when prices decline only slightly, the extent of re-sorting identifies the share with moderately negative  $\omega_i$ .

## 4.4 Estimation and results

### 4.4.1 Estimating non-wind preferences

**Sample.** I estimate the model using data on yearly bilateral flows of households between Census tracts, and between homes, from Infutor. I restrict the sample to the 26 states of the U.S. that have more than one in ten thousand homes that are near a wind turbine as of 2020. I further subset to origin tracts where there is ever a household from that tract that moves to a tract that ever has a wind farm. I study the period between 2000 and 2013. I measure average prices and characteristics of homes from transacted properties in CoreLogic within each tract during each year. I measure choice shares  $s_{d,t,m}^o$  to be the fraction of households, whose addresses I observe in  $t$ , who lived in origin tract  $o$  in year  $t-1$  who live in  $d$  and moved  $m$ , in year  $t$ .<sup>40</sup> My sample consists of 300,485,874 bilateral flows, where there was at least one home for sale in that destination in that year, subsetting to only origin-destination flows that are *ever* non-zero.<sup>41</sup>

**First stage.** I present the linear version first stage in Appendix Table A3.<sup>42</sup> The first column shows a “zeroth” stage in which both instruments increase the number of homes sold in the two nearest tracts. This is consistent with individuals’ deaths increasing the number of homes for sale in closely competing areas. The second column shows that both instruments decrease the transaction prices of homes in the focal tract,

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<sup>40</sup>The movement indicator is necessarily positive for all tracts  $d \neq o$ .

<sup>41</sup>If in all periods  $s_{d,t}^o = 0$  then  $\gamma_d^o$  will not be identified, I set  $\gamma_d^o$  to an arbitrarily low value. If there were no transactions, I conclude that this option was not available to any households not living there previously.

<sup>42</sup>The estimator uses a whitened and discretized version of the instruments, as described in Appendix C.6.

as expected. The ratios of the coefficients of the effects on supply of close competitors and the eventual transaction prices are similar, supporting the exclusion argument

**Estimation.** I estimate the vector of non-wind preferences,  $\hat{\theta}$ , to minimize violations of the moment inequalities described in Section 4.3.1. The non-linearity of these moment inequalities leaves me unable to use standard high-dimensional fixed effect IV estimators. I instead solve for  $\hat{\theta}$  via gradient descent, making use of the fact that the moments have an analytical gradient.<sup>43</sup>

**Parameter estimates.** I find the mean own-price elasticity to be  $-0.311$   $[-0.321, -0.282]$ .<sup>44</sup> Further, I find that households from higher-income origin tracts are less price sensitive. I find that a 1 standard deviation increase in household income is associated with a  $22.6\%$   $[20.3\%, 26.8\%]$  decrease in  $\alpha_i$ .

**Discussion.** I find substantial heterogeneity in tracts' own-price elasticities. The inter-quartile range of estimated own-price elasticities is  $0.204$   $[0.186, 0.210]$ , as shown in Appendix Figure A10. This heterogeneity arises from two sources. First, tracts have different mean utilities to household from other origin tracts, due to heterogeneity in estimated  $\hat{\delta}$ . Some areas attract many households who do not currently live there with high mean utilities from living there, while others attract few. Although within-group own-price elasticities are homogenous in this specification, differences in  $\hat{\delta}$  imply differences in baseline demand levels, and thus heterogeneous aggregate elasticities. Second, locations differ in the incomes of the households who most value living there, and generating further variation in the price elasticities.

In Appendix Table A4 I provide several robustness exercises. First, I emphasize the importance of the moment inequality estimator by noting how sensitive estimated price elasticities are to the choice of smoothing parameters that ensure shares are positive and thus estimable by way of a Berry (1994) inversion.<sup>45</sup> Second, I illustrate the importance of instruments by targeting the average of the Gandhi et al. (2023) bounds with and without instruments, since the moment inequality estimator does not allow for straightforward comparisons to OLS. In this specification, the OLS price elasticity is around 120 times smaller than the IV estimate, underscoring the importance of instruments for price.

#### 4.4.2 Estimating wind preferences

**Treatment effects on price and in- and out-migration.** I require treatment effects for each treated location  $d_w$ . For ease of estimation, I assume that treatment effects can be parameterized as a function of a

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<sup>43</sup>I begin by searching over 500 perturbations of a vector of the non-fixed effect parameters from a guess, using the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem (Frisch and Waugh, 1933; Lovell, 1963) to target the average of the bounds to solve for an intermediate guess of the fixed effects, and then converge to the full vector of  $\hat{\theta}$  by way of gradient descent. This method ensures that the numerical optimizer does not become stuck at a local optima. The specification in Equation 2 adds computational tractability since it ensures that the moments have a closed-form, and thus an analytical gradient, as opposed to common alternatives such as a mixed logit utility function.

<sup>44</sup>I validate this estimate in Appendix C.9 where I estimate the price coefficient  $\alpha_0$  using *only* the endowed options and find a similar preference parameter, which is consistent with the utility specification in Equation 2.

<sup>45</sup>This is consistent with the results in Dingel and Tintelnot (2025).

characteristic of non-wind demand. I use the following pre-period measure, outside demand, which is the model-implied percentage increase in population of  $d_w$  from in-migrants if prices dropped 5%:<sup>46</sup>

$$\iota_{d_w,t} = \sum_{d' \neq d} \hat{D}_{d_w,1,t}^{d'} (-0.05) / (\hat{D}_{d_w,t}^d (0)). \quad (11)$$

I define the treatment effect heterogeneity as  $\tau_{d_w,t}^p = \tau^p(\iota_{d_w,t})$ ,  $\tau_{d_w,t}^{q,\text{in}} = \tau^{q,\text{in}}(\iota_{d_w,t})$ , and  $\tau_{d_w,t}^{q,\text{out}} = \tau^{q,\text{out}}(\iota_{d_w,t})$ . A further simplifying assumption, short-run supply inelasticity and market clearing, yields the following relationship regarding the rate of in-migration,  $\tau_{d_w}^{q,\text{out}} = (1 - \tau_{d_w}^q) N^{\text{in}} / (\sum_o N_o^{\text{out}})$ .<sup>47</sup> I estimate the functions  $\hat{\tau}^p(\iota)$  and  $\hat{\tau}^{q,\text{out}}(\iota)$  by first recovering  $\hat{\tau}_O^p$  and  $\hat{\tau}_O^{q,\text{out}}$  for each octile of observed  $\iota_{d,t}$ . I then construct the functions  $\hat{\tau}^p$  and  $\hat{\tau}^{q,\text{out}}$  by linearly interpolating between the estimated effects.

I estimate the treatment effects on price and out-migration at different quantiles of model-implied in-migration rates,  $\iota$ , by estimating heterogeneous difference-in-difference effects on the price of homes and volume of home sales. I use homes that have a wind farm built within five and ten years after, but have not yet been treated, as a control group as in Section 4.1. I estimate the following specifications:

$$\log(p_{i,t}) = \sum_{O \in \{1, \dots, 8\}} (\tau_O^p \cdot B_{i,t} + \alpha_O^p \cdot T_{i,t} + \rho_O^p) \cdot \mathbb{I}\{O_i = O\} + \beta X_i + \nu_{c(i)}^p + \phi_t^p + \mu_{C(i), g(t)}^p + \varepsilon_{i,t}^p, \quad (12)$$

$$s_{i,t} = \sum_{O \in \{1, \dots, 8\}} (\tau_O^{q,\text{out}} \cdot B_{i,t} + \alpha_O^q \cdot T_{i,t} + \rho_O^q) \cdot \mathbb{I}\{O_i = O\} + \nu_{c(i)}^q + \phi_t^q + \mu_{C(i), g(t)}^q + \varepsilon_{i,t}^q. \quad (13)$$


For some property  $i$ ,  $p_{i,t}$  is the price at which it is transacted at time  $t$  and  $s_{i,t}$  is a binary variable indicating whether it was sold at time  $t$ .  $B_{i,t}$  is 1 if and only if the wind farm is built at time  $t$ ,  $T_{i,t}$  is 1 if and only if the property is treated in this stack, and  $O_i$  is the  $i$ 's octile of  $\iota$ . In Equation 12 I also control for  $X_{i,t}$ , which are logged home characteristics: acres, bedrooms, bathrooms, age, and square-feet. I include census tract,  $c(i)$ , year  $t$ , and 3-year bin  $\times$  county, fixed effects as  $\nu_{c(i)}$ ,  $\phi_t$ , and  $\mu_{C(i), g(y)}$  in both specifications. The identifying assumption is that, among places that eventually allow a wind farm to be built, the exact timing of when is plausibly exogenous. This is supported by no observed pre-trends in event studies using this control group. Figure 3 presents the effects on price by distance, Appendix Figure A13 presents the effects on price by octile of  $\iota$ , and Appendix Figure A4 shows the effects on home sales volumes.

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<sup>46</sup>This is closely related to the own-price elasticity with the main difference being that it is the change in demand from non-residents normalized by total demand. For the purposes of estimation I associate each home with the average of  $\iota_{d_w,t}$  for the three years just prior to a wind farm being built. In areas where the treated zone  $d_w$  is a fraction,  $b$ , of the total tract, I calibrate that the demand for  $d_w$  is equal to the demand for  $d$  multiplied by  $b$ .

<sup>47</sup>Since homes are durable, it is unlikely that homes are destroyed in the short run. Further, since this is a negative demand shock, it is unlikely that new homes will be built in the area. This appears to hold given no evidence of population changes in Infutor.

Figure 4: Effect of wind farms on price and sales volume by out-demand



Note: Both effects are estimated by comparing homes near turbines to homes near turbines that are treated between five and ten years after, but have not been treated yet. Home price effect is estimated controlling for age, acreage, bedrooms, baths, census tract, county  $\times$  3-year bin, and year. Sales effect is estimated controlling for census tract, county  $\times$  3-year bin, and year. Both sets of effects are estimated as a stacked difference-in-differences estimator jointly.

I present the estimated  $\hat{\tau}_O^P$  and  $\hat{\tau}_O^{q, \text{out}}$  in Figure 4, both of which vary substantially by  $\iota$ . Panel A shows that in areas with little outside demand, wind farm entry leads to large decreases in home prices. In contrast, in areas with high outside demand, the estimated price effects are small and statistically insignificant. Panel

B shows that in areas with little outside demand, out-migration changes very little, while in areas with lots of outside demand it increases sharply. These results are consistent with a model in which households have heterogeneous costs of living near a wind farm and choose to move out if price declines are insufficient to offset their disutility, as in Equation 9. The range of these estimated price effects, from around  $-0.20$  to  $0$ , provides sufficient support to identify the distribution of wind preferences, as proved in Appendix A.3. The measure of out-demand,  $\iota_{d_w,t}$ , is most strongly related to the fraction of residents who had not lived there the year before as shown in Appendix Figure A11 and Table A5. I find similar heterogeneity in price effects by this observable characteristic, presented in Appendix Figure A14.

**Counterfactual marginality distributions  $\tilde{V}$ .** In order to appropriately account for individuals'  $\tilde{v}_i$  in the in- and out-migration moments, presented in Equations 9 and 10, I need the counterfactual distribution of marginality, constructed from non-wind preferences. I assume that for the five years after wind entry, the relevant  $\tilde{V}_{d_w}$  is equal to the average of the measured  $\tilde{V}_{d_w,t}$  for the three years prior to wind entry.<sup>48</sup>

This involves the following simplifying assumptions. First, given the small number of homes that are treated in a given area, I assume that wind entry solely affects the utility of living in the treated area.<sup>49</sup> Second, given the relative sparsity of wind farms in my sample period, I assume that households are not sorted in accordance with their wind preferences in the pre-period.<sup>50</sup> Finally, this assumes stationarity of the average distribution of non-wind marginality over a short time horizon.

**Estimation of  $\omega_i \sim W$ .** I estimate the population distribution of  $\hat{W}$ .<sup>51</sup> From my estimates of  $\hat{\tau}^P(\iota)$ ,  $\hat{\tau}^{q,\text{out}}(\iota)$ , and  $\hat{\tau}^{q,\text{in}}(\iota)$  each location  $d_w$  with out-demand  $\iota_{d_w}$  has an associated treatment effect on price and effect on in- and out-migration. A guess of  $\hat{W}$ ,  $W_g$ , is a grid of mass-points. For each location, given their relevant  $\tilde{V}_{d_w}$  and  $\hat{\tau}^P(\iota_{d_w})$ , I find their model-implied in- and out-migration from  $W_g$  consistent with Equations 9 and 10. I use both in- and out-migration moments for additional statistical power although one series would be sufficient for identification as shown in Proposition 1. Intuitively, how many households move out is directly related to the left tail of  $\omega_i$  where households dislike wind farms. I combine this with information on how many households move in, which is directly related to the right tail of  $\omega_i$ .

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<sup>48</sup>This assumption, given the smoothness in the demand curves from the shape of the logit errors, and the fact that year to year populations and out-migration rates are relatively constant, but for large shocks like wind entry, is similar to an assumption that the own-price elasticity of demand for  $d_w$  from incumbents and non-incumbents would have been constant but for the wind farm.

<sup>49</sup>This shuts down broader equilibrium effects. I motivate the lack of a need to do so with two facts related to my empirical setting. First, typically very small numbers of homes are affected at one time, the median fraction of the tract that is within three miles of a wind farm is 4.2%. Second, the price effects estimated in Appendix Figure A3 decay quickly in space, even though distance is to the *first* wind farm and additional ones may be built. The treated census tracts are quite large, they are on average 180 square miles, and the wind farms tend to be in remote parts of the tract, implying close to no change in price for the remaining untreated portion of the tract and presumably little to no effects on neighboring tracts.


<sup>50</sup>There appears to be an empirically quite small amount of pre-sorting in my setting. In Appendix B.8 I estimate the effects of wind entry on the rate at which in- and out-migrants had previously lived near wind farms. I find a precise, but quite small, 2.5% increase in the chance that in-migrants were previously living near a wind farm, presented in Appendix Figure A34.

<sup>51</sup>The substantive assumption that allows for use of these price and sales effects together is that the preferences for wind  $\omega_i$  are i.i.d. in the population.

I solve for  $\hat{W}$  as a constrained regression to find the distribution of mass-points that minimizes the deviations between the model-implied migration moments and the associated treatment effects,  $\hat{\tau}^{q, \text{out}}(\iota_{d_w})$  and  $\hat{\tau}^{q, \text{in}}(\iota_{d_w})$  with an additional penalization term to enforce regularity of the tails. I provide more details on the exact estimation procedure in Appendix C.7.

**Results and discussion.** I present the preference estimates, smoothed using an Epanechnikov kernel, in Figure 5. The mean of this distribution is  $-7.54\%$ . There is considerable heterogeneity. I find a substantial mass of households are close to indifferent. At the same time, around 13% of households are willing to pay 25% or more of their homes' value to avoid having a wind farm built nearby. The distribution of these preferences is qualitatively similar, but slightly more negative, than poll responses of households who live near wind farms, measured after any potential re-sorting (Hoen et al., 2019).

Figure 5: Estimated distribution of  $W$



Note: These preferences are in units of equivalent log change in property values. For instance, if  $\omega = -0.1$  that would be equivalent to a 10% increase in price. After transforming each point to an equivalent percentage change the mean is  $-0.0754$ . The untransformed mean is  $-0.0511$ .

#### 4.5 Test of Coase (1960)

I test whether the aggregate distribution of wind farms efficiently trades off developer profitability with the costs borne by nearby households. In the Coasian benchmark with frictionless bargaining and fully delineated property rights, developers could contract directly with affected households and fully internalize their social costs of their project. For each location  $l$ , the total net social value of building a wind farm in that location is  $\hat{\Pi}_l + \mathbb{E}[C_l]$  where  $\mathbb{E}[C_l] = \mathbb{E}[\omega_i] \cdot P_l$ . Here,  $\omega_i$  are households' preferences for living near turbines and  $P_l$  is the total value of homes within five miles of site  $l$ . Appendix Figure A15 maps these


estimated social values across all potential sites.

I test the Coasian benchmark by estimating the following probit regression,

$$\text{Built}_l = \beta_p \underbrace{\hat{\Pi}_l + \beta A_l^{\text{ag}} + \gamma_{s(l)}}_{\text{profit}} + \beta_e \underbrace{\mathbb{E}[C_l]}_{\text{externality}} + \varepsilon_l \geq 0 \quad (14)$$

where  $\gamma_{s(l)}$  is a state fixed effect,  $A_l^{\text{ag}}$  is agricultural productivity, and  $\varepsilon_l \sim N(0, 1)$ . This is consistent with a model where developers obey a free-entry condition and there may be some other barriers to entry or misspecified intercepts that vary by state. I test the Coasian benchmark by assessing whether the estimated  $\hat{\beta}_e/\hat{\beta}_p = 1$ .

Figure 6: Estimated developer sensitivity to nearby homes' values



Note: The value of homes within five miles is from a hedonic price index from CoreLogic which is scaled by the mean preference of -7.54%. Confidence intervals calculated from 200 iterations of a Bayesian bootstrap.

In Figure 6, I present  $\hat{\beta}_e/\hat{\beta}_p$ . I find that what is built is substantially too sensitive to the value of homes nearby. This is consistent with a model where developers paid 55% of the total price of homes in a 5 mile radius. This is over seven times as much as the preference estimates, suggesting that there may be some failures of efficient Coasian bargaining.<sup>52</sup> These market failures lead to an aggregate avoidance of areas

<sup>52</sup>Multiplying the home prices by the mean preference estimate is a slight over-estimate of the true welfare cost, because there are

with many nearby properties. I assess the cause of this failures in Section 5, which could be due to frictions in preference aggregation, regulated prices, or hold-up risk. In Section B.9 I demonstrate the robustness of this finding to alternative specifications of the distribution of the unobservable  $\varepsilon_l$ . In Appendix Figure A6 I present a heat-map of data underlying this specification comparing the Coasian benchmark with the observed trade-offs. In Appendix Figure A5 I present the same bin-scatter as in Figure 2

## 5 Local government-developer interaction

### 5.1 Model

#### 5.1.1 Developer-government interaction

There is a set of locations  $\mathcal{L}$ . Each location  $l$  has an exogenous profitability if developed,  $\Pi_l$ . There exists a mapping  $\mathcal{I} : \mathcal{L} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{H})$  where  $\mathcal{I}(l)$  is the set of households impacted by construction of a wind farm  $l$ . The affected households' set of costs is  $\mathbf{d} = \{\omega'_i \text{ for } i \in \mathcal{I}(l)\}$ . The game is between a homogeneous developer,  $D$ , and the associated local government  $G = \mathcal{G}(l)$ . The game proceeds as follows, with the timing shown graphically in Figure 7.

**Period 1: Initial investment** The developer can choose to contact government  $G$  for a cost  $e$ . If contacted, the local government may block them from continuing for a cost  $B_1$ .<sup>53</sup> The site's expected profitability,  $\Pi_{l,0}$  is common knowledge. If the developer is not blocked, they must pay an investment cost  $E$  to design the site and learn their final, private, profit shock  $\Pi_{l,1}$ . At this point, the local government aggregates their constituents' costs as  $\zeta_l \cdot \mathbb{E}[C_l]$  where  $C_l = \sum \mathbf{d}$ . The government's private political friction  $\zeta_l$  and their value for money  $V_l$ , are both random variables drawn from a known distribution, where  $V_l$  has a mean of 1. The ratio of  $\zeta_l/V_l$  is how many additional dollars of revenue the local government requires to be indifferent to a \$1 increase in the size of the total household costs.

**Period 2: Potential negotiation** If regulated, the developer may be required to pay an exogenous transfer  $T_l$  to the local government. If the regulation is such that they may negotiate, the local government and developer will bargain over a transfer payment  $T_l$  at this point.

**Period 3: Final determination** The developer may decide whether she wants to construct the project after considering the sunk cost  $E$  and her final-period profit shock  $\Pi_{l,1}$ . The developer will construct if


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individuals for whom moving is a lower utility cost than their  $\omega_i$ .

<sup>53</sup>Common methods for blocking projects are voting on and passing new county laws imposing moratoria on wind farms or filing for conservation easements to block the interconnection of potential wind farms from the electrical grid, as documented in [Fowlie and Taylor \(2025\)](#). The costs may also include a hassle cost component to the local government. As I discuss in Section 2.3, local governments have wide leeway in determining land use, but may not make clearly arbitrary or unreasonable rules ([Taft, 1926](#)).

$\Pi_l + E - T_l > 0$ . Subsequently, the local government may decide whether they wish to block the project for some cost  $B_2 > B_1$ . They will do so if  $V_l \cdot T_l - \zeta_l \mathbb{E} [C_l] < -B_2$ .

Figure 7: Simple timeline of wind development



Note: I present, above the line, the description of wind development from industry documents and conversations with wind developers. I present, below the line, the model analog action space and information structure. The flow chart demonstrates the game tree. As the econometrician I observe the decisions to invest and whether a wind farm is built.

## 5.2 Potential market failures

This model allows for three potential market failures, which I discuss in more detail below. These market failures will be in comparison to the benchmark suggested by Coase (1960), in which I assume that each household has a property right to not allow a wind farm to be built and bilateral bargaining is frictionless.<sup>54</sup> For each household  $i \in \mathcal{I}(l)$  there is an associated transfer, from the developer to the household  $t_i^* \in \mathbb{R}$ . In this case, the wind farm will be built if and only if  $t_i^* \geq \omega_i$  for all  $i$  and  $\Pi_l - \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}(l)} t_i^* \geq 0$ . There exists such a series of transfers  $\{t_i^*\}$  such that a wind farm is built if and only if  $\Pi_l - \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}(l)} \omega_i \geq 0$  which is equivalent to all projects with positive social value being built.

### 5.2.1 Political frictions

The local government trades off costs to households with transfers. If  $\zeta_l/V_l \neq 1$ , this trade-off is different than a money-metric utilitarian social planner's. The local government may overweight household costs ( $\zeta_l/V_l > 1$ ) if, for example, the more acutely harmed households carry more weight in their decision-making process than those receiving diffuse benefits, or if the local governments' marginal value of public funds is less than one.<sup>55</sup> Conversely, the local government may under-weigh households costs ( $\zeta_l/V_l < 1$ ) if

<sup>54</sup>In this model, the holder of the property right has no effect on the outcome, rather on the direction of the transfer.

<sup>55</sup>For instance, harmed households may speak more in planning meetings, consistent with Einstein et al. (2019). Alternatively, much of the transfer revenue is used on educational expenditures and school finance equalization may effectively tax away

the opposite conditions hold, or if it seeks to maximize its own revenue.<sup>56</sup>

### 5.2.2 Contracting frictions

**Regulated transfer amounts.** In some states the transfer amounts,  $T_l$ , are regulated by law to be exogenous. If  $T_l$  is set too high, some socially valuable projects may no longer be profitable to the developer, and will not be pursued. If  $T_l$  is set too low, some socially valuable projects may be unacceptable to local governments, and will be blocked.

**Hold-up.** In some states the law is that the transfer amount  $T_l$  can be negotiated, after the developer sinks an initial investment  $E$ . After sinking this cost, the developer would agree to some transfer,  $T^*$ , where

$$\Pi_l + E - T^* \geq 0, \text{ and}$$

$$\Pi_l - T^* < 0.$$

The developer will anticipate this, and may not initially invest in some socially valuable locations depending how the surplus from negotiation accrues to the local government.

## 5.3 Effects of tax rules

I next describe how state rules governing developers' property tax payments to local governments affect construction. As classified by [Uebelhor et al. \(2021\)](#) there are three main categories of state laws, presented in Appendix Figure A16. The first category is the default system, where developers pay property taxes on the assessed value of the constructed site, consistent with a large exogenous  $T_l$ . The second, exempts developers, fully or largely, from property taxes, consistent with an exogenous small or zero  $T_l$ . For example, Texas' 1978 Proposition 4 amended their state constitution to allow the legislature to exempt "solar and wind-powered energy devices" as "an effective method of encouraging private investment" ([TLC, 1978](#)). The third system allows wind developers to negotiate payments to local governments in lieu of taxes. This is typically legislated explicitly, as in Minnesota Statute 272.028 ([Minnesota, 2001](#)), and parallels the structure of host fees for toxic waste ([Jenkins et al., 2004](#)).

Through the lens of the model in Section 5.1, changing how developers may pay local governments consists of two forces. First, when developers pay taxes this lowers the likelihood that a site is profitable. Second, tax payments increase the likelihood that a project is allowed by the local government. To isolate the first effect, I analyze empty locations, where there are one or fewer affected homes, where local government

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revenue gains to local governments. I find that this is the case in Appendix B.7 as do [Brunner et al. \(2022\)](#).

<sup>56</sup>There is some work that suggests a positive marginal value of public funds in school expenditures ([Cellini et al., 2010](#); [Biasi et al., 2025](#)), and other work in support of the so-called "Leviathan hypothesis" ([Brennan and Buchanan, 1980](#); [Diamond, 2017](#)).

opposition is assumed to be negligible.<sup>57</sup> I then consider the combined effect of these two forces in the full sample.

I estimate a spatial regression-discontinuity at state borders where the tax policy faced by wind developers changes.<sup>58</sup> Unobservable determinants of wind construction are likely similar across borders. A potential confound is other state-level policies, most notably renewable portfolio standards (RPS), which govern the share of used energy a state that is renewable. Since generation just across the border can count toward these requirements, RPS policies are unlikely to differentially impact profitability.<sup>59</sup>

In the full sample, more wind farms are built where developers pay property taxes than where they may negotiate or are exempt. Following [Calonico et al. \(2014\)](#), I estimate robust regression discontinuities for the three transitions between tax laws, controlling for border fixed effects, engineering profitability, and the number of homes within five miles. Relative to paying property taxes, exemption and negotiation reduces construction likelihoods by 4.5% [1.8%, 10.7%] and 10.7% [1.7%, 27.2%] respectively. Negotiation relative to exemption lowers construction by 6.2% [-0.9%, 13.2%]. Figure 8 shows the Loess local polynomial and residualized bin-scatter underlying these RD estimates; Appendix Figure A18 presents the analogous figure for empty locations. I find elevated likelihoods of any wind farm being built near the border, suggesting that developers may shift externalities to households who are not their constituents.<sup>60</sup>

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
<sup>57</sup>Standard theories and empirical evidence about firms' location choices when facing heterogeneous tax rates suggest that firms would cluster on the side of borders where they pay *less* in taxes ([Suarez Serrato and Zidar, 2016](#); [Fajgelbaum et al., 2019](#)).

<sup>58</sup>Some examples of this research design are [Holmes \(1998\)](#); [Black \(1999\)](#); [Dell \(2010\)](#); [Turner et al. \(2014\)](#); and others.

<sup>59</sup>This is not true of Texas, which I drop for the purposes of estimation.

<sup>60</sup>I plot the pooled relationship between distance to the border and the likelihood of construction in Appendix Figure A21. I find that wind farms are more likely to be built closer to a state border. This result is consistent with a minimization of externalities on constituents, which has been found in other settings like big box stores in [Shoag and Veugel \(2018\)](#) and traffic in [Kashner and Ross \(2025\)](#).

Figure 8: Border RDD effects of tax rule on existence



Note: I present the Loess local polynomial at borders where the law changes as depicted. I residualize controlling for engineering profitability and include border FE. I exclude Texas since they constitute a distinct electricity market. The robust RD effect from Calonico et al. (2014), relative to tax are pooled as  $-7.2\% [-13.6\%, -1.3\%]$  and separately as  $-4.5\% [-10.7\%, -1.8\%]$  and  $-10.7\% [-27.2\%, -1.7\%]$  respectively for exemption and negotiation. The effect of exemption relative to negotiation is  $-6.2\% [-13.2\%, 0.9\%]$ .

I then estimate the pooled effect along borders with a difference in tax treatment as a probit version of a spatial regression discontinuity for locations within 25 miles of relevant borders as

$$\text{Built}_l = \phi_{r(l)} + \gamma_{b(l)} + f_{r(l)}(d_l) + \varepsilon_l, \quad (15)$$

where  $\text{Built}_l$  is an indicator for whether location  $l$  is built,  $\phi_{r(l)}$  are fixed effects for the tax regime  $r(l)$ ,  $\gamma_{b(l)}$  are fixed effects for the border,  $f_{r(l)}$  is a flexible spline function of distance from the border  $d_l$ , and there is an error term  $\varepsilon_l$ . Column 1 of Table 1 presents my main specification, with the corresponding sample of sites mapped in Appendix Figure A17. I find that, relative to states where developers pay property taxes, substantially fewer wind farms are built when developers are exempt from paying taxes. Allowing developers to negotiate payments results in fewer projects than under tax payment, but more than under full exemption

Column 2 of Table 1 restricts the sample to areas with few or no nearby households. Community opposition should play a much smaller role in these areas, and so we expect the sign of the tax effect to reverse.<sup>61</sup> Indeed, in these areas, tax exemption leads to a large increase in wind farm construction relative to tax payment. In this sample, when developers may negotiate payments more wind farms are built than when they must pay taxes, but fewer than when they may not pay taxes. This suggests that although negotiation may in expectation lead to lower tax payments than the inflexible amount, the way that surplus is split makes it dispreferred to not paying taxes is small to no externalities. Appendix Tables A6 and A7 report robustness checks using alternative controls and find similar results along a range of specifications. I find that the estimates in Table 1 are largely insensitive to excluding controls, the balance of which I present in Appendix Figures A19 and A20. Appendix Figure A22 examines how the number of affected households affects whether paying taxes is preferable to exemption. With as few as three to five homes, paying taxes leads to more wind farms being built than exemption.

I then assess two additional channels. First, I examine whether tax rules influence how home prices respond to wind entry. Estimating event studies by tax regime (Appendix Figure A23),<sup>62</sup> I find large price decreases after wind entry in states with no tax payment, small decreases when developers may negotiate, and no changes when the developer pays property taxes. Higher local tax revenues appear to capitalize in home values, offsetting part of the household disamenities. Consistent with this, Appendix Figure A24 shows that in states where developers pay taxes, home prices five miles or further away actually increase. This supports the view that increased tax revenues generate countywide benefits, while nearby households bear the brunt of the costs.

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<sup>61</sup>I present the individual spatial RD plots for this subsample in Figure A18.

<sup>62</sup>I do so without fine geography by time fixed effects that may absorb the common gains to the county of increased tax revenue, to identify the bundled effects.

Table 1: Border effects of tax rules on wind farm existence

Dependent Variable:	Wind farm exists	
Model:	(1)	(2)
<i>Variables</i>		
Negotiation relative to Tax	-2.8% (0.5%)	1.5% (0.3%)
Exemption relative to Tax	-5.6% (0.4%)	5.3% (0.2%)
<i>Fixed-effects</i>		
Border	Yes	Yes
<i>Controls</i>		
Engineering profitability	Yes	Yes
Distance from border by rule (5 d.f. spline)	Yes	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>		
Observations	5,593	1,683
R <sup>2</sup>	0.03055	0.05065
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.00696	0.01203

Note: Standard errors clustered at the rule level.

Second, I study local school districts' finance in Appendix A24. Wind farms substantially raise expenditures when developers pay property taxes or negotiate payments. However, when developers pay taxes, part of this revenue is effectively "taxed" away through reductions in state and federal transfer. This friction may influence how local governments weigh households costs against revenues, as described in Section 5.2.1.

#### 5.4 Effects of tax rules by the size of the expected externality

I seek to characterize which potentially efficient sites are indeed constructed along two dimensions: the size of the expected externality and the tax rule. I consider only potential locations where, given the variance of unobservable profit shocks, they have a substantial likelihood of being built.<sup>63</sup> I then estimate the following probit regression

$$Y_l = \hat{\Pi}_l + f_{r(l)}(P_l) + \gamma_{c(l)} + \varepsilon_l, \quad (16)$$

where a location  $l$  is built if and only if  $Y_l \geq 0$ ,  $\gamma_{c(l)}$  are fixed effects for the census region  $c(l)$ , and there is an error term  $\varepsilon_l \sim N(0, \sigma_e^2)$ . I estimate  $f_{r(l)}$  separately for each tax regime separately as a Hermite spline with three degrees of freedom.


In Figure 9 I present the estimated curves  $f_{r(l)}$ . I find that for lower values of nearby homes, tax

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<sup>63</sup>I subset to locations where  $\hat{\Pi}_l - 0.2 \times p_l \geq -15M$ , which contain most but not all constructed locations.

exemption is associated with the highest likelihood of construction, followed by paying a fixed tax rate, where negotiation is associated with lowest likelihood. However, when  $\mathbb{E}[C_l] \approx \$2.2M$  when developers are tax-exempt, the likelihood of construction suddenly plummets to become vanishingly small. Similarly, when  $\mathbb{E}[C_l] \approx \$5M$  when developers must pay taxes, the likelihood of construction analogously plummets. This is in marked contrast to the locations where developers can negotiate. The likelihood of construction is relatively stable over the full sample, and it appears that the high social value locations where  $P_l$  is large are still able to be developed.

Figure 9: Estimated effect of nearby homes' value on construction probability



Note: Fit of Hermite spline with three degrees of freedom relating the value of nearby homes to construction outcomes. Estimated as a probit controlling for engineering profit, FE for rule and census region. Sample includes only locations where engineering profit +15M > 0.2 ×  $P_l$ , or locations that may be efficient to build.

## 5.5 Model parameterization

This game plays out in a tax regime  $r(l) \in \{t, b, e\}$  which correspond to exogenous tax, bargaining over payment, or exemption. The timing is shown graphically in Figure 7.

**Profit.** I model the site's expected profitability as

$$\Pi_{l,0} = \hat{\Pi}_l + \Pi_{l,\xi} + \beta X_l \quad (17)$$

where  $\hat{\Pi}_l$  is the engineering profit,  $\Pi_{l,\xi} \sim N(0, \sigma_\xi^2)^{64}$  is a persistent unobservable, and  $X$  are controls.<sup>65</sup>

<sup>64</sup>I assume independence between first period unobservable quality and final-period profit shocks. I show in Section D.5 that this nests a situation in which both  $\Pi_{l,\xi}$  and  $\Pi_{l,1}$  are drawn from a multivariate normal with arbitrary covariance so long as the developer correctly accounts for  $\mathbb{E}[\Pi_{l,1} | \Pi_{l,\xi}]$  when making period 1 decisions.

<sup>65</sup>I include an intercept, whether the state has a renewable portfolio standard, the amount of the renewable portfolio standard, and the per-acre profit in the local agricultural area.

If the developer approached in period 1 and was not blocked, she must pay an engineering cost  $E$  to design the site and learn her final, private, profit shock  $\Pi_{l,1}$ . I model the final true profit as

$$\Pi_l = \Pi_{l,0} + \Pi_{l,1}, \quad (18)$$

where  $\Pi_{l,1} \sim N(0, \sigma_f^2)$ .<sup>66</sup>

**Government utility.** The utility to the government of allowing a wind farm to be built is  $\zeta_l \mathbb{E}[C_l] + V_l T_l$ . The expectation of the sum of the money-metric costs to households of being exposed to a nearby wind farm is

$$\mathbb{E}[C_l] = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}(l)} \mathbb{E}[\omega'_i], \quad (19)$$

where  $\omega'_i$  is  $\omega_i$  multiplied by the value of household  $i$ 's home. If the game proceeds beyond period 1 the local government learns their private political friction  $\zeta_l \sim N(\zeta_0, \mu^2)$ . The local government also learns  $V_l \sim N(1, v^2)$ . I assume on average they value a dollar of tax revenue as a dollar, so  $\mathbb{E}[V_l] = 1$ .

**Potential negotiation.** If the tax regime  $r(l)$  allows bargaining, then the government and developer will bargain over a transfer payment  $T_l$ . With probability  $\rho$  the government may make a take-it-or-leave-it offer  $T_c^*$  with the ability to commit to blocking if the developer rejects it. With probability  $1 - \rho$ , the developer may make a take-it-or-leave-it offer  $T_d^*$ . The government observes a signal  $\Pi_{l,1,g} \sim N(\Pi_{l,1}, \eta^2)$  centered around the true final period profit shock. Analogously, the developer observes a signal  $\zeta_{l,d} \sim N(\zeta_l, \mu_c^2)$  centered around the true private cost.

## 5.6 Identification

I derive solutions for the developer and local governments' policy functions in Appendices D.1 and D.2. These have closed form solutions for the states where the transfers developers pay to local governments is exogenous. In states where developers and local governments may negotiate, no such closed forms exist. Instead, I numerically approximate continuation values via simulation. In all tax regimes, the determination in the final period—of whether to build and whether to allow construction—follows a cutoff rule. As such, all policy functions are solvable via backwards induction.

### 5.6.1 Identification: no bargaining

There are 17 parameters in  $\theta$  to estimate. Here, I discuss the variation that identifies four key parameters; the remaining thirteen are detailed in Appendix D.3. Although the parameters are jointly identified, I highlight the primary sources of variation that intuitively identify each parameter.

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<sup>66</sup>This shock can be thought of as changing prices at which developers buy inputs or sell outputs, or as more intimate knowledge of the cost of development during engineering and surveying.

**Taxes paid in tax regime:**  $T_l$ . This is identified by the differences in the minimum pre-tax profitability,  $\Pi_l + T_l$ , at which projects are built between the exemption versus the property tax regimes. This corresponds to the gap between the red and blue curves in Figure 9 at low values of expected externality.

**Blocking costs:**  $B_1, B_2$ .  $B_2$  is identified by the externality cost threshold at which projects begin to be blocked by the local government conditional on application in the exemption regime. This corresponds to the value of the expected externality at which the red curve in Figure 9 begins to sharply decline. The difference between  $B_1$  and  $B_2$  is inferred from the gap between the observed propensity of communities to block potential entrants and the threshold at which entry would be rational.

**Political friction:**  $\zeta_0$ . This is identified by the difference in the blocking thresholds for blocking between the tax and exemption regimes. Empirically, this is closely related to the difference in the value of the externalities at which the red and blue curves begin to slope down rapidly in Figure 9, scaled by the estimated value of  $T_l$ .

### 5.6.2 Identification: bargaining

There are three additional parameters of  $\theta$  which must be estimated, beyond those estimated in Section 5.7. I discuss the intuition regarding which variation identifies each of them in Appendix D.3.2.

The three are inextricably linked and are fit to rationalize the observed lower likelihood of investment, conditional on externalities and profitability, by way of expectations of hold-up risk. Each sides' knowledge of the other sides' semi-private information governs the rate of bargaining failure at different levels of profitability and externalities. The rate at which the local government proposes a take-it-or-leave-it offer, in conjunction with the size of private information, governs the split of the surplus.

## 5.7 Estimation

I estimate the model using non-linear least squares. The two-step selection process allows me to separate persistent unobserved profit differences from final-period profit shocks and other forces. Similar to the second step of Bajari et al. (2007), I minimize the deviation between predicted and observed outcomes for planning and for construction conditional on planning. Estimation is subject to the constraint that the predicted fraction of locations receiving applications equals the observed fraction.<sup>67</sup>

To allow for selection on the persistent component of profit that is unobserved to the econometrician, I simulate 150 bootstrap draws of  $\Pi_{l,\xi}, \Pi_{l,1}, \zeta_l$ , and  $V_l$  for each location to form an estimation set of locations  $\mathcal{L}$ .<sup>68</sup> For each  $l \in \mathcal{L}$  I denote the model prediction of selection into planning and construction as a function of the parameters  $\theta$  to be  $e_l(\theta)$  and  $c_l(\theta)$  respectively. I compare this to the observed decisions  $\mathbf{e}_l$  and  $\mathbf{c}_l$ .

<sup>67</sup>In principle without this constraint the estimator may converge to corner solutions that lead to only one site being applied for, where this site's construction status is correctly classified.

<sup>68</sup>In the negotiation estimation I also simulate  $\zeta_{l,d}$  and  $\Pi_{l,1,g}$

I then calculate the following mean squared errors

$$S_e(\theta) = \frac{\sum_{l \in \mathcal{L}} (\mathbf{e}_l - e_l(\theta))^2}{\sum_{l \in \mathcal{L}} 1}, \quad (20)$$

$$S_c(\theta) = \frac{\sum_{l \in \{l' \in \mathcal{L} : e_{l'}(\theta)\}} (\mathbf{c}_l - c_l(\theta))^2}{\sum_{l \in \{l' \in \mathcal{L} : e_{l'}(\theta)\}} 1}. \quad (21)$$

I also calculate the fraction of locations that are applied for as  $F_e(\theta) = \frac{\sum_{l \in \mathcal{L}} e_l(\theta)}{\sum_{l \in \mathcal{L}} 1}$ , which I can compare to  $\mathbf{F}_e = \frac{\sum_{l \in \mathcal{L}} \mathbf{e}_l}{\sum_{l \in \mathcal{L}} 1}$ . I estimate  $\theta$  as

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{\theta} &= \arg \min_{\theta} S_e(\theta) + S_c(\theta) \\ \text{s.t. } F_e(\theta) &= \mathbf{F}_e. \end{aligned} \quad (22)$$

To estimate the remaining parameters governing the negotiation process I take  $\hat{\theta}$  as given and estimate  $\hat{\rho}$ ,  $\hat{\eta}$ , and  $\hat{\mu}_c$  which represent the probability governing which group makes the take-it-or-leave-it offer, and the standard deviations of the signal about the final-period profit shock and cost shock that the other party observes.<sup>69</sup> I use simulation-based methods to approximate  $\mathbb{E}[\mathbb{V}_d | \mathbb{E}[C_l], \Pi_{l,0}]$  and  $\mathbb{E}[\mathbb{V}_c | \mathbb{E}[C_l], \Pi_{l,0}]$ . As before, I estimate the model via non-linear least squares identically as before. I conduct inference via a Bayesian bootstrap in which I re-weight each location.

## 5.8 Results and discussion

I present the most important parameter estimates below in Tables 2, with the additional parameters presented in Table A8. The estimated parameters shed light on the sources of market failure that lead to inefficient allocation. Below, I discuss and interpret the key estimates.

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<sup>69</sup>Estimating all parameters jointly is possible, however this approach has two benefits. The first is that model misspecification, as it pertains to bargaining, does not bias parameter estimates from the first step. The second is that when tax rates are exogenous, policy functions are solvable in closed form which allows for far more efficient numerical optimization.

Table 2: Key parameter estimates

**A. Estimates from Exogenous  $T_l$**

Parameter	Description	Value
$\zeta_0$	Externality: linear multiplier on cost	2.98 [2.98, -3.45]
$T_l$	Tax paid in tax regime	\$10.7M [10.4, 11.6]
$B_2$	Cost of blocking in last period	\$24.8M [20.9, 28.1]
$E$	Cost of planning and engineering	\$10.2M [10.0, 10.4]

**B. Estimates from Endogenous  $T_l$**

Parameter	Description	Value
$\rho$	Probability government offers	0.47
$\sqrt{(\eta^2\sigma^2) / (\eta^2 + \sigma^2)}$	SD of posterior of profit shock ( $\Pi_{1,l}$ )	\$22.7M

Note: Solved to rationalize dynamic discrete choices as a result of two threshold rules. Each “observation” is one of 82,563 locations in the continental US—with 150 simulated draws each. Confidence intervals are calculated from 42 Bayesian bootstrap iterations re-simulating and re-weighting each location.

**Cost on externalities**  $\zeta_0 = 2.98$ . I find that local governments trade off roughly one dollar of utility cost to households for about three dollars in tax revenue. This suggests that preference aggregation frictions in government decision-making are quantitatively meaningful. Local governments may place excess weight on the losses of directly affected household. This pattern is plausible if affected households exert greater political influence, for example by attending public hearings or meetings.

**Engineering cost**  $E = \$10.2$  million. The sunk cost is key for understanding how ignoring dynamics would bias parameter estimates in a static framework. Uncertainty about whether a local government will approve wind construction affects equilibrium entry decisions: developers invest less if they expect it to be more likely that they forfeit a large sunk cost. Without accounting for this channel, such strategic behavior would be misattributed to local governments’ preferences. The estimates also help to quantify hold-up risk in negotiation regimes, clarifying how expectations about the division of final-period surplus may reduce investment. The magnitude of the estimate is consistent with industry evidence. Firms report, in the popular press, that they spend around \$7 – 12 million engineering and planning (Goldstein, 2019). Likewise, a survey of utility-scale wind developers found average sunk costs of \$7.5 million (95% confidence interval of [\$4, \$11]) when projects were cancelled, based on 14 responding firms (Nilson et al., 2024).

**Tax cost**  $T_l = \$10.7$  million. In states without exemptions, property tax payments serve as the incentive that facilitates local government approval of wind projects with costlier local externalities. Based on estimates

from *System Advisory Model*, the total tax cost without depreciation would be between \$12 and \$18 million, assuming property tax rates of 1 to 1.5%, which are typical. Accounting for depreciation, the estimated amount is broadly consistent with expected tax costs. Moreover, this estimate is within the range of reported tax payments in local newspapers (Robledo, 2018; Benda, 2021).

**Probability government offers**  $\rho = 0.47$ . In roughly half of negotiations, the local government makes the take-it-or-leave-it offer. When the government makes the offer, developers anticipate greater hold-up risk, leading to more hesitation to incur the planning cost in the first place. This parameter governs the split of the surplus, net of sunk costs, between the government and the developer.

**SD of government knowledge of shock** \$22.7 million. The government's signal represents around 44% of the total variance of the developer's final-period profit shock. This estimate suggests two key features of government offers. First, the developer receives less information rent, so more of the surplus accrues to the government. Second, government knowledge allows offers to be better targeted, reducing negotiation failures relative to a benchmark where the government has no information about the final period profit shock.

**Do local governments' choices reflect information about heterogeneous costs to their residents?** In my model, governments allow wind farms to be built if and only if  $\zeta_l \mathbb{E}[C_l] + V_l T_l \geq -B_2$ . The coefficient  $\zeta_l$  can be systematically too large, but also can vary across localities. This local variation may represent idiosyncratic noise, which can be statistical error or genuine heterogeneity in government preferences. Alternatively, it may represent government information about heterogeneous household costs, a low draw of  $\zeta_l$  could indicate that the local government expects  $\mathbb{E}[C_l]$  to be smaller than the population mean. In Appendix D.7, I test whether  $\zeta_l$  is correlated with *actual* changes in home prices. For each eventually constructed location, I recover the posterior expectation of  $\zeta_l$  and estimate a heterogeneous difference-in-differences effect on home prices as a function of this posterior. I find that when  $\zeta_l$  is smaller, home prices decrease by a smaller amount, consistent with  $\zeta_l$  containing information about heterogeneous costs.

**Do developers negotiate with local governments or individuals?** Following Coase (1960), the canonical theory posits that developers could, in principle, negotiate transfer individually with all affected households.<sup>70</sup> In this paper, I model the developers as purchasing from an intermediary, the local government. This is supported by both anecdotal evidence and two reduced form patterns. In Appendix Figure A3 I find that the households within one mile of a wind farm experience much smaller price declines than those one to two miles away, likely because only those closest households receive direct payments through land leases or other compensation. In Appendix Figure A22 I re-estimate the effect of tax vs. exemption border effects by the number of homes. I find that the estimated benefits of tax exemption, as in Column 2 of Table 1, are only positive for one and two homes, turning negative once three or more homes are nearby, as in

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<sup>70</sup>Haghpanah et al. (2024) show that when buying a single item, in this case permission to build a wind farm, from multiple sellers, the optimal mechanism reflects a weighted average of the sellers' virtual valuations. Given the estimated variance of household preferences in Figure 5, these virtual values may be substantially greater than the mean preference.

Column 1 of 1. Suggestively, when as few as three households are involved, it becomes preferable for developers to pay a property taxes to the local government, rather than negotiate individually with residents.

## 6 Alternative market designs

In this section, I compare existing markets and alternative market designs in reaching the state-specific wind capacity goals outlined in the net-zero America plans of Larson et al. (2020), shown in Appendix Figure A26. For each market, I calibrate a state-specific subsidy for wind farms to ensure that aggregate capacity meets the targeted quantities.<sup>71</sup>

### 6.1 Alternative markets

**Benchmark (Net-zero plan).** The proposed wind farm sites in (Larson et al., 2020) may not be fully achievable given local governments' decisions. However, if built as planned, residents would face a cost of around \$50 billion.

**First best spatial allocation.** I consider a first best allocation, which is infeasible given private information. This allocation features efficient engineering and investment incentives and construction that only occurs when doing so is socially optimal. It could be implemented if each location reported, and was paid, its exact willingness-to-accept a wind farm. The resulting posted prices would guide investment decisions.

**Existing tax rules.** I compare the three status quo tax rules, which are the existing market designs.

**Expected externality taxes.** I consider a posted price, or tax, equal to the expected cost to households. In this setting, I set  $T_l = \bar{\omega} \cdot P_l$ . I maintain political-economy aggregation frictions.

**Overpayment of expected externality.** Due to the aggregation frictions (wherein  $\zeta_0 > 1$ ) it may be preferable from a social welfare perspective to have developers over-pay the expected externality to ensure that the local governments allow construction. I multiply the expected externality by around 2.5 such that  $T_l = \frac{1}{5}P_l$ .

**Up-front negotiation.** Hold-up risk in negotiation occurs due to the timing of contracting after the investment cost is sunk. This timing also has some efficiency benefits because it is after the realization of the final-period profit shock. I consider a mechanism where the developer buys a permit before realizing their final-period profit shocks. In this, negotiation occurs after the local government learns their idiosyncratic cost from wind farm entry. The government may commit to blocking wind farms if there is no contract, which leads wind developers to only proceed if bargaining succeeds. I derive the updated policy functions in Section D.4.

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<sup>71</sup>This allows me to compare the efficiency of siting under these rules, without taking a stance on the social value of carbon emissions abatement or the general equilibrium effects of decarbonizing the energy section, both of which are outside of my model.

## 6.2 Social welfare

To calculate the total social welfare I consider the impacts on the following groups.

**Developers.** The net value to a developer of a market is their realized profits net of the forfeited sunk costs which can be described as

$$SV_m^D = \sum_{l \in B_m} \Pi_l - T_{l,m} + S_{s(l),m} - \sum_{l \in E_m \setminus B_m} E, \quad (23)$$

where  $B_m$  and  $E_m$  are the sets of locations that are constructed and engineered in market  $m$ ,  $T_{l,m}$  is the transfer in location  $l$  in this market, and  $S_{s(l),m}$  is the subsidy from the federal government.

**Local communities.** The total value to local communities is the cost to affected households plus the value of the tax revenue, net of any blocking costs,

$$SV_m^C = \sum_{l \in B_m} \left( V_l T_{l,m} + \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}(l)} \omega_i V_l \right) - \sum_{l \in E_m \setminus B_m} B_2. \quad (24)$$

I allow for the governments'  $\zeta_l$  to partially represent heterogeneity in the costs to households, consistent my findings find in Appendix D.7.<sup>72</sup>

**Government.** The cost to the government is the total paid out subsidy times the marginal cost of public funds. In the baseline setup I choose a conservative MCPF of  $\mu = 10\%$ , however the differences between markets becomes more stark with higher values of MCPF. The cost can be represented as

$$SV_m^G = -(1 + \mu) \sum_{l \in B_m} S_{s(l),m} \quad (25)$$

## 6.3 Results

I compare the net social values of alternative market designs to that under the status quo property tax regime. In this regime, successful construction yields approximately \$1.4T in profit to developers. However, achieving the net-zero plan's roughly tenfold expansion of U.S. wind capacity would require \$3.6T in subsidies. In this case, the total cost of visual disamenities to households is around \$52B. Panel A of Figure 10 presents the total value of each market, net of the profits and subsidy cost from the tax regime, and Panel B decomposes these values by channel. Moving all states to this simple flat tax payment increases social welfare by \$125B relative to the existing payment rules.

When developers pay the existing flat taxes, local governments receive roughly \$210B in tax revenue.

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<sup>72</sup>I set  $\sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}(l)} \omega_i V_l = (\mathbb{E}[\omega_i] + 0.761(\zeta_l - \zeta_0)) \cdot \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}(l)} V_l$ . This re-scales the difference between the idiosyncratic value  $\zeta_l$  and the actual household cost to be centered around the true distribution of  $\omega_i$  from Section 4.4.2, where the deviation from this corresponds to the relationship between the posteriors of  $\zeta_l$  and home price changes estimated in Appendix D.7.

Although nearby households may be worse off, this appears to benefit the local communities overall. This is consistent with the findings in Appendix Figure A24, which show that beyond approximately five miles from the nearest turbine, wind farm entry leads to increased home prices. The costs of blocking are small, only around \$4B, because both taxes are high and developers generally avoid entering locations that are likely to block them.

I next compare the property tax regime to the two existing tax regimes: exemption and negotiation. I find that exemption, though benefiting from some Harberger-style efficiency by not taxing developers, yields a net social value around \$220B lower than the property tax regime. The profitability of selected sites, net of subsidies, is around \$1.25T lower, suggesting that when developers cannot pay taxes they are forced to select less productive sites. In this setting, households are subject to around \$13B less in visual disamenity, but receive no offsetting value from tax revenue. Consistent with this, home prices decline by more when wind farms are built in the exemption states, as shown in Appendix Figures A24 and A23.

When developers can negotiate, they anticipate hold-up risk from local communities. As a result, they require much larger subsidies before they are willing to enter. Despite these higher subsidies, the realized profits are about \$675B lower, because local governments capture much of the surplus when they make a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ offer. This generates substantial revenues for local communities. However, this represents a costly form of intra-governmental redistribution, effectively transferring money to local governments through an inefficient channel of developers’ payments. On net, social welfare under negotiation is roughly \$120B lower than paying flat property taxes.


Up-front negotiation can mitigate the existing hold-up risk. Currently, payments are negotiated only after the wind developer has invested around \$10 million in planning and engineering. I consider a regime in which payments are negotiated after local governments learn their idiosyncratic costs but before developers plan. This results in a social value roughly \$10 billion greater than the status quo fixed taxes. However, substantial information rents on both sides continue to distort the spatial allocation of wind farms, leading to only a modest welfare improvement relative to the status quo property tax regime.

A Pigouvian-style solution would require developers to pay an amount equal to the expected cost to households from the wind farm in a given location. This approach targets observable differences in the value of exposed homes. However, due to the political economy frictions this policy yields a social value around \$5 billion lower than the status quo tax regime. Since local governments trade off around \$3 of tax revenue with \$1 of externalities. An alternative payment scheme—paying 20% of the value of nearby homes, or about 2.5 times the expected externality—leaves the local governments close to indifferent to wind farm entry. On net, this design yields a social value roughly \$75B higher than under status quo fixed taxes.

I compare all regimes to an infeasible first-best without private information, where developers can perfectly observe and contract on payments equal to the exact costs to local communities prior to deciding

whether to invest. This unattainable benchmark yields a social value roughly \$100B higher than the simple property tax regime. However, much of this improvement can be achieved by allowing developers to pay 20% of the value of nearby homes. This captures about 75% of the gains of moving from a lump-sum property tax to the first best, and roughly 90% of the gains relative to current laws.

Figure 10: Social welfare under alternative market designs



Note: Profits and cost of public funds are relative to the tax regime, which are \$1.39T and -\$3.55T respectively. Calculated with government subsidy to producers to match state-by-state generation targets. Marginal cost of public funds is 10%.

## 7 Conclusion

The success of the U.S. green transition depends on its ability to build renewable energy. Wind development is a classic locally undesirable land use, where the emissions benefits are global, but the local costs are

borne by nearby households. I show that despite large local disamenities, the current pattern of wind farm development deviates from a Coasian benchmark, trading off over seven dollars of profit for each dollar of externality. Using variation in state rules governing developers' tax payments to local governments, I find that much of this inefficiency stems from incomplete contracting opportunities created by regulation.

I model the “*Not in my backyard*” or *NIMBY* problem by considering local governments as strategic actors deciding which projects to approve. I develop a nonparametric discrete choice approach to measure households’ costs from living near wind farms. The observed distribution of wind farms is socially inefficient, with too *few* built near households. I find that local governments trade off around three dollars of revenue for each one dollar of cost to their constituents. Despite this, in many cases wind farms are not built due to lack of incentives to allow. Without compensation, communities have little reason to permit wind development, and developers are often constrained from offering such payments.

I then compare existing and alternative policy regimes governing how developers compensate local governments. Two policies intended to encourage wind development, that changed how developers can compensate local governments, both inadvertently reduced the number of built projects. When developers are exempted from local taxes, local governments lack incentive to allow them to build. When developers may negotiate payments, hold-up risk leads to decreased investment. A simple alternative, linking developer payments to the value of nearby homes, better aligns incentives and increases social welfare.

Overall, I show that local governments respond to fiscal incentives and that inefficient siting reflects contractual constraints in addition to preference aggregation frictions. Policies that permit well-targeted payments to local governments can expand renewable energy at no additional subsidy cost by alleviating these contracting frictions.

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
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## A Appendix

### A.1 Appendix Figures and Tables

Figure A1: Engineering profits and constructed wind farms




Note: Red dots are built windmills. Present discounted profit calculated using NREL SAM using inferred PPA prices, inclusive of PTC. Likelihood of construction estimated using a probit including only engineering profitability and Census region fixed effects.

Table A1: Home values and construction likelihood

Dependent Variable:	Built		
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Variables</i>			
Home Value (\$B)	-1.51 (0.544)	-2.43 (0.698)	-1.52 (0.707)
<i>Fixed-effects</i>			
State	Yes		
County		Yes	
Census Region			Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>			
Observations	71,651	15,942	82,563
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.09602	0.20128	0.03405

Note: These are estimated as a probit. The value of homes within five miles is from a hedonic price index calculated from CoreLogic data.

Figure A2: Profitability of selected sites and home values: Different residualizations




Note: The value of homes within five miles is calculated from a hedonic price index using CoreLogic data. The profitability of a site is calculated using NREL's *System Advisory Model*, residualized by Census Region or un-residualized in Panels (A) and (B) respectively. Presented as a bin-scatter with 30 bins. Baseline rate of construction is 2.0%.

Table A2: Characteristics of homes transacted within 10 miles of a built wind farm

<i>Variable</i>	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	N
Sale Price (\$)	175,024	176,245	15,000	3,000,000	300,570
Distance from first turbine (mi)	6.819	2.369	0.026	10.000	300,570
Wind farm application year	2009.644	2.519	2004	2015	300,570
Sale year	2008.012	4.789	2000	2019	300,570
Age (years)	42.887	32.248	0	100	293,090
Bedrooms	3.183	1.017	1	50	300,570
Bathrooms	2.087	1.073	1	136	293,090
Acres	1.540	6.388	0.001	99.910	300,570
Square-feet	1,809.461	1,301.186	1	526,968	300,570


Note: Data from CoreLogic. Due to potential data entry issues regarding of price, bedrooms, bathrooms, acres, and square-feet I winsorize at 2.5% and 97.5% for all price effect estimation.

Figure A3: Price effects by distance from turbine




Note: Home price effect is estimated by comparing homes near turbines to homes near turbines that are treated later. Using matched controls of homes who will have a nearby farm built five to ten years after. As an institutional detail, many of the homes within 1 mile are receiving either lease or “good neighbor” payments from wind developers that are tied to the deed of the home.

Figure A4: Effects of wind farm entry on home sales




Note: Left dashed line is approximate timing of signing leases with landowners. Right dashed line is approximate timing of construction. Sample are all locations that ever had a wind farm proposed. [Sun and Abraham \(2021\)](#) difference-in-differences specification with year-county and event fixed effects.

Figure A5: Profitability of selected sites and expected externality



Note: The value of homes within 5 miles is calculated from a hedonic price index using CoreLogic data and multiplied by  $\mathbb{E}[\omega_i]$  from Section 4. The profitability of a site is calculated using NREL's *System Advisory Model*, residualized by state. Presented as a bin-scatter with 30 bins. The baseline rate of construction is 2.0%.

Figure A6: Heat map of probability of construction by profit and externality




Note: Green and red lines represent the threshold at which the likelihood of construction is 5%. The green line is a Coasian benchmark, fitting the size of the unobservable component of profit in locations with externalities equal to zero by a probit and mapping that threshold under a Coasian benchmark. The red line is the actual threshold fitting a probit in the full sample controlling for profit and expected externality separately.


Figure A7: Illustration of how the shape of demand curves affect price and re-sorting

### Initial Distribution of $v_{i,1}$



#### A. Balanced Demand & Homogeneous $\omega_i$





#### Distribution of $v_{i,1} + \omega_i$ & Price $\Delta$



#### B. Balanced Demand & Heterogeneous $\omega_i$



#### C. More price elastic in-migrants & Heterogeneous $\omega_i$




Note: In the first row, with homogeneous preferences, the price change is equal to the average preference and no households move in response. In the second row, the price change is equal to the average preference. In the third row, due to the shape of demand and preference heterogeneity, the price change does not equal the average preference. The posterior distribution of the ovals is identical in the second and third rows, however the equilibrium price change is smaller in magnitude in the third row so 20% and 30% of households move in response to the wind farm entry in the second and third rows respectively.

Table A3: Price instruments first stage

Dependent Variables:	Count of homes sold in 2 nearest tracts	$\log(p_{d,t})$
Model:	(1)	(2)
<i>Variables</i>		
$Z_{d,t}^1$	0.5436	-0.0047
(SSDMF 2 nearest deaths)	(0.0421)	(0.0012)
$Z_{d,t}^2$	0.3907	-0.0023
(CDC 75+ death shift-share)	(0.0784)	(0.0018)
$\tilde{x}_{d,t}^{SS}$	-0.0144	0.0007
(SSDMF own-tract deaths)	(0.0061)	(0.0001)
$C_{d,t}$	319.1609	4.0182
(Tract elderly exposure)	(86.5410)	(1.9089)
<i>Fixed-effects</i>		
Tract	Yes	Yes
Year × state	Yes	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>		
Observations	573,436	573,421
R <sup>2</sup>	0.744	0.807
First stage F-statistic (KP)		48.6


Note: Exact formulations for all included and excluded instruments in 4.3.1. Standard errors are clustered at the Census tract level. First stage Kleinberg-Paap F-statistic is for 1 block-bootstrap sample (2,500 origin tracts), clustered at the origin-destination level. Column (2) additionally contains controls for average home characteristics. With no repeated observations, as in the above regression, the first stage F-statistic is 15.7.

Figure A8: Distribution of number of homes sold in each census tract per year




Note: I present the histogram, pooling all counts of 75 or more. The vertical dashed lines represent the inter-quartile range, and the solid vertical line represents the median. For the median tract, 1 additional home sale would represent a 4.8% increase in supply.

Figure A9: Histogram of death instrument values



Note: Panel A presents a histogram of the count of deaths in each tract. Panel B presents  $\tilde{x}_{d,t}^{SS}$  as described in Section 4.3.1, interacting the number of deaths in Panel A with the pre-period share.

Figure A10: Histogram of estimated own-price elasticities of all census tracts




Note: Histogram of the own-price elasticity of all sample tracts, evaluated at the central estimates of  $\hat{\alpha}_0$  and  $\hat{\alpha}_I$ .

Table A4: Sensitivity of parameter estimates to smoothing parameters

Dependent Variables:	$\left[ \log\left(\frac{N_t^o s_{d,t}^o + \epsilon_l}{N_t^o}\right) + \log\left(\frac{N_t^o s_{d,t}^o + \epsilon_u}{N_t^o}\right) \right] / 2$	$\log(s_{d,t}^o)$	$\log(s_{d,t}^o + 10^{-8})$	$\log(s_{d,t}^o + 10^{-7})$	
(All - $\log(s_{oo,t}^o)$ )					
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Variables</i>					
$\log(p_{d,t})$	-3.502 (0.415)	-0.027 (0.003)	-0.301 (0.235)	-2.339 (0.309)	-1.805 (0.241)
$\log(p_{d,t}) \times I^o$	0.897 (0.426)	-0.004 (0.003)	0.099 (0.308)	0.678 (0.324)	0.528 (0.252)
Deaths (SSDMF)	0.002 (0.000)	0.002 (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)	0.002 (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)
$C_{d,t}$	15.898 (3.477)	0.659 (2.556)	3.320 (2.105)	10.212 (2.566)	7.721 (1.993)
% old	5.008 (0.515)	0.889 (0.122)	0.711 (0.171)	3.435 (0.384)	2.662 (0.299)
Acres	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Square-feet	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Bedrooms	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
# of units	0.838 (0.101)	0.010 (0.006)	0.079 (0.060)	0.560 (0.075)	0.433 (0.059)
<i>Fixed-effects</i>					
Origin $\times$ destination tract	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Origin $\times$ year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State $\times$ year $\times$ move	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>					
Observations	20,696,948	20,696,948	2,745,126	20,696,948	20,696,948
R <sup>2</sup>	0.333	0.387	0.896	0.322	0.338
Within R <sup>2</sup>	-0.087	0.000	-0.042	-0.080	-0.079

Note: I present a variety of linear specifications for the [Berry \(1994\)](#) inversion to estimate preferences—particularly as they relate to  $\log(p_{d,t})$ . In Columns (1) and (2) I present a targeting of the average of the bounds as described in [Section 4.4.1](#) from [Gandhi et al. \(2023\)](#). In Column (1) I instrument for  $\log(p_{d,t})$  and in Column (2) I present the OLS estimates. While linear IV differs from the discretization described in [Section 4.4.1](#), however it demonstrates the overall importance of including instruments for price. In Columns (3), (4), and (5) I show how different smoothing of the shares affects elasticity estimates. Standard errors are clustered at the origin-destination level.


Figure A11: Relationship between outside demand and the ex-ante fraction of in-migrants




Note: Each point is an eventually treated census tract evaluated for the three years prior to wind farm entry. The  $R^2$  of a rank-rank regression is 0.11.

Figure A12: Demand curves of eventually treated locations

**A. 10th percentile of outside demand**



**B. 90th percentile of outside demand**




Note: In the solid black lines I present the total demand curves. The total demand can be decomposed as the demand from incumbents, in the blue dashed lines, and in-migrants, in the red dashed lines. The grey horizontal line represents the market-clearing quantity. These are the estimated demand curves for two eventually treated locations using the three years of demand data prior to wind farm entry.

Table A5: Factors related to higher outside demand

Dependent Variable:	Out-demand, $\iota$		
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Variables</i>			
Travel time	0.010 (0.001)	0.005 (0.002)	0.005 (0.002)
Fraction in-migrants	0.006 (0.001)	0.008 (0.002)	0.008 (0.002)
% poverty	-0.003 (0.001)	-0.005 (0.001)	-0.004 (0.001)
% professional	0.004 (0.001)	0.0009 (0.001)	-0.0006 (0.001)
Median age	-0.005 (0.001)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
<i>Fixed-effects</i>			
State	Yes		
County	Yes		
<i>Fit statistics</i>			
Observations	417	417	417
R <sup>2</sup>	0.33673	0.65157	0.79123


Note: OLS regressions relating variables from the 2010 ACS, other than the fraction of in-migrants from Infutor, to the model-implied measure of  $\iota$  for each eventually treated location. X variables are all in z-scores within the eventually treated sample.

Figure A13: Effects of wind farm entry on home values by outside demand




Note: Consider treated homes between 1 and 4 miles of the first wind farm. Control group is homes near turbines that are treated 5 – 10 later at the same level of outside demand. Control for: census tract, year, and county  $\times$  3 year bin FE, log of acreage, bedrooms, bathrooms, age, and square-feet. SE clustered by stack  $\times$  tract  $\times$  treatment  $\times$  demand bin. Upper SEs cropped at 0.6 for legibility. The results in Section 4 rely on difference-in-difference estimates, averaging across pre and post periods.

Figure A14: Effect of wind farms on price by pre-period in-migrants




Note: Home price effects is estimated by comparing homes near turbines to homes near turbines that are treated between five and ten years after, but have not been treated yet, controlling for age, acreage, bedrooms, baths, census tract, county  $\times$  3-year bin, and year. Estimated as a stacked difference-in-differences estimator jointly. Fraction of in-migrants is defined to be the population normalized share that were not living in that tract in the three years prior to wind entry.

Figure A15: Net social value and constructed wind farms




Note: Red dots are built windmills. Present discounted profit calculated using NREL *System Advisory Model* using inferred PPA prices, inclusive of PTC. Social value is profit net of  $-0.0754 \times P_l$ .

Figure A16: Map of local tax treatments




Note: Windmill location from *LBNL*. Red dots are windmills. Tax rules from Uebelhor et al. (2021). This is a simple bucketing abstracting away from substantial within-rule heterogeneity.

Figure A17: Sample of potential sites along borders



Note: Windmill location from *LBNL Hoen et al. (2018)*. Profit using engineering estimates. Points shown are < 25 miles from a state border with another local tax regime.

Figure A18: Border RDD effects of tax rule on existence ( $\leq 1$  house within 5 mi)



Note: I present the Loess local polynomial at borders where the law changes as depicted. I residualize controlling for engineering profitability and include border FE. I exclude Texas since Electricity Reliability Council of Texas constitutes a distinct electricity market. I subset to only locations with one or fewer homes within 745 miles.

Table A6: Border effects of tax rule on wind farm existence: Alternative specifications

Dependent Variable:	Wind farm exists						
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>Variables</i>							
Negotiation relative to Tax	-0.028 (0.005)	-0.029 (0.005)	-0.019 (0.008)	-0.024 (0.003)	-0.032 (0.004)	-0.033 (0.005)	-0.032 (0.005)
Exemption relative to Tax	-0.056 (0.004)	-0.056 (0.004)	-0.053 (0.005)	-0.044 (0.004)	-0.055 (0.004)	-0.041 (0.005)	-0.032 (0.005)
<i>Fixed-effects</i>							
Border	Yes						
<i>Controls</i>							
Engineering profitability	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
RPS & RPS amount			Yes				
Distance to border by rule (d.f. #)	5	5	5	3	4	6	7
<i>Fit statistics</i>							
Observations	5,593	5,593	5,593	5,593	5,593	5,593	5,593
R <sup>2</sup>	0.03055	0.02953	0.03174	0.02939	0.03004	0.03205	0.03240


Note: Standard errors clustered at the rule level. Tax rules from [Uebelhor et al. \(2021\)](#).

 Table A7: Border effects of tax rule on wind farm existence: Alternative specifications ( $\leq 1$  home)

Dependent Variable:	Wind farm exists						
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>Variables</i>							
Negotiation relative to Tax	0.015 (0.003)	0.018 (0.003)	0.019 (0.003)	0.013 (0.0007)	0.007 (0.0009)	0.018 (0.004)	0.025 (0.003)
Exemption relative to Tax	0.053 (0.002)	0.053 (0.002)	0.058 (0.003)	0.062 (0.002)	0.048 (0.002)	0.066 (0.003)	0.085 (0.003)
<i>Fixed-effects</i>							
Border	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Controls</i>							
Engineering profitability	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
RPS & RPS amount			Yes				
Distance to border by rule (d.f. #)	5	5	5	3	4	6	7
<i>Fit statistics</i>							
Observations	1,683	1,683	1,683	1,683	1,683	1,683	1,683
R <sup>2</sup>	0.05065	0.04957	0.05195	0.04961	0.05022	0.05131	0.05327


Note: Standard errors clustered at the rule level. Tax rules from [Uebelhor et al. \(2021\)](#).

Figure A19: Balance of profit at borders




Note: I present the Loess local polynomial at borders where the law changes as depicted. I exclude Texas since Electricity Reliability Council of Texas constitutes a distinct electricity market.

Figure A20: Balance of the number of houses within 5 miles at borders




Note: I present the Loess local polynomial at borders where the law changes as depicted. I exclude Texas since the Electricity Reliability Council of Texas constitutes a distinct electricity market.

Figure A21: Relationship of likelihood of construction to distance from border




Note: Estimated likelihood of wind farm construction as a function of the distance from the border. Estimated as a Loess local polynomial. River border classification [here](#).

Figure A22: Border effect of exemption vs. tax by number of nearby homes




Note: Estimated differential likelihood of wind farm construction by bin of number of homes within 5 miles, controlling for engineering profitability, distance from border (with a 5 d.f. spline), and border FE. Sample includes only the borders from Figure A17 where one side is tax and the other exemption.

Figure A23: Price effects by tax regime



Note: Compares the total revenue on home transaction prices comparing to not-yet-treated homes in same tax regime using (Callaway and Sant'Anna, 2021) repeated cross-section estimator with census tract fixed effect considering homes within five miles of an eventual turbine. No additional controls.

Figure A24: Effects of wind farm entry on property values by distance and tax rule




Note: Control group is homes near turbines that are treated 5 to 10 years later than treatment. Estimated as  $\log(p_{i,t}) = \sum_D (\tau_D \cdot B_{i,t} + \alpha_D \cdot T_{i,t} + \rho_D) \cdot \mathbb{I}\{D_i = D\} + \sum_R (\tau_R \cdot B_{i,t} + \alpha_R \cdot T_{i,t}) \cdot \mathbb{I}\{R_i = R\} + \beta X_i + \gamma_{c(i)} + \phi_t + \mu_{C(i), g(t)} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$ , where there is an additive shifter for the treatment effect by rule. Control for logged characteristics of the home, census tract FE, year FE, and 3 year bin  $\times$  county FE.

Table A8: Additional parameter estimates

Parameter	Description	Value
$\nu$	Value of taxes SD	0.054
$\mu$	Cost of externality SD	0.145
$\sigma$	Profit shock after approach SD	\$46.7M
$\sigma_\varepsilon$	Persistent unobserved profit shock SD	\$51.7M
$B_1$	Cost of blocking initially	\$16.5M
$e$	Cost of approaching	\$2.51M
$\beta_{\text{NE}}$	Northeast FE	\$37M
$\beta_{\text{MW}}$	Midwest FE	-\$16M
$\beta_{\text{S}}$	South FE	-\$20M
$\beta_{\text{W}}$	West FE	-\$94M
$\beta_1$	Slope of ag. profit / acre in profit	$-2.27 \times 10^5$
$\beta_2$	FE of RPS in profit	\$3.7M
$\beta_3$	Slope of RPS $\times$ RPS amount in profit	$4.8 \times 10^5$
$\eta$	SD of profit shock signal ( $\Pi_{1,l}$ )	\$25.3M
$\mu_c$	SD of cost shock signal shock signal ( $c_{1,l}$ )	1.42


Note: Solved to rationalize dynamic discrete choices as a result of two threshold rules. Each observation is one of 82,563 locations in the continental US—with 150 simulated draws each. Confidence intervals are calculated from 42 Bayesian bootstrap iterations re-weighting each location.

Figure A25: Relationship of entry margins & key covariates across regimes



Note: This figure plots three margins of entry. Panel (A) present probit coefficient estimates on a farm ever being built. Panel (B) presents probit coefficient estimates on a farm ever being applied for. Panel (C) presents probit coefficient estimates on a farm being built conditional on it being applied for. Excluded covariates here include the engineering measures of profitability, an indicator for whether the state has a renewable portfolio standard, as well as the stringency of that RPS, and the per acre profit in the relevant agricultural district. The blue “overall” coefficient is relative to the listed tax.

Figure A26: Planned wind farm sites from Net-Zero-America



Note: Blue dots are planned locations for wind farms from Princeton Net-Zero America Project (Larson et al., 2020). Windmill locations from LBNL (Hoen et al., 2018).

## A.2 Proof of Proposition 2

*Proof.* I begin by noting that for some  $\Delta p$  and some household  $i$  such that  $v_{i,d}$ ,  $i$  will live in  $d$  if and only if  $v_{i,d} + \omega_i - \Delta p \geq 0$  which has a probability of  $1 - W(-x + \Delta p)$ . I note that the market clearing condition can be transformed into one in which the mass of in-migrants, households  $i$  where  $v_{i,d} < 0$  and  $v_{i,d} + \omega_i + \Delta p \geq 0$ , is equal to the mass of out-migrants. This implies the following market clearing condition

$$\int_{-\infty}^0 v(x) \cdot [1 - W(-x + \Delta p)] dx = \int_0^\infty v(x) \cdot W(-x + \Delta p) dx, \quad (26)$$

Consider the case where

$$\int_{-\infty}^0 v(x) \cdot [1 - W(-x + \mathbb{E}[W])] dx > \int_0^\infty v(x) \cdot W(-x + \mathbb{E}[W]) dx \quad (27)$$

Since  $W$  is a CDF,  $W(-x + \Delta p)$  and  $1 - W(-x + \Delta p)$  are monotonically increasing and decreasing in  $\Delta p$  respectively. If  $v(x) > 0$  is non-zero everywhere and there is a  $\Delta p$  where then  $\Delta p > \mathbb{E}[W]$ . The opposite holds when the inequality is reversed, by symmetry. If the two are equal,  $\Delta p = \mathbb{E}[W]$  mechanically.  $\square$

## A.3 Proof of Proposition 1

**Assumption 1.** For all households  $i$ , their value for some additive component  $W$  is independent and identically distributed.

**Assumption 2.** For the distribution  $W$ , the tails are regularly decaying (either polynomial, moderate exponential, or bounded at the tails)

**Proposition 1.** Suppose that for every household  $v_{i,g}^w = v_i + w_i$  where  $v_i$  is drawn from some known distribution  $V_{i,g}$  and  $w$  is drawn from some distribution  $W$  in a manner that Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied. Consider a series  $\{p_i, V_{i,1}, V_{i,2}, F_{V_{i,1}}(p_i), F_{V_{i,2}}(p_i)\}$  where  $p_i$  is some real value within the supports of  $V_{i,g} + W$ ,  $V_{i,1}$  and  $V_{i,2}$  are known smooth distributions with regularly decaying tails, and  $F_{V_{i,1}+W}(p_i)$  and  $F_{V_{i,2}+W}(p_i)$  are observations of the respective  $V_{i,g} + W$ 's cumulative density function at  $p_i$ . If  $\{p_i\}$  spans some subspace of the relevant supports then the distribution  $W$  is uniquely identified.

*Proof.* I can describe the CDFs as follows

$$F_{V_{i,1}+W}(p_i) = \int_{-\infty}^{p_i} F_{V_{i,1}}(p_i - w) f_W(w) dw, \quad (28)$$

$$F_{V_{i,2}+W}(p_i) = \int_{-\infty}^{p_i} F_{V_{i,2}}(p_i - w) f_W(w) dw. \quad (29)$$

I can thus differentiate both sides to get the PDFs

$$f_{V_{i,1}+W}(p_i) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f_{V_{i,1}}(p_i - w) f_W(w) dw, \quad (30)$$

$$f_{V_{i,2}+W}(p_i) = \int_{-\infty}^{p_i} f_{V_{i,2}}(p_i - w) f_W(w) dw. \quad (31)$$

This is a convolution of  $f_{V_{i,g}}$  and  $f_W$ , which can then be expressed as linear equations involving the convolution operator. Take the Fourier transform of both sides of the convolution equations, which will be the product of the individual Fourier transforms:

$$\mathcal{F}[V_{i,1} + W](\omega) = \mathcal{F}[f_{V_{i,1}}](\omega) \cdot \mathcal{F}[f_W](\omega), \quad (32)$$

$$\mathcal{F}[V_{i,2} + W](\omega) = \mathcal{F}[f_{V_{i,2}}](\omega) \cdot \mathcal{F}[f_W](\omega). \quad (33)$$

Since both  $V_{i,1}$  and  $V_{i,2}$  are smooth and regularly decaying it must be the case that both  $\mathcal{F}[f_{V_{i,1}}](\omega)$  and  $\mathcal{F}[f_{V_{i,2}}](\omega)$  are invertible. I find that

$$\mathcal{F}[f_W](\omega) = \frac{\mathcal{F}[V_{i,1} + W](\omega)}{\mathcal{F}[f_{V_{i,1}}](\omega)} = \frac{\mathcal{F}[V_{i,2} + W](\omega)}{\mathcal{F}[f_{V_{i,2}}](\omega)}. \quad (34)$$

Thus  $f_W$  is identified by taking the inverse Fourier transform of  $\mathcal{F}[f_W](\omega)$  using either of the above ratios equivalently. The regularly decaying tails of  $W$  guarantee that the inversion is valid and unique.  $\square$

## B Data construction and supplemental analyses

### B.1 Inferring prices for untransacted homes

For two main inputs, I require a measure of the price at which a home would transact, even for homes that do not transact in that period. The first is to measure the value of homes exposed if a given location is built upon. The second is to measure the price of households of staying in their own homes in the residential demand module. I fit the following linear price model on over 80 million observations of home sales:

$$\log(p_{i,t}) = \beta_{c(i)}^{(1)} X_i + \phi_{r(i)} + \nu_{c(i),t} + \beta_{s(i),t}^{(2)} X_i + \xi_i + \varepsilon_{i,t}. \quad (35)$$

Here, I consider some property  $i$  at time  $t$  where  $X_i$  is a vector of logged characteristics of the property  $i$  (acres, bedrooms, bathrooms, square-feet, and the number of units).  $\beta_{c(i)}^{(1)}$  and  $\beta_{s(i),t}^{(2)}$  are county and state  $\times$  year specific estimates of the relationship between these characteristics and price.  $\phi_{r(i)}$  is a Census tract

fixed effect and  $\nu_{c(i),t}$  is a county  $\times$  year fixed effect.  $\xi_i$  is an unobserved persistent quality component. This regression has an  $R^2$  of around 0.69.

I fit a predicted price for each home in 2019 using this model. I recover, for all properties where it is possible, the  $\xi_i$  at the most recent transaction as a residual—and hold this fixed in the prediction.<sup>73</sup> If there is not a prior transaction, I assume  $\xi_i = 0$ .

## B.2 Engineering profitability

Throughout, I consider a model wind farm that contains 80 1.5 MW turbines connecting to the grid at 130 kV in a standard design.

**Wind production.** The function  $\rho$ , which wind resources to output power is determined by a known engineering function given a farm's design and turbine characteristics. I use the standard, as of 2020, farm design and turbine characteristics, and use the functionality from NREL's System Advisory Model to convert the wind resource to hourly production, as can be described in more detail in [Freeman et al. \(2014\)](#). This accounts for heterogeneous wake effects given the direction of the wind, non-linearities in production at different wind speeds, and differential productivity given the direction and atmospheric pressure. To my knowledge, this is the state of the art publicly available model of the production function of wind farms.

**Contracted prices.** I abstract away from the price-setting process, and model  $p_s^*$  to be determined as a function of current locational marginal prices, the curve of expected future locational marginal prices, and state policy. In Section B.3 I describe the estimation of  $p_s^*$  in more detail.

**Costs.** I use the average fixed cost of construction, excluding interconnection and road construction, as  $\hat{C}$ , sourced from NREL reports using proprietary industry information. The engineers at NREL, as part of their LandBOSSE project in [Eberle et al. \(2019\)](#), propose a relationship between distance to interconnection and cost to be

$$\hat{I}(\delta_{g,s}) = (1,176V + 218,257)\delta_{g,s}^{0.8937}, \quad (36)$$

where  $V$  is the voltage based on their independent analysis of industry data. The same project produces estimates of the cost to build new roads, as  $\hat{R}(\delta_{r,s})$ . These costs are not readily expressed in closed form but includes variable cost of stockpiling topsoil, compacting shoulders, acquiring materials, and laying new road as a function of distance from existing roads. Additionally, I allow for the marginal cost to vary based on the amount of energy that is produced, and calibrate it to be \$11.5 per MWh as in [Stehly and Duffy \(n.d.\)](#), from a survey of wind industry experts from [Wiser et al. \(2019\)](#).

**Combining.** I use the industry standards costs of capital, as well as relevant payroll and corporate income tax rates, and the default NREL discount rate of  $\delta = 0.94$ . Given the differential timing of costs and revenues, I use this to combine all of these dollar values into a true profit  $\hat{\Pi}_s$ .

**Missing information.** I model the exogenous engineering fundamentals that affect site-specific profitability. However, this does not account for either the land lease costs, state-by-state variation in aggregate permitting ease, state-by-state variation in implicit subsidies for renewable energy from renewable portfolio standards, or the effect of nearby homes on entry decisions.

## B.3 PPA prices


In general, wind developers sign power purchase agreements with off-takers of this energy, the most common of whom are utilities. These contracts tend to extend for the useful lifetime of the project. Anecdotally, the long-term nature of this contract is crucial in securing financing for the project. These contracts make the future cash flows to the developers only unpredictable insofar that there may be variation in maintenance

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<sup>73</sup>This can be thought of as saying, conditional on observables, this house is 30% unobservably better and assuming persistence along this dimension.

costs or temporal variation in production. In Figure A27 I present the observed histogram of these PPA contracted prices from data collected by the American Clean Energy Association.

Figure A27: Histogram of power purchase agreement prices



Note: Plotting inflation-adjusted power purchase agreements for each wind facility in the American Clean Energy Association (ACEA) data. For plants with more than one PPA, I presented the weighted mean by the capacity under contract.

For each project site  $s$  in the ACEA data I create the following measures of the production-weighted prices:

$$\bar{p}_s^{\text{myo}} = \frac{\vec{\rho}(\vec{w}_s) \cdot \vec{p}_s^{\text{myo}}}{\sum \vec{\rho}(\vec{w}_s)}, \quad \bar{p}_s^{\text{exp}} = \frac{\vec{\rho}(\vec{w}_s) \cdot \vec{p}_s^{\text{exp}}}{\sum \vec{\rho}(\vec{w}_s)} \quad (37)$$

where  $\vec{\rho} : \mathbb{R}_+^Y \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+^Y$  maps hourly wind to hourly production, and  $\vec{p}_s^{\text{myo}}, \vec{p}_s^{\text{exp}} \in \mathbb{R}^Y$  are the hourly prices at the node of the grid which  $s$  is within both currently (myopically) and the full expected (projected) price path as published by the NREL's Cambium project. I then seek to relate these expected prices with actual contract prices as

$$p_s^* = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \bar{p}_s^{\text{myo}} + \beta_2 \bar{p}_s^{\text{exp}} + \beta_3 \text{RPS exists}_s + \varepsilon_s, \quad (38)$$

where  $\text{RPS exists}_s$  is an indicator for whether the state that  $s$  is in has a renewable portfolio standard. I present the results of the regression in Equation 38 in Table A9.

#### B.4 Clarifying the existence and timing of construction

I combine information from the FAA and LBNL/NREL to clarify which locations contain wind turbines and the timing of their construction. In Figure A28 I describe the number of turbines that are applied for and

Table A9: Relationship of PPA contract prices with market prices


	PPA price (\$)
Intercept	-38.67 (9.793)
Myopic price (\$/MWh)	1.342 (0.4006)
Projected price (\$/MWH)	1.081 (0.9926)
RPS exists?	10.37 (2.189)
Observations	320
R <sup>2</sup>	0.46345

Note: Matching inflation-adjusted power purchase agreement contracts from the American Clean Energy Association (ACEA) with generation-weighted hourly prices from *NREL Cambium* as well as an indicator for if the state has a renewable portfolio standard (RPS) from *RMI*.

built in the FAA data that can be matched to LBNL data. As can be seen in Panel (A) nearly every turbine in the FAA is verified to exist by LBNL, particularly for more recent builds. In Panel (B) I show that the project year appears to be on average around 1 year after application.


I take the set compliment of these turbines to form a full sample of affected locations. If the application year is less than the project year, I set as the application date the project year—since as can be seen in Figure A29 these follow-on applications tend to be for renovations or alterations.

Figure A28: Built FAA turbines in NREL data



Note: Matching exact turbine locations from FAA applications to the data from Lawrence Berkeley National Lab about which turbines exist in the United States as well as when they were built. In panel (B) I plot on the x-axis the project year from NREL vs. the application year from the FAA.

Figure A29: Stated reasons for applications after project year




Note: Application type from FAA forms. Only considering FAA applications where the project date from LBNL is prior to the application.

## B.5 Information on applications


I access the universe of applied-for wind turbines from the FAA. Every wind turbine that is built in the United States is required to be registered with the FAA at least 90-120 days prior to construction to ensure that airplanes do not crash into it and it does not infringe upon other uses of the airspace. More information on this application is available [here](#) and [here](#). In Figure A30 I present the outcomes of these application, nearly every one of which is approved. This provides documentation of all fully planned wind farms. In Figure A31 I present the histogram of the time between application and stated planned construction date. It appears that nearly every project is planned to be constructed within two years, with most of this construction planned for even sooner. A caveat is that I do not observe the actual construction date, only the stated planned date.

Figure A30: Outcomes of FAA applications over time



Note: Using reports of the determination from the FAA.

Figure A31: Time from FAA application to planned construction




Note: Comparing FAA application dates to dates of planned construction.

## B.6 Firm spatial concentration

The FAA applications contain identities of the firm, and the individual, applying for each turbine. In Figure A32 I present the spatial distribution of wind farms built by the 6 largest wind developers. Qualitatively, the large developers build in geographically heterogeneous locations. Anecdotally, developers attest to having minimal geographic specialization.

Figure A32: Developer spatial distribution



Note: Plotting the farms built by the 6 largest developers.

## B.7 Effects on local school finances

In Section 5.3 I show the spatial border RD effects on wind construction of different tax rules as outlined in Uebelhor et al. (2021). I document the effects of wind construction on school districts' local finances using measures of revenue by origin and expenditures from the National Center for Education Statistics' Common Core of Data<sup>74</sup>. I provide two complimentary analyses, measuring both the marginal effects of an additional wind turbine on school district revenues as well as estimating event studies of the evolutions of these revenues after the entry of the first wind farm. In both, I maintain the same control group as in Section 4.1, which is comparing school districts that receive wind farms earlier to school districts that have not yet, but will eventually, have a wind farm built within their borders. I document new facts about the effects of wind farm entry on school revenues and expenditures, and characterize heterogeneity in this effect consistent with the tax rules.

The first specification I run is the marginal effect of the number of built turbines, due to the fact that property taxes are assessed at the valuation of the project which approximately scales in the number of turbines. The estimating equation is presented in Equation 39, and contains both year and school district fixed effects,

$$Y_{d,t} = \tau \cdot \# \text{ Built}_{d,t} + \phi_d + \rho_t + \varepsilon_{d,t}. \quad (39)$$

<sup>74</sup>A similar analysis could be conducted in the Census of Governments, which would be noisier due to comprehensive data collection only every five years. However, school districts make up a majority of all spending from property taxes. School districts received around \$343 billion of the full \$630 billion, or around 55%, in collected property tax revenue in 2021 (Tax Policy TPC, 2022; COE, 2024).

I present the full set of results in [A10](#). I find that 100 turbines being built in a state where developers pay property taxes increases revenue from local sources by around 43%, however this is crowded out somewhat by decreases in both state and federal revenues. I see small positive increases in the other two tax regimes. I find, however, that the total expenditure response to 100 built turbines is similar, and around 3%, in the property tax payment and negotiation states and almost exactly zero in the states where the developers are exempt. While I do not observe any meaningful effect on local tax revenue from wind turbine construction in states where the developers may negotiate payment—it is possible that “Fees in Lieu of Taxes” are measured differently than typical local tax revenue for the purposes of this accounting.

Table A10: Effects of wind farm entry on school revenues

Dependent Variables: Model:	log(Local rev.) (1)	log(State rev.) (2)	log(Federal rev.) (3)	log(Total Exp.) (4)
Built turbines (/100)	0.434	-0.137	-0.144	0.028
<i>Pays property tax</i>	(0.017)	(0.009)	(0.020)	(0.004)
Built turbines (/100)	0.051	0.041	-0.010	0.028
<i>Negotiates payment</i>	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.024)	(0.006)
Built turbines (/100)	0.138	-0.009	-0.013	-0.004
<i>No payment</i>	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.018)	(0.005)
FE: Year, District	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	9,242	9,238	9,219	9,245
R <sup>2</sup>	0.98	0.98	0.97	1.00
Pre-wind mean	\$36.8M	\$29.5M	\$5.5M	\$60.3M


Note: Using data from the NCES’ Common Core of Data. Standard errors clustered at rule level. Control group of not yet treated units. Pre-period of six years prior to first wind farm entry, post-period treatment is defined to be two to six years after first wind farm entry. Limited to 240 wind turbines (~ 3 wind farms) per district.

I supplement this analysis with an event study estimation procedure where I define treatment to be the first year that a wind farm that is successfully built is applied for. I estimate the following specification

$$Y_{d,t} = \sum_{k \neq 1} \tau_k B_{d,t-g} + \phi_d + \rho_t + \varepsilon_{d,t}, \quad (40)$$

where the notation is as before but  $B_{d,t-g}$  is an indicator how many years it is from treatment  $g$ . I estimate these event studies using the [Callaway and Sant’Anna \(2021\)](#) estimator for panels. I present the results in [Figure A33](#). I find mostly analogous results to the linear effects presented in [Table A10](#), with one notable exception—which is a slightly negative and noisy effect on expenditures in the negotiation regime. The effect on revenues from local sources and the total expenditures in panel A seem to grow over time, which is consistent with two empirical regularities in this setting. First, I define treatment to be the first wind farm, where many school districts see multiple built over time. Second, as discussed in [Section B.4](#), many of these wind farms are not built immediately upon application and thus would not be taxed immediately upon application either.

Figure A33: Relationship of wind farm entry & school district finances across regimes




Note: Using data from the NCES' Common Core of Data. Standard errors clustered at rule level. Control group of not yet treated units. Limited to districts with final count of 25 – 240 wind turbines (~ 0.5 – 3 wind farms). Estimated using Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021) panel estimator.

## B.8 Effects on migration networks


I use Infutor data to ask whether migration patterns change in response to wind construction. A key challenge to this analysis is that the underlying rate of exposure of wind farms increasing with jumps as many of the nearby substitutes for movers are also treated simultaneously. To overcome this, I compare migrants' realized exposure to wind farms to their predicted exposure. Formally, I compare fraction of migrants who moved from/to area with existing wind farm to a simulated exposure holding fixed the average location flows in/out from  $t \in [-5, -2]$ . I consider 4,001,980 next addresses and 2,532,616 prior addresses. In Figure A35 I show the estimated effects at a variety of distances. I find that consistently, across a variety of distances, the out-migrants shift their chosen locations in a manner that leads to lower exposure to wind farms than had they maintained the migration patterns from the pre-period. In Figure A34 I show how the prior addresses of in-migrants to within 3 miles of a farm changes. I find that in-migrants are more likely to have already lived near a wind farm after construction, suggesting perhaps persistent preferences that accord with minimal distaste, or even positive taste, for living near wind turbines. An additional analysis is on the effect of wind construction on the tenure of out-migrants. I find in Figure A36 that after the entry of a wind farm, the people moving out of the area had on average a longer tenure in that location prior. It appears that wind farm entry leads to out-movers being compositionally different, and adjusting where they go next in response to wind farm entry. Further, it appears that the in-migrants are more likely to have already been exposed to wind farms prior.

Figure A34: Effects on in-migrants' prior locations




Note: Comparing the exposure to wind turbines of actual vs. simulated migration patterns had they moved from the same locations as from  $t = -2$  to  $t = -5$ . Confidence intervals calculated using standard errors from the binomial distribution.

Figure A35: Effects on out-migration destinations



Note: Comparing the exposure to wind turbines of actual vs. simulated migration patterns had they moved to the same locations as from  $t = -2$  to  $t = -5$ . Confidence intervals calculated using standard errors from the binomial distribution.

Figure A36: Effects on tenure of out-migrants



Note: Left dashed line is approximate timing of signing leases with landowners. Right dashed line is approximate timing of construction. Sample are all locations that ever had a wind farm proposed. [Sun and Abraham \(2021\)](#) difference-in-differences specification with year and event fixed effects. *Infutor* data from 2001-2016.

## B.9 Robustness of the inefficiency of the aggregate distribution

### B.9.1 Structural interpretation

In Section 4.5, I test whether development is efficiently trading off a dollar of developer profit with a dollar of household cost by estimating the regression I can test this by estimating the following probit regression,

$$\hat{\Pi}_l + \alpha \hat{E}_l + \gamma_{s(l)} + \varepsilon_l \geq 0,$$

where  $\gamma_{s(l)}$  is a state fixed effect,  $E_l = \bar{W} \cdot P_l$  where  $\bar{W}$  is the mean preference for living near turbines from Section 4 and  $P_l$  is the value of homes within 5 miles of site  $l$ , and  $\varepsilon_l \sim N(0, \mu)$ . I consider the following extension, which allows for more flexibility in the distribution of the unobservable. Here—I posit the following functional form decomposition where

$$\begin{aligned}\Pi_l &= \hat{\Pi}_l + \gamma_{s(l)} + \varepsilon_{\Pi,l}, \\ E_l &= \hat{E}_l + \varepsilon_{E,l}.\end{aligned}$$

In this setting,  $\varepsilon_{\Pi,l} \sim N(0, \mu_\Pi)$  and  $\varepsilon_{E,l} \sim N(0, n_l \cdot \text{Var}(\omega) \cdot (P_l/n_l)^2)$ . I assume that  $\varepsilon_{\Pi,l}$  and  $\varepsilon_{E,l}$  are independent, in which case their sum  $(\varepsilon_{\Pi,l} + \varepsilon_{E,l}) \sim N(0, \mu_\Pi + n_l \cdot \text{Var}(\omega) \cdot (P_l/n_l)^2)$ . The estimating equation from before can be transformed into

$$\frac{\hat{\Pi}_l + \alpha \hat{E}_l + \gamma_{s(l)}}{\sqrt{\mu_\Pi + n_l \cdot \text{Var}(\omega) \cdot (P_l/n_l)^2}} + \varepsilon'_l \geq 0,$$

where  $\varepsilon'_l \sim N(0, 1)$ . However, since  $\mu_\Pi$  is unknown—I must estimate it in a first step. When  $n_l = 0$  the estimating equation collapses to become


$$\frac{\hat{\Pi}_l + \gamma_{s(l)}}{\sqrt{\mu_\Pi}} + \varepsilon'_l \geq 0,$$

in which case the coefficient on  $\hat{\Pi}_l$  is  $1/\sqrt{\mu_\Pi}$ . I then estimate, in a second step the equation

$$\frac{\hat{\mu}' \cdot \hat{\Pi}_l + \hat{\alpha} \hat{E}_l + \hat{\gamma}_{s(l)}}{\sqrt{\hat{\mu}_\Pi + n_l \cdot \text{Var}(\omega) \cdot (P_l/n_l)^2}} + \varepsilon'_l \geq 0.$$

The ratio  $\hat{\alpha}/\hat{\mu}'$  is the trade-off between a dollar of profit and a dollar of externality. I find this to be 7.82, I present the 95% confidence interval—calculated from a two-step Bayesian bootstrap in Figure A37. I note that this is quite similar to the estimate from Section .

Figure A37: Tradeoff between profit and externality



Note: Using preference estimates from Section 4 and structure on the unobservable as above. 95% CI from 100 draws of a Bayesian bootstrap.

### B.9.2 Data-driven robustness

I estimate a similar specification as before estimating the following probit regression,


$$\hat{\Pi}_l + \alpha \hat{E}_l + \gamma_{s(l)} + \beta \sqrt{n_l} + \varepsilon_l \geq 0.$$

I consider the following extension, which allows for data-driven flexibility in the distribution of the unobservable. I maintain the following functional form decomposition where

$$\begin{aligned} \Pi_l &= \hat{\Pi}_l + \gamma_{s(l)} + \varepsilon_{\Pi,l}, \\ E_l &= \hat{E}_l + \varepsilon_{E,l}. \end{aligned}$$

In this setting, I assume that the standard deviation of the unobservable is linear in the square-root of the number of homes, so  $\varepsilon_{\Pi,l} \sim N(0, (\mu_\Pi^0 + \mu_\Pi^1 \sqrt{n_l})^2)$  and  $\varepsilon_{E,l} \sim N(0, (\vartheta^0 + \vartheta^1 \sqrt{n_l})^2)$ . I assume that  $\varepsilon_{\Pi,l}$  and  $\varepsilon_{E,l}$  are independent, as before. This allows me to, rather flexibly, measure the implied tradeoff between expected dollars of externality and expected dollars of profit at the full support of the number of potentially exposed houses,  $n_l$ . I present the results in Figure A38, finding that the tradeoff is particularly stark when there are very few homes—but appears to be inefficient over the full support.

Figure A38: Tradeoff between profit and externality: data-driven unobservable variance



Note: Using structure on the unobservable as above. 95% CI from 100 draws of a Bayesian bootstrap. The vertical dashed line represents the median number of exposed homes in the data.

## C Demand estimation appendix

In this section I discuss the testable implication of my demand model for census tracts as described in Section 4.2. This model is critical for identifying the full distribution of preferences for living near wind turbines. This model is a multinomial logit with observable heterogeneity in preferences based on each households' residency decision from the time period before. In Section C.4, I begin by describing the limited heterogeneity in cross-price elasticities by characteristic distance within each group, contrary to substitution patterns in e.g. Berry et al. (1995). I proceed in Section C.2 to describe the limited efficacy of observable characteristics in explaining choice shares, contrary to time-invariant fixed effects—perhaps suggesting persistent unobserved heterogeneity. In Section C.3, I provide a simplistic Monte Carlo style illustration of how, even when the true data-generating process is a random-coefficients logit, origin-destination fixed effects can closely approximate price elasticities and further can greatly out-perform BLP-style estimates of price elasticities when there is sorting along the dimension of unobserved heterogeneity and location characteristics are stable. Finally, in Section C.8, I compare my estimates of own-price elasticities to those implied by other estimated residential choice models.

## C.1 Relationship of demand curves with equilibrium price changes

I provide graphical intuition and a formal proof relating the demand for some location to the equilibrium change in price and sales volume. First, I show that with preference heterogeneity in a discrete choice setting using the change in price an an estimate for the mean preference over some bundled characteristic has a bias that is not possible to sign without more information. As a corollary to this, I illustrate how differences in the shape of demand for a location can be expected to lead to different equilibrium prices and sales volumes—which undergirds the identification in Section 4.3.2 .


I define  $v_{i,d}$  as the change in  $d$ 's price at which  $i$  would be indifferent between living within the focal location and elsewhere,  $v_{i,d} = u_{i,d} - \max_{d' \neq d} u_{i,d'}$  where  $u_{i,l}$  is household  $i$ 's indirect utility of living in  $l$ . I note for the CDF of  $v_{i,d}$ ,  $V_d$ , demand for  $d$  is  $1 - V_d(.)$ . I consider additive preferences for some characteristic, such as living near wind farms, that are bundled with the location and are drawn from a distribution  $W$ .

In Figure A39, I provide a graphical illustration of how the distribution of  $v_{i,d}$  affects equilibrium changes in price and sales volume. I consider alternative distributions of  $v_{i,d}$  and simulate the ensuing equilibrium when  $\omega_i \sim W$  is  $-10\%$  or  $0\%$  with equal probability. In the first row, the mass of  $v_{i,d}$  is approximately balanced around 0. In the second row there is a greater mass of households where  $v_{i,d} < 0$ , or more marginal potential in-migrants. In this simulation, I assume there is no change in quantity, and represent the change in price that clears the market with the thick black line. In the first row  $\Delta p = -5.2\%$ , in the second  $\Delta p = -3.7\%$ , although  $W$  is identical. In Figure A7 I describe how both preference heterogeneity and the shape of the demand curves, as in Figure A39, affect the degree of re-sorting in response to wind farm entry. I note that preference homogeneity implies no re-sorting, which is contradicted by the estimates in Figure A4. I further illustrate that for the same distribution of preference heterogeneity, smaller magnitude of equilibrium price changes imply a greater re-sorting margin.

**Proposition 2.** *The sign of  $\Delta p - \mathbb{E}[W]$  is the same as the sign of  $\int_{-\infty}^0 v(x) \cdot [1 - W(-x + \mathbb{E}[W])] dx - \int_0^\infty v(x) \cdot W(-x + \mathbb{E}[W]) dx$*

Without an estimate of the sign of the relative mass of just-in vs. just-out residents, weighted by the preference distribution, it is impossible to say whether the price effects in Section 4.1 are an over or under estimate of true preferences. Furthermore, this provides some intuition about why one may expect vastly different price effects from nearly the same bundled characteristic depending on the relevant demand curve for the treated location.

Figure A39: Relating the shape of demand curves and equilibrium price changes



Note: In each row, in the left panel I present alternative baseline demand curves for a treated location  $d$ . In the right panel, I present the new demand curve after wind farm entry where preferences are heterogeneous and may be  $-0.1$  or  $0$  with equal probability. In this example, supply is in-elastic in the short run, so the equilibrium price, represented by the vertical line, must re-equilibrate to clear the market.

## C.2 Can origin-destination shares be predicted by observable characteristics?

In this section, I attempt to determine the extent to which it is possible to predict the origin-destination flows as a function of observable characteristics and compare this to their stationarity over time. I use the main estimation sample from Section 4.4.1 and attempt to predict the shares for all origin-destination flows between 2000 and 2013 where the origin-destination flow is ever non-zero.

I present the results in Table A11. In Columns 1 and 3, I regress the shares on log transformations of the characteristic distance for 6 key observables. I find that larger differences in each of these categories are all strongly associated with smaller migration volumes. However, even so, this specification only has an  $R^2$  of 0.147 (0.177). In Columns 2 and 4, I attempt to determine whether a more nonparametric representation of

these characteristic distances in conjunction with nonparametric functions of the interactions between each of the 6 characteristics can better explain this variation. I find a small increase in the  $R^2$  to 0.162 (0.190). Finally, in Columns 3 and 6, I include origin-destination fixed effects which raise the  $R^2$  to 0.320 (0.337).

I take away two main points from this procedure. First, origin-destination fixed effects explain much more of the variation than can be done with the observables I have. Secondly, the origin-destination fixed effects explain much of the variation, suggesting that the flows are quite persistent. This may be a function of stable unobservable characteristics as well as stable origin-specific preferences over both observable and unobservable characteristics of the destinations.

Table A11: Predicting shares of in-state moves

Dependent Variable:	$\log(s_{d,t}^o + 10^{-8})$		$\left[ \log\left(\frac{N_t^o s_{d,t}^o + \iota_l}{N_t^o}\right) + \log\left(\frac{N_t^o s_{d,t}^o + \iota_u}{N_t^o}\right) \right] / 2$			
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Log(char. dist. +10<sup>-4</sup>)</i>						
Distance (mi)	-1.019 (0.002)			-1.440 (0.003)		
HH income	-0.042 (0.001)			-0.059 (0.002)		
% college	-0.135 (0.001)			-0.189 (0.002)		
% senior	-0.022 (0.001)			-0.029 (0.001)		
% white	-0.136 (0.001)			-0.188 (0.002)		
% poverty	-0.048 (0.001)			-0.068 (0.002)		
<i>Fixed-effects</i>						
Origin tract $\times$ Year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Destination $\times$ Origin			Yes			Yes
<i>Splines</i>						
Char. dist. (3 d.f.)		Yes			Yes	
All interactions (2 d.f.)		Yes			Yes	
Observations	16,105,668	16,105,668	16,105,668	16,105,668	16,105,668	16,105,668
$R^2$	0.147	0.162	0.320	0.177	0.190	0.337

Note: Sample includes all origin-destination flows from 2000 – 2013 for 2500 randomly selected origin tracts for which the flow is ever non-zero. Standard errors are clustered at the origin tract  $\times$  destination tract level. All variables, besides distance, are in z-scores.

### C.3 Can origin-destination FE's index multidimensional unobservable heterogeneity?

To assess the efficacy of indexing multidimensional heterogeneity by prior choices—I conduct a number of Monte Carlo simulations comparing my models' estimates of the own and cross price elasticities to the true values. In this section, I specify that there is a true data-generating process with random coefficients which is mis-specified by my model. In an important deviation from [Berry et al. \(1995\)](#) I allow households to sort along two dimensions of unobservable heterogeneity. I consider at baseline 5 locations,  $l$ , with two


dimensions of potentially time-varying unobservable characteristics,  $x_{1,l,t}$ ,  $x_{2,l,t}$ . Household  $i$  receives the following indirect utility

$$u_{h,l,t} = 3 - (\beta_{1,h,t} - x_{1,l,t})^2 - (\beta_{2,h,t} - x_{2,l,t})^2 - \log(p_{l,t}) + \xi_{l,t} + \varepsilon_{h,l,t}, \quad (41)$$

where  $\varepsilon_{h,l,t}$  are EV1 errors drawn from a distribution with standard deviation  $1/\alpha$ , and  $\beta_{1,h,t}$  and  $\beta_{2,h,t}$  are household  $h$ 's potentially time-varying random components of utility. This utility framework could be consistent for common instances in how households choose locations—wherein they seek to minimize for instance distance from (one or more) workplaces, distance from family, deviation from ideal climate, or deviation from ideal neighborhood character. The households' bliss points, as well as the characteristics of each location, may also change over time.

For each  $h$  and  $t$  I generate data as follows where  $\beta_{1,h,t} = \min\left(1, \max\left(0, \beta_{1,h}^0 + \beta_{1,h,t}^1\right)\right)$ , where  $\beta_{1,h}^0 \sim U([0, 1])$  and  $\beta_{1,h,t}^1 \sim U([-r/2, r/2])$ , and identically for  $\beta_{2,h,t}$ ,  $x_{1,h,t}$ , and  $x_{2,h,t}$ . This allows for serial correlation in preferences and characteristics. In each period, I solve for an equilibrium price vector  $p_{l,t}^*$  that ensures that all locations, including the outside option, have equal shares which is perhaps analogous to the price equilibrium in short-run supply inelastic markets that clear with price. To allow for IV estimation, I set  $p_{l,t} = p_{l,t}^* * z_{l,t}$  where  $z_{l,t} \sim N(1, 0.02)$ . I consider a variety of values for  $\alpha$  and  $r$  that alters both the dispersion of utilities and the predictability of the next period's choice from the prior period's choice.

Figure A40: Simulated choice regions



Note: Shown for  $\alpha = 100$  and  $r = 0.1$ . Both dimensions, for all households and all products, may be unobserved to the econometrician. The rectangles are the location of each product. Each dot is at a household's  $\vec{\beta}$  and is colored by the product which maximizes their utility.


I estimate the following utility specifications

$$u_{h,l,t,o}^{\text{o.f.e.}} = \gamma_l^{o(h)} - \alpha \log(p_{l,t}) + \xi_{l,t}^{o(h)} + \varepsilon_{h,l,t}, \quad (42)$$

$$u_{h,l,t}^n = \beta_0 - \alpha \log(p_{l,t}) + \xi_{l,t} + \varepsilon_{h,l,t}, \quad (43)$$

by way of a Berry (1994) inversion and compare the estimated own-price and cross-price elasticities to a 5% increase in the price of location 2. In principle, it is possible to consider a random coefficient on an indicator variable for each product from a very flexible distribution that could match the data—however in practice without using information on prior choices this may be hard to consistently estimate without more data than consistent estimation of Equations 42 and 43 require. In Figure A41 I compare the estimates from each strategy to the true elasticities. I find that on the whole, conditioning on prior choices and estimating a vanilla logit by group as in Equation 42 can do a much better job of matching the true substitution patterns than using the pooled estimates. Furthermore, this is achievable without any additional information besides a panel of consumer choices—and allows for extremely flexible unobserved heterogeneity and sorting along multiple dimensions of unobserved heterogeneity.


Figure A41: True price elasticities vs. estimates



Note: Both specifications are presented considering 20 simulated periods where  $\alpha = 100$  and  $r = 0.1$ . Each true price elasticity is calculated by increasing the price of product 2 by 5%.

Finally, I consider alternative values for both  $\alpha$  and  $r$ . I plot their estimated own-price elasticities in Figure A42. I define the own-share to be the average fraction of households  $h$  who choose the same location  $l$  in both  $t$  and  $t + 1$ . This is in many ways a proxy for the informativeness of prior choices for future choices and utility<sup>75</sup>. I find that the deviance between the true and the estimated own-price elasticities are largest when the own-share is largest. In my sample the average own-share, or households who remain in place, is 95.4%. I conclude from these Monte Carlo simulations that in situations where there is persistence in both consumer preferences and product characteristics, adding product  $\times$  prior choice fixed effects can be a powerful nonparametric tool to recover true price elasticities and substitution patterns in a variety of settings where typical demand estimation tools may fall short. This method accommodates sorting along multiple dimensions of unobserved heterogeneity. Further, even if the product characteristics  $x_{1,l,t}$  and  $x_{2,l,t}$  were in fact observed this method insulates the researcher from the risk of misspecifying the distribution of households' random coefficients  $\beta_{1,h,t}$  and  $\beta_{2,h,t}$ .

Figure A42: Simulated elasticities and estimates



Note: I show the estimated price elasticities under a variety of specifications of  $\alpha$  and  $r$ .

#### C.4 Cross-price elasticities by characteristic distance

A key implication of the demand model in Section 4.2, which is common to multinomial logit discrete choice models, is that the cross-price elasticity of location  $l'$  with regard to price in location  $l$  is constant across all alternatives  $l \neq l'$ . In many empirical settings, this assumption is untenable and assumes away the variation of interest.<sup>76</sup> A central motivation of Berry et al. (1995) is to allow for the ability to recover flexible cross-

<sup>75</sup>The own-share and the  $R^2$  of a regression of each household's utility from each product are almost exactly one-to-one related. A 1 SD increase in own-share is associated with a 0.99 SD increase in the  $R^2$ .

<sup>76</sup>As discussed in Berry and Haile (2021) the standard multinomial logit “impose(s) strong a priori restrictions on demand elasticities—and, therefore, on markups, pass-through, and other key quantities of interest—that are at odds with common sense and standard economic models.” I avoid this a priori restriction since although there are a priori restrictions on demand elasticities

price elasticities. As Berry et al. (1995) explain, the multinomial logit “model would necessarily predict that an increase in the price of BMW would generate equal increases in the demand for Yugos and for Mercedes. This contradicts the intuition which suggests that couples of goods whose characteristics are more “similar” should have higher cross-price elasticities.” From this, there is a natural falsification test for the multinomial logit model: measuring how the cross-price elasticity depends on two products’ observable similarity.

I am able to empirically test this prediction of my model in Section 4.2, that cross-price elasticities are largely independent of the distance between characteristics. I focus on the cross-price elasticity stemming from changes in the price of the origin tract.<sup>77</sup> I limit to locations 50 or more miles away from the origin census tract to ensure that the price instruments for the origin tract are independent from any instruments for the destination tract. In Table A12 I present the central estimate of this cross-price elasticity—which has a confidence interval within the cross-price elasticity suggested by the model. To measure heterogeneity in cross-price elasticities I estimate the following specification,

$$\log(s_{d,t}^o + 10^{-8}) = \gamma_d^o + \phi_{s(d),t} + \beta_d^o \log(p_{o,t}) + \varepsilon_{d,t}^o, \quad (44)$$

where  $\gamma_d^o$  is a time-invariant origin-destination fixed effect,  $\phi_{s(d),t}$  is a state,  $s(d)$ , by time fixed effect, and  $\beta_d^o = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \delta(X_o, X_d)$  for some scalar observable  $X$  measured in  $o$  and  $d$  and  $\delta$  is the Euclidean distance operator. I instrument for  $\log(p_{o,t})$  using the same instruments described in Section 4.4.1, as well as interacting those instruments with  $\delta(X_o, X_d)$ . In Figure A43 I present the ratio of the estimates of  $\alpha_{d'}^o$  where  $\delta(X_{d'}, X_{d'})$  is 1 standard deviation greater than the sample mean of  $\delta(X_o, X_d)$  relative to the mean  $\bar{\alpha}_d^o$ . I find that this ratio is not statistically significant for 4 of the 5 estimated cross-price elasticities. Furthermore, all 5 estimates of this heterogeneity in cross-price elasticity are economically small, with the greatest indicating that a 1 SD greater distance between acreages is associated with just less than a 5% difference in cross-price elasticity. I find that on the whole, within each group, the multinomial logit model performs quite well.

Table A12: Cross-price elasticity relative to origin price


Dependent Variables:	$\log(s_{d,t}^o + 10^{-8})$	$\left[ \log\left(\left(N_t^o s_{d,t}^o + \iota_l\right) / N_t^o\right) + \log\left(\left(N_t^o s_{d,t}^o + \iota_u\right) / N_t^o\right) \right] / 2$
Model:	(1)	(2)
$\log(p_{o,t})$	2.581 (0.622)	2.033 (0.739)
State × Year FE	Yes	Yes
Destination × Origin FE	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,347,522	5,347,522

Note: Column (1) presents a naive smoothing of the shares. Column (2) targets the average of the bounds explained in Section 4.4.1. Both regression have a first stage F-statistic of 126.6. Standard errors clustered at the origin × destination level.

within type, these are quite flexible across types and lead to vastly heterogeneous demand elasticities.

<sup>77</sup>The exact formula for the cross-price elasticity in this case is  $\alpha^o s_{o,t}^o$ , which illustrates why using origin prices (which have typically large choice shares) would be expected to have the largest cross-price elasticities.

Figure A43: The effect of a 1 SD increase in characteristic distance on cross-price elasticity



Note: Confidence intervals calculated from parametric bootstrap using the delta method. Standard errors clustered at the origin  $\times$  destination level.

### C.5 Do origin-destination FEs' allow for strategic moves?

I derive assumptions under which the utility specification in Equation 2 nests a model of dynamic discrete choice. In many papers, including [Kennan and Walker \(2011\)](#), [Bayer et al. \(2016\)](#), [Diamond et al. \(2019\)](#), [Bilal and Rossi-Hansberg \(2021\)](#), [Davis et al. \(2021\)](#), and [Almagro and Dominguez-Iino \(2025\)](#), location choice is modeled as such. I consider a model in which household  $i$  from origin tract  $o$  has the following flow utility from living in tract  $d$  at time  $t$

$$u_{i,j,d,t}^{o,F} = \underbrace{\omega_i w_{j,t}}_{\text{wind prefs}} + \underbrace{\gamma_{d,m_{i,j}}^{o,F}}_{\text{tract prefs.}} + \underbrace{\kappa_{d,m_{i,j},t}^o}_{\text{moving cost}} - \underbrace{\alpha^o \log(p_{d,t})}_{\text{price}} + \underbrace{\beta X_{d,t}}_{\text{chars.}} + \underbrace{\mu_t^0}_{\text{FE}} + \underbrace{\xi_{d,m_{i,j},t}^o}_{\text{unobs.}} + \underbrace{\varepsilon_{i,m_{i,j},d,t}}_{\text{TIEV}}, \quad (45)$$

where each period households re-draw their type 1 extreme value shocks, and there are both common preferences for tracts  $\gamma_{d,m_{i,j}}^{o,F}$  and un-restricted nonparametric moving costs  $\kappa_{d,m_{i,j},t}^o$ . Further, in this model when

households move their preferences shift–predictably–to be in accordance with their new state, or new origin location. As such, household  $i$ 's dynamic problem can be written recursively as,

$$V_{i,t}^o = \max_{d,j} u_{i,j,d,t}^{o,F} + \beta \mathbb{E} [V_{i,d,t+1}^o]. \quad (46)$$

I further assume that moving costs can be decomposed into a common state-level time-variant component and a origin-destination time-invariant component as  $\kappa_{d,m_{i,j},t}^o = \kappa_{d,m_{i,j}}^o + \phi_{m_{i,j},s,t}$  and the flow value of living in location  $d$  over time is in expectation constant, or there exists some  $\mathbb{E} [V_d^o] = \mathbb{E} [V_{i,d,t}^o]$  for all  $i$  and  $t$  in my sample period. This assumption, while potentially reductive, dismisses the possibility of systematic changes in the value of living in  $d$  for households coming from  $o$  over time. However, it allows for unrestricted changes in preferences and future flow values from households moving to  $d$  from  $o$ . While this rules out changing neighborhood character, as is the focus of [Almagro and Dominguez-Iino \(2025\)](#) and other work. However, this is consistent with the set of stylized facts in [Garin et al. \(2024\)](#) wherein individuals experience earnings changes and may change neighborhoods in a predictable manner, but the neighborhoods themselves are relatively static.

I note then that the likelihood that a household coming from  $o$  at time  $t$  chooses to live in destination  $d$  (or move to house  $j$ ) becomes

$$\pi_{i,j,d,t}^o = \frac{\exp(u_{i,j,d,t}^{o,F} + \beta \mathbb{E} [V_d^o])}{1 + \sum_{d',j'} \exp(u_{i,j',d',t}^{o,F} + \beta \mathbb{E} [V_d^o])}. \quad (47)$$

Collecting terms, I can write

$$\gamma_{d,m_{i,j}}^o = \gamma_{d,m_{i,j}}^{o,F} + \kappa_{d,m_{i,j}}^o + \beta \mathbb{E} [V_d^o] \quad (48)$$

and note that the specification estimated in Equation 2 nests this, somewhat restrictive, form of dynamics. So long as the continuation value of living in each location is stable this remains true.

In the case of a shock, like wind farm entry—I assume that this is a sudden and persistent change in which case the interpretation of  $\omega_i$  becomes the combination of the flow utility and the expected continuation value of living near a wind farm, in which case the remainder of  $\mathbb{E} [V^d]$  excluding the component related to preferences for living near wind farms is separable.

In this case it is important that the instruments  $Z$  for  $\log(p_{d,t})$  are excludable from the continuation values. Since  $\beta \mathbb{E} [V_{i,t+1}^d]$  is un-observed if  $\mathbb{E} [Z \cdot (\mathbb{E} [V_{i,t+1}^d] - \mathbb{E} [V^d]) | X] \neq 0$  this violates the standard exclusion restriction for identification of  $\alpha^o$ . In this case using  $Z$  that contain idiosyncratic year-to-year variation rather than long-run trends may be very important. Contemporaneous supply shocks, such as the death shocks in Section 4.4.1, fulfill this requirement—however more standard instruments such as the [Bayer et al. \(2007\)](#) instruments or other variants of the [Berry et al. \(1995\)](#) may not—since the construction of new housing proximate in characteristics is durable and so changes in  $Z_{d,t}$  affect the expectation of  $Z_{d,t+1}$ .

## C.6 Constructing moment inequalities for Section 4.3.1

I build two moment inequalities—one that *on average* serves as the upper bound and one that *on average* serves as the lower bound for  $\delta_{m,d,t}^{o(i,t)}$ . These bounds rely on there existing some upper (lower) prior choice probabilities  $\iota_u$  ( $\iota_l$ ). I then choose choose some  $\bar{\iota}_l \leq \iota_l \leq \iota_u \leq \bar{\iota}_u$ <sup>78</sup> and estimate parameters to satisfy the

<sup>78</sup>In practice, as suggested in [Gandhi et al. \(2023\)](#) I choose an extremely low  $\bar{\iota}_l$  to be  $1/(N_l^{hh} \cdot C_{S(l)} \cdot 100)$  where  $N_l^{hh}$  is the number of households,  $C_{S(l)}$  is the number of census tracts in state  $S(l)$ , and 100 is an arbitrary large smoothing parameter. This can be interpreted as essentially being a lower bound wherein 1 household would move to  $l$  in 100 years. I choose  $\bar{\iota}_u$  to be that each tract in state  $s$  is chosen with equal probability.

following conditional moment inequalities

$$\mathbb{E} \left[ \log \left( \left( N_t^o s_{d,t}^o + \bar{\iota}_u \right) / N_t^o \right) - \log \left( \pi_{m,d,t}^o \right) | z_{d,t} \right] \geq 0, \text{ and} \quad (49)$$

$$\mathbb{E} \left[ \log \left( \left( N_t^o s_{d,t}^o + \bar{\iota}_l \right) / N_t^o \right) - \log \left( \pi_{m,d,t}^o \right) | z_{d,t} \right] \leq 0. \quad (50)$$

Where  $N_t^o$  are the number of individuals in  $o$  at time  $t$  and  $z_{d,t}$  are discretized versions of my continuous instruments explained in more detail below.

I combine these inequalities with the orthogonality condition that  $\mathbb{E} [\xi | z] = 0$  to solve for the parameters of  $\delta_{m,d,t}^o - \xi_{m,d,t}^o$  to satisfy

$$\mathbb{E} \left[ \log \left( \left( N_t^o s_{d,t}^o + \bar{\iota}_u \right) / N_t^o \right) - \log \left( \pi_{0,t}^o \right) - \left( \delta_{m,d,t}^o - \xi_{m,d,t}^o \right) | z_{d,t} \right] \geq 0, \text{ and} \quad (51)$$

$$\mathbb{E} \left[ \log \left( \left( N_t^o s_{d,t}^o + \bar{\iota}_l \right) / N_t^o \right) - \log \left( \pi_{0,t}^o \right) - \left( \delta_{m,d,t}^o - \xi_{m,d,t}^o \right) | z_{d,t} \right] \leq 0, \quad (52)$$

where  $\pi_{0,t}$  is the probability of choosing the outside option.<sup>79</sup> I note that since  $\delta_{m,d,t}^o - \xi_{m,d,t}^o$  is linear as a function of a full vector of parameters  $\hat{\theta}$  there is some  $X_{o,d,m}^f$  such that  $\delta_{m,d,t}^o - \xi_{m,d,t}^o = X_{o,d,m}^f \theta$ . I then form the following sample moments and solve for  $\hat{\theta}$ , as follows

$$\bar{m}_u (\theta, g) := \frac{1}{N_{JT}} \sum_t \sum_{o,d,m} \left( \log \left( \left( N_t^o s_{d,t}^o + \bar{\iota}_u \right) / N_t^o \right) - \log \left( \pi_{0,t} \right) - X_{o,d,m}^f \theta \right) g(z_{d,t}), \quad (53)$$

$$\bar{m}_l (\theta, g) := \frac{1}{N_{JT}} \sum_t \sum_{o,d,m} \left( \log \left( \left( N_t^o s_{d,t}^o + \bar{\iota}_l \right) / N_t^o \right) - \log \left( \pi_{0,t} \right) - X_{o,d,m}^f \theta \right) g(z_{d,t}), \quad (54)$$

$$\hat{\theta} = \arg \min_{\theta} \sum_g \mu(g) \left( [\bar{m}_u (\theta, g)]_-^2 + [\bar{m}_l (\theta, g)]_+^2 \right). \quad (55)$$

Where  $[x]_- = \min \{0, x\}$ ,  $[x]_+ = \max \{0, x\}$ , and  $\mu$  is any weighting of a set of instrumental indicator functions  $g$ .

As proposed by [Gandhi et al. \(2023\)](#), in order to identify the parameters given the moment inequalities, I must discretize the instruments  $Z_{d,t}^1$  and  $Z_{d,t}^2$ . To do so, I follow their procedure and first transform  $\tilde{Z}_{d,t}^c = \Phi \left( \hat{\Sigma}_Z^{-1/2} Z_{d,t}^c \right)$ , where  $\Phi$  is the CDF of the standard normal and  $\hat{\Sigma}_Z$  is the sample covariance matrix of  $Z$ . I then construct a discretized grid of these instruments

$$\mathcal{G} = \left\{ g \left( \tilde{Z}_{d,t}^1, \tilde{Z}_{d,t}^2 \right) = \mathbb{I} \left\{ \left( \tilde{Z}_{d,t}^1, \tilde{Z}_{d,t}^2 \right) \in B_{a,r} \right\} : B_{a,r} \in \mathcal{B} \right\}, \quad (56)$$

$$\mathcal{B} = \left\{ \left( \times_{u=1}^2 \left( (a_u - 1) / (2r), a_u / (2r) \right] \right) \times \{\zeta\} : a_u \in \{1, 2, \dots, 2r\}, \right. \quad (57)$$

$$\left. \text{for } u = 1, 2, r = 6, \zeta \in \tilde{\mathcal{Z}} \right\}.$$

I choose  $\mu(\{g\})$  to be the empirical frequency of each  $B_{a,r} \in \mathcal{B}$ . Finally, I create an identical discretized grid for the instruments beginning with  $Z_{o,d,t}^{1,I} = Z_{o,d,t}^1 \cdot I_o$  and  $Z_{d,t}^{2,I} = Z_{d,t}^2 \cdot I_o$  where  $I_o$  is origin  $o$ 's income in 2000 in order to recover  $\alpha_I$ .

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<sup>79</sup>As instructed in [Gandhi et al. \(2023\)](#) I define  $\pi_{0,t}$  to be a simple modification of  $s_{0,t}^o$  of  $\max(s_{0,t}^o, 10^{-4})$ , which per their proof is allowable so long as the modification is negligible relative to the estimation error in  $s_{0,t}^o$ .

### C.7 Estimating the population distribution of $\omega_i$

I estimate  $\hat{W}$  by gridding the space of  $\hat{W}$  into  $G = 100$  grid points  $\{w_g\}$  with spacing  $\Delta w$  and minimizing a system of linear equations to match the observed series, with a penalization term to ensure the regularity of the tails. I denote the incumbent distribution of non-wind marginality as  $V_{i,1}$  and I aggregate the distribution of non-incumbent wind marginality,  $V_{i,2}$ , as their population-weighted average.

I can approximate the convolution integral in Proposition 1 as

$$F_{V_{i,1}+W}(p_i) \approx \sum_{k=1}^N f_{V_{i,1}}(p_i - w) f_W(w) \Delta w \equiv \tilde{F}_{V_{i,1}+W}(p_i), \quad (58)$$

$$F_{V_{i,2}+W}(p_i) \approx \sum_{k=1}^N f_{V_{i,2}}(p_i - w) f_W(w) \Delta w \equiv \tilde{F}_{V_{i,2}+W}(p_i). \quad (59)$$

I note that in my setting, it is simple to differentiate my known demand curves to get

$$f_{V_i^o}(z) = \alpha^o \frac{\exp(\delta_i - \alpha^o z) \left(1 + \sum_j \exp(\bar{\delta}_j)\right)}{\left(1 + \exp(\delta_i - \alpha^o z) + \sum_j \exp(\bar{\delta}_j)\right)^2} \quad (60)$$

where  $\delta_i$  is the relevant mean utility excluding changes in price, and  $\bar{\delta}_j$  is some non-negative alternative mean utility at the average price.<sup>80</sup> I thus am able to solve for a grid  $f_W$  where for some  $\lambda$  I enforce regularity of the tails as follows

$$\hat{f}_W = \min_{f_W} (\tau F_{V_{i,1}+W}(\tau_i^P) - \tilde{F}_{V_{i,1}+W}(p_i))^2 + (\tau F_{V_{i,2}+W}(\tau_i^P) - \tilde{F}_{V_{i,2}+W}(p_i))^2 - \lambda R(f_W) \quad (61)$$

where  $R$  applies Tikhonov regularization.

### C.8 Comparison of own-price elasticities

In my main specification, in Figure A10, I report a mean own-price elasticity of  $\varepsilon_p = -0.311$ . I compare this price elasticity to other elasticities that have been estimated in the residential demand literature. In my model, all households make active decisions in each year about where to live. In other models, this choice is made in other time spans. For instance, in Diamond (2016) the location choice occurs each ten years in accordance with the decennial censuses. In each, the size of the EV1 error distribution must scale to match the migration rates in that time period.

Consider a location  $d$  and an origin group  $o$ . The share of people living in  $d$  from  $o$  at time  $t$  can be represented as  $s_{d,t}^o$ . The price in  $d$  at time  $t$  is  $p_{d,t}$ . I consider an example where the price decreases 1% for a ten year period—with no ensuing effects on the size of the market  $o$ . Because, in my model, individuals re-draw their EV1 shocks every period, in each period there is a  $\varepsilon_p$  percent decrease in population. Over  $T$  years, the total decrease in population of a stable 1% price decrease is  $T \cdot \varepsilon_p$ . As such, it is possible to simply translate my estimated price elasticity to a ten year price elasticity of  $-3.11$ .

In considering other reported price elasticities in static demand models in the residential choice literature—I convert all elasticities to a ten-year elasticity for the sake of comparison. In Table A13 I present a selection of other price elasticities estimated in similar models, and I find that my estimate is within the range of estimates in the literature.

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<sup>80</sup>The support of  $f_{V_i}$  is  $(0, \infty)$  since  $z$  is in the space of  $\log(p_i)$ .

Table A13: Comparison to other price elasticities

Paper	Setting	Time frame	$\varepsilon_p$	Ten-year $\varepsilon_p$	Instrument
This paper	United States	1 year	-0.311	-3.11	Nearby deaths
Diamond (2016)	United States	10 years	-2.71	-2.71	Bartik $\times$ supply elasticity
Hsiao (2023)	Jakarta	Cross-section	-9.12	-	Land ruggedness
Cook et al. (2025)	Chicago (renters)	3 years	-0.7	-2.33	Shift-share by demographics

Note: Diamond (2016) average elasticity calculated by weighing the college and non-college demand elasticities to rental prices of Table 5, Column (4) by the 2000 population shares from Table A.1. The elasticities from Hsiao (2023) and Cook et al. (2025) are known from correspondence with the authors.

### C.9 Does the endowed option have a different price coefficient from alternatives?

In my demand specification in Section 4.2 I specify that each household's idiosyncratic value for all options in their choice set is drawn from the same distribution of Extreme Value Type 1 errors. The manner in which this enters utility is mediated only by the tract's pre-period income, which is applied uniformly across all choices. In principle it is possible that the coefficient measuring the effect of home prices on indirect utility may be different for different products. This may be the case primarily for endowed options which may have much more salient price observations as in the model in Abaluck and Adams-Prassl (2021). Alternatively, the substitution away from the endowed home in response to price changes may have different patterns than the overall out-migration from that location. Either of these would imply that the estimated coefficient on  $\log(p_{d,t})$  may be observable different for choices where households do not move. This is, given the scope of my data, testable. I note that in my full specification, I find that  $\alpha_0 = -3.32$  [-3.02, -3.43]. I am able to estimate a similar coefficient by subsetting to only the shares of the endowed options, which has the additional benefit of always having non-zero shares, meaning that the parameter  $\alpha_0^{\text{own}}$  is recoverable via a Berry (1994) inversion. In Table A14 I present my estimate of  $\hat{\alpha}_0^{\text{own}}$ . While this parameter is observed with noise, given the significant sample selection, I find the estimate to be qualitatively quite similar and statistically indistinguishable. Many of the possible concerns having to do with salience would suggest that  $\hat{\alpha}_0^{\text{own}} \gg \hat{\alpha}_0$  which appears to not be the case.

Table A14: Price coefficient of endowed option

Dependent Variable:	$\log(s_{d,t}^o) - \log(s_{oo,t}^o)$
Model:	(1)
<i>Variables</i>	
$\log(p_{d,t})$	-2.93 (1.25)
<i>FEs</i>	
Destination $\times$ Origin	Yes
County $\times$ Year	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>	
Observations	344,642
R <sup>2</sup>	-0.44195
Within R <sup>2</sup>	-11.583

Note: Additionally control for all parameters as in Table A4. Standard errors are clustered at the Destination  $\times$  Origin level. I instrument for  $\log(p_{d,t})$  as in Table A4.

## D Developer-local government model appendix

### D.1 Closed form policy function for exogenous transfers

I solve the model backwards by deriving closed form solutions for continuation values at each decision point in the regimes with exogenous transfers

**When do developers proceed with construction?** The developer builds if and only if the profit, net of sunk costs and transfers, is positive

$$\Pi_l + E - T_l > 0$$

**When does the government block development?** The government blocks development if and only if

$$V_l \times T_l + C_l \times P_l < -B_2,$$

or the value of the transfers and the cost of the externalities is worse than the cost of blocking.

**How does the government decide to initially dissuade?** If the government would be better off not allowing the process to proceed, or

$$\mathbb{E} [\mathbb{V}_d | C_{l,0}, \Pi_{l,0}] > -B_1$$

then they will optimally block at the first contact.

**How does the developer decide to approach?** The value to a developer of an approach, conditional on not being initially dissuaded, in the regimes with exogenous  $T_l$  is

$$\mathbb{E} [\mathbb{V}_e | C_{l,0}, \Pi_{l,0}] = \underbrace{\mathbb{E} [\max(\Pi_l - T_l + E, 0)]}_{\text{censored profit}} \mathbb{P} (\text{approve} | C_{l,0}, T_l) - \underbrace{E}_{\text{sunk cost}}.$$

The probability of final approval is solvable in closed form as

$$\mathbb{P}(\text{approve}|C_{l,0}, T_l) = \left(1 - \Phi\left(\frac{-C_{l,0} - B_2}{\sqrt{\mu^2 P_l + \nu^2 T_l}}\right)\right).$$

It is also possible to solve for the expected censored profit in closed form as

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}[\max(\Pi_l - T_l + E, 0)] &= \int_0^\infty x \mathbb{P}(\Pi_l - T_l + E = x) dx \\ &= (\Pi_{l,0} - T_l + E) \Phi\left(\frac{\Pi_{l,0} - T_l + E}{\sigma}\right) + \sigma \phi\left(\frac{\Pi_{l,0} - T_l + E}{\sigma}\right).\end{aligned}$$

If  $r(l) = b$  then the constraint on the offer  $T_l$  guarantees approval, but the offered  $T_l$  may well make it not profitable to build, so

$$\mathbb{E}[\mathbb{V}_e^b|C_{l,0}, \Pi_{l,0}] = \mathbb{E}_{T_l}[\max(\Pi_l - T_l + E, 0)] - E.$$

I combine this to find that the value to a developer of an approach is

$$\mathbb{E}[\mathbb{V}_a|C_{l,0}, \Pi_{l,0}] = \mathbb{E}[\mathbb{V}_e^b|C_{l,0}, \Pi_{l,0}] \cdot \underbrace{\mathbb{E}[\mathbb{V}_d|C_{l,0}, \Pi_{l,0}] < -B_1}_{\text{not immediately dissuaded}},$$

which is non-zero if and only if they will not be immediately blocked. They then approach if and only if  $\mathbb{E}[\mathbb{V}_a|C_{l,0}, \Pi_{l,0}] > e$ , where  $e$  is the cost of an approach.

## D.2 Characterizations of policy function for endogenous transfers

I solve the model backwards by deriving solutions, which will be approximated numerically, for continuation values at each decision point in the negotiation regime. I will denote  $T_g^*$  to be the government proposed transfer, and  $T_d^*$  to be the developer proposed transfer

**When do developers proceed with construction?** The developer builds if and only if the profit, net of sunk costs and transfers, is positive

$$\Pi_l + E - T^* > 0$$

**When does the local government block development?** The government blocks development if the developer proposed a transfer and

$$V_l \times T_d^* + C_l \times P_l < -B_2,$$

or the value of the transfers and the cost of the externalities is worse than the cost of blocking. If the government offered a TIOLI deal, they will block any rejection.

**How much does the local government offer?** With probability  $\rho$ , the government makes an offer

$$T_g^* = \arg \max_T (V \times T - C_l \times P_l) \mathbb{P}(\Pi_l + E - T > 0) + (1 - \mathbb{P}(\Pi_l + E - T > 0)) (-B_2).$$

I note that the posterior belief over the profit is such that  $\Pi_l \sim N\left(\Pi_{l,0} + \frac{\sigma_f^2}{\eta^2 + \sigma_f^2} \Pi_{l,1,g}, \frac{\eta^2 \cdot \sigma_f^2}{\eta^2 + \sigma_f^2}\right)$ . The government solves for  $T$  by noting that the first-order-condition implies that

$$V \left[ 1 - \Phi\left(\frac{T - E - \Pi_{l,0} - \frac{\sigma_f^2 \Pi_{l,1,g}}{\eta^2 + \sigma_f^2}}{\sqrt{\frac{\eta^2 \cdot \sigma_f^2}{\eta^2 + \sigma_f^2}}}\right) \right] - (V \cdot T - C_l \cdot P_l + B_2) \left[ \frac{1}{\sqrt{\frac{\eta^2 \cdot \sigma_f^2}{\eta^2 + \sigma_f^2}}} \phi\left(\frac{T - E - \Pi_{l,0} - \frac{\sigma_f^2 \Pi_{l,1,g}}{\eta^2 + \sigma_f^2}}{\sqrt{\frac{\eta^2 \cdot \sigma_f^2}{\eta^2 + \sigma_f^2}}}\right) \right] = 0,$$

which can be solved numerically, and must be such that  $T_g^* \geq 0$ .

**What does the firm offer?** With probability  $1 - \rho$ , the firm makes an offer

$$T_l^* = \arg \max_T (\Pi_l + E - T) \mathbb{P}(V \times T - C_l \times P_l > -B_2).$$

I write  $Z = \frac{-B_2 + C_l \times P_l}{V}$ . First, I note that as before, given the signal  $c_{l,d}$ , the developer holds a posterior belief over

$$c_l \sim N\left(c_0 + \frac{\mu^2}{\mu_c^2 + \mu^2} c_{l,d}, \frac{\mu_c^2 + \mu^2}{\mu_c^2 + \mu^2}\right).$$

I note that  $V \sim N(1, \nu)$  and  $C_l \sim N(c_0, \mu)$ . For simplicity, I assume that  $\nu$  is small<sup>81</sup> which allows me to approximate  $Z$  with a first order Taylor expansion since  $\frac{1}{\nu} \approx 1 - (V - 1)$ . This implies a closed form for  $Z \sim N(m_z, \sigma_z^2)$  where

$$m_z = -B_2 + \left(c_0 + \frac{\mu^2}{\mu_c^2 + \mu^2} c_{l,d}\right) \times P_l$$

and

$$\sigma_z^2 = \frac{\mu_c^2 + \mu^2}{\mu_c^2 + \mu^2} P^2 + \left(-B_2 + \left(c_0 + \frac{\mu^2}{\mu_c^2 + \mu^2} c_{l,d}\right) \times P_l\right)^2 \nu^2.$$

The developer solves for  $T$  by noting that the first-order-condition implies that

$$-\left[1 - \Phi\left(\frac{T - m_z}{\sigma_z^2}\right)\right] + (\Pi_l + E - T) \left[\sigma_z^2 \phi\left(\frac{T - m_z}{\sigma_z^2}\right)\right] = 0,$$

which can be solved numerically, and is constrained such that  $T_l^* \geq 0$ .

**How does the government decide to initially dissuade?** If the government would be better off not allowing the process to proceed, or

$$\mathbb{E}[\mathbb{V}_d | C_{l,0}, \Pi_{l,0}] > -B_1$$

then they will optimally block at the first contact. The government's

$$\mathbb{E}[\mathbb{V}_c | C_{l,0}, \Pi_{l,0}] = \rho \mathbb{E}[(V \times T_c^* - C_l \times P_l) \times (\Pi + E - T_c^* \geq 0) - B_2 (0 > \Pi + E - T_c^*) (\Pi + E > 0)] + (1 - \rho) \mathbb{E}[\max(V \times T_d^* - CP, -B_2)].$$

**How does the developer decide to approach?** The value to a developer of an approach, conditional on not being initially dissuaded, is

$$\mathbb{E}[\mathbb{V}_d | C_{l,0}, \Pi_{l,0}] = \rho \mathbb{E}[\max(\Pi + E - T_c^*, 0)] + (1 - \rho) \mathbb{E}[\max(\Pi + E - T_d^*, 0)] - E.$$

The value to a developer of an approach is

$$\mathbb{E}[\mathbb{V}_a | C_{l,0}, \Pi_{l,0}] = \mathbb{E}[\mathbb{V}_d | C_{l,0}, \Pi_{l,0}] \cdot \underbrace{\mathbb{E}[\mathbb{V}_c | C_{l,0}, \Pi_{l,0}] < -B_1}_{\text{not immediately dissuaded}},$$

which is non-zero if and only if they will not be immediately blocked. They then approach if and only if  $\mathbb{E}[\mathbb{V}_a | C_{l,0}, \Pi_{l,0}] > e$ , where  $e$  is the cost of an approach. Both  $\mathbb{V}_c$ ,  $\mathbb{V}_d$  must be simulated numerically.

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<sup>81</sup>In estimating step one, I find that this is true empirically.

### D.3 Additional identification

#### D.3.1 Identification: no bargaining

I discuss the intuitive variation that identifies each of the remaining 13 parameters not discussed in Section 5.6.1.

**Costs of planning and approaching:**  $E, e$ . Variation that aids in identifying  $E$  is the extent to which the inferred likelihood of being blocked, conditional on passing the first stage, affects decisions to contact the government in the first place. The overall level of implied initial contacts identifies  $e$ . Intuitively, the difference here is comparing how the likelihood of being rejected affects contact relative to the likelihood of a large negative final-period cost shock.

**Noise in government costs and benefits:**  $\mu, \nu$ . These parameters are symmetrically identified by the extent to which higher values of  $V_l$  and  $T_l$  lead to higher variance in the final decision to block.

**Noise in profit:**  $\sigma_\varepsilon, \sigma_\Pi$ . Intuitively  $\sigma_\varepsilon$  is identified by the noise that rationalizes the dispersion in  $\Pi_{l,0} + \beta X_l$  of applied for locations, after conditioning out all other strategic aspects. Then,  $\sigma_\Pi$  is the ensuing additional noise, conditional on the follow-through selection of the unobserved component from the first stage. For intuition, consider a setting with no risk of the government refusing. In this case, the extent to which there are locations  $l$  and  $l'$  where  $\Pi_{l,0} + \beta X_l < \Pi_{l',0} + \beta X_{l'}$  but  $l$  is applied for and  $l'$  is not will separately identify  $\sigma_\varepsilon$  from  $\sigma_\Pi$ . In other words, while higher  $\sigma_\varepsilon$  and  $\sigma_\Pi$  will both lead to a flattening of how predictive observable profit is for application, the extent to which observably worse projects receive applications and observably better projects do not will pin down this unobserved persistent component of profit.

**Controls in profit:**  $\beta_1, \beta_2, \beta_3, \beta_{\text{region}}$ . The parameters  $\beta_1, \beta_2$ , and  $\beta_3$  are identified by the effect of a marginal increase in agricultural profit/acre, RPS existence, and RPS amount compared to the effect of a dollar increase in  $\Pi_{l,0}$ . The census region fixed effects  $\beta_{\text{region}}$  are shifters that rationalizes the decisions to apply for and build the least observably productive locations by Census region, conditional on other parameters.

#### D.3.2 Identification: bargaining

There are three additional parameters of  $\theta$  which must be estimated, beyond those estimated in Section 5.7. I discuss the intuition regarding which variation identifies each of them. As before, these are jointly identified, for the sake of exposition I provide discussion around a separate identification.

**Probability of government offer:**  $\rho$ . This intuitively governs the way that the surplus is split between the government and the developer. I do not observe this directly, but intuitively it can be inferred from the selection into application—lower values of  $\rho$  would correspond with more entry.

**Noise around final-period profit shock:**  $\eta$ . This parameterizes the extent to which the developer's final cost shock is private information. If  $\eta$  is very small, the government can maximally extract all of the surplus. The failure rate conditional on application, and the way it varies at different levels of  $\Pi - \Pi_{l,1}$ , informs this.

**Noise around community cost shock:**  $\mu_c$ . This parameterizes the extent to which the government's cost  $\zeta_l$  is private information. Similarly, the rate at which applications fail as a function of  $P_l$  is instrumental in identifying this parameter.

### D.4 Policy functions with up-front negotiation

The firm now faces the problem of choosing an offer which can be described as

$$T_l^* = \arg \max_T \mathbb{E} [\max (\Pi_l + E - T, 0) - E] \mathbb{P} (V \times T - C_l \times P_l > 0).$$

This becomes

$$T_l^* = \arg \max_T (z\Phi(z/\sigma) + \sigma\phi(z/\sigma) - E) \mathbb{P} (V \times T - C_l \times P_l > 0),$$

where  $z = \Pi_{l,0} + E - T$ . The new first-order condition is now

$$(-\Phi(z/\sigma)) \left[ 1 - \Phi \left( \frac{T - m_z}{\sigma_z^2} \right) \right] + (z\Phi(z/\sigma) + \sigma\phi(z/\sigma) - E) \left[ \sigma_z^2 \phi \left( \frac{T - m_z}{\sigma_z^2} \right) \right] = 0,$$

which can be solved numerically, and is constrained such that  $T_l^* \geq 0$ .

## D.5 Robustness to correlation of profit shocks

In section 5.1 I specify that the firm's profit is revealed in the following manner: in period 1 they observe  $\Pi_{l,0} = \hat{\Pi}_l + \Pi_{l,\xi} + \beta X_l$  where  $\hat{\Pi}_l$  is engineering productivity,  $X_l$  are other relevant covariates, and  $\Pi_{l,\xi} \sim N(0, \sigma_\xi^2)$  is an unobservable quality. In period 2, after deciding on whether to contact the local government, they observe the full profit  $\Pi_l = \Pi_{l,0} + \Pi_{l,1}$  where  $\Pi_{l,1} \sim N(0, \sigma_f^2)$  is a final-period profit shock. I specify  $\Pi_{l,\xi}$  and  $\Pi_{l,1}$  as independent for ease of exposition. I can broaden my model to a setting in which

$$\begin{pmatrix} \Pi_{l,\xi} & \Pi_{l,1} \end{pmatrix} \sim N \left( \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}, \begin{bmatrix} \sigma_1^2 & \sigma_{1,2}^2 \\ \sigma_{1,2}^2 & \sigma_2^2 \end{bmatrix} \right).$$

This allows for a covariance  $\sigma_{1,2}$  between the initial unobservable quality and the final-period profit shock.

While this changes the interpretation of what is indicated about the information structure, it is possible to decompose the decision rule by the local government into one where behavior is isomorphic to the model with independent profit shocks. I note that while before  $\mathbb{E}[\Pi_l | \Pi_{l,0}] = \Pi_{l,0} + \mathbb{E}[\Pi_{l,1} | \Pi_{l,\xi}] = \Pi_{l,0}$ , this is no longer necessarily the case since  $\mathbb{E}[\Pi_{l,1} | \Pi_{l,\xi}]$  may be non-zero. In a multivariate normal distribution,  $\mathbb{E}[\Pi_{l,1} | \Pi_{l,\xi}] = \frac{\sigma_{1,2}^2}{\sigma_1^2} \Pi_{l,\xi}$ . Thus, I can write

$$\mathbb{E}[\Pi_l | \Pi_{l,0}] = \hat{\Pi}_l + \beta X_l + \left( 1 + \frac{\sigma_{1,2}^2}{\sigma_1^2} \right) \Pi_{l,\xi}$$


where I can define  $\Pi'_{l,\xi} = \left( 1 + \frac{\sigma_{1,2}^2}{\sigma_1^2} \right) \Pi_{l,\xi}$  and note that  $\Pi'_{l,\xi} \sim N \left( 0, \left( 1 + \frac{\sigma_{1,2}^2}{\sigma_1^2} \right)^2 \sigma_1^2 \right)$ . In the final period,

$$\begin{aligned} \Pi_l &= \hat{\Pi}_l + \beta X_l + \Pi_{l,\xi} + \Pi_{l,1} \\ &= \hat{\Pi}_l + \beta X_l + (\Pi_{l,\xi} + \mathbb{E}[\Pi_{l,1} | \Pi_{l,\xi}]) + (\Pi_{l,1} - \mathbb{E}[\Pi_{l,1} | \Pi_{l,\xi}]). \end{aligned}$$

I define  $\Pi'_{l,1} = \Pi_{l,1} - \mathbb{E}[\Pi_{l,1} | \Pi_{l,\xi}]$  and note that  $\Pi'_{l,1} \sim N \left( 0, \sigma_2^2 - \frac{(\sigma_{1,2}^2)^2}{\sigma_1^2} \right)$ . Thus, it is possible to write  $\mathbb{E}[\Pi_l | \Pi_{l,0}] = \hat{\Pi}_l + \beta X_l + \Pi'_{l,\xi}$  and  $\Pi_l = \mathbb{E}[\Pi_l | \Pi_{l,0}] + \Pi'_{l,1}$  where  $\Pi'_{l,\xi}$  and  $\Pi'_{l,1}$  are independent and normally distributed mean-zero errors with variances  $\sigma_\xi^2 = \left( 1 + \frac{\sigma_{1,2}^2}{\sigma_1^2} \right)^2 \sigma_1^2$  and  $\sigma_f^2 = \sigma_2^2 - \frac{(\sigma_{1,2}^2)^2}{\sigma_1^2}$  respectively. So long as both the local government and the developer have rational expectations given the covariance of shocks, all behavior will proceed as before. Intuitively, non-zero covariance between the first-period shock and second-period shock collapses to a question of semantics: so long as agents are aware of this covariance—the problem continues to admit a structure of independent profit shocks, where the variance of expectation shocks need not be equal to the variance of first period information shocks.

## D.6 Simple illustration of observed distances from local government threshold rules

Figure A44: Simple diagram of cost of coarse contracts



Note: This is a stylized example. Profit is decreasing in distance from the grid, due to higher cost of building roads and power lines. The externality is decreasing in distance from the grid due to decreasing population density—given that the grid often is close to population centers.

## D.7 Do local governments' choices represent heterogeneity in residents' disutilities?

In this section, I seek to test and measure the extent to which local governments' perceived costs of exposing households to wind farms accords with the real utility cost experienced by those households. Consider two extremes, if the idiosyncratic cost, perceived by the local government, has no correlation with the idiosyncratic utility costs then the local governments' costs are statistical or political noise. Another extreme is one in which the local government perfectly represents the local governments' utility costs. In the first case, acquiring private information from local governments does not make the ensuing allocation more efficient. In the second, this private information may be extremely valuable.

I measure this by comparing the change in home transaction prices<sup>82</sup> in locations along the dimension of model-implied estimates of the local governments' of exposure. In the model in Sections 5.1 and 5 local governments allow wind development if  $V_l T_l + \zeta_l \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}(l)} d_i \geq -B_2$ , or if the costs of blocking outweigh the net costs of construction<sup>83</sup>. In this model, a local government perceives smaller costs of wind development

<sup>82</sup>In this, I interpret smaller price reductions, conditional on all observables including outside demand, to be associated with lower household utility costs.

<sup>83</sup>I parameterize this such that  $c_1$  is mean-zero and has variance  $\mu$  and scales the idiosyncratic costs of wind development. There is

as  $\zeta_l$  being smaller. There are some locations  $l$  where  $T_l + \zeta_0 \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}(l)} d_i$  is much greater than  $-B_2$ . In these locations, there is very little selection along  $\zeta_l$ , since only very extremely positive draws would lead to no construction. There are also locations where  $T_l + \zeta_0 \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}(l)} d_i < -B_2$ , or where successful construction is associated with very small draws of  $\zeta_l$ . I compare locations where there are very small and very large model-implied probabilities of a local government blocking development.

I test for private information by comparing model-implied average conditional  $\zeta_l$  draws for each location to the *actual* price and sales responses when wind farms were built in these areas. Local governments having private information is consistent with the estimated price effects being smaller at smaller values of  $\zeta_l$ , conditional on the characteristics of demand responsiveness in these areas. I calculate for each treated census tract  $d \in \mathcal{T}$  the expected  $\zeta_l$  draw conditional on construction, using the parameter estimates from Section 5.8, which I refer to as  $\hat{\zeta}_d = \mathbb{E} [\zeta_d | d = \text{built}]^{84}$ .

I estimate the heterogeneous treatment effects on home prices and sales as a function of  $\hat{\zeta}_d$  only in states with exogenous transfers—due to the fact that negotiations imply that higher, unobserved, payments should be associated with lower values of  $\zeta_d$ —thus confounding some of the estimation. I estimate the following nonparametric difference-in-differences by constructing a stacked controls estimator of homes near turbines treated within the next five years, but have not been treated yet. I estimate the following specifications:

$$\log(p_{i,t}) = \tau^k \cdot (\hat{\zeta}_d - \zeta_0) \cdot B_{i,t} + \tau \cdot B_{i,t} + \beta_\zeta (\hat{\zeta}_d - \zeta_0) + f_{-c_1}^P(X_{i,t}, c(i), t, \delta_i, \iota_{i,t-1}) + \varepsilon_{i,t}^P, \quad (62)$$

For some property  $i$ ,  $p_{i,t}$  is the price at which it is transacted at time  $t$ , and  $B_{i,t}$  is 1 if and only if the wind farm is built at time  $t$ . The estimand of interest is  $\tau^k$  which is the treatment effect on price as a function of  $(\hat{\zeta}_d - \zeta_0)$ . I control for characteristics of the home: acres, bedrooms, age, and square-feet as  $X_{i,t}$ , as well as census tract,  $c(i)$ , year  $t$ , and 3-year bin  $\times$  county fixed effects identically as in Section 4.1. I also, with nonparametric Hermite splines with three degrees of freedom each, control for both distance from first turbine  $\delta_i$  and out-demand  $\iota_{i,t-1}$ , both of which ought to mediate the price effect as shown in Figures A3 and 4.

In Figure A45 I present the estimated effect. I find that in areas with higher values of  $c_1$  the price effects are more positive. This is consistent with a story where the cost shocks  $\zeta_d - \zeta_0$  have a real and positive accordance with the actual utility costs. In Figure A46 I present a bin-scatter of the posterior mean of  $\zeta_d - \zeta_0$  and the expected net cost to each location—showing that higher values of  $\hat{\zeta}_d - \zeta_0$  are associated with higher expected net costs.


Overall, I find that local governments’ perceptions of their cost of wind construction seems to be highly correlated with the true utility cost of wind construction in that location—as proxied by using home price effects. The degree of this private information suggests that local governments’ preferences in mechanisms can effectively target construction to areas with lower real utility costs.

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also variation in  $V_l = V + V_{l,1}$  which is their true value of transfer revenue—where  $V_{l,1} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, v^2)$  and  $V = 1$


<sup>84</sup>I calculate this by simulating each location in the United States 6,000 times using the estimated model parameters from Section 5.

Figure A45: Effect heterogeneity by implied cost shocks  $\zeta_d - \zeta_0$  on home prices



Note: Effect estimated using homes treated five to ten years after the treatment group as a control. Difference-in-difference price effect is estimated as an affine function of  $\hat{\zeta}_d - \zeta_0$ . Control for distance from turbine, out-demand, age, acreage, bedrooms, baths, distance to neighbors, census tract, and year. In green, I present the density of  $\hat{\zeta}_d - \zeta_0$ . The slope of this effect is  $-0.761 (0.273)$ .

Figure A46: Binscatter of expected net local cost and the posterior of  $\zeta_d - \zeta_0$



Note: Binscatter with 15 bins plotting each location's expected externality plus the transfer received from the tax regime compared to the simulation of the posterior of  $\zeta_d - \zeta_0$  conditional on successful construction. Lower values of  $\zeta_d - \zeta_0$  correspond with decisions consistent with the externality on households being smaller than the expectation of that externality.