Naturwissenschaft im Allgemeinen (Weimar Edition, i.  
II, ).  
  
 This is a Kantian term. Kant recognised two kinds of  
Freedomthe practical and the transcendental kind. The first belongs  
to the phenomenal, the second to the intelligible world.TRANSLATOR'S  
NOTE.  
  
 This probably refers to Kant's celebrated table of  
twelve categories. The four classes, quantity, quality, relation, and  
modality, are each provided with three categories..  
  
  
 zerdachtere.  
  
 Thekla is the sentimental heroine in Schiller's  
Wallenstein..  
  
 This is a reference to Wagner's Parsifal. The character  
as is well known, is written to represent a son of heart's affliction,  
and a child of wisdomhumble, guileless, loving, pure, and a  
fool..  
  
  
  
Vieles kann ich ertragen. Die meisten beschwerlichen Dinge  
Duld' ich mit ruhigem Mut, wie es ein Gott mir gebeut.  
Wenige sind mir jedoch wie Gift und Schlange zuwider;  
Viere: Rauch des Tabaks, Wanzen, und Knoblauch und  
Goethe's Venetian Epigrams  
  
Much can I bear. Things the most irksome  
I endure with such patience as comes from a god.  
Four things, however, repulse me like venom:Tobacco  
smoke, garlic, bugs, and the cross.  
  
  
  
 In The New Sydenham Society's Lexicon  
of Medicine and the Allied Sciences, the following description of  
Mitchell's treatment is to be found: "A method of treating cases of  
neurasthenia and hysteria ... by removal from home, rest in bed,  
massage twice a day, electrical excitation of the muscles, and  
excessive feeding, at first with milk."  
  
 The morality of custom.  
  
 "Thue Recht und scheue Niemand."  
  
 Here is a broad distinction between  
Nietzsche and Herbert Spencer.  
  
 Virtue is used here, of course, in the  
sense of "the excellence of man," not in the sense of the Christian  
negative virtue.  
  
 Here Nietzsche returns to Christian  
virtue which is negative and moral.  
  
 This is doubtless a reference to a  
passage in a letter written by Goethe to Herder, on 7th June 1793,  
from the camp at Marienborn, near Mainz, in which the following  
words occur:"Dagegen hat aber auch Kant seinen philosophischen  
Mantel, nachdem er ein langes Menschenleben gebraucht hat, ihn von  
mancherlei sudelhaften Vorurteilen zu reinigen, freventlich mit dem  
Schandfleck des radikalen Bösen beschlabbert, damit doch auch Christen  
herbeigelockt werden den Saum zu küssen?("Kant, on the other hand,  
after he had tried throughout his life to keep his philosophical cloak  
unsoiled by foul prejudices, wantonly dirtied it in the end with the  
disreputable stain of the 'radical evil' in human nature, in order that  
Christians too might be lured into kissing its hem.") From this passage  
it will be seen how Goethe had anticipated Nietzsche's view of Kant;  
namely, that he was a Christian in disguise.  
  
 We realise here the great difference  
between Nietzsche and those who draw premature conclusions from  
Darwinism. There is no brutal solution of modern problems in  
Nietzsche's philosophy. He did not advocate anything so ridiculous as  
the total suppression of the weak and the degenerate. What he wished to  
resist and to overthrow was their supremacy, their excessive power.  
He felt that there was a desirable and stronger type which was in need  
of having its hopes, aspirations, and instincts upheld in defiance of  
Christian values.  
  
 .Goethe invariably inveighed against  
the "gnoti seauton" of the Socratic school; he was of the opinion that  
an animal which tries to see its inner self must be sick.  
  
  
  
In the volume before us we have the first two books of what was to be  
Nietzsche's greatest theoretical and philosophical prose work. The  
reception given to Thus Spake Zarathustra had been so unsatisfactory,  
and misunderstandings relative to its teaching had become so general,  
that, within a year of the publication of the first part of that  
famous philosophical poem, Nietzsche was already beginning to see  
the necessity of bringing his doctrines before the public in a more  
definite and unmistakable form. During the years that followedthat is  
to say, between 1883 and 1886this plan was matured, and although we  
have no warrant, save his sister's own word and the internal evidence  
at our disposal, for classing Beyond Good and Evil (published 1886)  
among the contributions to Nietzsche's grand and final philosophical  
scheme, "The Will to Power," it is now impossible to separate it  
entirely from his chief work as we would naturally separate The Birth  
of Tragedy, the Thoughts out of Season, the volumes entitled Human,  
all-too-Human, The Dawn of Day, and Joyful Wisdom.  
  
Beyond Good and Evil, then, together with its sequel, The Genealogy  
of Morals, and the two little volumes, The Twilight of the Idols  
and the Antichrist (published in 1889 and 1894 respectively), must  
be regarded as forming part of the general plan of which The Will to  
Power was to be the opus magnum.  
  
Unfortunately, The Will to Power was never completed by its author.  
The text from which this translation was made is a posthumous  
publication, and it suffers from all the disadvantages that a book  
must suffer from which has been arranged and ordered by foster hands.  
When those who were responsible for its publication undertook the task  
of preparing it for the press, it was very little more than a vast  
collection of notes and rough drafts, set down by Nietzsche from time  
to time, as the material for his chief work; and, as any liberty taken  
with the original manuscript, save that of putting it in order, would  
probably have resulted in adding or excluding what the author would  
on no account have added or excluded himself, it follows that in some  
few cases the paragraphs are no more than hasty memoranda of passing  
thoughts, which Nietzsche must have had the intention of elaborating  
at some future time. In these cases the translation follows the German  
as closely as possible, and the free use even of a conjunction has in  
certain cases been avoided, for fear lest the meaning might be in the  
slightest degree modified. It were well, therefore, if the reader could  
bear these facts in mind whenever he is struck by a certain clumsiness,  
either of expression or disposition, in the course of reading this  
translation.  
  
It may be said that, from the day when Nietzsche first recognised the  
necessity of making a more unequivocal appeal to his public than  
the Zarathustra had been, that is to say, from the spring of 1883,  
his work in respect of The Will to Power suffered no interruption  
whatsoever, and that it was his chief preoccupation from that period  
until his breakdown in   
  
That this span of six years was none too long for the task he had  
undertaken, will be gathered from the fact that, in the great work he  
had planned, he actually set out to show that the life-principle, "Will  
to Power," was the prime motor of all living organisms.  
  
To do this he appeals both to the animal world and to human society,  
with its subdivisions, religion, art, morality, politics, etc. etc.,  
and in each of these he seeks to demonstrate the activity of the  
principle which he held to be the essential factor of all existence.  
  
Frau Foerster-Nietzsche tells us that the notion that "The Will to  
Power" was the fundamental principle of all life, first occurred to her  
brother in the year 1870, at the seat of war, while he was serving as  
a volunteer in a German army ambulance. On one occasion, at the close  
of a very heavy day with the wounded, he happened to enter a small  
town which lay on one of the chief military roads. He was wandering  
through it in a leisurely fashion when, suddenly, as he turned the  
corner of a street that was protected on either side by lofty stone  
walls, he heard a roaring noise, as of thunder, which seemed to come  
from the immediate neighbourhood. He hurried forward a step or two, and  
what should he see, but a magnificent cavalry regimentgloriously  
expressive of the courage and exuberant strength of a peopleride  
past him like a luminous stormcloud. The thundering din waxed louder  
and louder, and lo and behold! his own beloved regiment of field  
artillery dashed forward at full speed, out of the mist of motes, and  
sped westward amid an uproar of clattering chains and galloping steeds.  
A minute or two elapsed, and then a column of infantry appeared,  
advancing at the doublethe men's eyes were aflame, their feet struck  
the hard road like mighty hammer-strokes, and their accoutrements  
glistened through the haze. While this procession passed before him,  
on its way to war and perhaps to death,so wonderful in its vital  
strength and formidable courage, and so perfectly symbolic of a race  
that will conquer and prevail, or perish in the attempt,Nietzsche  
was struck with the thought that the highest will to live could not  
find its expression in a miserable "struggle for existence," but in  
a will to war, a Will to Power, a will to overpower! This is said to  
be the history of his first conception of that principle which is at  
the root of all his philosophy, and twelve years later, in Thus Spake  
Zarathustra, we find him expounding it thus:  
  
"Wherever I found a living thing, there found I Will to Power; and even  
in the will of the servant found I the will to be master.  
  
"Only where there is life, is there also will: not, however, Will to  
Life, butso teach I theeWill to Power!  
  
"Much is reckoned higher than life itself by the living one; but out of  
the very reckoning speakeththe Will to Power!"  
  
And three years later still, in Beyond Good and Evil, we read the  
following passage:  
  
"Psychologists should bethink themselves before putting down the  
instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic  
being. A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strengthlife  
itself is Will to Power; self-preservation is only one of the  
indirect and most frequent results thereof."  
  
But in this volume, and the one that is to follow, we shall find  
Nietzsche more mature, more sober, and perhaps more profound than  
in the works above mentioned. All the loves and hates by which we  
know him, we shall come across again in this work; but here he seems  
to stand more above them than he had done heretofore; having once  
enunciated his ideals vehemently and emphatically, he now discusses  
them with a certain grim humour, with more thoroughness and detail, and  
he gives even his enemies a quiet and respectful hearing. His tolerant  
attitude to Christianity on pages 8-9, 107, 323, for instance, is  
a case in point, and his definite description of what we are to  
understand by his pity () leaves us in no doubt as to the calm  
determination of this work. Book One will not seem so well arranged  
or so well worked out as Book Two; the former being more sketchy and  
more speculative than the latter. Be this as it may, it contains deeply  
interesting things, inasmuch as it attempts to trace the elements of  
Nihilismas the outcome of Christian valuesin all the institutions  
of the present day.  
  
In the Second Book Herbert Spencer comes in for a number of telling  
blows, and not the least of these is to be found on page 237, where,  
although his name is not mentioned, it is obviously implied. Here  
Nietzsche definitely disclaims all ideas of an individualistic  
morality, and carefully states that his philosophy aims at a new  
order of rank.  
  
It will seem to some that morality is dealt with somewhat cavalierly  
throughout the two books; but, in this respect, it should not be  
forgotten that Nietzsche not only made a firm stand in favour of  
exceptional men, but that he also believed that any morality is nothing  
more than a mere system of valuations which are determined by the  
conditions in which a given species lives. Hence his words on page 107:  
"Beyond Good and Evil,certainly; but we insist upon the unconditional  
and strict preservation of herd-morality"; and on page 323: "Suppose  
the strong were masters in all respects, even in valuing: let us try  
and think what their attitude would be towards illness, suffering,  
and sacrifice! Self-contempt on the part of the weak would be the  
result: they would do their utmost to disappear and to extirpate their  
kind. And would this be desirable?should we really like a world  
in which the subtlety, the consideration, the intellectuality, the  
plasticityin fact, the whole influence of the weakwas lacking?"  
  
It is obvious from this passage that Nietzsche only objected to the  
influence of herd-morality outside the herdthat is to say, among  
exceptional and higher men who may be wrecked by it. Whereas most other  
philosophers before him had been the "Altruist" of the lower strata of  
humanity, Nietzsche may aptly be called the Altruist of the exceptions,  
of the particular lucky cases among men. For such "varieties," he  
thought, the morality of Christianity had done all it could do, and  
though he in no way wished to underrate the value it had sometimes  
been to them in the past, he saw that at present, in any case, it  
might prove a great danger. With Goethe, therefore, he believed that  
"Hypotheses are only the pieces of scaffolding which are erected round  
a building during the course of its construction, and which are taken  
away as soon as the edifice is completed. To the workman, they are  
indispensable; but he must be careful not to confound the scaffolding  
with the building."1  
  
It is deeply to be deplored that Nietzsche was never able to complete  
his life-work. The fragments of it collected in volumes i. and ii. of  
The Will to Power are sufficiently remarkable to convey some idea of  
what the whole work would have been if only its author had been able to  
arrange and complete it according to his original design.  
  
It is to be hoped that we are too sensible nowadays to allow our  
sensibilities to be shocked by serious and well-meditated criticism,  
even of the most cherished among our institutions, and an honest and  
sincere reformer ought no longer to find us prejudicedto the extent  
of deafnessagainst him, more particularly when he comes forward with  
a gospel"The Will to Power"which is, above all, a test of our power  
to will.  
  
  
  
 When in our dream we hear a bell ringing, or a tapping at  
our door, we scarcely ever wake before having already accounted for the  
sound, in the terms of the dream-world we were in.  
  
 The German word vergleichen, meaning "to compare,"  
contains the root "equal" (gleich) which cannot be rendered in  
English.  
  
 The reference to Stendhal here, seems to point to a  
passage in his Life of Napoleon (Preface, p. xv) of which Nietzsche  
had made a note in another place, and which reads: "Une croyance  
presque instinctive chez moi c'est que tout homme puissant ment quand  
il parle et à plus forte raison quand il écrit."  
  
 See Beyond Good and Evil, in this edition, Aph.   
  
 On the Nature of Pleasure and Pain. "The only motive  
force of man is pain. Pain precedes every pleasure. Pleasure is not a  
positive thing."  
  
 This refers to Goethe's Faust. In Part , Act , Scene  
, we find Faust exclaiming in despair: "Two souls, alas! within my  
bosom throne!" See Theodore Martin's Faust, translated into English  
verse.  
  
 Spencer's conclusion in the Data of Ethics.  
  
 "Berliner"The citizens of Berlin are renowned in Germany  
for their poor jokes.  
  
 German: "Rausch."There is no word in English for the  
German expression "Rausch." When Nietzsche uses it, he means a sort of  
blend of our two words: intoxication and elation.  
  
 "How the music makes one sleep!"  
  
 This is an adapted quotation from Goethe's poem, "The  
Fisherman." The translation is Bowring's.  
  
 The German word is "Naturalist," and really means  
"realist" in a bad sense.  
  
 This sentence for ever distinguishes Nietzsche's  
aristocracy from our present plutocratic and industrial one, for which,  
at the present moment at any rate, it would be difficult to discover  
some meaning.  
  
 The Germans always call Goethe the Olympian.  
  
 Cf. Disraeli in Tancred: "Self-respect, too, is a  
superstition of past ages.... It is not suited to these times; it  
is much too arrogant, too self-conceited, too egoistical. No one is  
important enough to have self-respect nowadays" (book iii. chap.  
v.).  
  
 This not only refers to Heroes and Hero-Worship,  
but doubtless to Carlyle's prodigious misunderstanding of Goethe a  
misunderstanding which still requires to be put right by a critic  
untainted by Puritanism.  
  
 This is reminiscent of Goethe's Faust, See "Prologue in  
Heaven."  
  
 The play on the German words: "Unthier" and "Überthier,"  
"Unmensch" and "Übermensch," is unfortunately not translatable.  
  
 For the benefit of those readers who are not acquainted  
with the circumstances of Nietzsche's life, it would be as well to  
point out that this is a purely personal plaint, comprehensible enough  
in the mouth of one who, like Nietzsche, was for years a lonely  
anchorite.  
  
  
  
  
For the history of the text constituting this volume I would refer  
readers to my preface to The Will to Power, Books I, and II., where  
they will also find a brief explanation of the actual title of the  
complete work.  
  
In the two books before us Nietzsche boldly carries his principle  
still further into the various departments of human life, and does not  
shrink from showing its application even to science, to art, and to  
metaphysics.  
  
Throughout Part of the Third Book we find him going to great pains  
to impress the fact upon us that science is as arbitrary as art in  
its mode of procedure, and that the knowledge of the scientist is but  
the outcome of his inexorable will to power interpreting facts in the  
terms of the self-preservative conditions of the particular order of  
human beings to which he belongs. In Aphorisms 515 and 516, which are  
typical of almost all the thought expressed in Part , Nietzsche says  
distinctly: "The object is not 'to know,' but to schematise,to impose  
as much regularity and form upon chaos as our practical needs require."  
  
Unfamiliarity, constant change, and the inability to reckon with  
possibilities, are sources of great danger: hence, everything must  
be explained, assimilated, and rendered capable of calculation, if  
Nature is to be mastered and controlled.  
  
Schemes for interpreting earthly phenomena must be devised which,  
though they do not require to be absolute or irrefutable, must  
yet favour the maintenance of the kind of men that devises them.  
Interpretation thus becomes all important, and facts sink down to  
the rank of raw material which must first be given some shape (some  
sensealways anthropocentric) before they can become serviceable.  
  
Even the development of reason and logic Nietzsche consistently shows  
to be but a spiritual development of the physiological function  
of digestion which compels an organism to make things "like" (to  
"assimilate") before it can absorb them (Aph. 510). And seeing that he  
denies that hunger can be a first motive (Aphs. 651-656), and proceeds  
to show that it is the amœba's will to power which makes it extend its  
pseudopodia in search of what it can appropriate, and that, once the  
appropriated matter is enveloped, it is a process of making similar  
which constitutes the process of absorption, reason itself is by  
inference acknowledged to be merely a form of the same fundamental will.  
  
An interesting and certainly inevitable outcome of Nietzsche's argument  
appears in Aph. 516, where he declares that even our inability to deny  
and affirm one and the same thing is not in the least necessary, but  
only a sign of inability.  
  
The whole argument of Part tends to draw science ever nearer and  
nearer to art (except, of course, in those cases in which science  
happens to consist merely of an ascertainment of facts), and to prove  
that the one like the other is no more than a means of gaining some  
foothold upon the slippery soil of a world that is for ever in flux.  
  
In the rush and pell-mell of Becoming, some milestones must be fixed  
for the purposes of human orientation. In the torrent of evolutionary  
changes pillars must be made to stand, to which man can for a space  
hold tight and collect his senses. Science, like art, accomplishes this  
for us, and it is our will to power which "creates the impression of  
Being out of Becoming" (Aph. 517).  
  
According to this standpoint, then, consciousness is also but a weapon  
in the service of the will to power, and it extends or contracts  
according to our needs (Aph. 524). It might disappear altogether (Aph.  
523), or, on the other hand, it might increase and make our life more  
complicated than it already is. But we should guard against making  
it the Absolute behind Becoming, simply because it happens to be the  
highest and most recent evolutionary form (Aph. 709). If we had done  
this with each newly acquired characteristic, sight itself, which is a  
relatively recent development, would also have required to have been  
deified.  
  
Pantheism, Theism, Unitarianismin fact all religions in which a  
conscious god is worshipped, are thus aptly classed by Nietzsche  
as the result of man's desire to elevate that which is but a new and  
wonderful instrument of his will to power, to the chief place in the  
imaginary world beyond (eternal soul), and to make it even the deity  
itself (God Omniscient).  
  
With the question of Truth we find Nietzsche quite as ready to uphold  
his thesis as with all other questions. He frankly declares that "the  
criterion of truth lies in the enhancement of the feeling of power"  
(Aph. 534), and thus stands in diametrical opposition to Spencer, who  
makes constraint or inability the criterion of truth. (See Principles  
of Psychology, new edition, chapter ix.... "the unconceivableness of  
its negation is the ultimate test of the truth of a proposition.")  
  
However paradoxical Nietzsche's view may seem, we shall find that  
it is actually substantiated by experience; for the activity of our  
senses certainly convinces us more or less according to the degree to  
which it is provoked. Thus, if we walked for long round a completely  
dark room, and everything yielded, however slightly, to our touch, we  
should remain quite unconvinced that we were in a room at all, more  
particularly ifto suppose a still more impossible casethe floor  
yielded too. What provokes great activity in the bulbs of our fingers,  
then, likewise generates the sensation of truth.  
  
From this Nietzsche proceeds to argue that what provokes the strongest  
sentiments in ourselves is also true to us, and, from the standpoint of  
thought, "that which gives thought the greatest sensation of strength"  
(Aph. 533).  
  
The provocation of intense emotion, and therefore the provocation  
of that state in which the body is above the normal in power, thus  
becomes the index to truth; and it is a very remarkable thing that two  
prominent English thinkers should, at the very end of their careers,  
have practically admitted this, despite the fact that all their  
philosophical productions had been based upon a completely different  
belief. I refer, of course, to Spencer and Buckle, who both upheld the  
view that in a system of thought the emotional factor is of the highest  
importance.  
  
It follows from all this, that lies and false doctrines may quite  
conceivably prove to be even more preservative to species than truth  
itself, and although this is a view we have already encountered in the  
opening aphorisms of Beyond Good and Evil, in Aph, 538 this volume  
we find it further elucidated by Nietzsche's useful demonstration  
of the fact that "the easier way of thinking always triumphs over  
the more difficult way"; and that logic, inasmuch as it facilitated  
classification and orderly thought, ultimately "got to act like truths."  
  
Before leaving Part , with which it would be impossible to deal in  
full, a word or two ought to be said in regard to Nietzsche's views  
concerning the belief in "cause and effect." In the Genealogy of  
Morals (1st Essay, Aph. 13), we have already read a forecast of our  
author's more elaborate opinions on this question, and the aphorism  
in question might be read with advantage in conjunction with the  
discussion on the subject found in this book (Aphs. 545-555).  
  
The whole of Nietzsche's criticism, however, resolves itself into  
this, that the doctrine of causality begins with an unnecessary  
duplication of all that happens. Language, and its origin among a  
people uneducated in thoughts and concepts, is at the root of this  
scientific superstition, and Nietzsche traces its evolution from the  
primeval and savage desire always to find a "doer" behind every deed:  
to find some one who is responsible and who, being known, thus modifies  
the unfamiliarity of the deed which requires explaining. "The so-called  
instinct of causality of which Kant speaks with so much assurance is  
nothing more than the fear of the unfamiliar."  
  
In Aph. 585 , we have a very coherent and therefore valuable  
exposition of much that may still seem obscure in Nietzsche's  
standpoint, and we might almost regard this aphorism as the key to  
the epistemology of the Will to Power. When we find the "will to  
truth" defined merely as "the longing for a stable world," we are in  
possession of the very leitmotiv of Nietzsche's thought throughout Part  
, and most of what follows is clearly but an elaboration of this  
thought.  
  
In Part II. Nietzsche reveals himself as utterly opposed to all  
mechanistic and materialistic interpretations of the Universe. He  
exalts the spirit and repudiates the idea that mere pressure from  
withoutnaked environmentis to be held responsible (and often  
guilty!) for all that materialistic science would lay at its door.  
Darwin again comes in for a good deal of sharp criticism; and, to those  
who are familiar with the nature of Nietzsche's disagreement with this  
naturalist, such aphorisms as Nos. 643, 647, 649, 651, 684, 685, will  
be of special interest. There is one question of great moment, which  
all Nietzsche's perfectly sincere and profoundly serious deprecation  
of the Darwinian standpoint ought to bring home to all Englishmen who  
have perhaps too eagerly endorsed the conclusions of their own British  
school of organic evolution, and that is, to what extent were Malthus,  
and afterwards his disciple Darwin, perhaps influenced in their  
analysis of nature by preconceived notions drawn from the state of  
high pressure which prevailed in the thickly-populated and industrial  
country in which they both lived?  
  
It is difficult to defend Darwin from the fundamental attack which  
Nietzsche directs at the very root of his teaching, and which turns  
upon the question of the motive of all Life's struggle. To assume  
that the motive is always a "struggle for existence" presupposes the  
constant presence of two conditionswant and over-population,an  
assumption which is absolutely non-proven, and it likewise lends a  
peculiarly ignoble and cowardly colouring to the whole of organic life,  
which not only remains unsubstantiated in fact, but which the struggle  
for power completely escapes. In Part III., which, throughout, is  
pretty plain sailing, Aphorism 786 contains perhaps the most important  
statements. Here morality is shown to be merely an instrument, but this  
time it is the instrument of the gregarious will to power. In the last  
paragraph of this aphorism Nietzsche shows himself quite antagonistic  
to Determinism, because of its intimate relation to, and its origin in,  
a mechanistic interpretation of the Universe. But we should always  
remember that, inasmuch as Nietzsche would distribute beliefs, just as  
others distribute bountiesthat is to say, according to the needs of  
those whom he has in view, we must never take for granted that a belief  
which he deprecates for one class of man ought necessarily, according  
to him, to be denied another class.  
  
Hard as it undoubtedly is to bear this in mind, we should remember that  
his appeal is almost without interruption made to higher men, and that  
doctrines and creeds which he condemns for them he would necessarily  
exalt in the case of people who were differently situated and otherwise  
constituted. Christianity is a case in point (see Will to Power, vol.  
i. Aph. 132).  
  
We now come to Part IV., which is possibly the most important part of  
all, seeing that it treats of those questions which may be regarded as  
Nietzsche's most constant concern from the time when he wrote his first  
book.  
  
The world as we now see and know it, with all that it contains which is  
beautiful, indifferent, or ugly, from a human standpoint, is, according  
to Nietzsche, the creation of our own valuing minds. Perhaps only a few  
people have had a hand in shaping this world of values. Maybe their  
number could be counted on the fingers of two hands; but still, what  
Nietzsche insists upon is, that it is human in its origin. Our whole  
outlook, everything that gives us joy or pain, must at one time or  
other have been valued for us, and in persisting in these valuations  
we, as the acclimatised herd, are indebted to our artists, to our  
higher men, to all those in history, who at some time or other have  
dared to stand up and to declare emphatically that this was ugly and  
that that was beautiful, and to fight, and if necessary to die, for  
their opinion.  
  
Religion, morality, and philosophy, while they all aim at so-called  
universal Truth, tend to depreciate the value of life in the eyes of  
exceptional men. Though they establish the "beautiful" for the general  
stock, and in that way enhance the value of life for that stock,  
they contradict higher men's values, and, by so doing, destroy their  
innocent faith in the world. For the problem here is not, what value is  
true?but, what value is most conducive to the highest form of human  
life on earth?  
  
Nietzsche would fain throw all the burden of valuing upon the Dionysian  
artist him who speaks about this world out of the love and plenitude  
of power that is in his own breast, him who, from the very health that  
is within him, cannot look out upon life without transfiguring it,  
hallowing it, blessing it, and making it appear better, bigger, and  
more beautiful. And, in this view, Nietzsche is quite consistent; for,  
if we must accept his conclusion that our values are determined for us  
by our higher men, then it becomes of the highest importance that these  
valuers should be so constituted that their values may be a boon and  
not a bane to the rest of humanity.  
  
Alas! only too often, and especially in the nineteenth century, have  
men who lacked this Dionysian spirit stood up and valued the world; and  
it is against these that Nietzsche protests. It is the bad air they  
have spread which he would fain dispel.  
  
An to what art means to the artist himself, apart from its actual  
effect on the world, Nietzsche would say that it is a manner of  
discharging his will to power. The artist tries to stamp his opinion  
of what is desirable, and of what is beautiful or ugly, upon his  
contemporaries and the future; it is in this valuing that his impulse  
to prevail finds its highest expression. Hence the instinctive economy  
of artists in sex mattersthat is to say, in precisely that quarter  
whither other men go when their impulse to prevail urges them to  
action. Nietzsche did not of course deny the sensual nature of artists  
(Aph. 815); all he wished to make plain was this, that an artist who  
was not moderate, in eroticis, while engaged upon his task, was open  
to the strongest suspicion.  
  
In the Fourth Book Nietzsche is really at his very best. Here, while  
discussing questions such as "The Order of Rank," he is so thoroughly  
in his exclusive sphere, that practically every line, even if it were  
isolated and taken bodily from the context, would bear the unmistakable  
character of its author. The thought expressed in Aphorism 871 reveals  
a standpoint as new as it is necessary. So used have we become to the  
practice of writing and legislating for a mass, that we have forgotten  
the rule that prevails even in our own navythat the speed of a fleet  
is measured by its slowest vessel.  
  
On the same principle, seeing that all our philosophies and moralities  
have hitherto been directed at a mass and at a mob, we find that their  
elevation must of necessity be decided by the lowest of mankind. Thus  
all passions are banned, because base men do not know how to enlist  
them in their service. Men who are masters of themselves and of others,  
men who understand the management and privilege of passion, become the  
most despised of creatures in such systems of thought, because they are  
confounded with the vicious and licentious; and the speed of mankind's  
elevation thus gets to be determined by humanity's slowest vessels.  
  
Aphorisms 881, 882, 886 fully elucidate the above considerations, while  
in 912, 916, 943, and 951 we have plans of a constructive teaching  
which the remainder of Part elaborates.  
  
And now, following Nietzsche carefully through Part II. (Dionysus),  
what is the inevitable conclusion of all we have read? This analysis  
of the world's collective values and their ascription to a certain  
"will to power" may now seem to many but an exhaustive attempt at a new  
system of nomenclature, and little else. As a matter or fact it is very  
much more than this. By mean? of it Nietzsche wishes to show mankind  
how much has lain, and how much still lies, in man's power By laying  
his finger on everything and declaring to man that it was human will  
that created it. Nietzsche wished to give man the courage of this will,  
and a clean conscience in exercising it. For it was precisely this very  
will to power which had been most hated and most maligned by everybody  
up to Nietzsche's time.  
  
Long enough, prompted by the fear of attributing any one of his  
happiest thoughts to this hated fundamental will, had man ascribed  
all his valuations and all his most sublime inspirations to something  
outside himself,whether this something were a God, a principle, or  
the concept Truth. But Nietzsche's desire was to show man how human,  
all too human, have been the values that have appeared heretofore;  
he wished to prove, that to the rare sculptors of values, the world,  
despite its past, is still an open field of yielding clay, and in  
pointing to what the will to power has done until now, Nietzsche  
suggests to these coming sculptors what might still be done, provided  
they fear nothing, and have that innocence and that profound faith in  
the fundamental will which others hitherto have had in God, Natural  
Laws, Truth, and other euphemistic fictions.  
  
The doctrine of Eternal Recurrence, to which Nietzsche attached so much  
importance that it may be regarded almost as the inspiration which led  
to his great work, Thus Spake Zarathustra, ought to be understood  
in the light of a purely disciplinary and chastening creed. In one of  
his posthumous works we find Nietzsche saying: "The question which  
thou shalt have to answer before every deed that thou doest;is this  
such a deed as I am prepared to perform an incalculable number of  
times,is the best ballast." Thus it is obvious that, feeling the need  
of something in his teaching which would replace the metaphysics of  
former beliefs, he applied the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence to this  
end. Seeing, however, that even among Nietzscheans themselves there  
is considerable doubt concerning the actual value of the doctrine as  
a ruling belief, it does not seem necessary to enter here into the  
scientific justification which he claims for it. Suffice it to say  
that, as knowledge stands at present, the statement that the world will  
recur eternally in small things as in great, is still a somewhat daring  
conjecturea conjecture, however, which would have been entirely  
warrantable if its disciplinary value had been commensurate with its  
daring.