FIRST BOOK. EUROPEAN NIHILISM. A PLAN

I. NIHILISM--

1. Nihilism as an Outcome of the Valuations and Interpretations of

Existence which have prevailed hitherto

2. Further Causes of Nihilism

3. The Nihilistic Movement as an Expression of Decadence

4. The Crisis: Nihilism and the Idea of Recurrence

II. CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN NIHILISM--

Modern Gloominess

The Last Centuries

Signs of Increasing Strength

SECOND BOOK. A CRITICISM OF THE HIGHEST VALUES THAT HAVE PREVAILED

HITHERTO.

I. CRITICISM OF RELIGION--

1. Concerning the Origin of Religions

2. Concerning the History of Christianity

3. Christian Ideals

II. A CRITICISM OF MORALITY--

1. The Origin of Moral Valuations

2. The Herd

3. General Observations concerning Morality

4. How Virtue is made to Dominate

5. The Moral Ideal--

A Criticism of Ideals

A Criticism of the "Good Man," of the Saint, etc.

Concerning the Slander of the so-called Evil Qualities

A Criticism of the Words: Improving, Perfecting, Elevating

6. Concluding Remarks concerning the Criticism of Morality

III. CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY--

1. General Remarks

2. A Criticism of Greek Philosophy

3. The Truths and Errors of Philosophers

4. Concluding Remarks in the Criticism of Philosophy

Concerning great things one should either be silent or one should speak

loftily:--loftily--that is to say, cynically and innocently.

What I am now going to relate is the history of the next two centuries.

I shall describe what will happen, what must necessarily happen:

\_the triumph of Nihilism.\_ This history can be written already; for

necessity itself is at work in bringing it about. This future is

already proclaimed by a hundred different omens; as a destiny it

announces its advent everywhere, for this music of to-morrow all ears

are already pricked. The whole of our culture in Europe has long

been writhing in an agony of suspense which increases from decade

to decade as if in expectation of a catastrophe: restless, violent,

helter-skelter, like a torrent that will \_reach its bourne,\_ and

refuses to reflect--yea, that even dreads reflection.

On the other hand, the present writer has done little else, hitherto,

than \_reflect and meditate,\_ like an instinctive philosopher and

anchorite, who found his advantage in isolation--in remaining outside,

in patience, procrastination, and lagging behind; like a weighing and

testing spirit who has already lost his way in every labyrinth of

the future; like a prophetic bird-spirit that \_looks backwards\_ when

it would announce what is to come; like the first perfect European

Nihilist, who, however, has already outlived Nihilism in his own

soul--who has out-grown, overcome, and dismissed it.

For the reader must not misunderstand the meaning of the title which

has been given to this Evangel of the Future. "\_The Will to Power:

An Attempted Transvaluation of all Values\_"--with this formula a

\_counter-movement\_ finds expression, in regard to both a principle and

a mission; a movement which in some remote future will supersede this

perfect Nihilism; but which nevertheless regards it as a \_necessary

step,\_ both logically and psychologically, towards its own advent,

and which positively cannot come, except \_on top of\_ and \_out of\_ it.

For, why is the triumph of Nihilism \_inevitable\_ now? Because the

very values current amongst us to-day will arrive at their logical

conclusion in Nihilism,--because Nihilism is the only possible outcome

of our greatest values and ideals,--because we must first experience

Nihilism before we can realise what the actual worth of these "values"

was.... Sooner or later we shall be in need of \_new values.\_

Nihilism is at our door: whence comes this most gruesome of all

guests to us?--To begin with, it is a mistake to point to "social

evils," "physiological degeneration," or even to corruption as a cause

of Nihilism. This is the most straightforward and most sympathetic age

that ever was. Evil, whether spiritual, physical, or intellectual, is,

in itself, quite unable to introduce Nihilism, \_i.e.,\_ the absolute

repudiation of worth, purpose, desirability. These evils allow of yet

other and quite different explanations. But there is one \_very definite

explanation\_ of the phenomena: Nihilism harbours in the heart of

Christian morals.

The downfall of Christianity,--through its morality (which is

insuperable), which finally turns against the Christian God Himself

(the sense of truth, highly developed through Christianity, ultimately

revolts against the falsehood and fictitiousness of all Christian

interpretations of the world and its history. The recoil-stroke of

"God is Truth" in the fanatical Belief, is: "All is false." Buddhism

of \_action\_....).

Doubt in morality is the decisive factor. The downfall of the

\_moral\_ interpretation of the universe, which loses its \_raison

d'être\_ once it has tried to take flight to a Beyond, meets its

end in Nihilism. "Nothing has any purpose" (the inconsistency of

one explanation of the world, to which men have devoted untold

energy,--gives rise to the suspicion that all explanations may perhaps

be false). The Buddhistic feature: a yearning for nonentity (Indian

Buddhism has no fundamentally moral development at the back of it; that

is why Nihilism in its case means only morality not overcome; existence

is regarded as a punishment and conceived as an error; error is thus

held to be punishment--a moral valuation). Philosophical attempts to

overcome the "moral God" (Hegel, \_Pantheism\_). The vanquishing of

popular ideals: the wizard, the saint, the bard. Antagonism of "true"

and "beautiful" and "good."

Against "purposelessness" on the one hand, against moral valuations

on the other: how far has all science and philosophy been cultivated

heretofore under the influence of moral judgments? And have we not got

the additional factor--the enmity of science, into the bargain? Or the

prejudice against science? Criticism of Spinoza. Christian valuations

everywhere present as remnants in socialistic and positivistic systems.

A criticism of Christian morality is altogether lacking.

The Nihilistic consequences of present natural science (along

with its attempts to escape into a Beyond). Out of its practice there

finally \_arises\_ a certain self-annihilation, an antagonistic attitude

towards itself--a sort of anti-scientificality. Since Copernicus man

has been rolling away from the centre towards.

The Nihilistic consequences of the political and politico-economical

way of thinking, where all principles at length become tainted with the

atmosphere of the platform: the breath of mediocrity, insignificance,

dishonesty, etc. Nationalism. Anarchy, etc. Punishment. Everywhere

the deliverer is missing, either as a class or as a single man the

justifier.

Nihilistic consequences of history and of the "practical historian,"

i.e., the romanticist. The attitude of art is quite unoriginal in

modern life. Its gloominess. Goethe's so-called Olympian State.

Art and the preparation of Nihilism. Romanticism (the conclusion of

Wagner's Ring of the Nibelung.

NIHILISM AS AN OUTCOME OF THE VALUATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF

EXISTENCE WHICH HAVE PREVAILED HERETOFORE.

What does Nihilism mean? That the highest values are losing their

value.There is no bourne. There is no answer to the question: "to

what purpose?"

Thorough Nihilism is the conviction that life is absurd, in the

light of the highest values already discovered; it also includes the

view that we have not the smallest right to assume the existence of

transcendental objects or things in themselves, which would be either

divine or morality incarnate.

This view is a result of fully developed "truthfulness": therefore a

consequence of the belief in morality.

What advantages did the Christian hypothesis of morality offer?

It bestowed an intrinsic value upon men, which contrasted with

their apparent insignificance and subordination to chance in the

eternal flux of becoming and perishing.

It served the purpose of God's advocates, inasmuch as it granted

the world a certain perfection despite its sorrow and evil--it also

granted the world that proverbial "freedom": evil seemed full of

meaning.

It assumed that man could have a knowledge of absolute values,

and thus granted him adequate perception for the most important

things.

It prevented man from despising himself as man, from turning

against life, and from being driven to despair by knowledge: it was a

self-preservative measure.

In short: Morality was the great \_antidote\_ against practical and

theoretical Nihilism.

But among the forces reared by morality, there was truthfulness:

this in the end turns against morality, exposes the teleology of the

latter, its interestedness, and now the recognition of this lie so

long incorporated, from which we despaired of ever freeing ourselves,

acts just like a stimulus. We perceive certain needs in ourselves,

implanted during the long dynasty of the moral interpretation of life,

which now seem to us to be needs of untruth: on the other hand, those

very needs represent the highest values owing to which we are able to

endure life. We have ceased from attaching any worth to what we

know, and we dare not attach any more worth to that with which we

would fain deceive ourselves from this antagonism there results a

process of dissolution.

This is the antinomy: In so far as we believe in morality, we condemn

existence.

The highest values in the service of which man ought to live, more

particularly when they oppressed and constrained him most these

social values, owing to their tone-strengthening tendencies,

were built over men's heads as though they were the will of God or

"reality," or the actual world, or even a hope of a world to come.

Now that the lowly origin of these values has become known, the

whole universe seems to have been transvalued and to have lost its

Significance but this is only an intermediate stage.

The consequence of Nihilism (disbelief in all values) as a result

of a moral valuation:We have grown to dislike egotism (even

though we have realised the impossibility of altruism); we have

grown to dislike what is most necessary (although we have recognised

the impossibility of a liberum arbitrium and of an "intelligible

freedom"). We perceive that we do not reach the spheres in which we

have set our values--at the same time those other spheres in which we

live have not thereby gained one iota in value. On the contrary, we

are tired, because we have lost the main incentive to live. "All in

vain hitherto!"

"Pessimism as a preparatory state to Nihilism."

Pessimism viewed as strength in what respect? In the energy of

its logic, as anarchy, Nihilism, and analysis.

Pessimism regarded as collapse in what sense? In the sense of

its being a softening influence, a sort of cosmopolitan befingering, a

"tout comprendre," and historical spirit.

Critical tension: extremes make their appearance and become dominant.

The logic of Pessimism leads finally to Nihilism: what is the force at

Work? The notion that \_there are no values, and no purpose: the

recognition of the part that moral valuations have played in all other

lofty values.

Result: moral valuations are condemnations, negations; morality is the

abdication of the will to live.

THE COLLAPSE OF COSMOPOLITAN VALUES.

Nihilism will have to manifest itself as a psychological condition,

first when we have sought in all that has happened a purpose which

is not there: so that the seeker will ultimately lose courage.

Nihilism is therefore the coming into consciousness of the long

waste of strength, the pain of "futility," uncertainty, the lack

of an opportunity to recover in some way, or to attain to a state of

peace concerning anything shame in one's own presence, as if one

had cheated oneself too long. The purpose above-mentioned might

have been achieved: in the form of a "realisation" of a most high

canon of morality in all worldly phenomena, the moral order of the

universe; or in the form of the increase of love and harmony in the

traffic of humanity; or in the nearer approach to a general condition

of happiness; or even in the march towards general nonentity any sort

of goal always constitutes a purpose. The common factor to all these

appearances is that something will be attained, through the process

itself: and now we perceive that Becoming has been aiming at nothing,

and has achieved nothing. Hence the disillusionment in regard to a

so-called purpose in existence, as a cause of Nihilism; whether this

be in respect of a very definite purpose, or generalised into the

recognition that all the hypotheses are false which have hitherto been

offered as to the object of life, and which relate to the whole of

"Evolution" (man no longer an assistant in, let alone the culmination

of, the evolutionary process).

Nihilism will manifest itself as a psychological condition, in the

second place, when man has fixed a totality, a systematisation, even an

organisation in and behind all phenomena, so that the soul thirsting

for respect and admiration will wallow in the general idea of a highest

ruling and administrative power (if it be the soul of a logician,

the sequence of consequences and perfect reasoning will suffice to

conciliate everything). A kind of unity, some form of "monism":'

and as a result of this belief man becomes obsessed by a feeling of

profound relativity and dependence in the presence of an All which

is infinitely superior to him, a sort of divinity. "The general good

exacts the surrender of the individual ..." but lo, there is no such

general good! At bottom, man loses the belief in his own worth when no

infinitely precious entity manifests itself through him--that is to

say, he conceived such an All, in order to be able to believe in his

own worth.

Nihilism, as a psychological condition, has yet a third and last form.

Admitting these two points of view: that no purpose can be assigned

to Becoming, and that no great entity rules behind all Becoming, in

which the individual may completely lose himself as in an element of

superior value; there still remains the subterfuge which would

consist in condemning this whole world of Becoming as an illusion,

and in discovering a world which would lie beyond it, and would be a

Real world. The moment, however, that man perceives that this world

has been devised only for the purpose of meeting certain psychological

needs, and that he has no right whatsoever to it, the final form of

Nihilism comes into being, which comprises a denial of a metaphysical

world,\_ and which forbids itself all belief in a real world. From

this standpoint, the reality of Becoming is the only reality that

is admitted: all bypaths to back-worlds and false godheads are

Abandoned but this world is no longer endured, although no one wishes

to disown it.

What has actually happened? The feeling of worthlessness was realised

when it was understood that neither the notion of "Purpose" nor

that of "Unity" nor that of "Truth" could be made to interpret

the general character of existence. Nothing is achieved or obtained

thereby; the unity which intervenes in the multiplicity of events is

entirely lacking: the character of existence is not "true," it is

false; there is certainly no longer any reason to believe in a real

world. In short, the categories, "Purpose," "Unity," "Being," by means

of which we had lent some worth to life, we have once more divorced

from it--and the world now appears worthless to us.

Admitting that we have recognised the impossibility of interpreting

world by means of these three categories, and that from this

standpoint the world begins to be worthless to us; we must ask

ourselves whence we derived our belief in these three categories.

Let us see if it is possible to refuse to believe in them. If we can

deprive them of their value, the proof that they cannot be applied to

the world, is no longer a sufficient reason for depriving that world

of its value.

Result: The belief in the categories of reason is the cause

of Nihilism we have measured the worth of the world according to

categories which can only be applied to a purely fictitious world.

Conclusion: All values with which we have tried, hitherto, to lend

the world some worth, from our point of view, and with which we have

therefore deprived it of all worth (once these values have been

shown to be inapplicable) all these values, are, psychologically,

the results of certain views of utility, established for the purpose

of maintaining and increasing the dominion of certain communities:

but falsely projected into the nature of things. It is always man's

exaggerated ingenuousness to regard himself as the sense and measure

of all things.

Nihilism represents an intermediary pathological condition (the vast

generalisation, the conclusion that there is no purpose in anything,

is pathological): whether it be that the productive forces are not

yet strong enough--or that decadence still hesitates and has not yet

discovered its expedients.

The conditions of this hypothesis: That there is no truth; that

there is no absolute state of affairs no "thing-in-itself." This

alone is Nihilism, and of the most extreme kind. It finds that the

value of things consists precisely in the fact that these values are

not real and never have been real, but that they are only a symptom

of strength on the part of the valuer, a simplification serving the

purposes of existence.

Values and their modification are related to the growth of power of

the valuer.

The measure of disbelief and of the "freedom of spirit" which is

tolerated, viewed as an expression of the growth of power.

"Nihilism" viewed as the ideal of the highest spiritual power, of the

over-rich life, partly destructive, partly ironical.

What is belief? How is a belief born? All belief assumes that

something is true.

The extremest form of Nihilism would mean that all belief all

assumption of truth is false: because no real world is at hand.

It were therefore: only an appearance seen in perspective, whose

origin must be found in us (seeing that we are constantly in need of a

narrower, a shortened, and simplified world).

This should be realised, that the extent to which we can, in our heart

of hearts, acknowledge appearance, and the necessity of falsehood,

without going to rack and ruin, is the measure of strength.

In this respect, Nihilism, in that it is the negation of a real world

and of Being, might be a divine view of the world.

If we are disillusioned, we have not become so in regard to life,

but owing to the fact that our eyes have been opened to all kinds

of "desiderata." With mocking anger we survey that which is called

"Ideal": we despise ourselves only because we are unable at every

moment of our lives to quell that absurd emotion which is called

"Idealism." This pampering by means of ideals is stronger than the

anger of the disillusioned one.

To what extent does Schopenhauerian Nihilism continue to be the result

of the same ideal as that which gave rise to Christian Theism? The

amount of certainty concerning the most exalted desiderata, the highest

values and the greatest degree of perfection, was so great, that the

philosophers started out from it as if it had been an a priori and

absolute fact: "God" at the head, as the given quantity Truth. "To

become like God," "to be absorbed into the Divine Being"--these were

for centuries the most ingenuous and most convincing desiderata (but

that which convinces is not necessarily true on that account: it is

nothing more nor less than convincing. An observation for donkeys).

The granting of a personal-reality to this accretion of ideals

has been unlearned: people have become atheistic. But has the ideal

actually been abandoned? The latest metaphysicians, as a matter of

fact, still seek their true "reality" in it the "thing-in-itself"

beside which everything else is merely appearance. Their dogma is, that

because our world of appearance is so obviously not the expression

of that ideal, it therefore cannot be "true" and at bottom does not

even lead back to that metaphysical world as cause. The unconditioned,

in so far as it stands for that highest degree of perfection, cannot

possibly be the reason of all the conditioned. Schopenhauer, who

desired it otherwise, was obliged to imagine this metaphysical basis as

the antithesis to the ideal, as "an evil, blind will": thus it could

be "that which appears," that which manifests itself in the world of

appearance. But even so, he did not give up that ideal absolute he

circumvented it.

(Kant seems to have needed the hypothesis of "intelligible freedom,"

in order to relieve the ens perfectum of the responsibility of having

contrived this world as it is, in short, in order to explain evil:

scandalous logic for a philosopher!).

The most general sign of modern times: in his own estimation, man has

lost an infinite amount of dignity. For a long time he was the centre

and tragic hero of life in general; then he endeavoured to demonstrate

at least his relationship to the most essential and in itself most

valuable side of life as all metaphysicians do, who wish to hold fast

to the dignity of man, in their belief that moral values are cardinal

values. He who has let God go, clings all the more strongly to the

belief in morality.

Every purely moral valuation (as, for instance, the Buddhistic)

terminates in Nihilism: Europe must expect the same thing! It is

supposed that one can get along with a morality bereft of a religious

background; but in this direction the road to Nihilism is opened. There

is nothing in religion which compels us to regard ourselves as valuing

creatures.

The question which Nihilism puts, namely, "to what purpose?" is the

outcome of a habit, hitherto, to regard the purpose as something fixed,

given and exacted from outside that is to say, by some supernatural

authority. Once the belief in this has been unlearned, the force of an

old habit leads to the search after another authority, which would

know how to speak unconditionally, and could point to goals and

missions. The authority of the conscience now takes the first place

(the more morality is emancipated from theology, the more imperative

does it become) as a compensation for the personal authority. Or

the authority of reason. Or the gregarious instinct (the herd).

Or history with its immanent spirit, which has its goal in itself,

and to which one can abandon oneself. One would like to \_evade\_ the

will, as also the willing of a goal and the risk of setting oneself

a goal. One would like to get rid of the responsibility (Fatalism would be accepted). Finally: Happiness and with a dash of humbug, the

happiness of the greatest number.

It is said:

A definite goal is quite unnecessary.

Such a goal cannot possibly be foreseen. Precisely now, when will

in its fullest strength were \_necessary,\_ it is in the \_weakest\_

and most \_pusillanimous\_ condition. \_Absolute mistrust concerning the

organising power\_ of the will.

21.

\_The perfect Nihilist.\_--The Nihilist's eye \_idealises in an ugly

sense,\_ and is inconstant to what it remembers: it allows its

recollections to go astray and to fade, it does not protect them from

that cadaverous coloration with which weakness dyes all that is distant

and past. And what it does not do for itself it fails to do for the

whole of mankind as well--that is to say, it allows it to drop.

22.

Nihilism. It may be \_two things\_:--

A. Nihilism as a sign of \_enhanced spiritual strength\_: active Nihilism.

B. Nihilism as a sign of the \_collapse\_ and \_decline\_ of spiritual

\_strength\_: passive Nihilism.

23.

Nihilism, a \_normal\_ condition.

It may be a sign of \_strength\_; spiritual vigour may have increased to

such an extent that the \_goals\_ toward which man has marched \_hitherto\_

(the "convictions," articles of faith) are no longer suited to it

(for a faith generally expresses the exigencies of the \_conditions of

existence,\_ a submission to the authority of an order of things which

\_conduces\_ to the \_prosperity,\_ the \_growth\_ and \_power\_ of a living

creature ...); on the other hand, a sign of \_insufficient\_ strength, to

fix a goal, a "wherefore," and a faith for itself.

It reaches its \_maximum\_ of relative strength, as a powerful

\_destructive\_ force, in the form of \_active Nihilism.\_

Its opposite would be \_weary\_ Nihilism, which no longer attacks: its

most renowned form being Buddhism: as \_passive\_ Nihilism, a sign of

weakness: spiritual strength may be fatigued, \_exhausted,\_ so that the

goals and values which have prevailed \_hitherto\_ are no longer suited

to it and are no longer believed in--so that the synthesis of values

and goals (upon which every strong culture stands) decomposes, and

the different values contend with one another: \_Disintegration,\_ then

everything which is relieving, which heals, becalms, or stupefies,

steps into the foreground under the cover of various \_disguises,\_

either religious, moral, political or æsthetic, etc.

24.

Nihilism is not only a meditating over the "in vain!"--not only the

belief that everything deserves to perish; but one actually puts

one's shoulder to the plough; \_one destroys.\_ This, if you will, is

illogical; but the Nihilist does not believe in the necessity of being

logical.... It is the condition of strong minds and wills; and to these

it is impossible to be satisfied with the negation of judgment: the

\_negation by deeds\_ proceeds from their nature. Annihilation by the

reasoning faculty seconds annihilation by the hand.

25.

\_Concerning the genesis of the Nihilist.\_ The courage of all one really

\_knows\_ comes but late in life. It is only quite recently that I have

acknowledged to myself that heretofore I have been a Nihilist from top

to toe. The energy and thoroughness with which I marched forward as a

Nihilist deceived me concerning this fundamental principle. When one is

progressing towards a goal it seems impossible that "aimlessness \_per

se\_" should be one's fundamental article of faith.

26.

\_The Pessimism of strong natures.\_ The "wherefore" after a terrible

struggle, even after victory. That something may exist which is a

hundred times \_more important\_ than the question, whether we feel well

or unwell, is the fundamental instinct of all strong natures--and

consequently too, whether the \_others\_ feel well or unwell. In short,

that we have a purpose, for which we would not even hesitate to

\_sacrifice men,\_ run all risks, and bend our backs to the worst: \_this

is the great passion\_.

2. FURTHER CAUSES OF NIHILISM.

27.

\_The causes of Nihilism\_: (1) \_The higher species is lacking, i.e.,\_

the species whose inexhaustible fruitfulness and power would uphold our

belief in Man (think only of what is owed to Napoleon--almost all the

higher hopes of this century).

(2) \_The inferior species\_ ("herd," "ass," "society") is forgetting

modesty, and inflates its needs into \_cosmic\_ and \_metaphysical\_

values. In this way all life is \_vulgarised\_: for inasmuch as the

\_mass\_ of mankind rules, it tyrannises over the \_exceptions,\_ so that

these lose their belief in themselves and become \_Nihilists.\_

All attempts to \_conceive of a new species\_ come to nothing

("romanticism," the artist, the philosopher; against Carlyle's attempt

to lend them the highest moral values).

The result is that higher types are \_resisted\_.

\_The downfall and insecurity of all higher types.\_ The struggle against

genius ("popular poetry," etc.). Sympathy with the lowly and the

suffering as a \_standard\_ for the \_elevation of the soul\_.

The \_philosopher is lacking,\_ the interpreter of deeds, and not alone

he who poetises them.

28.

\_Imperfect\_ Nihilism--its forms: we are now surrounded by them.

All attempts made to escape Nihilism, which do not consist in

transvaluing the values that have prevailed hitherto, only make the

matter worse; they complicate the problem.

29.

\_The varieties of self-stupefaction.\_ In one's heart of hearts, not to

know, whither? Emptiness. The attempt to rise superior to it all by

means of emotional intoxication: emotional intoxication in the form of

music, in the form of cruelty in the tragic joy over the ruin of the

noblest, and in the form of blind, gushing enthusiasm over individual

\_men\_ or distinct \_periods\_ (in the form of hatred, etc.). The attempt

to work blindly, like a scientific instrument; to keep an eye on the

many small joys, like an investigator, for instance (modesty towards

oneself); the mysticism of the voluptuous \_joy\_ of eternal emptiness;

art "for art's sake" ("le fait"), "immaculate investigation," in the

form of narcotics against the disgust of oneself; any kind of incessant

work, \_any\_ kind of small foolish fanaticism; the medley of all

means, illness as the result of general profligacy (dissipation kills

pleasure).

(1) As a result, feeble will-power.

(2) Excessive pride and the humiliation of petty weakness felt as a

contrast.

30.

The time is coming when we shall have to pay for having been

\_Christians\_ for two thousand years: we are losing the equilibrium

which enables us to live--for a long while we shall not know in what

direction we are travelling. We are hurling ourselves headlong into the

\_opposite\_ valuations, with that degree of energy which could only have

been engendered in man by an \_overvaluation\_ of himself.

Now, everything is false from the root, words and nothing but words,

confused, feeble, or over-strained.

\_(a)\_ There is a seeking after a sort of earthly solution of the

problem of life, but in the same sense as that of the \_final triumph\_

of truth, love, justice (socialism: "equality of persons").

\_(b)\_ There is also an attempt to hold fast to the \_moral ideal\_ (with

altruism, self-sacrifice, and the denial of the will, in the front

rank).

\_(c)\_ There is even an attempt to hold fast to a "Beyond": were it

only as an antilogical \_x\_; but it is forthwith interpreted in such a

way that a kind of metaphysical solace, after the old style, may be

derived from it.

\_(d)\_ There is an attempt to read the phenomena of life in such a

way as to arrive \_at the divine guidance of old,\_ with its powers

of rewarding, punishing, educating, and of generally conducing to a

something \_better\_ in the order of things.

\_(e)\_ People once more believe in good and evil; so that the victory of

the good and the annihilation of the evil is regarded as a \_duty\_ (this

is English, and is typical of that blockhead, John Stuart Mill).

(f) The contempt felt for "naturalness," for the desires and for the

ego: the attempt to regard even the highest intellectuality of art as a

result of an impersonal and disinterested attitude.

(g) The Church is still allowed to meddle in all the essential

occurrences and incidents in the life of the individual, with a view to

consecrating it and giving it a \_loftier\_ meaning: we still have the

"Christian State" and the "Christian marriage."

31.

There have been more thoughtful and more destructively thoughtful[4]

times than ours: times like those in which Buddha appeared, for

instance, in which the people themselves, after centuries of sectarian

quarrels, had sunk so deeply into the abyss of philosophical dogmas,

as, from time to time, European people have done in regard to the fine

points of religious dogma. "Literature" and the press would be the last

things to seduce one to any high opinion of the spirit of our times:

the millions of Spiritists, and a Christianity with gymnastic exercises

of that ghastly ugliness which is characteristic of all English

inventions, throw more light on the subject.

European \_Pessimism\_ is still in its infancy--a fact which argues

against it: it has not yet attained to that prodigious and yearning

fixity of sight to which it attained in India once upon a time, and

in which nonentity is reflected; there is still too much of the

"ready-made," and not enough of the "evolved" in its constitution, too

much learned and poetic Pessimism; I mean that a good deal of it has

been discovered, invented, and "created," but not caused.

32.

Criticism of the Pessimism which has prevailed hitherto. The want of

the eudæmonological standpoint, as a last abbreviation of the question:

what is the \_purpose\_ of it all? The reduction of gloom.

\_Our\_ Pessimism: the world has not the value which we believed it to

have,--our faith itself has so increased our instinct for research that

we are \_compelled\_ to say this to-day. In the first place, it seems of

less value: \_at first it is felt\_ to be of less value,--only in this

sense are we pessimists,--that is to say, with the will to acknowledge

this transvaluation without reserve, and no longer, as heretofore, to

deceive ourselves and chant the old old story.

It is precisely in this way that we find the pathos which urges us to

seek for \_new values.\_ In short: the world might have far more value

than we thought--we must get behind the \_naïveté of our ideals,\_ for

it is possible that, in our conscious effort to give it the highest

interpretation, we have not bestowed even a moderately just value upon

it.

What has been \_deified\_? The valuing instinct inside the \_community\_

(that which enabled it to survive).

What has been \_calumniated\_? That which has tended to separate higher

men from their inferiors, the instincts which cleave gulfs and build

barriers.

33.

Causes effecting the \_rise of Pessimism\_:--

(1) The most powerful instincts and those which promised most for the

future have hitherto been \_calumniated,\_ so that life has a curse upon

it.

(2) The growing bravery and the more daring mistrust on the part of man

have led him to discover the fact that \_these instincts cannot be

cut adrift from life,\_ and thus he turns to embrace life.

(3) Only the most \_mediocre,\_ who are not \_conscious\_ of this conflict,

prosper; the higher species fail, and as an example of degeneration

tend to dispose all hearts against them--on the other hand, there is

some indignation caused by the mediocre positing themselves as the end

and meaning of all things. No one can any longer reply to the question:

"Why?"

(4) Belittlement, susceptibility to pain, unrest, haste, and confusion

are steadily increasing--the materialisation of all these tendencies,

which is called "civilisation," becomes every day more simple, with

the result that, in the face of the monstrous machine, the individual

\_despairs\_ and \_surrenders.\_

34.

Modern Pessimism is an expression of the uselessness only of the

\_modern\_ world, not of the world and existence as such.

35.

The "preponderance of \_pain over pleasure"\_ or the reverse (Hedonism);

both of these doctrines are already signposts to Nihilism....

For here, in both cases, no other final purpose is sought than the

phenomenon pleasure or pain.

But only a man who no longer dares to posit a will, a purpose, and a

final goal can speak in this way--according to every healthy type of

man, the worth of life is certainly not measured by the standard of

these secondary things. And a \_preponderance\_ of pain would be possible

and, \_in spite of it,\_ a mighty will, a \_saying of yea\_ to life, and a

holding of this preponderance for necessary.

"Life is not worth living"; "Resignation"; "what is the good of

tears?"--this is a feeble and sentimental attitude of mind. "\_Un

monstre gai vaut mieux qu'un sentimental ennuyeux.\_"

36.

The philosophie Nihilist is convinced that all phenomena are without

sense and are in vain, and that there ought to be no such thing as

Being without sense and in vain. But whence comes this "There ought

not to be?"--whence this "sense" and \_this standard\_? At bottom the

Nihilist supposes that the sight of such a desolate, useless Being is

\_unsatisfying\_ to the philosopher, and fills him with desolation and

despair. This aspect of the case is opposed to our subtle sensibilities

as a philosopher. It leads to the absurd conclusion that the character

of existence \_must perforce afford pleasure to the philosopher\_ if it

is to have any right to subsist.

Now it is easy to understand that happiness and unhappiness, within

the phenomena of this world, can only serve the purpose of \_means\_:

the question yet remaining to be answered is, whether it \_will

ever be possible\_ for us to perceive the "object" and "purpose" of

life--whether the problem of purposelessness or the reverse is not

quite beyond our ken.

37.

The development of \_Nihilism out of Pessimism.\_ The denaturalisation

of \_Values.\_ Scholasticism of values. The values isolated, idealistic,

instead of ruling and leading action, turn \_against\_ it and condemn it.

Opposites introduced in the place of natural gradations and ranks.

Hatred of the order of rank. Opposites are compatible with a plebeian

age, because they are more easy to grasp.

The \_rejected\_ world is opposed to an artificially constructed "true

and valuable" one. At last we discover out of what material the "true"

world was built; all that remains, now, is the rejected world, and to

the account of our reasons for \_rejecting it we place our greatest

disillusionment.\_

At this point \_Nihilism\_ is reached; the directing values have been

retained--nothing more!

This gives rise to \_the problem of strength and weakness\_:--

(1) The weak fall to pieces upon it;

(2) The strong destroy what does not fall to pieces of its own accord;

(3) The strongest overcome the directing values.

\_The whole condition of affairs produces the tragic age.\_

3. THE NIHILISTIC MOVEMENT AS AN EXPRESSION OF DECADENCE.

38.

Just lately an accidental and in every way inappropriate term has been

very much misused: everywhere people are speaking of "\_Pessimism\_,"

and there is a fight around the question (to which some replies must be

forthcoming): which is right--Pessimism or Optimism?

People have not yet seen what is so terribly-obvious--namely, that

Pessimism is not a problem but a \_symptom,\_--that the term ought to be

replaced by "Nihilism,"--that the question, "to be or not to be," is

itself an illness, a sign of degeneracy, an idiosyncrasy.

The Nihilistic movement is only an expression of physiological

decadence.

39.

\_To be understood\_:--That every kind of decline and tendency to

sickness has incessantly been at work in helping to create general

evaluations: that in those valuations which now dominate, decadence

has even begun to preponderate, that we have not only to combat the

conditions which present misery and degeneration have brought into

being; but that all decadence, previous to that of our own times, has

been transmitted and has therefore remained an \_active force\_ amongst

us. A universal departure of this kind, on the part of man, from

his fundamental instincts, such universal decadence of the valuing

judgment, is the note of interrogation \_par excellence,\_ the real

riddle, which the animal "man" sets to all philosophers.

40.

\_The notion "decadence":--Decay, decline,\_ and \_waste,\_ are, \_per se,\_

in no way open to objection; they are the natural consequences of life

and vital growth. The phenomenon of decadence is just as necessary to

life as advance or progress is: we are not in a position which enables

us to \_suppress\_ it. On the contrary, reason \_would have it retain its

rights.\_

It is disgraceful on the part of socialist-theorists to argue that

circumstances and social combinations could be devised which would put

an end to all vice, illness, crime, prostitution, and poverty.... But

that is tantamount to condemning \_Life\_ ... a society is not at liberty

to remain young. And even in its prime it must bring forth ordure and

decaying matter. The more energetically and daringly it advances, the

richer will it be in failures and in deformities, and the nearer it

will be to its fall. Age is not deferred by means of institutions. Nor

is illness. Nor is vice.

41.

Fundamental aspect of the nature of decadence: \_what has heretofore

been regarded as its causes are its effects.\_

In this way, the whole perspective \_of the problems of morality\_ is

altered.

All the struggle of morals against vice, luxury, crime, and even

against illness, seems a \_naïveté,\_ a superfluous effort: there is no

such thing as "\_improvement\_" (a word against \_repentance\_).

Decadence itself is not a thing \_that can be withstood\_: it is

absolutely necessary and is proper to all ages and all peoples. That

which must be withstood, and by all means in our power, is the

spreading of the contagion among the sound parts of the organism.

Is that done? The very \_reverse\_ is done. It is precisely on this

account that one makes a stand on behalf of \_humanity.\_

How do the \_highest values\_ created hitherto stand in relation to this

fundamental question in \_biology\_? Philosophy, religion, morality, art,

etc.

(The remedy: militarism, for instance, from Napoleon onwards, who

regarded civilisation as his natural enemy.)

42.

All those things which heretofore have been regarded as the \_causes of

degeneration,\_ are really its effects.

But those things also which have been regarded as the \_remedies\_ of

degeneration are only \_palliatives\_ of certain effects thereof: the

"cured" are \_types of the degenerate.\_

\_The results of decadence\_: vice--viciousness; illness--sickliness;

crime--criminality; celibacy--sterility; hysteria--the weakness of the

will; alcoholism; pessimism, anarchy; debauchery (also of the spirit).

The calumniators, underminers, sceptics, and destroyers.

43.

Concerning the notion "decadence." (1) Scepticism is a result of

decadence: just as spiritual debauchery is.

(2) Moral corruption is a result of decadence (the weakness of the will

and the need of strong stimulants).

(3) Remedies, whether psychological or moral, do not alter the march

of decadence, they do not arrest anything; physiologically they do not

count.

A peep into the \_enormous futility\_ of these pretentious "reactions";

they are forms of anæsthetising oneself against certain fatal

symptoms resulting from the prevailing condition of things; they do

not eradicate the morbid element; they are often heroic attempts to

cancel the decadent man, to allow only a minimum of his \_deleterious

influence\_ to survive.

(4) Nihilism is not a cause, but only the \_rationale\_ of decadence.

(5) The "good" and the "bad" are no more than two types of decadence:

they come together in all its fundamental phenomena.

(6) The \_social problem\_ is a result of \_decadence.\_

(7) Illnesses, more particularly those attacking the nerves and the

head, are signs that the \_defensive\_ strength of strong nature is

lacking; a proof of this is that irritability which causes pleasure and

pain to be regarded as problems of the first order.

44.

\_The most common types of decadence\_: (1) In the belief that they are

remedies, cures are chosen which only precipitate exhaustion;--this is

the case with Christianity (to point to the most egregious example of

mistaken instinct);--this is also the case with "progress."

(2) The \_power of resisting\_ stimuli is on the wane--chance rules

supreme: events are inflated and drawn out until they appear monstrous

... a suppression of the "personality," a disintegration of the

will; in this regard we may mention a whole class of morality, the

altruistic, that which is incessantly preaching pity, and whose most

essential feature is the weakness of the personality, so that it \_rings

in unison,\_ and, like an over-sensitive string, does not cease from

vibrating ... extreme irritability....

(3) Cause and effect are confounded: decadence is not understood as

physiological, and its results are taken to be the causes of the

general indisposition:--this applies to all religious morality.

(4) A state of affairs is desired in which suffering shall cease;

life is actually considered the cause of all ills--\_unconscious\_ and

insensitive states (sleep and syncope) are held in incomparably higher

esteem than the conscious states; hence a \_method\_ of life.

45.

Concerning the hygiene of the "weak." All that is done in weakness ends

in failure. Moral: do nothing. The worst of it is, that precisely the

strength required in order to stop action, and to cease from reacting,

is most seriously diseased under the influence of weakness: that one

never reacts more promptly or more blindly than when one should not

react at all.

The strength of a character is shown by the ability to delay and

postpone reaction: a certain ἀδιαφορία is just as proper to it, as

involuntariness in recoiling, suddenness and lack of restraint in

"action," are proper to weakness. The will is weak: and the recipe

for preventing foolish acts would be: to have a strong will and to do

nothing--contradiction. A sort of self-destruction, the instinct of

self-preservation is compromised.... \_The weak man injures himself\_....

That is the decadent \_type\_.

As a matter of fact, we meet with a vast amount of thought concerning

the means wherewith \_impassibility\_ may be induced. To this extent, the

instincts are on the right scent; for to do nothing is more useful than

to do something....

All the practices of private orders, of solitary philosophers, and of

fakirs, are suggested by a correct consideration of the fact, that a

certain kind of man is most \_useful to himself\_ when he hinders his own

action as much as possible.

\_Relieving measures\_: absolute obedience, mechanical activity, total

isolation from men and things that might exact immediate decisions and

actions.

46.

\_Weakness of Will\_: this is a fable that can lead astray. For there

is no will, consequently neither a strong nor a weak one. The

multiplicity and disintegration of the instincts, the want of system in

their relationship, constitute what is known as a "weak will"; their

co-ordination, under the government of one individual among them,

results in a "strong will"--in the first case vacillation and a lack

of equilibrium is noticeable: in the second, precision and definite

direction.

47.

That which is inherited is not illness, but a \_predisposition to

illness\_: a lack of the powers of resistance against injurious external

influences, etc. etc, broken powers of resistance; expressed morally:

resignation and humility in the presence of the enemy.

I have often wondered whether it would not be possible to class all the

highest values of the philosophies, moralities, and religions which

have been devised hitherto, with the values of the feeble, the \_insane\_

and the \_neurasthenic\_ in a milder form, they present the same evils.

The value of all morbid conditions consists in the fact that they

magnify certain normal phenomena which are difficult to discern in

normal conditions....

\_Health\_ and \_illness\_ are not essentially different, as the ancient

doctors believed and as a few practitioners still believe to-day. They

cannot be imagined as two distinct principles or entities which fight

for the living organism and make it their battlefield. That is nonsense

and mere idle gossip, which no longer holds water. As a matter of

fact, there is only a difference of degree between these two living

conditions: exaggeration, want of proportion, want of harmony among the

normal phenomena, constitute the morbid state (Claude Bernard).

Just as "evil" may be regarded as exaggeration, discord, and want of

proportion, so can "good" be regarded as a sort of protective diet

against the danger of exaggeration, discord, and want of proportion.

\_Hereditary weakness\_ as a \_dominant\_ feeling: the cause of the

prevailing values.

\_N.B.\_--Weakness is in demand--why?... mostly because people cannot be

anything else than weak.

\_Weakening considered a duty\_: The weakening of the desires, of the

feelings of pleasure and of pain, of the will to power, of the will

to pride, to property and to more property; weakening in the form of

humility; weakening in the form of a belief; weakening in the form

of repugnance and shame in the presence of all that is natural--in

the form of a denial of life, in the form of illness and chronic

feebleness; weakening in the form of a refusal to take revenge, to

offer resistance, to become an enemy, and to show anger.

\_Blunders\_ in the treatment: there is no attempt at combating weakness

by means of any fortifying system; but by a sort of justification

consisting of moralising; \_i.e.,\_ by means of \_interpretation.\_

Two totally different conditions are \_confused\_: for instance, the

\_repose of strength,\_ which is essentially abstinence from reaction

(the prototype of the gods whom nothing moves), and the \_peace of

exhaustion,\_ rigidity to the point of anæsthesia. All these philosophic

and ascetic modes of procedure aspire to the second state, but actually

pretend to attain to the first ... for they ascribe to the condition

they have reached the attributes that would be in keeping only with a

divine state.

48.

\_The most dangerous misunderstanding.\_--There is one concept which

apparently allows of no confusion or ambiguity, and that is the concept

\_exhaustion.\_ Exhaustion may be acquired or inherited--in any case it

alters the aspect and \_value of things.\_

Unlike him who involuntarily \_gives\_ of the superabundance which he

both feels and represents, to the things about him, and who sees them

fuller, mightier, and more pregnant with promises,--who, in fact, \_can\_

bestow,--the exhausted one belittles and disfigures everything he

sees--he impoverishes its worth: he is detrimental....

No mistake seems possible in this matter: and yet history discloses the

terrible fact, that the exhausted have always been \_confounded\_ with

those with the most abundant resources, and the latter with the most

detrimental.

The pauper in vitality, the feeble one, impoverishes even life: the

wealthy man, in vital powers, enriches it. The first is the parasite of

the second: the second is a bestower of his abundance. How is confusion

possible?

When he who was exhausted came forth with the bearing of a very

active and energetic man (when degeneration implied a certain excess

of spiritual and nervous discharge), he was \_mistaken\_ for the wealthy

man. He inspired terror. The cult of the madman is also always the cult

of him who is rich in vitality, and who is a powerful man. The fanatic,

the one possessed, the religious epileptic, all eccentric creatures

have been regarded as the highest types of power: as divine.

This kind of strength which inspires terror seemed to be, above all,

divine: this was the starting-point of authority; here \_wisdom\_

was interpreted, hearkened to, and sought. Out of this there was

developed, everywhere almost, a \_will\_ to "deify," \_i.e.,\_ to a typical

degeneration of spirit, body, and nerves: an attempt to discover the

road to this higher form of being. To make oneself ill or mad, to

provoke the symptoms of serious disorder--was called getting stronger,

becoming more superhuman, more terrible and more wise. People thought

they would thus attain to such wealth of power, that they would be able

to \_dispense\_ it. Wheresoever there have been prayers, some one has

been sought who had something to give away.

What led astray, here, was the experience of intoxication. This

increases the feeling of power to the highest degree, therefore, to the

mind of the ingenuous, it is \_power.\_ On the highest altar of power

\_the most intoxicated man\_ must stand, the ecstatic. (There are two

causes of \_intoxication\_: superabundant life, and a condition of morbid

nutrition of the brain.)

49.

\_Acquired,\_ not inherited exhaustion: (1) inadequate \_nourishment,\_

often the result of ignorance concerning diet, as, for instance, in the

case of scholars; (2) erotic precocity: the damnation more especially

of the youth of France--Parisian youths, above all, who are already

dirtied and ruined when they step out of their \_lycées\_ into the world,

and who cannot break the chains of despicable tendencies; ironical and

scornful towards themselves--galley-slaves despite all their refinement

(moreover, in the majority of cases, already a symptom of racial and

family decadence, as all hypersensitiveness is; and examples of the

infection of environment: to be influenced by one's environment is

also a sign of decadence); (3) alcoholism, not the instinct but the

habit, foolish imitation, the cowardly or vain adaptation to a ruling

fashion. What a blessing a Jew is among Germans! See the obtuseness,

the flaxen head, the blue eye, and the lack of intellect in the face,

the language, and the bearing; the lazy habit of stretching the limbs,

and the need of repose among Germans--a need which is not the result of

overwork, but of the disgusting excitation and over-excitation caused

by alcohol.

50.

\_A theory of exhaustion.\_--Vice, the insane (also artists), the

criminals, the anarchists--these are not the \_oppressed\_ classes, but

\_the outcasts\_ of the community of all classes hitherto.

Seeing that all our classes are permeated by these elements, we have

grasped the fact that \_modern society\_ is not a "society" or a "body,"

but a diseased agglomeration of Chandala,--a society which no longer

has the strength even to \_excrete\_.

To what extent living together for centuries has very much deepened

\_sickliness\_:

modern virtue }

modern intellect} as forms of disease.

modern science }

51.

\_The state of corruption.\_--The interrelation of all forms of

corruption should be understood, and the Christian form (Pascal as

the type), as also the socialistic and communistic (a result of the

Christian), should not be overlooked (from the standpoint of natural

science, the \_highest\_ conception of society according to socialists,

is the lowest in the order of rank among societies); the "Beyond"

--corruption: as though outside the real world of Becoming there were a

world of Being.

Here there must be no compromise, but selection, annihilation, and

war--the Christian Nihilistic standard of value must be withdrawn from

all things and attacked beneath every disguise ... for instance, from

modern \_sociology, music,\_ and \_Pessimism\_ (all forms of the Christian

ideal of values).

Either one thing \_or\_ the other is true--that is to say, tending to

elevate the type man....

The priest, the shepherd of souls, should be looked upon as a form

of life which must be suppressed. All education, hitherto, has been

helpless, adrift, without ballast, and afflicted with the contradiction

of values.

Either one thing \_or\_ the other is true--that is to say, tending to

elevate the type man....

The priest, the shepherd of souls, should be looked upon as a form

of life which must be suppressed. All education, hitherto, has been

helpless, adrift, without ballast, and afflicted with the contradiction

of values.

52.

If Nature have no pity on the degenerate, it is not therefore

immoral: the growth of physiological and moral evils in the human

race, is rather the \_result\_ of \_morbid and unnatural morality.\_ The

sensitiveness of the majority of men is both morbid and unnatural.

Why is it that mankind is corrupt in a moral and physiological respect?

The body degenerates if one organ is \_unsound.\_ The \_right of altruism\_

cannot be traced to physiology, neither can the right to help and

to the equality of fate: these are all premiums for degenerates and

failures.

There can be no \_solidarity\_ in a society containing unfruitful,

unproductive, and destructive members, who, by the bye, are bound to

have offspring even more degenerate than they are themselves.

53.

Decadence exercises a profound and perfectly unconscious influence,

even over the ideals of science: all our sociology is a proof of this

proposition, and it has yet to be reproached with the fact that

it has only the experience of \_society in the process of decay,\_

and inevitably takes its own decaying instincts as the basis of

sociological judgment.

The \_declining\_ vitality of modern Europe formulates its social ideals

in its decaying instincts: and these ideals are all so like those of

\_old and effete\_ races, that they might be mistaken for one another.

The \_gregarious instinct,\_ then,--now a sovereign power,--is something

totally different from the instinct of an \_aristocratic society\_: and

the value of the sum depends upon the value of the units constituting

it.... The whole of our sociology knows no other instinct than that

of the herd, \_i.e.,\_ of a \_multitude of mere ciphers\_--of which every

cipher has "equal rights," and where it is a virtue to be----naught....

The valuation with which the various forms of society are judged to-day

is absolutely the same with that which assigns a higher place to peace

than to war: but this principle is contrary to the teaching of biology,

and is itself a mere outcome of decadent life. Life is a result of war,

society is a means to war.... Mr. Herbert Spencer was a decadent in

biology, as also in morality (he regarded the triumph of altruism as a

desideratum!!!).

54.

After thousands of years of error and confusion, it is my good fortune

to have rediscovered the road which leads to a Yea and to a Nay.

I teach people to say Nay in the face of all that makes for weakness

and exhaustion.

I teach people to say Yea in the face of all that makes for strength,

that preserves strength, and justifies the feeling of strength.

Up to the present, neither the one nor the other has been taught; but

rather virtue, disinterestedness, pity, and even the negation of life.

All these are values proceeding from exhausted people.

After having pondered over the physiology of exhaustion for some time,

I was led to the question: to what extent the judgments of exhausted

people had percolated into the world of values.

The result at which I arrived was as startling as it could possibly

be--even for one like myself who was already at home in many a strange

world: I found that all prevailing values--that is to say, all those

which had gained ascendancy over humanity, or at least over its tamer

portions, could be traced back to the judgment of exhausted people.

Under the cover of the holiest names, I found the most destructive

tendencies; people had actually given the name "God" to all that

renders weak, teaches weakness, and infects with weakness.... I found

that the "good man" was a form of self-affirmation on the part of

decadence.

That virtue which Schopenhauer still proclaimed as superior to all,

and as the most fundamental of all virtues; even that same pity I

recognised as more dangerous than any vice. Deliberately to thwart

the law of selection among species, and their natural means of purging

their stock of degenerate members--this, up to my time, had been the

greatest of all virtues....

One should do honour to the \_fatality\_ which says to the feeble:

"perish!"

The opposing of this fatality, the botching of mankind and the allowing

of it to putrefy, was given the name "God" One shall not take the name

of the Lord one's God in vain....

The race is corrupted--not by its vices, but by its ignorance: it is

corrupted because it has not recognised exhaustion as exhaustion:

physiological misunderstandings are the cause of all evil.

Virtue is our greatest misunderstanding.

Problem: how were the exhausted able to make the laws of values? In

other words, how did they who are the last, come to power?... How did

the instincts of the animal man ever get to stand on their heads?...

4. THE CRISIS: NIHILISM AND THE IDEA OF RECURRENCE.

55.

Extreme positions are not relieved by more moderate ones, but by

extreme \_opposite\_ positions. And thus the belief in the utter

immorality of nature, and in the absence of all purpose and sense, are

psychologically necessary attitudes when the belief in God and in an

essentially moral order of things is no longer tenable.

Nihilism now appears, \_not\_ because the sorrows of existence are

greater than they were formerly, but because, in a general way, people

have grown suspicious of the "meaning" which might be given to evil and

even to existence. One interpretation has been overthrown: but since it

was held to be \_the\_ interpretation, it seems as though there were no

meaning in existence at all, as though everything were in vain.

\*\*\*

It yet remains to be shown that this "in vain!" is the character

of present Nihilism. The mistrust of our former valuations has

increased to such an extent that it has led to the question: "are

not all 'values' merely allurements prolonging the duration of the

comedy, without, however, bringing the unravelling any closer?" The

"long period of time" which has culminated in an "in vain," without

either goal or purpose, is the \_most paralysing\_ of thoughts, more

particularly when one sees that one is duped without, however, being

able to resist being duped.

\*\*\*

Let us imagine this thought in its worst form: existence, as it is,

without either a purpose or a goal, but inevitably recurring, without

an end in nonentity: "\_Eternal Recurrence.\_"

This is the extremest form of Nihilism: nothing (purposelessness)

eternal!

European form of Buddhism: the energy of knowledge and of strength

drives us to such a belief. It is the most \_scientific\_ of all

hypotheses. We deny final purposes. If existence had a final purpose it

would have reached it.

\*\*\*

It should be understood that what is being aimed at, here, is a

contradiction of Pantheism: for "everything perfect, divine, eternal,"

\_also\_ leads \_to the belief in Eternal Recurrence.\_ Question: has this

pantheistic and affirmative attitude to all things also been made

possible by morality? At bottom only the moral God has been overcome.

Is there any sense in imagining a God "beyond good and evil"? Would

Pantheism in \_this\_ sense be possible? Do we withdraw the idea of

purpose from the process, and affirm the process notwithstanding?

This were so if, within that process, something were \_attained\_ every

moment--and always the same thing. Spinoza won an affirmative position

of this sort, in the sense that every moment, according to him, has

a logical necessity: and he triumphed by means of his fundamentally

logical instinct over a like conformation of the world.

\*\*\*

But his case is exceptional. If every \_fundamental trait of character,\_

which lies beneath every act, and which finds expression in every

act, were recognised by the individual as \_his\_ fundamental trait of

character, this individual would be driven to regard every moment of

his existence in general, triumphantly as good. It would simply be

necessary for that fundamental trait of character to be felt in oneself

as something good, valuable, and pleasurable.

\*\*\*

Now, in the case of those men and classes of men who were treated

with violence and oppressed by their fellows, \_morality\_ saved life

from despair and from the leap into nonentity:. for impotence in

relation to mankind and \_not\_ in relation to Nature is what generates

the most desperate bitterness towards existence. Morality treated the

powerful, the violent, and the "masters" in general, as enemies against

whom the common man must be protected--\_that is to say, emboldened,

strengthened.\_ Morality has therefore always taught the most profound

\_hatred\_ and \_contempt\_ of the fundamental trait of character of all

rulers--\_i.e., their Will to Power.\_ To suppress, to deny, and to

decompose this morality, would mean to regard this most thoroughly

detested instinct with the reverse of the old feeling and valuation.

If the sufferer and the oppressed man were \_to lose his belief\_ in his

right to contemn the Will to Power, his position would be desperate.

This would be so if the trait above-mentioned were essential to life,

in which case it would follow that even that will to morality was only

a cloak to this "Will to Power," as are also even that hatred and

contempt. The oppressed man would then perceive that he stands \_on

the same platform\_ with the oppressor, and that he has no individual

privilege, nor any \_higher rank\_ than the latter.

\*\*\*

On the \_contrary\_! There is nothing on earth which can have any value,

if it have not a modicum of power--granted, of course, that life itself

is the Will to Power. Morality protected the \_botched\_ and \_bungled\_

against Nihilism, in that it gave every one of them infinite worth,

metaphysical worth, and classed them altogether in one order which did

not correspond with that of worldly power and order of rank: it taught

submission, humility, etc. \_Admitting that the belief in this morality

be destroyed,\_ the botched and the bungled would no longer have any

comfort, and would perish.

This \_perishing\_ seems like \_self-annihilation,\_ like an instinctive

selection of that which must be destroyed. The \_symptoms\_ of this

self-destruction of the botched and the bungled: self-vivisection,

poisoning, intoxication, romanticism, and, above all, the instinctive

constraint to acts whereby the powerful are made into \_mortal

enemies\_ (training, so to speak, one's own hangmen), \_the will to

destruction\_ as the will of a still deeper instinct--of the instinct of

self-destruction, of the Will to Nonentity.

\*\*\*

Nihilism is a sign that the botched and bungled in order to be

destroyed, that, having been deprived of morality, they no longer have

any reason to "resign themselves," that they take up their stand on the

territory of the opposite principle, and \_will also exercise power\_

themselves, by compelling the powerful to become their hangmen. This

is the European form of Buddhism, that \_active negation,\_ after all

existence has lost its meaning.

\*\*\*

It must not be supposed that "poverty" has grown more acute, on the

contrary! "God, morality, resignation" were remedies in the very

deepest stages of misery: \_active\_ Nihilism made its appearance in

circumstances which were relatively much more favourable. The fact,

alone, that morality is regarded as overcome, presupposes a certain

degree of intellectual culture; while this very culture, for its part,

bears evidence to a certain relative well-being. A certain intellectual

fatigue, brought on by the long struggle concerning philosophical

opinions, and carried to hopeless scepticism \_against\_ philosophy,

shows moreover that the level of these Nihilists is by no means a

low one. Only think of the conditions in which Buddha appeared! The

teaching of the eternal recurrence would have learned principles to

go upon (just as Buddha's teaching, for instance, had the notion of

causality, etc.).

\*\*\*

What do we mean to-day by the words "botched and bungled"? In the

first place, they are used \_physiologically\_ and not politically. The

unhealthiest kind of man all over Europe (in all classes) is the soil

out of which Nihilism grows: this species of man will regard eternal

recurrence as damnation--once he is bitten by the thought, he can no

longer recoil before any action. He would not extirpate passively,

but would cause everything to be extirpated which is meaningless

and without a goal to this extent; although it is only a spasm, or

sort of blind rage in the presence of the fact that everything has

existed again and again for an eternity--even this period of Nihilism

and destruction. The value of such a \_crisis\_ is that it \_purifies,\_

that it unites similar elements, and makes them mutually destructive,

that it assigns common duties to men of opposite persuasions, and

brings the weaker and more uncertain among them to the light, thus

taking the first step towards a new \_order of rank\_ among forces

from the standpoint of health: recognising commanders as commanders,

subordinates as subordinates. Naturally irrespective of all the present

forms of society.

\*\*\*

What class of men will prove they are strongest in this new order of

things? The most moderate--they who do not \_require\_ any extreme forms

of belief, they who not only admit of, but actually like, a certain

modicum of chance and nonsense; they who can think of man with a very

moderate view of his value, without becoming weak and small on that

account; the most rich in health, who are able to withstand a maximum

amount of sorrow, and who are therefore not so very much afraid of

sorrow--men who are \_certain of their power,\_ and who represent with

conscious pride the state of strength to which man has attained.

\*\*\*

How could such a man think of Eternal Recurrence?

56.

\_The Periods of European Nihilism.\_

\_The Period of Obscurity\_: all kinds of groping measures devised to

preserve old institutions and not to arrest the progress of new ones.

\_The Period of Light\_: men see that old and new are fundamental

contraries; that the old values are born of descending life, and that

the new ones are born of ascending life--\_that all old ideals\_ are

unfriendly to life (born of decadence and determining it, however

much they may be decked out in the Sunday finery of morality). We

\_understand\_ the old, but are far from being sufficiently strong for

the new.

\_The Periods of the Three Great Passions\_: contempt, pity, destruction.

\_The Periods of Catastrophes\_: the rise of a teaching which will sift

mankind ... which drives the weak to some decision and the strong also.

II.

CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN NIHILISM.

\_(a)\_ MODERN GLOOMINESS.

57.

My friends, we had a hard time as youths; we even suffered from

youth itself as though it were a serious disease. This is owing to

the age in which we were born--an age of enormous internal decay and

disintegration which, with all its weakness and even with the best of

its strength, is opposed to the spirit of youth. Disintegration--that

is to say, uncertainty--is peculiar to this age: nothing stands on

solid ground or on a sound faith. People live for the morrow, because

the day-after-to-morrow is doubtful. All our road is slippery and

dangerous, while the ice which still bears us has grown unconscionably

thin: we all feel the mild and gruesome breath of the thaw-wind--soon,

where we are walking, no one will any longer \_be able\_ to stand!

58.

If this is not an age of decay and of diminishing vitality, it is at

least one of indiscriminate and arbitrary experimentalising--and it is

probable that out of an excess of abortive experiments there has grown

this general impression, as of decay: and perhaps decay itself.

59.

\_Concerning the history of modern gloominess.\_

The state-nomads (officials, etc.): "homeless"--.

The break-up of the family.

The "good man" as a symptom of exhaustion.

Justice as Will to Power (Rearing).

Lewdness and neurosis.

Black music: whither has real music gone?

The anarchist.

Contempt of man, loathing.

Most profound distinction: whether hunger or satiety is creative? The

first creates the \_Ideals of Romanticism.\_

Northern unnaturalness.

The need of Alcohol: the "need" of the working classes.

Philosophical Nihilism.

60.

The slow advance and rise of the middle and lower classes (including

the lower kind of spirit and body), which was already well under way

before the French Revolution, and would have made the same progress

forward without the latter,--in short, then, the preponderance of the

herd over all herdsmen and bell-wethers,--brings in its train:--

(1) Gloominess of spirit (the juxtaposition of a stoical and a

frivolous \_appearance\_ of happiness, peculiar to noble cultures, is on

the decline; much suffering is allowed to be \_seen\_ and \_heard\_ which

formerly was borne in concealment);

(2) Moral hypocrisy (a way of \_distinguishing\_ oneself through

morality, but by means of the values of the herd: pity, solicitude,

moderation; and not by means of those virtues which are recognised and

honoured outside the herd's sphere of power);

(3) A \_really\_ large amount of sympathy with both pain and joy (a

feeling of pleasure resulting from being herded together, which is

peculiar to all gregarious animals--"public spirit," "patriotism,"

everything, in fact, which is apart from the individual).

61.

Our age, with its indiscriminate endeavours to mitigate distress, to

honour it, and to wage war in advance with unpleasant possibilities, is

an age of the \_poor.\_ Our "\_rich people\_"--\_they\_ are the poorest! The

real \_purpose\_ of all wealth has been forgotten.

62.

\_Criticism of modern man\_:--"the good man," but corrupted and misled by

bad institutions (tyrants and priests);--reason elevated to a position

of authority;--history is regarded as the surmounting of errors;--the

future is regarded as progress;--the Christian state ("God of the

armies");--Christian sexual intercourse (as marriage);--the realm of

"justice" (the cult of "mankind");--"freedom."

The \_romantic\_ attitudes of the modern man;--the noble man

(Byron, Victor Hugo, George Sand);--taking the part of the

oppressed and the bungled and the botched: motto for historians and

romancers;--the Stoics of duty;--disinterestedness regarded as art

and as knowledge;--altruism as the most mendacious form of egoism

(utilitarianism), the most sentimental form of egoism.

All this savours of the eighteenth century. But it had other

qualities which were not inherited, namely, a certain \_insouciance,\_

cheerfulness, elegance, spiritual clearness. The spiritual tempo has

altered; the pleasure which was begotten by spiritual refinement and

clearness has given room to the pleasure of colour, harmony, mass,

reality, etc. etc. Sensuality in spiritual things. In short, it is the

eighteenth century of Rousseau.

63.

Taken all in all, a considerable amount of \_humanity\_ has been attained

by our men of to-day. That we feel this is in itself a proof of the

fact that we have become so sensitive in regard to small cases of

distress, that we somewhat unjustly overlook what has been achieved.

Here we must make allowances for the fact that a great deal of

decadence is rife, and that, through such eyes, our world \_must appear\_

bad and wretched. But these eyes have always seen in the same way, in

all ages.

(1) A certain hypersensitiveness, even in morality.

(2) The quantum of bitterness and gloominess, which pessimism bears

with it in its judgments--both together have helped to bring about the

preponderance of the other and \_opposite\_ point of view, that things

are not well with our morality.

The fact of credit, of the commerce of the world, and the means of

traffic--are expressions of an extraordinarily mild \_trustfulness\_ in

men.... To that may also be added--

(3) The deliverance of science from moral and religious prejudices: a

very good sign, though for the most part misunderstood.

In my own way, I am attempting a justification of history.

64.

\_The second appearance of Buddhism.\_--Its precursory signs: the

increase of pity. Spiritual exhaustion. The reduction of all

problems to the question of pleasure and pain. The glory of war

which calls forth a counter-stroke. Just as the sharp demarcation of

nations generates a counter-movement in the form of the most hearty

"Fraternity." The fact that it is impossible for religion to carry on

its work any longer with dogma and fables.

The \_catastrophe of Nihilism\_ will put an end to all this Buddhistic

culture.

65.

That which is most sorely afflicted to-day is the instinct and will of

\_tradition\_: all institutions which owe their origin to this instinct,

are opposed to the tastes of the age.... At bottom, nothing is thought

or done which is not calculated to tear up this spirit of tradition

by the roots. Tradition is looked upon as a fatality; it is studied

and acknowledged (in the form of "heredity"), but people will not have

anything to do with it. The extension of one will over long periods

of time, the selection of conditions and valuations which make it

possible to dispose of centuries in advance--this, precisely, is what

is most utterly anti-modern. From which it follows, that disorganising

principles give our age its specific character.

66.

"Be simple"--a demand which, when made to us complicated and

incomprehensible triers of the heart and reins, is a simple

absurdity.... Be natural: but even if we are unnatural--what then?

67.

The means employed in former times in order to arrive at \_similarly

constituted\_ and lasting types, throughout long generations: entailed

property and the respect of parents (the origin of the faith in gods

and heroes as ancestors).

Now, the \_subdivision of property\_ belongs to the opposite tendency.

The centralisation of an enormous number of, different interests in one

soul: which, \_to that end,\_ must be very strong and mutable.

68.

Why does everything become \_mummery.\_--The modern man is lacking in

unfailing instinct (instinct being understood here to mean that which

is the outcome of a \_long period of activity in the same occupation\_ on

the part of one family of men); the incapability of producing anything

perfect, is simply the result of this lack of instinct: one individual

alone cannot make up for the schooling his ancestors should have

transmitted to him.

What a morality or book of law creates: that deep instinct which

renders \_automatism\_ and perfection possible in life and in work.

But now we have reached the opposite point; yes, we wanted to reach

it--the most extreme consciousness, through introspection on the part

of man and of history: and thus we are practically most distant from

perfection in Being, doing, and willing: our desires--even our will

to knowledge--shows how prodigiously decadent we are. We are striving

after the very reverse of what \_strong races\_ and \_strong natures\_ will

have--understanding is an \_end\_....

That Science is possible in the way in which it is practised to-day,

proves that all elementary instincts, \_the instincts which ward off

danger and protect life,\_ are no longer active. We no longer save, we

are merely spending the capital of our forefathers, even in the way in

which we \_pursue knowledge\_.

69.

\_Nihilistic trait\_.

\_(a)\_ In the \_natural sciences\_ ("purposelessness"), causality,

mechanism, "conformity to law," an interval, a remnant.

\_(b)\_ Likewise in \_politics\_: the individual lacks the belief in his

own right, innocence; falsehood rules supreme, as also the worship of

the moment.

\_(d)\_ Likewise in \_political economy\_: the abolition of slavery: the

lack of a redeeming class, and of \_one who justifies\_--the rise of

anarchy. "Education"?

\_(d)\_ Likewise in \_history\_: fatalism, Darwinism; the last attempts at

reconciling reason and Godliness fail. Sentimentality in regard to the

past: biographies can no longer be endured! (Phenomenalism even here:

character regarded as a mask; there are no facts.)

\_(e)\_ Likewise in \_Art\_: romanticism and its \_counter-stroke\_

(repugnance towards romantic ideals and lies). The latter, morally,

as a sense of greatest truthfulness, but pessimistic. Pure "artists"

(indifference as to the "subject"). (The psychology of the

father-confessor and puritanical psychology--two forms of psychological

romanticism: but also their counter-stroke, the attempt to maintain a

purely artistic attitude towards "men"--but even in this respect no one

dares to make the \_opposite\_ valuation.)

70.

\_Against\_ the teaching of the influence of \_environment\_ and external

causes: the power coming from inside is infinitely \_superior\_;

much that appears like influence acting from without is merely the

subjection of environment to this inner power.

Precisely the same environment may be used and interpreted in opposite

ways: there are no facts. A genius is \_not\_ explained by such theories

concerning origins.

71.

"\_Modernity\_" regarded in the light of nutrition and digestion.

Sensitiveness is infinitely more acute (beneath moral vestments: the

increase of pity), the abundance of different impressions is greater

than ever. The \_cosmopolitanism\_ of articles of diet, of literature,

newspapers, forms, tastes, and even landscapes. The speed of this

affluence is \_prestissimo\_; impressions are wiped out, and people

instinctively guard against assimilating anything or against taking

anything \_seriously\_ and "digesting" it; the result is a weakening of

the powers of digestion. There begin a sort of \_adaptation\_ to this

accumulation of impressions. Man unlearns the art of \_doing,\_ and

\_all he does is to react\_ to stimuli coming from his environment. \_He

spends his strength,\_ partly in the process of \_assimilation,\_ partly

in \_defending himself,\_ and again partly in \_responding to stimuli.

Profound enfeeblement of spontaneity\_:--the historian, the critic, the

analyst, the interpreter, the observer, the collector, the reader,--all

reactive talents,--\_all\_ science!

Artificial \_modification\_ of one's own nature in order to make it

resemble a "mirror"; one is interested, but only epidermally: this

is systematic coolness, equilibrium, a steady \_low\_ temperature,

just beneath the thin surface on which warmth, movement, "storm," and

undulations play.

Opposition of \_external\_ mobility to a certain \_dead heaviness and

fatigue\_.

72.

Where must our modern world be classed--under exhaustion or under

increasing strength? Its multiformity and lack of repose are brought

about by the highest form of \_consciousness.\_

73.

Overwork, curiosity and sympathy--our \_modern vices.\_

74.

A contribution to the characterisation of "\_Modernity.\_"--Exaggerated

development of intermediate forms; the decay of types; the break-up of

tradition, schools; the predominance of the instincts (philosophically

prepared: the unconscious has the greater value) after the appearance

of the \_enfeeblement of will power\_ and of the will to an end \_and\_ to

the means thereto.

75.

A capable artisan or scholar cuts a good figure if he have his pride

in his art, and looks pleasantly and contentedly upon life. On the

other hand, there is no sight more wretched than that of a cobbler or

a schoolmaster who, with the air of a martyr, gives one to understand

that he was really born for something better. There is nothing better

than what is good! and that is: to have a certain kind of capacity and

to use it. This is \_virtù\_ in the Italian style of the Renaissance.

Nowadays, when the state has a nonsensically oversized belly, in all

fields and branches of work there are "representatives" over and above

the real workman: for instance, in addition to the scholars, there

are the journalists; in addition to the suffering masses, there is a

crowd of jabbering and bragging ne'er-do-wells who "represent" that

suffering--not to speak of the professional politicians who, though

quite satisfied with their lot, stand up in Parliament and, with

strong lungs, "represent" grievances. Our modern life is extremely

\_expensive,\_ thanks to the host of middlemen that infest it; whereas

in the city of antiquity, and in many a city of Spain and Italy

to-day, where there is an echo of the ancient spirit, the man himself

comes forward and will have nothing to do with a representative or an

intermediary in the modern style--except perhaps to kick him hence!

76.

The pre-eminence of the \_merchant\_ and the \_middleman,\_ even in the

most intellectual spheres: the journalist, the "representative," the

historian (as an intermediary between the past and the present), the

exotic and cosmopolitan, the middleman between natural science and

philosophy, the semi-theologians.

77.

The men I have regarded with the most loathing, heretofore, are the

parasites of intellect: they are to be found everywhere, already, in

our modern Europe, and as a matter of fact their conscience is as light

as it possibly can be. They may be a little turbid, and savour somewhat

of Pessimism, but in the main they are voracious, dirty, dirtying,

stealthy, insinuating, light-fingered gentry, scabby--and as innocent

as all small sinners and microbes are. They live at the expense of

those who have intellect and who distribute it liberally: they know

that it is peculiar to the rich mind to live in a disinterested

fashion, without taking too much petty thought for the morrow, and

to distribute its wealth prodigally. For intellect is a bad domestic

economist, and pays no heed whatever to the fact that everything lives

on it and devours it.

78.

MODERN MUMMERY

The motleyness of modern men and its charm Essentially a mask and a

sign of boredom.

The journalist.

The political man (in the "national swindle").

Mummery in the arts:--

The lack of honesty in preparing and schooling oneself for

them (Fromentin);

The Romanticists (their lack of philosophy and science and

their excess in literature);

The novelists (Walter Scott, but also the monsters of the

\_Nibelung,\_ with their inordinately nervous music);

The lyricists.

"Scientifically."

Virtuosos (Jews).

The popular ideals are overcome, but not yet \_in the presence of the

people\_:

The saint, the sage, the prophet.

79.

\_The want of discipline in the modern spirit\_ concealed beneath all

kinds of moral finery.--The show-words are: Toleration (for the

"incapacity of saying yes or no"); \_la largeur de sympathie\_ (= a

third of indifference, a third of curiosity, and a third of morbid

susceptibility); "objectivity" (the lack of personality and of

will, and the inability to "love"); "freedom" in regard to the rule

(Romanticism); "truth" as opposed to falsehood and lying (Naturalism);

the "scientific spirit" (the "human document": or, in plain English,

the serial story which means "addition"--instead of "composition");

"passion" in the place of disorder and intemperance; "depth" in the

place of confusion and the pell-mell of symbols.

80.

\_Concerning the criticism of big words.\_--I am full of mistrust and

malice towards what is called "ideal": this is my \_Pessimism,\_ that

I have recognised to what extent "sublime sentiments" are a source of

evil--that is to say, a belittling and depreciating of man.

Every time "progress" is expected to result from an ideal,

disappointment invariably follows; the triumph of an ideal has always

been a \_retrograde movement\_.

Christianity, revolution, the abolition of slavery, equal rights,

philanthropy, love of peace, justice, truth: all these big words are

only valuable in a struggle, as banners: not as realities, but as

\_show-words,\_ for something quite different (yea, even quite opposed to

what they mean!).

81.

The kind of man is known who has fallen in love with the sentence

"\_tout comprendre à est tout pardonner"\_ It is the weak and, above all,

the disillusioned: if there is something to pardon in everything, there

is also something to contemn! It is the philosophy of disappointment,

which here swathes itself so humanly in pity, and gazes out so sweetly.

They are Romanticists, whose faith has gone to pot: now they at least

wish to look on and see how everything vanishes and fades. They call it

\_l'art pour l'art,\_ "objectivity," etc.

82.

\_The main symptoms of Pessimism\_:--Dinners at Magny's; Russian

Pessimism (Tolstoy, Dostoiewsky); æsthetic Pessimism, \_l'art pour

l'art,\_ "description" (the romantic and the anti-romantic Pessimism);

Pessimism in the theory of knowledge (Schopenhauer: phenomenalism);

anarchical Pessimism; the "religion of pity," Buddhistic preparation;

the Pessimism of culture (exoticness, cosmopolitanism); moral

Pessimism, myself.

83.

"\_Without the Christian Faith\_" said Pascal, "you would yourselves

be like nature and history, \_un monstre et un chaos.\_" We fulfilled

this prophecy: once the weak and optimistic eighteenth century had

\_embellished\_ and \_rationalised\_ man.

\_Schopenhauer\_ and \_Pascal.\_--I none essential point, Schopenhauer is

the first who \_takes up Pascal's\_ movement again: \_un monstre et un

chaos,\_ consequently something that must be negatived ... history,

nature, and man himself!

"\_Our inability to know the truth\_ is the result of our \_corruption,\_

of our moral \_decay\_" says Pascal. And Schopenhauer says essentially

the same. "The more profound the corruption of reason is, the

more necessary is the doctrine of salvation"--or, putting it into

Schopenhauerian phraseology, negation.

84.

\_Schopenhauer as an epigone\_ (state of affairs before the

Revolution):--Pity, sensuality, art, weakness of will, Catholicism

of the most intellectual desires--that is, at bottom, the good old

eighteenth century.

\_Schopenhauer's\_ fundamental misunderstanding of the \_will\_ (just

as though passion, instinct, and desire were the essential factors

of will) is typical: the depreciation of the will to the extent of

mistaking it altogether. Likewise the hatred of willing: the attempt at

seeing something superior--yea, even superiority itself, and that which

really matters, in non-willing, in the "subject-being \_without\_ aim or

intention." Great symptom of \_fatigue or of the weakness of will\_: for

this, in reality, is what treats the passions as master, and directs

them as to the way and to the measure....

85.

The undignified attempt has been made to regard Wagner and Schopenhauer

as types of the mentally unsound: an infinitely more essential

understanding of the matter would have been gained if the exact

decadent type which each of them represents had been scientifically and

accurately defined.

86.

In my opinion, Henrik Ibsen has become very German. With all his

robust idealism and "Will to Truth," he never dared to ring himself

free from moral-illusionism which says "freedom," and will not admit,

even to itself, what freedom is: the second stage in the metamorphosis

of the "Will to Power" in him who lacks it. In the first stage, one

demands justice at the hands of those who have power. In the second,

one speaks of "freedom," that is to say, one wishes to "shake oneself

free" from those who have power. In the third stage, one speaks of

"equal rights"--that is to say, so long as one is not a predominant

personality one wishes to prevent one's competitors from growing in

power.

87.

The Decline of \_Protestantism\_: theoretically and historically

understood as a half-measure. Undeniable predominance of Catholicism

to-day: Protestant feeling is so dead that the strongest

\_anti-Protestant\_ movements (Wagner's \_Parsifal,\_ for instance) are no

longer regarded as such. The whole of the more elevated intellectuality

in France is \_Catholic\_ in instinct; Bismarck recognised that there was

no longer any such thing as Protestantism.

88.

Protestantism, that spiritually unclean and tiresome form of decadence,

in which Christianity has known how to survive in the mediocre North,

is something incomplete and complexly valuable for knowledge, in so far

as it was able to bring experiences of different kinds and origins into

the same heads.

89.

What has the German spirit not made out of Christianity! And, to refer

to Protestantism again, how much beer is there not still in Protestant

Christianity! Can a crasser, more indolent, and more lounging form

of Christian belief be imagined, than that of the average German

Protestant?... It is indeed a very humble Christianity. I call it

the Homœopathy of Christianity! I am reminded that, to-day, there

also exists a less humble sort of Protestantism; it is taught by

royal chaplains and anti-Semitic speculators: but nobody has ever

maintained that any "spirit" "hovers" over these waters. It is merely

a less respectable form of Christian faith, not by any means a more

comprehensible one.

90.

\_Progress.\_--Let us be on our guard lest we deceive ourselves! Time

flies forward apace,--we would fain believe that everything flies

forward with it,--that evolution is an advancing development.... That

is the appearance of things which deceives the most circumspect. But

the nineteenth century shows no advance whatever on the sixteenth:

and the German spirit of 1888 is an example of a backward movement

when compared with that of 1788.... Mankind does not advance, it does

not even exist. The aspect of the whole is much more like that of a

huge experimenting workshop where some things in all ages succeed,

while an incalculable number of things fail; where all order, logic,

co-ordination, and responsibility is lacking. How dare we blink the

fact that the rise of Christianity is a decadent movement?--that the

German Reformation was a recrudescence of Christian barbarism?--that

the Revolution destroyed the instinct for an organisation of society

on a large scale?... Man is not an example of progress as compared with

animals: the tender son of culture is an abortion compared with the

Arab or the Corsican; the Chinaman is a more successful type--that is

to say, richer in sustaining power than the European.

\_(b)\_ THE LAST CENTURIES.

91.

Gloominess and pessimistic influence necessarily follow in the wake of

enlightenment. Towards 1770 a falling-off in cheerfulness was already

noticeable; women, with that very feminine instinct which always

defends virtue, believed that immorality was the cause of it. Galiani

hit the bull's eye: he quotes Voltaire's verse:

"Un monstre gai vaut mieux

Qu'un sentimental ennuyeux."

If now I maintain that I am ahead, by a century or two of

enlightenment, of Voltaire and Galiani--who was much more profound, how

deeply must I have sunk into gloominess! This is also true, and betimes

I somewhat reluctantly manifested some caution in regard to the German

and Christian narrowness and inconsistency of Schopenhauerian or, worse

still, Leopardian Pessimism, and sought the most characteristic form

(Asia). But, in order to endure that extreme Pessimism (which here and

there peeps out of my \_Birth of Tragedy),\_ to live alone "without God

or morality," I was compelled to invent a counter-prop for myself.

Perhaps I know best why man is the only animal that laughs: he alone

surfers so excruciatingly that he was \_compelled\_ to invent laughter.

The unhappiest and most melancholy animal is, as might have been

expected, the most cheerful.

92.

In regard to German culture, I have always had a feeling as of

\_decline.\_ The fact that I learned to know a declining form of culture

has often made me \_unfair\_ towards the whole phenomenon of European

culture. The Germans always follow at some distance behind: they always

go to the root of things, for instance:--

Dependance upon foreigners; \_Kant\_--Rousseau, the sensualists, Hume,

Swedenborg.

\_Schopenhauer\_--the Indians and Romanticism, Voltaire.

\_Wagner\_--the French cult of the ugly and of grand opera, \_Paris,\_ and

the flight into \_primitive barbarism\_ (the marriage of brother and

sister).

The law of the \_laggard\_ (the provinces go to Paris, Germany goes to

France).

How is it that precisely \_Germans discovered the Greek\_ (the more an

instinct is developed, the more it is \_tempted\_ to run for once into

its opposite).

Music is the last breath of every culture.

93.

\_Renaissance and Reformation.\_--What does the Renaissance prove? That

the reign of the "individual" can be only a short one. The output

is too great; there is not even the possibility of husbanding or of

capitalising forces, and exhaustion sets in step by step. These are

times when everything is \_squandered,\_ when even the strength itself

with which one collects, capitalises, and heaps riches upon riches,

\_is squandered.\_ Even the opponents of such movements are driven to

preposterous extremes in the dissipation of their strength: and they

too are very soon exhausted, used up, and completely sapped.

In the Reformation we are face to face with a wild and plebeian

counterpart of the Italian Renaissance, generated by similar impulses,

except that the former, in the backward and still vulgar North, had to

assume a religious form--there the concept of a higher life had not yet

been divorced from that of a religious one.

Even the Reformation was a movement for individual liberty; "every one

his own priest" is really no more than a formula for \_libertinage.\_

As a matter of fact, the words "Evangelical freedom" would have

sufficed--and all instincts which had reasons for remaining concealed

broke out like wild hounds, the most brutal needs suddenly acquired the

courage to show themselves, everything seemed justified ... men refused

to specify the kind of freedom they had aimed at, they preferred to

shut their eyes. But the fact that their eyes were closed and that

their lips were moistened with gushing orations, did not prevent their

hands from being ready to snatch at whatever there was to snatch at,

that the belly became the god of the "free gospel," and that all lusts

of revenge and of hatred were indulged with insatiable fury.

This lasted for a while: then exhaustion supervened, just as it

had done in Southern Europe; and again here, it was a low form of

exhaustion, a sort of general \_ruere in servitium\_.... Then the

\_disreputable\_ century of Germany dawned.

94.

\_Chivalry\_--the position won by power: its gradual break-up (and

partial transference to broader and more bourgeois spheres). In the

case of Larochefoucauld we find a knowledge of the actual impulses of a

noble temperament--together with the gloomy Christian estimate of these

impulses.

The \_protraction of Christianity\_ through the \_French Revolution.\_ The

seducer is Rousseau; he once again liberates woman, who thenceforward

is always represented as ever more interesting--\_suffering.\_ Then come

the slaves and Mrs. Beecher-Stowe. Then the poor and the workmen.

Then the vicious and the sick--all this is drawn into the foreground

(even for the purpose of disposing people in favour of the genius,

it has been customary for five hundred years to press him forward as

the great sufferer!). Then comes the cursing of all voluptuousness

(Baudelaire and Schopenhauer), the most decided conviction that the

lust of power is the greatest vice; absolute certainty that morality

and disinterestedness are identical things; that the "happiness of all"

is a goal worth striving after (\_i.e.,\_ Christ's Kingdom of Heaven).

We are on the best road to it: the Kingdom of Heaven of the poor in

spirit has begun.--Intermediate stages: the bourgeois (as a result of

the \_nouveau riche\_) and the workman (as a result of the machine).

Greek and French culture of the time of Louis XIV. compared. A decided

belief in oneself. A leisure-class which makes things hard for itself

and exercises a great deal of self-control. The power of form, the will

to form \_oneself.\_ "Happiness" acknowledged as a purpose. Much strength

and energy \_behind\_ all formality of manners. Pleasure at the sight of

a life that is \_seemingly so easy.\_ The \_Greeks\_ seemed like \_children\_

to the French.

95.

\_The Three Centuries.\_

Their different kinds of \_sensitiveness\_ may perhaps be best expressed

as follows:--

\_Aristocracy\_: Descartes, the reign of \_reason,\_ evidence showing the

sovereignty of the \_will\_.

\_Feminism\_: Rousseau, the reign of \_feeling,\_ evidence showing the

sovereignty of the senses; all lies.

\_Animalism\_: Schopenhauer, the reign of \_passion,\_ evidence showing the

sovereignty of animality, more honest, but gloomy.

The seventeenth century is \_aristocratic,\_ all for order, haughty

towards everything animal, severe in regard to the heart, "austere,"

and even free from sentiment, "non-German," averse to all that is

burlesque and natural, generalising and maintaining an attitude of

sovereignty towards the past for it believes in itself. At bottom it

partakes very much of the beast of prey, and practises asceticism in

order to remain master. It is the century of strength of will, as also

that of strong passion.

The eighteenth century is dominated by \_woman,\_ it is gushing,

spiritual, and flat; but with intellect at the service of aspirations

and of the heart, it is a libertine in the pleasures of intellect,

undermining all authorities; emotionally intoxicated, cheerful, clear,

humane, and sociable, false to itself and at bottom very rascally....

The nineteenth century is more \_animal,\_ more subterranean, hateful,

realistic, plebeian, and on that very account "better," "more honest,"

more submissive to "reality" of what kind soever, and \_truer\_; but

weak of will, sad, obscurely exacting and fatalistic. It has no

feeling of timidity or reverence, either in the presence of "reason"

or the "heart"; thoroughly convinced of the dominion of the desires

(Schopenhauer said "Will," but nothing is more characteristic of his

philosophy than that it entirely lacks all actual \_willing\_). Even

morality is reduced to an instinct ("Pity").

Auguste Comte is \_the continuation of the\_ eighteenth \_century\_ (the

dominion of the heart over the head, sensuality in the theory of

knowledge, altruistic exaltation).

The fact that \_science\_ has become as sovereign as it is to-day, proves

how the nineteenth century has \_emancipated itself\_ from the dominion

of \_ideals.\_ A certain absence of "needs" and wishes makes our

scientific curiosity and rigour possible--this is our kind of virtue.

Romanticism is the \_counterstroke\_ of the eighteenth century; a sort of

accumulated longing for its grand style of exaltation (as a matter of

fact, largely mingled with mummery and self-deception: the desire was

to represent \_strong nature\_ and \_strong passion\_).

The nineteenth century instinctively goes in search of \_theories\_

by means of which it may feel its \_fatalistic, submission to the

empire of facts\_ justified. Hegel's success against sentimentality

and romantic idealism was already a sign of its fatalistic trend of

thought, in its belief that superior reason belongs to the triumphant

side, and in its justification of the actual "state" (in the place of

"humanity," etc.).--Schopenhauer: we are something foolish, and at the

best self-suppressive. The success of determinism, the genealogical

derivation of \_obligations\_ which were formerly held to be absolute,

the teaching of environment and adaptation, the reduction of will to

a process of reflex movement, the denial of the will as a "working

cause"; finally--a real process of re-christening: so little will

is observed that the word itself becomes \_available\_ for another

purpose. Further theories: the teaching of \_objectivity,\_ "will-less"

contemplation, as the only road to truth, \_as also\_ to \_beauty\_ (also

the belief in "genius," in order to have \_the right to be submissive\_);

mechanism, the determinable rigidity of the mechanical process;

so-called "Naturalism," the elimination of the choosing, directing,

interpreting subject, on principle.

Kant, with his "practical reason," with his \_moral fanaticism,\_ is

quite eighteenth century style; still completely outside the historical

movement, without any notion whatsoever of the reality of his time, for

instance, revolution; he is not affected by Greek philosophy; he is a

phantasist of the notion of duty, a sensualist with a hidden leaning to

dogmatic pampering.

\_The return to Kant\_ in our century means a \_return to the eighteenth

century,\_ people desire to create themselves a right to the \_old ideas\_

and to the old exaltation--hence a theory of knowledge which "describes

limits," that is to say, which admits \_of the option of fixing a Beyond

to the domain of reason.\_

\_Hegel's\_ way of thinking is not so very far removed from that of

Goethe: see the latter on the subject of Spinoza, for instance.

The will to deify the All and Life, in order to find both \_peace\_

and \_happiness\_ in contemplating them: Hegel looks for reason

everywhere--in the presence of reason man may be \_submissive\_ and

resigned. In Goethe we find a kind of \_fatalism\_ which is almost

\_joyous\_ and \_confiding,\_ which neither revolts nor weakens, which

strives to make a totality out of itself, in the belief that only in

totality does everything seem good and justified, and find itself

resolved.

96.

The period of \_rationalism\_--followed by a period of \_sentimentality.\_

To what extent does Schopenhauer come under "sentimentality"? (Hegel

under intellectuality?)

97.

The seventeenth century \_suffers\_ from \_humanity\_ as from a \_host

of contradictions\_ ("\_l'amas de contradictions\_" that we are); it

endeavours to discover man, to \_co-ordinate him,\_ to excavate him:

whereas the eighteenth century tries to forget what is known of man's

nature, in order to adapt him to its Utopia. "Superficial, soft,

humane"--gushes over "humanity."

The seventeenth century tries to banish all traces of the individual

in order that the artist's work may resemble life as much as possible.

The eighteenth century strives \_to create interest in the author\_ by

means of the work. The seventeenth century seeks art in art, a piece of

culture; the eighteenth uses art in its propaganda for political and

social reforms.

"Utopia," the "ideal man," the deification of Nature, the vanity of

making one's own personality the centre of interest, subordination to

the propaganda of \_social ideas,\_ charlatanism--all this we derive from

the eighteenth century.

The style of the seventeenth century: \_propre exact et libre.\_

The strong individual who is self-sufficient, or who appeals

ardently to God--and that obtrusiveness and indiscretion of modern

authors--these things are \_opposites.\_ "Showing-oneself-off"--what a

contrast to the Scholars of Port-Royal!

Alfieri had a sense for the \_grand style.\_

The hate of the \_burlesque\_ (that which lacks dignity), \_the lack of a

sense of Nature\_ belongs to the seventeenth century.

98.

\_Against Rousseau.--Alas!\_ man is no longer sufficiently evil;

Rousseau's opponents, who say that "man is a beast of prey," are

unfortunately wrong. Not the corruption of man, but the softening and

moralising of him is the curse. In the sphere which Rousseau attacked

most violently, the \_relatively\_ strongest and most successful type of

man was still to be found (the type which still possessed the great

passions intact: Will to Power, Will to Pleasure, the Will and Ability

to Command). The man of the eighteenth century must be compared with

the man of the Renaissance (also with the man of the seventeenth

century in France) if the matter is to be understood at all: Rousseau

is a symptom of self-contempt and of inflamed vanity--both signs that

the dominating will is lacking: he moralises and seeks the \_cause\_ of

his own misery after the style of a revengeful man in the \_ruling\_

classes.

99.

\_Voltaire--Rousseau.\_--A state of nature is terrible; man is a beast of

prey: our civilisation is an extraordinary \_triumph\_ over this beast of

prey in nature--this was \_Voltaires\_ conclusion. He was conscious of

the mildness, the refinements, the intellectual joys of the civilised

state; he despised obtuseness, even in the form of virtue, and the lack

of delicacy even in ascetics and monks.

The \_moral depravity\_ of man seemed to pre-occupy \_Rousseau\_; the words

"unjust," "cruel," are the best possible for the purpose of exciting

the instincts of the oppressed, who otherwise find themselves under

the ban of the \_vetitum\_ and of disgrace; \_so that their conscience

is opposed to their indulging any insurrectional desires.\_ These

emancipators seek one thing above all: to give their party the great

accents and attitudes of \_higher Nature\_.

100.

\_Rousseau\_; the rule founded on sentiment; Nature as the source of

justice; man perfects himself in proportion as he approaches \_Nature\_

(according to Voltaire, in proportion \_as he leaves Nature behind\_).

The very same periods seem to the one to demonstrate the progress of

\_humanity\_ and, to the other, the increase of injustice and inequality.

Voltaire, who still understood \_umanità\_ in the sense of the

Renaissance, as also \_virtù\_ (as "higher culture"), fights for the

cause of the "\_honnêtes gens\_" "\_la bonne compagnie\_" taste, science,

arts, and even for the cause of progress and civilisation.

\_The flare-up occurred towards 1760\_: On the one hand the citizen

of Geneva, on the other \_le seigneur de Ferney.\_ It is only from

that moment and henceforward that Voltaire was the man of his age,

the philosopher, the representative of Toleration and of Disbelief

(theretofore he had been merely \_un bel esprit\_). His envy and hatred

of Rousseau's success forced him upwards.

"\_Pour 'la canaille' un dieu rémunérateur et vengeur\_"--Voltaire.

The criticism of both standpoints in regard to the \_value of

civilisation.\_ To Voltaire nothing seems finer than the \_social

invention\_: there is no higher goal than to uphold and perfect it.

\_L'honnêteté\_ consists precisely in respecting social usage; virtue

in a certain obedience towards various necessary "prejudices" which

favour the maintenance of society. \_Missionary of Culture,\_ aristocrat,

representative of the triumphant and ruling classes and their values.

But Rousseau remained a \_plebeian,\_ even as \_hommes de lettres,\_ this

was \_preposterous\_; his shameless contempt for everything that was not

himself.

The \_morbid feature\_ in Rousseau is the one which happens to have been

most admired and \_imitated.\_ (Lord Byron resembled him somewhat, he

too screwed himself up to sublime attitudes and to revengeful rage--a

sign of vulgarity; later on, when Venice restored his equilibrium,

he understood what \_alleviates most\_ and does the \_most good ...

l'insouciance\_.)

In spite of his antecedents, Rousseau is proud of himself; but he is

incensed if he is reminded of his origin....

In Rousseau there was undoubtedly some brain trouble; in Voltaire--rare

health and lightsomeness. \_The revengefulness of the sick\_; his

periods of insanity as also those of his contempt of man, and of his

mistrust.

Rousseau's defence of \_Providence\_ (against Voltaire's Pessimism):

he \_had need of\_ God in order to be able to curse society and

civilisation; everything must be good \_per se,\_ because God had created

it; man \_alone has corrupted man.\_ The "good man" as a man of Nature

was pure fantasy; but with the dogma of God's authorship he became

something probable and even not devoid of foundation.

\_Romanticism\_ à la \_Rousseau\_: passion ("the sovereign right of

passion"); "naturalness"; the fascination of madness (foolishness

reckoned as greatness); the senseless vanity of the weak; the

revengefulness of the masses elevated to the position of \_justice\_

("in politics, for one hundred years, the leader has always been this

invalid").

101.

\_Kant\_: makes the scepticism of Englishmen, in regard to the theory of

knowledge, \_possible\_ for Germans.

(1) By enlisting in its cause the interest of the German's religious

and moral needs: just as the new academicians used scepticism for the

same reasons, as a preparation for Platonism (\_vide\_ Augustine); just

as Pascal even used \_moral\_ scepticism in order to provoke (to justify)

the need of belief;

(2) By complicating and entangling it with scholastic flourishes in

view of making it more acceptable to the German's scientific taste in

form (for Locke and Hume, alone, were too illuminating, too clear--that

is to say, judged according to the German valuing instinct, "too

superficial").

\_Kant\_: a poor psychologist and mediocre judge of human nature, made

hopeless mistakes in regard to great historical values (the French

Revolution); a moral fanatic \_à la\_ Rousseau; with a subterranean

current of Christian values; a thorough dogmatist, but bored to

extinction by this tendency, to the extent of wishing to tyrannise

over it, but quickly tired, even of 'scepticism; and not yet affected

by any cosmopolitan thought or antique beauty ... a \_dawdler\_ and a

\_go-between,\_ not at all original (like \_Leibnitz,\_ something between

mechanism and spiritualism; like \_Goethe,\_ something between the taste

of the eighteenth century and that of the "historical sense" [which

\_is\_ essentially a sense of exoticism]; like \_German music,\_ between

French and Italian music; like Charles the Great, who mediated and

built bridges between the Roman Empire and Nationalism--a dawdler \_par

excellence\_).

102.

In what respect have the \_Christian\_ centuries with their Pessimism

been \_stronger\_ centuries than the eighteenth--and how do they

correspond with the \_tragic\_ age of the Greeks?

The nineteenth century \_versus\_ the eighteenth. How was it an

heir?--how was it a step backwards from the latter? (more lacking in

"spirit" and in taste)--how did it show an advance on the latter?

(more gloomy, more realistic, \_stronger\_).

103.

How can we \_explain\_ the fact that we feel something in common with the

\_Campagna romana?\_ And the high mountain chain?

Chateaubriand in a letter to M. de Fontanes in 1803 writes his first

impression of the \_Campagna romana.\_

The President de Brosses says of the \_Campagna romana\_: "Il fallait

que Romulus fût ivre quand il songea à bâtir une ville dans un terrain

aussi laid."

Even Delacroix would have nothing to do with Rome, it frightened him.

He loved Venice, just as Shakespeare, Byron, and Georges Sand did.

Théophile Gautier's and Richard Wagner's dislike of Rome must not be

forgotten.

Lamartine has the language for Sorrento and Posilippo.

Victor Hugo raves about Spain, "parce que aucune autre nation n'a

moins emprunté à l'antiquité, parce qu'elle n'a subi aucune influence

classique."

104.

The \_two great attempts\_ that were made to overcome the eighteenth

century:

\_Napoleon,\_ in that he called man, the soldier, and the great struggle

for power, to life again, and conceived Europe as a political power.

\_Goethe,\_ in that he imagined a European culture which would consist

of the whole heritage of what humanity had \_attained to\_ up to his time.

German culture in this century inspires mistrust--the music of the

period lacks that complete element which liberates and binds as well,

to wit--Goethe.

The pre-eminence of \_music\_ in the romanticists of 1830 and 1840.

Delacroix. Ingres--a passionate musician (admired Gluck, Haydn,

Beethoven, Mozart), said to his pupils in Rome: "Si je pouvais vous

rendre tous musiciens, vous y gagneriez comme peintres"--likewise

Horace Vernet, who was particularly fond of Don Juan (as Mendelssohn

assures us, 1831); Stendhal, too, who says of himself: "Combien de

lieues ne ferais-je pas à pied, et à combien de jours de prison ne me

soumetterais-je pas pour entendre \_Don Juan ou le Matrimonio segreto\_;

et je ne sais pour quelle autre chose je ferais cet effort." He was

then fifty-six years old.

The borrowed forms, for instance: Brahms as a typical "Epigone,"

likewise Mendelssohn's cultured Protestantism (a former "soul" is

turned into poetry posthumously ...)

--the moral and poetical substitutions in Wagner, who used \_one\_ art as

a stop-gap to make up for what another lacked.

--the "historical sense," inspiration derived from poems, sagas.

--that characteristic transformation of which G. Flaubert is the most

striking example among Frenchmen, and Richard Wagner the most striking

example among Germans, shows how the romantic belief in love and the

future changes into a longing for nonentity in 1830-50.

106.

How is it that German music reaches its culminating point in the age of

German romanticism? How is it that German music lacks Goethe? On the

other hand, how much Schiller, or more exactly, how much "Thekla"[5] is

there not in Beethoven!

Schumann has Eichendorff, Uhland, Heine, Hoffman, Tieck, in him.

Richard Wagner has Freischütz, Hoffmann, Grimm, the romantic Saga,

the mystic Catholicism of instinct, symbolism, "the free-spiritedness

of passion" (Rousseau's intention). The \_Flying Dutchman\_ savours of

France, where \_le ténébreux\_ (1830) was the type of the seducer.

\_The cult of music,\_ the revolutionary romanticism of form. Wagner

\_synthesises\_ German and French romanticism.

107.

From the point of view only of his value to Germany and to German

culture, Richard Wagner is still a great problem, perhaps a German

misfortune: in any case, however, a fatality. But what does it

matter? Is he not very much more than a German event? It also

seems to me that to no country on earth is he less related than to

Germany; nothing was prepared there for his advent; his whole type

is simply strange amongst Germans; there he stands in their midst,

wonderful, misunderstood, incomprehensible. But people carefully avoid

acknowledging this: they are too kind, too square-headed--too German

for that. "Credo quia absurdus est": thus did the German spirit wish

it to be, in this case too--hence it is content meanwhile to believe

everything Richard Wagner wanted to have believed about himself. In all

ages the spirit of Germany has been deficient in subtlety and divining

powers concerning psychological matters. Now that it happens to be

under the high pressure of patriotic nonsense and self-adoration, it is

visibly growing thicker and coarser: how could it therefore be equal to

the problem of Wagner!

108.

The Germans \_are\_ not yet anything, but they are \_becoming\_ something;

that is why they have not yet any culture;--that is why they cannot

yet have any culture!--They are not yet anything: that means they are

all kinds of things. They are \_becoming\_ something: that means that

they will one day cease from being all kinds of things. The latter is

at bottom only a wish, scarcely a hope yet. Fortunately it is a wish

with which one can live, a question of will, of work, of discipline, a

question of training, as also of resentment, of longing, of privation,

of discomfort,--yea, even of bitterness,--in short, we Germans \_will\_

get something out of ourselves, something that has not yet been wanted

of us--we want something \_more\_!

That this "German, as he is not as yet"--has a right to something

better than the present German "culture"; that all who wish to

become something better, must wax angry when they perceive a sort of

contentment, an impudent "setting-oneself-at-ease," or "a process of

self-censing," in this quarter: that is my second principle, in regard

to which my opinions have not yet changed.

\_(c)\_ SIGNS OF INCREASING STRENGTH.

109.

First Principle: everything that characterises modern men savours of

decay: but side by side with the prevailing sickness there are signs of

a strength and powerfulness of soul which are still untried. \_The same

causes which tend to promote the belittling of men,\_ also force \_the

stronger and rarer individuals upwards to greatness.\_

110.

\_General survey: the ambiguous\_ character of our \_modern

world\_--precisely the same symptoms might at the same time be

indicative of either \_decline\_ or \_strength.\_ And the signs of strength

and of emancipation dearly bought, might in view of traditional

(or \_hereditary\_) appreciations concerned with the feelings, be

\_misunderstood\_ as indications of weakness. In short, \_feeling,\_ as a

\_means of fixing valuations,\_ is not \_on a level with the times.\_

\_Generalised\_: Every valuation is always \_backward\_; it is merely the

expression of the conditions which favoured survival and growth in a

much earlier age: it struggles against new conditions of existence

out of which it did not arise, and which it therefore necessarily

misunderstands: it hinders, and excites suspicion against, all that is

new.

111.

\_The problem of the nineteenth century.\_--To discover whether its

strong and weak side belong to each other. Whether they have been cut

from one and the same piece. Whether the variety of its ideals and

their contradictions are conditioned by a higher purpose: whether

they are something higher.--For it might be \_the prerequisite of

greatness,\_ that growth should take place amid such violent tension.

Dissatisfaction, Nihilism, \_might be a good sign.\_

112.

\_General survey.\_--As a matter of fact, all abundant growth involves a

concomitant process of \_crumbling to bits\_ and \_decay\_: suffering and

the symptoms of decline \_belong\_ to ages of enormous progress; every

fruitful and powerful movement of mankind has always \_brought about\_

a concurrent Nihilistic movement. Under certain circumstances, the

appearance of \_the extremest\_ form of Pessimism and actual \_Nihilism\_

might be the sign of a process of incisive and most essential growth,

and of mankind's transit into completely new conditions of existence.

\_This is what I have understood.\_

113.

\_A.\_

Starting out with a thoroughly courageous \_appreciation\_ of our men of

to-day:--we must not allow ourselves to be deceived by appearance: this

mankind is much less effective, but it gives quite different pledges

of \_lasting strength,\_ its tempo is slower, but the rhythm itself is

richer. \_Healthiness\_ is increasing, the real conditions of a healthy

body are on the point of being known, and will gradually be created,

"asceticism" is regarded with irony. The fear of extremes, a certain

confidence in the "right way," no raving: a periodical self-habituation

to narrower values (such as "mother-land," "science," etc.).

This whole picture, however, would still be \_ambiguous\_: it might be a

movement either of \_increase\_ or \_decline\_ in Life.

\_B.\_

The belief in "progress"--in lower spheres of intelligence, appears as

increasing life: but this is self-deception;

in higher spheres of intelligence it is a sign of

\_declining\_ life.

Description of the symptoms.

The unity of the aspect: uncertainty in regard to the standard of

valuation.

Fear of a general "in vain."

Nihilism.

114.

As a matter of fact, we are no longer so urgently in need of an

antidote against the first Nihilism: Life is no longer so uncertain,

accidental, and senseless in modern Europe. All such tremendous

\_exaggeration\_ of the value of men, of the value of evil, etc., are

not so necessary now; we can endure a considerable diminution of this

value, we may grant a great deal of nonsense and accident: the \_power\_

man has acquired now allows of a \_lowering\_ of the means of discipline,

of which the strongest was the moral interpretation of the universe.

The hypothesis "God" is much too extreme.

115.

If anything shows that our \_humanisation\_ is a genuine sign of

\_progress,\_ it is the fact that we no longer require excessive

contraries, that we no longer require contraries at all....

We may love the senses; for we have spiritualised them in every way and

made them artistic;

We have a right to all things which hitherto have been most

\_calumniated.\_

116.

\_The reversal of the order of rank.\_--Those pious counterfeiters--the

priests--are becoming Chandala in our midst:--they occupy the

position of the charlatan, of the quack, of the counterfeiter, of the

sorcerer: we regard them as corrupters of the will, as the great

slanderers and vindictive enemies of Life, and as the \_rebels\_ among

the bungled and the botched. We have made our middle class out of our

servant-caste--the Sudra--that is to say, our people or the body which

wields the political power.

On the other hand, the Chandala of former times is paramount: the

\_blasphemers,\_ the \_immoralists,\_ the independents of all kinds, the

artists, the Jews, the minstrels--and, at bottom, all \_disreputable\_

classes are in the van.

We have elevated ourselves to \_honourable\_ thoughts,--even more, we

determine what honour is on earth,--"nobility." ... All of us to-day

are \_advocates of life.\_--We \_Immoralists\_ are to-day the \_strongest\_

power: the other great powers are in need of us ... we re-create the

world in our own image.

We have transferred the label "Chandala" to the \_priests,\_ the

\_backworldsmen,\_ and to the deformed \_Christian society\_ which has

become associated with these people, together with creatures of like

origin, the pessimists, Nihilists, romanticists of pity, criminals, and

men of vicious habits--the whole sphere in which the idea of "God" is

that of \_Saviour....\_

We are proud of being no longer obliged to be liars, slanderers, and

detractors of Life....

117.

\_The advance\_ of the nineteenth century upon the eighteenth (at bottom

we \_good Europeans\_ are carrying on a war against the eighteenth

century):

(1) "The return to Nature" is getting to be understood, ever more

definitely, in a way which is quite the reverse of that in which

Rousseau used the phrase--\_away from idylls and operas!\_

(2) Ever more decided, more anti-idealistic, more objective, more

fearless, more industrious, more temperate, more suspicious of sudden

changes, \_anti-revolutionary\_;

(3) The question of \_bodily health\_ is being pressed ever more

decidedly in front of the health of "the soul": the latter is regarded

as a condition brought about by the former, and bodily health is

believed to be, at least, the prerequisite to spiritual health.

118.

If anything at all has been achieved, it is a more innocent attitude

towards the senses, a happier, more favourable demeanour in regard

to sensuality, resembling rather the position taken up by Goethe; a

prouder feeling has also been developed in knowledge, and the "reine

Thor"[6] meets with little faith.

119.

We "\_objective people.\_"--It is not "pity" that opens up the way for

\_us\_ to all that is most remote and most strange in life and culture;

but our accessibility and ingenuousness, which precisely does not

"pity," but rather takes pleasure in hundreds of things which formerly

caused pain (which in former days either outraged or moved us, or in

the presence of which we were either hostile or indifferent). Pain in

all its various phases is now interesting to us: on that account we are

certainly \_not\_ the more pitiful, even though the sight of pain may

shake us to our foundations and move us to tears: and we are absolutely

not inclined to be more helpful in view thereof.

In this \_deliberate\_ desire to look on at all pain and error, we have

grown stronger and more powerful than in the eighteenth century; it

is a proof of our increase of strength (we have \_drawn closer\_ to the

seventeenth and sixteenth centuries). But it is a profound mistake

to regard our "romanticism" as a proof of our "beautified souls." We

want \_stronger\_ sensations than all \_coarser\_ ages and classes have

wanted. (This fact must not be confounded with the needs of neurotics

and decadents; in their case, of course, there is a craving for pepper

--even for cruelty.)

We are all seeking conditions \_which are emancipated from\_ the

bourgeois, and to a greater degree from the priestly, notion of

morality (every book which savours at all of priestdom and theology

gives us the impression of pitiful \_niaiserie\_ and mental indigence).

"Good company," in fact, finds everything insipid which is not

forbidden and considered compromising in bourgeois circles; and the

case is the same with books, music, politics, and opinions on women.

120.

\_The simplification of man in the nineteenth century\_ (The eighteenth

century was that of elegance, subtlety, and generous feeling).--Not

"return to nature"; for no natural humanity has ever existed yet.

Scholastic, unnatural, and antinatural values are the rule and the

beginning; man only reaches Nature after a long struggle--he never

turns his "back" to her.... To be natural means, to dare to be as

immoral as Nature is.

We are coarser, more direct, richer in irony towards generous feelings,

even when we are beneath them.

Our \_haute volée,\_ the society consisting of our rich and leisured

men, is more natural: people hunt each other, the love of the sexes

is a kind of sport in which marriage is both a charm and an obstacle;

people entertain each other and live for the sake of pleasure; bodily

advantages stand in the first rank, and curiosity and daring are the

rule.

Our attitude towards \_knowledge\_ is more natural; we are innocent

in our absolute spiritual debauchery, we hate pathetic and hieratic

manners, we delight in that which is most strictly prohibited, we

should scarcely recognise any interest in knowledge if we were bored in

acquiring it.

Our attitude to \_morality\_ is also more natural. Principles have become

a laughing-stock; no one dares to speak of his "duty," unless in irony.

But a helpful, benevolent disposition is highly valued. (Morality is

located in \_instinct\_ and the rest is despised. Besides this there are

few points of honour.)

Our attitude to \_politics\_ is more natural: we see problems of power,

of the quantum of power, against another quantum. We do not believe in

a right that does not proceed from a power which is able to uphold it.

We regard all rights as conquests.

Our valuation of \_great men and things\_ is more natural: we regard

passion as a privilege; we can conceive of nothing great which does not

involve a great crime; all greatness is associated in our minds with a

certain standing-beyond-the-pale in morality.

Our attitude to \_Nature\_ is more natural: we no longer love her for her

"innocence," her "reason," her "beauty," we have made her beautifully

devilish and "foolish." But instead of despising her on that account,

since then we have felt more closely related to her and more familiar

in her presence. She does \_not\_ aspire to virtue: we therefore respect

her.

Our attitude towards \_Art\_ is more natural: we do not exact beautiful,

empty lies, etc., from her; brutal positivism reigns supreme, and it

ascertains things with perfect calm.

In short: there are signs showing that the European of the nineteenth

century is less ashamed of his instincts; he has gone a long way

towards acknowledging his unconditional naturalness and immorality,

\_without bitterness\_: on the contrary, he is strong enough to endure

this point of view alone.

To some ears this will sound as though \_corruption\_ had made strides:

and certain it is that man has not drawn nearer to the "Nature"

which Rousseau speaks about, but has gone one step farther in the

civilisation before which Rousseau \_stood in horror.\_ We have grown

\_stronger,\_ we have drawn nearer to the seventeenth century, more

particularly to the taste which reigned towards its close (Dancourt, Le

Sage, Renard).

121.

\_Culture\_ versus \_Civilisation.\_--The culminating stages of culture

and civilisation lie apart: one must not be led astray as regards the

fundamental antagonism existing between culture and civilisation.

From the moral standpoint, great periods in the history of culture

have always been periods of corruption; while on the other hand,

those periods in which man was deliberately and compulsorily \_tamed\_

("civilisation") have always been periods of intolerance towards the

most intellectual and most audacious natures. Civilisation desires

something different from what culture strives after: their aims may

perhaps be opposed....

122.

\_What I warn people against\_: confounding the instincts of decadence

with those of \_humanity\_;

Confounding the \_dissolving means\_ of civilisation \_and those which

necessarily promote decadence,\_ with \_culture\_;

Confounding \_debauchery,\_ and the principle, "laisser aller," with the

\_Will to Power\_ (the latter is the exact reverse of the former).

123.

The unsolved problems which I set anew: the \_problem of civilisation,\_

the struggle between Rousseau and Voltaire about the year 1760. Man

becomes deeper, more mistrustful, more "immoral," stronger, more

self-confident--and therefore "\_more natural\_"; that is "progress."

In this way, by a process of division of labour, the more evil strata

and the milder and tamer strata of society get separated: so that \_the

general facts\_ are not visible at first sight.... It is a sign of

\_strength,\_ and of the self-control and fascination of the strong, that

these stronger strata possess the arts in order to make their greater

powers for evil felt as something "\_higher\_" As soon as there is

"progress" there is a transvaluation of the strengthened factors into

the "good."

124.

Man must have the \_courage\_ of his natural instincts restored to him.--

\_The poor opinion\_ he has of himself must be destroyed (\_not\_ in the

sense of the individual, but in the sense of the \_natural\_ man ...)--

The \_contradictions\_ in things must be eradicated, after it has been

well understood that we were responsible for them--

\_Social idiosyncrasies\_ must be stamped out of existence (guilt,

punishment, justice, honesty, freedom, love, etc. etc.)--

An advance towards "\_naturalness\_": in all political questions, even

in the relations between parties, even in merchants', workmen's, or

contractors' parties, only \_questions\_ of \_power\_ come into play:--

"what one \_can\_ do" is the first question, what one ought to do is only

a secondary consideration.

125.

Socialism--or the \_tyranny\_ of the meanest and the most

brainless,--that is to say, the superficial, the envious, and the

mummers, brought to its zenith,--is, as a matter, of fact, the logical

conclusion of "modern ideas" and their latent anarchy: but in the

genial atmosphere of democratic well-being the capacity for forming

resolutions or even for coming \_to an end\_ at all, is paralysed. Men

follow--but no longer their reason. That is why socialism is on the

whole a hopelessly bitter affair: and there is nothing more amusing

than to observe the discord between the poisonous and desperate faces

of present-day socialists--and what wretched and nonsensical feelings

does not their style reveal to us!--and the childish lamblike happiness

of their hopes and desires. Nevertheless, in many places in Europe,

there may be violent hand-to-hand struggles and irruptions on their

account: the coming century is likely to be convulsed in more than

one spot, and the Paris Commune, which finds defenders and advocates

even in Germany, will seem to have been but a slight indigestion

compared with what is to come. Be this as it may, there will always

be too many people of property for socialism ever to signify anything

more than an attack of illness: and these people of property are like

one man with one faith, "one must possess something in order \_to

be\_ some one." This, however, is the oldest and most wholesome of

all instincts; I should add: "one must desire more than one has in

order to \_become\_ more." For this is the teaching which life itself

preaches to all living things: the morality of Development. To have

and to wish to have more, in a word, \_Growth\_--that is life itself.

In the teaching of socialism "a will to the denial of life" is but

poorly concealed: botched men and races they must be who have devised

a teaching of this sort. In fact, I even wish a few experiments might

be made to show that in a socialistic society, life denies itself,

and itself cuts away its own roots. The earth is big enough and man

is still unexhausted enough for a practical lesson of this sort and

\_demonstratio ad absurdum\_--even if it were accomplished only by a vast

expenditure of lives--to seem worth while to me. Still, Socialism,

like a restless mole beneath the foundations of a society wallowing in

stupidity, will be able to achieve something useful and salutary: it

delays "Peace on Earth" and the whole process of character-softening of

the democratic herding animal; it forces the European to have an extra

supply of intellect,--that is to say, craft and caution, and prevents

his entirely abandoning the manly and warlike qualities,--it also saves

Europe awhile from the \_marasmus femininus\_ which is threatening it.

126.

The most favourable obstacles and remedies of modernity:

(1) Compulsory \_military service\_ with real wars in which all joking is

laid aside.

(2) \_National\_ thick-headedness (which simplifies and concentrates).

(3) Improved \_nutrition\_ (meat).

(4) Increasing \_cleanliness\_ and wholesomeness in the home.

(5) The predominance of \_physiology\_ over theology, morality,

economics, and politics.

(6) Military discipline in the exaction and the practice of one's

"duty" (it is no longer customary to praise).

127.

I am delighted at the military development of Europe, also at the inner

anarchical conditions: the period of quietude and "Chinadom" which

Galiani prophesied for this century is now over. Personal and \_manly\_

capacity, bodily capacity recovers its value, valuations are becoming

more physical, nutrition consists ever more and more of flesh. Fine

men have once more become possible. Bloodless sneaks (with mandarins

at their head, as Comte imagined them) are now a matter of the past.

The savage in every one of us is \_acknowledged,\_ even the wild animal.

\_Precisely on that account,\_ philosophers will have a better chance.

--Kant is a scarecrow!

128.

I have not yet \_seen\_ any reasons to feel discouraged. He who acquires

and preserves a \_strong will,\_ together with a broad mind, has a more

favourable chance now than ever he had. For the \_plasticity\_ of man has

become exceedingly great in democratic Europe: men who learn easily,

who readily adapt themselves, are the rule: the gregarious animal of

a high order of intelligence is prepared. He who would command finds

those who \_must\_ obey: I have Napoleon and Bismarck in mind, for

instance. The struggle against strong and unintelligent wills, which

forms the surest obstacle in one's way, is really insignificant Who

would not be able to knock down these "objective" gentlemen with weak

wills, such as Ranke and Renan!

129.

\_Spiritual enlightenment\_ is an unfailing means of making men

uncertain, weak of will, and needful of succour and support; in

short, of developing the herding instincts in them. That is why all

great artist-rulers, hitherto (Confucius in China, the Roman Empire,

Napoleon, Popedom--at a time when they had the courage of their

worldliness and frankly pursued power) in whom the ruling instincts,

that had prevailed until their time, culminated, also made use of the

spiritual enlightenment--or at least allowed it to be supreme (after

the style of the Popes of the Renaissance). The self-deception of

the masses on this point, in every democracy for instance, is of the

greatest possible value: all that makes men smaller and more amenable

is pursued under the title "progress."

130.

The highest equity and mildness as a condition of \_weakness\_ (the New

Testament and the early Christian community--manifesting itself in the

form of utter foolishness in the Englishmen, Darwin and Wallace). Your

equity, ye higher men, drives you to universal suffrage, etc.; your

"humanity" urges you to be milder towards crime and stupidity. In the

\_end\_ you will thus help stupidity and harmlessness to conquer.

\_Outwardly\_: Ages of terrible wars, insurrections, explosions.

\_Inwardly\_: ever more and more weakness among men; \_events\_ take the

\_form of excitants.\_ The Parisian as the type of the European extreme.

\_Consequences\_: (1) Savages (at first, of course, in conformity with

the culture that has reigned hitherto); (2) \_Sovereign individuals\_

(where \_powerful\_ barbarous \_masses\_ and emancipation from all that

has been, are crossed). The age of greatest stupidity, brutality, and

wretchedness in the masses, and \_in the highest individuals.\_

131.

An incalculable number of higher individuals now perish: but he who

\_escapes their fate\_ is as strong as the devil. In this respect we are

reminded of the conditions which prevailed in the Renaissance.

132.

How are \_Good Europeans\_ such as ourselves distinguished from the

patriots? In the first place, we are atheists and immoralists, but we

take care to support the religions and the morality which we associate

with the gregarious instinct: for by means of them, an order of men is,

so to speak, being prepared, which must at some time or other fall into

our hands, which must actually \_crave\_ for our hands.

Beyond Good and Evil,--certainly; but we insist upon the unconditional

and strict preservation of herd-morality.

We reserve ourselves the right to several kinds of philosophy which it

is necessary to learn: under certain circumstances, the pessimistic

kind as a hammer; a European Buddhism might perhaps be indispensable.

We should probably support the development and the maturation of

democratic tendencies; for it conduces to weakness of will: in

"Socialism" we recognise a thorn which prevents smug ease.

Attitude towards the people.. Our prejudices; we pay attention to the

results of cross-breeding.

Detached, well-to-do, strong: irony concerning the "press" and its

culture. Our care: that scientific men should not become journalists.

We mistrust any form of culture that tolerates news-paper reading or

writing.

We make our accidental positions (as Goethe and Stendhal did), our

experiences, a foreground, and we lay stress upon them, so that we

may deceive concerning our backgrounds. We ourselves \_wait\_ and

avoid putting our heart into them. They serve us as refuges, such as

a wanderer might require and use--but we avoid feeling at home in

them. We are ahead of our fellows in that we have had a \_disciplina

voluntatis.\_ All strength is directed to the \_development of the will,\_

an art which allows us to wear masks, an art of understanding \_beyond\_

the passions (also "super-European" thought at times).

This is our preparation before becoming the law-givers of the future

and the lords of the earth; if not we, at least our children. Caution

where marriage is concerned.

133.

\_The twentieth century.\_--The Abbé Galiani says somewhere: "\_La

prévoyance est la cause des guerres actuelles de l'Europe. Si l'on

voulait se donner la peine de ne rien prévoir, tout le monde serait

tranquille, et je ne crois pas qu'on serait plus malheureux parce qu'on

ne ferait pas la guerre.\_" As I in no way share the unwarlike views of

my deceased friend Galiani, I have no fear whatever of saying something

beforehand with the view of conjuring in some way the cause of wars.

A condition of excessive \_consciousness,\_ after the worst of

earthquakes: with new questions.

134.

It is the time of the \_great noon, of the most appalling

enlightenment\_: my particular kind of \_Pessimism\_: the great

starting-point.

(1) Fundamental contradiction between civilisation and the elevation of

man.

(2) Moral valuations regarded as a history of lies and the art of

calumny in the service of the Will to Power (of the will of the \_herd,\_

which rises against stronger men).

(3) The conditions which determine every elevation in culture (the

facilitation of a \_selection\_ being made at the cost of a crowd) are

the \_conditions\_ of all growth.

(4). \_The multiformity\_ of the world as a question of \_strength,\_

which sees all things in the \_perspective of their growth.\_ The moral

Christian values to be regarded as the insurrection and mendacity of

slaves (in comparison with the aristocratic values of the \_ancient

world). \_

SECOND BOOK.

CRITICISM OF THE HIGHEST VALUES THAT HAVE PREVAILED HITHERTO.

I.

CRITICISM OF RELIGION.

All the beauty and sublimity with which we have invested real and

imagined things, I will show to be the property and product of man, and

this should be his most beautiful apology. Man as a poet, as a thinker,

as a god, as love, as power. Oh, the regal liberality with which he

has lavished gifts upon things in order \_to impoverish\_ himself and

make himself feel wretched! Hitherto, this has been his greatest

disinterestedness, that he admired and worshipped, and knew how to

conceal from himself that \_he\_ it was who had created what he admired.

1. CONCERNING THE ORIGIN OF RELIGIONS.

135.

\_The origin of religion.\_--Just as the illiterate man of to-day

believes that his wrath is the cause of his being angry, that his

mind is the cause of his thinking, that his soul is the cause of

his feeling, in short, just as a mass of psychological entities

are still unthinkingly postulated as causes; so, in a still more

primitive age, the same phenomena were interpreted by man by means of

personal entities. Those conditions of his soul which seemed strange,

overwhelming, and rapturous, he regarded as obsessions and bewitching

influences emanating from the power of some personality. (Thus the

Christian, the most puerile and backward man of this age, traces hope,

peace, and the feeling of deliverance to a psychological inspiration

on the part of God: being by nature a sufferer and a creature in need

of repose, states of happiness, peace, and resignation, perforce seem

strange to him, and seem to need some explanation.) Among intelligent,

strong, and vigorous races, the epileptic is mostly the cause of a

belief in the existence of some \_foreign power\_; but all such examples

of apparent subjection--as, for instance, the bearing of the exalted

man, of the poet, of the great criminal, or the passions, love and

revenge--lead to the invention of supernatural powers. A condition is

made concrete by being identified with a personality, and when this

condition overtakes anybody, it is ascribed to that personality. In

other words: in the psychological concept of God, a certain state of

the soul is personified as a cause in order to appear as an effect.

The psychological logic is as follows: when the \_feeling of power\_

suddenly seizes and overwhelms a man,--and this takes place in the

case of all the great passions,--a doubt arises in him concerning his

own person: he dare not think himself the cause of this astonishing

sensation--and thus he posits a \_stronger\_ person, a Godhead as its

cause. In short, the origin of religion lies in the extreme feelings

of power, which, being \_strange,\_ take men by surprise: and just

as the sick man, who feels one of his limbs unaccountably heavy,

concludes that another man must be sitting on it, so the ingenuous

\_homo religiosus,\_ divides himself up into \_several people.\_ Religion

is an example of the "\_altération de la personalité.\_" A sort of \_fear\_

and \_sensation of terror\_ in one's own presence.... But also a feeling

of inordinate \_rapture\_ and \_exaltation.\_ Among sick people, the

\_sensation of health\_ suffices to awaken a belief in the proximity of

God.

136.

\_Rudimentary psychology of the religious man:--\_All changes are

effects; all effects are effects of will (the notion of "Nature"

and of "natural law," is lacking); all effects presuppose an agent.

Rudimentary psychology: one is only a cause oneself, when one knows

that one has willed something.

Result: States of power impute to man the feeling that he is \_not\_ the

cause of them, that he is not \_responsible\_ for them: they come without

being willed to do so--consequently we cannot be their originators:

will that is not free (that is to say, the knowledge of a change in our

condition which we have not helped to bring about) requires a \_strong\_

will.

\_Consequence of this rudimentary psychology\_: Man has never dared to

credit \_himself\_ with his strong and startling moods, he has always

conceived them as "passive," as "imposed upon him from outside":

Religion is the offshoot of a \_doubt\_ concerning the entity of the

person, an \_altération\_ of the personality: in so far as everything

great and strong in man was considered \_superhuman\_ and \_foreign,\_ man

belittled himself,--he laid the two sides, the very pitiable and weak

side, and the very strong and startling side apart, in two spheres, and

called the one "Man" and the other "God."

And he has continued to act on these lines; during the period of the

\_moral idiosyncrasy\_ he did not interpret his lofty and sublime moral

states as "proceeding from his own will" or as the "work" of the

person. Even the Christian himself divides his personality into two

parts, the one a mean and weak fiction which he calls man, and the

other which he calls God (Deliverer and Saviour).

Religion has lowered the concept "man"; its ultimate conclusion is

that all goodness, greatness, and truth are superhuman, and are only

obtainable by the grace of God.

137.

One way of raising man out of his self-abasement, which brought about

the decline of the point of view that classed all lofty and strong

states of the soul, as strange, was the theory of relationship. These

lofty and strong states of the soul could at least be interpreted as

the influence of our \_forebears\_; we belonged to each other, we were

irrevocably joined; we grew in our own esteem, by acting according to

the example of a model known to us all.

There is an attempt on the part of noble families to associate religion

with their own feelings of self-respect. Poets and seers do the same

thing; they feel proud that they have been worthy,--that they have been

\_selected\_ for such association,--they esteem it an honour, not to be

considered at all as individuals, but as mere mouthpieces (Homer).

Man gradually takes possession of the highest and proudest states of

his soul, as also of his acts and his works. Formerly it was believed

that one paid oneself the greatest honour by denying one's own

responsibility for the highest deeds one accomplished, and by ascribing

them to--God. The will which was not free, appeared to be that which

imparted a higher value to a deed: in those days a god was postulated

as the author of the deed.

138.

Priests are the actors of something which is supernatural, either in

the way of ideals, gods, or saviours, and they have to make people

believe in them; in this they find their calling, this is the purpose

of their instincts; in order to make it as credible as possible, they

have to exert themselves to the utmost extent in the art of posing;

their actor's sagacity must, above all, aim at giving them \_a clean

conscience,\_ by means of which, alone, it is possible to persuade

effectively.

139.

The priest wishes to make it an understood thing, that he is the

\_highest type\_ of man, that he rules,--even over those who wield the

power,--that he is indispensable and unassailable,--that he is the

\_strongest power\_ in the community, not by any means to be replaced or

undervalued.

\_Means thereto\_: he alone is cultured; he alone is the \_man of virtue\_;

he alone has \_sovereign power over himself\_: he alone is, in a certain

sense, God, and ultimately goes back to the Godhead; he alone is the

middleman between God and \_others\_; the Godhead administers punishment

to every one who puts the priest at a disadvantage, or who thinks in

opposition to him.

\_Means thereto: Truth\_ exists. There is only one way of attaining to

it, and that is to become a priest. Everything good, which relates

either to order, nature, or tradition, is to be traced to the wisdom

of the priests. The Holy Book is their work. The whole of nature is

only a fulfilment of the maxims which it contains. No other \_source of

goodness\_ exists than the priests. Every other kind of perfection, even

the \_warrior's,\_ is different in rank from that of the priests.

\_Consequence\_: If the priest is to be the \_highest\_ type, then the

\_degrees\_ which lead to his \_virtues\_ must be the degrees of value

among men. \_Study, emancipation from material things, inactivity,

impassibility, absence of passion, solemnity\_;--the opposite of all

this is found in the \_lowest\_ type of man.

The priest has taught a kind of morality which conduced to his being

considered the \_highest type\_ of man. He conceives a \_type\_ which

is the \_reverse\_ of his own: the Chandala. By making \_these\_ as

contemptible as possible, some strength is lent to the \_order of

castes.\_ The priest's excessive fear of \_sensuality\_ also implies that

the latter is the most serious threat to the \_order of castes\_ (that is

to say, \_order\_ in general).... Every "free tendency" \_in puncto puncti

overthrows\_ the laws of marriage.

140.

The \_philosopher\_ considered as the development of the \_priestly\_

type:--He has the heritage of the priest in his blood; even as a rival

he is compelled to fight with the same weapons as the priest of his

time;--he aspires to the \_highest authority.\_

What is it that bestows \_authority\_ upon men who have no physical power

to wield (no army, no arms at all ...)? How do such men gain authority

\_over\_ those who are in possession of material power, and who represent

authority? (Philosophers enter the lists against princes, victorious

conquerors, and wise statesmen.)

They can do it only by establishing the belief that they are in

possession of a power which is higher and stronger--\_God.\_ Nothing is

strong enough: every one is in \_need\_ of the mediation and the services

of priests. They establish themselves as indispensable \_intercessors.\_

The conditions of their existence are: (1) That people believe in the

absolute superiority of their god, in fact believe in \_their god\_';

(2) that there is no other access, no direct access to god, save

through them. The \_second\_ condition alone gives rise to the concept

"heterodoxy"; the \_first\_ to the concept "disbelievers" (that is to

say, he who believes in another god).

141.

\_A Criticism of the Holy Lie.\_--That a lie is allowed in pursuit

of holy ends 'is a principle which belongs to the theory of all

priestcraft, and the object of this inquiry is to discover to what

extent it belongs to its practice.

But philosophers, too, whenever they intend taking over the leadership

of mankind, with the ulterior motives of priests in their minds, have

never failed to arrogate to themselves the right to lie: Plato above

all. But the most elaborate of lies is the double lie, developed

by the typically Arian philosophers of the Vedanta: two systems,

contradicting each other in all their main points, but interchangeable,

complementary, and mutually expletory, when educational ends were in

question. The lie of the one has to create a condition in which the

truth of the other can alone become \_intelligible....\_

How \_far\_ does the holy lie of priests and philosophers go?--The

question here is, what hypotheses do they advance in regard to

education, and what are the dogmas they are compelled to \_invent\_ in

order to do justice to these hypotheses?

First: they must have power, authority, and absolute credibility on

their side.

Secondly: they must have the direction of the whole of Nature, so that

everything affecting the individual seems to be determined by their law.

Thirdly: their domain of power must be very extensive, in order that

its control may escape the notice of those they subject: they must know

the penal code of the life beyond--of the life "after death,"--and, of

course, the means whereby the road to blessedness may be discovered.

They have to put the notion of a natural course of things out of sight,

but as they are intelligent and thoughtful people, they are able to

\_promise\_ a host of effects, which they naturally say are conditioned

by prayer or by the strict observance of their law. They can, moreover,

\_prescribe\_ a large number of things which are exceedingly reasonable

--only they must not point to experience or empiricism as the source

of this wisdom, but to revelation or to the fruits of the "most severe

exercises of penance."

The \_holy lie,\_ therefore, applies principally to the \_purpose\_ of

an action (the natural purpose, reason, is made to vanish: a moral

purpose, the observance of some law, a service to God, seems to be the

purpose): to the \_consequence\_ of an action (the natural consequence

is interpreted as something supernatural, and, in order to be on

surer ground, other incontrollable and supernatural consequences are

foretold).

In this way the concepts \_good\_ and \_evil\_ are created, and seem

quite divorced from the natural concepts: "useful," "harmful,"

"life-promoting," "life-retarding,"--indeed, inasmuch as \_another\_

life is imagined, the former concepts may even be \_antagonistic\_ to

Nature's concepts of good and evil. In this way, the proverbial concept

"conscience" is created: an inner voice, which, though it makes itself

heard in regard to every action, does not measure the worth of that

action according to its results, but according to its conformity or

non-conformity to the "law."

The holy lie therefore invented: (1) a \_god\_ who \_punishes\_ and

\_rewards,\_ who recognises and carefully observes the law-book of the

priests, and who is particular about sending them into the world as

his mouthpieces and plenipotentiaries; (2) an \_After Life,\_ in which,

alone, the great penal machine is supposed to be active--to this end

the \_immortality of the soul\_ was invented; (3) a \_conscience in

man,\_ understood as the knowledge that good and evil are permanent

values--that God himself speaks through it, whenever its counsels are

in conformity with priestly precepts; (4) \_Morality\_ as the denial of

all natural processes, as the subjection of all phenomena to a moral

order, as the interpretation of all phenomena as the effects of a moral

order of things (that is to say, the concept of punishment and reward),

as the only power and only creator of all transformations; (5) \_Truths\_

given, revealed, and identical with the teaching of the priests: as the

condition to all salvation and happiness in this and the next world.

\_In short\_: what is the price paid for the \_improvement\_ supposed

to be due to morality?--The unhinging of \_reason,\_ the reduction of

all motives to fear and hope (punishment and reward); \_dependence\_

upon the tutelage of priests, and upon a formulary exactitude

which is supposed to express a divine will; the implantation of

a "conscience" which establishes a false science in the place of

experience and experiment: as though all one had to do or had not

to do were predetermined--a kind of contraction of the seeking and

striving spirit;--\_in short\_: the worst \_mutilation\_ of man that can be

imagined, and it is pretended that "the good man" is the result.

Practically speaking, all reason, the whole heritage of intelligence,

subtlety, and caution, the first condition of the priestly canon, is

arbitrarily reduced, when it is too late, to a simple \_mechanical\_

process: conformity with the law becomes a purpose in itself, it is the

highest purpose; \_Life no longer contains any problems\_;--the whole

conception of the world is polluted by the notion of \_punishment\_;

--Life itself, owing to the fact that the \_priests life\_ is upheld as

the \_non plus ultra\_ of perfection, is transformed into a denial and

pollution of life;--the concept "God" represents an aversion to Life,

and even a criticism and a contemning of it. Truth is transformed in

the mind, into \_priestly\_ prevarication; the striving after truth, into

the \_study of the Scriptures,\_ into the way to \_become a theologian.\_

142.

\_A criticism of the Law-Book of Manu.\_--The whole book is founded upon

the holy lie. Was it the well-being of humanity that inspired the whole

of this system? Was this kind of man, who believes in the \_interested\_

nature of every action, interested or not interested in the success

of this system? The desire to improve mankind--whence comes the

inspiration to this feeling? Whence is the concept improvement taken?

We find a class of men, \_the sacerdotal class,\_ who consider themselves

the standard pattern, the highest example and most perfect expression

of the type man. The notion of "improving" mankind, to this class of

men, means to make mankind like themselves. They believe in their own

superiority, they \_will\_ be superior in practice: the cause of the holy

lie is \_The Will to Power....\_

Establishment of the dominion: to this end, ideas which place a \_non

plus ultra\_ of power with the priesthood are made to prevail. Power

acquired by lying was the result of the recognition of the fact that it

was not already possessed physically, in a military form.... Lying as a

supplement to power--this is a new concept of "truth."

It is a mistake to presuppose \_unconscious\_ and \_innocent\_ development

in this quarter--a sort of self-deception. Fanatics are not the

discoverers of such exhaustive systems of oppression.... Cold-blooded

reflection must have been at work here; the same sort of reflection

which Plato showed when he worked out his "State"--"One must desire the

means when one desires the end." Concerning this political maxim, all

legislators have always been quite clear.

We possess the classical model, and it is specifically Arian: we

can therefore hold the most gifted and most reflective type of man

responsible for the most systematic lie that has ever been told....

Everywhere almost the lie was copied, and thus \_Avian influence\_

corrupted the world....

143.

Much is said to-day about the \_Semitic\_ spirit of the \_New Testament\_:

but the thing referred to is merely priestcraft,--and in the purest

example of an Arian law-book, in Manu, this kind of "Semitic

spirit"--that is to say, \_Sacerdotalism,\_ is worse than anywhere else.

The development of the Jewish hierarchy is \_not\_ original: they learnt

the scheme in Babylon--it is Arian. When, later on, the same thing

became dominant in Europe, under the preponderance of Germanic blood,

this was in conformity to the spirit of the \_ruling race\_: a striking

case of atavism. The Germanic middle ages aimed at a revival of the

\_Arian order of castes\_.

Mohammedanism in its turn learned from Christianity the use of a

"Beyond" as an instrument of punishment.

The scheme of a \_permanent community,\_ with priests at its

head--this oldest product of Asia's great culture in the domain of

organisation--\_naturally\_ provoked reflection and imitation in every

way.--Plato is an example of this, but above all, the Egyptians.

144.

\_Moralities\_ and \_religions\_ are the principal means by which one can

modify men into whatever one likes; provided one is possessed of an

overflow of creative power, and can cause one's will to prevail over

long periods of time.

145.

If one wish to see an \_affirmative\_ Arian religion which is the product

of a \_ruling\_ class, one should read the law-book of Manu. (The

deification of the feeling of power in the Brahmin: it is interesting

to note that it originated in the warrior-caste, and was later

transferred to the priests.)

If one wish to see an \_affirmative\_ religion of the Semitic order,

which is the product of the \_ruling\_ class, one should read the Koran

or the earlier portions of the Old Testament. (\_Mohammedanism,\_ as a

religion for men, has profound contempt for the sentimentality and

prevarication of Christianity, ... which, according to Mohammedans, is

a woman's religion.)

If one wish to see a \_negative\_ religion of the Semitic order, which is

the product of the \_oppressed\_ class, one should read the New Testament

(which, according to Indian and Arian points of view, is a religion for

the Chandala).

If one wish to see a \_negative\_ Arian religion, which is the product of

the \_ruling\_ classes, one should study Buddhism.

It is quite in the nature of things that we have no Arian religion

which is the product of the \_oppressed\_ classes; for that would have

been a contradiction: a race of masters is either paramount or else it

goes to the dogs.

146.

Religion, \_per se,\_ has nothing to do with morality; yet both offshoots

of the Jewish religion are \_essentially\_ moral religions--which

prescribe the rules of living, and procure obedience to their

principles by means of rewards and punishment.

147.

\_Paganism--Christianity.--Paganism\_ is that which says yea to all

that is natural, it is innocence in being natural, "naturalness."

\_Christianity\_ is that which says no to all that is natural, it is a

certain lack of dignity in being natural; hostility to Nature.

"Innocent":--Petronius is innocent, for instance. Beside this happy

man a Christian is absolutely devoid of innocence. But since even

the \_Christian\_ status is ultimately only a natural condition, the

term "Christian" soon begins to mean the \_counterfeiting of the

psychological interpretation.\_

148.

The Christian priest is from the root a mortal enemy of sensuality: one

cannot imagine a greater contrast to his attitude than the guileless,

slightly awed, and solemn attitude, which the religious rites of the

most honourable women in Athens maintained in the presence of the

symbol of sex. In all non-ascetic religions the procreative act is

\_the\_ secret \_per se\_: a sort of symbol of perfection and of the

designs of the future: re-birth, immortality.

149.

Our belief in ourselves is the greatest fetter, the most telling spur,

and the \_strongest pinion.\_ Christianity ought to have elevated the

innocence of man to the position of an article of belief--men would

then have become gods: in those days believing was still possible.

150.

The egregious \_lie\_ of history: as if it were the \_corruption\_ of

Paganism that opened the road to Christianity. As a matter of fact, it

was the enfeeblement and \_moralisation\_ of the man of antiquity. The

new interpretation of natural functions, which made them appear like

\_vices,\_ had already gone before!

151.

Religions are ultimately wrecked by the belief in morality. The idea of

the Christian moral God becomes untenable,--hence "Atheism,"--as though

there could be no other god.

\_Culture\_ is likewise wrecked by the belief in morality. For when the

necessary and only possible conditions of its growth are revealed,

nobody \_will\_ any longer countenance it (Buddhism).

152.

\_The physiology of Nihilistic religions.\_--All in all, the \_Nihilistic\_

religions are \_systematised histories of sickness\_ described in

religious and moral terminology.

In pagan cultures it is around the interpretation of the great annual

cycles that the religious cult turns; in Christianity it is around a

cycle of \_paralytic phenomena.\_

153.

This \_Nihilistic\_ religion gathers together all the \_decadent elements\_

and things of like order which it can find in antiquity, viz.:--

\_(a)\_ The \_weak\_ and the \_botched\_ (the refuse of the ancient world,

and that of which it rid itself with most violence).

\_(b)\_ Those who are \_morally obsessed\_ and \_anti-pagan.\_

\_(c)\_ Those who are \_weary of politics\_ and indifferent (the \_blasé\_

Romans), the \_denationalised,\_ who know not what they are.

\_(d)\_ Those who are tired of themselves--who are happy to be party to a

subterranean conspiracy.

154.

\_Buddha\_ versus \_Christ.\_--Among the Nihilistic religions, Christianity

and \_Buddhism\_ may always be sharply distinguished. \_Buddhism\_ is the

expression of a \_fine evening,\_ perfectly sweet and mild--it is a sort

of gratitude towards all that lies hidden, including that which it

entirely lacks, viz., bitterness, disillusionment, and resentment.

Finally it possesses lofty intellectual love; it has got over all

the subtlety of philosophical contradictions, and is even resting

after it, though it is precisely from that source that it derives its

intellectual glory and its glow as of a sunset (it originated in the

higher classes).

\_Christianity\_ is a degenerative movement, consisting of all kinds

of decaying and excremental elements: it is \_not\_ the expression of

the downfall of a race, it is, from the root, an agglomeration of all

the morbid elements which are mutually attractive and which gravitate

to one another.... It is therefore \_not\_ a national religion, \_not\_

determined by race: it appeals to the disinherited everywhere; it

consists of a foundation of resentment against all that is successful

and dominant: it is in need of a symbol which represents the damnation

of everything successful and dominant. It is opposed to every form of

\_intellectual\_ movement, to all philosophy: it takes up the cudgels for

idiots, and utters a curse upon all intellect. Resentment against those

who are gifted, learned, intellectually independent: in all these it

suspects the element of success and domination.

155.

In Buddhism this thought prevails: "All passions, everything which

creates emotions and leads to blood, is a call to action"--to this

extent alone are its believers \_warned\_ against evil. For action has

no sense, it merely binds one to existence. All existence, however, has

no sense. Evil is interpreted as that which leads to irrationalism:

to the affirmation of means whose end is denied. A road to nonentity

is the desideratum, \_hence all\_ emotional impulses are regarded with

horror. For instance: "On no account seek after revenge! Be the enemy

of no one!"--The Hedonism of the weary finds its highest expression

here. Nothing is more utterly foreign to Buddhism than the Jewish

fanaticism of St. Paul: nothing could be more contrary to its instinct

than the tension, fire, and unrest of the religious man, and, above

all, that form of sensuality which sanctifies Christianity with the

name "Love." Moreover, it is the cultured and very intellectual classes

who find blessedness in Buddhism: a race wearied and besotted by

centuries of philosophical quarrels, but not \_beneath all culture\_ as

those classes were from which Christianity sprang.... In the Buddhistic

ideal, there is essentially an emancipation from good and evil: a

very subtle suggestion of a Beyond to all morality is thought out

in its teaching, and this Beyond is supposed to be compatible with

perfection,--the condition being, that even good actions are only

needed \_pro tem.,\_ merely as a means,--that is to say, in order to be

free from \_all\_ action.

156.

\_How very curious\_ it is to see a \_Nihilistic\_ religion such as

Christianity, sprung from, and in keeping with, a decrepit and worn-out

people, who have outlived all strong instincts, being transferred step

by step to another environment--that is to say, to a land of young

people, \_who have not yet lived at all.\_ The joy of the final chapter,

of the fold and of the evening, preached to barbarians and Germans!

How thoroughly all of it must first have been barbarised, Germanised!

To those who had dreamed of a \_Walhalla\_: who found happiness only in

war!--A \_super\_national religion preached in the midst of chaos, where

\_no nations yet existed even.\_

157.

The only way to refute priests and religions is this: to show that

their errors are no longer \_beneficent\_--that they are rather harmful;

in short, that their own "proof of power" no longer holds good....

2. CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY.

158.

Christianity as an \_historical reality\_ should not be confounded with

that one root which its name recalls. The \_other\_ roots, from which it

has sprung, are by far the more important. It is an unprecedented abuse

of names to identify such manifestations of decay and such abortions as

the "Christian Church," "Christian belief," and "Christian life," with

that Holy Name. What did Christ \_deny\_?--Everything which to-day is

called Christian.

159.

The whole of the Christian \_creed\_--all Christian "truth," is idle

falsehood and deception, and is precisely the reverse of that which was

at the bottom of the first Christian movement.

All that which in the \_ecclesiastical\_ sense is Christian, is just

exactly what is most radically \_anti-Christian\_: crowds of things and

people appear instead of symbols, history takes the place of eternal

facts, it is all forms, rites, and dogmas instead of a "practice" of

life. To be really Christian would mean to be absolutely indifferent to

dogmas, cults, priests, church, and theology.

The practice of Christianity is no more an impossible phantasy than the

practice of Buddhism is: it is merely a means to happiness.

160.

Jesus goes straight to the point, the "Kingdom of Heaven" in the heart,

and He does \_not\_ find the means in duty to the Jewish Church; He

even regards the reality of Judaism (its need to maintain itself) as

nothing; He is concerned purely with the \_inner\_ man.

Neither does He make anything of all the coarse forms relating to man's

intercourse with God: He is opposed to the whole of the teaching of

repentance and atonement; He points out how man ought to live in order

to feel himself "deified," and how futile it is on his part to hope to

live properly by showing repentance and contrition for his sins. "Sin

is of no account" is practically his chief standpoint.

Sin, repentance, forgiveness,--all this does not belong to Christianity

... it is Judaism or Paganism which has become mixed up with Christ's

teaching.

161.

The \_Kingdom of Heaven\_ is a state of the heart (of children it is

written, "for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven"): it has nothing to

do with superterrestrial things. The Kingdom of God "cometh," not

chronologically or historically, not on a certain day in the calendar;

it is not something which one day appears and was not previously there;

it is a "change of feeling in the individual," it is something which

may come at any time and which may be absent at any time....

162.

\_The thief on the cross\_;--When the criminal himself, who endures a

painful death, declares: "the way this Jesus suffers and dies, without

a murmur of revolt or enmity, graciously and resignedly, is the only

right way," he assents to the gospel; and by this very fact \_he is in

Paradise....\_

163.

Jesus bids us:--not to resist, either by deeds or in our heart, him who

ill-treats us;

He bids us admit of no grounds for separating ourselves from our wives;

He bids us make no distinction between foreigners and

fellow-countrymen, strangers and familiars;

He bids us show anger to no one, and treat no one with contempt;--give

alms secretly; not to desire to become rich;--not to swear;--not to

stand in judgment;--become reconciled with our enemies and forgive

offences;--not to worship in public.

"Blessedness" is nothing promised: it is here, with us, if we only wish

to live and act in a particular way.

164.

\_Subsequent Additions\_;--The whole of the prophet- and

thaumaturgist-attitudes and the bad temper; while the conjuring-up of a

supreme tribunal of justice is an abominable corruption (see Mark vi.

11: "And whosoever shall not receive you.... Verily I say unto you, It

shall be more tolerable for Sodom and Gomorrha," etc.). The "fig tree"

(Matt. xxi. 18, 19): "Now in the morning as he returned into the city,

he hungered. And when he saw a fig tree in the way, he came to it, and

found nothing thereon, but leaves only, and said unto it, Let no fruit

grow on thee henceforward for ever. And presently the fig tree withered

away."

165.

The teaching of rewards and punishments has become mixed up with

Christianity in a way which is quite absurd; everything is thereby

spoilt. In the same way, the practice of the first \_ecclesia

militans,\_ of the Apostle Paul and his attitude, is put forward as if

it had been \_commanded\_ or predetermined.

The subsequent glorification of the actual \_life\_ and \_teaching\_ of the

first Christians: as if everything had been \_prescribed beforehand\_ and

had been only a matter of \_following\_ directions----And as for the

\_fulfilment of scriptural prophecies\_: how much of all that is more

than forgery and cooking?

166.

Jesus opposed a real life, a life in truth, to ordinary life: nothing

could have been more foreign to His mind than the somewhat heavy

nonsense of an "eternal Peter,"--of the eternal duration of a single

person. Precisely what He combats is the exaggerated importance of the

"person": how can He wish to immortalise it?

He likewise combats the hierarchy within the community; He never

promises a certain proportion of reward for a certain proportion of

deserts: how can He have meant to teach the doctrine of punishment and

reward in a Beyond?

167.

Christianity is an ingenuous attempt at bringing about a \_Buddhistic

movement in favour of peace,\_ sprung from the very heart of the

resenting masses ... but transformed by \_Paul\_ into a mysterious

pagan cult, which was ultimately able to accord with the whole of

\_State organisation\_ ... and which carries on war, condemns, tortures,

conjures, and hates.

Paul bases his teaching upon the need of mystery felt by the great

masses capable of religious emotions: he seeks a \_victim,\_ a bloody

phantasmagoria, which may be equal to a contest with the images of

a secret cult: God on the cross, the drinking of blood, the \_unio

mystica\_ with the "victim."

He seeks the prolongation of life after death (the blessed and atoned

after-life of the individual soul) which he puts in causal relation

with the \_victim\_ already referred to (according to the type of

Dionysos, Mithras, Osiris).

He feels the necessity of bringing notions of \_guilt\_ and \_sin\_

into the foreground, \_not\_ a new practice of life (as Jesus Himself

demonstrated and taught), but a new cult, a new belief, a belief in a

miraculous metamorphosis ("Salvation" through belief).

He understood the \_great needs of the pagan worlds\_ and he gave quite

an absolutely arbitrary picture of those two plain facts, Christ's life

and death. He gave the whole a new accent, altering the equilibrium

everywhere ... he was one of the most active destroyers of primitive

Christianity.

The attempt made on the life of \_priests and theologians\_ culminated,

thanks to Paul, in a new priesthood and theology--a \_ruling\_ caste and

a \_Church.\_

The attempt made to suppress the fussy importance of the "person,"

culminated in the belief in the eternal "personality" (and in the

anxiety concerning "eternal salvation" ...), and in the most

paradoxical exaggeration of individual egoism.

This is the humorous side of the question--tragic humour: Paul again

set up on a large scale precisely what Jesus had overthrown by His

life. At last, when the Church edifice was complete, it even sanctioned

the \_existence\_ of the \_State.\_

168.

The Church is precisely that against which Jesus inveighed--and against

which He taught His disciples to fight.

169.

A God who died for our sins, salvation through faith, resurrection

after death--all these things are the counterfeit coins of real

Christianity, for which that pernicious blockhead Paul must be held

responsible.

The \_life which must serve as an example\_ consists in love and

humility; in the abundance of hearty emotion which does not even

exclude the lowliest; in the formal renunciation of all desire of

making its rights felt; in conquest, in the sense of triumph over

oneself; in the belief in salvation in this world, despite all sorrow,

opposition, and death; in forgiveness and the absence of anger and

contempt; in the absence of a desire to be rewarded; in the refusal

to be bound to anybody; abandonment to all that is most spiritual and

intellectual;--in fact, a very proud life controlled by the will of a

servile and poor life.

Once the Church had allowed itself to take over \_all the Christian

practice,\_ and had formally sanctioned the State,--that kind of life

which Jesus combats and condemns,--it was obliged to lay the sense

of Christianity in other things than early Christian ideals--that is

to say, in the \_faith\_ in incredible things, in the ceremonial of

prayers, worship, feasts, etc. etc. The notions "sin," "forgiveness,"

"punishment," "reward"--everything, in fact, which had nothing in

common with, and was quite \_absent\_ from, primitive Christianity, now

comes into the foreground.

An appalling stew of Greek philosophy and Judaism; asceticism;

continual judgments and condemnations; the order of rank, etc.

170.

Christianity has, from the first, always transformed the symbolical

into crude realities:

(1) The antitheses "true life" and "false life" were misunderstood and

changed into "life here" and "life beyond."

(2) The notion "eternal life," as opposed to the personal life which is

ephemeral, is translated into "personal immortality";

(3) The process of fraternising by means of sharing the same food and

drink, after the Hebrew-Arabian manner, is interpreted as the "miracle

of transubstantiation."

(4) "Resurrection" which was intended to mean the entrance to the

"true life," in the sense of being intellectually "born again," becomes

an historical contingency, supposed to take place at some moment after

death;

(5) The teaching of the Son of man as the "Son of God,"--that is to

say, the life-relationship between man and God,--becomes the "second

person of the Trinity," and thus the filial relationship of every

man--even the lowest--to God, is \_done away with\_;

(6) Salvation through faith (that is to say, that there is no other way

to this filial relationship to God, save through the \_practice of life\_

taught by Christ) becomes transformed into the belief that there is a

miraculous way of \_atoning\_ for all \_sin\_; though not through our own

endeavours, but by means of Christ:

For all these purposes, "Christ on the Cross" had to be interpreted

afresh. The \_death\_ itself would certainly not be the principal feature

of the event ... it was only another sign pointing to the way in

which one should behave towards the authorities and the laws of the

world--\_that one was not to defend oneself--this was the exemplary

life.\_

171.

Concerning the psychology of \_Paul.\_--The important fact is Christ's

death. This remains to be \_explained ...\_. That there may be truth or

error in an explanation never entered these people's heads: one day a

sublime possibility strikes them, "His death \_might\_ mean so and so"

--and it forthwith \_becomes\_ so and so. An hypothesis is proved by the

sublime \_ardour\_ it lends to its discoverer....

"The proof of strength": \_i.e.,\_ a thought is demonstrated by its

\_effects\_ ("by their fruits," as the Bible ingenuously says); that

which fires enthusiasm must be \_true,\_--what one loses one's blood for

must be \_true--\_

In every department of this world of thought, the sudden feeling of

power which an idea imparts to him who is responsible for it, is

placed to the \_credit\_ of that idea:--and as there seems no other way

of honouring an idea than by calling it true, the first epithet it is

honoured with is the word \_true.\_ ... How could it have any effect

otherwise? It was imagined by some power: if that power were not

real, it could not be the cause of anything.... The thought is then

understood as \_inspired\_: the effect it causes has something of the

violent nature of a demoniacal influence--

A thought which a decadent like Paul could not resist and to which he

completely yields, is thus "proved" \_true\_!!!

All these holy epileptics and visionaries did not possess a thousandth

part of the honesty in self-criticism with which a philologist,

nowadays, reads a text, or tests the truth of an historical event....

Beside us, such people were moral cretins.

172.

It matters little \_whether a thing be true,\_ provided it be

\_effective\_: total \_absence of intellectual uprightness.\_ Everything

is good, whether it be lying, slander, or shameless "cooking," provided

it serve to heighten the degree of heat to the point at which people

"believe."

We are face to face with an actual school for the teaching of \_the

means wherewith\_ men are \_seduced\_ to a belief: we see systematic

\_contempt\_ for those spheres whence contradiction might come (that

is to say, for reason, philosophy, wisdom, doubt, and caution); a

shameless praising and glorification of the teaching, with continual

references to the fact that it was God who presented us with it--that

the apostle signifies nothing--that no criticism is brooked, but

only faith, acceptance; that it is the greatest blessing and favour

to receive such a doctrine of salvation; that the state in which one

should receive it, ought to be one of the profoundest thankfulness and

humility....

The resentment which the lowly feel against all those in high places,

is continually turned to account: the fact that this teaching is

revealed to them as the reverse of the wisdom of the world, against

the power of the world, seduces them to it. This teaching convinces

the outcasts and the botched of all sorts and conditions; it promises

blessedness, advantages, and privileges to the most insignificant and

most humble men; it fanaticises the poor, the small, and the foolish,

and fills them with insane vanity, as though \_they\_ were the meaning

and salt of the earth.

Again, I say, all this cannot be sufficiently contemned, we spare

ourselves a criticism of the teaching; it is sufficient to take

note of the means it uses in order to be aware of the nature of the

phenomenon one is examining. It identified itself with \_virtue,\_

it appropriated the whole of the \_fascinating power of virtue,\_

shamelessly, for its own purposes ... it availed itself of the power of

paradox, and of the need, manifested by old civilisation, for pepper

and absurdity; it amazed and revolted at the same time; it provoked

persecutions and ill-treatment.

It is the same kind of \_well-thought-out meanness\_ with which the

Jewish priesthood established their power and built up their Church....

One must be able to discern: (1) that warmth of passion "love" (resting

on a base of ardent sensuality); (2) the thoroughly \_ignoble character\_

of Christianity:--the continual exaggeration and verbosity;--the lack

of cool intellectuality and irony;--the unmilitary character of all its

instincts;--the priestly prejudices against manly pride, sensuality,

the sciences, the arts.

173.

\_Paul\_: seeks power \_against\_ ruling Judaism,--his attempt is too

weak.... Transvaluation of the notion "Jew": the "race" is put aside:

but that means denying the very basis of the whole structure. The

"martyr," the "fanatic," the value of all \_strong\_ belief. Christianity

is the \_form of decay\_ of the old world, after the latter's collapse,

and it is characterised by the fact that it brings all the most sickly

and unhealthy elements and needs to the top.

\_Consequently other\_ instincts had to step into the foreground, in

order to \_constitute\_ an entity, a power able to stand alone--in short,

a condition of tense sorrow was necessary, like that out of which the

Jews had derived their \_instinct of self-preservation....\_

The persecution of Christians was invaluable for this purpose.

Unity in the face of danger; the conversion of the masses becomes the

only means of putting an end to the persecution of the individual. (The

notion "conversion" is therefore made as elastic as possible.)

174.

The \_Christian Judaic\_ life: here resentment did not prevail. The

great persecutions alone could have driven out the passions to that

extent--as also the \_ardour of love\_ and \_hate.\_

When the creatures a man most loves are sacrificed before his eyes for

the sake of his faith, that man becomes \_aggressive\_; the triumph of

Christianity is due to its persecutors.

\_Asceticism\_ is not specifically Christian: this is what Schopenhauer

misunderstood. It only shoots up in Christianity, wherever it would

have existed without that religion.

Melancholy Christianity, the torture and torment of the conscience,

also only a peculiarity of a particular soil, where Christian values

have taken root: it is not Christianity properly speaking. Christianity

has absorbed all the different kinds of diseases which grow from morbid

soil: one could refute it at one blow by showing that it did not know

how to resist any contagion. But \_that\_ precisely is the essential

feature of it. Christianity is a type of decadence.

175.

The reality on which Christianity was able to build up its power

consisted of the small dispersed \_Jewish families,\_ with their warmth,

tenderness, and peculiar readiness to help, which, to the whole of the

Roman Empire, was perhaps the most incomprehensible and least familiar

of their characteristics; they were also united by their pride at

being a "chosen people," concealed beneath a cloak of humility, and by

their secret denial of all that was uppermost and that possessed power

and splendour, although there was no shade of envy in their denial.

\_To have recognised this as a power,\_ to have regarded this \_blessed\_

state as communicable, seductive, and infectious even where pagans

were concerned--this constituted Paul's genius: to use up the treasure

of latent energy and cautious happiness for the purposes of "a Jewish

Church of free confession," and to avail himself of all the Jewish

experience, their propaganda, and their expertness in \_the preservation

of a community\_ under a foreign power--this is what he conceived to

be his duty. He it was who discovered that absolutely unpolitical and

isolated body of \_paltry people,\_ and their art of asserting themselves

and pushing themselves to the front, by means of a host of acquired

virtues which are made to represent the only forms of virtue ("the

self-preservative measure and weapon of success of a certain class of

man").

The principle of \_love\_ comes from the small community of Jewish

people: a \_very passionate\_ soul glows here, beneath the ashes of

humility and wretchedness: it is neither Greek, Indian, nor German. The

song in praise of love which Paul wrote is not Christian; it is the

Jewish flare of that eternal flame which is Semitic. If Christianity

has done anything essentially new in a psychological sense, it is this,

that it has \_increased the temperature of the soul\_ among those cooler

and more noble races who were at one time at the head of affairs;

it discovered that the most wretched life could be made rich and

invaluable, by means of an elevation of the temperature of the soul....

It is easily understood that a transfer of this sort could \_not\_

take place among the ruling classes: the Jews and Christians were at

a disadvantage owing to their bad manners--spiritual strength and

passion, when accompanied by bad manners, only provoke loathing (I

become aware of these bad manners while reading the New Testament). It

was necessary to be related both in baseness and sorrow with this type

of lower manhood in order to feel anything attractive in him.... The

attitude a man maintains towards the New Testament is a test of the

amount of taste he may have for the classics (see Tacitus); he who is

not revolted by it, he who does not feel honestly and deeply that he is

in the presence of a sort of \_fœda superstitio\_ when reading it, and

who does not draw his hand back so as not to soil his fingers--such a

man does not know what is classical. A man must feel about "the cross"

as Goethe did.[1]

176.

\_The reaction of paltry people\_:--Love provides the feeling of highest

power. It should be understood to what extent, not man in general, but

only a certain kind of man is speaking here.

"We are godly in love, we shall be 'the children of God'; God loves us

and wants nothing from us save love"; that is to say: all morality,

obedience, and action, do not produce the same feeling of power and

freedom as love does;--a man does nothing wicked from sheer love, but

he does much more than if he were prompted by obedience and virtue

alone.

Here is the happiness of the herd, the communal feeling in big things

as in small, the living sentiment of unity felt as the \_sum of the

feeling of life.\_ Helping, caring for, and being useful, constantly

kindle the feeling of power; visible success, the expression of

pleasure, emphasise the feeling of power; pride is not lacking either,

it is felt in the form of the community, the House of God, and the

"chosen people."

As a matter of fact, man has once more experienced an "\_altération" of

his personality\_: this time he called his feeling of love--God. The

awakening of such a feeling must be pictured; it is a sort of ecstasy,

a strange language, a "Gospel"--it was this newness which did not

allow man to attribute love to himself--he thought it was God leading

him on and taking shape in his heart. "God descends among men," one's

neighbour is transfigured and becomes a God (in so far as he provokes

the sentiment of love), \_Jesus is the neighbour,\_ the moment He is

transfigured in thought into a God, and into a cause \_provoking the

feeling of power.\_

177.

Believers are aware that they owe an infinite amount to Christianity,

and therefore conclude that its Founder must have been a man of the

first rank.... This conclusion is false, but it is typical of the

reverents. Regarded objectively, it is, \_in the first place,\_ just

possible that they are mistaken concerning the extent of their debt to

Christianity: a man's convictions prove nothing concerning the thing

he is convinced about, and in religions they are more likely to give

rise to suspicions.... Secondly, it is possible that the debt owing

to Christianity is not due to its Founder at all, but to the whole

structure, the whole thing--to the Church, etc. The notion "Founder"

is so very equivocal, that it may stand even for the accidental

cause of a movement: the person of the Founder has been inflated in

proportion as the Church has grown: but even this process of veneration

allows of the conclusion that, at one time or other, this Founder was

something exceedingly insecure and doubtful--in the beginning.... Let

any one think of the \_free and easy way\_ in which Paul treats the

problem of the personality of Jesus, how he almost juggles with it:

some one who died, who was seen after His death,--some one whom the

Jews delivered up to death--all this was only the theme--\_Paul\_ wrote

the music to it.

178.

The founder of a religion \_may\_ be quite insignificant--a wax vesta and

no \_more\_!

179.

\_Concerning the psychological problem of Christianity.--The driving

forces are\_: resentment, popular insurrection, the revolt of the

bungled and the botched. (In Buddhism it is different: it is not \_born\_

of \_resentment.\_ It rather combats resentment because the latter leads

to \_action\_!)

This party, which stands for freedom, understands that the \_abandonment

of antagonism in thought and deed\_ is a condition of distinction and

preservation. Here lies the psychological difficulty which has stood in

the way of Christianity being understood: the force which created it,

urges to a struggle against itself.

Only as a party standing \_for peace\_ and \_innocence\_ can this

insurrectionary movement hope to be successful: it must conquer by

means of excessive mildness, sweetness, softness, and its instincts

are aware of this. The \_feat\_ was to deny and condemn the force, of

which man is the expression, and to press the reverse of that force

continually to the fore, by word and deed.

180.

\_The pretence of youthfulness.\_--It is a mistake to imagine that,

with Christianity, an ingenuous and youthful people rose against an

old culture; the story goes that it was out of the lowest levels of

society, where Christianity flourished and shot its roots, that the

more profound source of life gushed forth afresh: but nothing can

be understood of the psychology of Christianity, if it be supposed

that it was the expression of revived youth among a people, or of

the resuscitated strength of a race. It is rather a typical form

of decadence, of moral-softening and of hysteria, amid a general

hotch-potch of races and people that had lost all aims and had grown

weary and sick. The wonderful company which gathered round this

master-seducer of the populace, would not be at all out of place in a

Russian novel: all the diseases of the nerves seem to give one another

a rendezvous in this crowd--the absence of a known duty, the feeling

that everything is nearing its end, that nothing is any longer worth

while, and that contentment lies in \_dolce far niente\_.

The power and certainty of the future in the Jew's instinct, its

monstrous will for life and for power, lies in its ruling classes; the

people who upheld primitive Christianity are best distinguished by this

\_exhausted condition\_ of their instincts. On the one hand, they are

sick of everything; on the other, they are content with each other,

with themselves and for themselves.

181.

Christianity regarded as \_emancipated Judaism\_ (just as a nobility

which is both racial and indigenous ultimately emancipates itself from

these conditions, and \_goes in search of\_ kindred elements....).

(1) As a Church (community) on the territory of the State, as an

unpolitical institution.

(2) As life, breeding, practice, art of living.

(3) As a \_religion of sin\_ (sin committed against \_God, being the

only recognised kind,\_ and the only cause of all suffering), with a

universal cure for it. There is no sin save against God; what is done

against men, man shall not sit in judgment upon, nor call to account,

except in the name of God. At the same time, all commandments (love):

everything is associated with God, and all acts are performed according

to God's will. Beneath this arrangement there lies exceptional

intelligence (a very narrow life, such as that led by the Esquimaux,

can only be endured by most peaceful and indulgent people: the

Judæo-Christian dogma turns against sin in favour of the "sinner").

182.

The Jewish priesthood understood how to present everything it claimed

to be right as a \_divine precept,\_ as an act of obedience to God, and

also to introduce all those things which conduced to \_preserve Israel\_

and were the \_conditions\_ of its existence (for instance: the large

number of "\_works\_": circumcision and the cult of sacrifices, as the

very pivot of the national conscience), not as Nature, but as God.

\_This process continued; within the very heart\_ of Judaism, where the

need of these "works" was not felt (that is to say, as a means of

keeping a race distinct), a priestly sort of man was pictured, whose

bearing towards the aristocracy was like that of "noble nature"; a

sacerdotalism of the soul, which now, in order to throw its opposite

into strong relief, attaches value, not to the "dutiful acts"

themselves, but to the sentiment....

At bottom, the problem was once again, how to make a certain kind of

soul \_prevail\_: it was also \_a popular insurrection in the midst of

a priestly people\_--a pietistic movement coming from below (sinners,

publicans, women, and children). Jesus of Nazareth was the symbol of

their sect. And again, in order to believe in themselves, they were in

need of a \_theological transfiguration\_: they require nothing less than

"the Son of God" in order to create a belief for themselves. And just

as the priesthood had falsified the whole history of Israel, another

attempt was made, here, to \_alter and falsify\_ the whole history of

mankind in such a way as to make Christianity seem like the most

important event it contained. This movement could have originated only

upon the soil of Judaism, the main feature of which was the confounding

of \_guilt with sorrow\_ and the reduction of all \_sin\_ to \_sin against

God.\_ Of all this, Christianity is the \_second degree of power.\_

183.

The symbolism of Christianity is based upon that of \_Judaism,\_ which

had already transfigured all reality (history, Nature) into a holy and

artificial unreality--which refused to recognise real history, and

which showed no more interest in a natural course of things.

184.

The Jews made the attempt to prevail, after two of their castes--the

warrior and the agricultural castes, had disappeared from their midst.

In this sense they are the "castrated people": they have their priests

and then--their Chandala....

How easily a disturbance occurs among them--an insurrection of their

Chandala. This was the origin of \_Christianity.\_

Owing to the fact that they had no knowledge of warriors except as

their masters, they introduced enmity towards the nobles, the men

of honour, pride, and power, and the \_ruling\_ classes, into their

religion: they are pessimists from \_indignation....\_

Thus they created a very important and novel position: the priests in

the van of the Chandala--against the \_noble classes....\_

Christianity was the logical conclusion of this movement: even in the

Jewish priesthood, it still scented the existence of the caste, of the

privileged and noble minority--\_it therefore did away with priests.\_

Christ is the unit of the Chandala who removes the priest ... the

Chandala who redeems himself....

That is why the \_French\_ Revolution is the lineal descendant and the

continuator of \_Christianity--\_ it is characterised by an instinct of

hate towards castes, nobles, and the last privileges.

185.

The "\_Christian Ideal\_" put on the stage with Jewish astuteness--these

are the fundamental \_psychological forces\_ of its "nature":--

Revolt against the ruling spiritual powers;

The attempt to make those virtues which facilitate the \_happiness of

the lowly,\_ a standard of all values--in fact, to call \_God\_ that which

is no more than the self-preservative instinct of that class of man

possessed of least vitality;

Obedience and absolute \_abstention\_ from war and resistance, justified

by this ideal;

The love of one another as a result of the love of God.

\_The trick\_: The \_denial\_ of all \_natural mobilia,\_ and their

transference to the spiritual world beyond ... the exploitation of

\_virtue\_ and its \_veneration\_ for wholly interested motives, gradual

\_denial\_ of virtue in everything that is not Christian.

186.

The \_profound contempt\_ with which the Christian was treated by

the noble people of antiquity, is of the same order as the present

instinctive aversion to Jews: it is the hatred which free and

self-respecting classes feel towards those \_who wish to creep

in secretly,\_ and who combine an awkward bearing with foolish

self-sufficiency.

The New Testament is the gospel of a completely \_ignoble\_ species of

man; its pretensions to highest values--\_yea, to all\_ values, is, as a

matter of fact, revolting--even nowadays.

187.

How little the subject matters! It is the spirit which gives the thing

life! What a quantity of stuffy and sick-room air there is in all that

chatter about "redemption," "love," "blessedness," "faith," "truth,"

"eternal life"! Let any one look into a really pagan book and compare

the two; for instance, in Petronius, nothing at all is done, said,

desired, and valued, which, according to a bigoted Christian estimate,

is not sin, or even deadly sin. And yet how happy one feels with the

purer air, the superior intellectuality, the quicker pace, and the

free overflowing strength which is certain of the future! In the whole

of the New Testament there is not one \_bouffonnerie\_: but that fact

alone would suffice to refute any book....

188.

The \_profound lack of dignity\_ with which all life, which is not

Christian, is condemned: it does not suffice them to think meanly of

their actual opponents, they cannot do with less than a general slander

of everything that is not \_themselves....\_ An abject and crafty soul is

in the most perfect harmony with the arrogance of piety, as witness the

early Christians.

The \_future\_: they see that \_they are heavily paid for it.... Theirs is

the muddiest kind of spirit that exists.\_ The whole of Christ's life is

so arranged as to confirm the prophecies of the Scriptures: He behaves

in such wise \_in order that\_ they may be right....

189.

The deceptive interpretation of the words, the doings, and the

condition of \_dying people\_; the natural fear of death, for instance,

is systematically confounded with the supposed fear of what is to

happen "after death." ...

190.

The \_Christians\_ have done exactly what the Jews did before them.

They introduced what they conceived to be an innovation and a thing

necessary to self-preservation into their Master's teaching, and wove

His life into it They likewise credited Him with all the wisdom of a

maker of proverbs--\_in short,\_ they represented their everyday life and

activity as an act of obedience, and thus sanctified their propaganda.

What it all depends upon, may be gathered from Paul: it is \_not much.\_

What remains is the development of a type of saint, out of the values

which these people regarded as saintly.

The whole of the "doctrine of miracles," including the resurrection, is

the result of self-glorification on the part of the community, which

ascribed to its Master those qualities it ascribed to itself, but in a

higher degree (or, better still, it derived its strength from Him....)

191.

The Christians have never led the life which Jesus commanded them to

lead, and the impudent fable of the "justification by faith," and its

unique and transcendental significance, is only the result of the

Church's lack of courage and will in acknowledging those "\_works\_"

which Jesus commanded.

The Buddhist behaves differently from the non-Buddhist; but \_the

Christian behaves as all the rest of the world does,\_ and possesses a

Christianity of ceremonies and \_states of the soul.\_

The profound and contemptible falsehood of Christianity in Europe makes

us deserve the contempt of the Arabs, Hindoos, and Chinese....

Let any one listen to the words of the first German statesman,

concerning that which has preoccupied Europe for the last forty years.

192.

"\_Faith\_" or "\_works\_"?--But that the "works," the habit of particular

works may engender a certain \_set of values or thoughts,\_ is just as

natural as it would be unnatural for "works" to proceed from mere

valuations. Man must practise, \_not\_ how to strengthen feelings of

value, but how to strengthen action: first of all, one must be able

\_to do something....\_ Luther's Christian Dilettantism. Faith is an

asses' bridge. The background consists of a profound conviction on

the part of Luther and his peers, that they are enabled to accomplish

Christian "works," a personal fact, disguised under an extreme doubt

as to whether \_all\_ action is not sin and devil's work, so that the

worth of life depends upon isolated and highly-strained conditions of

\_inactivity\_ (prayer, effusion, etc.).--Ultimately, Luther would be

right: the instincts which are expressed by the whole bearing of the

reformers are the most brutal that exist. Only in \_turning absolutely

away\_ from themselves, and in becoming absorbed in the \_opposite\_ of

themselves, only by means of an \_illusion\_ ("faith") was existence

endurable to them.

193.

"What was to be done in order to believe?"--an absurd question. That

which is wrong with Christianity is, that it does none of the things

that Christ \_commanded.\_

It is a mean life, but \_seen\_ through the eye of contempt.

194.

The entrance into the \_real\_ life--\_a man saves his own life by living

the life of the multitude.\_

195.

Christianity has become something fundamentally different from what

its Founder wished it to be. It is the great \_anti-pagan movement\_ of

antiquity, formulated with the use of the life, teaching, and "words"

of the Founder of Christianity, but interpreted quite \_arbitrarily,\_

according to a scheme embodying \_profoundly different needs\_:

translated into the language of all the \_subterranean religions\_ then

existing.

It is the rise of Pessimism (whereas Jesus wished to bring the peace

and the happiness of the lambs): and moreover the Pessimism of the

weak, of the inferior, of the suffering, and of the oppressed.

Its mortal enemies are (1) \_Power,\_ whether in the form of character,

intellect, or taste, and "worldliness"; (2) the "good cheer" of

classical times, the noble levity and scepticism, hard pride, eccentric

dissipation, and cold frugality of the sage, Greek refinement in

manners, words, and form. Its mortal enemy is as much the \_Roman\_ as

the \_Greek.\_

The attempt on the part of \_anti-paganism\_ to establish itself on

a philosophical basis, and to make its tenets possible: it shows a

taste for the ambiguous figures of antique culture, and above all for

Plato, who was, more than any other, an anti-Hellene and Semite in

instinct.... It also shows a taste for Stoicism, which is essentially

the work of Semites ("dignity" is regarded as severity, law; virtue

is held to be greatness, self-responsibility, authority, greatest

sovereignty over oneself--this is Semitic.) The Stoic is an Arabian

sheik wrapped in Greek togas and notions.

196.

Christianity only resumes the fight which had already been begun

against the \_classical\_ ideal and \_noble\_ religion.

As a matter of fact, the whole process of \_transformation\_ is only

an adaptation to the needs and to the level of intelligence of

\_religious\_ masses then existing:--those masses which believed in

Isis, Mithras, Dionysos, and the "great mother," and which demanded

the following things of a religion: (1) hopes of a beyond, (2) the

bloody phantasmagoria of animal sacrifice (the mystery), (3) holy

legend and the redeeming \_deed,\_ (4) asceticism, denial of the

world, superstitious "purification," (5) a hierarchy as a part of

the community. In short, Christianity everywhere fitted the already

prevailing and increasing \_anti-pagan tendency\_--those cults which

Epicurus combated,--or more exactly, those \_religions proper to the

lower herd, women, slaves, and ignoble classes.\_

The misunderstandings are therefore the following:--

(1) The immortality of the individual;

(2) The assumed existence of \_another\_ world;

(3) The absurd notion of punishment and expiation in the heart of the

interpretation of existence;

(4) The profanation of the divine nature of man, instead of its

accentuation, and the construction of a very profound chasm, which

can only be crossed by the help of a miracle or by means of the most

thorough self-contempt;

(5) The whole world of corrupted imagination and morbid passion,

instead of a simple and loving life of action, instead of Buddhistic

happiness attainable on earth;

(6) An ecclesiastical order with a priesthood, theology, cults, and

sacraments; in short, everything that Jesus of Nazareth \_combated\_;

(7) The \_miraculous\_ in everything and everybody, superstition too:

while precisely the trait which distinguished Judaism and primitive

Christianity was their \_repugnance to\_ miracles and their relative

\_rationalism.\_

197.

\_The psychological pre-requisites:--Ignorance\_ and \_lack of

culture,\_--the sort of ignorance which has unlearned every kind of

shame: let any one imagine those impudent saints in the heart of

Athens;

The \_Jewish instinct of a chosen people\_: they appropriate \_all the

virtues,\_ without further ado, as their own, and regard the rest of

the world as their opposite; this is a profound sign of \_spiritual

depravity\_;

\_The total lack of real aims\_ and real \_duties,\_ for which other

virtues are required than those of the bigot--\_the State undertook

this work for them\_: and the impudent people still behaved as though

they had no need of the State. "Except ye become as little children"

--oh, how far we are from this psychological ingenuousness!

198.

The Founder of Christianity had to pay dearly for having directed His

teaching at the lowest classes of Jewish society and intelligence. They

understood Him only according to the limitations of their own spirit.

... It was a disgrace to concoct a history of salvation, a personal

God, a personal Saviour, a personal immortality, and to have retained

all the meanness of the "person," and of the "history" of a doctrine

which denies the reality of all that is personal and historical.

The legend of salvation takes the place of the symbolic "now" and "all

time," of the symbolic "here" and "everywhere"; and miracles appear

instead of the psychological symbol.

199.

Nothing is less innocent than the New Testament. The soil from which it

sprang is known.

These people, possessed of an inflexible will to assert themselves, and

who, once they had lost all natural hold on life, and had long existed

without any right to existence, still knew how to prevail by means of

hypotheses which were as unnatural as they were imaginary (calling

themselves the chosen people, the community of saints, the people of

the promised land, and the "Church"): these people made use of their

\_pia fraus\_ with such skill, and with such "clean consciences," that

one cannot be too cautious when they preach morality. When Jews step

forward as the personification of innocence, the danger must be great.

While reading the New Testament a man should have his small fund of

intelligence, mistrust, and wickedness constantly at hand.

People of the lowest origin, partly mob, outcasts not only from good

society, but also from respectable society; grown away from the

\_atmosphere\_ of culture, and free from discipline; ignorant, without

even a suspicion of the fact that conscience can also rule in spiritual

matters; in a word--the Jews: an instinctively crafty people, able to

create an advantage, a means of \_seduction\_ out of every conceivable

hypothesis of superstition, even out of ignorance itself.

200.

I regard Christianity as the most fatal and seductive lie that has ever

yet existed--as the greatest and most \_impious lie\_: I can discern the

last sprouts and branches of its ideal beneath every form of disguise,

I decline to enter into any compromise or false position in reference

to it--I urge people to declare open war with it.

The \_morality of paltry people\_ as the measure of all things: this is

the most repugnant kind of degeneracy that civilisation has ever yet

brought into existence. And this \_kind of ideal\_ is hanging still,

under the name of "God," over men's heads!!

201.

However modest one's demands may be concerning intellectual

cleanliness, when one touches the New Testament one cannot help

experiencing a sort of inexpressible feeling of discomfort; for the

unbounded cheek with which the least qualified people will have their

say in its pages, in regard to the greatest problems of existence,

and claim to sit in judgment on such matters, exceeds all limits. The

impudent levity with which the most unwieldy problems are spoken of

here (life, the world, God, the purpose of life), as if they were not

problems at all, but the most simple things which these little bigots

\_know all about\_!!!

202.

This was the most fatal form of insanity that has ever yet existed on

earth:--when these little lying abortions of bigotry begin laying claim

to the words "God," "last judgment," "truth," "love," "wisdom," "Holy

Spirit," and thereby distinguishing themselves from the rest of the

world; when such men begin to transvalue values to suit themselves, as

though they were the sense, the salt, the standard, and the measure of

all things; then all that one should do is this: build lunatic asylums

for their incarceration. To \_persecute\_ them was an egregious act of

antique folly: this was taking them too seriously; it was making them

serious.

The whole fatality was made possible by the fact that a similar form

of megalomania was already \_in existence,\_ the \_Jewish\_ form (once

the gulf separating the Jews from the Christian-Jews was bridged, the

Christian-Jews \_were compelled\_ to employ those self-preservative

measures afresh which were discovered by the Jewish instinct, for

their own self-preservation, after having accentuated them); and again

through the fact that Greek moral philosophy had done everything that

could be done to prepare the way for moral-fanaticism, even among

Greeks and Romans, and to render it palatable.... Plato, the great

importer of corruption, who was the first who refused to see Nature

in morality, and who had already deprived the Greek gods of all their

worth by his notion "\_good\_" was already tainted with \_Jewish bigotry\_

(in Egypt?).

203.

These small virtues of gregarious animals do not by any means lead

to "eternal life": to put them on the stage in such a way, and to

use them for one's own purpose is perhaps very smart; but to him who

keeps his eyes open, even here, it remains, in spite of all, the most

ludicrous performance. A man by no means deserves privileges, either on

earth or in heaven, because he happens to have attained to perfection

in the art of behaving like a good-natured little sheep; at best, he

only remains a dear, absurd little ram with horns--provided, of course,

he does not burst with vanity or excite indignation by assuming the

airs of a supreme judge.

What a terrible glow of false colouring here floods the meanest

virtues--as though they were the reflection of divine qualities!

The \_natural\_ purpose and utility of every virtue is systematically

\_hushed up\_; it can only be valuable in the light of a \_divine\_ command

or model, or in the light of the good which belongs to a beyond or a

spiritual world. (This is magnificent!--As if it were a question of the

\_salvation of the soul\_: but it was a means of making things bearable

here with as many beautiful sentiments as possible.)

204.

The \_law,\_ which is the fundamentally realistic formula of certain

self-preservative measures of a community, forbids certain actions

that have a definite tendency to jeopardise the welfare of that

community: it does \_not\_ forbid the attitude of mind which gives rise

to these actions--for in the pursuit of other ends the community

requires these forbidden actions, namely, when it is a matter of

opposing its \_enemies.\_ The moral idealist now steps forward and says:

"God sees into men's hearts: the action itself counts for nothing;

the reprehensible attitude of mind from which it proceeds must be

extirpated ..." In normal conditions men laugh at such things; it is

only in exceptional cases, when a community lives \_quite\_ beyond the

need of waging war in order to maintain itself, that an ear is lent to

such things. Any attitude of mind is abandoned, the utility of which

cannot be conceived.

This was the case, for example, when Buddha appeared among a people

that was both peaceable and afflicted with great intellectual weariness.

This was also the case in regard to the first Christian community (as

also the Jewish), the primary condition of which was the absolutely

\_unpolitical\_ Jewish society. Christianity could grow only upon the

soil of Judaism--that is to say, among a people that had already

renounced the political life, and which led a sort of parasitic

existence within the Roman sphere of government, Christianity goes a

step \_farther\_: it allows men to "emasculate" themselves even more; the

circumstances actually favour their doing so.--\_Nature\_ is \_expelled\_

from morality when it is said, "Love ye your enemies": for \_Nature's\_

injunction, "Ye shall \_love\_ your neighbour and \_hate\_ your enemy,"

has now become senseless in the law (in instinct); now, even \_the love

a man feels for his neighbour\_ must first be based upon something (\_a

sort of love of God\_). \_God\_ is introduced everywhere, and \_utility\_

is withdrawn; the natural \_origin\_ of morality is denied everywhere:

the \_veneration of Nature,\_ which lies in \_acknowledging a natural

morality,\_ is \_destroyed\_ to the roots....

Whence comes the \_seductive charm\_ of this emasculate ideal of man? Why

are we not \_disgusted\_ by it, just as we are disgusted at the thought

of a eunuch?... The answer is obvious: it is not the voice of the

eunuch that revolts us, despite the cruel mutilation of which it is the

result; for, as a matter of fact, it has grown sweeter.... And owing to

the very fact that the "male organ" has been amputated from virtue, its

voice now has a feminine ring, which, formerly, was not to be discerned.

On the other hand, we have only to think of the terrible hardness,

dangers, and accidents to which a life of manly virtues leads--the

life of a Corsican, even at the present day, or that of a heathen Arab

(which resembles the Corsican's life even to the smallest detail:

the Arab's songs might have been written by Corsicans)--in order to

perceive how the most robust type of man was fascinated and moved by

the voluptuous ring of this "goodness" and "purity." ... A pastoral

melody ... an idyll ... the "good man": such things have most effect in

ages when tragedy is abroad.

\*\*\*

With this, we have realised to what extent the "idealist" (the ideal

eunuch) also proceeds from a definite reality and is not merely a

visionary.... He has perceived precisely that, for his kind of reality,

a brutal injunction of the sort which prohibits certain actions has no

sense (because the instinct which would urge him to these actions is

\_weakened,\_ thanks to a long need of practice, and of compulsion to

practise). The castrator formulates a host of new self-preservative

measures for a perfectly definite species of men: in this sense he is

a realist. The \_means\_ to which he has recourse for establishing his

legislation, are the same as those of ancient legislators: he appeals

to all authorities, to "God," and he exploits the notions "guilt and

punishment"--that is to say, he avails himself of the whole of the

older ideal, but interprets it differently; for instance: punishment is

given a place in the inner self (it is called the pang of conscience).

In practice this kind of man \_meets with his end\_ the moment the

exceptional conditions favouring his existence cease to prevail--a sort

of insular happiness, like that of Tahiti, and of the little Jews in

the Roman provinces. Their only \_natural\_ foe is the soil from which

they spring: they must wage war against that, and once more give their

\_offensive\_ and \_defensive\_ passions rope in order to be equal to

it: their opponents are the adherents of the old ideal (this kind of

hostility is shown on a grand scale by Paul in relation to Judaism, and

by Luther in relation to the priestly ascetic ideal). The mildest form

of this antagonism is certainly that of the first Buddhists; perhaps

nothing has given rise to so much work, as the enfeeblement and

discouragement of the feeling of \_antagonism.\_ The struggle against

resentment almost seems the Buddhist's first duty; thus only is his

\_peace\_ of soul secured. To isolate oneself without bitterness, this

presupposes the existence of a surprisingly mild and sweet order of

men,--saints....

\*\*\*

The \_Astuteness of moral castration.\_--How is war waged against

the virile passions and valuations? No violent physical means are

available; the war must therefore be one of ruses, spells, and lies--in

short, a "spiritual war."

First recipe: One appropriates virtue in general, and makes it the main

feature of one's ideal; the older ideal is denied and declared to be

\_the reverse of all ideals.\_ Slander has to be carried to a fine art

for this purpose.

Second recipe: A type of man is set up as a general \_standard\_; and

this is projected into all things, behind all things, and behind the

destiny of all things--as God.

Third recipe: The opponents of one's ideal are declared to be the

opponents of God; one arrogates to oneself a \_right\_ to great pathos,

to power, and a right to curse and to bless.

Fourth recipe: All suffering, all gruesome, terrible, and fatal things

are declared to be the results of opposition to \_ones\_ ideal--all

suffering is \_punishment\_ even in the case of one's adherents (except

it be a trial, etc.).

Fifth recipe: One goes so far as to regard Nature as the reverse of

one's ideal, and the lengthy sojourn amid natural conditions is

considered a great trial of patience--a sort of martyrdom; one studies

contempt, both in one's attitudes and one's looks towards all "natural

things."

Sixth recipe: The triumph of anti-naturalism and ideal castration,

the triumph of the world of the pure, good, sinless, and blessed, is

projected into the future as the consummation, the finale, the great

hope, and the "Coming of the Kingdom of God."

I hope that one may still be allowed to \_laugh\_ at this artificial

hoisting up of a small species of man to the position of an absolute

standard of all things?

205.

What I do not at all like in Jesus of Nazareth and His Apostle Paul,

is that they \_stuffed so much into the heads of paltry people,\_ as

if their modest virtues were worth so much ado. We have had to pay

dearly for it all; for they brought the most valuable qualities of both

virtue and man into ill repute; they set the guilty conscience and the

self-respect of noble souls at loggerheads, and they led the \_braver,

more magnanimous, more daring, and more excessive\_ tendencies of strong

souls astray--even to self-destruction.

206.

In the New Testament, and especially in the Gospels, I discern

absolutely no sign of a "\_Divine\_" voice: but rather an \_indirect

form\_ of the most subterranean fury, both in slander and

destructiveness--one of the most dishonest forms of hatred. It lacks

\_all\_ knowledge of the qualities of a \_higher nature.\_ It makes an

impudent abuse of all kinds of plausibilities, and the whole stock of

proverbs is used up and foisted upon one in its pages. Was it necessary

to make a \_God\_ come in order to appeal to those publicans and to say

to them, etc. etc.?

Nothing could be more vulgar than this struggle with the \_Pharisees,\_

carried on with a host of absurd and unpractical moral pretences; the

mob, of course, has always been entertained by such feats. Fancy the

reproach of "hypocrisy!" coming from those lips! Nothing could be more

vulgar than this treatment of one's opponents--a most insidious sign of

nobility or its \_reverse....\_

207.

Primitive Christianity is the \_abolition\_ of the \_State\_: it prohibits

oaths, military service, courts of justice, self-defence or the defence

of a community, and denies the difference between fellow-countrymen and

strangers, as also the \_order of castes.\_

\_Christs example\_; He does not withstand those who ill-treat Him; He

does not defend Himself; He does more, He "offers the left cheek"

(to the demand: "Tell us whether thou be the Christ?" He replies:

"Hereafter shall ye see the Son of man sitting on the right hand of

power, and coming in the clouds of heaven"). He forbids His disciples

to defend Him; He calls attention to the fact that He could get help

if He wished to, but \_will\_ not.

Christianity also means the \_abolition of society,\_ it prizes

everything that society despises, its very growth takes place among the

outcasts, the condemned, and the leprous of all kinds, as also among

"publicans," "sinners," prostitutes, and the most foolish of men (the

"fisher folk "); it despises the rich, the scholarly, the noble, the

virtuous, and the "punctilious." ...

208.

The war against the noble and the powerful, as it is waged in the New

Testament, is reminiscent of Reynard the Fox and his methods: but

\_plus\_ the Christian unction and the more absolute refusal to recognise

one's own craftiness.

209.

The Gospel is the announcement that the road to happiness lies open for

the lowly and the poor--that all one has to do is to emancipate one's

self from all institutions, traditions, and the tutelage of the higher

classes. Thus Christianity is no more than the \_typical teaching of

Socialists.\_

Property, acquisitions, mother-country, status and rank, tribunals,

the police, the State, the Church, Education, Art, militarism: all

these are so many obstacles in the way of happiness, so many mistakes,

snares, and devil's artifices, on which the Gospel passes sentence--all

this is typical of socialistic doctrines.

Behind all this there is the outburst, the explosion, of a

concentrated loathing of the "masters,"--the instinct which discerns

the happiness of freedom after such long oppression.... (Mostly a

symptom of the fact that the inferior classes have been treated too

humanely, that their tongues already taste a joy which is forbidden

them.... It is not hunger that provokes revolutions, but the fact that

the mob have contracted an appetite \_en mangeant....\_)

210.

Let the \_New Testament only be read as a book of seduction\_: in it

virtue is appropriated, with the idea that public opinion is best

won with it,--and as a matter of fact it is a very modest kind of

\_virtue,\_ which recognises only the ideal gregarious animal and nothing

more (including, of course, the herdsmen): a puny, soft, benevolent,

helpful, and gushingly-satisfied kind of virtue which to the outside

world is quite devoid of pretensions,--and which separates the "world"

entirely from itself. The \_crassest arrogance\_ which fancies that the

destiny of man turns around it, and it alone, and that on the one side

the community of believers represents what is right, and on the other

the world represents what is false and eternally to be reproved and

rejected. The most \_imbecile hatred\_ of all things in power, which,

however, never goes so far as to touch these things. A kind of \_inner

detachment\_ which, outwardly, leaves everything as it was (servitude

and slavery; and knowing how to convert \_everything\_ into a means of

serving God and virtue).

211.

Christianity is possible as the \_most private\_ form of life; it

presupposes the existence of a narrow, isolated, and absolutely

unpolitical society--it belongs to the conventicle. On the other hand,

a "Christian \_State\_," "Christian politics," are pieces of downright

impudence; they are lies, like, for instance, a Christian leadership

of an army, which in the end regards "the God of hosts" as chief of

the staff. Even the Papacy has never been able to carry on politics

in a Christian way...; and when Reformers indulge in politics, as

Luther did, it is well known that they are just as ardent followers of

Machiavelli as any other immoralists or tyrants.

212.

Christianity is still possible at any moment. It is not bound to any

one of the impudent dogmas that have adorned themselves with its name:

it needs neither the teaching of the \_personal God,\_ nor of \_sin,\_

nor of \_immortality,\_ nor of \_redemption,\_ nor of \_faith\_; it has

absolutely no need whatever of metaphysics, and it needs asceticism and

Christian "natural science" still less. Christianity is a \_method of

life,\_ not a system of belief. It tells us how we should behave, not

what we should believe.

He who says to-day: "I refuse to be a soldier," "I care not for

tribunals," "I lay no claim to the services of the police," "I will

not do anything that disturbs the peace within me: and if I must

suffer on that account, nothing can so well maintain my inward peace as

suffering"--such a man would be a Christian.

213.

\_Concerning the history of Christianity.\_--Continual change of

environment: Christian teaching is thus continually changing its

\_centre of gravity.\_ The favouring of \_low\_ and \_paltry\_ people....

The development of \_Caritas....\_ The type "Christian" gradually

adopts everything that it originally rejected (\_and in the rejection

of which it asserted its right to exist\_). The Christian becomes a

citizen, a soldier, a judge, a workman, a merchant, a scholar, a

theologian, a priest, a philosopher, a farmer, an artist, a patriot,

a politician, a prince ... he re-enters all those \_departments of

active life\_ which he had forsworn (he defends himself, he establishes

tribunals, he punishes, he swears, he differentiates between people

and people, he contemns, and he shows anger). The whole life of the

Christian is ultimately exactly that life \_from which Christ preached

deliverance....\_ The Church is just as much a factor in the \_triumph\_

of the Antichrist, as the modern State and modern Nationalism.... The

Church is the barbarisation of Christianity.

214.

Among the powers that have mastered \_Christianity\_ are: Judaism

(\_Paul\_); Platonism (Augustine); The cult of mystery (the teaching of

salvation, the emblem of the "cross"); Asceticism (hostility towards

"Nature," "Reason," the "senses,"--the Orient ...).

215.

Christianity is a denaturalisation of gregarious morality: under the

power of the most complete misapprehensions and self-deceptions.

Democracy is a more natural form of it, and less sown with falsehood.

It is a fact that the oppressed, the low, and whole mob of slaves and

half-castes, \_will prevail.\_

First step: they make themselves free--they detach themselves, at

first in fancy only; they recognise each other; they make themselves

paramount.

Second step: they enter the lists, they demand acknowledgment, equal

rights, "Justice."

Third step: they demand privileges (they draw the representatives of

power over to their side).

Fourth step: they \_alone\_ want all power, and they \_have\_ it.

There are \_three elements\_ in Christianity which must be distinguished:

\_(a)\_ the oppressed of all kinds, \_(b)\_ the mediocre of all kinds,

\_(c)\_ the dissatisfied and diseased of all kinds. The \_first\_ struggle

against the politically noble and their ideal; the second contend with

the exceptions and those who are in any way privileged (mentally or

physically); the third oppose the \_natural instinct\_ of the happy and

the sound.

Whenever a triumph is achieved, the second element steps to the fore;

for then Christianity has won over the sound and happy to its side

(as warriors in its cause), likewise the powerful (interested to this

extent in the conquest of the crowd)--and now it is the \_gregarious

instinct,\_ that \_mediocre nature\_ which is valuable in every respect,

that now gets its highest sanction through Christianity. This mediocre

nature ultimately becomes so conscious of itself (gains such courage

in regard to its own opinions), that it arrogates to itself even

\_political power\_....

Democracy is Christianity \_made natural\_: a sort of "return to Nature,"

once Christianity, owing to extreme anti-naturalness, might have been

overcome by the opposite valuation. Result: the aristocratic ideal

begins to \_lose its natural character\_ ("the higher man," "noble,"

"artist," "passion," "knowledge"; Romanticism as the cult of the

exceptional, genius, etc. etc.).

216.

\_When the "masters" may also become Christians.\_--It is of the nature

of a \_community\_ (race, family, herd, tribe) to regard all those

conditions and aspirations which favour its survival, as in themselves

\_valuable\_; for instance: obedience, mutual assistance, respect,

moderation, pity--as also, to \_suppress\_ everything that happens to

stand in the way of the above.

It is likewise of the nature of the \_rulers\_ (whether they are

individuals or classes) to patronise and applaud those virtues which

make their subjects \_amenable\_ and \_submissive\_--conditions and

passions which may be utterly different from their own.

The \_gregarious instinct\_ and the \_instinct of the rulers\_ sometimes

\_agree\_ in approving of a certain number of qualities and

conditions,--but for different reasons: the first do so out of direct

egoism, the second out of indirect egoism.

\_The submission to Christianity on the part of master races\_ is

essentially the result of the conviction that Christianity is a

\_religion for the herd,\_ that it teaches obedience: in short, that

Christians are more easily ruled than non-Christians. With a hint of

this nature, the Pope, even nowadays, recommends Christian propaganda

to the ruling Sovereign of China.

It should also be added that the seductive power of the Christian ideal

works most strongly upon natures that love danger, adventure, and

contrasts; that love everything \_that entails a risk,\_ and wherewith a

\_non plus ultra\_ of powerful feeling may be attained. In this respect,

one has only to think of Saint Theresa, surrounded by the heroic

instincts of her brothers:--Christianity appears in those circumstances

as a dissipation of the will, as strength of will, as a will that is

Quixotic.

3. CHRISTIAN IDEALS.

217.

War against the \_Christian ideal,\_ against the doctrine of

"blessedness" and "salvation" as the aims of life, against the

supremacy of the fools, of the pure in heart, of the suffering and of

the botched!

When and where has any man, \_of any note at all,\_ resembled the

Christian ideal?--at least in the eyes of those who are psychologists

and triers of the heart and reins. Look at all Plutarch's heroes!

218.

\_Our claim to superiority\_: we live in an age of \_Comparisons\_; we

are able to calculate as men have never yet calculated; in every way

we are history become self-conscious. We enjoy things in a different

way; we suffer in a different way: our instinctive activity is the

comparison of an enormous variety of things. We understand everything;

we experience everything, we no longer have a hostile feeling left

within us. However disastrous the results may be to ourselves, our

plunging and almost lustful inquisitiveness, attacks, unabashed, the

most dangerous of subjects....

"Everything is good"--it gives us pain to say "nay" to anything. We

suffer when we feel that we are sufficiently foolish to make a definite

stand against anything.... At bottom, it is we scholars who to-day are

fulfilling Christ's teaching most thoroughly.

219.

We cannot suppress a certain irony when we contemplate those who think

they have overcome Christianity by means of modern natural science.

Christian values are by no means overcome by such people. "Christ on

the cross" is still the most sublime symbol--even now....

220.

The two great Nihilistic movements are: \_(a)\_ Buddhism, \_(b)\_

Christianity. The latter has only just about reached a state of

culture in which it can fulfil its original object,--it has found its

\_level,\_--and now it can manifest itself \_without disguise\_.....

221.

We have \_re-established\_ the Christian ideal, it now only remains \_to

determine\_ its value.

(1) Which values does it \_deny\_? What does \_the ideal that opposes it\_

stand for?--Pride, pathos of distance, great responsibility, exuberant

spirits, splendid animalism, the instincts of war and of conquest;

the deification of passion, revenge, cunning, anger, voluptuousness,

adventure, knowledge--the \_noble ideal\_ is denied: the beauty, wisdom,

power, pomp, and awfulness of the type man: the man who postulates

aims, the "future" man (here Christianity presents itself as the

\_logical result\_ of \_Judaism\_).

(2) \_Can it be realised?\_--Yes, of course, when the climatic conditions

are favourable--as in the case of the Indian ideal. Both neglect the

factor \_work.\_--It separates a creature from a people, a state, a

civilised community, and jurisdiction; it rejects education, wisdom,

the cultivation of good manners, acquisition and commerce; it cuts

adrift everything which is of use and value to men--by means of an

idiosyncrasy of sentiment it \_isolates\_ a man. It is non-political,

anti-national, neither aggressive nor defensive,--and only possible

within a strictly-ordered State or state of society, which allows these

\_holy parasites\_ to flourish at the cost of their neighbours.....

(3) It has now become the will to be \_happy\_--and nothing else!

"Blessedness" stands for something self-evident, that no longer

requires any justification--everything else (the way to live and let

live) is only a means to an end....

But what follows is the result of a \_low order of thought,\_ the fear of

pain, of defilement, of corruption, is great enough to provide ample

grounds for allowing everything to go to the dogs.... This is a \_poor\_

way of thinking, and is the sign of an exhausted race; we \_must\_ not

allow ourselves to be deceived. ("Become as little children." Natures

\_of the same order\_: Francis of Assisi, neurotic, epileptic, visionary,

like Jesus.)

222.

The \_higher\_ man distinguishes himself from the \_lower\_ by his

fearlessness and his readiness to challenge misfortune: it is a

sign of \_degeneration\_ when eudemonistic values begin to prevail

(physiological fatigue and enfeeblement of will-power). Christianity,

with its prospect of "blessedness," is the typical attitude of mind of

a suffering and impoverished species of man. Abundant strength will be

active, will suffer, and will go under: to it the bigotry of Christian

salvation is bad music and hieratic posing and vexation.

223.

\_Poverty, humility, and chastity\_ are dangerous and slanderous ideals;

but like poisons, which are useful cures in the case of certain

diseases, they were also necessary in the time of the Roman Empire.

All ideals are dangerous: because they lower and brand realities; they

are all poisons, but occasionally indispensable as cures.

224.

God created man, happy, idle, innocent, and immortal: our actual life

is a false, decadent, and sinful existence, a punishment.... Suffering,

struggle, work, and death are raised as objections against life, they

make life questionable, unnatural--something that must cease, and for

which one not only requires but also \_has\_--remedies!

Since the time of Adam, man has been in an abnormal state: God

Himself delivered up His Son for Adam's sin, in order to put an end

to the abnormal condition of things: the natural character of life

is a \_curse\_; to those who believe in Him, Christ restores normal

life: He makes them happy, idle, and innocent. But the world did not

become fruitful without labour; women do not bear children without

pain; illness has not ceased: believers are served just as badly as

unbelievers in this respect. All that has happened is, that man is

delivered from \_death\_ and \_sin--\_two assertions which allow of no

verification, and which are therefore emphasised by the Church with

more than usual heartiness. "He is free from sin,"--not owing to

his own efforts, not owing to a vigorous struggle on his part, but

\_redeemed by the death of the Saviour,\_--consequently, perfectly

innocent and paradisaical.

\_Actual\_ life is nothing more than an illusion (that is to say, a

deception, an insanity). The whole of struggling, fighting, and

real existence--so full of light and shade, is only bad and false:

everybody's duty is to be \_delivered\_ from it.

"Man, innocent, idle, immortal, and happy"--this concept, which is

the object of the "most supreme desires," must be criticised before

anything else. Why should guilt, work, death, and pain (\_and,\_ from

the Christian point of view, also \_knowledge\_ ...) be \_contrary\_ to

all supreme desires?--The lazy Christian notions: "blessedness,"

"innocence," "immortality."

225.

The eccentric concept "holiness" does not exist--"God" and "man" have

not been divorced from each other. "Miracles" do not exist--such

spheres do not exist: the only one to be considered is the

"intellectual" (that is to say, the symbolically-psychological). As

decadence: a counterpart to "Epicureanism." ... Paradise according to

Greek notions was only "Epicurus' Garden."

A life of this sort lacks a purpose: it \_strives after\_ nothing;--a

form of the "Epicurean gods"--there is no longer any reason to aim at

anything,--not even at having children:--everything has been done.

226.

They despised the body: they did not reckon with it: nay, more--they

treated it as an enemy. It was their delirium to think that a man

could carry a "beautiful soul" about in a body that was a cadaverous

abortion.... In order to inoculate others with this insanity they

had to present the concept "beautiful soul" in a different way, and

to transvalue the natural value, until, at last, a pale, sickly,

idiotically exalted creature, something angelic, some extreme

perfection and transfiguration was declared to be the higher man.

227.

Ignorance in matters psychological.--The Christian has no nervous

system;--contempt for, and deliberate and wilful turning away from, the

demands of the body, and the \_naked\_ body; it is assumed that all this

is in keeping with man's nature, and \_must perforce work the ultimate

good of the soul\_;--all functions of the body are systematically

reduced to moral values; illness itself is regarded as determined by

morality, it is held to be the result of sin, or it is a trial or a

state of salvation, through which man becomes more perfect than he

could become in a state of health (Pascal's idea); under certain

circumstances, there are wilful attempts at inducing illness.

228.

What in sooth is this struggle "against Nature" on the part of the

Christian? We shall not, of course, let ourselves be deceived by

his words and explanations. It is Nature against something which is

also Nature. With many, it is fear; with others, it is loathing;

with yet others, it is the sign of a certain intellectuality, the

love of a bloodless and passionless ideal; and in the case of the

most superior men, it is love of an abstract Nature--these try to

live up to their ideal. It is easily understood that humiliation in

the place of self-esteem, anxious cautiousness towards the passions,

emancipation from the usual duties (whereby, a higher notion of rank is

created), the incitement to constant war on behalf of enormous issues,

habituation to effusiveness of feelings--all this goes to constitute

a type: in such a type the \_hypersensitiveness\_ of a perishing body

preponderates; but the nervousness and the inspirations it engenders

are \_interpreted\_ differently. The \_taste\_ of this kind of creature

tends either (1) to subtilise, (2) to indulge in bombastic eloquence,

or (3) to go in for extreme feelings. The natural inclinations \_do\_

get satisfied, but they are interpreted in a new way; for instance,

as "justification before God," "the feeling of redemption through

grace," every undeniable \_feeling of pleasure\_ becomes (interpreted

in this way!) pride, voluptuousness, etc. General problem: what will

become of the man who slanders and practically denies and belittles

what is natural? As a matter of fact, the Christian is an example of

exaggerated self-control: in order to tame his passions, he seems to

find it necessary to extirpate or crucify them.

229.

Man did not know himself physiologically throughout the ages his

history covers; he does not even know himself now. The knowledge, for

instance, that man has a nervous system (but no "soul") is still the

privilege of the most educated people. But man is not satisfied, in

this respect, to say he does not know. A man must be very superior to

be able to say: "I do not know this,"--that is to say, to be able to

admit his ignorance.

Suppose he is in pain or in a good mood, he never questions that he

can find the reason of either condition if only he seeks.... In truth,

he cannot find the reason; for he does not even suspect where it

lies.... What happens?... He takes the \_result\_ of his condition for

its \_cause\_; for instance, if he should undertake some work (really

undertaken because his good mood gave him the courage to do so) and

carry it through successfully: behold, the work itself is the \_reason\_

of his good mood.... As a matter of fact, his success was determined by

the same cause as that which brought about his good mood--that is to

say, the happy co-ordination of physiological powers and functions.

He feels bad: \_consequently\_ he cannot overcome a care, a scruple,

or an attitude of self-criticism.... He really fancies that his

disagreeable condition is the result of his scruple, of his "sin," or

of his "self-criticism."

But after profound exhaustion and prostration, a state of recovery sets

in. "How is it possible that I can feel so free, so happy? It is a

miracle; only a God could have effected this change."--Conclusion: "He

has forgiven my sin." ...

From this follow certain practices: in order to provoke feelings of

sinfulness and to prepare the way for crushed spirits it is necessary

to induce a condition of morbidity and nervousness in the body. The

methods of doing this are well known. Of course, nobody suspects

the causal logic of the fact: the \_maceration\_ of the \_flesh\_ is

interpreted religiously, it seems like an end in itself, whereas it

is no more than a \_means\_ of bringing about that morbid state of

indigestion which is known as repentance (the "fixed idea" of sin, the

hypnotising of the hen by-means of the chalk-line "sin").

The mishandling of the body prepares the ground for the required range

of "guilty feelings"--that is to say, for that general state of pain

which \_demands an explanation....\_

On the other hand, the \_method\_ of "salvation" may also develop

from the above: every dissipation of the feelings, whether prayers,

movements, attitudes, or oaths, has been provoked, and exhaustion

follows; very often it is acute, or it appears in the form of

epilepsy. And behind this condition of deep somnolence there come signs

of recovery--or, in religious parlance, "Salvation."

230.

Formerly, the conditions and results of \_physiological exhaustion\_ were

considered more important than healthy conditions and their results,

and this was owing to the suddenness, fearfulness, and mysteriousness

of the former. Men were terrified by themselves, and postulated the

existence of a \_higher\_ world. People have ascribed the origin of the

idea of two worlds--one this side of the grave and the other beyond

it--to sleep and dreams, to shadows, to night, and to the fear of

Nature: but the symptoms of physiological exhaustion should, above all,

have been considered.

Ancient religions have quite special methods of disciplining the

pious into states of exhaustion, in which they \_must\_ experience such

things.... The idea was, that one entered into a new order of things,

where everything ceases to be known.--The \_semblance\_ of a higher

power....

231.

Sleep is the result of every kind of exhaustion; exhaustion follows

upon all excessive excitement....

In all pessimistic religions and philosophies there is a yearning for

sleep; the very notion "sleep" is deified and worshipped.

In this case the exhaustion is racial; sleep regarded psychologically

is only a symbol of a much deeper and longer \_compulsion to rest....

In praxi\_ it is death which rules here in the seductive image of its

brother sleep....

232.

The whole of the Christian training in repentance and redemption may

be regarded as a \_folie circulaire\_ arbitrarily produced; though,

of course, it can be produced only in people who are predisposed to

it--that is to say, who have morbid tendencies in their constitutions.

233.

\_Against remorse and its purely psychical treatment.\_--To be unable

to have done with an experience is already a sign of decadence.

This reopening of old wounds, this wallowing in self-contempt and

depression, is an additional form of disease; no "salvation of the

soul" ever results from it, but only a new kind of spiritual illness....

These "conditions of salvation" of which the Christian is conscious are

merely variations of the same diseased state--the interpretation of an

attack of epilepsy by means of a particular formula which is provided,

\_not\_ by science, but by religious mania.

When a man is ill his very \_goodness\_ is sickly.... By far the

greatest portion of the psychical apparatus which Christianity has

used, is now classed among the various forms of hysteria and epilepsy.

The whole process of spiritual healing must be remodelled on a

physiological basis: the "sting of conscience" as such is an obstacle

in the way of recovery--as soon as possible the attempt must be made

to counterbalance everything by means of new actions, so that there

may be an escape from the morbidness of \_self-torture....\_ The purely

psychical practices of the Church and of the various sects should be

decried as dangerous to the health. No invalid is ever cured by prayers

or by the exorcising of evil spirits: the states of "repose" which

follow upon such methods of treatment, by no means inspire confidence,

in the psychological sense....

A man is \_healthy\_ when he can laugh at the seriousness and ardour with

which he has allowed himself to be \_hypnotised\_ to any extent by any

detail in his life--when his remorse seems to him like the action of a

dog biting a stone--when he is ashamed of his repentance.

The purely psychological and religious practices, which have existed

hitherto, only led to an \_alteration in the symptoms\_: according to

them a man had recovered when he bowed before the cross, and swore

that in future he would be a good man.... But a criminal, who, with

a certain gloomy seriousness cleaves to his fate and refuses to

malign his deed once it is done, has more \_spiritual health....\_

The criminals with whom Dostoiewsky associated in prison, were all,

without exception, unbroken natures,--are they not a hundred times more

valuable than a "broken-spirited" Christian?

(For the treatment of pangs of conscience I recommend Mitchell's

Treatment.[2])

234.

A \_pang of conscience\_ in a man is a sign that his character is not

yet equal to his \_deed.\_ There is such a thing as a pang of conscience

after \_good deeds\_: in this case it is their unfamiliarity, their

incompatibility with an old environment.

235.

\_Against remorse.\_--I do not like this form of cowardice in regard to

one's own actions, one must not leave one's self in the lurch under

the pressure of sudden shame or distress. Extreme pride is much more

fitting here. What is the good of it all in the end! No deed gets

undone because it is regretted, no more than because it is "forgiven"

or "expiated." A man must be a theologian in order to believe in

a power that erases faults: we immoralists prefer to disbelieve

in "faults." We believe that all deeds, of what kind soever, are

identically the same at root; just as deeds which turn \_against\_ us

may be useful from an economical point of view, and even \_generally

desirable.\_ In certain individual cases, we admit that we might well

have been \_spared\_ a given action; the circumstances alone predisposed

us in its favour. Which of us, if \_favoured\_ by circumstances, would

not already have committed every possible crime?... That is why one

should never say: "Thou shouldst never have done such and such a

thing," but only: "How strange it is that I have not done such and

such a thing hundreds of times already!"--As a matter of fact, only

a very small number of acts are \_typical\_ acts and real epitomes of

a personality, and seeing what a small number of people really are

personalities, a single act very rarely \_characterises\_ a man. Acts

are mostly dictated by circumstances; they are superficial or merely

reflex movements performed in response to a stimulus, long before the

depths of our beings are affected or consulted in the matter. A fit of

temper, a gesture, a blow with a knife: how little of the individual

resides in these acts!--A deed very often brings a sort of stupor or

feeling of constraint in its wake: so that the agent feels almost

spellbound at its recollection, or as though he \_belonged to it,\_

and were not an independent creature. This mental disorder, which is

a form of hypnotism, must be resisted at all costs: surely a single

deed, whatever it be, when it is compared with all one has done, is

\_nothing,\_ and may be deducted from the sum without making the account

wrong. The unfair interest which society manifests in controlling the

whole of our lives in one direction, as though the very purpose of its

existence were to cultivate a certain individual act, should not infect

the man of action: but unfortunately this happens almost continually.

The reason of this is, that every deed, if followed by unexpected

consequences, leads to a certain mental disturbance, no matter whether

the consequences be good or bad. Behold a lover who has been given a

promise, or a poet while he is receiving applause from an audience:

as far as \_intellectual torpor\_ is concerned, these men are in no way

different from the anarchist who is suddenly confronted by a detective

bearing a search warrant.

There are some acts which are \_unworthy\_ of us: acts which, if they

were regarded as typical, would set us down as belonging to a lower

class of man. The one fault that has to be avoided here, is to regard

them as typical. There is another kind of act of which \_we\_ are

unworthy: exceptional acts, born of a particular abundance of happiness

and health; they are the highest waves of our spring tides, driven to

an unusual height by a storm--an accident: such acts and "deeds" are

also not typical. An artist should never be judged according to the

measure of his works.

236.

A. In proportion as Christianity seems necessary to-day, man is still

wild and fatal....

B. In another sense, it is not necessary, but extremely dangerous,

though it is captivating and seductive, because it corresponds with

the \_morbid\_ character of whole classes and types of modern humanity,

... they simply follow their inclinations when they aspire to

Christianity--they are decadents of all kinds.

A and B must be kept very sharply apart. In the \_case of A,\_

Christianity is a cure, or at least a taming process (under certain

circumstances it serves the purpose of making people ill: and this is

sometimes useful as a means of subduing savage and brutal natures).

In the \_case of B,\_ it is a symptom of illness itself, it renders the

state of decadence \_more acute\_; in this case it stands opposed to

a \_corroborating\_ system of treatment, it is the invalid's instinct

standing \_against\_ that which would be most salutary to him.

237.

On one side there are the \_serious,\_ the \_dignified,\_ and \_reflective\_

people: and on the other the barbarous, the unclean, and the

irresponsible beasts: it is merely a question of \_taming animals\_--and

in this case the tamer must be hard, terrible, and awe-inspiring, at

least to his beasts.

All essential requirements must be imposed upon the unruly creatures

with almost brutal distinctness--that is to say, magnified a thousand

times.

Even the fulfilment of the requirement must be presented in the

coarsest way possible, so that it may command respect, as in the case

of the spiritualisation of the Brahmins. \_The struggle with the rabble

and the herd.\_ If any degree of tameness and order has been reached,

the chasm separating these \_purified\_ and \_regenerated\_ people from the

terrible \_remainder\_ must have been bridged....

This chasm is a means of increasing self-respect in higher castes,

and of confirming their belief in \_that\_ which they represent--hence

the \_Chandala.\_ Contempt and its excess are perfectly correct

psychologically--that is to say, magnified a hundred times, so that it

may at least be felt.

238.

The struggle against \_brutal\_ instincts is quite different from

the struggle against \_morbid\_ instincts; it may even be a means

of overcoming brutality by making the brutes \_ill.\_ The psychical

treatment practised by Christianity is often nothing more than the

process of converting a brute into a sick and \_therefore\_ tame animal.

The struggle against raw and savage natures must be a struggle with

weapons which are able to affect such natures: \_superstitions\_ and such

means are therefore indispensable and essential.

239.

Our age, in a certain sense, is \_mature\_ (that is to say, decadent),

just as Buddha's was.... That is why a sort of Christianity is possible

without all the absurd dogmas (the most repulsive offshoots of ancient

hybridism).

240.

Supposing it were impossible to disprove Christianity, Pascal thinks,

in view of the \_terrible\_ possibility that it may be true, that it is

in the highest degree prudent to be a Christian. As a proof of how

much Christianity has lost of its terrible nature, to-day we find that

other attempt to justify it, which consists in asserting, that even if

it were a mistake, it nevertheless provides the greatest advantages

and pleasures for its adherents throughout their lives:--it therefore

seems that this belief should be upheld owing to the peace and quiet

it ensures--not owing to the terror of a threatening possibility, but

rather out of fear of a life that has lost its charm. This hedonistic

turn of thought, which uses happiness as a proof, is a symptom of

decline: it takes the place of the proof resulting from power or from

that which to the Christian mind is most terrible--namely, \_fear.\_ With

this new interpretation, Christianity is, as a matter of fact, nearing

its stage of exhaustion. People are satisfied with a Christianity which

is an \_opiate,\_ because they no longer have the strength to seek, to

struggle, to dare, to stand alone, nor to take up Pascal's position and

to share that gloomily brooding self-contempt, that belief in human

unworthiness, and that anxiety which believes that it "may be damned."

But a Christianity the chief object of which is to soothe diseased

nerves, does \_not require\_ the terrible solution consisting of a "God

on the cross"; that is why Buddhism is secretly gaining ground all

over Europe.

241.

The humour of European culture: people regard one thing as true, but do

\_the other.\_ For instance, what is the use of all the art of reading

and criticising, if the ecclesiastical interpretation of the Bible,

whether according to Catholics or Protestants, is still upheld!

242.

No one is sufficiently aware of the barbarity of the notions among

which we Europeans still live. To think that men have been able to

believe that the "Salvation of the soul" depended upon a book!... And I

am told that this is still believed.

What is the good of all scientific education, all criticism and all

hermeneutics, if such nonsense as the Church's interpretation of the

Bible has not yet turned the colours of our bodies permanently into the

red of shame?

243.

\_Subject for reflection\_: To what extent does the fatal belief in

"Divine Providence"--the most \_paralysing\_ belief for both the hand

and the understanding that has ever existed--continue to prevail;

to what extent have the Christian hypothesis and interpretation of

Life continued their lives under the cover of terms like "Nature,"

"Progress," "perfectionment," "Darwinism," or beneath the superstition

that there is a certain relation between happiness and virtue,

unhappiness and sin? That absurd \_belief\_ in the course of things, in

"Life" and in the "instinct of Life"; that foolish \_resignation\_ which

arises from the notion that if only every one did his duty \_all\_ would

go well--all this sort of thing can only have a meaning if one assumes

that there is a direction of things \_sub specie boni.\_ Even \_fatalism,\_

our present form of philosophical sensibility, is the result of a

\_long\_ belief in Divine Providence, an unconscious result: as though it

were nothing to do with us how everything goes! (As though we \_might\_

let things take their own course; the individual being only a \_modus\_

of the absolute reality.)

244.

It is the height of psychological falsity on the part of man to imagine

a being according to his own petty standard, who is a beginning, a

"thing-in-itself," and who appears to him good, wise, mighty, and

precious; for thus he suppresses in thoughts \_all the causality\_

by means of which every kind of goodness, wisdom, and power comes

into existence and has value. In short, elements of the most recent

and most conditional origin were regarded not as evolved, but as

spontaneously generated and "things-in-themselves," and perhaps as

the cause of all things.... Experience teaches us that, in every case

in which a man has means elevated the interests of the species above

those of the individual. Its real \_historical\_ effect, its fatal

effect, remains precisely the \_increase of egotism,\_ of individual

egotism, to excess (to the extreme which consists in the belief in

individual immortality). The individual was made so important and so

absolute, by means of Christian values, that he could no longer be

\_sacrificed,\_ despite the fact that the species can only be maintained

by human sacrifices. All "souls" became \_equal\_ before God: but this

is the most pernicious of all valuations! If one regards individuals

as equals, the demands of the species are ignored, and a process is

initiated which ultimately leads to its ruin. Christianity is the

\_reverse of the\_ principle of \_selection.\_ If the degenerate and sick

man ("the Christian") is to be of the same value as the healthy man

("the pagan"), or if he is even to be valued higher than the latter,

as Pascal's view of health and sickness would have us value him, the

natural course of evolution is thwarted and the \_unnatural\_ becomes

law.... In practice this general love of mankind is nothing more

than deliberately favouring all the suffering, the botched, and the

degenerate: it is this love that has reduced and weakened the power,

responsibility, and lofty duty of sacrificing men. According to the

scheme of Christian values, all that remained was the alternative

of self-sacrifice, but this \_vestige\_ of human sacrifice, which

Christianity conceded and even recommended, has no meaning when

regarded in the light of rearing a whole species. The prosperity of the

species is by no means affected by the sacrifice of one individual

(whether in the monastic and ascetic manner, or by means of crosses,

stakes, and scaffolds, as the "martyrs" of error). What the species

requires is the suppression of the physiologically botched, the

weak and the degenerate: but it was precisely to these people that

Christianity appealed as a \_preservative\_ force, it simply strengthened

that natural and very strong instinct of all the weak which bids them

protect, maintain, and mutually support each other. What is Christian

"virtue" and "love of men," if not precisely this mutual assistance

with a view to survival, this solidarity of the weak, this thwarting of

selection? What is Christian altruism, if it is not the mob-egotism of

the weak which divines that, if everybody looks after everybody else,

every individual will be preserved for a longer period of time?... He

who does not consider this attitude of mind as \_immoral,\_ as a crime

against life, himself belongs to the sickly crowd, and also shares

their instincts.... Genuine love of mankind exacts sacrifice for

the good of the species--it is hard, full of self-control, because

it needs human sacrifices. And this pseudo-humanity which is called

Christianity, would fain establish the rule that nobody should be

sacrificed.

247.

Nothing could be more useful and deserves more promotion than

systematic \_Nihilism in action.\_--As I understand the phenomena of

Christianity and pessimism, this is what they say: "We are ripe for

nonentity, for us it is reasonable not to be." This hint from "reason"

in this case, is simply the voice of \_selective Nature.\_

On the other hand, what deserves the most rigorous condemnation, is

the ambiguous and cowardly infirmity of purpose of a religion like

\_Christianity,\_--or rather like the \_Church,\_--which, instead of

recommending death and self-destruction, actually protects all the

botched and bungled, and encourages them to propagate their kind.

Problem: with what kind of means could one lead up to a severe form of

really contagious Nihilism--a Nihilism which would teach and practise

voluntary death with scientific conscientiousness (and not the feeble

continuation of a vegetative sort of life with false hopes of a life

after death)?

Christianity cannot be sufficiently condemned for having depreciated

the \_value\_ of a great \_cleansing\_ Nihilistic movement (like the one

which was probably in the process of formation), by its teaching of

the immortality of the private individual, as also by the hopes of

resurrection which it held out: that is to say, by dissuading people

from performing the \_deed of Nihilism\_ which is suicide.... In the

latter's place it puts lingering suicide, and gradually a puny, meagre,

but durable life; gradually a perfectly ordinary, bourgeois, mediocre

life, etc.

248.

\_Christian moral quackery.\_--Pity and contempt succeed each other at

short intervals, and at the sight of them I feel as indignant as if I

were in the presence of the most despicable crime. Here error is made

a duty--a virtue, misapprehension has become a knack, the destructive

instinct is systematised under the name of "redemption"; here every

operation becomes a wound, an amputation of those very organs whose

energy would be the prerequisite to a return of health. And in the

best of cases no cure is effected; all that is done is to exchange one

set of evil symptoms for another set.... And this pernicious nonsense,

this systematised profanation and castration of life, passes for

holy and sacred; to be in its service, to be an instrument of this

art of healing--that is to say, to be a priest, is to be rendered

distinguished, reverent, holy, and sacred. God alone could have been

the Author of this supreme art of healing; redemption is only possible

as a revelation, as an act of grace, as an unearned gift, made by the

Creator Himself.

Proposition I.: Spiritual healthiness is regarded as morbid, and

creates suspicion....

Proposition II.: The prerequisites of a strong, exuberant life--strong

desires and passions--are reckoned as objections against strong and

exuberant life.

Proposition III.: Everything which threatens danger to man, and which

can overcome and ruin him, is evil--and should be torn root and branch

from his soul.

Proposition IV.: Man converted into a weak creature, inoffensive to

himself and others, crushed by humility and modesty, and conscious of

his weakness,--in fact, the "sinner,"--this is the desirable type, and

one which one can \_produce\_ by means of a little spiritual surgery....

249.

What is it I protest against? That people should regard this paltry and

peaceful mediocrity, this spiritual equilibrium which knows nothing

of the fine impulses of great accumulations of strength, as something

high, or possibly as the standard of all things.

\_Bacon of Verulam\_ says: \_Infimarum virtutum apud vulgus laus est,

mediarum admiratio, supremarum sensus nullus.\_ Christianity as a

religion, however, belongs to the \_vulgus\_: it has no feeling for the

highest kind of \_virtus\_.

250.

Let us see what the "genuine Christian" does of all the things which

his instincts forbid him to do:--he covers beauty, pride, riches,

self-reliance, brilliancy, knowledge, and power with suspicion and

\_mud\_--in short, \_all culture\_: his object is to deprive the latter of

its \_clean conscience.\_

251.

The attacks made upon Christianity, hitherto, have been not only timid

but false. So long as Christian morality was not felt to be a \_capital

crime against Life,\_ its apologists had a good time. The question

concerning the mere "truth" of Christianity--whether in regard to the

existence of its God, or to the legendary history of its origin, not to

speak of its astronomy and natural science--is quite beside the point

so long as no inquiry is made into the value of Christian \_morality.\_

Are Christian morals \_worth anything,\_ or are they a profanation and an

outrage, despite all the arts of holiness and seduction with which they

are enforced? The question concerning the truth of the religion may be

met by all sorts of subterfuges; and the most fervent believers can,

in the end, avail themselves of the logic used by their opponents, in

order to create a right for their side to assert that certain things

are irrefutable--that is to say, they \_transcend\_ the means employed

to refute them (nowadays this trick of dialectics is called "Kantian

Criticism").

252.

Christianity should never be forgiven for having ruined such men as

Pascal. This is precisely what should be combated in Christianity,

namely, that it has the will to break the spirit of the strongest

and noblest natures. One should take no rest until this thing is

utterly destroyed:--the ideal of mankind which Christianity advances,

the demands it makes upon men, and its "Nay" and "Yea" relative to

humanity. The whole of the remaining absurdities, that is to say,

Christian fable, Christian cobweb-spinning in ideas and principles,

and Christian theology, do not concern us; they might be a thousand

times more absurd and we should not raise a finger to destroy them.

But what we do stand up against, is that ideal which, thanks to its

morbid beauty and feminine seductiveness, thanks to its insidious and

slanderous eloquence, appeals to all the cowardices and vanities of

wearied souls,--and the strongest have their moments of fatigue,--as

though all that which seems most useful and desirable at such

moments--that is to say, confidence, artlessness, modesty, patience,

love of one's like, resignation, submission to God, and a sort of

self-surrender--were useful and desirable \_per se\_; as though the puny,

modest abortion which in these creatures takes the place of a soul,

this virtuous, mediocre animal and sheep of the flock--which deigns to

call itself man, were not only to take precedence of the stronger, more

evil, more passionate, more defiant, and more prodigal type of man, who

by virtue of these very qualities is exposed to a hundred times more

dangers than the former, but were actually to stand as an ideal for man

in general, as a goal, a measure--the highest desideratum. The creation

of \_this\_ ideal was the most appalling temptation that had ever

been put in the way of mankind; for, with it, the stronger and more

successful exceptions, the lucky cases among men, in which the will

to power and to growth leads the whole species "man" one step farther

forward, this type was threatened with disaster. By means of the values

of this ideal, the growth of such higher men would be checked at the

root. For these men, owing to their superior demands and duties,

readily accept a more dangerous life (speaking economically, it is a

case of an increase in the costs of the undertaking coinciding with

a greater chance of failure). What is it we combat in Christianity?

That it aims at destroying the strong, at breaking their spirit, at

exploiting their moments of weariness and debility, at converting

their proud assurance into anxiety and conscience-trouble; that it

knows how to poison the noblest instincts and to infect them with

disease, until their strength, their will to power, turns inwards,

against themselves--until the strong perish through their excessive

self-contempt and self-immolation: that gruesome way of perishing, of

which \_Pascal\_ is the most famous example.

II.

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.

1. THE ORIGIN OF MORAL VALUATIONS.

253.

This is an attempt at investigating morality without being affected by

its charm, and not without some mistrust in regard to the beguiling

beauty of its attitudes and looks. A world which we can admire, which

is in keeping with our capacity for worship--which is continually

\_demonstrating\_ itself--in small things or in large: this is the

Christian standpoint which is common to us all.

But owing to an increase in our astuteness, in our mistrust, and in our

scientific spirit (also through a more developed instinct for truth,

which again is due to Christian influence), this interpretation has

grown ever less and less tenable for us.

The craftiest of subterfuges: Kantian criticism. The intellect not

only denies itself every right to interpret things in that way, but

also to reject the interpretation once it has been made. People are

satisfied with a \_greater\_ demand upon their credulity and faith, with

a renunciation of all right to reason concerning the proof of their

creed, with an intangible and superior "Ideal" (God) as a stop-gap.

The Hegelian subterfuge, a continuation of the Platonic, a piece

of romanticism and reaction, and at the same time a symptom of

the historical sense of a new \_power\_: "Spirit" itself is the

"self-revealing and self-realising ideal": we believe that in the

"process of, development" an ever greater proportion of this ideal is

being manifested--thus the ideal is being realised, faith is vested in

the \_future\_ into which all its noble needs are projected and in which

they are being worshipped.

In short:--

(1) God is unknowable to us and not to be demonstrated by us (the

concealed meaning behind the whole of the epistemological movement);

(2) God may be demonstrated, but as something evolving, and we are

part of it, as our pressing desire for an ideal proves (the concealed

meaning behind the historical movement).

It should be observed that criticism is \_never\_ levelled at the ideal

itself, but only at the problem which gives rise to a controversy

concerning the ideal--that is to say, why it has not yet been realised,

or why it is not demonstrable in small things as in great.

\*\*\*

It makes all the difference: whether a man recognises this state of

distress as such owing to a passion or to a yearning in himself, or

whether it comes home to him as a problem which he arrives at only by

straining his thinking powers and his historical imagination to the

utmost.

Away from the religious and philosophical points of view we find the

same phenomena. Utilitarianism (socialism and democracy) criticises

the origin of moral valuations, though it believes in them just as

much as the Christian does. (What guilelessness! As if morality could

remain when the sanctioning \_deity\_ is no longer present! The belief in

a "Beyond" is absolutely necessary, if the faith in morality is to be

maintained.)

\_Fundamental problem\_: whence comes this almighty power of \_Faith?

Whence this faith in morality?\_ (It is betrayed by the fact that even

the fundamental conditions of life are falsely interpreted in favour of

it: despite our knowledge of plants and animals. "Self-preservation":

the Darwinian prospect of a reconciliation of the altruistic and

egotistic principles.)

254.

An inquiry into the \_origin of our moral valuations\_ and tables of

law has absolutely nothing to do with the \_criticism\_ of them, though

people persist in believing it has; the two matters lie quite apart,

notwithstanding the fact that the knowledge of the \_pudenda origo\_

of a valuation does diminish its prestige, and prepares the way to a

critical attitude and spirit towards it.

What is the actual worth of our valuations and tables of moral laws?

\_What is the outcome of their dominion?\_ For whom? In relation to

what?--answer: for Life. But \_what is Life?\_ A new and more definite

concept of what "Life" is, becomes necessary here. My formula of this

concept is: Life is Will to Power.

\_What is the meaning of the very act of valuing?\_ Does it point back to

another, metaphysical world, or does it point down? (As Kant believed,

who lived in a period which \_preceded\_ the great historical movement.)

In short: \_what is its origin?\_ Or had it no human "origin"?--Answer:

moral valuations are a sort of explanation, they constitute a method

of interpreting. Interpretation in itself is a symptom of definite

physiological conditions, as also of a definite spiritual level of

ruling judgments. \_What is it that interprets?\_--Our passions.

255

All virtues should be looked upon as physiological \_conditions\_: the

principal organic functions, more particularly, should be considered

necessary and good. All virtues are really refined \_passions\_ and

elevated physiological conditions.

Pity and philanthropy may be regarded as the developments of

sexual relations,--justice as the development of the passion for

revenge,--virtue as the love of resistance, the will to power,--honour

as an acknowledgment of an equal, or of an equally powerful, force.

256.

Under "Morality" I understand a system of valuations which is in

relation with the conditions of a creature's life.

257.

Formerly it was said of every form of morality, "Ye shall know them by

their fruits." I say of every form of morality: "It is a fruit, and

from it I learn the \_Soil\_ out of which it grew."

258.

I have tried to understand all moral judgments as symptoms and a

language of signs in which the processes of physiological prosperity

or the reverse, as also the consciousness of the conditions of

preservation and growth, are betrayed--a mode of interpretation equal

in worth to astrology, prejudices, created by instincts (peculiar

to races, communities, and different stages of existence, as, for

instance, youth or decay, etc.).

Applying this principle to the morality of Christian Europe more

particularly, we find that our moral values are signs of decline, of a

disbelief in \_Life,\_ and of a preparation for pessimism.

My leading doctrine is this: \_there are no moral phenomena, but only a

moral interpretation of phenomena. The origin of this interpretation

itself lies beyond the pale of morality.\_

What is the meaning of the fact that we have imagined a

\_contradiction\_ in existence? This is of paramount importance: behind

all other valuations those moral valuations stand commandingly.

Supposing they disappear, according to what standard shall we then

measure? And then of what value would knowledge be, etc. etc.???

259.

A point of view: in all valuations there is a definite purpose:

the \_preservation\_ of an individual, a community, a race, a state,

a church, a belief, or a culture.--Thanks to the fact that people

\_forget\_ that all valuing has a purpose, one and the same man may swarm

with a host of contradictory valuations, and \_therefore with a host of

contradictory impulses.\_ This is the \_expression of disease in man\_ as

opposed to the health of animals, in which all the instincts answer

certain definite purposes.

This creature full of contradictions, however, has in his being a grand

method of acquiring knowledge: he feels the pros and cons, he elevates

himself \_to Justice\_--that is to say, to the ascertaining of principles

\_beyond the valuations good and evil.\_

The wisest man would thus be the \_richest in contradictions,\_ he would

also be gifted with mental antennæ wherewith he could understand all

kinds of men; and with it all he would have his great moments, when all

the chords in his being would ring in \_splendid unison\_--the rarest of

\_accidents\_ even in us! A sort of planetary movement.

260.

"To will" is to will an object. But "object," as an idea, involves

a valuation. Whence do valuations originate? Is a permanent norm,

"pleasant or painful," their basis?

But in an incalculable number of cases we first of all \_make\_ a thing

painful, by investing it with a valuation.

The compass of moral valuations: they play a part in almost every

mental impression. To us the world is \_coloured\_ by them.

We have imagined the purpose and value of all things: owing to this

we possess an enormous fund of \_latent power,\_ but the study of

\_comparative\_ values teaches us that values which were actually opposed

to each other have been held in high esteem, and that there have been

\_many\_ tables of laws (they could not, therefore, have been worth

anything \_per se\_).

The analysis of individual tables of laws revealed the fact that they

were framed (often very badly) as the \_conditions of existence\_ for

limited groups of people, to ensure their maintenance.

Upon examining modern men, we found that there are a large number

of \_very different\_ values to hand, and that they no longer contain

any creative power--the fundamental principle: "the condition of

existence" is now quite divorced from the moral values. It is much

more superfluous and not nearly so painful. It becomes an \_arbitrary\_

matter. Chaos.

Who creates \_the goal\_ which stands above mankind kind and above the

individual? Formerly morality was a \_preservative\_ measure: but nobody

wants to \_preserve\_ any longer, there is nothing to preserve. Thus we

are reduced to an \_experimental morality,\_ each must \_postulate\_ a goal

for himself.

261.

What is the \_criterion\_ of a moral action? (1) Its disinterestedness,

(2) its universal acceptation, etc. But this is parlour-morality. Races

must be studied and observed, and, in each case, the criterion must be

discovered, as also the thing it expresses: a belief such as: "This

particular attitude or behaviour belongs to the principal condition of

our existence." Immoral means "that which brings about ruin." Now all

societies in which these principles were discovered have met with their

ruin: a few of these principles have been used and used again, because

every newly established community required them; this was the case, for

instance, with "Thou shalt not steal." In ages when people could not be

expected to show any marked social instinct (as, for instance, in the

age of the Roman Empire) the latter was, religiously speaking, directed

towards the idea of "spiritual salvation," or, in philosophical

parlance, towards "the greatest happiness." For even the philosophers

of Greece did not feel any more for their πολις.

262.

\_The necessity of false values.\_--A judgment may be refuted when it is

shown that it was conditioned: but the necessity of retaining it is

not thereby cancelled. Reasons can no more eradicate false values than

they can alter astigmatism in a man's eyes.

The need of their \_existence\_ must be understood: they are the \_result\_

of causes which have nothing to do with reasoning.

263.

To \_see\_ and \_reveal\_ the problem of morality seems to me to be the new

task and the principal thing of all. I deny that this has been done by

moral philosophies heretofore.

264.

How false and deceptive men have always been concerning the fundamental

facts of their inner world! Here to have no eye; here to hold one's

tongue, and here to open one's mouth.

265.

There seems to be no knowledge or consciousness of the many

\_revolutions\_ that have taken place in moral judgments, and of

the number of times that "evil" has really and seriously been

christened "good" and \_vice versa.\_ I myself pointed to one of these

transformations with the words "Sittlichkeit der Sitte."[3] Even

conscience has changed its sphere: formerly there was such a thing as

a gregarious pang of conscience.

266.

A. \_Morality\_ as the work of \_Immorality.\_

1. In order that moral values may attain to \_supremacy,\_ a host of

immoral forces and passions must assist them.

2. The establishment of moral values is the work of immoral passions

and considerations.

B. \_Morality as the work of error.\_

C. \_'Morality gradually contradicts itself.\_ Requital--Truthfulness,

Doubt, έποχή, Judging. The "Immorality" of \_belief\_ in morality.

The steps:--

1. Absolute dominion of morality: all biological phenomena measured and

\_judged\_ according to its values.

2. The attempt to identify Life with morality (symptom of awakened

scepticism: morality must no longer be regarded as the opposite of

Life); many means are sought--even a transcendental one.

3. The \_opposition of Life\_ and \_Morality.\_ Morality condemned and

sentenced by Life.

D. To what extent was morality \_dangerous\_ to Life?

\_(a)\_ It depreciated the joy of living and the gratitude felt towards

Life, etc.

\_(b)\_ It checked the tendency to beautify and to ennoble Life.

\_(c)\_ It checked the knowledge of Life.

\_(d)\_ It checked the unfolding of Life, because it tried to set the

highest phenomena thereof at variance with itself.

E. Contra-account: the \_usefulness\_ of morality to Life.

(1) Morality may be a preservative measure for the general whole, it

may be a process of uniting dispersed members: it is useful as an agent

in the production of the man who is a "\_tool\_."

(2) Morality may be a preservative measure mitigating the inner danger

threatening man from the direction of his passions: it is useful to

"\_mediocre people\_."

(3) Morality may be a preservative measure resisting the life-poisoning

influences of profound sorrow and bitterness: it is useful to the

"\_sufferers\_."

(4) Morality may be a preservative measure opposed to the terrible

outbursts of the mighty: it is useful to the "\_lowly\_."

267.

It is an excellent thing when one can use the expressions "right" and

"wrong" in a definite, narrow, and "bourgeois" sense, as for instance

in the sentence: "Do right and fear no one";[4]--that is to say, to

do one's duty, according to the rough scheme of life within the limit

of which a community exists.--Let us not think meanly of what a few

thousand years of morality have inculcated upon our minds.

268.

Two types of morality must not be confounded: the morality with which

the instinct that has remained healthy defends itself from incipient

decadence, and the other morality by means of which this decadence

asserts itself, justifies itself, and leads downwards.

The first-named is usually stoical, hard, tyrannical \_(Stoicism\_ itself

was an example of the sort of "drag-chain" morality we speak of); the

other is gushing, sentimental, full of secrets, it has the women and

"beautiful feelings" on its side (Primitive Christianity was an example

of this morality).

269.

I shall try to regard all moralising, with one glance, as a

phenomenon--also as a \_riddle.\_ Moral phenomena have preoccupied me

like riddles. To-day I should be able to give a reply to the question:

why \_should\_ my neighbour's welfare be of greater value to me than

my own? and why is it that my neighbour himself \_should\_ value his

welfare differently from the way in which I value it--that is to say,

why should precisely \_my\_ welfare be paramount in his mind? What is

the meaning of this "Thou shalt," which is regarded as "given" even by

philosophers themselves?

The seemingly insane idea that a man should esteem the act he performs

for a fellow-creature, higher than the one he performs for himself,

and that the same fellow-creature should do so too (that only those

acts should be held to be good which are performed with an eye to

the neighbour and for his welfare) has its reasons--namely, as the

result of the social instinct which rests upon the valuation, that

single individuals are of little importance although collectively

their importance is very great. This, of course, presupposes that they

constitute a \_community\_ with one feeling and one conscience pervading

the whole. It is therefore a sort of exercise for keeping one's eyes in

a certain direction; it is the will to a kind of optics which renders a

view of one's self impossible.

My idea: goals are wanting, and \_these must be individuals.\_ We see the

general drift: every individual gets sacrificed and serves as a tool.

Let any one keep his eyes open in the streets--is not every one he sees

a slave? Whither? What is the purpose of it all?

270.

How is it possible that a man can respect himself \_only\_ in regard

to moral values, that he subordinates and despises everything in

favour of good, evil, improvement, spiritual salvation, etc.? as,

for instance, Henri Fréd. Amiel. What is the meaning of the \_moral

idiosyncrasy\_?--I mean this both in the psychological and physiological

sense, as it was, for instance, in Pascal. In cases, then, in which

\_other\_ great qualities are not wanting; and even in the case of

Schopenhauer, who obviously valued what he did not and \_could\_ not have

...--is it not the result of a merely mechanical \_moral interpretation\_

of real states of pain and displeasure? is it not a particular form

of \_sensibility\_ which does \_not\_ happen to \_understand\_ the cause

of its many unpleasurable feelings, but \_thinks to explain them with

moral hypotheses?\_ In this way an occasional feeling of well-being and

\_strength\_ always appears under the optics of a "clean conscience,"

flooded with light through the proximity of God and the consciousness

of salvation.... Thus the \_moral idiosyncratist\_ has (1) \_either\_

acquired his real worth in approximating to the virtuous type of

society: "the good fellow," "\_the upright man\_"--a sort of medium

state of high respectability: \_mediocre\_ in all his abilities,

but honest, conscientious, firm, respected, and tried, in all his

aspirations; (2) \_or,\_ he imagines he has acquired that worth, simply

because he cannot otherwise understand all his states--he is unknown to

himself; he therefore interprets himself in this fashion.--Morality is

the only \_scheme of interpretation\_ by means of which this type of man

can tolerate himself:--is it a form of vanity?

271.

\_The predominance of moral values.\_--The consequence of this

predominance: the corruption of psychology, etc.; the fatality which

is associated with it everywhere. What is the \_meaning\_ of this

predominance? What does it point to?

To a certain \_greater urgency\_ of saying nay or yea definitely in

this domain. All sorts of \_imperatives\_ have been used in order to

make moral values appear as if they were for ever fixed:--they have

been enjoined for the longest period of time: they almost appear

to be instinctive, like inner commands. They are the expression of

\_society's preservative measures,\_ for they are felt to be almost

\_beyond question.\_ The practice--that is to say, the \_utility\_ of being

agreed concerning superior values, has attained in this respect to

a sort of sanction. We observe that every care is taken to paralyse

reflection and criticism in this department--look at Kant's attitude!

not to speak of those who believe that it is immoral even to prosecute

"research" in these matters.

272.

\_My desire\_ is to show the absolute homogeneity of all phenomena, and

to ascribe to moral differentiations but the value of \_perspective\_; to

show that all that which is praised as moral is essentially the same

as that which is immoral, and was only made possible, according to

the law of all moral development--that is to say, by means of immoral

artifices and with a view to immoral ends--just as all that which

has been decried as immoral is, from the standpoint of economics,

both superior and essential; and how development leading to a greater

abundance of life necessarily Involves \_progress\_ in the realm \_of

immorality\_. "Truth," that is the extent to which we \_allow\_ ourselves

to comprehend \_this\_ fact.

273.

But do not let us fear: as a matter of fact, we require a great deal of

morality, in order to be immoral in this subtle way; let me speak in a

parable:--

A physiologist interested in a certain illness, and an invalid who

wishes to be cured of that same illness, have not the same interests.

Let us suppose that the illness happens to be morality,--for morality

is an illness,--and that we Europeans are the invalid: what an amount

of subtle torment and difficulty would arise supposing we Europeans

were, at once, our own inquisitive spectators and the physiologist

above-mentioned! Should we under these circumstances earnestly desire

to rid ourselves of morality? Should we want to? This is of course

irrespective of the question whether we should be \_able\_ to do

so--whether we can be \_cured\_ at all?

2. THE HERD.

274.

\_Whose will to power is morality?\_--The \_common factor\_ of all European

history since the time of \_Socrates\_ is the attempt to make the \_moral

values\_ dominate all other values, in order that they should not be

only the leader and judge of life, but also: (1) knowledge, (2) Art,

(3) political and social aspirations. "Amelioration" regarded as the

only duty, everything else used as a \_means\_ thereto (or as a force

distributing, hindering, and endangering its realisation, and therefore

to be opposed and annihilated ...).--A similar movement to be observed

\_in China\_ and \_India.\_

What is the meaning of this \_will to power on the part of moral

values,\_ which has played such a part in the world's prodigious

evolutions?

\_Answer:--Three powers lie concealed behind it\_; (1) The instinct

of the \_herd\_ opposed to the strong and the independent; (2) the

instinct of all \_sufferers\_ and all \_abortions\_ opposed to the happy

and well-constituted; (3) the instinct of the mediocre opposed to

the exceptions.--\_Enormous advantage of this movement,\_ despite the

cruelty, falseness, and narrow-mindedness which has helped it along

(for the history of the \_struggle of morality with the fundamental

instincts of life\_ is in itself the greatest piece of immorality that

has ever yet been witnessed on earth ...).

275.

The fewest succeed in discovering a problem behind all that which

constitutes our daily life, and to which we have become accustomed

throughout the ages--our eye does not seem focussed for such things:

at least, this seems to me to be the case in so far as our morality is

concerned.

"Every man should be the preoccupation of his fellows"; he who thinks

in this way deserves honour: no one ought to think of himself.

"Thou shalt": an impulse which, like the sexual impulse, cannot fathom

itself, is set apart and is not condemned as all the other instincts

are--on the contrary, it is made to be their standard and their judge!

The problem of "equality," in the face of the fact that we all thirst

for distinction: here, on the contrary, we should demand of ourselves

what we demand of others. That is so tasteless and obviously insane;

but--it is felt to be holy and of a higher order. The fact that it is

opposed to common sense is not even noticed.

Self-sacrifice and self-abnegation are considered distinguishing, as

are also the attempt to obey morality implicitly, and the belief that

one should be every one's equal in its presence.

The neglect and the surrender of Life and of well-being is held to be

distinguished, as are also the complete renunciation of individual

valuations and the severe exaction from every one of the same

sacrifice. "The value of an action is once and for all \_fixed\_: every

individual must submit to this valuation."

We see: an authority speaks--who speaks?--We must condone it in human

pride, if man tried to make this authority as high as possible, for

he wanted to feel as humble as he possibly could by the side of it.

Thus--God speaks!

God was necessary as an unconditional sanction which has no superior,

as a "Categorical Imperator": or, in so far as people believed in the

authority of reason, what was needed was a "unitarian metaphysics" by

means of which this view could be made logical.

Now, admitting that faith in God is dead: the question arises once

more: "who speaks?" My answer, which I take from biology and not from

metaphysics, is: "the \_gregarious instinct speaks.\_" This is what

desires to be master: hence its "thou shalt!"--it will allow the

individual to exist only as a part of a whole, only in favour of the

whole, it hates those who detach themselves from everything--it turns

the hatred of all individuals against him.

276.

The whole of the morality of Europe is based upon the values \_which

are useful to the herd\_: the sorrow of all higher and exceptional men

is explained by the fact that everything which distinguishes them from

others reaches their consciousness in the form of a feeling of their

own smallness and egregiousness. It is the \_virtues\_ of modern men

which are the causes of pessimistic gloominess; the mediocre, like the

herd, are not troubled much with questions or with conscience--they

are cheerful. (Among the gloomy strong men, Pascal and Schopenhauer are

noted examples.)

\_The more dangerous a quality seems to the herd, the more completely it

is condemned.\_

277.

The morality of \_truthfulness\_ in the herd. "Thou shalt be

recognisable, thou shalt express thy inner nature by means of clear

and constant signs--otherwise thou art dangerous: and supposing

thou art evil, thy power of dissimulation is absolutely the worst

thing for the herd. We despise the secretive and those whom we

cannot identify.--\_Consequently\_ thou must regard thyself as

recognisable, thou mayest not remain \_concealed\_ from thyself, thou

mayest not even believe in the possibility of thy ever \_changing\_."

Thus, the insistence upon truthfulness has as its main object the

\_recognisability\_ and the \_stability\_ of the individual. As a matter

of fact, it is the object of education to make each gregarious

unit believe in a certain \_definite dogma\_ concerning the nature

of man: education \_first creates this dogma\_ and thereupon exacts

"truthfulness."

278.

Within the confines of a herd or of a community--that is to say, \_inter

pares,\_ the \_over-estimation\_ of truthfulness is very reasonable. A

man must not allow himself to be deceived--and \_consequently\_ he

adopts as his own personal morality that he should deceive no one!--a

sort of mutual obligation among equals! In his dealings with the

outside world caution and danger demand that he should \_be on his guard

against deception\_: the first psychological condition of this attitude

would mean that he is also on his guard against \_his own people.\_

Mistrust thus appears as the source of truthfulness.

279.

\_A criticism of the virtues of the herd.\_--Inertia is active: (1)

In confidence, because mistrust makes suspense, reflection, and

observation necessary. (2) In veneration, where the gulf that

separates power is great and submission necessary: then, so that

fear may cease to exist, everybody tries to love and esteem, while

the difference in power is interpreted as a difference of value:

and thus the relationship to the powerful \_no longer has anything

revolting in it.\_ (3) In the sense of truth. What is truth? Truth

is that explanation of things which causes us the smallest amount

of mental exertion (apart from this, lying is extremely fatiguing).

(4) In sympathy. It is a relief to know one's self on the same level

with all, to feel as all feel, and to \_accept\_ a belief which is

already current; it is something passive beside the activity which

appropriates and continually carries into practice the most individual

rights of valuation (the latter process allows of no repose). (5) In

impartiality and coolness of judgment: people scout the strain of being

moved, and prefer to be detached and "objective." (6) In uprightness:

people prefer to obey a law which is to hand rather than to \_create\_

a new one, rather than to command themselves and others: the fear of

commanding--it is better to submit than to rebel. (7) In toleration:

the fear of exercising a right or of enforcing a judgment.

280.

The instinct of the herd values the \_juste milieu\_ and the \_average\_

as the highest and most precious of all things: the spot where the

majority is to be found, and the air that it breathes there. In this

way it is the opponent of all order of rank; it regards a climb from

the level to the heights in the same light as a descent from the

majority to the minority. The herd regards the \_exception,\_ whether

it be above or beneath its general level, as something which is

antagonistic and dangerous to itself. Their trick in dealing with

the exceptions above them, the strong, the mighty, the wise, and the

fruitful, is to persuade them to become guardians, herdsmen, and

watchmen--in fact, to become their \_head-servants\_: thus they convert

a danger into a thing which is useful. In the middle, fear ceases:

here a man is alone with nothing; here there is not much room even for

misunderstandings; here there is equality; here a man's individual

existence is not felt as a reproach, but as the \_right\_ existence;

here contentment reigns supreme. Mistrust is active only towards the

exceptions; to be an exception is to be a sinner.

281.

If, in compliance with our communal instincts, we make certain

regulations for, ourselves and forbid certain acts, we do not of

course, in common reason, forbid a certain kind of "existence," nor

a certain attitude of mind, but only a particular application and

development of this "existence" and "attitude of mind." But then the

idealist of virtue, the \_moralist,\_ comes along and says: "God sees

into the human heart! What matters it that ye abstain from certain

acts: ye are not any better on that account!" Answer: Mr. Longears

and Virtue-Monger, we do not want to be better at all, we are quite

satisfied with ourselves, all we desire is that we should not \_harm\_

one another--and that is why we forbid certain actions when they take

a particular direction--that is to say, when they are against our

own interests: but that does not alter the fact that when these same

actions are directed against the enemies of our community--against

you, for instance--we are at a loss to know how to pay them sufficient

honour. We educate our children up to them; we develop them to the

fullest extent. Did we share that "god-fearing" radicalism which your

holy craziness recommends, if we were green-horns enough to condemn

the source of those forbidden "acts" by condemning the "heart" and the

"attitude of mind" which recommends them, that would mean condemning

our very existence, and with it its greatest prerequisite--an attitude

of mind, a heart, a passion which we revere with all our soul. By

our decrees we prevent this attitude of mind from breaking out and

venting itself in a useless way--we are prudent when we prescribe

such laws for ourselves; we are also \_moral\_ in so doing.... Have

you no idea--however vague--what sacrifices it has cost us, how much

self-control, self-subjection, and hardness it has compelled us to

exercise? We are vehement in our desires; there are times when we even

feel as if we could devour each other.... But the "communal spirit" is

master of us: have you observed that this is almost a definition of

morality?

282.

\_The weakness of the gregarious animal\_ gives rise to a morality

which is precisely similar to that resulting from the weakness of the

decadent man: they understand each other; they \_associate\_ with each

other (the great decadent religions always rely upon the support of

the herd). The gregarious animal, as such, is free from all morbid

characteristics, it is in itself an invaluable creature; but it is

incapable of taking any initiative; it must have a "leader"--the

priests understand this.... The state is not subtle, not secret

enough; the art of "directing consciences" slips its grasp. How is the

gregarious animal infected with illness by the priest?

283.

\_The hatred directed against the privileged in body and spirit\_:

the revolt of the ugly and bungled souls against the beautiful, the

proud, and the cheerful. The weapons used: contempt of beauty, of

pride, of happiness: "There is no such thing as merit," "The danger is

enormous: it is right that one \_should\_ tremble and feel ill at ease,"

"Naturalness is evil; it is right to oppose all that is natural--even

'reason'" (all that is antinatural is elevated to the highest place).

It is again the \_priests\_ who exploit this condition, and who win the

"people" over to themselves. "The sinner" over whom there is more joy

in heaven than over "the just person." This is the struggle against

"paganism" (the pang of conscience, a measure for disturbing the

harmony of the soul).

\_The hatred of the mediocre\_ for the \_exceptions,\_ and of the herd for

its independent members. (Custom actually regarded as "morality.") The

revulsion of feeling \_against\_ "egotism": that only is worth anything

which is done "for another." "We are all equal";--against the love of

dominion, against "dominion" in general;--against privilege;--against

sectarians, free-spirits, and sceptics;--against philosophy (a

force opposing mechanical and automatic instincts); in philosophers

themselves--"the categorical imperative," the essential nature of

morality, "general and universal."

284.

The qualities and tendencies which are \_praised\_: peacefulness, equity,

moderation, modesty, reverence, respectfulness, bravery, chastity,

honesty, fidelity, credulity, rectitude, confidence, resignation,

pity, helpfulness, conscientiousness, simplicity, mildness, justice,

generosity, leniency, obedience, disinterestedness, freedom from envy,

good nature, industry.

We must ascertain to what extent \_such qualities\_ are conditioned

as means to the attainment of certain desires and \_ends\_ (often an

"\_evil\_" end); or as results of dominating passions (for instance,

\_intellectuality\_): or as the expressions of certain states of

need--that is to say, as \_preservative measures\_ (as in the case of

citizens, slaves, women, etc.).

In short, every one of them is not \_considered "good" for its own

sake,\_ but rather because it approximates to a standard prescribed

either by "society" or by the "herd," as a means to the ends of the

latter, as necessary for their preservation and enhancement, and also

as the result of an actual \_gregarious instinct\_ in the individual;

these qualities are thus in the service of an instinct which is

\_fundamentally different\_ from these \_states of virtue.\_ For the herd

is \_antagonistic, selfish, and pitiless\_ to the outside world; it is

full of a love of dominion and of feelings of mistrust, etc.

In the "herdsman" this \_antagonism\_ comes to the \_fore\_ he must have

qualities which are \_the reverse of\_ those possessed by the herd.

The mortal enmity of the herd towards all \_order of rank\_: its

instinct is in favour of the \_leveller\_ (Christ). Towards all \_strong

individuals (the sovereigns)\_ it is hostile, unfair, intemperate,

arrogant, cheeky, disrespectful, cowardly, false, lying, pitiless,

deceitful, envious, revengeful.

285.

My teaching is this, that the herd seeks to maintain and preserve one

type of man, and that it defends itself on two sides--that is to say,

against those which are decadents from its ranks (criminals, etc.), and

against those who rise superior to its dead level. The instincts of the

herd tend to a stationary state of society; they merely preserve. They

have no creative power.

The pleasant feelings of goodness and benevolence with which the just

man fills us (as opposed to the suspense and the fear to which the

great innovating man gives rise) are our own sensations of personal

security and equality: in this way the gregarious animal glorifies

the gregarious nature, and then begins to feel at ease. This judgment

on the part of the "comfortable" ones rigs itself out in the most

beautiful words--and thus "morality" is born. Let any one observe,

however, the \_hatred of the herd\_ for all truthful men.

286.

Let us not deceive ourselves! When a man hears the whisper of the moral

imperative in his breast, as altruism would have him hear it, he

shows thereby that he belongs to the \_herd.\_ When a man is conscious

of the opposite feelings,--that is to say, when he sees his danger and

his undoing in disinterested and unselfish actions,--then he does not

belong to the herd.

287.

My philosophy aims at a new \_order of rank: not\_ at an individualistic

morality.[5] The spirit of the herd should rule within the herd--but

not beyond it: the leaders of the herd require a fundamentally

different valuation for their actions, as do also the independent ones

or the beasts of prey, etc.

3. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING MORALITY.

288.

\_Morality regarded as an attempt at establishing human pride.\_--The

"Free-Will" theory is anti-religious. Its ultimate object is to bestow

the right upon man to regard himself as the \_cause\_ of his highest

states and actions: it is a form of the growing \_feeling of pride.\_

Man feels his power his "happiness"; as they say: there must be a will

behind these states--otherwise they do not belong to him. Virtue is

an attempt at postulating a modicum of will, past or present, as the

necessary antecedent to every exalted and strong feeling of happiness:

if the will to certain actions is regularly present in consciousness,

a sensation of power may be interpreted as its result. This is a

\_merely psychological point of view,\_ based upon the false assumption

that nothing belongs to us which we have not consciously willed. The

whole of the teaching of responsibility relies upon the ingenuous

psychological rule that the will is the only cause, and that one must

have been aware of having willed in order to be able to regard \_one's

self\_ as a cause.

\_Then comes the counter-movement\_--that of the moral-philosophers.

These men still labour under the delusion that a man is responsible

only for what he has willed. The value of man is then made a \_moral

value\_: thus morality becomes a \_causa prima\_; for this there must be

some kind of principle in man, and "free will" is posited as \_prima

causa.\_ The \_arrière pensée\_ is always this: If man is not a \_causa

prima\_ through his will, he must be irresponsible,--therefore he

does not come within the jurisdiction of morals,--virtue or vice is

automatic and mechanical....

In short: in order that man may respect himself he must be capable of

becoming evil.

289.

\_Theatricalness\_ regarded as the result of "Free Will" morality. It

is a step in the \_development of the feeling of power itself\_ to

believe one's self to be the author of one's exalted moments (of one's

perfection) and to have \_willed\_ them....

(Criticism: all perfect action is precisely unconscious and not

deliberate; consciousness is often the expression of an imperfect

and often morbid constitution. \_Personal perfection regarded as

determined by will, as an act of consciousness,\_ as reason with

dialectics, is a caricature, a sort of self-contradiction.... Any

degree of consciousness renders perfection \_impossible.\_ ... A form of

\_theatricalness\_.)

290.

The \_moral hypothesis,\_ designed with a view to \_justifying God,\_

said: evil must be voluntary (simply in order that the \_voluntariness

of goodness\_ might be believed in); and again, all evil and suffering

have an \_object which is salvation\_.

The notion "guilt" was considered as something which had no

connection at all with the ultimate cause of existence, and the

notion "punishment" was held to be an educating and beneficent act,

consequently an act proceeding from a \_good\_ God.

The absolute dominion of moral valuations \_over\_ all others: nobody

doubted that God could not be evil and could do no harm--that is to

say, perfection was understood merely as \_moral\_ perfection.

291.

How false is the supposition that an action must depend upon what has

preceded it in consciousness! And morality has been measured in the

light of this supposition, as also criminality....

The value of an action must be judged by its results, say the

utilitarians: to measure it according to its origin involves the

impossibility of \_knowing\_ that origin.

But do we know its results? Five stages ahead, perhaps. Who can tell

what an action provokes and sets in motion? As a stimulus? As the spark

which fires a powder-magazine? Utilitarians are simpletons.... And

finally, they would first of all have to know \_what\_ is useful; here

also their sight can travel only over five stages or so.... They have

no notion of the great economy which cannot dispense with evil.

We do not know the origin or the results: has an action, then, any

value?

We have yet the action itself to consider: the states of consciousness

that accompany it, the yea or nay which follows upon its performance:

does the value of an action lie in the subjective states which

accompany it? (In that case, the value of music would be measured

according to the pleasure or displeasure which it occasions in us ...

which it gives to the \_composer.\_ ...) Obviously feelings of value

must accompany it, a sensation of power, restraint, or impotence--for

instance, freedom or lightsomeness. Or, putting the question

differently: could the value of an action be reduced to physiological

terms? could it be the expression of completely free or constrained

life?--Maybe its \_biological\_ value is expressed in this way....

If, then, an action can be judged neither in the light of its origin,

nor its results, nor its accompaniments in consciousness, then its

value must be \_x\_ unknown....

292.

It amounts to a \_denaturalisation of morality,\_ to \_separate\_ an action

from a man; to direct hatred or contempt against "sin"; to believe that

there are actions which are good or bad in themselves.

The \_re-establishment of\_ "\_Nature\_": an action in itself is quite

devoid of value; the whole question is this: who performed it? One and

the same "crime" may, in one case, be the greatest privilege, in the

other infamy. As a matter of fact, it is the selfishness of the judges

which interprets an action (in regard to its author) according as to

whether it was useful or harmful to themselves (or in relation to its

degree of likeness or unlikeness to them).

293.

The concept "reprehensible action" presents us with some difficulties.

Nothing in all that happens can be reprehensible in itself: \_one would

not dare to eliminate it completely\_; for everything is so bound up

with everything else, that to exclude one part would mean to exclude

the whole.

A reprehensible action, therefore, would mean a reprehensible world as

a whole....

And even then, in a reprehensible world even reprehending would be

reprehensible.... And the consequence of an attitude of mind that

condemns everything, would be the affirmation of everything in

practice.... If Becoming is a huge ring, everything that forms a part

of it is of equal value, is eternal and necessary.--In all correlations

of yea and nay, of preference and rejection, love and hate, all that

is expressed is a certain point of view, peculiar to the interests of

a certain type of living organism: everything that lives says \_yea\_ by

the very fact of its existence.

294.

\_Criticism of the subjective feelings of value.--\_Conscience. Formerly

people argued: conscience condemns this action, therefore this action

is reprehensible. But, as a matter of fact, conscience condemns an

action because that action has been condemned for a long period of

time: all conscience does is to imitate. It does not create values.

That which first led to the condemnation of certain actions, was

\_not\_ conscience: but the knowledge of (or the prejudice against)

its consequences.... The approbation of conscience, the feeling of

well-being, of "inner peace," is of the same order of emotions as the

artist's joy over his work--it proves nothing.... Self-contentment

proves no more in favour of that which gives rise to it, than its

absence can prove anything against the value of the thing which fails

to give rise to it. We are far too ignorant to be able to judge of the

value of our actions: in this respect we lack the ability to regard

things objectively. Even when we condemn an action, we do not do so

as judges, but as adversaries.... When noble sentiments accompany an

action, they prove nothing in its favour: an artist may present us

with an absolutely insignificant thing, though he be in the throes of

the most exalted pathos during its production. It were wiser to regard

these sentiments as misleading: they actually beguile our eye and our

power, away from criticism, from caution and from suspicion, and the

result often is that we make \_fools\_ of ourselves ... they actually

make fools of us.

295.

We are heirs to the conscience-vivisection and self-crucifixion of two

thousand years: in these two practices lie perhaps our longest efforts

at becoming perfect, our mastery, and certainly our subtlety; we have

affiliated natural propensities with a heavy conscience.

An attempt to produce an entirely opposite state of affairs would be

possible: that is to say, to affiliate all desires of a beyond, all

sympathy with things which are opposed to the senses, the intellect,

and nature--in fact, all the ideals that have existed hitherto (which

were all anti-worldly), with a heavy conscience.

296.

The great \_crimes\_ in \_psychology\_:--

(1) That all \_pain\_ and \_unhappiness\_ should have been falsified by

being associated with what is wrong (guilt). (Thus pain was robbed of

its innocence.)

(2) That all \_strong emotions\_ (wantonness, voluptuousness, triumph,

pride, audacity, knowledge, assurance, and happiness in itself) were

branded as sinful, as seductive, and as suspicious.

(3) That \_feelings of weakness,\_ inner acts of cowardice, lack of

personal courage, should have decked themselves in the most beautiful

words, and have been taught as desirable in the highest degree.

(4) That \_greatness\_ in man should have been given the meaning of

disinterestedness, self-sacrifice for another's good, for other people;

that even in the scientist and the artist, the \_elimination of the

individual personality\_ is presented as the cause of the greatest

knowledge and ability.

(5) That \_love\_ should have been twisted round to mean submission

(and altruism), whereas it is in reality an act of appropriation or

of bestowal, resulting in the last case from a superabundance in the

wealth of a given personality. Only the \_wholest\_ people can love; the

disinterested ones, the "objective" ones, are the worst lovers (just

ask the girls!). This principle also applies to the love of God or of

the "home country": a man must be able to rely absolutely upon himself.

(Egotism may be regarded as the \_pre-eminence of the ego,\_ altruism as

the \_pre-eminence of others\_.)

(6) Life regarded as a punishment (happiness as a means of seduction);

the passions regarded as devilish; confidence in one's self as godless.

\_The whole of psychology is a psychology of obstacles,\_ a sort of

\_barricade\_ built out of fear; on the one hand we find the masses (the

botched and bungled, the mediocre) defending themselves, by means of

it, against the \_strong\_ (and finally \_destroying\_ them in their growth

...); on the other hand, we find all the instincts with which these

classes are best able to prosper, sanctified and alone held in honour

by them. Let anyone examine the Jewish priesthood.

297.

\_The vestiges of the depreciation of Nature\_ through moral

transcendence: The value of disinterestedness, the cult of altruism;

the belief in a reward in the play of natural consequences; the belief

in "goodness" and in genius itself, as if the one, like the other,

were the \_result of disinterestedness\_; the continuation of the

Church's sanction of the life of the citizen; the absolutely deliberate

misunderstanding of history (as a means of educating up to morality)

or pessimism in the attitude taken up towards history (the latter

is just as much a result of the depreciation of Nature, as is that

\_pseudo-justification\_ of history, that refusal to see history as the

pessimist \_sees\_ it).

298.

"\_Morality for its own sake\_"--this is an important step in the

denaturalisation of morals: in itself it appears as a final value. In

this phase religion has generally become saturated with it: as, for

instance, in the case of Judaism. It likewise goes through a phase in

which it \_separates itself from\_ religion, and in which no God is

"moral" enough for it: it then prefers the impersonal ideal.... This is

how the case stands at present.

"\_Art for Art's sake\_": this is a similarly dangerous principle: by

this means a false contrast is lent to things--it culminates in the

slander of reality ("idealising" \_into the hateful\_). When an ideal

is severed from reality, the latter is debased, impoverished, and

calumniated. \_"Beauty for Beauty's sake," "Truth for Truth's sake,"

"Goodness for Goodness' sake"\_--these are three forms of the evil eye

for reality.

\_Art, knowledge, and morality\_ are \_means\_: instead of recognising a

life-promoting tendency in them, they have been associated with the

\_opposite of Life\_--with "\_God\_"--they have also been regarded as

revelations of a higher world, which here and there transpires through

them....

"\_Beautiful\_" and "\_ugly\_," "\_true\_" and "\_false\_," "\_good\_" and

"\_evil\_"--these things are \_distinctions\_ and \_antagonisms\_ which

betray the preservative and promotive measures of Life, not necessarily

of man alone, but of all stable and enduring organisms which take up a

definite stand against their opponents. The \_war\_ which thus ensues is

the essential factor: it is a means of \_separating\_ things, \_leading to

stronger\_ isolation....

299.

\_Moral naturalism\_: The tracing back of apparently independent and

supernatural values to their real "nature"--that is to say, to

\_natural immorality,\_ to natural "utility," etc.

Perhaps I may designate the tendency of these observations by the term

\_moral naturalism\_: my object is to re-translate the moral values which

have apparently become independent and \_unnatural\_ into their real

nature--that is to say, into their natural "\_immorality\_."

\_N.B.\_--Refer to Jewish "holiness" and its natural basis. The case is

the same in regard to \_the moral law which has been made sovereign,\_

emancipated from its real \_feature\_ (until it is almost the \_opposite\_

of Nature).

The stages in the \_denaturalisation of morality\_ (or so-called

"\_Idealisation\_"):--

First it is a road to individual happiness,

then it is the result of knowledge,

then it is a Categorical Imperative,

then it is a way to Salvation,

then it is a denial of the will to live.

(The gradual progress of the \_hostility\_ of morality to \_Life\_.)

300.

The suppressed and effaced \_Heresy\_ in morality.--Concepts: paganism,

master-morality, \_virtù\_.

301.

\_My problem\_: What harm has mankind suffered hitherto from morals, as

also from its own morality? Intellectual harm, etc.

302.

Why are not human values once more deposited nicely in the rut to

which they alone have a right--as routinary values? Many species

of animals have already become extinct; supposing man were also to

disappear, nothing would be lacking on earth. A man should be enough of

a philosopher to admire even this "nothing" (\_Nil admirari\_).

303.

Man, a small species of very excitable animals,

which--fortunately--has its time. Life in general on earth is a

matter of a moment, an incident, an exception that has no consequence,

something which is of no importance whatever to the general character

of the earth; the earth itself is, like every star, a hiatus between

two nonentities, an event without a plan, without reason, will, or

self-consciousness--the worst kind of necessity--\_foolish\_ necessity....

Something in us rebels against this view; the serpent vanity whispers

to our hearts, "All this must be false because it is revolting....

Could not all this be appearance? And man in spite of all, to use

Kant's words"----

4. HOW VIRTUE IS MADE TO DOMINATE.

304.

\_Concerning the ideal of the moralist.\_--In this treatise we wish to

speak of the great \_politics\_ of virtue. We wrote it for the use of

all those who are interested, not so much in the process of becoming

virtuous as in that of making others virtuous--in how virtue \_is made

to dominate.\_ I even intend to prove that in order to desire this

one thing--the dominion of virtue--the other must be systematically

avoided; that is to say, one must renounce all hopes of becoming

virtuous. This sacrifice is great: but such an end is perhaps a

sufficient reward for such a sacrifice. And even greater sacrifices!...

And some of the most famous moralists have risked as much. For these,

indeed, had already recognised and anticipated the truth which is to

be revealed for the first time in this treatise: that the \_dominion of

virtue\_ is absolutely attainable \_only by the use of the same means\_

which are employed in the attainment of any other dominion, in any case

not \_by\_ means of virtue itself....

As I have already said, this treatise deals with the politics of

virtue: it postulates an ideal of these politics; it describes it as it

ought to be, if anything at all can be perfect on this earth. Now, no

philosopher can be in any doubt as to what the type of perfection is

in politics; it is, of course, Machiavellianism. But Machiavellianism

which is \_pur, sans mélange, cru, vert, dans toute sa force, dans

toute son âpreté,\_ is superhuman, divine, transcendental, and can

never be achieved by man--the most he can do is to approximate it.

Even in this narrower kind of politics--in the politics of virtue--the

ideal never seems to have been realised. Plato, too, only bordered

upon it. Granted that one have eyes for concealed things, one can

discover, even in the most guileless and most conscious \_moralists\_

(and this is indeed the name of these moral politicians and of the

founders of all newer moral forces), traces showing that they too paid

their tribute to human weakness. \_They all aspired\_ to virtue on their

own account--at least in their moments of weariness; and this is the

leading and most capital error on the part of any moralist--whose duty

it is to be an \_immoralist in deeds.\_ That he must not exactly \_appear

to be the latter,\_ is another matter. Or rather it is \_not\_ another

matter: systematic self-denial of this kind (or, expressed morally:

dissimulation) belongs to, and is part and parcel of, the moralist's

canon and of his self-imposed duties: without it he can never attain

to his particular kind of perfection. Freedom from morality \_and from

truth\_ when enjoyed for that purpose which rewards every sacrifice: for

the sake of making \_morality dominate\_--that is the canon. Moralists

are in need of the \_attitudes of virtue,\_ as also of the attitudes of

truth; their error begins when they \_yield\_ to virtue, when they lose

control of virtue, when they themselves become \_moral\_ or \_true.\_ A

great moralist is, among other things, necessarily a great actor; his

only danger is that his pose may unconsciously become a second nature,

just like his ideal, which is to keep his \_esse\_ and his \_operari\_

apart in a divine way; everything he does must be done \_sub specie

boni\_--a lofty, remote, and exacting ideal! A \_divine\_ ideal! And, as

a matter of fact, they say that the moralist thus imitates a model

which is no less than God Himself: God, the greatest Immoralist in

deeds that exists, but who nevertheless understands how to remain what

He \_is,\_ the \_good\_ God....

305.

The dominion of virtue is not established by means of virtue itself;

with virtue itself, one renounces power, one loses the Will to Power.

306.

The victory of a moral ideal is achieved by the same "immoral" means as

any other victory: violence, lies, slander, injustice.

307.

He who knows the way fame originates will be suspicious even of the

fame virtue enjoys.

308.

Morality is just as "immoral" as any other thing on earth; morality is

in itself a form of immorality.

The great \_relief\_ which this conviction brings. The contradiction

between things disappears, the unity of all phenomena is \_saved----\_

309.

There are some who actually go in search of what is immoral. When they

say: "this is wrong," they believe it ought to be done away with

or altered. On the other hand, I do not rest until I am quite clear

concerning the \_immorality\_ of any particular thing which happens to

come under my notice. When I discover it, I recover my equanimity.

310.

A. \_The ways which lead to power\_: the presentation of the new virtue

under the name of an \_old\_ one,--the awakening of "interest" concerning

it ("happiness" declared to be its reward, and \_vice versâ\_),--artistic

slandering of all that stands in its way,--the exploitation of

advantages and accidents with the view of glorifying it,--the

conversion of its adherents into fanatics by means of sacrifices and

separations,--symbolism \_on a grand scale\_.

B. \_Power attained\_: (1) Means of constraint of virtue; (2) seductive

means of virtue; (3) the (court) etiquette of virtue.

311.

\_By what means does a virtue attain to power?--\_With precisely the

same means as a political party: slander, suspicion, the undermining of

opposing virtues that happen to be already in power, the changing of

their names, systematic persecution and scorn; in short, \_by means of

acts of general "immorality."\_

How does a \_desire\_ behave towards itself in order to become a

\_virtue\_?--A process of rechristening; systematic denial of its

intentions; practice in misunderstanding itself; alliance with

established and recognised virtues; ostentatious enmity towards its

adversaries. If possible, too, the protection of sacred powers must be

purchased; people must also be intoxicated and fired with enthusiasm;

idealistic humbug must be used, and a party must be won, which \_either\_

triumphs \_or\_ perishes--one must be \_unconscious and naïf\_.

312.

Cruelty has become transformed and elevated into tragic pity, so that

we no longer recognise it as such. The same has happened to the love

of the sexes which has become amour-passion; the slavish attitude of

mind appears as Christian obedience; wretchedness becomes humility;

the disease of the \_nervus sympathicus,\_ for instance, is eulogised as

Pessimism, Pascalism, or Carlylism, etc.

313.

We should begin to entertain doubts concerning a man if we heard that

he required reasons in order to remain respectable: we should, in any

case, certainly avoid his society. The little word "for" in certain

cases may be compromising; sometimes a single "for" is enough to

refute one. If we should hear, in course of time, that such-and-such

an aspirant for virtue was in need of \_bad\_ reasons in order to remain

respectable, it would not conduce to increasing our respect for him.

But he goes further; he comes to us, and tells us quite openly: "You

disturb my morality, with your disbelief, Mr. Sceptic; so long as you

cannot believe in my \_bad reasons,\_--that is to say, in my God, in a

disciplinary Beyond, in free will, etc.,--you put obstacles in the way

of my virtue.... Moral, sceptics must be suppressed: they prevent the

\_moralisation of the masses\_."

314.

Our most sacred convictions, those which are permanent in us concerning

the highest values, are \_judgments emanating from our muscles.\_

315.

\_Morality in the valuation of races and classes.--\_In view of the fact

that the \_passions\_ and \_fundamental instincts\_ in every race and class

express the means which enable the latter to preserve themselves (or at

least the means which have enabled them to live for the longest period

of time), to call them "virtuous" practically means:

That they change their character, shed their skins, and blot out their

past.

It means that they should cease from differentiating themselves from

others.

It means that they are getting to resemble each other in their needs

and aspirations--or, more exactly, \_that they are declining....\_

It means that the will to one kind of morality is merely the \_tyranny\_

of the particular species, which is adapted to that kind of morality,

over other species: it means a process of annihilation or general

levelling in favour of the prevailing species (whether it be to

render the non-prevailing species harmless, or to exploit them); the

"Abolition of Slavery"--a so-called tribute to "human dignity"; in

truth, the \_annihilation\_ of a fundamentally different species (the

undermining of its values and its happiness).

The qualities which constitute the strength of an \_opposing race\_ or

class are declared to be the most evil and pernicious things it has:

for by means of them it may be harmful to us (its virtues are slandered

and rechristened).

When a man or a people harm us, their action constitutes an objection

against them: but from their point of view we are desirable, because we

are such as can be useful to them.

The insistence upon spreading "humaneness" (which guilelessly starts

out with the assumption that it is in possession of the formula "What

is human") is all humbug, beneath the cover of which a certain definite

type of man strives to attain to power: or, more precisely, a very

particular kind of instinct--the \_gregarious instinct.\_ "The equality

of men": this is what lies \_concealed\_ behind the tendency of \_making\_

ever more and more men \_alike\_ as men.

\_The "interested nature" of the morality of ordinary people.\_ (The

trick was to elevate the great passions for power and property to the

positions of protectors of virtue.)

To what extent do all kinds of \_business men\_ and money-grabbers--all

those who give and take credit--find it \_necessary\_ to promote the

levelling of all characters and notions of value? the \_commerce and the

exchange of the world\_ leads to, and almost purchases, virtue.

The \_State\_ exercises the same influence, as does also any sort of

ruling power at the head of officials and soldiers; \_science\_ acts in

the same way, in order that it may work in security and economise its

forces. And the \_priesthood\_ does the same.

Communal morality is thus promoted here, because it is advantageous;

and, in order to make it triumph, war and violence are waged against

immorality--with what "right"? Without any right whatsoever; but in

accordance with the instinct of self-preservation. The same classes

avail themselves of immorality when it serves their purpose to do so.

316.

Observe the hypocritical colour which all \_civil institutions\_ are

painted, just as if they were \_the offshoots of morality\_--for

instance: marriage, work, calling, patriotism, the family, order,

and rights. But as they were all established in favour of the \_most

mediocre\_ type of man, to protect him from exceptions and the need of

exceptions, one must not be surprised to find them sown with lies.

317.

\_Virtue\_ must be defended against its preachers: they are its worst

enemies. For they teach virtue as an ideal \_for all\_; they divest

virtue of the charm which consists in its rareness, its inimitableness,

its exceptional and non-average character--that is to say, of its

\_aristocratic charm.\_ A stand must also be made against those

embittered idealists who eagerly tap all pots and are satisfied to

hear them ring hollow: what ingenuousness--to \_demand\_ great and rare

things, and then to declare, with anger and contempt of one's fellows,

that they do not exist!--It is obvious, for instance, that a \_marriage\_

is worth only as much as those are worth whom it joins--that is to say,

that on the whole it is something wretched and indecent: no priest or

registrar can make anything else of it.

\_Virtue\_[6] has all the instincts of the average man against it: it is

not profitable, it is not prudent, and it isolates. It is related to

passion, and not very accessible to reason; it spoils the character,

the head, and the senses--always, of course, subject to the medium

standard of men; it provokes hostility towards order, and towards the

\_lies\_ which are concealed beneath all order, all institutions, and

all reality--when seen in the light of its pernicious influence upon

\_others,\_ it is \_the worst of vices\_.

I recognise virtue in that: (1) it does not insist upon being

recognised; (2) it does not presuppose the existence of virtue

everywhere, but precisely something else; (3) it does \_not suffer\_

from the absence of virtue, but regards it rather as a relation of

perspective which throws virtue into relief: it does not proclaim

itself; (4) it makes no propaganda; (5) it allows no one to pose as

judge because it is always a \_personal\_ virtue; (6) it does precisely

what is generally \_forbidden\_: virtue as I understand it is the actual

\_vetitum\_ within all gregarious legislation; (7) in short, I recognise

virtue in that it is in the Renaissance style--\_virtù\_--free from all

moralic acid....

318.

In the first place[7] Messrs. Virtue-mongers, you have no superiority

over us; we should like to make you take \_modesty\_ a little more to

heart: it is wretched personal interests and prudence which suggest

your virtue to you. And if you had more strength and courage in your

bodies you would not lower yourselves thus to the level of virtuous

nonentities. You make what you can of yourselves: partly what you are

obliged to make,--that is to say, what your circumstances force you

to \_make,\_--partly what suits your pleasure and seems useful to you.

But if you do only what is in keeping with your inclinations, or

what necessity exacts from you, or what is useful to you, you ought

\_neither to praise yourselves nor let others praise you\_!... One is

a \_thoroughly puny kind of man\_ when one is \_only\_ virtuous: nothing

should mislead you in this regard! Men who have to be considered at

all, were never such donkeys of virtue: their inmost instinct, that

which determined their quantum of power, did not find its reckoning

thus: whereas with your minimum amount of power nothing can seem more

full of wisdom to you than virtue. But the \_multitude\_ are on your

side: and because you \_tyrannise\_ over us, we shall fight you....

319.

A \_virtuous man\_ is of a lower species because, in the first place,

he has no "personality," but acquires his value by conforming with a

certain human scheme which has been once and for ever fixed. He has no

independent value: he may be compared; he has his equals, he \_must\_ not

be an individual.

Reckoning up the qualities of the \_good\_ man, why is it they appear

pleasant to us? Because they urge us neither to war, to mistrust, to

caution, to the accumulating of forces, nor to severity: our laziness,

our good nature, and our levity, have a \_good time.\_ This, our \_feeling

of well-being,\_ is \_what we project into\_ the good man in the form of a

\_quality,\_ in the form of a \_valuable possession.\_

320.

Under certain circumstances, virtue is merely a venerable form of

stupidity: who could blame you for it? And this form of virtue has not

been outlived even to-day. A sort of honest peasant-simplicity, which

is possible, however, in all classes of society, and which one cannot

meet with anything else than a respectful smile, still thinks to-day

that everything is in good hands--that is to say, in "God's hands": and

when it supports this proposition with that same modest assurance as

that with which it would assert that two and two are four, we others

naturally refrain from contradiction.

Why disturb \_this\_ pure foolery? Why darken it with our cares

concerning man, people, goals, the future? Even if we wished to

do so, we shouldn't succeed. \_In\_ all things these people see the

reflection of their own venerable stupidity and goodness (in them the

old God--\_deus myops--\_ still lives); we others see something else in

everything: our problematic nature, our contradictions, our deeper,

more painful, and more suspicious wisdom.

321.

He who finds a particular virtue an easy matter, ultimately laughs at

it. Seriousness cannot be maintained once virtue is attained. As soon

as a man has reached virtue, he jumps out of it--whither? Into devilry.

Meanwhile, how intelligent all our evil tendencies and impulses have

become! What an amount of inquisitiveness torments them! They are all

fishhooks of knowledge!

322.

The idea is to associate vice with something so terrible that at

last one is obliged to run away from it in order to be rid of its

associations. This is the well-known case of Tannhäuser. Tannhäuser,

brought to his wits' end by Wagnerian music, cannot endure life any

longer even in the company of Mrs. Venus: suddenly virtue begins to

have a charm for him; a Thuringian virgin goes up in price, and what

is even worse still, he shows a liking for Wolfram von Eschenbach's

melody....

323.

\_The Patrons of Virtue.\_--Lust of property, lust of power, laziness,

simplicity, fear; all these things are interested in virtue; that is

why it stands so securely.

324.

\_Virtue\_ is no longer believed in; its powers of attraction are dead;

what is needed is some one who will once more bring it into the market

in the form of an outlandish kind of adventure and of dissipation. It

exacts too much extravagance and narrow-mindedness from its believers

to allow of conscience not being against it to-day. Certainly, for

people, without either consciences or scruples, this may constitute

its new charm: it is now what it has never been before--a vice.

325.

Virtue is still the most expensive vice: \_let\_ it remain so!

326.

Virtues are as dangerous as vices, in so far as they are allowed to

rule over one as authorities and laws coming from outside, and not as

qualities one develops one's self. The latter is the only right way;

they should be the most personal means of defence and most individual

needs--the determining factors of precisely \_our\_ existence and growth,

which we recognise and acknowledge independently of the question

whether others grow with us with the help of the same or of different

principles. This view of the danger of the virtue which is understood

as impersonal and \_objective\_ also holds good of modesty: through

modesty many of the choicest intellects perish. The morality of modesty

is the worst possible softening influence for those souls for which it

is pre-eminently necessary that they become \_hard\_ betimes.

327.

The domain of morality must be reduced and limited step by step; the

names of the instincts which are really active in this sphere must be

drawn into the light of day and honoured, after they have lain all

this time in the concealment of hypocritical names of virtue. Out of

respect for one's "honesty," which makes itself heard ever more and

more imperiously, one ought to unlearn the shame which makes one deny

and "explain away" all natural instincts. The extent to which one can

dispense with virtue is the measure of one's strength; and a height may

be imagined where the notion "virtue" is understood in such a way as

to be reminiscent of \_virtù\_--the virtue of the Renaissance--free from

moralic acid. But for the moment--how remote this ideal seems!

\_The reduction of the domain of morality\_ is a sign of its progress.

Wherever, hitherto, thought has not been guided by causality, thinking

has taken a \_moral\_ turn.

328.

After all, what have I achieved? Let us not close our eyes to this

wonderful result: I have lent new \_charms\_ to virtue--it now affects

one in the same way as something \_forbidden.\_ It has our most subtle

honesty against it, it is salted in the "\_cum grano salis\_" of the

scientific pang of conscience. It savours of antiquity and of old

fashion, and thus it is at last beginning to draw refined people and

to make them inquisitive--in short, it affects us like a vice. Only

after we have once recognised that everything consists of lies and

appearance, shall we have again earned the right to uphold this most

beautiful of all fictions--virtue. There will then remain no further

reason to deprive ourselves of it: only when we have shown virtue to

be a \_form of immorality\_ do we again \_justify it,\_--it then becomes

classified, and likened, in its fundamental features, to the profound

and general immorality of all existence, of which it is then shown to

be a part. It appears as a form of luxury of the first order, the most

arrogant, the dearest, and rarest form of vice. We have robbed it of

its grimaces and divested it of its drapery; we have delivered it from

the importunate familiarity of the crowd; we have deprived it of its

ridiculous rigidity, its empty expression, its stiff false hair, and

its hieratic muscles.

329.

And is it supposed that I have thereby done any harm to virtue?... Just

as little as anarchists do to princes. Only since they have been shot

at, have they once more sat securely on their thrones.... For thus

it has always been and will ever be: one cannot do a thing a better

service than to persecute it and to run it to earth.... This--I have

done.

5. THE MORAL IDEAL.

A. \_A Criticism of Ideals.\_

330.

It were the thing to begin this criticism in suchwise as to do away

with the word "\_Ideal\_": a criticism of \_desiderata.\_

331.

Only the fewest amongst us are aware of what is involved, from the

standpoint of \_desirability,\_ in every "thus should it be, but it

is not," or even "thus it ought to have been": such expressions of

opinion involve a condemnation of the whole course of events. For

there is nothing quite isolated in the world: the smallest thing bears

the largest on its back; on thy small injustice the whole nature of

the future depends; the whole is condemned by every criticism which

is directed at the smallest part of it. Now granting that the moral

norm--even as Kant understood it--is never completely fulfilled, and

remains like a sort of Beyond hanging over reality without ever falling

down to it; then morality would contain in itself a judgment concerning

the whole, which would still, however, allow of the question: \_whence

does it get the right thereto?\_ How does the part come to acquire this

judicial position relative to the whole? And if, as some have declared,

this moral condemnation of, and dissatisfaction with, reality, is

an ineradicable instinct, is it not possible that this instinct may

perhaps belong to the ineradicable stupidities and immodesties of our

species?--But in saying this, we are doing precisely what we deprecate;

the point of view of desirability and of unauthorised fault-finding

is part and parcel of the whole character of worldly phenomena just

as every injustice and imperfection is--it is our very notion of

"perfection" which is never gratified. Every instinct which desires

to be indulged gives expression to its dissatisfaction with the

present state of things: how? Is the whole perhaps made up of a host

of dissatisfied parts, which all have desiderata in their heads? Is

the "course of things" perhaps "the road hence? the road leading away

from reality "--that is to say, eternal dissatisfaction in itself? Is

the conception of desiderata perhaps the essential motive-power of all

things? Is it--\_deus\_?

\*\*\*

It seems to me of the utmost importance that we should rid ourselves

of the notion of \_the\_ whole, of an entity, and of any kind of power

or form of the unconditioned. For we shall never be able to resist the

temptation of regarding it as the supreme being, and of christening

it "God." The "All" must be subdivided; we must unlearn our respect

for it, and reappropriate that which we have lent the unknown and an

imaginary entity, for the purposes of our neighbour and ourselves.

Whereas, for instance, Kant said: "Two things remain for ever worthy

of honour" (at the close of his \_Practical Reason\_)--to-day we should

prefer to say: "Digestion is more worthy of honour." The concept,

"the All," will always give rise to the old problems, "How is evil

possible?" etc. Therefore, \_there is no "All",\_ there \_is no\_ great

\_sensorium\_ or \_inventarium\_ or power-magazine.

332.

A man as he \_ought\_ to be: this sounds to me in just as bad taste as:

"A tree as it ought to be."

333.

Ethics: or the "philosophy of desirability."--"Things \_ought\_ to be

otherwise," "things \_ought\_ to become different": dissatisfaction

would thus seem the heart of ethics.

One could find a way out of it, first, by selecting only those states

in which one is free from emotion; secondly, by grasping the insolence

and stupidity of the attitude of mind: for to desire that something

should be otherwise than it is, means to desire that \_everything\_

should be different--it involves a damaging criticism of the whole.

\_But life itself consists in such desiring!\_

To ascertain \_what exists, how it exists\_ seems an ever so much higher

and more serious matter than every "thus should it be," because the

latter, as a piece of human criticism and arrogance, appears to be

condemned as ludicrous from the start. It expresses a need which would

fain have the organisation of the world correspond with our human

well-being, and which directs the will as much as possible towards the

accomplishment of that relationship.

On the other hand, this desire, "thus it ought to be," has only called

forth that other desire, "\_what exists?\_" The desire of knowing what

exists, is already a consequence of the question, "how? is it possible?

Why precisely so?" Our wonder at the disagreement between our desires

and the course of the world has led to our learning to know the

course of the world. Perhaps the matter stands differently: maybe the

expression, "thus it ought to be," is merely the utterance of our

desire to overcome the world----

334.

To-day when every attempt at determining how man should be--is

received with some irony, when we adhere to the notion that in spite

of all one only \_becomes\_ what one \_is\_(in spite of all--that is to

say, education, instruction, environment, accident, and disaster),

in the matter of morality we have learnt, in a very peculiar way,

how to \_reverse\_ the relation of cause and effect. Nothing perhaps

distinguishes us more than this from the ancient believers in morality.

We no longer say, for instance, "Vice is the cause of a man's

physical ruin," and we no longer say, "A man prospers with virtue

because it brings a long life and happiness." Our minds to-day are

much more inclined to the belief that vice and virtue are not causes

but only \_effects.\_ A man becomes a respectable member of society

because he \_was\_ a respectable man from the start--that is to say,

because he was born in possession of good instincts and prosperous

propensities.... Should a man enter the world poor, and the son of

parents who are neither economical nor thrifty, he is insusceptible

of being improved--that is to say, he is only fit for the prison or

the madhouse.... To-day we are no longer able to separate moral from

physical degeneration: the former is merely a complicated symptom of

the latter; a man is necessarily bad just as he is necessarily ill....

Bad: this word here stands for a certain \_lack of capacity\_ which is

related physiologically with the degenerating type--for instance, a

weak will, an uncertain and many-sided personality, the inability to

resist reacting to a stimulus and to control one's self, and a certain

constraint resulting from every suggestion proceeding from another's

will. Vice is not a cause; it is an \_effect.\_ ... Vice is a somewhat

arbitrary-epitome of certain effects resulting from physiological

degeneracy. A general proposition such as that which Christianity

teaches, namely, "Man is evil," would be justified provided one were

justified in regarding a given type of degenerate man as normal. But

this may be an exaggeration. Of course, wherever Christianity prospers

and prevails, the proposition holds good: for then the existence of an

unhealthy soil--of a degenerate territory--is demonstrated.

335.

It is difficult to have sufficient respect for man, when one sees how

he understands the art of fighting his way, of enduring, of turning

circumstances to his own advantage, and of overthrowing opponents;

but when he is seen in the light of his \_desires,\_ he is the most

absurd of all animals. It is just as if he required a playground

for his cowardice, his laziness, his feebleness, his sweetness, his

submissiveness, where he recovers from his strong virile virtues. Just

look at man's "\_desiderata\_" and his "ideals." Man, when he \_desires,

\_ tries to recover from that which is eternally valuable in him, from

his deeds; and then he rushes into nonentity, absurdity, valuelessness,

childishness. The intellectual indigence and lack of inventive power of

this resourceful and inventive animal is simply terrible. The "ideal"

is at the same time the penalty man pays for the enormous expenditure

which he has to defray in all real and pressing duties.--Should reality

cease to prevail, there follow dreams, fatigue, weakness: an "ideal"

might even be regarded as a form of dream, fatigue, or weakness. The

strongest and the most impotent men become alike when this condition

overtakes them: they \_deify\_ the cessation of work, of war, of

passions, of suspense, of contrasts, of "reality "--in short, of the

struggle for knowledge and of the \_trouble\_ of acquiring it.

"Innocence" to them is idealised stultification; "blessedness" is

idealised idleness; "love," the ideal state of the gregarious animal

that will no longer have an enemy. And thus everything that lowers and

belittles man is elevated to an \_ideal\_.

336.

A desire \_magnifies\_ the thing desired; and by not being realised it

grows--the \_greatest ideas\_ are those which have been created by the

strongest and longest desiring. Things grow \_ever more valuable\_ in our

estimation, the more our desire for them increases: if "moral values"

have become the highest values, it simply shows that the moral ideal

is the one which has been \_realised least\_ (and thus it \_represented

the Beyond to all suffering,\_ as a road to \_blessedness\_). Man,

with ever-increasing ardour, has only been embracing \_clouds\_: and

ultimately called his desperation and impotence "God."

337.

Think of the \_naïveté\_ of all ultimate "desiderata"--when the

"wherefore" of man remains unknown.

338.

What is the counterfeit coinage of morality? First of all we should

know what "good and evil" mean. That is as good as wishing to know why

man is here, and what his goal or his destiny is. And that means that

one would fain know that man actually \_has\_ a goal or a destiny.

The very obscure and arbitrary notion that humanity has a general

duty to perform, and that, as a whole, it is striving towards a

goal, is still in its infancy. Perhaps we shall once more be rid

of it before it becomes a "fixed idea." ... But humanity does not

constitute a whole: it is an indissoluble multiplicity of ascending

and descending organisms--it knows no such thing as a state of youth

followed by \_maturity\_ and then age. But its strata lie confused and

superimposed--and in a few thousand years there may be even younger

types of men than we can point out to-day. Decadence, on the other

hand, belongs to all periods of human history: everywhere there is

refuse and decaying matter, such things are in themselves vital

processes; for withering and decaying elements must be eliminated.

Under the empire of Christian prejudice \_this question was never put

at all\_: the purpose of life seemed to lie in the salvation of the

individual soul; the question whether humanity might last for a long or

a short time was not considered. The best Christians longed for the end

to come as soon as possible;--concerning the needs of the individual,

\_there seemed to be no doubt whatsoever.\_ ... The duty of every

individual for the present was identical with what it would be in any

sort of future for the man of the future: the value, the purpose, the

limit of values was for ever fixed, unconditioned, eternal, one with

God.... What deviated from this eternal type was impious, diabolic,

criminal.

The centre of gravity of all values for each soul lay in that soul

itself: salvation or damnation! The salvation of the \_immortal\_ soul!

The most extreme form of \_personalisation....\_ For each soul there

was only one kind of perfection; only one ideal, only one road to

salvation.... The most extreme form of the principle of \_equal rights,\_

associated with an optical magnification of individual importance to

the point of megalomania.... Nothing but insanely important souls,

revolving round their own axes with unspeakable terror....

\*\*\*

Nobody believes in these assumed airs of importance any longer

to-day: and we have sifted our wisdom through the sieve of contempt.

Nevertheless the \_optical habit\_ survives, which would fain measure the

value of man by his proximity to a certain \_ideal maw.\_ at bottom the

personalisation view is upheld as firmly as that of the \_equality of

rights as regards the ideal.\_ In short: people \_seem to think that they

know\_ what \_the ultimate desideratum\_ is in regard to the ideal man....

But this belief is merely the result of the exceedingly \_detrimental

influence\_ of the Christian ideal, as anybody can discover for himself

every time he carefully examines the "ideal type." In the first place,

it is believed that the approach to a given "type" is desirable;

\_secondly,\_ that this particular type is known; \_thirdly,\_ that every

deviation from this type is a retrograde movement, a stemming of the

spirit of progress, a loss of power and might in man.... To dream of a

state of affairs in which this \_perfect\_ man will be in the majority:

our friends the Socialists and even Messrs. the Utilitarians have not

reached a higher level than this. In this way an \_aim\_ seems to have

crept into the \_evolution\_ of man: at any rate the belief in a certain

\_progress towards an ideal\_ is the only shape in which an \_aim\_ is

conceived in the history of mankind to-day. In short: the coming of the

"\_Kingdom of God\_" has been placed in the future, and has been given an

earthly, a human meaning--but on the whole the faith in the \_old\_ ideal

is still maintained....

340.

\_The more concealed forms of the cult of Christian, moral ideals.\_--The

\_insipid and cowardly notion "Nature"\_ invented by Nature-enthusiasts

(without any knowledge whatsoever of the terrible, the implacable,

and the cynical element in even "the most beautiful" aspects), is

only a sort of attempt at \_reading\_ the moral and Christian notion of

"humanity" into Nature;--Rousseau's concept of Nature, for instance,

which took for granted that "Nature" meant freedom, goodness,

innocence, equity, justice, and \_Idylls,\_ was nothing more at bottom

than the cult of Christian morality. We should collect passages from

the poets in order to see \_what\_ they admired, in lofty mountains, for

instance. What Goethe had to do with them--why he admired Spinoza.

Absolute \_ignorance\_ concerning the reasons of this \_cult....\_

The \_insipid and cowardly concept "Man"\_ à la Comte and Stuart

Mill, is at times the subject of a cult.... This is only the

Christian moral ideal again under another name.... Refer also to the

freethinkers--Guyau for example.

The \_insipid and cowardly concept "Art"\_ which is held to mean sympathy

with all suffering and with everything botched and bungled (the same

thing happens to \_history,\_ cf. Thierry): again it is the cult of the

Christian moral ideal.

And now, as to the whole \_socialistic ideal\_: it is nothing but a

blockheaded misunderstanding of the Christian moral ideal.

341.

\_The origin of the ideal.\_ The examination of the soil out of which it

grows.

\_A.\_ Starting out from those "æsthetic" mental states during which the

world seems rounder, fuller, and \_more perfect\_: we have the pagan

ideal with its dominating spirit of self-affirmation (\_people give of

their abundance\_). The highest type: the \_classical\_ ideal--regarded

as an expression of the successful nature of \_all\_ the more important

instincts. In this classical ideal we find \_the grand style\_ as the

highest style. An expression of the "will to power" itself. The

instinct which is most feared \_dares to acknowledge itself.\_

\_B.\_ Starting out from the mental states in which the world seemed

emptier, paler, and thinner, when "spiritualisation" and the absence

of sensuality assume the rank of perfection, and when all that is

brutal, animal, direct, and proximate is avoided (\_people calculate

and select\_): the "sage," "the angel"; priestliness = virginity =

ignorance, are the physiological ideals of such idealists: the \_anæmic\_

ideal. Under certain circumstances this anæmic ideal may be the ideal

of such natures as \_represent\_ paganism (thus Goethe sees his "saint"

in Spinoza).

\_C.\_ Starting out from those mental states in which the world seemed

more absurd, more evil, poorer, and more deceptive, an ideal cannot

even be imagined or desired in it (\_people deny and annihilate\_);

the projection of the ideal into the sphere of the anti-natural,

anti-actual, anti-logical; the state of him who judges thus (the

"impoverishment" of the world as a result of suffering: \_people take,

they no longer bestow\_): the \_anti-natural ideal.\_

(The \_Christian ideal\_ is a \_transitional form\_ between the second

and the third, now inclining more towards the former type, and anon

inclining towards the latter.)

\_The three ideals: A.\_ Either a \_strengthening\_ of Life (\_paganism,\_)

or \_B.\_ an \_impoverishment\_ of Life (\_anæmia\_), or \_C.\_ a \_denial\_ of

Life (\_anti-naturalism\_). The state of beatitude in \_A.\_ is the feeling

of extreme abundance; in \_B.\_ it is reached by the most fastidious

selectiveness; in \_C.\_ it is the contempt and the destruction of Life.

342.

\_A.\_ The \_consistent\_ type understands that even evil must not be

hated, must not be resisted, and that it is not allowable to make war

against one's self; that it does not suffice merely to accept the pain

which such behaviour brings in its train; that one lives entirely in

positive feelings; that one takes the side of one's opponents in word

and deed; that by means of a superfœtation of peaceful, kindly,

conciliatory, helpful, and loving states, one impoverishes the soil of

the other states, ... that one is in need of unremitting \_practice.\_

What is achieved thereby?--The Buddhistic type, or the \_perfect\_ cow.

This point of view is possible only where no moral fanaticism

prevails--that is to say, when evil is not hated on its own account,

but because it opens the road to conditions which are painful (unrest,

work, care, complications, dependence).

This is the Buddhistic point of view: there is no hatred of sin, the

concept "sin," in fact, is entirely lacking.

\_B.\_ The \_inconsistent\_ type. War is waged against evil--there is a

belief that war waged \_for Goodness' sake\_ does not involve the same

moral results or affect character in the same way as war generally

does (and owing to which tendencies it is detested as \_evil).\_ As a

matter of fact, a war of this sort carried on against evil is much

more profoundly pernicious than any sort of personal hostility; and

generally, it is "the person" which reassumes, at least in fancy, the

position of opponent (the devil, evil spirits, etc.). The attitude of

hostile observation and spying in regard to everything which may be

bad in us, or hail from a bad source, culminates in a most tormented

and most anxious state of mind: thus "miracles," rewards, ecstasy, and

transcendental solutions of the earth-riddle now became \_desirable\_.

... The Christian type: or the \_perfect bigot\_.

\_C.\_ The \_stoical\_ type. Firmness, self-control, imperturbability,

peace in the form of the rigidity of a will long active--profound

quiet, the defensive state, the fortress, the mistrust of war--firmness

of principles; the unity of \_knowledge\_ and \_will\_; great self-respect.

The type of the anchorite. \_The perfect blockhead.\_

343.

An ideal which is striving to prevail or to assert itself endeavours

to further its purpose \_(a)\_ by laying claim to a \_spurious\_ origin;

\_(b)\_ by assuming a relationship between itself and the powerful ideals

already existing; \_(c)\_ by means of the thrill produced by mystery,

as though an unquestionable power were manifesting itself; \_(d)\_ by

the slander of its opponents' ideals; \_(e)\_ by a lying teaching of

the advantages which follow in its wake, for instance: happiness,

spiritual peace, general peace, or even the assistance of a mighty

God, etc.--Contributions to the psychology of the idealists: Carlyle,

Schiller, Michelet.

Supposing all the means of defence and protection, by means of which an

ideal survives, are discovered, is it thereby \_refuted\_? It has merely

availed itself of the means of which everything lives and grows--they

are all "immoral."

My view: all the forces and instincts which are the source of life

are lying beneath the \_ban of morality\_: morality is the life-denying

instinct. Morality must be annihilated if life is to be emancipated.

344.

To \_avoid\_ knowing himself is the prudence of the idealist. The

idealist: a creature who has reasons for remaining in the dark

concerning himself, and who is also clever enough to remain in the dark

concerning these reasons also.

345.

\_The tendency of moral evolution.\_--Every one's desire is that there

should be no other teaching and valuation of things than those by means

of which he himself succeeds. Thus the \_fundamental tendency\_ of the

\_weak\_ and \_mediocre\_ of all times, has been to \_enfeeble the strong

and to reduce them to the level of the weak: their chief weapon in this

process\_ was the \_moral principle.\_ The attitude of the strong towards

the weak is branded as evil; the highest states of the strong become

bad bywords.

The struggle of the many against the strong, of the ordinary against

the extraordinary, of the weak against the strong: meets with one

of its finest interruptions in the fact that the rare, the refined,

the more exacting, present themselves as the weak, and repudiate the

coarser weapons of power.

346.

(1) The so-called pure instinct for knowledge of all philosophers

is dictated to them by their moral "truths," and is only seemingly

independent.

(2) The "Moral Truths," "thus shall things be done," are mere states

of consciousness of an instinct which has grown tired, "thus and thus

are things done by us." The "ideal" is supposed to re-establish and

strengthen an instinct; it flatters man to feel he can obey when he is

only an automaton.

347.

\_Morality as a means of seduction.\_--"Nature is good; for a wise

and good God is its cause. Who, therefore, is responsible for the

'corruption of man'? Tyrants and seducers and the ruling classes are

responsible--they must be wiped out": this is Rousseau's logic (compare

with \_Pascals\_ logic, which concludes by an appeal to original sin).

Refer also to \_Luther's\_ logic, which is similar. In both cases a

pretext is sought for the introduction of an insatiable lust of revenge

as a \_moral and religious\_ duty. The hatred directed against the ruling

classes tries to \_sanctify\_ itself ... (the "sinfulness of Israel" is

the basis of the priest's powerful position).

Compare this with \_Pauls\_ logic, which is similar. It is always under

the cover of God's business that these reactions appear, under the

cover of what is right, or of humanity, etc. In the case of \_Christ\_

the rejoicings of the people appear as the cause of His crucifixion.

It was an anti-priestly movement from the beginning. Even in the

anti-Semitic movement we find the same trick: the opponent is overcome

with moral condemnations, and those who attack him pose as \_retributive

Justice.\_

348.

\_The incidents of the fight\_: the fighter tries to transform his

opponent into the \_exact opposite\_ of himself--imaginatively, of

course. He tries to believe in himself to such an extent that he may

have the courage necessary for the "good Cause" (as if he were the

\_good Cause\_); as if reason, taste, and virtue were being assailed

by his opponents.... The belief of which he is most in need, as the

strongest means of defence and attack, \_is the belief in himself,\_

which, however, knows how to misinterpret itself as a belief in

God. He never pictures the advantages and the uses of victory, but

only understands victory for the sake of victory--for God's sake.

Every small community (or individual), finding itself involved in

a struggle, strives to convince itself of this: "\_Good taste, good

judgment, and virtue are ours.\_" War urges people to this \_exaggerated

self-esteem\_....

349.

Whatever kind of \_eccentric ideal\_ one may have (whether as

a "Christian," a "free-spirit," an "immoralist," or a German

Imperialist), one should try to avoid insisting upon its being \_the\_

ideal; for, by so doing, it is deprived of all its privileged nature.

One should have an ideal as a distinction; one should not propagate it,

and thus level one's self down to the rest of mankind.

How is it, that in spite of this obvious fact, the majority of

idealists indulge in propaganda for their ideal, just as if they had

no right to it unless the \_majority\_ acquiesce therein?--For instance,

all those plucky and insignificant girls behave in this way, who claim

the right to study Latin and mathematics. What is it urges them to do

this? I fear it is the instinct of the herd, and the terror of the

herd: they fight for the "emancipation of woman," because they are best

able to achieve their own private little distinction by fighting for it

under the cover of a \_charitable movement,\_ under the banner bearing

the device "For others."

The \_cleverness\_ of idealists consists in their persistently posing

as the missionaries and "representatives" of an ideal: they thus

"beautify" themselves in the eyes of those who still believe in

disinterestedness and heroism. Whereas real heroism consists, \_not\_

in fighting under the banner of self-sacrifice, submission, and

disinterestedness, but in \_not fighting at all\_.... "I am thus; I will

be thus--and you can go to the devil!"

350.

\_Every\_ ideal assumes \_love, hate, reverence,\_ and \_contempt.\_ Either

positive feeling is the \_primum mobile,\_ or negative feeling is.

\_Hatred\_ and \_contempt\_ are the \_primum mobile\_ in all the ideals which

proceed from resentment.

B. \_A Criticism of the "Good Man" of the Saint, etc.\_

351.

The "\_good man\_" Or, hemiplegia of virtue.--In the opinion of every

strong and natural man, love and hate, gratitude and revenge, goodness

and anger, affirmative and negative action, belong to each other. A

man is good on condition that he knows how to be evil; a man is evil,

because otherwise he would not know how to be good. Whence comes

the morbidness and ideological unnaturalness which repudiates these

compounds--which teaches a sort of one-sided efficiency as the highest

of all things? Whence this hemiplegia of virtue, the invention of the

good man? The object seems to be to make man amputate those instincts

which enable him to be an enemy, to be harmful, to be angry, and to

insist upon revenge.... This unnaturalness, then, corresponds to that

dualistic concept of a wholly good and of a wholly bad creature (God,

Spirit, Man); in the first are found all the positive, in the second

all the negative forces, intentions, and states. This method of valuing

thus believes itself to be "idealistic"; it never doubts that in its

concept of the "good man," it has found the highest desideratum. When

aspiring to its zenith it fancies a state in which all evil is wiped

out, and in which only good creatures have actually remained over.

It does not therefore regard the mutual dependence of the opposites

good and evil as proved. On the contrary, the latter ought to vanish,

and the former should remain. The first has a right to exist, the

second ought not \_to be with us at all....\_ What, as a matter of fact,

is the reason of this desire? In all ages, and particularly in the

Christian age, much labour has been spent in trying to reduce men

to this one-sided activity: and even to-day, among those who have

been deformed and weakened by the Church, people are not lacking who

desire precisely the same thing with their "humanisation" generally,

or with their "Will of God," or with their "Salvation of the Soul."

The principal injunction behind all these things is, that man should

no longer do anything evil, that he should under no circumstances be

harmful or \_desire\_ harm. The way to arrive at this state of affairs is

to amputate all hostile tendencies, to suppress all the instincts of

resentment, and to establish "spiritual peace" as a chronic disease.

This attitude of mind, in which a certain type of man is bred,

starts out with this absurd hypothesis: good and evil are postulated

as realities which are in a state of mutual contradiction (not as

complementary values, which they are), people are advised to take the

side of the good, and it is insisted upon that a good man resists

and forswears evil until every trace of it is uprooted--\_but with

this valuation Life is actually denied,\_ for in all its instincts

Life has both yea and nay. But far from understanding these facts,

this valuation dreams rather of returning to the wholeness, oneness,

and strengthfulness of Life: it actually believes that a state of

blessedness will be reached when the inner anarchy and state of unrest

which result from these opposed impulses is brought to an end.--It is

possible that no more dangerous ideology, no greater mischief \_in the

science of psychology,\_ has ever yet existed, as this will to good: the

most repugnant type of man has been reared, the man who is \_not free,\_

the bigot; it was taught that only in the form of a bigot could one

tread the path which leads to God, and that only a bigot's life could

be a godly life.

And even here, Life is still in the right--Life that knows not how to

separate Yea from Nay: what is the good of declaring with all one's

might that war is an evil, that one must harm no one, that one must

not act negatively? One is still waging a war even in this, it is

impossible to do otherwise! The good man who has renounced all evil,

and who is afflicted according to his desire with the hemiplegia of

virtue, does not therefore cease from waging war, or from making

enemies, or from saying "nay" and doing "nay." The Christian, for

instance, hates "sin"!--and what on earth is there which he does

not call "sin"! It is precisely because of his belief in a moral

antagonism between good and evil, that the world for him has grown

so full of hatefulness and things that must be combated eternally.

The "good man" sees himself surrounded by evil, and, thanks to the

continual onslaughts of the latter, his eye grows more keen, and in

the end discovers traces of evil in every one of his acts. And thus he

ultimately arrives at the conclusion, which to him is quite logical,

that Nature is evil, that man is corrupted, and that being good is an

act of grace (that is to say, it is impossible to man when he stands

alone). In short: \_he denies Life,\_ he sees how "good," as the highest

value, \_condemns\_ Life.... And thus his ideology concerning good and

evil ought to strike him as refuted. But one cannot refute a disease.

Therefore he is obliged to conceive \_another\_ life!...

352.

Power, whether in the hands of a god or of a man, is always understood

to consist in the ability to \_harm\_ as well as to \_help.\_ This is the

case with the Arabs and with the Hebrews, in fact with all strong and

well-constituted races.

The dualistic separation of the two powers is fatal.... In this way

morality becomes the poisoner of life.

353.

\_A criticism of the good man.\_--Honesty, dignity, dutifulness, justice,

humanity, loyalty, uprightness, clean conscience--is it really supposed

that, by means of these fine-sounding words, the qualities they stand

for are approved and affirmed for their own sake? Or is it this, that

qualities and states indifferent in themselves have merely been looked

at in a light which lends them some value? Does the worth of these

qualities lie in themselves, or in the use and advantages to which they

lead (or to which they seem to lead, to which they are expected to

lead)?

I naturally do not wish to imply that there is any opposition between

the \_ego\_ and the \_alter\_ in the judgment: the question is, whether

it is the \_results\_ of these qualities, either in regard to him who

possesses them or in regard to environment, society, "humanity," which

lend them their value; or whether they have a value in themselves....

In other words: is it \_utility\_ which bids men condemn, combat, and

deny the opposite qualities (duplicity, falseness, perversity, lack

of self-confidence, inhumanity)? Is the essence of such qualities

condemned, or only their consequences? In other words: were it

\_desirable\_ that there should exist no men at all possessed of such

qualities? \_In any case, this is believed\_.... But here lies the error,

the shortsightedness, the monocularity of \_narrow egoism.\_

Expressed otherwise: would it be desirable to create circumstances in

which the whole advantage would be on the side of the just--so that

all those with opposite natures and instincts would be discouraged and

would slowly become extinct?

At bottom, this is a question of taste and of \_æsthetics\_: should we

desire the most honourable types of men--that is to say, the greatest

bores--alone to subsist? the rectangular, the virtuous, the upright,

the good-natured, the straightforward, and the "blockheads"?

If one can imagine the total suppression of the huge number

constituting the "others," even the just man himself ceases from having

a right to exist,--he is, in fact, no longer necessary,--and in this

way it is seen that coarse utility alone could have elevated such an

\_insufferable\_ virtue to a place of honour.

Desirability may lie precisely on the other side. It might be better

to create conditions in which the "just man" would be reduced to

the humble position of a "useful instrument"--an "ideal gregarious

animal," or at best a herdsman: in short, conditions in which he would

no longer stand in the highest sphere, which requires \_other qualities\_.

354.

\_The "good man" as a tyrant--\_Mankind has always repeated the same

error: it has always transformed a mere vital measure into the

\_measure\_ and standard of life;--instead of seeking the standard in

the highest ascent of life, in the problem of growth and exhaustion,

it takes the \_preservative measures\_ of a very definite kind of life,

and uses them to exclude all other kinds of life, and even to criticise

Life itself and to select from among its forms. That is to say, man

ultimately forgets that measures are a means to an end, and gets to

like them for themselves: they take the place of a goal in his mind,

and even become the standard of goals to him--that is to say, \_a given

species of man\_ regards his means of existence as the only legitimate

means, as the means which ought to be imposed upon all, as "truth,"

"goodness," "perfection": the given species, in fact, begins to

\_tyrannise.\_ ... It is a \_form of faith,\_ of instinct, when a certain

species of man does not perceive that his kind has been conditioned,

when he does not understand his relation to other species. At any rate,

any species of men (a people or a race) seems to be doomed as soon as

it becomes tolerant, grants equal rights, and no longer desires to be

master.

355.

"All good people are weak: they are good because they are not strong

enough to be evil," said the Latuka chieftain Comorro to Baker.

\* \* \*

"Disasters are not to the faint-hearted," is a Russian proverb.

356.

Modest, industrious, benevolent, and temperate: thus you would that

men were?--that \_good men\_ were? But such men I can only conceive as

slaves, the slaves of the future.

357.

\_The metamorphoses of slavery\_; its disguise in the cloak of religion;

its transfiguration through morality.

358.

\_The ideal slave\_ (the "good man").--He who cannot regard himself

as a "purpose," and who cannot give himself any aim whatsoever,

instinctively honours the morality of \_unselfishness.\_ Everything urges

him to this morality: his prudence, his experience, and his vanity. And

even faith is a form of self-denial.

\*\*\*

\_Atavism\_: delightful feeling, to be able to obey unconditionally for

once.

\*\*\*

Industry, modesty, benevolence, temperance, are just so many

\_obstacles\_ in the way of \_sovereign sentiments,\_ of great \_ingenuity,\_

of an heroic purpose, of noble existence for one's self.

\*\*\*

It is not a question of \_going ahead\_ (to that end all that is required

is to be at best a herdsman, that is to say, the prime need of the

herd), it is rather a matter of \_getting along alone,\_ of \_being able

to be another.\_

359.

We must realise \_all\_ that has been accumulated as the result of

the highest moral \_idealism\_: how almost \_all other values\_ have

crystallised round it. This shows that it has been desired for \_a very

long time\_ and with the \_strongest passions\_--and that it has not yet

been attained: otherwise it would have \_disappointed\_ everybody (that

is to say, it would have been followed by a more moderate valuation).

The \_saint\_ as the \_most powerful type\_ of man: \_this\_ ideal it is

which has elevated the value of moral perfection so high. One would

think that the whole of science had been engaged in proving that the

\_moral\_ man is the most \_powerful\_ and most godly.--The conquest of the

senses and the passions--everything inspired \_terror\_;--the unnatural

seemed to the spectators to be \_supernatural\_ and \_transcendental....\_

360.

Francis of Assisi: amorous and popular, a poet who combats the order

of rank among souls, in favour of the lowest. The denial of spiritual

hierarchy--"all alike before God."

Popular ideals: the good man, the unselfish man, the saint, the sage,

the just man. O Marcus Aurelius!

361.

I have declared war against the anæmic Christian ideal (together with

what is closely \_I\_ related to it), not because I want to annihilate

it, but only to put an end to its \_tyranny\_ and clear the way for

other \_ideals,\_ for \_more robust\_ ideals.... The \_continuance\_ of the

Christian ideal belongs to the most desirable of desiderata: if only

for the sake of the ideals which wish to take their stand beside it and

perhaps above it--they must have opponents, and strong ones too, in

order to grow \_strong\_ themselves. That is why we immoralists require

the \_power\_ of \_morality,\_ our instinct of self-preservation insists

upon our opponents maintaining their strength--all it requires is to

\_become master of them\_.

C. \_Concerning the Slander of the so-called Evil Qualities\_.

362.

Egoism and its problem! The Christian gloominess of La Rochefoucauld,

who saw egoism in everything, and imagined that he had therefore

\_reduced\_ the worth of things and virtues! In opposition to him,

I first of all tried to show that nothing else \_could\_ exist save

egoism,--that in those men whose \_ego\_ is weak and thin, the power to

love also grows weak,--that the greatest lovers are such owing to the

strength of their \_ego,\_--that love is an expression of egoism, etc.

As a matter of fact, the false valuation aims at the interest of those

who find it useful, whom it helps--in fact, the herd; it fosters a

pessimistic mistrust towards the basis of Life; it would fain undermine

the most glorious and most well-constituted men (out of fear); it would

assist the lowly to have the upper hand of their conquerors; it is the

cause of universal dishonesty, especially in the most useful type of

men.

363.

Man is an indifferent egoist: even the cleverest regards his habits as

more important than his advantage.

364.

Egoism! But no one has yet asked: \_what\_ is the \_ego\_ like? Everybody

is rather inclined to see all \_egos\_ alike. This is the result of the

slave theory, of \_universal suffrage,\_ and of "equality."

365.

The behaviour of a higher man is the result of a very complex set of

motives: any word such as "pity" \_betrays\_ nothing of this complexity.

The most important factor is the feeling, "who am I? who is the other

relative to me?"--Thus the valuing spirit is continually active.

366.

To think that the history of all moral phenomena may be simplified, as

Schopenhauer thought,--that is to say, that \_pity\_ is to be found at

the root of every moral impulse that has ever existed hitherto,--is

to be guilty of a degree of nonsense and ingenuousness worthy only

of a thinker who is devoid of all historical instincts and who has

miraculously succeeded in evading the strong schooling in history which

the Germans, from Herder to Hegel, have undergone.

367.

\_My "pity."\_--This is a feeling for which I can find no adequate

term: I feel it when I am in the presence of any waste of precious

capabilities, as, for instance, when I contemplate Luther: what power

and what tasteless problems fit for back-woodsmen! (At a time when the

brave and light-hearted scepticism of a Montaigne was already possible

in France!) Or when I see some one standing below where he might have

stood, thanks to the development of a set of perfectly senseless

accidents. Or even when, with the thought of man's destiny in my mind,

I contemplate with horror and contempt the whole system of modern

European politics, which is creating the circumstances and weaving

the fabric of the \_whole\_ future of mankind. Yes, to what could not

"mankind" attain, if----! This is my "pity"; despite the fact that no

sufferer yet exists with whom I sympathise in this way.

368.

Pity is a waste of feeling, a moral parasite which is injurious to

the health, "it cannot possibly be our duty to increase the evil in

the world." If one does good merely out of pity, it is one's self and

not one's neighbour that one is succouring. Pity does not depend upon

maxims, but upon emotions. The suffering we see infects us; pity is an

infection.

369.

There is no such thing as egoism which keeps within its bounds and

does not exceed them--consequently, the "allowable," the "morally

indifferent" egoism of which some people speak, does not exist at all.

"One is continually promoting the interests of one's '\_ego\_' at the

cost of other people "; "Living consists in living at the cost of

others"--he who has not grasped this fact, has not taken the first step

towards truth to himself.

370.

The "subject" is a piece of fiction: the \_ego\_ of which every one

speaks when he blames egoism, does not exist at all.

371.

Our "ego"--which is \_not\_ one with the unitary controlling force of our

beings!--is really only an imagined synthesis; therefore there can \_be\_

no "\_egoistic\_" \_actions\_.

372.

Since all instincts are unintelligent, utility cannot represent a

standpoint as far as they are concerned. Every instinct, when it is

active, sacrifices strength and other instincts into the bargain: in

the end it is stemmed, otherwise it would be the end of everything

owing to the waste it would bring about. Thus: that which is

"unegoistic," self-sacrificing, and imprudent is nothing in particular

--it is common to all the instincts; they do not consider the welfare

of the whole \_ego\_ (\_because they simply do not think!\_), they act

counter to our interests, against the \_ego\_: and often \_for\_ the

\_ego--\_innocent in both cases!

373.

\_The origin of moral values.\_--Selfishness has as much value as the

physiological value of him who possesses it. Each individual represents

the whole course of Evolution, and he is not, as morals teach,

something that begins at his birth. If he represent the \_ascent\_ of the

line of mankind, his value is, in fact, very great; and the concern

about his maintenance and the promoting of his growth may even be

extreme. (It is the concern about the promise of the future in him

which gives the well-constituted individual such an extraordinary right

to egoism.) If he represent \_descending\_ development, decay, chronic

sickening, he has little worth: and the greatest fairness would have

him take as little room, strength, and sunshine as possible from the

well-constituted. In this case society's duty is to \_suppress egoism\_

(for the latter may sometimes manifest itself in an absurd, morbid,

and seditious manner): whether it be a question of the decline and

pining away of single individuals or of whole classes of mankind. A

morality and a religion of "love," the \_curbing\_ of the self-affirming

spirit, and a doctrine encouraging patience, resignation, helpfulness,

and co-operation in word and deed may be of the highest value within

the confines of such classes, even in the eyes of their rulers:

for it restrains the feelings of rivalry, of resentment, and of

envy,--feelings which are only too natural in the bungled and the

botched,--and it even deifies them under the ideal of humility, of

obedience, of slave-life, of being ruled, of poverty, of illness, and

of lowliness. This explains why the ruling classes (or races) and

individuals of all ages have always upheld the cult of unselfishness,

the gospel of the lowly and of "God on the Cross."

The preponderance of an altruistic way of valuing is the result of

a consciousness of the fact that one is botched and bungled. Upon

examination, this point of view turns out to be: "I am not worth

much," simply a psychological valuation; more plainly still: it is

the feeling of impotence, of the lack of the great self-asserting

impulses of power (in muscles, nerves, and ganglia). This valuation

gets translated, according to the particular culture of these classes,

into a moral or religious principle (the pre-eminence of religious or

moral precepts is always a sign of low culture): it tries to justify

itself in spheres whence, as far as it is concerned, the notion "value"

hails. The interpretation by means of which the Christian sinner

tries to understand himself, is an attempt at justifying his lack of

power and of self-confidence: he prefers to feel himself a sinner

rather than feel bad for nothing: it is in itself a symptom of decay

when interpretations of this sort are used at all. In some cases the

bungled and the botched do not look for the reason of their unfortunate

condition in their own guilt (as the Christian does), but in society:

when, however, the Socialist, the Anarchist, and the Nihilist are

conscious that their existence is something for which some one must

be \_guilty,\_ they are very closely related to the Christian, who also

believes that he can more easily endure his ill ease and his wretched

constitution when he has found some one whom he can hold \_responsible\_

for it. The instinct of \_revenge\_ and \_resentment\_ appears in both

cases here as a means of enduring life, as a self-preservative measure,

as is also the favour shown to \_altruistic\_ theory and practice. The

\_hatred of egoism,\_ whether it be one's own (as in the case of the

Christian), or another's (as in the case of the Socialists), thus

appears as a valuation reached under the predominance of revenge; and

also as an act of prudence on the part of the preservative instinct

of the suffering, in the form of an increase in their feelings of

co-operation and unity.... At bottom, as I have already suggested,

the discharge of resentment which takes place in the act of judging,

rejecting, and punishing egoism (one's own or that of others) is

still a self-preservative measure on the part of the bungled and the

botched. In short: the cult of altruism is merely a particular form of

egoism, which regularly appears under certain definite physiological

circumstances.

When the Socialist, with righteous indignation, cries for "justice,"

"rights," "equal rights," it only shows that he is oppressed by his

inadequate culture, and is unable to understand why he suffers: he

also finds pleasure in crying;--if he were more at ease he would take

jolly good care not to cry in that way: in that case he would seek his

pleasure elsewhere. The same holds good of the Christian: he curses,

condemns, and slanders the "world"--and does not even except himself.

But that is no reason for taking him seriously. In both cases we are

in the presence of invalids who feel better for crying, and who find

relief in slander.

374.

Every society has a tendency to reduce its opponents to

\_caricatures,\_--at least in its own imagination,--as also to

starve them. As an example of this sort of caricature we have our

"\_criminal.\_" In the midst of the Roman and aristocratic order of

values, the \_Jew\_ was reduced to a caricature. Among artists, "Mrs.

Grundy and the bourgeois" become caricatures; while among pious

people it is the heretics, and among aristocrats, the plebeian. Among

immoralists it is the moralist. Plato, for instance, in \_my\_ books

becomes a caricature.

375.

All the instincts and forces which morality praises, seem to me to

be essentially the same as those which it slanders and rejects: for

instance, justice as will to power, will to truth as a means in the

service of the will to power.

376.

The \_turning of\_ man's \_nature inwards.\_ The process of turning a

nature inwards arises when, owing to the establishment of peace and

society, powerful instincts are prevented from venting themselves

outwardly, and strive to survive harmlessly inside in conjunction with

the imagination. The need of hostility, cruelty, revenge, and violence

is reverted, "it steps backwards"; in the thirst for knowledge there

lurks both the lust of gain and of conquest; in the artist, the powers

of dissimulation and falsehood find their scope; the instincts are thus

transformed into demons with whom a fight takes place, etc.

377.

\_Falsity.\_--Every \_sovereign instinct\_ makes the others its

instruments, its retainers and its sycophants: it never allows itself

to be called by its more hateful name: and it brooks no terms of praise

in which it cannot \_indirectly\_ find its share. Around every sovereign

instinct all praise and blame in general crystallises into a rigorous

form of ceremonial and etiquette. This is \_one\_ of the causes of

falsity.

\_Every\_ instinct \_which aspires to dominion,\_ but which finds itself

under a yoke, requisitions all the most beautiful names and the

\_most generally accepted\_ values to strengthen it and to support its

self-esteem, and this explains why \_as a rule\_ it dares to come forward

under the name of the "master" it is combating and from whom it would

be free (for instance, under the domination of Christian values, the

desires of the flesh and of power act in this way). This is the \_other\_

cause of falsity.

In both cases \_complete ingenuousness\_ reigns: the falseness \_never\_

even occurs to the mind of those concerned. It is the sign of a

\_broken\_ instinct when man sees the motive force and its "expression"

("the mask") as separate things--it is a sign of inner contradiction

and is much less formidable. Absolute \_innocence\_ in bearing, word,

and passion, a "good conscience" in falseness, and the certainty

wherewith all the grandest and most pompous words and attitudes are

appropriated--all these things are necessary for victory.

In the \_other case\_: that is to say, when \_extreme clearsightedness\_

is present, the genius of the \_actor\_ is needful as well as tremendous

discipline in self-control, if victory is to be achieved. That is why

priests are the cleverest and \_most conscious\_ hypocrites; and then

come princes, in whom their position in life and their antecedents

account for a certain histrionic gift. Society men and diplomatists

come third, and women fourth.

\_The fundamental thought\_: Falsity seems so deep, so many-sided, and

the \_will\_ is directed so inexorably against perfect self-knowledge

and accurate self-classification, that one is \_very probably right in

supposing that Truth\_ and \_the will to truth\_ are perhaps something

quite different and only \_disguises.\_ (The need of \_faith\_ is the

greatest obstacle in the way of truthfulness.)

378.

"Thou shalt not tell a falsehood": people insist upon truthfulness. But

the acknowledgment of facts (the refusal to allow one's self to be lied

to) has always been greatest with liars: they actually recognised the

reality of this popular "truthfulness." There is too much or too little

being said continually: to insist upon people's \_exposing themselves\_

with every word they say, is a piece of naïveté.

People say what they think, they are "truthful"; but \_only under

certain circumstances\_: that is to say, provided they be \_understood\_

(\_inter pares\_), and understood with good will into the bargain (\_once

more inter pares\_). One conceals one's self in the presence of the

\_unfamiliar\_: and he who would attain to something, says what he would

fain have people think about him, but \_not\_ what he thinks. ("The

powerful man is always a liar.")

379.

The great counterfeit coinage of Nihilism concealed beneath an artful

abuse of moral values:--

\_(a)\_ Love regarded as self-effacement; as also pity.

\_(b)\_ The \_most impersonal intellect\_ ("the philosopher") can know the

\_truth\_, "the true essence and nature of things."

\_(c)\_ Genius, \_great men\_ are \_great,\_ because they do not strive

to further their own interests: the \_value\_ of man \_increases\_ in

proportion as he effaces himself.

\_(d)\_ Art as the work of the "\_pure free-willed subject\_";

misunderstanding of "objectivity."

\_(e)\_ Happiness as the object of life: \_virtue\_ as a means to an end.

The pessimistic condemnation of life by Schopenhauer is a \_moral\_ one.

Transference of the gregarious standards into the realm of metaphysics.

The "individual" lacks sense, he must therefore have his origin in "the

thing in itself" (and the significance of his existence must be shown

to be "error"); parents are only an "accidental cause."--The mistake

on the part of science in considering the individual as the result of

all past life instead of the epitome of all past life, is now becoming

known.

380.

1. Systematic \_falsification of history,\_ so that it may present a

proof of the moral valuation:

\_(a)\_ The decline of a people and corruption. \_(b)\_ The rise of a

people and virtue. \_(c)\_ The zenith of a people ("its culture")

regarded as the result of high moral excellence.

2. Systematic falsification of \_great men, great creators,\_ and \_great

periods.\_ The desire is to make \_faith\_ that which distinguishes great

men: whereas carelessness in this respect, scepticism, "immorality,"

the right to repudiate a belief, belongs to greatness (Cæsar, Frederick

the Great, Napoleon; but also Homer, Aristophanes, Leonardo, Goethe).

The principal fact--their "free will"--is always suppressed.

381.

A great \_lie\_ in history; as if the \_corruption of the Church were the

cause\_ of the Reformation! This was only the pretext and self-deception

of the agitators--very strong needs were making themselves felt, the

brutality of which sorely required a spiritual dressing.

382.

Schopenhauer declared high intellectuality to be the \_emancipation\_

from the will: he did not wish to recognise the freedom from moral

prejudices which is coincident with the emancipation of a great mind;

he refused to see what is the typical immorality of genius; he artfully

contrived to set up the only moral value he honoured--self-effacement,

as the one \_condition\_ of highest intellectual activity: "objective"

contemplation. "Truth," even in art, only manifests itself after the

withdrawal of the \_will\_....

Through all moral idiosyncrasies I see a \_fundamentally different

valuation.\_ Such absurd distinctions as "genius" and the world of will,

of morality and immorality, \_I know nothing about at all.\_ The moral is

a lower kind of animal than the immoral, he is also weaker; indeed--he

is a type in regard to morality, but he is not a type of his own. He

is a copy; at the best, a good copy--the standard of his worth lies

\_without\_ him. I value a man according to the \_quantum of power and

fullness of his will\_: not according to the enfeeblement and moribund

state thereof. I consider that a philosophy which \_teaches\_ the denial

of will is both defamatory and slanderous.... I test the \_power\_ of

a \_will\_ according to the amount of resistance it can offer and the

amount of pain and torture it can endure and know how to turn to its

own advantage; I do not point to the evil and pain of existence with

the finger of reproach, but rather entertain the hope that life may one

day be more evil and more full of suffering than it has ever been.

The zenith of intellectuality, according to Schopenhauer, was to arrive

at the knowledge that all is to no purpose--in short, to recognise what

the good man already \_does\_ instinctively.... He denies that there can

be higher states of intellectuality--he regards his view as a \_non plus

ultra..\_.. Here intellectuality is placed much lower than goodness; its

highest value (as art, for instance) would be to lead up to, and to

advise the adoption of, morality, the absolute predominance of \_moral

values.\_

Next to Schopenhauer I will now characterise \_Kant\_: there was nothing

Greek in Kant; he was quite anti-historical (cf. his attitude in

regard to the French Revolution) and a moral fanatic (see Goethe's

words concerning the radically evil element in human nature[8]).

\_Saintliness\_ also lurked somewhere in his soul.... I require a

criticism of the saintly type.

Hegel's value: "Passion."

Herbert Spencer's tea-grocer's philosophy: total absence of an ideal

save that of the mediocre man.

Fundamental instinct of all philosophers, historians, and

psychologists: everything of \_value\_ in mankind, art, history, science,

religion, and technology must be shown to be \_morally valuable\_ and

\_morally conditioned,\_ in its aim, means, and result. Everything is

seen in the light of this highest value; for instance, Rousseau's

question concerning civilisation, "Will it make man grow better?"--a

funny question, for the reverse is \_obvious,\_ and is a fact which

speaks \_in favour\_ of civilisation.

383.

\_Religious morality.--\_Passion, great desire; the passion for power,

love, revenge, and property: the moralists wish to uproot and

exterminate all these things, and "purify" the soul by driving them out

of it.

The argument is: the passions often lead to disaster--therefore, they

are evil and ought to be condemned. Man must wring himself free from

them, otherwise he cannot be a \_good\_ man....

This is of the same nature as: "If thy right eye offend thee, pluck it

out." In this particular case when, with that "bucolic simplicity,"

the Founder of Christianity recommended a certain practice to His

disciples, in the event of sexual excitement, the result would not be

only the loss of a particular member, but the actual castration of the

whole of the man's character.... And the same applies to the moral

mania, which, instead of insisting upon the control of the passions,

sues for their extirpation. Its conclusion always is: only the

emasculated man is a good man.

Instead of making use of and of \_economising\_ the great sources of

passion, those torrents of the soul which are often so dangerous,

overwhelming, and impetuous, morality--this most shortsighted and most

corrupted of mental attitudes--would fain make them \_dry up.\_

384.

\_Conquest over the passions?\_--No, not if this is to mean their

enfeeblement and annihilation. \_They must be enlisted in our service\_:

and to this end it may be necessary to tyrannise them a good deal (not

as individuals, but as communities, races, etc.). At length we should

trust them enough to restore their freedom to them: they love us like

good servants, and willingly go wherever our best interests lie.

385.

\_Intolerance on the part of morality\_ is a sign of man's \_weakness\_:

he is frightened of his own "immorality," he must \_deny\_ his strongest

\_instincts,\_ because he does not yet know how to use them. Thus the

most fruitful quarters of the globe remain uncultivated longest: the

power is lacking that might become master here....

386.

There are some very simple peoples and men who believe that continuous

fine weather would be a desirable thing: they still believe to-day

in \_rebus moralibus,\_ that the "good man" alone and nothing else than

the "good man" is to be desired, and that the ultimate end of man's

evolution will be that only the good man will remain on earth (and that

it is only to that end that all efforts should be directed). This is

in the highest degree an \_uneconomical\_ thought; as we have already

suggested, it is the very acme of simplicity, and it is nothing more

than the expression of the \_agreeableness\_ which the "good man" creates

(he gives rise to no fear, he permits of relaxation, he gives what one

is able to take).

With a more educated eye one learns to desire exactly the reverse--that

is to say, an ever greater \_dominion of evil,\_ man's gradual

emancipation from the narrow and aggravating bonds of morality, the

growth of power around the greatest forces of Nature, and the ability

to enlist the passions in one's service.

387.

The whole idea of the hierarchy of the \_passions\_: as if the only right

and normal thing were to be led by \_reason\_--whereas the passions are

abnormal, dangerous, half-animal, and moreover, in so far as their end

is concerned, nothing more than \_desires for pleasure....\_

Passion is deprived of its dignity (1) as if it only manifested

itself in an unseemly way and were not necessary and always the

\_motive force\_, (2) inasmuch as it is supposed to aim at no high

purpose--merely at pleasure....

The misinterpretation of passion and \_reason,\_ as if the latter were

an independent entity, and not a state of relationship between all

the various passions and desires; and as though every passion did not

possess its quantum of reason....

388.

How it was that, under the pressure of the dominion of an ascetic

and \_self-effacing morality,\_ it was precisely the passions--love,

goodness, pity, even justice, generosity, and heroism, which were

necessarily misunderstood?

It is the \_richness of a personality,\_ the fullness of it, its power

to flow over and to bestow, its instinctive feeling of ease, and its

affirmative attitude towards itself, that creates great love and great

sacrifices: these passions proceed from strong and godlike personalism

as surely as do the desire to be master, to obtrude, and the inner

certainty that one has a right to everything. The \_opposite\_ views,

according to the most accepted notions, are indeed common views; and if

one does not stand firmly and bravely on one's legs, one has nothing to

give, and it is perfectly useless to stretch out one's hand either to

protect or to support others....

How was it possible to \_transform\_ these instincts to such an extent

that man could feel that to be of value which is directed against

himself, so that he could sacrifice himself for another self! O the

psychological baseness and falseness which hitherto has laid down the

law in the Church and in Church-infected philosophy!

If man is thoroughly sinful, then all he can do is to hate himself. As

a matter of fact, he ought not to regard even his fellows otherwise

than he does himself; the love of man requires a justification, and it

is found in the fact that \_God commanded it.\_--From this it follows

that all the natural instincts of man (to love, etc.) appear to him

to be, in themselves, prohibited; and that he re-acquires a right to

them only after having \_denied\_ them as an obedient worshipper of God.

... Pascal, the admirable \_logician\_ of Christianity, \_went as far as

this\_! let any one examine his relations to his sister. "Not to make

one's self loved," seemed Christian to him.

389.

Let us consider how dearly a moral canon such as this ("an ideal")

makes us pay. (Its enemies are--well? The "egoists.")

The melancholy astuteness of self-abasement in Europe (Pascal,

La Rochefoucauld)--inner enfeeblement, discouragement, and

self-consumption of the non-gregarious man.

The perpetual process of laying stress upon mediocre qualities as being

the most valuable (modesty in rank and file, Nature converted into an

instrument).

Pangs of conscience associated with all that is self-glorifying and

original: thus follows the unhappiness--the \_gloominess\_ of the world

from the standpoint of stronger and better-constituted men!

Gregarious consciousness and timorousness transferred to philosophy and

religion.

Let us leave the psychological impossibility of a purely unselfish

action out of consideration!

390.

My ultimate conclusion is, that the \_real\_ man represents a much

higher value than the "desirable" man of any ideal that has ever

existed hitherto; that all "desiderata" in regard to mankind have

been absurd and dangerous dissipations by means of which a particular

kind of man has sought to establish \_his\_ measures of preservation

and of growth as a law for all; that every "desideratum" of this

kind which has been made to dominate has \_reduced\_ man's worth, his

strength, and his trust in the future; that the indigence and mediocre

intellectuality of man becomes most apparent, even to-day, when he

reveals a \_desire\_; that man's ability to fix values has hitherto been

developed too inadequately to do justice to the actual, not merely

to the "desirable," \_worth of man\_; that, up to the present, ideals

have really been the power which has most slandered man and power, the

poisonous fumes which have hung over reality, and which have \_seduced

men to yearn for nonentity\_....

D. \_A Criticism of the Words: Improving, Perfecting, Elevating.\_

391.

The standard \_according\_ to which the value of moral valuations is to

be determined.

The fundamental fact \_that has been overlooked\_: The contradiction

between "becoming more moral" and the elevation and the strengthening

of the type man.

\_Homo natura\_: The "will to power."

392.

Moral values regarded as \_values of appearance\_ and compared with

\_physiological\_ values.

393.

Reflecting upon generalities is always retrograde: the last of the

"desiderata" concerning men, for instance, have never been regarded as

problems by philosophers. They always postulate the "\_improvement\_"

of man, quite guilelessly, as though by means of some intuition they

had been helped over the note of interrogation following the question,

\_why\_ necessarily "\_improve!\_" To what extent is it \_desirable\_ that

man should be more \_virtuous,\_ or more \_intelligent,\_ or \_happier!\_

Granting that nobody yet \_knows\_ the "wherefore?" of mankind, all

such desiderata have no sense whatever; and if one aspires to one

of them--who knows?--perhaps one is frustrating the other. Is an

increase of virtue compatible with an increase of intelligence and

insight? \_Dubito\_: only too often shall I have occasion to show that

the reverse is true. Has virtue, as an end, in the strict sense of the

word, not always been opposed to happiness hitherto? And again, does it

not require misfortune, abstinence, and self-castigation as a necessary

means? And if the aim were to arrive at the \_highest insight,\_ would

it not therefore be necessary to renounce all hope of an increase in

happiness, and to choose danger, adventure, mistrust, and seduction as

a road to enlightenment?... And suppose one will have happiness; maybe

one should join the ranks of the "poor in spirit."

394.

The wholesale deception and fraud of so-called \_moral improvement.\_

We do not believe that one man can be another if he is not that

other already--that is to say, if he is not, as often happens, an

accretion of personalities or at least of parts of persons. In this

case it is possible to draw another set of actions from him into the

foreground, and to drive back "the older man." ... The man's aspect

is altered, but \_not\_ his actual nature.... It is but the merest

\_factum brutum\_ that any one should cease from performing certain

actions, and the fact allows of the most varied interpretations.

Neither does it always follow therefrom that the habit of performing

a certain action is entirely arrested, nor that the reasons for

that action are dissipated. He whose destiny and abilities make him

a criminal never unlearns anything, but is continually adding to his

store of knowledge: and long abstinence acts as a sort of tonic on

his talent.... Certainly, as far as society is concerned, the only

interesting fact is that some one has ceased from performing certain

actions; and to this end society will often raise a man out of those

circumstances which make him \_able\_ to perform those actions: this

is obviously a wiser course than that of trying to break his destiny

and his particular nature. The Church,--which has done nothing except

to take the place of, and to appropriate, the philosophic treasures

of antiquity,--starting out from another standpoint and wishing to

secure a "soul" or the "salvation" of a soul, believes in the expiatory

power of punishment, as also in the obliterating power of forgiveness:

both of which supposed processes are deceptions due to religious

prejudice--punishment expiates nothing, forgiveness obliterates

nothing; what is done cannot be undone. Because some one forgets

something it by no means proves that something has been wiped out....

An action leads to certain consequences, both among men and away from

men, and it matters not whether it has met with punishment, or whether

it has been "expiated," "forgiven," or "obliterated," it matters not

even if the Church meanwhile canonises the man who performed it. The

Church believes in things that do not exist, it believes in "Souls"; it

believes in "influences" that do not exist--in divine influences; it

believes in states that do not exist, in sin, redemption, and spiritual

salvation: in all things it stops at the surface and is satisfied with

signs, attitudes, words, to which it lends an arbitrary interpretation.

It possesses a method of counterfeit psychology which is thought out

quite systematically.

395.

"Illness makes men better," this famous assumption which is to be met

with in all ages, and in the mouth of the wizard quite as often as in

the mouth and maw of the people, really makes one ponder. In view of

discovering whether there is any truth in it, one might be allowed to

ask whether there is not perhaps a fundamental relationship between

morality and illness? Regarded as a whole, could not the "improvement

of mankind"--that is to say, the unquestionable softening, humanising,

and taming which the European has undergone within the last two

centuries--be regarded as the result of a long course of secret and

ghastly suffering, failure, abstinence, and grief? Has illness made

"Europeans" "better"? Or, put into other words, is not our modern

soft-hearted European morality, which could be likened to that of the

Chinese, perhaps an expression of physiological \_deterioration\_?...

It cannot be denied, for instance, that wherever history shows us

"man" in a state of particular glory and power, his type is always

dangerous, impetuous, and boisterous, and cares little for humanity;

and perhaps, in those cases in which \_it seems otherwise,\_ all that

was required was the courage or subtlety to see sufficiently below the

surface in psychological matters, in order even in them to discover the

general proposition: "the more healthy, strong, rich, fruitful, and

enterprising a man may feel, the more immoral he will be as well." A

terrible thought, to which one should on no account give way. Provided,

however, that one take a few steps forward with this thought, how

wondrous does the future then appear! What will then be paid for more

dearly on earth, than precisely this very thing which we are all trying

to promote, by all means in our power--the humanising, the improving,

and the increased "civilisation" of man? Nothing would then be more

expensive than virtue: for by means of it the world would ultimately

be turned into a hospital: and the last conclusion of wisdom would be,

"everybody must be everybody else's nurse." Then we should certainly

have attained to the "Peace on earth," so long desired! But how little

"joy we should find in each other's company"! How little beauty, wanton

spirits, daring, and danger! So few "actions" which would make life on

earth worth living! Ah! and no longer any "deeds"! But have not all the

\_great\_ things and deeds which have remained fresh in the memory of

men, and which have not been destroyed by time, been \_immoral\_ in the

deepest sense of the word?...

396.

The priests--and with them the half-priests or philosophers of all

ages--have always called that doctrine true, the educating influence

of which was a benevolent one or at least seemed so--that is to say,

tended to "improve." In this way they resemble an ingenuous plebeian

empiric and miracle-worker who, because he had tried a certain poison

as a cure, declared it to be no poison. "By their fruits ye shall know

them"--that is to say, "by our truths." This has been the reasoning

of priests until this day. They have squandered their sagacity, with

results that have been sufficiently fatal, in order to make the "proof

of power" (or the proof "by the fruits ") pre-eminent and even supreme

arbiter over all other forms of proof. "That which makes good must

be good; that which is good cannot lie"--these are their inexorable

conclusions--"that which bears good fruit must consequently be true;

there is no other criterion of truth." ...

But to the extent to which "improving" acts as an argument,

deteriorating must also act as a refutation. The error can be shown to

be an error, by examining the lives of those who represent it: a false

step, a vice can refute.... This indecent form of opposition, which

comes from below and behind--the doglike kind of attack, has not died

out either. Priests, as psychologists, never discovered anything more

interesting than spying out the secret vices of their adversaries--they

prove Christianity by looking about for the world's filth. They apply

this principle more particularly to the greatest on earth, to the

geniuses: readers will remember how Goethe has been attacked on every

conceivable occasion in Germany (Klopstock and Herder were among the

first to give a "good example" in this respect--birds of a feather

flock together).

397.

One must be very immoral in order to \_make people moral by deeds.\_ The

moralist's means are the most terrible that have ever been used; he

who has not the courage to be an immoralist in deeds may be fit for

anything else, but not for the duties of a moralist.

Morality is a menagerie; it assumes that iron bars may be more useful

than freedom, even for the creatures it imprisons; it also assumes that

there are animal-tamers about who do not shrink from terrible means,

and who are acquainted with the use of red-hot iron. This terrible

species, which enters into a struggle with the wild animal, is called

"priests."

\*\*\*

Man, incarcerated in an iron cage of errors, has become a caricature

of man; he is sick, emaciated, ill-disposed towards himself, filled

with a loathing of the impulses of life, filled with a mistrust of

all that is beautiful and happy in life--in fact, he is a wandering

monument of misery. How shall we ever succeed in vindicating this

phenomenon--this artificial, arbitrary, and \_recent\_ miscarriage--the

sinner--which the priests have bred on their territory?

\*\*\*

In order to think fairly of morality, we must put two \_biological\_

notions in its place: the \_taming\_ of the wild beasts, and the \_rearing

of a particular species.\_

The priests of all ages have always pretended that they wished to

"\_improve\_" ... But we, of another persuasion, would laugh if a

lion-tamer ever wished to speak to us of his "improved" animals. As a

rule, the taming of a beast is only achieved by deteriorating it: even

the moral man is not a better man; he is rather a weaker member of his

species. But he is less harmful....

398.

What I want to make clear, with all the means in my power, is:--

\_(a)\_ That there is no worse confusion than that which confounds

\_rearing\_ and \_taming\_: and these two things have always been

confused.... Rearing, as I understand it, is a means of husbanding

the enormous powers of humanity in such a way that whole generations

may build upon the foundations laid by their progenitors--not only

outwardly, but inwardly, organically, developing from the already

existing stem and growing \_stronger\_....

\_(b)\_ That there is an exceptional danger in believing that mankind as

a whole is developing and growing stronger, if individuals are seen

to grow more feeble and more equally mediocre. Humanity--mankind--is

an abstract thing: the object of \_rearing,\_ even in regard to the most

individual cases, can only be the \_strong\_ man (the man who has no

breeding is weak, dissipated, and unstable).

6. CONCLUDING REMARKS CONCERNING THE CRITICISM OF MORALITY.

399.

These are the things I demand of you--however badly they may sound in

your ears: that you subject moral valuations themselves to criticism.

That you should put a stop to your instinctive moral impulse--which in

this case demands submission and not criticism--with the question: "why

precisely submission?" That this yearning for a "why?"--for a criticism

of morality should not only be your present form of morality, but the

sublimest of all moralities, and an honour to the age you live in. That

your honesty, your will, may give an account of itself, and not deceive

you: "why not?"--Before what tribunal?

400.

The three \_postulates\_:--

All that is ignoble is high (the protest of the "vulgar

man").

All that is contrary to Nature is high (the protest of the

physiologically botched).

All that is of average worth is high (the protest of the

herd, of the "mediocre").

Thus in the \_history of morality\_ a \_will to power\_ finds expression,

by means of which, either the slaves, the oppressed, the bungled and

the botched, those that suffer from themselves, or the mediocre,

attempt to make those valuations prevail which favour \_their\_ existence.

From a biological standpoint, therefore, the phenomenon Morality is of

a highly suspicious nature. Up to the present, morality has developed

at the \_cost\_ of: the ruling classes and their specific instincts,

the well-constituted and \_beautiful\_ natures, the independent and

privileged classes in all respects.

Morality, then, is a sort of counter-movement opposing Nature's

endeavours to arrive at a \_higher type.\_ Its effects are: mistrust of

life in general (in so far as its tendencies are felt to be immoral),

--hostility towards the senses (inasmuch as the highest values are

felt to be opposed to the higher instincts),--Degeneration and

self-destruction of "higher natures," because it is precisely in them

that the conflict becomes \_conscious.\_

401.

\_Which values have been paramount hitherto?\_

Morality as the leading value in all phases of philosophy (even with

the Sceptics). Result: this world is no good, a "true world" must exist

somewhere.

What is it that here determines the highest value? What, in sooth,

is morality? The instinct of decadence; it is the exhausted and

the disinherited who \_take their revenge\_ in this way and play the

\_masters\_....

Historical proof: philosophers have always been decadents and always in

the pay of Nihilistic religions.

The instinct of decadence appears as the will to power. The

introduction of its system of means: its means are absolutely immoral.

General aspect: the values that have been highest hitherto have been a

special instance of the will to power; morality itself is a particular

instance of \_immorality.\_

\*\*\*

Why the Antagonistic Values always succumbed.

1. How was this actually \_possible!\_ Question: why did life and

physiological well-constitutedness succumb everywhere? Why was there no

affirmative philosophy, no affirmative religion?

The historical signs of such movements: the pagan religion.

Dionysos \_versus\_ the Christ. The Renaissance. Art.

2. The strong and the weak: the healthy and the sick; the exception and

the rule. There is no doubt as to who is the stronger....

\_General view of history\_; Is man an \_exception\_ in the history of life

on this account?--An objection to \_Darwinism.\_ The means wherewith

the weak succeed in ruling have become: instincts, "humanity,"

"institutions." ...

3. The proof of this rule on the part of the weak is to be found in

our political instincts, in our social values, in our arts, and in our

\_science.\_

\*\*\*

The \_instincts of decadence\_ have become master of the \_instincts of

ascending\_ life.... The \_will to nonentity\_ has prevailed over the

\_will to life\_!

Is this \_true\_? is there not perhaps a stronger guarantee of life and

of the species in this victory of the weak and the mediocre?--is it

not perhaps only a means in the collective movement of life, a mere

slackening of the pace, a protective measure against something even

more dangerous?

Suppose the \_strong\_ were masters in all respects, even in valuing:

let us try and think what their attitude would be towards illness,

suffering, and sacrifice! \_Self-contempt on the part of the weak\_ would

be the result: they would do their utmost to disappear and to extirpate

their kind. And would this be \_desirable\_?--should we really like a

world in which the subtlety, the consideration, the intellectuality,

the \_plasticity\_--in fact, the whole influence of the weak--was

lacking?[9] ...

We have seen two "wills to power" at war \_(in this special case we

had a principle\_: that of agreeing with the one that has hitherto

succumbed, and of disagreeing with the one that has hitherto

triumphed): we have recognised the "real world" as a "\_world of lies\_"

and morality as a \_form of immorality.\_ We do \_not\_ say "the stronger

is wrong."

We have understood \_what\_ it is that has determined the highest values

hitherto, and \_why\_ the latter should have prevailed over the opposite

value: it was numerically the \_stronger\_.

If we now purify \_the opposite value\_ of the infection, the

half-heartedness, \_and the degeneration,\_ with which we identify it, we

restore Nature to the throne, free from moralic acid.

402.

\_Morality,\_ a useful error; or, more clearly still, a necessary and

expedient lie according to the greatest and most impartial of its

supporters.

403.

One ought to be able to acknowledge the truth up to that point where

one is sufficiently elevated no longer to require the \_disciplinary

school of moral error.\_--When one judges life morally, it \_disgusts\_

one.

Neither should false personalities be invented; one should not say, for

instance, "Nature is cruel." It is precisely when one perceives \_that

there is no such central controlling and responsible force that one is

relieved!\_

\_Evolution of man.\_ A. He tried to attain to a certain power

over Nature and over himself. (Morality was necessary in

order to make man triumph in his struggle with Nature and

"wild animals.")

B. If power over Nature has been attained, this power can

be used as a help in our development: Will to Power as a

self-enhancing and self-strengthening principle.

404.

Morality may be regarded as the \_illusion of a species,\_ fostered with

the view of urging the individual to sacrifice himself to the future,

and seemingly granting him such a very great value, that with that

\_self-consciousness\_ he may tyrannise over, and constrain, other sides

of his nature, and find it difficult to be pleased with himself.

We ought to be most profoundly thankful for what morality has done

hitherto: \_but now it is no more than a burden\_ which may prove fatal.

\_Morality itself\_ in the form of honesty urges us to deny morality.

405.

To what extent is the \_self-destruction of morality\_ still a sign of

its own strength? We Europeans have within us the blood of those who

were ready to die for their faith; we have taken morality frightfully

seriously, and there is nothing which we have not, at one time,

sacrificed to it. On the other hand, our intellectual subtlety has

been reached essentially through the vivisection of our consciences.

We do not yet know the "whither" towards which we are urging our

steps, now that we have departed from the soil of our forebears. But

it was on this very soil that we acquired the strength which is now

driving us from our homes in search of adventure, and it is thanks

to that strength that we are now in mid-sea, surrounded by untried

possibilities and things undiscovered--we can no longer choose, we must

be conquerors, now that we have no land in which we feel at home and

in which we would fain "survive." A concealed "\_yea\_" is driving us

forward, and it is stronger than all our "nays." Even our \_strength\_ no

longer bears with us in the old swampy land: we venture out into the

open, we attempt the task. The world is still rich and undiscovered,

and even to perish were better than to be half-men or poisonous men.

Our very strength itself urges us to take to the sea; there where all

suns have hitherto sunk we know of a new world....

III.

CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.

1. GENERAL REMARKS.

406.

Let us rid ourselves of a few superstitions which heretofore have been

fashionable among philosophers!

407.

Philosophers are prejudiced \_against\_ appearance, change, pain, death,

the things of the body, the senses, fate, bondage, and all that which

has no purpose.

In the first place, they believe in: absolute knowledge, (2) in

knowledge for its own sake,

(3) in virtue and happiness as necessarily related,

(4) in the recognisability of men's acts. They are led by instinctive

determinations of values, in which \_former\_ cultures are reflected

(more dangerous cultures too).

408.

What have philosophers \_lacked\_! (1) A sense of history, (2) a

knowledge of physiology, (3) a goal in the future.--The ability to

criticise without irony or moral condemnation.

409.

Philosophers have had (1) from times immemorial a wonderful capacity

for the \_contradictio in adjecto,\_ (2) they have always trusted

concepts as unconditionally as they have mistrusted the senses: it

never seems to have occurred to them that notions and words are our

inheritance of past ages in which thinking was neither very clear nor

very exact.

What seems to dawn upon philosophers last of all: that they must

no longer allow themselves to be presented with concepts already

conceived, nor must they merely purify and polish up those concepts;

but they must first \_make\_ them, \_create\_ them, themselves, and

then present them and get people to accept them. Up to the present,

people have trusted their concepts generally, as if they had been a

wonderful \_dowry\_ from some kind of wonderland: but they constitute

the inheritance of our most remote, most foolish, and most intelligent

forefathers. This \_piety\_ towards that \_which already exists in us\_

is perhaps related to the \_moral element in science.\_ What we needed

above all is absolute scepticism towards all traditional concepts (like

that which a certain philosopher may already have possessed--and he was

Plato, of course: for he taught \_the reverse\_).

410.

Profoundly mistrustful towards the dogmas of the theory of knowledge,

I liked to look now out of this window, now out of that, though I took

good care not to become finally fixed anywhere, indeed I should have

thought it dangerous to have done so--though finally: is it within the

range of probabilities for an instrument to criticise its own fitness?

What I noticed more particularly was, that no scientific scepticism or

dogmatism has ever arisen quite free from all \_arrières pensées\_--that

it has only a secondary value as soon as the motive lying immediately

behind it is discovered.

Fundamental aspect: Kant's, Hegel's, Schopenhauer's, the sceptical and

epochistical, the historifying and the pessimistic attitudes--all have

a \_moral\_ origin. I have found no one who has dared to \_criticise the

moral valuations,\_ and I soon turned my back upon the meagre attempts

that have been made to describe the evolution of these feelings (by

English and German Darwinians).

How can Spinoza's position, his denial and repudiation of the moral

values, be explained? (It was the result of his Theodicy!)

411.

\_Morality regarded as the highest form of protection.\_--Our world is

\_either\_ the work and expression (the \_modus\_) of God, in which case

it must be \_in the highest degree perfect\_ (Leibnitz's conclusion

...),--and no one doubted that he knew what perfection must be

like,--and then all evil can only be \_apparent\_ (Spinoza is \_more

radical,\_ he says this of good and evil), or it must be a part of God's

high purpose (a consequence of a particularly great mark of favour

on God's part, who thus allows man to choose between good and evil:

the privilege of being no automaton; "freedom," with the ever-present

danger of making a mistake and of choosing wrongly.... See Simplicius,

for instance, in the commentary to Epictetus).

\_Or\_ our world is imperfect; evil and guilt are real, determined, and

are absolutely inherent to its being; in that case it cannot be the

\_real\_ world: consequently knowledge can only be a way of denying

the world, for the latter is error which may be recognised as such.

This is Schopenhauer's opinion, based upon Kantian first principles.

Pascal was still more desperate: he thought that even knowledge must be

corrupt and false--that \_revelation\_ is a necessity if only in order to

recognise that the world should be denied....

412.

Owing to our habit of believing in unconditional authorities, we have

grown to feel a profound need for them: indeed, this feeling is so

strong that, even in an age of criticism such as Kant's was, it showed

itself to be superior to the need for criticism, and, in a certain

sense, was able to subject the whole work of critical acumen, and to

convert it to its own use. It proved its superiority once more in

the generation which followed, and which, owing to its historical

instincts, naturally felt itself drawn to a relative view of all

authority, when it converted even the Hegelian philosophy of evolution

(history rechristened and called philosophy) to its own use, and

represented history as being the self-revelation and self-surpassing

of moral ideas. Since Plato, philosophy has lain under the dominion of

morality. Even in Plato's predecessors, moral interpretations play a

most important rôle (Anaximander declares that all things are made to

perish as a punishment for their departure from pure being; Heraclitus

thinks that the regularity of phenomena is a proof of the morally

correct character of evolution in general).

413.

The progress of philosophy has been hindered most seriously hitherto

through the influence of moral \_arrières-pensées.\_

414.

In all ages, "fine feelings" have been regarded as arguments, "heaving

breasts" have been the bellows of godliness, convictions have been the

"criteria" of truth, and the need of opposition has been the note of

interrogation affixed to wisdom. This falseness and fraud permeates

the whole history of philosophy. But for a few respected sceptics,

no instinct for intellectual Uprightness is to be found anywhere.

Finally, \_Kant\_ guilelessly sought to make this thinker's corruption

scientific by means of his concept, "\_practical reason\_". He expressly

invented a reason which, in certain cases, would allow one \_not\_ to

bother about reason--that is to say, in cases where the heart's desire,

morality, or "duty" are the motive power.

415.

\_Hegel\_: his popular side, the doctrine of war and of great men. Right

is on the side of the victorious: he (the victorious man) stands for

the progress of mankind. His is an attempt at proving the dominion of

morality by means of history.

Kant: a kingdom of moral values withdrawn from us, invisible, real.

Hegel: a demonstrable process of evolution, the actualisation of the

kingdom of morality.

We shall not allow ourselves to be deceived either in Kant's or Hegel's

way:--We no longer \_believe,\_ as they did, in morality, and therefore

have no philosophies to found with the view of justifying morality.

Criticism and history have no charm for us \_in this\_ respect: what is

their charm, then?

416.

The importance of German philosophy (\_Hegel,\_) the thinking out of a

kind of \_pantheism\_ which would not reckon evil, error, and suffering

as arguments against godliness. \_This grand initiative\_ was misused

by the powers that were (State, etc.) to sanction the rights of the

people that happened to be paramount.

\_Schopenhauer\_ appears as a stubborn opponent of this idea; he is a

moral man who, in order to keep in the right concerning his moral

valuation, finally becomes a \_denier of the world.\_ Ultimately he

becomes a "mystic."

I myself have sought an \_æsthetic\_ justification of the ugliness in

this world. I regarded the desire for beauty and for the persistence

of certain forms as a temporary preservative and recuperative measure:

what seemed to me to be fundamentally associated with pain, however,

was the eternal lust of creating and the \_eternal compulsion to

destroy.\_

We call things ugly when we look at them with the desire of attributing

some sense, some \_new\_ sense, to what has become senseless: it is the

accumulated power of the creator which compels him to regard what has

existed hitherto as no longer acceptable, botched, worthy of being

suppressed--ugly!

417.

\_My first solution of the problem: Dionysian wisdom. The joy in the

destruction of the most noble thing,\_ and at the sight of its gradual

undoing, regarded as the joy over what is \_coming and what lies in the

future,\_ which triumphs over \_actual things, however good they may

be.\_ Dionysian: temporary identification with the principle of life

(voluptuousness of the martyr included).

\_My innovations.\_ The Development of Pessimism: intellectual

pessimism; \_moral\_ criticism, the dissolution of the last comfort.

Knowledge, a sign of \_decay,\_ veils by means of an illusion all strong

action; isolated culture is unfair and therefore strong.

(1) My \_fight\_ against decay and the increasing weakness of

personality. I sought a new \_centrum.\_

(2) The impossibility of this endeavour is \_recognised.\_

(3) \_I therefore travelled farther along the road of dissolution--and

along it I found new sources of strength for individuals.\_ We \_must

be destroyers\_!--I perceived that the state of \_dissolution is one

in which individual beings are able to arrive at a kind of perfection

not possible hitherto, it is an image and isolated example of life

in general.\_ To the paralysing feeling of general dissolution and

imperfection, I opposed the \_Eternal Recurrence.\_

418.

People naturally seek the picture of life in \_that\_ philosophy which

makes them most cheerful--that is to say, in that philosophy which

gives the highest sense of freedom to \_their strongest instinct.\_ This

is probably the case with me.

419.

German philosophy, as a whole,--Leibnitz, Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, to

mention the greatest,--is the most out-and-out \_form of romanticism\_

and home-sickness that has ever yet existed: it is a yearning for the

best that has ever been known on earth. One is at home nowhere; that

which is ultimately yearned after is a place where one can somehow

feel at home; because one has been at home there before, and that

place is the \_Greek\_ world! But it is precisely in that direction

that airbridges are broken down\_--save,\_ of course, the rainbow

of concepts! And the latter lead everywhere, to all the homes and

"fatherlands" that ever existed for Greek souls! Certainly, one must be

very light and thin in order to cross these bridges! But what happiness

lies even in this desire for spirituality, almost for ghostliness!

With it, how far one is from the "press and bustle" and the mechanical

boorishness of the natural sciences, how far from the vulgar din

of "modern ideas"! One wants to get back to the Greeks \_via\_ the

Fathers of the Church, from North to South, from formulæ to forms; the

passage out of antiquity--Christianity--is still a source of joy as a

means of access to antiquity, as a portion of the old world itself,

as a glistening mosaic of ancient concepts and ancient valuations.

Arabesques, scroll-work, rococo of scholastic abstractions--always

better, that is to say, finer and more slender, than the peasant and

plebeian reality of Northern Europe, and still a protest on the part

of higher intellectuality against the peasant war and insurrection

of the mob which have become master of the intellectual taste of

Northern Europe, and which had its leader in a man as great and

unintellectual as Luther:--in this respect German philosophy belongs

to the Counter-Reformation, it might even be looked upon as related

to the Renaissance, or at least to the will to Renaissance, the will

to get ahead with the discovery of antiquity, with the excavation of

ancient philosophy, and above all of pre-Socratic philosophy--the

most thoroughly dilapidated of all Greek temples! Possibly, in à few

hundred years, people will be of the opinion that all German philosophy

derived its dignity from this fact, that step by step it attempted

to reclaim the soil of antiquity, and that therefore all demands for

"originality" must appear both petty and foolish when compared with

Germany's higher claim to having refastened the bonds which seemed for

ever rent--the bonds which bound us to the Greeks, the highest type

of "men" ever evolved hitherto. To-day we are once more approaching

all the fundamental principles of the cosmogony which the Greek mind

in Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Empedocles, Democritus, and

Anaxagoras, was responsible for. Day by day we are growing more

\_Greek\_; at first, as is only natural, the change remains confined to

concepts and valuations, and we hover around like Greasing spirits: but

it is to be hoped that some day our \_body\_ will also be involved! Here

lies (and has always lain) my hope for the German nation.

420.

I do not wish to convert anybody to philosophy: it is both necessary

and perhaps desirable that the philosopher should be a \_rare\_

plant. Nothing is more repugnant to me than the scholarly praise of

philosophy which is to be found in Seneca and Cicero. Philosophy

has not much in common with virtue. I trust I may be allowed to say

that even the scientific man is a fundamentally different person

from the philosopher. What I most desire is, that the genuine notion

"philosopher" should not completely perish in Germany. There are so

many incomplete creatures in Germany already who would fain conceal

their ineptitude beneath such noble names.

421.

I must \_set up the highest ideal of a philosopher.\_ Learning is not

everything! The scholar is the sheep in the kingdom of learning; he

studies because he is told to do so, and because others have done so

before him.

422.

The superstition concerning \_philosophers\_: They are confounded with

men \_of science.\_ As if the value of things were inherent in them

and required only to be held on to tightly! To what extent are their

researches carried on under the influence of values which already

prevail (their hatred of appearance of the body, etc.)? Schopenhauer

concerning morality (scorn of Utilitarianism). Ultimately the confusion

goes so far that Darwinism is regarded as philosophy, and thus at the

present day power has gone over to the men of \_science.\_ Even Frenchmen

like Taine prosecute research, or mean to prosecute research,

\_without\_ being already in possession of a standard of valuation.

Prostration before "facts" of a kind of cult. As a matter of fact, they

\_destroy\_ the existing valuations.

The \_explanation\_ of this misunderstanding. The man who is able to

command is a rare phenomenon; he misinterprets himself. What one

\_wants\_ to do, above all, is to disclaim all authority and to attribute

it to \_circumstances.\_ In Germany the critic's estimations belong to

the history of awakening \_manhood.\_ Lessing, etc. (Napoleon concerning

Goethe). As a matter of fact, the movement is again made retrograde

owing to German romanticism: and the \_fame\_ of German philosophy

relies upon it as if it dissipated the danger of scepticism and could

\_demonstrate faith.\_ Both tendencies culminate in Hegel: at bottom,

what he did was to generalise the fact of German criticism and the

fact of German romanticism,--a kind of dialectical fatalism, but to

the honour of intellectuality, with the actual submission of the

philosopher to reality. \_The critic prepares the way\_: that is all!

With Schopenhauer the philosopher's mission dawns; it is felt that

the object is to determine \_values\_; still under the dominion of

eudemonism. The ideal of Pessimism.

423.

\_Theory and practice.\_--This is a pernicious distinction, as if there

were an \_instinct of knowledge,\_ which, without inquiring into the

utility or harmfulness of a thing, blindly charged at the truth; and

then that, apart from this instinct, there were the whole world of

\_practical\_ interests.

In contradiction of this, I try to show what instincts are active

behind all these \_pure\_ theorists,--and how the latter, as a whole,

under the dominion of their instincts, fatally make for something

which \_to their minds\_ is "truth," to their minds and \_only\_ to their

minds. The struggle between systems, together with the struggle between

epistemological scruples, is one which involves very special instincts

(forms of vitality, of decline, of classes, of races, etc.).

The so-called \_thirst for knowledge\_ may be traced to the \_lust of

appropriation\_ and of \_conquest\_: in obedience to this lust the

senses, memory, and the instincts, etc., were developed. The quickest

possible reduction of the phenomena, economy, the accumulation of spoil

from the world of knowledge (\_i.e.\_ that portion of the world which has

been appropriated and made manageable)....

Morality is therefore such a curious science, because it is in the

highest degree \_practical\_: the purely scientific position, scientific

uprightness, is thus immediately abandoned, as soon as morality calls

for replies to its questions. Morality says: I \_require\_ certain

answers--reasons, arguments; scruples may come afterwards, or they may

not come at all.

"How must one act?" If one considers that one is dealing with a

supremely evolved type--a type which has been "dealt with" for

countless thousands of years, and in which everything has become

instinct, expediency, automatism, fatality, the \_urgency\_ of this moral

question seems rather funny.

"How must one act?" Morality has always been a subject of

misunderstanding: as a matter of fact, a certain species, which was

constituted to act in a certain way, wished to justify itself by

\_making\_ its norm paramount.

"How must one act?" this is not a cause, but an \_effect.\_ Morality

follows, the ideal comes first....

On the other hand, the appearance of moral scruples (or in other

words, \_the coming to consciousness of the values\_ which guide action)

betray a certain \_morbidness\_; strong ages and people do not ponder

over their rights, nor over the principles of action, over instinct or

over reason. \_Consciousness\_ is a sign that the real morality--that

is to say, the certainty of instinct which leads to a definite

course of action--is going to the dogs.... Every time a new \_world

of consciousness\_ is created, the moralists are signs of a lesion,

of impoverishment and of disorganisation. Those who are \_deeply

instinctive\_ fear bandying words over duties: among them are found

pyrrhonic opponents of dialectics and of knowableness in general.... A

virtue is \_refuted\_ with a "for." ...

\_Thesis\_: The appearance of moralists belongs to periods when morality

is declining.

\_Thesis\_: The moralist is a dissipator of moral instincts, however much

he may appear to be their restorer.

\_Thesis\_: That which really prompts the action of a moralist is not a

moral instinct, but the \_instincts of decadence,\_ translated into the

forms of morality (he regards the growing uncertainty of the instincts

as \_corruption\_).

\_Thesis\_: The \_instincts of decadence\_ which, thanks to moralists, wish

to become master of the instinctive morality of stronger races and

ages, are:--

(1) The instincts of the weak and of the botched;

(2) The instincts of the exceptions, of the anchorites, of the

unhinged, of the abortions of quality or of the reverse;

(3) The instincts of the habitually suffering, who require a noble

interpretation of their condition, and who therefore require to be as

poor physiologists as possible.

424.

The humbug of the \_scientific spirit.\_--One should not affect the

spirit of science, when the time to be scientific is not yet at

hand; but even the genuine investigator has to abandon vanity, and

has to affect a certain kind of method which is not yet seasonable.

Neither should we falsify things and thoughts, which we have arrived

at differently, by means of a false arrangement of deduction and

dialectics. It is thus that Kant in his "morality" falsifies his

inner tendency to psychology; a more modern example of the same thing

is Herbert Spencer's \_Ethics.\_ A man should neither conceal nor

misrepresent the \_facts\_ concerning the way in which he conceived his

thoughts. The deepest and most inexhaustible books will certainly

always have something of the aphoristic and impetuous character of

Pascal's \_Pensées\_. The motive forces and valuations have lain long

below the surface; that which comes uppermost is their effect.

I guard against all the humbug of a false scientific spirit:--

(1) In respect of the manner of \_demonstration,\_ if it does not

correspond to the genesis of the thoughts;

(2) In respect of the demands for \_methods\_ which, at a given period in

science, may be quite impossible;

(3) In respect of the demand for \_objectivity\_ for cold impersonal

treatment, where, as in the case of all valuations, we describe

ourselves and our intimate experiences in a couple of words. There

are ludicrous forms of vanity, as, for instance, Sainte-Beuve's. He

actually worried himself all his life because he had shown some warmth

or passion either "\_pro\_" or "con," and he would fein have lied that

fact out of his life.

425.

"Objectivity" in the philosopher: moral indifference in regard to one's

self, blindness in regard to either favourable or fetal circumstances.

Unscrupulousness in the use of dangerous means; perversity and

complexity of character considered as an advantage and exploited.

My profound indifference to myself: I refuse to derive any advantage

from my knowledge, nor do I wish to escape any disadvantages which it

may entail.--I include among these disadvantages that which is called

the \_perversion\_ of character; this prospect is beside the point: I use

my character, but I try neither to understand it nor to change it--the

personal calculation of virtue has not entered my head once. It strikes

me that one closes the doors of knowledge as soon as one becomes

interested in one's own personal case--or even in the "Salvation of

one's soul"!... One should not take one's morality too seriously, nor

should one forfeit a modest right to the opposite of morality....

A sort of \_heritage of morality\_ is perhaps presupposed here: one

feels that one can be lavish with it and fling a great deal of it out

of the window without materially reducing one's means. One is never

tempted to admire "beautiful souls," one always knows one's self to be

their superior. The monsters of virtue should be met with inner scorn;

\_déniaiser la vertu\_--Oh, the joy of it!

One should revolve round one's self, have no desire to be "better" or

"anything else" at all than one is. One should be too interested to

omit throwing the tentacles or meshes of every morality out to things.

426.

Concerning the psychology of \_philosophers.\_ They should be

psychologists--this was possible only from the nineteenth century

onwards--and no longer little Jack Homers, who see three or four

feet in front of them, and are almost satisfied to burrow inside

themselves. We psychologists of the future are not very intent on

self-contemplation: we regard it almost as a sign of degeneration when

an instrument endeavours "to know itself":[10] we are instruments of

knowledge and we would fain possess all the precision and ingenuousness

of an instrument--consequently we may not analyse or "know" ourselves.

The first sign of a great psychologist's self-preservative instinct:

he never goes in search of himself, he has no eye, no interest, no

inquisitiveness where he himself is concerned.... The great egoism

of our dominating will insists on our completely shutting our eyes to

ourselves, and on our appearing "impersonal," "disinterested"!--Oh to

what a ridiculous degree we are the reverse of this!

We are no Pascals, we are not particularly interested in the

"Salvation of the soul," in our own happiness, and in our own

virtue.--We have neither enough time nor enough curiosity to be so

concerned with ourselves. Regarded more deeply, the case is again

different, we thoroughly mistrust all men who thus contemplate their

own navels: because introspection seems to us a degenerate form of

the psychologist's genius, as a note of interrogation affixed to the

psychologist's instinct: just as a painter's eye is degenerate which is

actuated by the \_will\_ to see for the sake of seeing.

2. A CRITICISM OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY.

427.

The apparition of Greek philosophers since the time of Socrates is a

symptom of decadence; the anti-Hellenic instincts become paramount.

The "\_Sophist\_" is still quite Hellenic--as are also Anaxagoras,

Democritus, and the great Ionians; but only as transitional forms. The

\_polis\_ loses its faith in the unity of its culture, in its rights of

dominion over every other \_polis....\_ Cultures, that is to say, "the

gods," are exchanged, and thus the belief in the exclusive prerogative

of the \_deus autochthonus\_ is lost. Good and Evil of whatever origin

get mixed: the boundaries separating good from evil gradually

\_vanish....\_ This is the "Sophist." ...

On the other hand, the "philosopher" is the \_reactionary\_: he insists

upon the \_old\_ virtues. He sees the reason of decay in the decay of

institutions: he therefore wishes to revive \_old\_ institutions;--he

sees decay in the decline of authority: he therefore endeavours to

find \_new\_ authorities (he travels abroad, explores foreign literature

and exotic religions....);--he will reinstate the \_ideal polis,\_ after

the concept "polis" has become superannuated (just, as the Jews kept

themselves together as a "people" after they had fallen into slavery).

They become interested in all tyrants: their desire is to re-establish

virtue with "\_force majeure\_".

Gradually everything \_genuinely Hellenic\_ is held responsible for

the state of \_decay\_ (and Plato is just as ungrateful to Pericles,

Homer, tragedy, and rhetoric as the prophets are to David and

Saul). \_The downfall of Greece is conceived as an objection to the

fundamental principles of Hellenic culture: the profound error of

philosophers\_--Conclusion: the Greek world perishes. The cause thereof:

Homer, mythology, ancient morality, etc.

The anti-Hellenic development of philosophers' valuations:--the

Egyptian influence ("Life after death" made into law....);--the Semitic

influence (the "dignity of the sage," the "Sheik");--the Pythagorean

influence, the subterranean cults, Silence, means of terrorisation

consisting of appeals to a "Beyond," \_mathematics\_: the religious

valuation consisting of a sort of intimacy with a cosmic entity;--the

sacerdotal, ascetic, and transcendental influences;--the \_dialectical\_

influence,--I am of opinion that even Plato already betrays revolting

and pedantic meticulousness in his concepts!--Decline of good

intellectual taste: the hateful noisiness of every kind of direct

dialectics seems no longer to be felt.

The \_two\_ decadent tendencies and extremes run side by side: (a) the

luxuriant and more charming kind of decadence which shows a love of

pomp and art, and (b) the gloomy kind, with its religious and moral

pathos, its stoical self-hardening tendency, its Platonic denial of the

senses, and its preparation of the soil for the coming of Christianity.

428.

To what extent psychologists have been corrupted by the moral

idiosyncrasy!--Not one of the ancient philosophers had the courage to

advance the theory of the non-free will (that is to say, the theory

that denies morality);--not one had the courage to identify the typical

feature of happiness, of every kind of happiness "pleasure"), with the

will to power: for the pleasure of power was considered immoral;--not

one had the courage to regard virtue as a \_result of immorality\_ (as a

result of a will to power) in the service of a species (or of a race,

or of a \_polis\_); for the will to power was considered immoral.

In the whole of moral evolution, there is no sign of truth: all

the conceptual elements which come into play are fictions; all the

psychological tenets are false; all the forms of logic employed in this

department of prevarication are sophisms. The chief feature of all

moral philosophers is their total lack of intellectual cleanliness and

self-control: they regard "fine feelings" as arguments: their heaving

breasts seem to them the bellows of godliness.... Moral philosophy is

the most suspicious period in the history of the human intellect.

The first great example: in the name of morality and under its

patronage, a great wrong was committed, which as a matter of fact was

in every respect an act of decadence. Sufficient stress cannot be laid

upon this fact, that the great Greek philosophers not only represented

the decadence of \_every kind of Greek ability\_, but also made it

\_contagious\_.... This "virtue" made wholly abstract was the highest

form of seduction; to make oneself abstract means to turn one's back on

the world.

The moment is a very remarkable one: the Sophists are within sight

of the first \_criticism of morality,\_ the first \_knowledge\_ of

morality:--they classify the majority of moral valuations (in view

of their dependence upon local conditions) together;--they lead one

to understand that every form of morality is capable of being upheld

dialectically: that is to say, they guessed that all the fundamental

principles of a morality must be \_sophistical\_--a proposition which

was afterwards proved in the grandest possible style by the ancient

philosophers from Plato onwards (up to Kant);--they postulate the

primary truth that there is no such thing as a "moral \_per se\_," a

"good \_per se\_," and that it is madness to talk of "truth" in this

respect.

Wherever was \_intellectual uprightness\_ to be found in those days?

The Greek culture of the Sophists had grown out of all the Greek

instincts; it belongs to the culture of the age of Pericles as

necessarily as Plato does not: it has its predecessors in Heraclitus,

Democritus, and in the scientific types of the old philosophy; it

finds expression in the elevated culture of Thucydides, for instance.

And--it has ultimately shown itself to be right: every step in the

science of epistemology and morality has \_confirmed the attitude\_ of

the Sophists.... Our modern attitude of mind is, to a great extent,

Heraclitean, Democritean, and Protagorean ... to say that it is

\_Protagorean\_ is even sufficient: because Protagoras was in himself a

synthesis of the two men Heraclitus and Democritus.

(\_Plato\_: a \_great Cagliostro,\_--let us think of how Epicurus judged

him; how Timon, Pyrrho's friend, judged him----Is Plato's integrity by

any chance beyond question?... But we at least know what he wished to

have \_taught\_ as absolute truth--namely, things which were to him not

even relative truths: the separate and immortal life of "souls.")

429.

The \_Sophists\_ are nothing more, nor less than realists: they elevate

all the values and practices which are common property to the rank of

values--they have the courage, peculiar to all strong intellects,

which consists in \_knowing\_ their immorality....

Is it to be supposed that these small Greek independent republics,

so filled with rage and envy that they would fain have devoured each

other, were led by principles of humanity and honesty? Is Thucydides

by any chance reproached with the words he puts into the mouths of

the Athenian ambassadors when they were treating with the Melii anent

the question of destruction or submission? Only the most perfect

Tartuffes could have been able to speak of virtue in the midst of that

dreadful strain--or if not Tartuffes, at least \_detached philosophers,\_

anchorites, exiles, and fleers from reality.... All of them, people

who denied things in order to be able to exist.

The Sophists were Greeks: when Socrates and Plato adopted the cause

of virtue and justice, they were \_Jews\_ or I know not what. \_Grote's\_

tactics in the defence of the Sophists are false: he would like to

raise them to the rank of men of honour and moralisers--but it was

their honour not to indulge in any humbug with grand words and virtues.

430.

The great reasonableness underlying all moral education lay in the fact

that it always attempted to attain to \_the certainty of an instinct\_:

so that neither good intentions nor good means, as such, first required

to enter consciousness. Just as the soldier learns his exercises, so

should man learn how to act in life. In truth this unconsciousness

belongs to every kind of perfection: even the mathematician carries out

his calculations unconsciously....

What, then, does Socrates' \_reaction\_ mean, which recommended

dialectics as the way to virtue, and which was charmed when morality

was unable to justify itself logically? But this is precisely what

proves its \_superiority\_--without unconsciousness \_it is worth nothing\_!

In reality it means \_the dissolution of Greek instincts,\_ when

\_demonstrability\_ is posited as the first condition of personal

excellence in virtue. All these great "men of virtue" and of words are

themselves types of dissolution.

In practice, it means that moral judgments have been torn from the

conditions among which they grew and in which alone they had some

sense, from their Greek and Græco-political soil, in order to be

\_denaturalised\_ under the cover of being \_made sublime.\_ The great

concepts "good" and "just" are divorced from the first principles of

which they form a part, and, as "ideas" \_become free,\_ degenerate

into subjects for discussion. A certain truth is sought behind them;

they are regarded as entities or as symbols of entities: a world is

\_invented\_ where they are "at home," and from which they are supposed

to hail.

\_In short\_: the scandal reaches its apotheosis in Plato.... And then it

was necessary to invent the \_perfectly abstract\_ man also:--good, just,

wise, and a dialectician to boot--in short, the \_scarecrow\_ of the

ancient philosopher: a plant without any soil whatsoever; a human race

devoid of all definite ruling instincts; a virtue which "justifies"

itself with reasons. The perfectly absurd "individual" \_per se\_! the

highest form of \_Artificiality....\_

Briefly, the denaturalisation of moral values resulted in the creation

of a degenerate \_type of man\_--"the good man," "the happy man,"

"the wise man."--Socrates represents a moment of the most \_profound

perversity\_ in the history of values.

431.

\_Socrates.\_--This veering round of Greek taste in favour of dialectics

is a great question. What really happened then? Socrates, the

\_roturier\_ who was responsible for it, was thus able to triumph over

a more noble taste, the taste of \_the noble\_:--the mob gets the upper

hand along with dialectics. Previous to Socrates dialectic manners

were repudiated in good society; they were regarded as indecent; the

youths were Warned against them. What was the purpose of this display

of reasons? Why demonstrate? Against others one could use authority.

One commanded, and that sufficed. Among friends, \_inter pares,\_ there

was tradition--\_also\_ a form of authority: and last but not least,

one understood each other. There was no room found for dialectics.

Besides, all such modes of presenting reasons were distrusted. All

honest things do not carry their reasons in their hands in such

fashion. It is indecent to show all the five fingers at the same time.

That which can be "demonstrated" is little worth. The instinct of

every party-speaker tells him that dialectics excites mistrust and

carries little conviction. Nothing is more easily wiped away than the

effect of a dialectician. It can only be a \_last defence.\_ One must

be in an extremity; it is necessary to have to \_extort\_ one's rights;

otherwise one makes no use of dialectics. That is why the Jews were

dialecticians, Reynard the Fox was a dialectician, and so was Socrates.

As a dialectician a person has a merciless instrument in his hand:

he can play the tyrant with it; he compromises when he conquers. The

dialectician leaves it to his opponent to demonstrate that he is not an

idiot; he is made furious and helpless, while the dialectician himself

remains calm and still possessed of his triumphant reasoning powers--he

\_paralyses\_ his opponent's intellect.--The dialectician's irony is a

form of mob-revenge: the ferocity of the oppressed lies in the cold

knife-cuts of the syllogism....

In Plato, as in all men of excessive sensuality and wild fancies, the

charm of concepts was so great, that he involuntarily honoured and

deified the concept as a form of ideal. \_Dialectical intoxication\_: as

the consciousness of being able to exercise control over one's self by

means of it--as an instrument of the Will to Power.

432.

\_The problem of Socrates.\_--The two antitheses: the \_tragic\_ and the

\_Socratic\_ spirits--measured according to the law of Life.

To what extent is the Socratic spirit a decadent phenomenon? to what

extent are robust health and power still revealed by the whole attitude

of the scientific man, his dialectics, his ability, and his severity?

(the health of the \_plebeian\_; whose malice, \_esprit frondeur,\_

whose astuteness, whose rascally depths, are held in check by his

\_cleverness\_; the whole type is "ugly").

\_Uglification\_: self-derision, dialectical dryness, intelligence in

the form of a \_tyrant\_ against the "tyrant" (instinct). Everything in

Socrates is exaggeration, eccentricity, caricature; he is a buffoon

with the blood of Voltaire in his veins.

He discovers a new form of \_agon\_; he is the first fencing-master in

the superior classed of Athens; he stands for nothing else than the

\_highest form of cleverness\_: he calls it "virtue" (he regarded it as a

means of \_salvation\_; he did not choose to be \_clever,\_ cleverness was

\_de rigueur\_); the proper thing is to control one's self in suchwise

that one enters into a struggle \_not\_ with passions but with reasons

as one's weapons (Spinoza's stratagem--the unravelment of the errors

of passion);--it is desirable to discover how every one may be caught

once he is goaded into a passion, and to know how illogically passion

proceeds; self-mockery is practised in order to injure the very roots

of the \_feelings of resentment.\_

It is my wish to understand which idiosyncratic states form a part of

the Socratic problem: its association of reason, virtue, and happiness.

With this absurd doctrine of the identity of these things it succeeded

\_in charming\_ the world: ancient philosophy could not rid itself of

this doctrine....

Absolute lack of objective interest: hatred of science: the

idiosyncrasy of considering one's self a problem. Acoustic

hallucinations in Socrates: morbid element. When the intellect is

rich and independent, it most strongly resists preoccupying itself

with morality. How is it that Socrates is a \_moral-maniac\_?--Every

"practical" philosophy immediately steps into the foreground in times

of distress. When morality and religion become the chief interests of a

community, they are signs of a state of distress.

433.

Intelligence, clearness, hardness, and logic as weapons against the\_

wildness of the instincts\_. The latter must be dangerous and must

threaten ruin, otherwise no purpose can be served by developing

\_intelligence\_ to this degree of tyranny. In order to make a \_tyrant\_

of intelligence the instincts must first have proved themselves

tyrants. This is the problem. It was a very timely one in those days.

Reason became virtue--virtue equalled happiness.

\_Solution\_: Greek philosophers stand upon the same fundamental fact

of their inner experiences as Socrates does; five feet from excess,

from anarchy and from dissolution--all decadent men. They regard him

as a doctor: Logic as will to power, as will to control self, as will

to "happiness." The wildness and anarchy of Socrates' instincts is a

\_sign of decadence\_, as is also the superfœtation of logic and clear

reasoning in him. Both are abnormities, each belongs to the other.

Criticism. Decadence reveals itself in this concern about "happiness"

(\_i.e.\_ about the "salvation of the soul"; \_i.e. to feel that one's

condition is a danger\_). Its fanatical interest in "happiness" shows

the pathological condition of the subconscious self: it was a vital

interest. The \_alternative\_ which faced them all was: to be reasonable

or to perish. The morality of Greek philosophers shows that they felt

they were in danger.

434.

\_Why everything resolved itself into mummery.--\_Rudimentary

psychology, which only considered the \_conscious\_ lapses of men (as

causes), which regarded "consciousness" as an attribute of the soul,

and which sought a will behind every action (\_i.e.\_ an intention),

could only answer "\_Happiness\_" to the question: "\_What does man

desire?\_" (it was impossible to answer "Power," because that would have

been \_immoral)\_;--consequently behind all men's actions there is the

intention of attaining to happiness by means of them. Secondly: if man

as a matter of fact does not attain to happiness, why is it? Because he

mistakes the means thereto.--\_What is the unfailing means of acquiring

happiness?\_ Answer: \_virtue.\_--Why virtue? Because virtue is supreme

rationalness, and rationalness makes mistakes in the choice of means

impossible: virtue in the form of \_reason\_ is the way to happiness.

Dialectics is the constant occupation of virtue, because it does away

with passion and intellectual cloudiness.

As a matter of fact, man does \_not\_ desire "happiness." Pleasure is

a sensation of power: if the passions are excluded, those states of

the mind are also excluded which afford the greatest sensation of

power and therefore of pleasure. The highest rationalism is a state of

cool clearness, which is very far from being able to bring about that

feeling of power which every kind of \_exaltation\_ involves....

The ancient philosophers combat everything that intoxicates and

exalts--everything that impairs the perfect coolness and impartiality

of the mind.... They were consistent with their first false principle:

that consciousness was the \_highest,\_ the \_supreme\_ state of mind, the

prerequisite of perfection--whereas the reverse is true....

Any kind of action is imperfect in proportion as it has been willed or

conscious. The philosophers of antiquity \_were the greatest duffers\_

in practice, "because they condemned themselves" theoretically

to \_dufferdom,\_.... In practice everything resolved itself into

theatricalness: and he who saw through it, as Pyrrho did, for instance,

thought as everybody did--that is to say, that in goodness and

uprightness "paltry people" were far superior to philosophers.

All the deeper natures of antiquity were disgusted at the \_philosophers

of virtue\_; all people saw in them was brawlers and actors. (This was

the judgment passed on \_Plato\_ by \_Epicurus\_ and \_Pyrrho\_.)

\_Result\_: In practical life, in patience, goodness, and mutual

assistance, paltry people were above them:--this is something like the

judgment Dostoiewsky or Tolstoy claims for his muzhiks: they are more

philosophical in practice, they are more courageous in their way of

dealing with the exigencies of life....

435.

\_A criticism of the philosopher.\_--Philosophers and moralists merely

deceive themselves when they imagine that they escape from decadence

by \_opposing\_ it. That lies beyond their wills: and however little they

may be aware of the fact, it is generally discovered, subsequently that

they were among the most powerful promoters of decadence.

Let us examine the philosophers of Greece--Plato, for instance. He

it was who separated the instincts from the polis, from the love of

contest, from military efficiency, from art, beauty, the mysteries,

and the belief in tradition and in ancestors.... He was the seducer of

the nobles: he himself seduces through the \_roturier\_ Socrates.... He

denied all the first principles of the "noble Greek" of sterling worth;

he made dialectics an everyday practice, conspired with the tyrants,

dabbled in politics for the future, and was the example of a man whose

\_instincts\_ were the example of a man whose \_instincts\_ were most

perfectly separated from \_tradition.\_ He is profound and passionate in

everything that is \_anti-Hellenic\_....

One after the other, these great philosophers represent the \_typical\_

forms of decadence: the moral and religious idiosyncrasy, anarchy,

nihilism, (ἀδιαφορία), cynicism, hardening principles, hedonism, and

reaction.

The question of "happiness," of "virtue," and of the "salvation of the

soul," is the expression of \_physiological contradictoriness\_ in these

declining natures: their instincts lack all \_balance\_ and \_purpose.\_

436.

To what extent do dialectics and the faith in reason rest upon \_moral\_

prejudices? With Plato we are as the temporary inhabitants of an

intelligible world of goodness, still in possession of a bequest from

former times: divine dialectics taking its root in goodness leads to

everything good (it follows, therefore, that it must lead "backwards").

Even Descartes had a notion of the fact that, according to a thoroughly

Christian and moral attitude of mind, which includes a belief in a

\_good\_ God as the Creator of all things, the truthfulness of God

\_guarantees\_ the judgments of our senses for us. But for this religious

sanction and warrant of our senses and our reason, whence should

we obtain our right to trust in existence? That thinking must be a

measure of reality,--that what cannot be the subject of thought, cannot

\_exist,\_--is a coarse \_non plus ultra\_ of a moral blind confidence

(in the essential principle of truth at the root of all things); this

in itself is a mad assumption which our experience contradicts every

minute. We cannot think of anything precisely as it is....

437.

The real \_philosophers of Greece\_ are those which came before Socrates

(with Socrates something changes). They are all distinguished men,

they take their stand away from the people and from usage; they have

travelled; they are earnest to the point of sombreness, their eyes

are calm, and they are not unacquainted with the business of state and

diplomacy. They anticipated all the great concepts which coming sages

were to have concerning things in general: they themselves represented

these concepts, they made systems out of themselves. Nothing run give a

higher idea of Greek intellect than this sudden fruitfulness in types,

than this involuntary completeness in the drawing up of all the great

possibilities of the philosophical ideal. I can see only one original

figure in those that came afterwards: a late arrival but necessarily

the last--\_Pyrrho\_ the nihilist. His instincts were opposed to the

influences which had become ascendant in the mean-time the Socratic

school, Plato, and the artistic optimism of Heraclitus. (Pyrrho goes

back to Democritus \_via\_ Protagoras....)

\*\*\*

Wise weariness: Pyrrho. To live humbly among the humble. Devoid of

pride. To live in the vulgar way; to honour and believe what every

one believes. To be on one's guard against science and intellect, and

against everything that \_puffs one out.\_ ... To be simply patient

in the extreme, careless and mild;--\_ὰπάθεια\_ or, better still,

πραῢτης. A Buddhist for Greece, bred amid the tumult of the

Schools; born alter his time; weary; an example of the protest of

weariness against the eagerness of dialecticians; the incredulity of

the tired man in regard to the importance of everything. He had seen

\_Alexander\_; he had seen the \_Indian penitents.\_ To such late-arrivals

and creatures of great subtlety, everything lowly, poor, and idiotic,

is seductive. It narcoticises: it gives them relaxation (Pascal).

On the other hand, they mix with the crowd, and get confounded

with the rest. These weary creatures need warmth.... To overcome

contradiction; to do away with contests; to have no will to excel in

any way; to deny the \_Greek\_ instincts (Pyrrho lived with his sister,

who was a midwife.) To rig out wisdom in such a way that it no longer

distinguishes; to give it the ragged mantle of poverty; to perform

the lowest offices, and to go to market and sell sucking-pigs....

Sweetness, clearness, indifference; no need of virtues that require

attitudes; to be equal to all even in virtue: final conquest of one's

self, final indifference.

Pyrrho and Epicurus;--two forms of Greek decadence; they are related

in their hatred of dialectics and all \_theatrical\_ virtues. These

two things together were then called philosophy; Pyrrho and Epicurus

intentionally held that which they loved in low esteem; they chose

common and even contemptible names for it, and they represented a state

in which one is neither ill, healthy, lively, nor dead.... Epicurus was

more \_naïf,\_ more idyllic, more grateful; Pyrrho had more experience of

the world, had travelled more, and was more nihilistic. His life was a

protest against the great \_doctrine of Identity\_ (Happiness = Virtue =

Knowledge). The proper way of living is not promoted by science: wisdom

does not make "wise." ... The proper way of living does not desire

happiness, it turns away from happiness....

438.

The war against the "old faith," as Epicurus waged it, was, strictly

speaking, a struggle against \_pre-existing\_ Christianity--the struggle

against a world then already gloomy, moralised, acidified throughout

with feelings of guilt, and grown old and sick.

Not the "moral corruption" of antiquity, but precisely its \_moral

infectedness\_ was the prerequisite which enabled Christianity to become

its master. Moral fanaticism (in short: Plato) destroyed paganism by

transvaluing its values and poisoning its innocence. We ought at last

to understand that what was then destroyed was \_higher\_ than what

prevailed! Christianity grew on the soil of psychological corruption,

and could only take root in rotten ground.

439.

Science: as a disciplinary measure or as an instinct--I see a decline

of the instincts in Greek philosophers: otherwise they could not have

been guilty of the profound error of regarding the conscious state

as the more valuable state. The intensity of consciousness stands in

the inverse ratio to the ease and speed of cerebral transmission.

Greek philosophy upheld the opposite view, which is always the sign of

weakened instincts.

We must, in sooth, seek \_perfect life\_ there where it is least

conscious (that is to say, there where it is least aware of its logic,

its reasons, its means, its intentions, and its \_utility).\_ The return

to the facts of \_common sense,\_ the facts of the common man and of

"paltry people." \_Honesty and intelligence\_ stored up for generations

of people who are quite unconscious of their principles, and who

even have some fear of principles. It is not reasonable to desire a

\_reasoning virtue.\_ ... A philosopher is compromised by such a desire.

440.

When morality--that is to say, refinement, prudence, bravery, and

equity--have been stored up in the same way, thanks to the moral

efforts of a whole succession of generations, the collective power of

this hoard of virtue projects its rays even into that sphere where

honesty is most seldom present--the sphere of \_intellect.\_ When a

thing becomes conscious, it is the sign of a state of ill-ease in

the organism; something new has got to be found, the organism is not

satisfied or adapted, it is subject to distress, suspense, and it is

hypersensitive--precisely all this is consciousness....

Gennius lies in the instincts; goodness does too. One only acts

perfectly when one acts instinctively. Even from the moral point of

view all thinking which is conscious is merely a process of groping,

and in the majority of cases an attack on morality. Scientific honesty

is always sacrificed when a thinker begins to reason: let any one try

the experiment: put the wisest man in the balance, and then let him

discourse upon morality....

It could also be proved that the whole of a man's \_conscious\_ thinking

shows a much lower standard of morality than the thoughts of the same

man would show if they were led by his \_instincts.\_

441.

The struggle against Socrates, Plato, and all the Socratic schools,

proceeds from the profound instinct that man \_is\_ not made \_better\_

when he is shown that virtue may be demonstrated or based upon

reason.... This in the end is the niggardly fact, it was the agonal

instinct in all these born dialecticians, which drove them to glorify

their \_personal abilities\_ as the \_highest of all qualities,\_ and to

represent every other form of goodness as conditioned by them. The

\_anti-scientific\_ spirit of all this "philosophy": it \_will never admit

that it is not right.\_

442.

This is extraordinary. From its very earliest beginnings, Greek

philosophy carries on a struggle against science with the weapons of

a theory of knowledge, especially of scepticism; and why is this? It

is always in favour of \_morality....\_ (Physicists and medical men

are hated.) Socrates, Aristippus, the Megarian school, the Cynics,

Epicurus and Pyrrho--a general onslaught upon knowledge in favour

of \_morality....\_ (Hatred of dialectics also.) There is still a

problem to be solved: they approach sophistry in order to be rid of

science. On the other hand, the physicists are subjected to such an

extent that, among their first principles, they include the theory of

truth and of real being: for instance, the atom, the four elements

(\_juxtaposition\_ of being, in order to explain its multiformity and its

transformations). Contempt of \_objectivity\_ in interests is taught:

return to practical interest, and to the personal utility of all

knowledge....

The struggle against science is directed at: (1) its pathos

(objectivity); (2) its means (that is to say, at its utility); (3) its

results (which are considered childish). It is the same struggle which

is taken up later on by the \_Church\_ in the name of piety: the Church

inherited the whole arsenal of antiquity for her war with science. The

theory of knowledge played the same part in the affair as it did in

Kant's or the Indians' case. There is no desire whatever to be troubled

with it, a free hand is wanted for the "purpose" that is envisaged.

Against what powers are they actually defending themselves? Against

dutifulness, against obedience to law, against the compulsion of going

hand in hand--I believe this is what is called \_Freedom....\_

This is how decadence manifests itself: the instinct of solidarity is

so degenerate that solidarity itself gets to be regarded as \_tyranny\_:

no authority or solidarity is brooked, nobody any longer desires to

fall in with the rank and file, and to adopt its ignobly slow pace. The

slow movement which is the tempo of science is generally hated, as are

also the scientific man's indifference in regard to getting on, his

long breath, and his impersonal attitude.

443.

At bottom, morality is \_hostile\_ to science: Socrates was so already

too--and the reason is, that science considers certain things important

which have no relation whatsoever to "good" and "evil," and which

therefore reduce the gravity of our feelings concerning "good" and

"evil." What morality requires is that the whole of a man should serve

it with all his power: it considers it waste on the part of a creature

that \_can ill afford waste,\_ when a man earnestly troubles his head

about stars or plants. That is why science very quickly declined

in Greece, once Socrates had inoculated scientific work with the

disease of morality. The mental attitudes reached by a Democritus, a

Hippocrates, and a Thucydides, have not been reached a second time.--

444.

The problem of the \_philosopher\_ and of the \_scientific\_ man.--The

influence of age; depressing habits (sedentary study \_à la\_ Kant;

over-work; inadequate nourishment of the brain; reading). A more

essential question still: is it not already perhaps a \_symptom\_ of

decadence when thinking tends to establish \_generalities\_?

\_Objectivity regarded as the disintegration of the will\_ (to be able

to remain as detached as possible ...). This presupposes a tremendous

adiaphora in regard to the strong passions: a kind of isolation, an

exceptional position, opposition to the normal passions.

Type: desertion of \_home-country\_ emigrants go ever greater distances

afield; growing exoticism; the voice of the old imperative dies

away;--and the continual question "whither?" ("happiness") is a sign

of \_emancipation\_ from forms of organisation, a sign of breaking loose

from everything.

Problem: is the man of \_science\_ more of a decadent symptom than the

philosopher?--as a \_whole\_ scientific man is not, cut loose from

everything, only a part of his being is consecrated exclusively to the

service of knowledge and disciplined to maintain a special attitude and

point of view; in his department he is in need of \_all\_ the virtues

of a strong race, of robust health, of great severity, manliness and

intelligence. He is rather a symptom of the great multiformity of

culture than of the effeteness of the latter. The decadent scholar

is a \_bad\_ scholar. Whereas the decadent philosopher has always been

reckoned hitherto as the typical philosopher.

445.

Among philosophers, nothing is more rare than \_intellectual

uprightness\_: they perhaps say the very reverse, and even believe it.

But the prerequisite of all their work is, that they can only admit

of certain truths; they know what they \_have\_ to prove; and the fact

that they must be agreed as to these "truths" is almost what makes them

recognise one another as philosophers. There are, for instance, the

truths of morality. But belief in morality is not a proof of morality:

there are cases--and the philosopher's case is one in point--when a

belief of this sort is simply a piece of \_immorality\_.

446.

\_What is the retrograde factor in a philosopher?\_--He teaches that

the qualities which he happens to possess are the only qualities that

exist, that they are indispensable to those who wish to attain to the

"highest good" (for instance, dialectics with Plato). He would have

all men raise themselves, \_gradatim,\_ to \_his\_ type as the highest. He

despises what is generally esteemed--by him a gulf is cleft between

the highest \_priestly\_ values and the values of the \_world.\_ He knows

what is true, who God is, what every one's goal should be, and the way

thereto.... The typical philosopher is thus an absolute dogmatist;--if

he \_requires\_ scepticism at all it is only in order to be able to speak

dogmatically of his \_principal purpose\_.

447.

When the philosopher is confronted with his rival--science, for

instance, he becomes a sceptic; then he appropriates a \_form of

knowledge\_ which he denies to the man of science; he goes hand in

hand with the priest so that he may not be suspected of atheism or

materialism; he considers an attack made upon himself as an attack

upon morals, religion, virtue, and order--he knows how to bring his

opponents into ill repute by calling them "seducers" and "underminers":

then he marches shoulder to shoulder with power.

The philosopher at war with other philosophers:--he does his best

to compel them to appear like anarchists, disbelievers, opponents of

authority. In short, when he fights, he fights exactly like a priest

and like the priesthood.

3. THE TRUTHS AND ERRORS OF PHILOSOPHERS.

448.

Philosophy defined by Kant: "\_The science of the limitations of

reason\_"!!

449.

According to Aristotle, Philosophy is the art of discovering truth. On

the other hand, the Epicurians, who availed themselves of Aristotle's

\_sensual\_ theory of knowledge, retorted in ironical opposition to the

search for truth: "Philosophy is the art of \_Life.\_"

450.

\_The three great naïvetés:--\_

Knowledge as a means of happiness (as if ...);

Knowledge as a means to virtue (as if ...);

Knowledge as a means to the "denial of Life"--inasmuch as it leads to

disappointment--(as if ...).

451.

As if there were a "truth" which one could by some means approach!

452.

Error and ignorance are fatal.--The assumption that \_truth has been

found\_ and that ignorance and error are at an end, constitutes one

of the most seductive thoughts in the world. Granted that it be

generally accepted, it paralyses the will to test, to investigate,

to be cautious, and to gather experience: it may even be regarded as

criminal--that is to say, as a \_doubt\_ concerning truth....

"Truth" is therefore more fatal than error and ignorance, because it

paralyses the forces which lead to enlightenment and knowledge. The

passion for \_idleness\_ now stands up for "truth" ("Thought is pain

and misery!"), as also do order, rule, the joy of possession, the

pride of wisdom--in fact, \_vanity.\_--it is easier to \_obey\_ than to

\_examine\_; it is more gratifying to think "I possess the truth," than

to see only darkness in all directions; ... but, above all, it is

reassuring, it lends confidence, and alleviates life--it "improves"

the character inasmuch as it \_reduces mistrust.\_" Spiritual peace," "a

quiet conscience"--these things are inventions which are only possible

provided "\_Truth be found.\_"--"By their fruits ye shall know them." ...

"Truth" is the truth because it makes men \_better....\_ The process goes

on: all goodness and all success is placed to the credit of "truth."

This is the \_proof by success\_: the happiness, contentment, and the

welfare of a community or of an individual, are now understood to be

the \_result of the belief in morality\_.... Conversely: \_failure\_ is

ascribed to a \_lack\_ of faith.

453.

The causes of error lie just as much in the \_good\_ as in the \_bad will\_

of man:--in an incalculable number of cases he conceals reality from

himself, he falsifies it, so that he may not suffer from his good or

bad will. God, for instance, is considered the shaper of man's destiny;

he interprets his little lot as though everything were intentionally

sent to him for the salvation of his soul,--this act of ignorance in

"philology," which to a more subtle intellect would seem unclean and

false, is done, in the majority of cases, with perfect \_good faith.\_

Goodwill, "noble feelings," and "lofty states of the soul" are just as

underhand and deceptive in the means they use as are the passions love,

hatred, and revenge, which morality has repudiated and declared to be

egotistic.

Errors are what mankind has had to pay for most dearly: and taking them

all in all, the errors which have resulted from goodwill are those

which have wrought the most harm. The illusion which makes people

happy is more harmful than the illusion which is immediately followed

by evil results: the latter increases keenness and mistrust, and

purifies, the understanding; the former merely narcoticises....

Fine feelings and noble impulses ought, speaking physiologically, to be

classified with the narcotics: their abuse is followed by precisely the

same results as the abuse of any other opiate--\_weak nerves\_.

454.

Error is the most expensive luxury that man can indulge in: and if the

error happen to be a physiological one, it is fatal to life. What has

mankind paid for most dearly hitherto? For its "truths ": for every one

of these were errors \_in physiologicis>\_....

455.

Psychological \_confusions\_: the \_desire for belief\_ is confounded with

the "will to truth" (for instance, in Carlyle). But the \_desire for

disbelief\_ has also been confounded with the "will to truth" (a need of

ridding one's self of a belief for a hundred reasons: in order to carry

one's point against certain "believers"). \_What is it that inspires

Sceptics?\_ The hatred of dogmatists--or a need of repose, weariness as

in Pyrrho's case.

The \_advantages\_ which were expected to come from truth, were the

advantages resulting from a belief in \_it\_: for, in itself, truth could

have been thoroughly painful, harmful, and even fatal. Likewise truth

was combated only on account of the advantages which a victory over it

would provide--for instance, emancipation from the yoke of the ruling

powers.

The method of truth was \_not\_ based upon motives of truthfulness, but

upon \_motives of power, upon the desire to be superior.\_

\_How is\_ truth \_proved\_? By means of the feeling of increased

power,--by means of utility,--by means of indispensability,--\_in short,

by means of its advantages\_ (that is to say, hypotheses concerning what

truth should be like in order that it may be embraced by us). But this

involves \_prejudice\_: it is a sign that \_truth\_ does not enter the

question at all....

What is the meaning of the "will to truth," for instance in the

Goncourts? and in the \_naturalists\_?--A criticism of "objectivity."

Why should we know: why should we not prefer to be deceived?...

But what was needed was always belief--and \_not\_ truth.... Belief

is created by means which are quite \_opposed\_ to the method of

investigation: \_it even depends upon the exclusion of the latter.\_

456.

A certain degree of faith suffices to-day to give us an \_objection\_

to what is believed--it does more, it makes us question the spiritual

healthiness of the believer.

457.

\_Martyrs.\_--To combat anything that is based upon reverence, opponents

must be possessed of both daring and recklessness, and be hindered

by no scruples.... Now, if one considers that for thousands of

years man has sanctified as truths only those things which were in

reality errors, and that he has branded any criticism of them with

the hall-mark of badness, one will have to acknowledge, however

reluctantly, that a goodly amount of \_immoral deeds\_ were necessary in

order to give the initiative to an attack--I mean to \_reason....\_ That

these immoralists have always posed as the "martyrs of truth" should

be forgiven them: the truth of the matter is that they did not stand

up and deny owing to an instinct for truth; but because of a love of

dissolution, criminal scepticism, and the love of adventure. In other

cases it is personal rancour which drives them into the province of

problems--they only combat certain points of view in order to be

able to carry their point against certain people. But, above all, it

is revenge which has become scientifically useful--the revenge of the

oppressed, those who, thanks to the truth that happens to be ruling,

have been pressed aside and even smothered....

Truth, that is to say the scientific method, was grasped and favoured

by such as recognised that it was a useful weapon of war--an instrument

of \_destruction\_....

In order to be honoured as opponents, they were moreover obliged

to use an apparatus similar to that used by those whom they were

attacking: they therefore brandished the concept "truth" as absolutely

as their adversaries did--they became fanatics at least in their

poses, because no other pose could be expected to be taken seriously.

What still remained to be done was left to persecution, to passion,

and the uncertainty of the persecuted--hatred waxed great, and the

first impulse began to die away and to leave the field entirely to

science. Ultimately all of them wanted to be right in the same absurd

way as their opponents.... The word "conviction," "faith," the pride

of martyrdom--these things are most unfavourable to knowledge. The

adversaries of truth finally adopt the whole subjective manner of

deciding about truth,--that is to say, by means of poses, sacrifices,

and heroic resolutions,--and thus \_prolong\_ the \_dominion\_ of the

anti-scientific method. As martyrs they compromise their very own deed.

458.

\_The dangerous distinction between "theoretical" and "practical"\_ in

Kant for instance, but also in the ancient philosophers:--they behave

as if pure intellectuality presented them with the problems of science

and metaphysics;--they behave as if practice should be judged by a

measure of its own, whatever the judgment of theory may be.

Against the first tendency I set up my \_psychology of philosophers\_:

their strangest calculations and "intellectuality" are still but the

last pallid impress of a physiological fact; spontaneity is absolutely

lacking in them, everything is instinct, everything is intended to

follow a certain direction from the first....

Against the second tendency I put my question: whether we know another

method of acting correctly, besides that of thinking correctly;

the last case \_is\_ action, the first presupposes thought Are we

possessed of a means whereby we can judge of the value of a method

of life differently from the value of a theory: through induction or

comparison?... Guileless people imagine that in this respect we are

better equipped, we know what is "good"--and the philosophers are

content to repeat this view. We conclude that some sort of \_faith\_ is

at work in this matter, and nothing more....

"Men must act; \_consequently\_ rules of conduct are necessary"--this is

what even the ancient Sceptics thought. The \_urgent need\_ of a definite

decision in this department of knowledge is used as an argument in

favour of regarding something as \_true\_!...

"Men must not act"--said their more consistent brothers, the Buddhists,

and then thought out a mode of conduct which would deliver man from the

yoke of action....

To adapt one's self, to live as the "\_common man\_" lives, and to regard

as right and proper what \_he\_ regards as right: this is \_submission\_ to

the \_gregarious instinct.\_ One must carry one's courage and severity

so far as to learn to consider such submission a \_disgrace.\_ One should

not live according to two standards!... One should not separate theory

and practice!...

459.

Of all that which was formerly held to be true, not one word is to be

credited. Everything which was formerly disdained as unholy, forbidden,

contemptible, and fatal--all these flowers now bloom on the most

charming paths of truth.

The whole of this old morality concerns us no longer: it contains not

one idea which is still worthy of respect. We have outlived it--we

are no longer sufficiently coarse and guileless to be forced to allow

ourselves to be lied to in this way.... In more polite language: we are

too virtuous for it.... And if truth in the old sense were "true" only

because the old morality said "yea" to it, and \_had a right\_ to say

"yea" to it: it follows that no truth of the past can any longer be of

use to us.... Our \_criterion\_ of truth is /certainly not morality: we

\_refute\_ an assertion when we show that it is dependent upon morality

and is inspired by noble feelings.

460.

All these values are empirical and conditioned. But he who believes

in them and who honours them, \_refuses\_ to acknowledge this aspect of

them. All philosophers believe in these values, and one form their

reverence takes is the endeavour to make \_a priori truths\_ out of them.

The falsifying nature of \_reverence\_....

Reverence is the supreme test of intellectual \_honesty,\_ but in the

whole history of philosophy there is no such thing as intellectual

honesty,--but the "love of goodness ..."

On the one hand, there is an absolute \_lack of method\_ in testing the

value of these values; \_secondly,\_ there is a general disinclination

either to test them or to regard them as conditioned at all.--All

\_anti-scientific\_ instincts assembled round moral values in order to

\_keep science out\_ of this department....

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS IN THE CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.

461.

\_Why philosophers are slanderers.\_--The artful and blind hostility

of philosophers towards the \_senses\_--what an amount of \_mob\_ and

\_middle-class\_ qualities lie in all this hatred!

The crowd always believes that an abuse of which it feels the harmful

results, constitutes an \_objection\_ to the thing which happens to be

abused: all insurrectionary movements against principles, whether in

politics or agriculture, always follow a line of argument suggested by

this ulterior motive: the abuse must be shown to be necessary to, and,

inherent in, the principle.

It is a \_woeful\_ history: mankind looks for a principle, from the

standpoint of which he will be able to contemn man--he invents a world

in order to be able to slander and throw mud at this world: as a matter

of fact, he snatches every time at nothing, and construes this nothing

as "God," as "Truth," and, in any case, as judge and detractor of

\_this\_ existence....

If one should require a proof of how deeply and thoroughly the actually

\_barbarous\_ needs of man, even in his present state of tameness and

"civilisation," still seek gratification, one should contemplate the

"leitmotifs" of the whole of the evolution of philosophy:--a sort

of revenge upon reality, a surreptitious process of destroying the

values by means of which men live, a \_dissatisfied\_ soul to which

the conditions of discipline is one of torture, and which takes a

particular pleasure in morbidly severing all the bonds that bind it to

such a condition.

The history of philosophy is the story of a \_secret and mad hatred\_

of the prerequisities of Life, of the feelings which make for the

real values of Life, and of all partisanship in favour of Life.

Philosophers have never hesitated to affirm a fanciful world, provided

it contradicted this world, and furnished them with a weapon wherewith

they could calumniate this world. Up to the present, philosophy has

been the \_grand school of slander\_: and its power has been so great,

that even to-day our science, which pretends to be the advocate of

Life, has \_accepted\_ the fundamental position of slander, and treats

this world as "appearance," and this chain of causes as though it were

only phenomenal. What is the hatred which is active here?

I fear that it is still the \_Circe of philosophers--\_Morality, which

plays them the trick of compelling them to be ever slanderers.... They

believed in moral "truths," in these they thought they had found the

highest values; what alternative had they left, save that of denying

existence ever more emphatically the more they got to know about it?...

For this life is \_immoral....\_ And it is based upon immoral first

principles: and morality says \_nay\_ to Life.

Let us suppress the real world: and in order to do this, we must first

suppress the highest values current hitherto--morals.... It is enough

to show that morality itself \_is immoral,\_ in the same sense as that in

which immorality has been condemned heretofore. If an end be thus made

to the tyranny of the former values, if we have suppressed the "real

world," a \_new order of values\_ must follow of its own accord.

The world of appearance and the world \_of lies\_: this constitutes the

contradiction. The latter hitherto has been the "real world," "truth,"

"God." This is the one which we still have to suppress.

The \_logic of my conception\_:

(1) \_Morality as the highest value\_ (it is master of \_all\_ the phases

of philosophy, even of the Sceptics). \_Result\_: this world is no good,

it is not the "real world."

(2) \_What\_ is it that determines the highest value here? What, in

sooth, is morality?--It is the instinct of \_decadence\_; it is the

means whereby the exhausted and the degenerate \_revenge themselves.\_

\_Historical\_ proof: philosophers have always been decadents ... in the

service of \_nihilistic\_ religions.

(3) It is the instinct of decadence coming to the fore as \_will to

power.\_ Proof: the absolute \_immorality\_ of the means employed by

morality throughout its history.

General aspect: the values which have been highest hitherto constitute

a specific case of the will to power; morality itself is a specific

case of immorality.

462.

\_The principal innovations\_: Instead of "moral values," nothing but

\_naturalistic values.\_ Naturalisation of morality.

In the place of "sociology," a \_doctrine of the forms of dominion.\_

In the place of "society," the \_complex whole of culture,\_ which is

\_my\_ chief interest (whether in its entirety or in parts).

In the place of the "theory of knowledge," a \_doctrine which laid down

the value of the passions\_ (to this a hierarchy of the passions would

belong: the passions \_transfigured\_; their \_superior rank,\_ their

"\_spirituality\_").

In the place of "metaphysics" and religion, the doctrine of \_Eternal

Recurrence\_ (this being regarded as a means to the breeding and

selection of men).

463.

My precursors: Schopenhauer. To what extent I deepened pessimism, and

first brought its full meaning within my grasp, by means of its most

extreme opposite.

Likewise: the higher Europeans, the pioneers of \_great politics.\_

Likewise: the Greeks and their genesis.

464.

I have named those who were unconsciously my workers and precursors.

But in what direction may I turn with any hope of finding my particular

kind of philosophers themselves, or at least \_my yearning for new

philosophers\_? In that direction, alone, where a \_noble\_ attitude of

mind prevails, an attitude of mind which believes in slavery and in

manifold orders of rank, as the prerequisites of any high degree of

culture. In that direction, alone, where a \_creative\_ attitude of

mind prevails, an attitude of mind which does not regard the world

of happiness and repose, the "Sabbath of Sabbaths" as an end to be

desired, and which, even in peace, honours the means which lead to new

wars; an attitude of mind which would prescribe laws for the future,

which for the sake of the future would treat everything that exists

to-day with harshness and even tyranny; a daring and "immoral" attitude

of mind, which would wish to see both the good and the evil qualities

in man developed to their fullest extent, because it would feel itself

able to put each in its right place--that is to say, in that place in

which each would need the other. But what prospect has he of finding

what he seeks, who goes in search of philosophers to-day? Is it not

probable that, even with the best Diogenes-lantern in his hand, he will

wander about by night and day in vain? This age is possessed of the

\_opposite\_ instincts. What it wants, above all, is comfort; secondly,

it wants publicity and the deafening din of actors' voices, the big

drum which appeals to its Bank-Holiday tastes; thirdly, that every

one should lie on his belly in utter subjection before the greatest

of all lies--which is "the equality of men"--and should honour only

those virtues which \_make men equal and place them in equal positions.\_

But in this way, the rise of the philosopher, as I understand him, is

made completely impossible--despite the fact that many may regard the

present tendencies as rather favourable to his advent. As a matter of

fact, the whole world mourns, to-day, the hard times that philosophers

\_used\_ to have, hemmed in between the fear of the stake, a guilty

conscience, and the presumptuous wisdom of the Fathers of the Church:

but the truth is, that precisely these conditions were \_ever so much

more favourable\_ to the education of a mighty, extensive, subtle,

rash, and daring intellect than the conditions prevailing to-day. At

present another kind of intellect, the intellect of the demagogue, of

the actor, and perhaps of the beaver- and ant-like scholar too, finds

the best possible conditions for its development. But even for artists

of a superior calibre the conditions are already far from favourable:

for does not every one of them, almost, perish owing to his want of

discipline? They are no longer tyrannised over by an outside power--by

the tables of absolute values enforced by a Church or by a monarch:

and thus they no longer learn to develop their "inner tyrant," their

\_will.\_ And what holds good of artists also holds good, to a greater

and more fatal degree, of philosophers. Where, then, are free spirits

to be found to-day? Let any one show me a free spirit to-day!

465.

Under "Spiritual freedom" I understand something very definite: it is

a state in which one is a hundred times superior to philosophers and

other disciples of "truth" in one's severity towards one's self, in

one's uprightness, in one's courage, and in one's absolute will to say

nay even when it is dangerous to say nay. I regard the philosophers

that have appeared heretofore as \_contemptible libertines\_ hiding

behind the petticoats of the female "Truth."

END OF VOL. I.

CONTENTS OF VOL. II.

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

THIRD BOOK. THE PRINCIPLES OF A NEW VALUATION.

I. THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE--

\_(a)\_ The Method of Investigation

\_(b)\_ The Starting-Point of Epistemology

\_(c)\_ The Belief in the "Ego." Subject

\_(d)\_ Biology of the Instinct of Knowledge. Perspectivity

\_(e)\_ The Origin of Reason and Logic

\_(f)\_ Consciousness

\_(g)\_ Judgment. True--False

\_(h)\_ Against Causality

\_(i)\_ The Thing-in-Itself and Appearance

\_(k)\_ The Metaphysical Need

\_(l)\_ The Biological Value of Knowledge

\_(m)\_ Science

II. THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE--

1. The Mechanical Interpretation of the World

2. The Will to Power as Life--

\_(a)\_ The Organic Process

\_(b)\_ Man

3. Theory of the Will to Power and of Valuations

III. THE WILL TO POWER AS EXEMPLIFIED IN

SOCIETY AND IN THE INDIVIDUAL

1. Society and the State

2. The Individual

IV. THE WILL TO POWER IN ART

FOURTH BOOK. DISCIPLINE AND BREEDING.

I. THE ORDER OF RANK--

1. The Doctrine of the Order of Rank

2. The Strong and the Weak

3. The Noble Man

4. The Lords of the Earth

5. The Great Man

6. The Highest Man as Lawgiver of the Future

II. DIONYSUS

III. ETERNAL RECURRENCE

I.

THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.

(a) The Method of Investigation.

466.

The distinguishing feature of our nineteenth century is not the triumph

of \_science,\_ but the triumph of the scientific \_method\_ over science.

467.

\_The history of scientific methods\_ was regarded by Auguste Comte

almost as philosophy itself.

468.

The great \_Methodologists:\_ Aristotle, Bacon, Descartes, Auguste Comte.

469.

The most valuable knowledge is always discovered last: but the most

valuable knowledge consists of \_methods.\_

All methods, all the hypotheses on which the science of our day

depends, were treated with the profoundest contempt for centuries:

on their account a man used to be banished from the society of

\_respectable\_ people--he was held to be an "\_enemy of God,\_" a reviler

of the highest ideal, a madman.

We had the whole \_pathos\_ of mankind against us,--our notion of what

"truth" ought to be, of what the service of truth ought to be, our

objectivity, our method, our calm, cautious and distrustful manner were

altogether \_despicable....\_ At bottom, that which has kept men back

most, is an æsthetic taste: they believed in the picturesque effect of

truth; what they demanded of the scientist was, that he should make a

strong appeal to their imagination.

From the above, it would almost seem as if the very \_reverse\_ had been

achieved, as if a sudden \_jump\_ had been made: as a matter of fact, the

schooling which the moral hyperboles afforded, gradually prepared the

way for that \_milder form of pathos\_ which at last became incarnate in

the scientific man....

\_Conscientiousness in small things,\_ the self-control of the religious

man, was a preparatory school for the scientific character, as was

also, in a very pre-eminent sense, the attitude of mind which makes a

man \_take problems seriously,\_ irrespective of what personal advantage

he may derive from them....

\_(b)\_ The Starting-point of Epistemology.

470.

Profound disinclination to halt once and for all at any collective view

of the world. The charm of the opposite point of view: the refusal to

relinquish the stimulus residing in the enigmatical.

471.

The hypothesis that, at bottom, things proceed in such a moral fashion

that \_human reason must be right,\_ is a mere piece of good-natured

and simple-minded trustfulness, the result of the belief in Divine

truthfulness--God regarded as the Creator of all things.--These

concepts are our inheritance from a former existence in a Beyond.

472.

The contradiction of the so-called "facts of consciousness."

Observation a thousand times more difficult, error is perhaps the

absolute \_condition\_ of observation.

473.

The intellect cannot criticise itself, simply because it can be

compared with no other kind of intellect, and also because its ability

to know would only reveal itself in the presence of "actual reality";

that is to say, because, in order to criticise the intellect, we should

have to be higher creatures with "absolute knowledge." This would

presuppose the existence of \_something,\_ a "thing-in-itself," apart

from all the perspective kinds of observation and senso-spiritual

perception. But the psychological origin of the belief in \_things,\_

forbids our speaking of "things in themselves."

474.

The idea that a sort of adequate relation exists between \_subject\_ and

\_object,\_ that the object is something which \_when seen from inside\_

would be a subject, is a well-meant invention which, I believe, has

seen its best days. The measure of that which we are conscious of, is

perforce entirely dependent upon the coarse utility of the function of

consciousness: how could this little garret-prospect of consciousness

warrant our asserting anything in regard to "subject" and "object,"

which would bear any relation to reality!

475.

Criticism of modern philosophy: erroneous starting-point, as if there

were such things as "facts of consciousness"--and no \_phenomenalism\_ in

\_introspection.\_

476.

"Consciousness"--to what extent is the idea which is thought of, the

idea of will, or the idea of a feeling (\_which is known by us alone\_),

quite superficial? Our \_inner\_ world is also "appearance."

477.

I am convinced of the phenomenalism of the \_inner\_ world also:

everything that reaches our consciousness is utterly and completely

adjusted, simplified, schematised, interpreted, the \_actual\_ process

of inner "perception," the \_relation of causes\_ between thoughts,

feelings, desires, between subject and object, is absolutely concealed

from us, and may be purely imaginary. This "\_inner\_ world of

appearance" is treated with precisely the same forms and procedures as

the "outer" world. We never come across a single "fact": pleasure and

pain are more recently evolved intellectual phenomena....

Causality evades us; to assume the existence of an immediate causal

relation between thoughts, as Logic does, is the result of the coarsest

and most clumsy observation. There are \_all sorts of passions\_ that may

intervene between two thoughts: but the interaction is too rapid--that

is why we \_fail to recognise\_ them, that is why we actually \_deny\_

their existence....

"Thinking," as the epistemologists understand \_\r\_ it, never takes

place at all: it is an absolutely gratuitous fabrication, arrived at

by selecting one element from the process and by eliminating all the

rest--an artificial adjustment for the purpose of the understanding....

The "mind," \_something that thinks\_: at times, even, "the mind absolute

and pure"--this concept is an evolved and second result of false

introspection, which believes in "thinking": in the first place an act

is imagined here which does not really occur at all, \_i.e.\_ "thinking";

and, \_secondly,\_ a subject-substratum is imagined in which every

process of this thinking has its origin, and nothing else--that is to

say, \_both the action and the agent are fanciful.\_

478.

Phenomenalism must not be sought in the wrong quarter: nothing is more

phenomenal, or, to be more precise, nothing is so much \_deception,\_ as

this inner world, which we observe with the "inner sense."

Our belief that the will is a cause was so great, that, according to

our personal experiences in general, we projected a cause into all

phenomena (\_i.e.\_ a certain motive is posited as the cause of all

phenomena).

We believe that the thoughts which follow one upon the other in our

minds are linked by some sort of causal relation: the logician, more

especially, who actually speaks of a host of facts which have never

once been seen in reality, has grown accustomed to the prejudice that

thoughts \_are the cause\_ of thoughts.

We believe--and even our philosophers believe it still--that pleasure

and pain are the causes of reactions, that the very purpose of pleasure

and pain is to occasion reactions. For hundreds of years, pleasure and

pain have been represented as the \_motives\_ for every action. Upon

reflection, however, we are bound to concede that everything would have

proceeded in exactly the same way, according to precisely the same

sequence of cause and effect, if the states "pleasure" and "pain" had

been entirely absent; and that we are simply deceived when we believe

that they actually cause anything:--they are the \_attendant phenomena,\_

and they have quite a different purpose from that of provoking

reactions; they are in themselves effects involved in the process of

reaction which takes place.

\_In short:\_ Everything that becomes conscious is a final phenomenon, a

conclusion--and is the cause of nothing; all succession of phenomena

in consciousness is absolutely atomistic.--And we tried to understand

the universe from the \_opposite\_ point of view--as if nothing were

effective or real, save thinking, feeling, willing! ...

479.

\_The phenomenalism of the "inner world!" A chronological inversion

takes place,\_ so that the cause reaches consciousness as the

effect.--We know that pain is projected into a certain part of the

body although it is not really situated there; we have learnt that all

sensations which were ingenuously supposed to be conditioned by the

outer world are, as a matter of fact, conditioned by the inner world:

that the real action of the outer world never takes place in a way of

which we can become conscious.... That fragment of the outer world of

which we become conscious, is born after the effect produced by the

outer world has been recorded, and is subsequently interpreted as the

"cause" of that effect....

In the phenomenalism of the "inner world," the chronological order

of cause and effect is inverted. The fundamental fact of "inner

experience" is, that the cause is imagined after the effect has been

recorded.... The same holds good of the sequence of thoughts: we seek

for the reason of a thought, before it has reached our consciousness;

and then the reason reaches consciousness first, whereupon follows

its effect. All our dreams are the interpretation of our collective

feelings with the view of discovering the possible causes of the

latter; and the process is such that a condition only becomes

conscious, when the supposed causal link has reached consciousness.[1]

The whole of "inner experience" is founded on this: that a cause is

sought and imagined which accounts for a certain irritation in our

nerve-centres, and that it is only the cause which is found in this way

which reaches consciousness; this cause may have absolutely nothing to

do with the real cause--it is a sort of groping assisted by former

"inner experiences," that is to say, by memory. The memory, however,

retains the habit of old interpretations,--that is to say, of erroneous

causality,--so that "inner experience" comprises in itself all the

results of former erroneous fabrications of causes. Our "outside

world," as we conceive it every instant, is indissolubly bound up with

the old error of cause: we interpret by means of the schematism of

"the thing," etc.

"Inner experience" only enters consciousness when it has found a

language which the individual can \_understand\_--that is to say, a

translation of a certain condition into conditions with which he is

\_familiar;\_ "understand" means simply this: to be able to express

something new in the terms of something old or familiar. For instance,

"I feel unwell"--a judgment of this sort presupposes a \_very great and

recent neutrality on the part of the observer:\_ the simple man always

says, "This and that make me feel unwell,"--he begins to be clear

concerning his indisposition only after he has discovered a reason for

it.... This is what I call \_a lack of philological\_ knowledge; to be

able to read a text, \_as such,\_ without reading an interpretation into

it, is the latest form of "inner experience,"--it is perhaps a barely

possible form....

480.

There are no such things as "mind," reason, thought, consciousness,

soul, will, or truth: they all belong to fiction, and can serve no

purpose. It is not a question of "subject and object," but of a

particular species of animal which can prosper only by means of a

certain \_exactness,\_ or, better still, \_regularity\_ in recording its

perceptions (in order that experience may be capitalised)....

Knowledge works as an \_instrument\_ of power. It is therefore obvious

that it increases with each advance of power....

The purpose of knowledge: in this case, as in the case of "good" or

"beautiful," the concept must be regarded strictly and narrowly from an

anthropocentric and biological standpoint. In order that a particular

species may maintain and increase its power, its conception of reality

must contain enough which is calculable and constant to allow of its

formulating a scheme of conduct. \_The utility of preservation\_--and

\_not\_ some abstract or theoretical need to eschew deception--stands as

the motive force behind the development of the organs of knowledge; ...

they evolve in such a way that their observations may suffice for our

preservation. In other words, the \_measure\_ of the desire for knowledge

depends upon the extent to which \_the Will to Power\_ grows in a certain

species: a species gets a grasp of a given amount of reality, \_in order

to master it, in order to enlist that amount in its service.\_

(c) The Belief in the "Ego." Subject.

481.

In opposition to Positivism, which halts at phenomena and says,

"These are only \_facts\_ and nothing more," I would say: No,

facts are precisely what is lacking, all that exists consists of

\_interpretations.\_ We cannot establish any fact "in itself": it

may even be nonsense to desire to do such a thing. "Everything is

\_subjective,\_" ye say: but that in itself is \_interpretation.\_ The

subject is nothing given, but something superimposed by fancy,

something introduced behind.--Is it necessary to set an interpreter

behind the interpretation already to hand? Even that would be fantasy,

hypothesis.

To the extent to which knowledge has any sense at all, the world is

knowable: but it may be interpreted \_differently,\_ it has not one sense

behind it, but hundreds of senses.--"Perspectivity."

It is our needs that \_interpret the world\_; our instincts and their

impulses for and against. Every instinct is a sort of thirst for power;

each has its point of view, which it would fain impose upon all the

other instincts as their norm.

482.

Where our ignorance really begins, at that point from which we can see

no further, we set a word; for instance, the word "I," the word "do,"

the word "suffer"--these concepts may be the horizon lines of our

knowledge, but they are not "truths."

483.

Owing to the phenomenon "thought," the ego is taken for granted; but

up to the present everybody believed, like the people, that there

was something unconditionally certain in the notion "I think," and

that by analogy with our understanding of all other causal reactions

this "I" was the given \_cause\_ of the thinking. However customary

and indispensable this fiction may have become now, this fact proves

nothing against the imaginary nature of its origin; it might be a

life-preserving belief and \_still\_ be \_false.\_

484.

"Something is thought, therefore there is something that thinks": this

is what Descartes' argument amounts to. But this is tantamount to

considering our belief in the notion "\_substance\_" as an "\_a priori\_"

truth:--that there must be something "that thinks" when we think, is

merely a formulation of a grammatical custom which sets an agent to

every action. In short, a metaphysico-logical postulate is already put

forward here--and it is not merely \_an ascertainment of fact....\_ On

Descartes' lines nothing absolutely certain is attained, but only the

fact of a very powerful faith.

If the proposition be reduced to "Something is thought, therefore there

are thoughts," the result is mere tautology; and precisely the one

factor which is in question, the "\_reality\_ of thought," is not touched

upon,--so that, in this form, the apparitional character of thought

cannot be denied. What Descartes \_wanted\_ to prove was, that thought

not only had \_apparent reality,\_ but absolute reality.

485.

The concept \_substance\_ is an outcome of the concept \_subject,\_ and not

conversely! If we surrender the concept soul, the subject, the very

conditions for the concept "substance" are lacking. \_Degrees of Being\_

are obtained, but Being is lost.

Criticism of "\_reality\_": what does a \_"plus or minus of reality"\_ lead

to, the gradation of Being in which we believe?

The degree of our feeling of \_life\_ and \_power\_ (the logic and

relationship of past life) presents us with the measure of "Being,"

"reality," "non-appearance."

\_Subject i\_ this is the term we apply to our belief in an \_entity\_

underlying all the different moments of the most intense sensations

of reality; we regard this belief as the effect of a cause,--and we

believe in our belief to such an extent that, on its account alone,

we imagine "truth," "reality," "substantiality."--a "Subject" is the

fiction which would fain make us believe that several similar states

were the effect of one substratum: but we it was who first \_created\_

the "similarity" of these states; the similising and adjusting of them

is the \_fact--not\_ their similarity (on the contrary, this ought rather

to be denied).

486.

One would have to know what \_Being\_ is, in order to be able to

\_decide\_ whether this or that is real (for instance, "the facts of

consciousness"); it would also be necessary to know what \_certainty\_

and \_knowledge\_ are, and so forth.--But, as we do \_not\_ know these

things, a criticism of the faculty of knowledge is nonsensical: how is

it possible for an instrument to criticise itself, when it is itself

that exercises the critical faculty. It cannot even define itself!

487.

Should not all philosophy ultimately disclose the first principles on

which the reasoning processes depend?--that is to say, our \_belief\_

in the "ego" as a substance, as the only reality according to which,

alone, we are able to ascribe reality to things? The oldest realism

at length comes to light, simultaneously with man's recognition of

the fact that his whole religious history is no more than a history

of soul-superstitions. \_Here there is a barrier;\_ our very thinking,

itself, involves that belief (with its distinctions--substance,

accident, action, agent, etc.); to abandon it would mean to cease from

being able to think.

But that a belief, however useful it may be for the preservation of a

species, has nothing to do with the truth, may be seen from the fact

that we \_must\_ believe in time, space, and motion, without feeling

ourselves compelled to regard them as absolute realities.

488.

\_The psychological origin of our belief in reason.--\_The ideas

"reality," "Being," are derived from our \_subject-\_feeling.

"Subject," interpreted through ourselves so that the ego may stand as

substance, as the cause of action, as the \_agent.\_

The metaphysico-logical postulates, the belief in substance, accident,

attribute, etc. etc., draws its convincing character from our habit of

regarding all our actions as the result of our will: so that the ego,

as substance, does not vanish in the multiplicity of changes.--\_But

there is no such thing as will.\_ We have no categories which allow

us to separate a "world as thing-in-itself," from "a world of

appearance." All our \_categories of reason\_ have a sensual origin: they

are deductions from the empirical world. "The soul," "the ego"--the

history of these concepts shows that here, also, the oldest distinction

("\_spiritus\_," "life") obtains....

If there is nothing material, then there can be nothing immaterial. The

concept no longer \_means\_ anything.

No subject-"atoms." The sphere of a subject \_increasing\_ or

\_diminishing\_ unremittingly, the centre of the system continually

\_displacing\_ itself, in the event of the system no longer being able

to organise the appropriated mass, it divides into two. On the other

hand, it is able, without destroying it, to transform a weaker subject

into one of its own functionaries, and, to a certain extent, to compose

a new entity with it. Not a "substance," but rather something which in

itself strives after greater strength; and which wishes to "preserve"

itself only indirectly (it wishes to \_surpass\_ itself).

489.

Everything that reaches consciousness as an entity is already

enormously complicated: we never have anything more than the \_semblance

of an entity.\_

The phenomenon of the \_body\_ is the richer, more distinct, and more

tangible phenomenon: it should be methodically drawn to the front, and

no mention should be made of its ultimate significance.

490.

The assumption of a \_single subject\_ is perhaps not necessary, it

may be equally permissible to assume a plurality of subjects, whose

interaction and struggle lie at the bottom of our thought and our

consciousness in general. A sort of \_aristocracy\_ of "cells" in which

the ruling power is vested? Of course an aristocracy of equals, who are

accustomed to ruling co-operatively, and understand how to command?

\_My hypotheses\_. The subject as a plurality. Pain intellectual and

dependent upon the judgment harmful, projected. The effect always

"unconscious": the inferred and imagined cause is projected, it

\_follows\_ the event. Pleasure is a form of pain. The only kind of power

that exists is of the same nature as the power of will: a commanding

of other subjects which thereupon alter themselves. The unremitting

transientness and volatility of the subject. "Mortal soul." \_Number\_ as

perspective form.

491.

The belief in the body is more fundamental than the belief in the soul:

the latter arose from the unscientific observation of the agonies

of the body. (Something which leaves it. The belief in the \_truth of

dreams\_)

492.

The body and physiology the starting-point: why?--We obtain a correct

image of the nature of our subject-entity, that is to say, as a

number of regents at the head of a community (not as "souls" or as

"life-forces") as also of the dependence of these regents upon their

subjects, and upon the conditions of a hierarchy, and of the division

of labour, as the means ensuring the existence of the part and the

whole. We also obtain a correct image of the way in which the living

entities continually come into being and expire, and we see how

eternity cannot belong to the "subject"; we realise that the struggle

finds expression in obeying as well as in commanding, and that a

fluctuating definition of the limits of power is a factor of life. The

comparative \_ignorance\_ in which the ruler is kept, of the individual

performances and even disturbances taking place in the community,

also belong to the conditions under which government may be carried

on. In short, we obtain a valuation even of \_want-of-knowledge,\_

of seeing-things-generally-as-a-whole, of simplification, of

falsification, and of perspective. What is most important, however,

is, that we regard the ruler and his subjects as of the \_same kind,\_

all feeling, willing, thinking--and that wherever we see or suspect

movement in a body, we conclude that there is co-operative-subjective

and invisible life. Movement as a symbol for the eye; it denotes that

something has been felt, willed, thought.

The danger of directly questioning the subject \_concerning\_ the

subject, and all spiritual self-reflection, consists in this, that it

might be a necessary condition of its activity to interpret itself

\_erroneously.\_ That is why we appeal to the body and lay the evidence

of sharpened senses aside: or we try and see whether the subjects

themselves cannot enter into communication with us.

\_(d)\_ Biology of the Instinct of Knowledge. Perspectivity.

493.

\_Truth is that kind of error\_ without which a certain species of living

being cannot exist. The value for \_Life\_ is ultimately decisive.

494.

It is unlikely that our "knowledge" extends farther than is exactly

necessary for our self-preservation. Morphology shows us how the

senses and the nerves as well as the brain evolve in proportion as the

difficulties of acquiring sustenance increase.

495.

If the morality of "Thou shalt not lie" be refuted, the sense for truth

will then have to justify itself before another tribunal--as a means

to the preservation of man, \_as Will to Power.\_

Likewise our love of the beautiful: it is also the \_creative will.\_

Both senses stand side by side; the sense of truth is the means

wherewith the power is appropriated to adjust things according to one's

taste. The love of adjusting and reforming--a primeval love! We can

only \_take cognisance\_ of a world which we ourselves have \_made.\_

496.

Concerning the multifariousness of knowledge. The tracing of \_its\_

relation to many other things (or the relation of kind)--how should

"knowledge" be of another? The way to know and to investigate is in

itself among the conditions of life; that is why the conclusion that

there could be no other kind of intellect (for ourselves) than the kind

which serves the purpose of our preservation is an excessively hasty

one: this \_actual\_ condition may be only an accidental, not in the

least an essential; one.

Our apparatus for acquiring knowledge is not adjusted for knowledge.

497.

\_The most strongly credited a priori "truths" are, to my mind, mere

assumptions pending further investigation\_; for instance, the law

of causation is a belief so thoroughly acquired by practice and so

completely assimilated, that to disbelieve in it would mean the ruin of

our kind. But is it therefore true? What an extraordinary conclusion!

As if truth were proved by the mere fact that man survives!

498.

To what extent is our \_intellect\_ also a result of the conditions of

life?--We should not have it did we not \_need\_ to have it, and we

should not have it \_as\_ we have it, if we did not need it \_as\_ we need

it--that is to say, if we could live otherwise.

499.

Thinking in a primitive (inorganic) state is to \_persevere in forms,\_

as in the case of the crystal.--In \_our\_ thought, the \_essential

factor\_ is the harmonising of the new material with the old schemes (=

Procrustes' bed), the \_assimilation\_ of the unfamiliar.

500.

The perception of the senses projected outwards: "inwards" and

"outwards"--does the \_body\_ command here?

The same equalising and ordering power which rules in the idioplasma,

also rules in the incorporation of the outer world: our sensual

perceptions are already the \_result\_ of this process of \_adaptation\_

and \_harmonisation\_ in regard to \_all\_ the past in us; they do not

follow directly upon the "impression."

501.

All thought, judgment, perception, regarded as an act of \_comparing\_[2]

has as a first condition the act of \_equalising,\_ and earlier still the

act of \_"making equal."\_ The process of making equal is the same as the

assimilation by the amœba of the nutritive matter it appropriates.

"Memory" late, in so far as the equalising instinct appears to have

been \_subdued\_: the difference is preserved. Memory--a process of

classification and collocation; active--who?

502.

In regard to the \_memory,\_ we must unlearn a great deal: here we meet

with the greatest temptation to assume the existence of a "soul,"

which, irrespective of time, reproduces and recognises again and again,

etc. What I have experienced, however, continues to live "in the

memory"; I have nothing to do with it when memory "comes," my will is

inactive in regard to it, as in the case of the coming and going of a

thought. Something happens, of which I become conscious: now something

similar comes--who has called it forth? Who has awakened it?

503.

The whole apparatus of knowledge is an abstracting and simplifying

apparatus--not directed at knowledge, but at the \_appropriation\_ of

things: "end" and "means" are as remote from the essence of this

apparatus as "concepts" are. By the "end" and the "means" a process is

appropriated (--a process is \_invented\_ which may be grasped), but by

"\_concepts\_" one appropriates the "things" which constitute the process.

504.

\_Consciousness\_ begins outwardly as co-ordination and knowledge of

impressions,--at first it is at the point which is remotest from the

biological centre of the individual; but it is a process which deepens

and which tends to become more and more an inner function, continually

approaching nearer to the centre.

505.

Our perceptions, as we understand them--that is to say, the sum of all

those perceptions the consciousness whereof was useful and essential

to us and to the whole organic processes which preceded us: therefore

they do not include all perceptions (for instance, not the electrical

ones);--that is to say, we have \_senses\_ only for a definite selection

of perceptions--such perceptions as concern us with a view to our

self-preservation. \_Consciousness extends so far only as it is useful.\_

There can be no doubt that all our sense-perceptions are entirely

permeated by valuations (useful or harmful--consequently, pleasant or

painful). Every particular colour; besides being a colour, expresses a

value to us (although we seldom admit it, or do so only after it has

affected us exclusively for a long time, as in the case of convicts

in gaol or lunatics). Insects likewise react in different ways to

different colours: some like this shade, the others that. Ants are a

case in point.

506.

In the beginning \_images\_ how images originate in the mind must be

explained. Then \_words,\_ applied to images. Finally \_concepts,\_

possible only when there are words--the assembling of several pictures

into a whole which is not for the eye but for the ear (word). The

small amount of emotion which the "word" generates,--that is, then,

which the view of the similar pictures generates, for which one word

is used,--this simple emotion is the common factor, the basis of a

concept. That weak feelings should all be regarded as alike, \_as the

same,\_ is the fundamental fact. There is therefore a confusion of

two very intimately associated feelings in the \_ascertainment\_ of

these feelings;--but who is it that ascertains? \_Faith\_ is the very

first step in every sensual impression: a sort of yea-saying is the

\_first\_ intellectual activity! A "holding-a-thing-to-be-true" is

the beginning. It were our business, therefore, to explain how the

"holding-of-a-thing-to-be-true" arose! What sensation lies beneath the

comment "true"?

507.

The \_valuation\_, "I believe that this and that is so," is the essence

of "truth." In all valuations, the conditions of \_preservation\_ and

of \_growth\_ find expression. All our \_organs and senses\_ of knowledge

have been developed only in view of the conditions of preservation

and growth. The \_trust\_ in reason and its categories, the trust

in dialectics, and also the \_valuation\_ of logic, prove only that

\_experience\_ has taught the usefulness of these things to life: not

their "truth." The prerequisites of all living things and of their

lives is: that there should be a large amount of faith, that it should

be possible to pass definite judgments on things, and that \_there

should be no doubt\_ at all concerning all essential values. Thus it is

necessary that something should be assumed to be true, \_not\_ that it

\_is\_ true.

"The \_real\_ world and the world of \_appearance\_"-- I trace this

contrast to the \_relation of values.\_ We have posited \_our\_ conditions

of existence as the \_attributes of being\_ in general. Owing to the

fact that, in order to prosper, we must be stable in our belief, we

developed the idea that the real world was neither a changing nor an

evolving one, but a world of \_being.\_

\_(e)\_ The Origin of Reason and Logic.

508.

Originally there was chaos among our ideas. Those ideas which were able

to stand side by side remained over, the greater number perished--and

are still perishing.

509.

The kingdom of desires out of which logic grew: the gregarious instinct

in the background. The assumption of similar facts is the first

condition for "similar souls." \_For the purpose of mutual understanding

and government.\_

510.

Concerning the \_origin of logic.\_ The fundamental proneness to

\_equalise\_ things and to \_see them equal\_, gets to be modified,

and kept within bounds, by the consideration of what is useful or

harmful--in fact, by considerations of success: it then becomes adapted

in suchwise as to be gratified in a milder way, without at the same

time denying life or endangering it. This whole process corresponds

entirely with that external and mechanical process (which is its

symbol) by which the \_protoplasm\_ continually assimilates, makes equal

to itself, what it appropriates, and arranges it according to its own

forms and requirements.

511.

Likeness and Similarity.

1. The coarser the organ the more apparent likenesses it sees;

2. The mind \_will\_ have likeness--that is to say, the identification

of one sensual impression with others already experienced: just as the

body \_assimilates\_ inorganic matter.

For the understanding of Logic:--

\_The will which tends to see likeness everywhere is the will to

power\_--the belief that something is so and so (the essence of a

judgment), is the result of a will which \_would fain have it\_ as

similar as possible.

512.

Logic is bound up with the proviso: granted \_that identical cases

exist\_. As a matter of fact, before one can think and conclude in a

logical fashion, \_this\_ condition \_must\_ first be assumed. That is

to say, the will to \_logical truth\_ cannot be consummated before a

fundamental falsification of all phenomena has been assumed. From which

it follows that an instinct rules here, which is capable of employing

both means: first, falsification; and secondly, the carrying out of its

own point of view: logic does not spring from a will to truth.

513.

The inventive force which devised the categories, worked in the service

of our need of security, of quick intelligibility, in the form of

signs, sounds, and abbreviations.--"Substance," "subject," "object,"

"Being," "Becoming," are not matters of metaphysical truth. It was

the powerful who made the names of things into law, and, among the

powerful, it was the greatest artists in abstraction who created the

categories.

514.

A moral--that is to say, a method of living which long experience

and experiment have tested and proved efficient, at last enters

consciousness as a law, as dominant.... And then the whole group of

related values and conditions become part of it: it becomes venerable,

unassailable, holy, true; a necessary part of its evolution is that

its origin should be forgotten.... That is a sign that it has become

master. Exactly the same thing might have happened with the categories

of reason: the latter, after much groping and many trials, might have

proved true through relative usefulness.... A stage was reached when

they were grasped as a whole, and when they appealed to consciousness

as a whole,--when belief in them was commanded,--that is to say, when

they acted as if they commanded.... From that time forward they passed

as a priori, as beyond experience, as irrefutable. And, possibly, they

may have been the expression of no more than a certain practicality

answering the ends of a race and a species,--their usefulness alone is

their "truth."

515.

The object is, not "to know," but to schematise,--to impose as much

regularity and form upon chaos, as our practical needs require. In

the formation of reason, logic, and the categories, it was a need

in us that was the determining power: not the need "to know," but

to classify, to schematise, for the purpose of intelligibility and

calculation. (The adjustment and interpretation of all similar and

equal things,--the same process, which every sensual impression

undergoes, is the development of reason!) No pre-existing "idea" had

anything to do with it: but utility, which teaches us that things

can be reckoned with and managed, only when we view them roughly

as equal.... \_Finality\_ in reason is an effect, not a cause: Life

degenerates with every other form of reason, although constant attempts

are being made to attain to those other forms of reason;--for Life

would then become too obscure, too unequal.

The categories are "truths" only in the sense that they are the

conditions of our existence, just as Euclid's Space is a conditional

"truth." (Between ourselves, as no one will maintain that men are

absolutely necessary, reason, as well as Euclid's Space, are seen

to be but an idiosyncrasy of one particular species of animals, one

idiosyncrasy alone among many others....)

The subjective constraint which prevents one from contradicting here,

is a biological constraint: the instinct which makes us see the utility

of concluding as we do conclude, is in our blood, we \_are\_ almost this

instinct.... But what simplicity it is to attempt to derive from this

fact that we possess an absolute truth! ... The inability to contradict

anything is a proof of impotence but not of "truth."

516.

We are not able to affirm and to deny one and the same thing: that

is a principle of subjective experience--which is not in the least

"necessary," \_but only a sign of inability.\_

If, according to Aristotle, the \_principium contradictionis\_ is the

most certain of all principles; if it is the most ultimate of all,

and the basis of every demonstration; if the principle of every

other axiom lie within it: then one should analyse it all the more

severely, in order to discover how many assumptions \_already lie\_ at

its root. It either assumes something concerning reality and Being,

as if these had become known in some other sphere--that is to say, as

if it were \_impossible\_ to ascribe the opposite attributes to it; or

the proposition means: that the opposites \_should\_ not be ascribed to

it. In that case, logic would be an imperative, \_not\_ directed at the

knowledge of truth, but at the adjusting and fixing of a world \_which

must seem true to us.\_

In short, the question is a debatable one: are the axioms of logic

adequate to reality, or are they measures and means by which alone

we can, \_create\_ realities, or the concept "reality"?... In order to

affirm the first alternative, however, one would, as we have seen,

require a previous knowledge of Being; which is certainly not the case.

The proposition therefore contains no \_criterion of truth,\_ but an

\_imperative\_ concerning that which \_should\_ pass as true.

Supposing there were no such thing as A identical with itself, as

every logical (and mathematical) proposition presupposes, and that A

is in itself an \_appearance,\_ then logic would have a mere world \_of

appearance\_ as its first condition. As a matter of fact, we believe

in that proposition, under the influence of an endless empiricism

which seems to \_confirm\_ it every minute. The "thing"--that is the

real substratum of A; \_our belief in things\_ is the first condition of

our faith in logic. The A in logic is, like the atom, a reconstruction

of the thing.... By not understanding this, and by making logic

into a criterion of \_real being,\_ we are already on the road to the

classification of all those hypostases, substance, attribute, object,

subject, action, etc., as realities--that is to say, the conception of

a metaphysical world or a "real world" (--\_this is, however, once more

the world of appearance...\_).

The primitive acts of thought, affirmation, and negation, the holding

of a thing for true, and the holding of a thing for not true,--in so

far as they do not only presuppose a mere habit, but the very \_right\_

to postulate truth or untruth at all,--are already dominated by a

belief, \_that there is such a thing as knowledge for us,\_ and \_that

judgments can really hit the truth:\_ in short, logic never doubts that

it is able to pronounce something concerning truth in itself (--that

is to say, that to the thing which is in itself true, no opposite

attributes \_can\_ be ascribed).

In this belief there \_reigns\_ the sensual and coarse prejudice that our

sensations teach us \_truths\_ concerning things,--that I cannot at the

same moment of time say of one and the same thing that it is \_hard\_ and

\_soft.\_ (The instinctive proof, "I cannot have two opposite sensations

at once," is quite \_coarse\_ and \_false\_.)

That all contradiction in concepts should be forbidden, is the result

of a belief, that we \_are able\_ to form concepts, that a concept not

only characterises but also \_holds\_ the essence of a thing.... As a

matter of fact, logic (like geometry and arithmetic) only holds good of

\_assumed existences which we have created.\_ Logic is \_the attempt on

our part to understand the actual world according to a scheme of Being

devised by ourselves; or, more exactly, it is our attempt at making the

actual world more calculable and more susceptible to formulation, for

our own purposes....\_

517.

In order to be able to think and to draw conclusions, it is necessary

to \_acknowledge that which exists:\_ logic only deals with formulæ for

things which are constant. That is why this acknowledgment would not in

the least prove reality: "that which is" is part of our optics. The ego

regarded as Being (not affected by either Becoming or evolution).

The \_assumed world\_ of subject, substance, reason, etc., is necessary,

an adjusting, simplifying falsifying, artificially-separating power

resides in us. "Truth" is the will to be master over the manifold

sensations that reach consciousness; it is the will to \_classify\_

phenomena according to definite categories. In this way we start out

with a belief in the "true nature" of things (we regard phenomena as

real).

The character of the world in the process of Becoming \_is not

susceptible of formulation;\_ it is "false" and "contradicts itself."

\_Knowledge\_ and the process of \_evolution\_ exclude each other.

\_Consequently,\_ knowledge must be something else: it must be preceded

by a will to make things knowable, a kind of Becoming in itself must

create the \_illusion\_ of \_Being.\_

518.

If our "ego" is the only form of Being, according to which we make

and understand all Being: very good! In that case it were very

proper to doubt whether an \_illusion\_ of perspective were not active

here--the apparent unity which everything assumes in our eyes on the

horizon-line. Appealing to the body for our guidance, we are confronted

by such appalling manifoldness, that for the sake of method it is

allowable to use that phenomenon which is \_richer\_ and more easily

studied as a clue to the understanding of the poorer phenomenon.

Finally: admitting that all is Becoming, \_knowledge is only possible

when based on a belief in Being.\_

519.

If there is "only one form of Being, the ego," and all other forms

of Being are made in its own image,--if, in short, the belief in the

"ego," together with the belief in logic, stands and falls with the

metaphysical truth of the categories of reason: if, in addition, the

"ego" is shown to be something that is \_evolving: then----\_

520.

The continual transitions that occur, forbid our speaking of the

"individual," etc.; the "number" of beings itself fluctuates. We should

know nothing of time or of movement, if, in a rough way, we did not

believe we saw things "standing still" behind or in front of things

moving. We should also know just as little about cause and effect,

and without the erroneous idea of "empty space" we should never have

arrived at the concept of space at all. The principle of identity is

based on the "fact of appearance" that there are some things alike.

Strictly speaking, it would not be possible to "understand" and "know"

an evolving world; something which is called "knowledge" exists only

in so far as the "understanding" and "knowing" intellect already

finds an adjusted and rough world to hand, fashioned out of a host

of mere appearances, but become fixed \_to\_ the extent in which this

kind of appearance has helped to preserve life; only to this extent is

"knowledge" possible--that is to say, as a measuring of earlier and

more recent errors by one another.

521.

\_Concerning logical appearance.\_--The concept "individual" and the

concept "species" are equally false and only apparent. "\_Species\_" only

expresses the fact that an abundance of similar creatures come forth at

the same time, and that the speed of their further growth and of their

further transformation has been made almost imperceptible for a long

time: so that the actual and trivial changes and increase of growth are

of no account at all (--a stage of evolution in which the process of

evolving is not visible, so that, not only does a state of equilibrium

\_seem\_ to have been reached, but the road is also made clear for the

error of supposing \_that an actual goal has been reached\_--and that

evolution had a goal...).

The form seems to be something enduring, and therefore valuable;

but the form was invented merely by ourselves; and however often

"the same form is attained," it does not signify that it \_is the

same form,--because something new always appears\_; and we alone, who

compare, reckon the new with the old, in so far as it resembles the

latter, and embody the two in the unity of "form." As if a \_type\_ had

to be reached and were actually intended by the formative processes.

\_Form, species, law, idea, purpose\_--the same fault is made in respect

of all these concepts, namely, that of giving a false realism to a

piece of fiction: as if all phenomena were infused with some sort of

obedient spirit--an artificial distinction is here made between that

\_which\_ acts and that \_which\_ guides action (but both these things are

only fixed in order to agree with our metaphysico-logical dogma: they

are not "facts").

We should not interpret this \_constraint\_ in ourselves, to imagine

concepts, species, forms, purposes, and laws ("\_a world of identical

cases\_") as if we were in a position to construct a \_real world\_; but

as a constraint to adjust a world by means of which \_our existence\_

will be ensured: we thereby create a world which is determinable,

simplified, comprehensible, etc., for us.

The very same constraint is active in \_the functions of the senses\_

which support the reason--by means of simplification, coarsening,

accentuation, and interpretation; whereon all "recognition," all the

ability of making one's self intelligible rests. Our \_needs\_ have made

our senses so precise, that the "same world of appearance" always

returns, and has thus acquired the semblance of \_reality.\_

Our subjective constraint to have faith in logic, is expressive only

of the fact that long before logic itself became conscious in us, we

did nothing \_save introduce its postulates into the nature of things:\_

now we find ourselves in their presence,--we can no longer help

it,--and now we would fain believe that this constraint is a guarantee

of "truth." We it was who created the "thing," the "same thing," the

subject, the attribute, the action, the object, the substance, and

the form, after we had carried the process of equalising, coarsening,

and simplifying as far as possible. The world \_seems\_ logical to us,

because we have already made it logical.

522.

\_Fundamental solution.\_--We believe in reason: this is, however, the

philosophy of colourless \_concepts.\_ Language is built upon the most

\_naïf\_ prejudices.

Now we read discord and problems into things, because we are able to

\_think only\_ in the form of language--we also believe in the "eternal

truth" of "wisdom" (for instance, subject, attribute, etc.).

\_We cease from thinking if we do not wish to think under the control

of language\_; the most we can do is to attain to an attitude of doubt

concerning the question whether the boundary here really is a boundary.

\_Rational thought is a process of interpreting according to a scheme

which we cannot reject.\_

(\_f\_) Consciousness.

523.

There is no greater error than that of making psychical and physical

phenomena the two faces, the two manifestations of the same substance.

By this means nothing is explained: the concept \_"substance"\_ is

utterly useless as a means of explanation. \_Consciousness\_ may be

regarded as secondary, almost an indifferent and superfluous thing,

probably destined to disappear and to be superseded by perfect

automatism--

When we observe mental phenomena we may be likened to the deaf and dumb

who divine the spoken word, which they do not hear, from the movements

of the speaker's lips. From the appearance of the inner mind we draw

conclusions concerning invisible and other phenomena, which we could

ascertain if our powers of observation were adequate for the purpose.

For this inner world we have no finer organs, and that is why a

\_complexity which is thousandfold\_ reaches our consciousness as a

simple entity, and we invent a process of causation in it, despite

the fact that we can perceive no cause either of the movement or of

the change--the sequence of thoughts and feelings is nothing more

than their becoming visible to consciousness. That this sequence

has anything to do with a chain of causes is not worthy of belief:

consciousness never communicates an example of cause and effect to us.

524.

\_The part "consciousness" plays,\_--It is essential that one should not

mistake the part that "consciousness plays" it is our \_relation to the

outer world; it was the outer world that developed it.\_ On the other

hand, the \_direction\_--that is to say, the care and cautiousness which

is concerned with the inter-relation of the bodily functions, does

\_not\_ enter into our consciousness any more than does the \_storing

activity\_ of the intellect: that there is a superior controlling

force at work in these things cannot be doubted--a sort of directing

committee, in which the various \_leading desires\_ make their votes and

their power felt. "Pleasure" and "pain" are indications which reach us

from this sphere: as are also \_acts of will\_ and \_ideas.\_

\_In short:\_ That which becomes conscious has causal relations which are

completely and absolutely concealed from our knowledge--the sequence of

thoughts, feelings, and ideas, in consciousness, does not signify that

the order in which they come is a causal order: it is \_so apparently,\_

however, in the highest degree. We have \_based\_ the whole of our notion

of \_intellect, reason, logic,\_ etc., upon this \_apparent truth\_ (all

these things do not exist: they are imaginary syntheses and entities),

and we then projected the latter into and \_behind\_ all things!

As a rule \_consciousness\_ itself is understood to be the general

sensorium and highest ruling centre; albeit, it is only a \_means of

communication:\_ it was developed by intercourse, and with a view to

the interests of intercourse.... "Intercourse" is understood, here,

as "relation," and is intended to cover the action of the outer world

upon us and our necessary response to it, as also our actual influence

\_upon\_ the outer world. It is \_not\_ the conducting force, but an \_organ

of the latter.\_

525.

My principle, compressed into a formula which savours of antiquity, of

Christianity, Scholasticism, and other kinds of musk: in the concept,

"God is \_spirit,\_" God as perfection is "\_denied....\_"

526.

Wherever people have observed a certain unity in the grouping of

things, \_spirit\_ has always been regarded as the cause of this

co-ordination: an assumption for which reasons are entirely lacking.

Why should the idea of a complex fact be one of the conditions of that

fact? Or why should the \_notion\_ of a complex fact have to precede it

as its cause?

We must be on our guard against explaining \_finality\_ by the spirit:

there is absolutely no reason whatever for ascribing to spirit the

peculiar power of organising and systematising. The domain of the

nervous system is much more extensive: the realm of consciousness is

superadded. In the collective process of adaptation and systematising,

consciousness plays no part at all.

527.

Physiologists, like philosophers, believe that consciousness increases

in \_value\_ in proportion as it \_gains\_ in clearness: the most lucid

consciousness and the most logical and impassive thought are of the

\_first\_ order. Meanwhile--according to what standard is this value

determined?--In regard to the \_discharge of will-power\_ the most

superficial and \_most simple\_ thought is the most useful--it might

therefore, etc. etc. (because it leaves few motives over).

\_Precision in action\_ is opposed to the \_far-sighted\_ and often

uncertain judgments of \_caution:\_ the latter is led by the \_deeper\_

instinct.

528.

\_The chief error of psychologists:\_ they regard the indistinct idea as

of a lower \_kind\_ than the distinct; but that which keeps at a distance

from our consciousness and which is therefore \_obscure, may\_ on that

very account be quite clear in itself. \_The fact that a thing becomes

obscure\_ is a question \_of the perspective of consciousness.\_

529.

The great misapprehensions:--

(1) The senseless \_overestimation of consciousness,\_ its elevation to

the dignity of an entity: "a spirit," "a soul," something that feels,

thinks, and wills;

(2) The spirit regarded as a \_cause,\_ especially where finality,

system, and co-ordination appear;

(3) Consciousness classed as the highest form attainable, as the most

superior kind of being, as "God";

(4) Will introduced wherever effects are observed;

(5) The "real world" regarded as the spiritual world, accessible by

means of the facts of consciousness;

(6) Absolute knowledge regarded as the faculty of consciousness,

wherever knowledge exists at all.

\_Consequences:\_--

Every step forward consists of a step forward in consciousness; every

step backwards is a step into unconsciousness (unconsciousness was

regarded as a falling-back upon the \_passions\_ and \_senses--\_as a

state of \_animalism ...\_.)

Man approaches reality and real being through dialectics: man \_departs\_

from them by means of instincts, senses, and automatism....

To convert man into a spirit, would mean to make a god of him: spirit,

will, goodness--all one.

\_All goodness\_ must take its root in spirituality, must be a fact of

consciousness.

Every step made towards \_something better\_ can be only a step forward

in \_consciousness.\_

(g) Judgment. True--false.

530.

Kant's theological bias, his unconscious dogmatism, his moral outlook,

ruled, guided, and directed him.

The πρῶτον ψεῡδος: how is the fact knowledge possible? Is knowledge

a fact at all? What is knowledge? If we do not \_know\_ what knowledge

is, we cannot possibly reply to the question, Is there such a thing

as knowledge? Very \_fine!\_ But if I do not already "know" whether

there is, or can be, such a thing as knowledge, I cannot reasonably

ask the question, "What is knowledge?" Kant \_believes\_ in the fact of

knowledge: what he requires is a piece of \_naïveté: the knowledge of

knowledge!\_

"Knowledge is judgment." But judgment is a belief that something is

this or that! And not knowledge! "All knowledge consists in synthetic

judgments" which have the character of being \_universally true\_ (the

fact is \_so\_ in all cases, and does not change), and which have the

character of being \_necessary\_ (the reverse of the proposition cannot

be imagined to exist).

The \_validity\_ of a belief in knowledge is always taken for granted; as

is also the \_validity\_ of the feelings which conscience dictates. Here

\_moral ontology\_ is the \_ruling\_ bias.

The conclusion, therefore, is: (1) there are propositions which we

believe to be universally true and necessary.

(2) This character of universal truth and of necessity cannot spring

from experience.

(3) Consequently it must base itself upon no experience at all, \_but

upon something else\_, it must be derived from another source of

knowledge!

Kant concludes (1) that there are some propositions which hold good

only on one condition; (2) this condition is that they do not spring

from experience, but from pure reason.

Thus, the question is, whence do we derive our reasons for \_believing\_

in the truth of such propositions? No, whence does our belief get

its cause? But the \_origin of a belief,\_ of a strong conviction,

is a psychological problem: and very limited and narrow experience

frequently brings about such a belief! \_It already presupposes\_ that

there are not only "data \_a posteriori\_" but also "data \_a priori\_"--

that is to say, "previous to experience." Necessary and universal truth

cannot be given by experience: it is therefore quite clear that it has

come to us without experience at all?

There is no such thing as an isolated judgment!

An isolated judgment is never "true," it is never knowledge; only in

\_connection with,\_ and when \_related to,\_ many other judgments, is a

guarantee of its truth forthcoming.

What is the difference between true and false belief? What is

knowledge? He "knows" it, that is heavenly! Necessary and universal

truth cannot be given by experience! It is therefore independent of

experience, \_of\_ all experience! The view which comes quite \_a priori,\_

and therefore independent of all experience, \_merely out of reason,\_ is

"pure knowledge"!

"The principles of logic, the principle of identity and of

contradiction, are examples of pure knowledge, because they precede all

experience."--But these principles are not cognitions, but \_regulative

articles of faith.\_

In order to establish the \_a priori\_ character (the pure rationality)

of mathematical axioms, space \_must be conceived as a form of pure

reason.\_

Hume had declared that there were no \_a priori\_ synthetic judgments.

Kant says there are--the mathematical ones! And if there are such

judgments, there may also be such things as metaphysics and a knowledge

of things by means of pure reason!

Mathematics is possible under conditions which are \_not\_ allowed to

metaphysics. All human knowledge is either experience or mathematics.

A judgment is synthetic--that is to say, it co-ordinates various ideas.

It is \_a priori\_--that is to say, this co-ordination is universally

true and necessary, and is arrived at, not by sensual experience, but

by pure reason.

If there are such things as \_a priori\_ judgments, then reason must be

able to co-ordinate: co-ordination is a form. Reason must \_possess a

formative faculty.\_

531.

\_Judging\_ is our oldest faith; it is our habit of believing this to be

true or false, of asserting or denying, our certainty that something

is thus and not otherwise, our belief that we really "know"--\_what\_ is

believed to be true in all judgments?

What are \_attributes\_?--We did not regard changes in ourselves merely

as such, but as "things in themselves," which are strange to us, and

which we only "perceive"; and we did \_not\_ class them as phenomena,

but as Being, as "attributes"; and in addition we invented a creature

to which they attach themselves--that is to say, we made the \_effect\_

the \_working cause,\_ and \_the latter\_ we made \_Being.\_ But even in

this plain statement, the concept "effect" is arbitrary: for in regard

to those changes which occur in us, and of which we are convinced

we ourselves are \_not\_ the cause, we still argue that they must be

effects: and this is in accordance with the belief that "every change

must have its author";--but this belief in itself is already mythology;

for it \_separates\_ the working \_cause from\_ the cause in work. When I

say the "lightning flashes," I set the flash down, once as an action

and a second time as a subject acting; and thus a thing is fancifully

affixed to a phenomenon, which is not one with it, but which is

\_stable,\_ which \_is,\_ and does not "come."--\_To make the phenomenon the

working cause,\_ and to make \_the effect into a thing--into Being:\_

this is the \_double\_ error, or \_interpretation,\_ of which we are guilty.

532.

The \_Judgment\_--that is the faith: "This and this is so. In every

judgment, therefore, there lies the admission that an "identical"

case has been met with: it thus takes some sort of comparison for

granted, with the help of the memory. Judgment does \_not\_ create the

idea that an identical case seems to be there. It believes rather that

it actually perceives such a case; it works on the hypothesis that

there are such things as identical cases. But what is that much \_older\_

function called, which must have been active much earlier, and which

in itself equalises unequal cases and makes them alike? What is that

second function called, which with this first one as a basis, etc. etc,

"That which provokes the same sensations as another thing is equal

to that other thing": but what is that called which makes sensations

equal, which regards them as equal?--There could be no judgments if

a sort of equalising process were not active within all sensations:

memory is only possible by means of the underscoring of all that has

already been experienced and learned. Before a judgment can be formed,

\_the process of assimilation must already have been completed\_: thus,

even here, an intellectual activity is to be observed which does

not enter consciousness in at all the same way as the pain which

accompanies a wound. Probably the psychic phenomena correspond to all

the organic functions--that is to say, they consist of assimilation,

rejection, growth, etc.

The essential thing is to start out from the body and to use it as the

general clue. It is by far the richer phenomenon, and allows of much

more accurate observation. The belief in the body is much more soundly

established than the belief in spirit.

"However strongly a thing may be believed, the degree of belief is no

criterion of its truth." But what is truth? Perhaps it is a form of

faith, which has become a condition of existence? Then \_strength\_ would

certainly be a criterion; for instance, in regard to causality.

533.

Logical accuracy, transparency, considered as the criterion

of truth ("\_omne illud verum est, quod clare et distincte

percipitur.\_"--Descartes): by this means the mechanical hypothesis of

the world becomes desirable and credible.

But this is gross confusion: like \_simplex sigillum veri.\_ Whence comes

the knowledge that the real nature of things stands in \_this\_ relation

to our intellect? Could it not be otherwise? Could it not be this,

that the hypothesis which gives the intellect the greatest feeling of

power and security, is \_preferred, valued,\_ and marked as \_true\_--The

intellect sets its \_freest\_ and \_strongest faculty\_ and \_ability\_

as the criterion of what is most valuable, consequently of what is

\_true....\_

"True"--from the standpoint of sentiment--is that which most

provokes sentiment ("I");

from the standpoint of thought--is that which gives thought

the greatest sensation of strength;

from the standpoint of touch, sight, and hearing--is that

which calls forth the greatest resistance.

Thus it is the \_highest degrees of activity\_ which awaken belief in

regard to the \_object\_, in regard to its "reality." The sensations of

strength, struggle, and resistance convince the subject that there is

something which is being resisted.

534.

The criterion of truth lies in the enhancement of the feeling of power.

535.

According to my way of thinking, "truth" does not necessarily mean

the opposite of error, but, in the most fundamental cases, merely

the relation of different errors to each other: thus one error might

be older, deeper than another, perhaps altogether ineradicable, one

without which organic creatures like ourselves could not exist;

whereas other errors might not tyrannise over us to that extent as

conditions of existence, but when measured according to the standard

of those other "tyrants," could even be laid aside and "refuted." Why

should an irrefutable assumption necessarily be "true"? This question

may exasperate the logicians who limit \_things\_ according to the

limitations they find in themselves: but I have long since declared war

with this logician's optimism.

536.

Everything simple is simply imaginary, but not "true." That which is

real and true is, however, neither a unity nor reducible to a unity.

537.

\_What is truth?\_--Inertia; \_that\_ hypothesis which brings satisfaction,

the smallest expense of intellectual strength, etc.

538.

First proposition. The \_easier\_ way of thinking always triumphs

over the more difficult way;--\_dogmatically\_: \_simplex sigillum

veri\_.--\_Dico\_: to suppose that \_clearness\_ is any proof of truth, is

absolute childishness. . . .

Second proposition. The teaching of Being, of things, and of all those

constant entities, is a \_hundred times more easy\_ than the teaching of

\_Becoming\_ and of evolution. . .

Third proposition. Logic was intended to be a method of \_facilitating\_

thought: a \_means of expression\_, --not truth. . . . Later on it got to

\_act\_ like truth. . . .

539.

Parmenides said: "One can form no concept of the non-existent";--we are

at the other extreme, and say, "That Of which a concept can be formed,

is certainly fictional."

540.

There are many kinds of eyes. Even the Sphinx has eyes--therefore there

must be many kinds of "truths," and consequently there can be no truth.

541.

\_Inscriptions over the porch of a modern lunatic asylum.\_

"That which is necessarily true in thought must be necessarily true in

morality."--HERBERT SPENCER.

"The ultimate test of the truth of a proposition is the

inconceivableness of its negation,"--HERBERT SPENCER.

542.

If the character of existence were false,:--and this would be

possible,--what would truth then be, all our truth? ... An unprincipled

falsification of the false? A higher degree of falseness? ...

543.

In a world which was essentially false, truthfulness would be an

\_anti-natural tendency\_: its only purpose would be to provide a means

of attaining to a \_higher degree of falsity.\_ For a world of truth and

Being to be simulated, the truthful one would first have to be created

(it being understood that he must believe himself to be "truthful").

Simple, transparent, not in contradiction with himself, lasting,

remaining always the same to himself, free from faults, sudden changes,

dissimulation, and form: such a man conceives a world of Being as

"\_God\_" in His own image.

In order that truthfulness may be possible, the whole sphere in which

man moves must be very tidy, small, and respectable: the advantage

in every respect must be with the truthful one.--Lies, tricks,

dissimulations, must cause astonishment.

544.

\_"Dissimulation"\_ increases in accordance with the rising \_order of

rank\_ among organic beings. In the inorganic world it seems to be

entirely absent. There power opposes power quite roughly \_--ruse\_

begins in the organic world; plants are already masters of it. The

greatest men, such as Cæsar and Napoleon (see Stendhal's remark

concerning him),[3] as also the higher races (the Italians), the Greeks

(Odysseus); the most supreme cunning, belongs to the very \_essence\_

of the elevation of man. ... The problem of the actor. My Dionysian

ideal.... The optics of all the organic functions, of all the strongest

vital instincts: the power which \_will\_ have error in all life; error

as the very first principle of thought itself. Before "thought" is

possible, "fancy" must first have done its work; the \_picturing\_ of

identical cases, of the \_seemingness\_ of identity, is more primeval

than the cognition of identity.

\_(h)\_ Against Causality.

545.

I believe in absolute space as the basis of force, and I believe the

latter to be limited and formed. Time, eternal. But space and time

as things in themselves do not exist. "Changes" are only appearances

(or mere processes of our senses to us); if we set recurrence,

however regular, between them, nothing is proved beyond the fact that

it has always happened so. The feeling that \_post hoc\_ is \_propter

hoc,\_ is easily explained as the result of a misunderstanding, it is

comprehensible. But appearances cannot be "causes"!

546.

The interpretation of a phenomenon, \_either\_ as an action \_or\_ as the

endurance of an action (that is to say, every action involves the

suffering of it), amounts to this: every change, every differentiation,

presupposes the existence of an agent and somebody acted upon, \_who\_ is

"altered."

547.

Psychological history of the concept \_subject.\_ The body, the thing,

the "whole," which is visualised by the eye, awakens the thought of

distinguishing between an action and an agent; the idea that the agent

is the cause of the action, after having been repeatedly refined, at

length left the "subject" over.

548.

Our absurd habit of regarding a mere mnemonic sign or abbreviated

formula as an independent being, and ultimately as a \_cause\_; as, for

instance, when we say of lightning that it flashes, even the little

word "I." A sort of double-sight in seeing which makes sight a \_cause

of seeing in itself\_: this was the feat in the invention of the

"subject" of the "ego."

549.

"Subject," "object," "attribute"--these distinctions have been \_made,\_

and are now used like schemes to cover all apparent facts. The false

fundamental observation is this, that I believe it is I who does

something, who suffers something, who "has" something, who "has" a

quality.

550.

In every judgment lies the whole faith in subject, attribute, or cause

and effect (in the form of an assumption that every effect is the

result of activity, and that all activity presupposes an agent), and

even this last belief is only an isolated case of the first, so that

faith remains as the most fundamental belief! there are such things as

subjects, everything that happens is related attributively to a subject

of some sort.

I notice something, and try to discover the reason of it: originally

this was, I look for an \_intention\_ behind it, and, above all, I

look for one who has an intention, for a subject, an agent: every

phenomenon is an action, formerly intentions were seen behind \_all\_

phenomena, this is our oldest habit. Has the animal also this habit?

As a living organism, is it not also compelled to interpret things

through itself. The question why? is always a question concerning the

\_causa finalis,\_ and the general "purpose" of things. We have no sign

of the "sense of the efficient cause"; in this respect Hume is quite

right, habit (but not only that of the individual) allows us to expect

that a certain process, frequently observed, will follow upon another,

but nothing more! That which gives us such an extraordinarily firm

faith in causality, is not the rough habit of observing the sequence of

processes, but our \_inability\_ to \_interpret\_ a phenomenon otherwise

than as the result of \_design.\_ It is the \_belief in\_ living and

thinking things, as the only agents of \_causation\_; it is the belief in

will, in design--the belief that all phenomena are actions, and that

all actions presuppose an agent; it is the belief in the "subject." Is

not this belief in the concepts subject and object an arrant absurdity?

Question: Is the design the cause of a phenomenon? Or is that also

illusion? Is it not the phenomenon itself?

551.

\_A criticism of the concept "cause."\_--We have absolutely no experience

concerning \_cause\_, viewed psychologically we derive the whole concept

from the subjective conviction, that \_we\_ ourselves are causes--that is

to say, that the arm moves.... \_But that is an error.\_ We distinguish

ourselves, the agents, from the action, and everywhere we make use of

this scheme--we try to discover an agent behind every phenomenon. What

have we done? We have \_misunderstood\_ a feeling of power, tension,

resistance, a muscular feeling, which is already the beginning of the

action, and posited it as a cause; or we have understood the will to

do this or that, as a cause, because the action follows it. There is

no such thing as "Cause," in those few cases in which it seemed to

be given, and in which we projected it out of ourselves in\_ order to

understand a phenomenon,\_ it has been shown to be an illusion. Our

understanding of a phenomenon consisted in our inventing a subject

who was responsible for something happening, and for the manner in

which it happened. In our concept "cause" we have embraced our feeling

of will, our feeling of "freedom," our feeling of responsibility and

our design to do an action: \_causa efficiens\_ and \_causa finalis\_ are

fundamentally one.

We believed that an effect was explained when we could point to a state

in which it was inherent. As a matter of fact, we invent all causes

according to the scheme of the effect: the latter is known to us.... On

the other hand, we are not in a position to say of any particular thing

how it will "act." The thing, the subject the will, the design--all

inherent in the conception "cause." We try to discover things in order

to explain why something has changed. Even the "atom" is one of these

fanciful inventions like the "thing" and the "primitive subject."...

At last we understand that things--consequently also atoms--effect

nothing: \_because they are non-existent;\_ and that the concept

causality is quite! useless. Out of a necessary sequence of states,

the latter's causal relationship does \_not\_ follow (that would be

equivalent to extending their \_active principle\_ from 1 to 2, to 3, to

4, to 5). \_There is no such thing as a cause or an effect.\_ From the

standpoint of language we do not know how to rid ourselves of them.

But that does not matter. If I imagine \_muscle\_ separated from its

"effects," I have denied it....

In short: \_a phenomenon is neither effected nor capable of effecting.

Causa\_ is a \_faculty to effect something,\_ superadded fancifully to

what happens....

\_The interpretation of causality is an illusion....\_ A "thing" is the

sum of its effects, synthetically united by means of a concept, an

image. As a matter of fact, science has robbed the concept causality

of all meaning, and has reserved it merely as an allegorical formula,

which has made it a matter of indifference whether cause or effect be

put on this side or on that. It is asserted that in two complex states

(centres of force) the quantities of energy remain constant.

\_The calculability of a phenomenon\_ does not lie in the fact that

a rule is observed, or that a necessity is obeyed, or that we have

projected a law of causality into every phenomenon: it lies in the

\_recurrence of "identical cases."\_

There is no such thing as a \_sense of causality,\_ as Kant would have

us believe. We are aghast, we feel insecure, we will have something

familiar, which can be relied upon.... As soon as we are shown the

existence of something old in a new thing, we are pacified. The

so-called instinct of causality is nothing more than the \_fear of

the unfamiliar\_, and the attempt at finding something in it which is

already \_known.\_--It is not a search for causes, but for the familiar.

552.

\_To combat determinism and teleology.\_--From the fact that something

happens regularly, and that its occurrence may be reckoned upon, it

does not follow that it happens \_necessarily.\_ If a quantity of force

determines and conducts itself in a certain way in every particular

case, it does not prove that it has "no free will." "Mechanical

necessity" is not an established fact: it was \_we\_ who first read

into the nature of all phenomena. We interpreted the possibility of

\_formularising\_ phenomena as a result of the dominion of necessary law

over all existence. But it does not follow, because I do a determined

thing, that I am bound to do it. \_Compulsion\_ cannot be demonstrated

in things: all that the rule proves is this, that one and the same

phenomenon is not another phenomenon. Owing to the very fact that we

fancied the existence of subjects "\_agents\_" in things, the notion

arose that all phenomena are the \_consequence\_ of a \_compulsory force\_

exercised over the subject--exercised by whom? once more by an "agent."

The concept "Cause and Effect" is a dangerous one, so long as people

believe in something that \_causes,\_ and a something that is \_caused.\_

\_(a)\_ Necessity is not an established fact, but an interpretation.

\*\*\*

\_(b)\_ When it is understood that the "subject" is nothing that \_acts,\_

but only a thing of fancy, there is much that follows.

Only with the subject as model we invented \_thingness\_ and read it into

the pell-mell of sensations. If we cease from believing in the \_acting\_

subject, the belief in \_acting\_ things, in reciprocal action, in cause

and effect between phenomena which we call things, also falls to pieces.

In this case the world of \_acting atoms\_ also disappears: for this

world is always assumed to exist on the pre-determined grounds that

subjects are necessary.

Ultimately, of course, \_the "thing-in-itself"\_ also disappears: for

at bottom it is the conception of a "subject-in-itself." But we

have seen that the subject is an imaginary thing. The antithesis

"thing-in-itself" and "appearance" is untenable; but in this way the

concept "\_appearance\_" also disappears.

\*\*\*

\_(c)\_ If we abandon the idea of the acting \_subject,\_ we also abandon

the \_object\_ acted upon. Duration, equality to self, Being, are

inherent neither in what is called subject, nor in what is called

object: they are complex phenomena, and in regard to other phenomena

are apparently durable--they are distinguishable, for instance, by

the different tempo with which they happen (repose--movement, fixed

--loose: all antitheses which do not exist in themselves and by means

of which \_differences of degree\_ only are expressed; from a certain

limited point of view, though, they seem to be antitheses. There are no

such things as antitheses; it is from logic that we derive our concept

of contrasts--and starting out from its standpoint we spread the error

over all things).

\*\*\*

\_(d)\_ If we abandon the ideas "subject" and "object"; then we must also

abandon the idea \_"substance"\_--and therefore its various modifications

too; for instance: "matter," "spirit," and other hypothetical things,

"eternity and the immutability of matter," etc. We are then rid of

\_materiality.\_

\*\*\*

From a moral standpoint \_the world is false.\_ But inasmuch as morality

itself is a part of this world, morality also is false. The will

to truth is a process of \_establishing things\_, it is a process of

\_making\_ things true and lasting, a total elimination of that \_false\_

character, a transvaluation of it into \_being.\_ Thus, "truth" is not

something which is present and which has to be found and discovered; it

is something \_which has to be created\_ and which \_gives\_ its name \_to a

process,\_ or, better still, to the Will to overpower, which in itself

has no purpose: to introduce truth is a \_processus in infinitum,\_ an

\_active determining\_--it is not a process of becoming conscious of

something, which in itself is fixed and determined. It is merely a word

for "The Will to Power."

Life is based on the hypothesis of a belief in stable and regularly

recurring things, the mightier it is, the more vast must be the world

of knowledge and the world called being. Logicising, rationalising, and

systematising are of assistance as means of existence.

Man projects his instinct of truth, his "aim," to a certain extent

beyond himself, in the form of a metaphysical world of Being, a

"thing-in-itself," a world already to hand. His requirements as a

creator make him \_invent\_ the world in which he works in advance; he

anticipates it: this anticipation (this faith in truth) is his mainstay.

\*\*\*

All phenomena, movement, Becoming, regarded as the establishment of

relations of degree and of force, as a contest....

\*\*\*

As soon as we \_fancy\_ that some one is responsible for the fact that

we are thus and thus, etc. (God, Nature), and that we ascribe our

existence, our happiness, our misery, our \_destiny,\_ to that some one,

we corrupt the \_innocence of Becoming\_ for ourselves. We then have some

one who wishes to attain to something by means of us and with us.

\*\*\*

The "welfare of the individual" is just as fanciful as the "welfare

of the species": the first is \_not\_ sacrificed to the last; seen

from afar, the species is just as fluid as the individual. "The

\_preservation\_ of the species" is only a result of the \_growth\_ of the

species--that is to say, \_of the overcoming of the species\_ on the road

to a stronger kind.

\*\*\*

Theses:--The apparent conformity of means to end ("the conformity of

means to end which far surpasses the art of man) is merely the result

of that "\_Will to Power\_" which manifests itself in all phenomena:--\_To

become stronger\_ involves a process of ordering, which may well be

mistaken for an attempted conformity of means to end:--The \_ends\_ which

are apparent are not intended but, as soon as a superior power prevails

over an inferior power, and the latter proceeds to work as a function

of the former, an order of \_rank\_ is established, an organisation which

must give rise to the idea that there is an arrangement of means and

ends.

Against apparent "\_necessity\_":--

This is only an expression for the fact that a certain power is not

also something else.

Against the apparent conformity of means to ends":--

The latter is only an \_expression\_ for the order among the spheres of

power and their interplay.

\_(i)\_ The Thing-in-Itself and Appearance.

553.

The foul blemish on Kant's criticism has at last become visible

even to the coarsest eyes: Kant had no right to his distinction

"\_appearance\_" and "\_thing-in-itself,\_"--in his own writings he had

deprived himself of the right of differentiating any longer in this

old and hackneyed manner, seeing that he had condemned the practice of

drawing any conclusions concerning the cause of an appearance from the

appearance itself, as unallowable in accordance with his conception

of the idea of causality and its \_purely intraphenomenal\_ validity,

and this conception, on the other hand, already anticipates that

\_differentiation,\_ as if the "thing in itself" were not only inferred

but actually \_given.\_

554.

It is obvious that neither things-in-themselves \_nor\_ appearances can

be related to each other in the form of cause and effect: and from this

it follows that the concept "cause and effect" is \_not applicable\_ in a

philosophy which believes in things-in-themselves and in appearances.

Kant's mistake--... As a matter of fact, from a psychological

standpoint, the concept "cause and effect" is derived from an attitude

of mind which believes it sees the action of will upon will everywhere,

which believes only in living things, and at bottom only in souls (not

in things). Within the mechanical view of the world (which is logic

and its application to space and time) that concept is reduced to

the mathematical formula with which--and this is a fact which cannot

be sufficiently emphasised--nothing is ever understood, but rather

\_defined\_--deformed.

555.

The greatest of all fables is the one relating to knowledge. People

would like to know how things-in-themselves are constituted: but

behold, there are no things-in-themselves! But even supposing there

\_were\_ an "in-itself," an unconditional thing, it could on that very

account \_not be known\_! Something unconditioned cannot be known:

otherwise it would not be unconditioned! Knowing, however, is always a

process of "coming into relation with something"; the knowledge-seeker,

on this principle, wants the thing, which he would know, to be nothing

to him, and to be nothing to anybody at all: and from this there

results a contradiction,--in the first place, between this \_will\_ to

know, and this desire that the thing to be known \_should\_ be nothing

to him (wherefore know at all then?); and secondly, because something

which is nothing to anybody, does not even \_exist,\_ and therefore

cannot be known. Knowing means: "to place one's self in relation with

something," to feel one's self conditioned by something and one's

self conditioning it under all circumstances, then, it is a process

of \_making stable or fixed,\_ of \_defining,\_ of \_making conditions

conscious\_ (not a process of \_sounding\_ things, creatures, or objects

in-themselves).

556.

A "thing-in-itself" is just as absurd as a "sense-in-itself," a

"meaning-in-itself." There is no such thing as a "fact-in-itself,"

\_for a meaning must always be given to it before it can become a fact.\_

The answer to the question, "What is that?" is a process of \_fixing a

meaning\_ from a different standpoint. The "\_essence\_" the "\_essential

factor,\_" is something which is only seen as a whole in perspective,

and which presupposes a basis which is multifarious. Fundamentally the

question is "What is that for me?" (for us, for everything that lives,

etc. etc.).

A thing would be defined when all creatures had asked and answered this

question, "What is that?" concerning it. Supposing that one single

creature, with its own relations and standpoint in regard to all

things, were lacking, that thing would still remain undefined.

In short: the essence of a thing is really only an \_opinion\_ concerning

that "thing." Or, better still; "\_it is worth\_" is actually what is

meant by \_"it is"\_ or by "that is."

One may not ask: "\_Who\_ interprets, then?" for the act of interpreting

\_itself\_ as a form of the Will to Power, manifests itself (not as

"Being," but as a \_process,\_ as \_Becoming\_) as a passion.

The origin of "things" is wholly the work of the idealising, thinking,

willing, and feeling subject. The concept thing as well as all its

attributes.--Even "the subject" is a creation of this order, a "thing"

like all others: a simplification, aiming at a definition of the

\_power\_ that fixes, invents, and thinks, as such, as distinct from

all isolated fixing, inventing, and thinking. Thus a capacity defined

or distinct from all other individual capacities; at bottom action

conceived collectively in regard to all the action which has yet to

come (action and the probability of similar action).

557.

The qualities of a thing are its effects upon other "things."

If one imagines other "things" to be non-existent, a thing has no

qualities.

That is to say; \_there is nothing without other things.\_

That is to say; there is no "thing-in-itself."

558.

The thing-in-itself is nonsense. If I think all the "relations," all

the "qualities" all the "activities" of a thing, away, the thing itself

does \_not\_ remain: for "thingness" was only \_invented fancifully\_ by

us to meet certain logical needs--that is to say, for the purposes of

definition and comprehension (in order to correlate that multitude of

relations, qualities, and activities).

559.

"Things which have a nature \_in themselves\_"--a dogmatic idea, which

must be absolutely abandoned.

560.

That things should have a \_nature in themselves,\_ quite apart from

interpretation and subjectivity, \_is a perfectly idle hypothesis\_:

it would presuppose that \_interpretation\_ and the \_act of being

subjective\_ are not essential, that a thing divorced from all its

relations can still be a thing.

Or, the other way round: the apparent \_objective\_ character of things;

might it not be merely the result of a \_difference of degree\_ within

the subject perceiving?--could not that which changes slowly strike

us as being objective, lasting, Being, "in-itself"?--could not the

objective view be only a false way of conceiving things and a contrast

\_within\_ the perceiving subject?

561.

If all unity were only unity as organisation. But the "thing" in

which we believe was \_invented\_ only as a substratum to the various

attributes. If the thing "acts," it means: we regard \_all the other\_

qualities which are to hand, and which are momentarily latent, as

the cause accounting for the fact that one individual quality steps

forward--that is to say, \_we take the sum of its qualities--x--\_as

the cause of the quality \_x\_; which is obviously \_quite\_ absurd and

imbecile!

All unity is \_only so\_ in the form of \_organisation\_ and \_collective

action:\_ in the same way as a human community is a unity--that is to

say, \_the reverse of\_ atomic \_anarchy\_; thus it is a body politic,

which \_stands for\_ one, yet \_is\_ not one.

562.

"At some time in the development of thought, a point must have been

reached when man became conscious of the fact that what he called

the \_qualities of a thing\_ were merely the sensations of the feeling

subject: and thus the qualities ceased from belonging to the thing."

The "thing-in-itself" remained over. 'The distinction between the

thing-in-itself and the thing-for-us, is based upon that older and

artless observation which would fain grant energy to things: but

analysis revealed that even force was only ascribed to them by our

fancy, as was also--substance. "The thing affects a subject?" Thus the

root of the idea of substance is in language, not in things outside

ourselves! The thing-in-itself is not a problem at all!

Being will have to be conceived as a sensation which is no longer based

upon anything quite devoid of sensation.

In movement no new \_meaning\_ is given to feeling. That which is, cannot

be the substance of movement: it is therefore a form of Being.

\_N.B.\_--The explanation of life may be sought, in the first

place, through mental images of phenomena which \_precede\_ it

(purposes);

Secondly, through mental images of phenomena which follow

behind it (the mathematico-physical explanation).

The two should not be confounded. Thus: the physical explanation, which

is the symbolisation of the world by means of feeling and thought,

cannot in itself make feeling and thinking originate again and show

its derivation: physics must rather construct the world of feeling,

consistently \_without feeling or purpose \_ right up to the highest man.

And teleology is only a \_history of purposes,\_ and is never physical.

563.

Our method of acquiring "knowledge" is limited to a process of

establishing \_quantities,\_ but we can by no means help feeling the

difference of quantity as differences of \_quality.\_ Quality is merely a

\_relative\_ truth for \_us\_; it is not a "thing-in-itself."

Our senses have a certain definite quantum as a mean, within the limits

of which they perform their functions--that is to say, we become

conscious of bigness and smallness in accordance with the conditions of

our existence. If we sharpened or blunted our senses tenfold, we should

perish--that is to say, we feel even \_proportions\_ as \_qualities\_ in

regard to our possibilities of existence.

564.

But could not all \_quantities\_ be merely tokens of \_qualities\_? Another

consciousness and scale of desires must correspond to greater power

in fact, another point of view; growth in itself is the expression of

a desire \_to become more;\_ the desire for a greater \_quantum\_ springs

from a certain \_quale,\_ in a purely quantitative world, everything

would be dead, stiff, and motionless.--The reduction of all qualities

to quantities is nonsense: it is discovered that they can only stand

together, an analogy--

565.

Qualities are our insurmountable barriers; we cannot possibly help

feeling mere \_differences of quantity\_ as something fundamentally

different from quantity--that is to say, as \_qualities,\_ which we can

no longer reduce to terms of quantity. But everything in regard to

which the word "knowledge" has any sense at all, belongs to the realm

of reckoning, weighing, and measuring, to quantity whereas, conversely,

all our valuations (that is to say, our sensations) belong precisely to

the realm of qualities, \_i.e.\_ to those truths which belong to us alone

and to our point of view, and which absolutely cannot be "known." It is

obvious that every one of us, different creatures, must feel different

qualities, and must therefore live in a different world from the rest.

Qualities are an idiosyncrasy proper to human nature; the demand that

these our human interpretations and values, should be general and

perhaps real values, belongs to the hereditary madnesses of human pride.

566.

The "real world," in whatever form it has been conceived hitherto--was

always the world of appearance \_over again.\_

567.

The world of appearance, \_i.e.\_ a world regarded in the light of

values; ordered, selected according to values--that is to say, in

this case, according to the standpoint of utility in regard to the

preservation and the increase of power of a certain species of animals.

It is \_the point of view,\_ then, which accounts for the character of

"appearance." As if a world could remain over, when the point of view

is cancelled! By such means \_relativity\_ would also be cancelled!

Every centre of energy has its \_point of view\_ of the whole of the

\_remainder\_ of the world--that is to say, its perfectly definite

\_valuation,\_ its mode of action, its mode of resistance. The "world of

appearance" is thus reduced to a specific kind of action on the world

proceeding from a centre.

But there is no other kind of action: and the "world" is only a word

for the collective play of these actions. \_Reality\_ consists precisely

in this particular action and reaction of every isolated factor against

the whole.

There no longer remains a shadow of a \_right\_ to speak here of

"appearance." ...

The \_specific way of reacting\_ is the only way of reacting; we do not

know how many kinds and what sort of kinds there are.

But there is no "\_other,\_" no "real," no essential being,--for thus a

world \_without\_ action and reaction would be expressed....

The antithesis: world of appearance and real world, is thus reduced to

the antitheses "world" and "nonentity."

568.

A criticism of the concept "\_real and apparent\_ world."--Of these two

the first is a mere fiction, formed out of a host of imaginary things.

Appearance itself belongs to reality: it is a form of its being; \_i.e.\_

in a world where there is no such thing as being, a certain calculable

world of \_identical\_ cases must first be created through \_appearance;\_

a \_tempo\_ in which observation and comparison is possible, etc.

"Appearance" is an adjusted and simplified world, in which our

\_practical\_ instincts have worked: for us it is perfectly true: for we

\_live\_ in it, we can live in it: \_this is the proof\_ of its truth as

far as we are concerned....

The world, apart from the fact that we have to live in it--the

world, which we have \_not\_ adjusted to our being, our logic, and our

psychological prejudices--does \_not\_ exist as a world "in-itself"; it

is essentially a world of relations: under certain circumstances it has

a \_different aspect\_ from every different point at which it is seen:

it presses against every point, and every point resists it--and these

collective relations are in every case \_incongruent.\_

The \_measure of power\_ determines what \_being\_ possesses the other

measure of power: under what form, force, or constraint, it acts or

resists.

Our particular case is interesting enough: we have created a conception

in order to be able to live in a world, in order to perceive just

enough to enable us to \_endure\_ life in that world....

569.

The nature of our psychological vision is determined by the fact--

(1) That \_communication\_ is necessary, and that for communication

to be possible something must be stable, simplified, and capable of

being stated precisely (above all, in the so-called \_identical\_ case).

In order that it may be communicable, it must be felt as something

\_adjusted,\_ as "\_recognisable\_." The material of the senses, arranged

by the understanding, reduced to coarse leading features, made similar

to other things, and classified with its like. Thus: the indefiniteness

and the chaos of sense-impressions are, as it were, \_made logical.\_

(2) The \_phenomenal\_ world is the adjusted world which \_we believe

to be real,\_ Its "reality" lies in the constant return of similar,

familiar, and related things, in their \_rationalised character,\_ and in

the belief that we are here able to reckon and determine.

(3) The opposite of this phenomenal world is not "the real world,"

but the amorphous and unadjustable world consisting of the chaos of

sensations--that is to say, \_another kind\_ of phenomenal; world, a

world which to us is "unknowable."

(4) The question how things-in-themselves are constituted, quite apart

from our sense-receptivity and from the activity of our understanding,

must be answered by the further question: how were we able to know

\_that things existed?\_ "Thingness" is one of our own inventions. The

question is whether there are not a good many more ways of creating

such a world of appearance--and whether this creating, rationalising,

adjusting, and falsifying be not the best-guaranteed \_reality\_ itself:

in short, whether that which "fixes the meaning of things" is not

the only reality: and whether the "effect of environment upon us"

be not merely the result of such will-exercising subjects.... The

other "creatures" act upon us; our \_adjusted\_ world of appearance

is an arrangement and an \_overpowering\_ of its activities: a sort

of \_defensive\_ measure. \_The subject alone is demonstrable\_;

the \_hypothesis\_ might be advanced \_that subjects are all that

exist,\_--that "object" is only a form of action of subject upon

subject ... a \_modus of the subject.\_

\_(k)\_ The Metaphysical Need.

570.

If one resembles all the philosophers that have gone before, one

can have no eyes for what has existed and what will exist--one sees

only what \_is.\_ But as there is no such thing as Being; all that the

philosophers had to deal with was a host of \_fancies,\_ this was their

"world."

571.

To assert the \_existence\_ as a whole of things concerning which we know

nothing, simply because there is an advantage in not being able to know

anything of them, was a piece of artlessness on Kant's part, and the

result of the recoil-stroke of certain needs--especially in the realm

of morals and metaphysics.

572.

An artist cannot endure reality; he turns away or back from it: his

earnest opinion is that the worth of a thing consists in that nebulous

residue of it which one derives from colour, form, sound, and thought;

he believes that the more subtle, attenuated, and volatile, a thing

or a man becomes, \_the more valuable he becomes: the less real,\_ the

greater the worth. This is Platonism: but Plato was guilty of yet

further audacity in the matter of turning tables--he measured the

degree of reality according to the degree of value, and said: The more

there is of "idea" the more there is of Being. He twisted the concept

"reality" round and said: "What ye regard as real is an error, and the

nearer we get to the 'idea' the nearer we are to 'truth.'"--Is this

understood? It was the \_greatest of all rechristenings:\_ and because

Christianity adopted it, we are blind to its astounding features. At

bottom, Plato, like the artist he was, \_placed appearance before\_

Being! and therefore lies and fiction before truth! unreality before

actuality!--He was, however, so convinced of the value of appearance,

that he granted it the attributes of "Being," "causality," "goodness,"

and "truth," and, in short, all those things which are associated with

value.

The concept value itself regarded as a cause: first standpoint.

The ideal granted all attributes, conferring honour: second standpoint.

573.

The idea of the "true world" or of "God" as absolutely spiritual,

intellectual, and good, is an \_emergency measure\_ to the extent to

which the \_antagonistic\_ instincts are all-powerful....

Moderation and existing humanity is reflected exactly in the

humanisation of the gods. The Greeks of the strongest period, who

entertained no fear whatever of themselves, but on the contrary were

pleased with themselves, brought down their gods to all their emotions.

The spiritualisation of the idea of God is thus very far from being a

sign of \_progress\_: one is heartily conscious of this when one reads

Goethe--in his works the vaporisation of God into virtue and spirit is

felt as being upon a lower plane.

574.

The nonsense of all metaphysics shown to reside in the derivation of

the conditioned out of the unconditioned.

It belongs to the nature of thinking that it adds the unconditioned to

the conditioned, that it invents it--just as it thought of and invented

the "ego" to cover the multifariousness of its processes i it measures

the world according to a host of self-devised measurements--according

to its fundamental fictions "the unconditioned," "end and means,"

"things," "substances," and according to logical laws, figures, and

forms.

There would be nothing which could be called knowledge, if thought did

not first so \_re-create\_ the world into "things" which are in its own

image. It is only \_through\_ thought that there is \_untruth.\_

The \_origin\_ of thought, like that of \_feelings,\_ cannot be traced:

but that is \_no\_ proof of its primordiality or absoluteness! It simply

shows that we cannot get \_behind it,\_ because we have nothing else save

thought and feeling.

575.

To know is to \_point to past experience:\_ in its nature it is a

\_regressus in infinitum.\_ That which halts (in the face of a so-called

\_causa prima\_ or the unconditioned, etc.) is \_laziness,\_ weariness.

576.

\_Concerning the psychology of metaphysics\_--the influence of fear. That

which has been most feared, the cause of the \_greatest suffering\_ (lust

of power, voluptuousness, etc.), has been treated with the greatest

amount of hostility by men, and eliminated from the "real" world. Thus

the \_passions\_ have been step by step \_struck out,\_ God posited as

the opposite of evil--that is to say, reality is conceived to be the

\_negation of the passions and the emotions\_ (i.e. \_nonentity\_).

\_Irrationality,\_ impulsive action, accidental action, is, moreover,

hated by them (as the cause of incalculable suffering). \_Consequently\_

they denied this element in the absolute, and interpreted it as

absolute "rationality" and "conformity of means to ends."

\_Change\_ and \_perishability\_ were also feared; and by this fear an

oppressed soul is revealed, full of distrust and painful experiences

(the case with \_Spinoza\_: a man differently constituted would have

regarded this change as a charm).

A nature overflowing and \_playing\_ with energy, would call precisely

the \_passions, irrationality\_ and \_change, good\_ in a eudemonistic

sense, together with their consequences: danger, contrast, ruin, etc.

577.

Against the value of that which always remains the same (remember

Spinoza's artlessness and Descartes' likewise), the value of the

shortest and of the most perishable, the seductive flash of gold on the

belly of the serpent \_vita\_----

578.

\_Moral values in epistemology itself:\_--

The faith in reason--why not mistrust?

The "real world" is the good world--why?

Appearance, change, contradiction, struggle, regarded as

immoral: the desire for a world which \_knows nothing\_ of

these things.

The transcendental world discovered, \_so that\_ a place may

be kept for "moral freedom" (as in Kant).

Dialectics as the road to virtue (in Plato and Socrates:

probably because sophistry was held to be the road to

immorality).

Time and space are ideal: consequently there is unity in

the essence of things; consequently no sin, no evil, no

imperfection, a \_justification\_ of God.

Epicurus \_denied\_ the possibility of knowledge, in order to

keep the moral (particularly the hedonistic) values as the

highest.

Augustine does the same, and later Pascal ("corrupted

reason"), in favour of Christian values.

Descartes' contempt for everything variable; likewise

Spinoza's.

579.

\_Concerning the psychology of metaphysics.\_--This world is only

apparent: \_therefore\_ there must be a real world;--this world is

conditioned: \_consequently\_ there must be an unconditioned world;--this

world is contradictory: \_consequently\_ there is a world free from

contradiction;--this world is evolving: \_consequently\_ there is

somewhere a static world:--a host of false conclusions (blind faith

in reason: if A exists, then its opposite B must also \_exist\_). Pain

\_inspires these conclusions\_: at bottom they are \_withes\_ that such

a world might exist; the hatred of a world which leads to suffering

is likewise revealed by the fact that another and \_better\_ world is

imagined: the \_resentment\_ of the metaphysician against reality is

creative here.

\_The second\_ series of questions: \_wherefore\_ suffer? ... and from

this a conclusion is derived concerning the relation of the real

world to our apparent, changing, suffering, and contradictory world:

(1) Suffering as the consequence of error: how is error possible?

(2) Suffering as the consequence of guilt: how is guilt possible?

(A host of experiences drawn from the sphere of nature or society,

universalised and made absolute.) But if the conditioned world be

causally determined by the unconditioned, then the \_freedom to err, to

be sinful,\_ must also be derived from the same quarter: and once more

the question arises, \_to what purpose?\_ ... The world of appearance, of

Becoming, of contradiction, of suffering, is therefore \_willed; to what

purpose?\_

The error of these conclusions; two contradictory concepts are

formed--because one of them corresponds to a reality, the other

"\_must\_" also correspond to a reality. "\_Whence\_" would one otherwise

derive its contradictory concept? \_Reason\_ is thus a source of

revelation concerning the absolute.

But the \_origin\_ of the above contradictions \_need not necessarily\_ be

a supernatural source of reason: it is sufficient to oppose t\_he real

genesis\_ of the concepts, this springs from practical spheres, from

utilitarian spheres, hence the \_strong faith\_ it commands \_(one is

threatened with ruin\_ if one's conclusions are not in conformity with

this reason; but this fact is no "\_proof\_" of what the latter asserts).

\_The preoccupation of metaphysicians with pain,\_ is quite artless.

"Eternal blessedness": psychological nonsense. Brave and creative men

never make pleasure and pain ultimate questions--they are incidental

conditions: both of them must be desired when one \_will attain to\_

something. It is a sign of fatigue and illness in these metaphysicians

and religious men, that they should press questions of pleasure and

pain into the foreground. Even \_morality\_ in their eyes derives its

great importance \_only\_ from the fact that it is regarded as an

essential condition for abolishing pain.

\_The same holds good of the preoccupation with appearance and error\_

the cause of pain. A superstition that happiness and truth are related

(confusion: happiness in "certainty," in "faith").

580.

To what extent are the various \_epistemological positions\_

(materialism, sensualism, idealism) consequences of valuations? The

source of the highest feelings of pleasure ("feelings of value") may

also judge concerning the problem of \_reality\_!

The measure of \_positive knowledge\_ is quite a matter of indifference

and beside the point; as witness the development of Indici.

The Buddhistic \_negation\_ of reality in general (appearance pain) is

perfectly consistent: undemonstrability, inaccessibility, lack of

categories, not only for an "absolute world," but a recognition of

the \_erroneous procedures\_ by means of which the whole concept has

been reached. "Absolute reality," "Being in itself," a contradiction.

In a world of \_Becoming,\_ reality is merely a \_simplification\_ for

the purpose of practical ends, or a \_deception\_ resulting from the

coarseness of certain organs, or a variation in the tempo of Becoming.

The logical denial of the world and Nihilism is a consequence of the

fact that we must oppose nonentity with Being, and that Becoming is

denied. ("\_Something\_" becomes.)

581.

\_Being\_ and \_Becoming.\_--"\_Reason\_" developed upon a sensualistic basis

upon the \_prejudices of the senses\_--that is to say, with the belief in

the truth of the judgment of the senses.

"Being," as the generalisation of the concept "\_Life\_" (breath), "to be

animate," "to will," "to act upon," "become."

The opposite is: "to be inanimate," "\_not\_ to become," "\_not\_ to will."

\_Thus\_: "Being" is \_not\_ opposed to "not-Being," to "appearance," nor

is it opposed to death (for only that can be dead which can also live).

The "soul," the "ego," posited as \_primeval facts;\_ and introduced

wherever \_there is Becoming.\_

582.

\_Being\_--we have no other idea of it than that which we derive from

"\_living.\_"--How then can everything "be" dead?

583.

\_A.\_

I see with astonishment that science resigns itself to-day to the fate

of being reduced to the world of appearance: we certainly have no organ

of knowledge for the real world--be it what it may.

At this point we may well ask: With what organ of knowledge is this

contradiction established?...

The fact that a world which is accessible to our organs is also

understood to be dependent upon these organs, and the fact that we

should understand a world as subjectively conditioned, are \_no\_ proofs

of the actual \_possibility\_ of an objective world. Who urges us to

believe that subjectivity \_is\_ real or essential?

The absolute is even an absurd concept: an "absolute mode of existence"

is nonsense, the concept "being," "thing," is always \_relative\_ to us.

The trouble is that, owing to the old antithesis "apparent" and "real,"

the correlative valuations "of little value" and "absolutely valuable"

have been spread abroad.

The world of appearance does not strike us as a "valuable" world;

appearance is on a lower plane than the highest value. Only a "real"

world can be absolutely "valuable"....

\_Prejudice of prejudices!\_ It is perfectly possible in itself that

the real nature of things would be so unfriendly, so opposed to the

first conditions of life, that appearance is necessary in order to

make life possible.... This is certainly the case in a large number of

situations--for instance, marriage.

Our empirical world would thus be conditioned, even in its limits

to knowledge, by the instinct of self-preservation, we regard that

as good, valuable, and true, which favours the preservation of the

species....

\_(a)\_ We have no categories which allow us to distinguish between a

real and an apparent world. (At the most, there could exist a world of

appearance, but not \_our\_ world of appearance.)

\_(b)\_ Taking the \_real\_ world for granted, it might still be the \_less

valuable\_ to us; for the quantum of illusion might be of the highest

order, owing to its value to us as a preservative measure. (Unless

\_appearance\_ in itself were sufficient to condemn anything?)

\_(c)\_ That there exists a correlation between the \_degrees of value\_

and the \_degrees of reality\_ (so that the highest values also possessed

the greatest degree of reality), is a metaphysical postulate which

starts out with the hypothesis that we \_know\_ the order of rank among

values; and that this order is a \_moral\_ one. It is only on this

hypothesis that \_truth\_ is necessary as a definition of all that is of

a superior value.

\_B.\_

It is of cardinal importance that the \_real world\_ should be

suppressed. It is the most formidable inspirer of doubts, and

depredator of values, concerning the \_world which we are\_: it was our

most dangerous\_ attempt\_ heretofore on the life of Life.

\_War\_ against all the hypotheses upon which a real world has been

imagined. The notion that \_moral values\_ are the \_highest\_ values,

belongs to this hypothesis.

The superiority of the moral valuation would be refuted, if it could

be shown to be the result of an \_immoral\_ valuation--a specific case

of real immorality: it would thus reduce itself to an \_appearance,\_

and as an \_appearance\_ it would cease from having any right to condemn

appearance.

\_C.\_

Then the "Will to Truth" would have to be examined psychologically: it

is not a moral power, but a form of the Will to Power. This would have

to be proved by the fact that it avails itself of every \_immoral\_ means

there is; above all, of the metaphysicians.

At the present moment we are face to face with the necessity of testing

the assumption that moral values are the highest values, \_Method in

research\_ is attained only when all \_moral prejudices\_ have been

overcome: it represents a conquest over morality....

584.

The aberrations of philosophy are the outcome of the fact that,

instead of recognising in logic and the categories of reason merely

a means to the adjustment of the world for utilitarian ends (that is

to say, especially, a useful \_falsification\_), they were taken to be

the criterion of truth--particularly of \_reality.\_ The "criterion

of truth" was, as a matter of fact, merely the \_biological utility

of a systematic falsification of this sort, on principle:\_ and,

since a species of animals knows nothing more important than its own

preservation, it was indeed allowable here to speak of "truth." Where

the artlessness came in, however, was in taking this anthropocentric

idiosyncrasy as the \_measure of things,\_ as the canon for recognising

the "real" and the "unreal": in short, in making a relative thing

absolute. And behold, all at once, the world fell into the two halves,

"real" and "apparent": and precisely that world which man's reason had

arranged for him to live and to settle in, was discredited. Instead of

using the forms as mere instruments for making the world manageable

and calculable, the mad fancy of philosophers intervened, and saw that

in these categories the concept of that world is given which does

not correspond to the concept of the world in which man lives.... The

means were misunderstood as measures of value, and even used as a

condemnation of their original purpose....

The purpose was, to deceive one's self in a useful way: the means

thereto was the invention of forms and signs, with the help of which

the confusing multifariousness of life could be reduced to a useful and

wieldy scheme.

But woe! a \_moral category\_ was now brought into the game: no creature

would deceive itself, no creature may deceive itself--consequently

there is only a will to truth. What is "truth"?

The principle of contradiction provided the scheme: the real world to

which the way is being sought cannot be in contradiction with itself,

cannot change, cannot evolve, has no beginning and no end.

That is the greatest error which has ever been committed, the really

fatal error of the world: it was believed that in the forms of reason a

criterion of reality had been found--whereas their only purpose was to

master reality, by \_misunderstanding\_ it intelligently....

And behold, the world became false precisely owing to the qualities

\_which constitute its reality,\_ namely, change, evolution,

multifariousness, contrast, contradiction, war. And thenceforward the

whole fatality was there.

1. How does one get rid of the false and merely apparent world? (it was

the real and only one).

2. How does one become one's self as remote as possible from the

world of appearance? (the concept of the perfect being as a contrast

to the real being; or, more correctly still, as \_the contradiction of

life\_....).

The whole direction of values was towards the \_slander of life\_; people

deliberately confounded ideal dogmatism with knowledge in general: so

that the opposing parties also began to reject \_science\_ with horror.

Thus the road to science was \_doubly\_ barred: first, by the belief

in the real world; and secondly, by the opponents of this belief.

Natural science and psychology were (1) condemned in their objects, (2)

deprived of their artlessness....

Everything is so absolutely bound and related to everything else in

the real world, that to condemn, or to \_think away\_ anything, means to

condemn and think away the whole. The words "this should not be," "this

ought not to be," are a farce.... If one imagines the consequences,

one would ruin the very source of Life by suppressing everything which

is in any sense whatever \_dangerous or destructive.\_ Physiology proves

this \_much better\_!

We see how morality \_(a) poisons\_ the whole concept of the world, \_(b)\_

cuts off the way to \_science, (c)\_ dissipates and undermines all real

instincts (by teaching that their root is \_immoral\_).

We thus perceive a terrible tool of decadence at work, which succeeds

in remaining immune, thanks to the holy names and holy attitudes it

assumes.

585.

The awful recovery of our \_consciousness:\_ not of the individual, but

of the human species. Let us reflect; let us think backwards; let us

follow the narrow and broad highway.

\_A.\_

Man seeks "the truth": a world that does not contradict itself,

that does not deceive, that does not change, a \_real\_ world--a

world in which there is no suffering: contradiction, deception,

variability---the causes of suffering! He does not doubt that there is

such a thing as a world as it ought to be; he would fain find a road to

it. (Indian criticism: even the ego is apparent and \_not\_ real.)

Whence does man derive the concept of \_reality\_? --Why does he make

variability, deception, contradiction, the origin of \_suffering;\_ why

not rather of his happiness? ...

The contempt and hatred of all that perishes, changes, and varies:

whence comes this valuation of stability? Obviously, the will to truth

is \_merely\_ the longing for a \_stable world.\_

The senses deceive; reason corrects the errors: \_therefore,\_ it was

concluded, reason is the road to a static state; the most \_spiritual\_

ideas must be nearest to the "real world."--It is from the senses that

the greatest number of misfortunes come they are cheats, deluders, and

destroyers.

Happiness can be promised only by Being: change and happiness exclude

each other. The loftiest desire is thus to be one with Being. That is

the formula for the way to happiness.

\_In summa:\_ The world as it \_ought\_ to be exists; this world in which

we live is an error--this our world should \_not\_ exist.

\_The belief in Being\_ shows itself only as a result: the real primum

\_mobile\_ is the disbelief in Becoming, the mistrust of Becoming, the

scorn of all Becoming....

What kind of a man reflects in this way? An unfruitful, \_suffering\_

kind, a world-weary kind. If we try and fancy what the opposite kind

of man would be like, we have a picture of a creature who would not

require the belief in Being; he would rather despise it as dead,

tedious, and indifferent....

The belief that the world which ought to be, is, really exists, is a

belief proper to the unfruitful, \_who do not wish to create a world as

it should be.\_ They take it for granted, they seek for means and ways

of attaining to it. "The will to truth"--\_is the impotence of the will

to create.\_

To recognise that something } Antagonism in

is \_thus\_ or \_thus:\_ } the degrees of

To act so that something will } energy in

be \_thus\_ or \_thus:\_ } various natures.

The fiction of a world which corresponds to our desires; psychological

artifices and interpretations calculated to associate all that we

honour and regard as pleasant, with this \_real world.\_

"The will to truth" at this stage is essentially \_the art of

interpretation:\_ to which also belongs that interpretation which still

possesses strength.

The same species of men, grown one degree poorer, \_no longer possessed

of the power\_ to interpret and to create fictions, produces the

Nihi\_lists.\_ A Nihilist is the man who says of the world as it is,

that it ought \_not\_ to exist, and of the world as it ought to be, that

it does not exist. According to this, existence (action, suffering,

willing, and feeling) has no sense: the pathos of the "in vain" is the

Nihilist's pathos--and as pathos it is moreover an \_inconsistency\_ on

the part of the Nihilist.

He who is not able to introduce his will into things, the man without

either will or energy, at least invests them with some meaning, \_i.e.\_

he believes that a will is already in them.

The degree of a man's \_will-power\_ may be measured from the extent to

which he can dispense with the meaning in things, from the extent to

which he is able to endure a world without meaning: \_because he himself

arranges a small portion of it.\_

The \_philosophical objective view of things\_ may thus be a sign of

poverty both of will and of energy. For energy organises what is

closest and next; the "scientists," whose only desire is to \_ascertain\_

what exists, are such as cannot arrange things \_as they ought to be.\_

The \_artists,\_ an intermediary species, they at least set up a symbol

of what should exist,--they are productive inasmuch as they actually

\_alter\_ and transform; not like the scientists, who leave everything as

it is.

\_The connection between philosophers and the pessimistic religions;\_

the same species of man (\_they attribute the highest degree of

reality\_ to the \_things which are valued highest\_).

\_The connection between philosophers and moral men\_ and their

evaluations (the \_moral\_ interpretation of the world as the sense of

the world: after the collapse of the religious sense).

\_The overcoming of philosophers\_ by the annihilation of the world of

being: intermediary period of Nihilism; before there is sufficient

strength present to transvalue values, and to make the world of

becoming, and of appearance, the \_only\_ world to be deified and called

good.

\_B.\_

Nihilism as a normal phenomenon may be a symptom of increasing

\_strength\_ or of increasing \_weakness\_:--

Partly owing to the fact that the strength \_to create\_ and \_to will\_

has grown to such an extent, that it no longer requires this collective

interpretation and introduction of a \_sense\_ ("present duties," state,

etc.);

Partly owing to the fact that even the creative power necessary

to invent sense, declines, and disappointment becomes the ruling

condition. The inability to \_believe\_ in a sense becomes "unbelief."

What is the meaning of \_science\_ in regard to both possibilities?

(1) It is a sign of strength and self-control; it shows an \_ability\_ to

dispense with healing, consoling worlds of illusion.

(2) It is also able to undermine, to dissect, to disappoint, and to

weaken.

\_C.\_

\_The belief in truth,\_ the need of holding to something which is

believed to be true: psychological reduction apart from the valuations

that have existed hitherto. Fear and laziness.

At the same time \_unbelief:\_ Reduction. In what way does it acquire a

\_new value,\_ if a real world does not exist at all (by this means the

capacity of valuing, which hitherto has been \_lavished\_ upon the world

of being, becomes free once more).

586.

The \_real\_ and the \_ "apparent" world.\_

\_A.\_

The \_erroneous concepts\_ which proceed from this concept are of three

kinds:--

\_(a)\_ An unknown world:--we are adventurers, we are inquisitive,--that

which is known to us makes us weary (the danger of the concept lies in

the fact it suggests that "this" world is known to us....);

\_(b) Another\_ world, where things are different:--something in us draws

comparisons, and thereby our calm submission and our silence lose their

value--perhaps all will be for the best, we have not hoped in vain....

The world where things are different--who knows?--where we ourselves

will be different....

\_(c)\_ A \_real\_ world:--that is the most singular blow and attack

which we have ever received; so many things have become encrusted in

the word "true," that we involuntarily give these to the "real world";

the \_real\_ world must also be a \_truthful\_ world, such a one as would

not deceive us or make fools of us; to believe in it in this way is to

be almost \_forced\_ to believe (from convention, as is the case among

people worthy of confidence).

\*\*\*

The concept, "the \_unknown\_ world," suggests that this world is known

to us (is tedious);

The concept, "the other world," suggests that this world \_might be

different,\_ it suppresses necessity and fate (it is useless to \_submit\_

and to \_adapt one's self\_);

The concept, \_the true world,\_ suggests that this world is

untruthful, deceitful, dishonest, not genuine, and not essential,

and \_consequently\_ not a world calculated to be useful to us (it is

unadvisable to become adapted to it; \_better\_ resist it).

\*\*\*

Thus we \_escape\_ from "this" world in three different ways:----

\_(a)\_ With our \_curiosity\_--as though the interesting part was

somewhere else;

\_(b)\_ With our \_submission\_--as though it was not necessary to submit,

as though this world was not an ultimate necessity;

\_(c)\_ With our \_sympathy\_ and respect--as though this world did not

deserve them, as though it was mean and dishonest towards us....

\_In summa\_: we have become revolutionaries in three different ways; we

have made \_x\_ our criticism of the "known world."

\_B.\_

\_The first step to reason:\_ to understand to what extent we have been

\_seduced,\_--for it might be \_precisely\_ the reverse:

\_(a)\_ The \_unknown\_ world could be so constituted as to give us a

liking for "this" world--it may be a more stupid and meaner form of

existence.

\_(b)\_ The other world, very far from taking account of our desires

which were never realised here, might be part of the mass of things

which \_this\_ world makes possible for us; to learn to know this world

would be a means of satisfying us,

\_(c)\_ The \_true\_ world: but who actually says that the apparent world

must be of less value than the true world? Do not our instincts

contradict this judgment? Is not man eternally occupied in creating an

imaginative world, because he will have a better world than reality?

\_In the first place,\_ how do we know that \_our\_ world is \_not\_ the

true world? ... for it might be that the other world is the world of

"appearance" (as a matter of fact, the Greeks, for instance, actually

imagined a \_region of shadows, a life of appearance,\_ beside \_real\_

existence). And finally, what right have we to establish \_degrees of

reality,\_ as it were? That is something different from an unknown

world--that is already the \_will to know something of the unknown.\_ The

"other," the "unknown" world--good! but to speak of the "true world" is

as good as "\_knowing\_ something about it,"--that is the \_contrary\_ of

the assumption of an \_x\_-world....

In short, the world \_x\_ might be in every way a more tedious, a more

inhuman, and a less dignified world than this one.

It would be quite another matter if it were assumed that there were

several \_x\_-worlds--that is to say, every possible kind of world

besides our own. But this has \_never been assumed....\_

\_C.\_

Problem: why has the \_image of the other world\_ always been to the

disadvantage of "this" one--that is to say, always stood as a criticism

of it; what does this point to?--

A people that are proud of themselves, and who are on the ascending

path of Life, always; picture \_another\_ existence as lower and less

valuable than theirs; they regard the strange unknown world as their

enemy, as their opposite; they feel no curiosity, but rather repugnance

in regard to what is strange to them.... Such a body of men would never

admit that another people were the "true people"....

The very fact that such a distinction is possible,--that this world

should be called the world of appearance, and that the other should be

called the true world,--is symptomatic.

The places of origin of the idea, of "another world":

The philosopher who invents a rational world where \_reason\_

and logical functions are adequate:--this is the root of

the "true" world.

The religious man who invents a "divine world";--this is the

root of the "denaturalised" and the "anti-natural" world.

The moral man who invents a "free world":--this is the root

of the good, the perfect, the just, and the holy world.

The \_common factor\_ in the three places of origin: \_psychological\_

error, physiological confusion.

With what attributes is the "other world," as it actually appears in

history, characterised? With the stigmata of philosophical, religious,

and moral prejudices.

The "other world" as it appears in the light of these facts, is

\_synonymous\_ with \_not-Being,\_ with not-living, with the \_will\_ not to

live....

\_General aspect:\_ it was the instinct of the \_fatigue of living,\_ and

not that of life, which created the "other world."

\_Result:\_ philosophy, religion, and morality are \_symptoms of

decadence.\_

\_(l)\_ The Biological Value of Knowledge.

587.

It might seem as though I had evaded the question concerning

"certainty". The reverse is true: but while raising the question of the

criterion of certainty, I wished to discover the weights and measures

with which men had weighed heretofore--and to show that the question

concerning certainty is already in itself a \_dependent\_ question, a

question of the second rank.

588.

The question of values is more \_fundamental\_ than the question of

certainty: the latter only becomes serious once the question of values

has been answered.

Being and appearance, regarded psychologically, yield no "Being in

itself," no criterion for reality, but only degrees of appearance,

measured according to the strength of the sympathy which we feel for

appearance.

There is no struggle for existence between ideas and observations,

but only a struggle for supremacy--the vanquished idea is \_not

annihilated,\_ but only \_driven to the background\_ or \_subordinated.

There is no such thing as annihilation in intellectual spheres.\_

589.

"End and means"

"Cause and effect"

"Subject and object"

"Action and suffering"

"Thing-in-itself and

appearance"

As interpretations (\_not\_ as established facts)--and in what respect

were they perhaps necessary interpretations? (as "preservative

measures")--all in the sense of a Will to Power.

590.

Our values are \_interpreted into the heart\_ of things.

Is there, then, any \_sense\_ in the absolute?

Is not sense necessarily \_relative-sense\_ and perspective?

All sense is Will to Power (all relative senses may be identified with

it).

591.

The desire for "established facts"--Epistemology: how much pessimism

there is in it!

592.

The antagonism between the "true world," as pessimism depicts it, and

a world in which it were possible to live--for this the rights of

\_truth\_ must be tested. It is necessary to measure all these "ideal

forces" according to the standard of life, in order to understand the

nature of that antagonism: the struggle of sickly, desperate life,

cleaving to a beyond, against healthier, more foolish, more false,

richer, and fresher life. Thus it is not "truth" struggling with Life,

but \_one\_ kind of Life with another kind.--But the former would fain

be the \_higher\_ kind!--Here we must prove that some order of rank is

necessary,--that the first problem is \_the order of rank among kinds of

Life.\_

593.

The belief, "It is \_thus\_ and \_thus,\_" must be altered into the will,

"Thus and thus \_shall it be.\_"

\_(m)\_ Science.

594.

Science hitherto has been a means of disposing of the confusion of

things by hypotheses which "explain everything"--that is to say, it

has been the result of the intellect's repugnance to chaos. This

same repugnance takes hold of me when I contemplate \_myself;\_ I

should like to form some kind of representation of my inner world

for myself by means of a \_scheme,\_ and thus overcome intellectual

confusion. Morality was a simplification of this sort: it taught man as

\_recognised,\_ as \_known,\_--Now we have annihilated morality--we have

once more grown \_completely obscure\_ to ourselves! I know that I know

nothing \_about myself. Physics\_ shows itself to be a \_boon\_ for the

mind: science (as the road to \_knowledge\_) acquires a new charm after

morality has been laid aside--and \_owing to the fact\_ that we find

consistency here alone, we must \_order\_ our lives in accordance with

it so that it may help us to \_preserve it. \_ This results in a sort of

\_practical meditation\_ concerning the \_conditions of our existence\_ as

investigators.

595.

Our first principles: no God: no purpose: limited energy. We will take

good care to \_avoid\_ thinking out and prescribing the necessary lines

of thought for the lower orders.

596.

No "\_moral\_ education" of humanity: but the \_disciplinary school of

scientific errors\_ is necessary, because truth disgusts and creates a

dislike of life, provided a man is not already irrevocably launched

upon his \_way,\_ and bears the consequences of his honest standpoint

with tragic pride.

597.

The first principle of \_scientific work:\_ faith in the union and

continuance of scientific work, so that the individual may undertake to

work at any point, however small, and feel sure that his efforts \_will

not be in vain.\_

There is a great paralysing force: to work \_in vain,\_ to struggle \_in

vain.\_

\*\*\*

The periods of \_hoarding,\_ when energy and power are stored, to be

utilised later by subsequent periods: \_Science\_ as a \_half-way house,\_

at which the mediocre, more multifarious, and more complicated beings

find their most natural gratification and means of expression: all

those who do well to avoid \_action.\_

598.

A. philosopher recuperates his strength in a way quite his own, and

with other means: he does it, for instance, with Nihilism. The belief

\_that there is no such thing as truth,\_ the Nihilistic belief, is a

tremendous relaxation for one who, as a warrior of knowledge, is

unremittingly struggling with a host of hateful truths. For truth is

ugly.

599.

The "purposelessness of all phenomena": the belief in this is the

result of the view that all interpretations hitherto have been false,

it is a generalisation on the part of discouragement and weakness--it

is not a necessary belief.

The arrogance of man: when he sees no purpose, he \_denies\_ that there

can be one!

600.

The unlimited ways of interpreting the world: every interpretation is a

symptom of growth or decline.

Unity (monism) is a need of inertia; Plurality in interpretation is a

sign of strength. One should not \_desire to deprive\_ the world of its

disquieting and enigmatical nature.

601.

Against the desire for reconciliation and peaceableness. To this also

belongs every attempt on the part of monism.

602.

This relative world, this world for the eye, the touch, and the

ear, is very false, even when adjusted to a much more sensitive

sensual apparatus. But its comprehensibility, its clearness, its

practicability, its beauty, will begin to \_near their end\_ if we

\_refine\_ our senses, just as beauty ceases to exist when the processes

of its history are reflected upon: the arrangement of the \_end\_ is in

itself an illusion. Let it suffice, that the more coarsely and more

superficially it is understood, the \_more valuable,\_ the more definite,

the more beautiful and important the world then seems. The more

deeply one looks into it, the further our valuation retreats from our

view,-\_senselessness approaches!\_ We have created the world that has

any value! Knowing this, we also perceive that the veneration of truth

is already the \_result of illusion\_--and that it is much more necessary

to esteem the formative, simplifying, moulding, and romancing power.

"All is false--everything is allowed!"

Only as the result of a certain bluntness of vision and the desire for

simplicity does the beautiful and the "valuable" make its appearance:

in itself it is purely fanciful.

603.

We know that the destruction of an illusion does not necessarily

produce a truth, but only one more piece of \_ignorance;\_ it is the

extension of our "empty space," an increase in our "waste."

604.

Of what alone can \_knowledge\_ consist?--"Interpretation," the

introduction of a sense into things, \_not\_ "explanation" (in the

majority of cases a new interpretation of an old interpretation which

has grown incomprehensible and little more than a mere sign). There

is no such thing as an established fact, everything fluctuates,

everything, is intangible, yielding; after all, the most lasting of all

things are our opinions.

605.

The ascertaining of "truth" and "untruth," the ascertaining of facts

in general, is fundamentally different from the creative \_placing,\_

forming, moulding, subduing, and \_willing\_ which lies at the root of

\_philosophy. To give a sense to things\_--this duty always remains

\_over,\_ provided \_no sense already lies in them.\_ The same holds good

of sounds, and also of the fate of nations they are susceptible of the

most varied interpretations and turns, \_for different purposes.\_

A higher duty is to \_fix a goal\_ and to mould facts according to

it: \_that is,\_ the \_interpretation of action,\_ and not merely a

\_transvaluation\_ of concepts.

606.

Man ultimately finds nothing more in things than he himself has laid

in them--this process of finding again is science, the actual process

of laying a meaning in things, is art, religion, love, pride. In both,

even if they are child's play, one should show good courage and one

should plough ahead; on the one hand, to find again, on the other,--we

are the other,--to lay a sense in things.

607.

\_Science\_: its two sides:--

In regard to the individual;

In regard to the complex of culture ("levels of culture")

--antagonistic valuation in regard to this and that side.

608.

The development of science tends ever more to transform the known into

the unknown: its aim, however, is to do the \_reverse,\_ and it starts

out with the instinct of tracing the unknown to the known.

In short, science is laying the road to \_sovereign ignorance,\_ to a

feeling that "knowledge" does not exist at all, that it was merely a

form of haughtiness to dream of such a thing; further, that we have not

preserved the smallest notion which would allow us to class knowledge

even as a \_possibility\_ that "knowledge" is a contradictory idea. We

\_transfer\_ a primeval myth and piece of human vanity into the land

of hard facts: we can \_allow\_ a thing-in-itself as a concept, just

as little as we can \_allow\_ "knowledge-in-itself." The \_misleading\_

influence of "numbers and logic," the misleading influence of "laws."

\_Wisdom\_ is an attempt to \_overcome\_ the perspective valuations (\_i.e.\_

the "will to power"): it is a principle which is both unfriendly to

Life, and also decadent; a symptom in the case of the Indians, etc.;

\_weakness\_ of the power of appropriation.

609.

It does not suffice for you to see in what ignorance man and beast now

live; you must also have and learn the \_desire\_ for \_ignorance.\_ It

is necessary that you should know that without this form of ignorance

life itself would be impossible, that it is merely a vital condition

under which, alone, a living organism can preserve itself and prosper:

a great solid belt of ignorance must stand about you.

610.

Science--the transformation of Nature into concepts for the purpose of

governing Nature--that is part of the rubric \_means.\_

But the \_purpose\_ and \_will\_ of mankind must grow in the same way, the

intention in regard to the whole.

611.

\_Thought\_ is the strongest and most persistently exercised function in

all stages of life--and also in every act of perception or apparent

experience! Obviously it soon becomes the \_mightiest\_ and \_most

exacting\_ of all functions, and in time tyrannises over other powers.

Ultimately it becomes "passion in itself."

612.

The right to great passion must be reclaimed for the investigator,

after self-effacement and the cult of "objectivity" have created a

false order of rank in this sphere. Error reached its zenith when

Schopenhauer taught: \_in the release from passion and\_ in will alone

lay the road to "truth," to knowledge; the intellect freed from will

\_could not help\_ seeing the true and actual essence of things. The same

error in art: as if everything became \_beautiful\_ the moment it was

regarded without will.

613.

The contest for supremacy among the passions, and the dominion of one

of the passions over the intellect.

614.

To "humanise" the world means to feel ourselves ever more and more

masters upon earth.

615.

Knowledge, among a higher class of beings, will also take new forms

which are not yet necessary.

616.

That the \_worth of the world\_ lies in our interpretations (that perhaps

yet other interpretations are possible somewhere, besides mankind's);

that the interpretations made hitherto were perspective valuations,

by means of which we were able to survive in life, \_i.e.\_ in the

Will to Power and in the growth of power; that every \_elevation of

man\_ involves the overcoming of narrower interpretations; that every

higher degree of strength or power attained, brings new views in its

train, and teaches a belief in new horizons--these doctrines lie

scattered through all my works. The world that \_concerns us at all\_ is

false--that is to say, is not a fact; but a romance, a piece of human

sculpture, made from a meagre sum of observation; it is "in flux"; it

is something that evolves, a great revolving lie continually moving

onwards and never getting any nearer to truth--for there is no such

thing as "truth."

617.

\_Recapitulation\_:--

To \_stamp\_ Becoming with the character of Being--this is the highest

\_Will to Power.\_

\_The twofold falsification,\_ by the senses on the one hand, by the

intellect on the other, with the view of maintaining a world of being,

of rest, of equivalent cases, etc.

That \_everything recurs,\_ is the very nearest \_approach of a world of

Becoming to a world of Being, the height of contemplation.\_

It is out of the values which have been attributed to Being, that the

condemnation of, and dissatisfaction with, Becoming, have sprung: once

such a world of Being had been invented.

The metamorphoses of Being (body, God, ideas, natural laws, formulæ,

etc.).

"Being" as appearance the twisting round of values: appearance was that

which \_conferred the values.\_

Knowledge in itself in a world of Becoming is impossible; how can

knowledge be possible at all, then? Only as a mistaking of one's self,

as will to power, as will to deception.

Becoming is inventing, willing, self-denying, self-overcoming; no

subject but an action, it places things, it is creative, no "causes and

effects."

Art is the will to overcome Becoming, it is a process of eternalising,

but short-sighted, always according to the perspective, repeating, as

it were in a small way, the tendency of the whole.

That which \_all life\_ shows, is to be regarded as a reduced formula for

the collective tendency: hence the new definition of the concept "Life"

as "will to power."

Instead of "cause and effect," the struggle of evolving factors with

one another, frequently with the result that the opponent is absorbed;

no constant number for Becoming.

The uselessness of old ideals for the interpretation of all that takes

place, once their bestial origin and utility have been recognised, they

are, moreover, all hostile to life.

The uselessness of the mechanical theory--it gives the impression that

there \_can be no purpose.\_

All the \_idealism\_ of mankind, hitherto, is on the point of

turning into \_Nihilism\_--may be shown to be a belief in absolute

\_worth\_lessness, \_i.e. purpose\_lessness.

The annihilation of ideals, the new desert waste the new arts which

will help us to endure it--\_amphibia\_ that we are!

\_First principles,\_ bravery, patience, no "stepping-back," not too much

ardour to get to the fore. (\_N.B.\_--Zarathustra constantly maintaining

an attitude of parody towards all former values, as the result of his

overflowing energy.)

II.

THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.

1. The Mechanical Interpretation of the World.

618.

Of all the interpretations of the world attempted heretofore, the

\_mechanical\_ one seems to-day to stand most prominently in the front.

Apparently it has a clean conscience on its side; for no science

believes inwardly in progress and success unless it be with the help

of mechanical procedures. Every one knows these procedures: "reason"

and "purpose" are allowed to remain out of consideration as far as

possible; it is shown that, provided a sufficient amount of time be

allowed to elapse, everything can evolve out of everything else, and no

one attempts to suppress his malicious satisfaction, when the "apparent

design in the fate" of a plant or of the yolk of an egg, may be traced

to stress and thrust in short, people are heartily glad to pay respect

to this principle of profoundest stupidity, if I may be allowed to pass

a playful remark concerning these serious matters. Meanwhile, among the

most select intellects to be found in this movement, some presentiment

of evil, some anxiety is noticeable, as if the theory had a rent in it,

which sooner or later might be its last: I mean the sort of rent which

denotes the end of all balloons inflated with such theories.

Stress and thrust themselves cannot be "explained," one cannot get rid

of the \_actio in distans.\_ The belief even in the ability to explain is

now lost, and people peevishly admit that one can only describe, not

explain that the dynamic interpretation of the world, with its denial

of "empty space" and its little agglomerations of atoms, will soon get

the better of physicists: although in this way \_Dynamis\_ is certainly

granted an inner quality.

619.

The triumphant concept "\_energy\_" with which our physicists created

God and the world, needs yet to be completed: it must be given an

inner will which I characterise as the "\_Will to Power\_"--that is to

say, as an insatiable desire to manifest power; or the application and

exercise of power as a creative instinct, etc. Physicists cannot get

rid of the "\_actio in distans\_" in their principles; any more than they

can a repelling force (or an attracting one). There is no help for it,

all movements, all "appearances," all "laws" must be understood as

\_symptoms\_ of an \_inner\_ phenomenon, and the analogy of man must be

used for this purpose. It is possible to trace all the instincts of an

animal to the will to power; as also all the functions of organic life

to this one source.

620.

Has anybody ever been able to testify to a \_force!\_ No, but to

\_effects,\_ translated into a completely strange language. Regularity in

sequence has so spoilt us, \_that we no longer wonder at the wonderful

process.\_

621.

A force of which we cannot form any idea, is an empty word, and ought

to have no civic rights in the city of science: and the same applies to

the purely mechanical powers of attracting and repelling by means of

which we can form an image of the world--no more!

622.

\_Squeezes and kicks\_ are something incalculably recent, evolved and

not primeval. They presuppose something which holds together and \_can\_

press and strike! But how could it hold together?

623.

There is nothing \_unalterable\_ in chemistry: this is only appearance,

a mere school prejudice. We it was who \_introduced\_ the unalterable,

taking it from metaphysics as usual, Mr. Chemist. It is a mere

superficial judgment to declare that the diamond, graphite, and carbon

are identical. Why? Simply because no loss of substance can be traced

in the scales! Well then, at least they have something in common; but

the work of the molecules in the process of changing from one form to

the other, an action we can neither see nor weigh, is just exactly what

makes one material something different--with specifically different

qualities.

624.

\_Against\_ the physical \_atom.\_--In order to understand the world, we

must be able to reckon it up; in order to be able to reckon it up, we

must be aware of constant causes; but since we find no such constant

causes in reality, we \_invent\_ them for ourselves and call them atoms.

This is the origin of the atomic theory.

The possibility of calculating the world, the possibility of expressing

all phenomena by means of formulæ--is that really "understanding"? What

would be understood of a piece of music, if all that were calculable in

it and capable of being expressed in formulas, were reckoned up?--Thus

"constant causes", things, substances, something "unconditioned," were

therefore \_invented\_;--what has been attained thereby?

625.

The mechanical concept of "movement" is already a translation of the

original process into the \_language of symbols of the eye and the

touch.\_

The concept \_atom,\_ the distinction between the "seat of a motive force

and the force itself," is a \_language of symbols derived from our

logical and physical world.\_

It does not lie within our power to alter our means of expression:

it is possible to understand to what extend they are but symptomatic.

To demand an \_adequate means of expression is nonsense\_: it lies at

the heart of a language, of a medium of communication, to express

\_relation\_ only.... The concept "truth" is \_opposed to good sense.\_

The whole province of truth--\_falseness\_ only applies to the relations

between beings, not to an "absolute." There is no such thing as a

"being in itself" (\_relations\_ in the first place constitute being),

any more than there can be "knowledge in itself."

626.

"\_The feeling of force\_ cannot proceed from movement: feeling in

general cannot proceed from movement."

"Even in support of this, an apparent experience is the only evidence:

in a substance (brain) feeling is generated through transmitted motion

(stimuli). But generated? Would this show that the feeling did \_not\_

yet exist there \_at all\_? so that its appearance would \_have\_ to

be regarded as the \_creative act\_ of the intermediary--motion? The

feelingless condition of this substance is only an hypothesis! not an

experience! Feeling, therefore is the \_quality\_ of the substance: there

actually are substances that feel."

"Do we learn from certain substances that they have \_no\_ feeling? No,

we merely cannot tell that they have any. It is impossible to seek the

origin of feeling in non-sensitive substance."--\_Oh what hastiness!\_

627.

"To attract" and "to repel", in a purely mechanical sense, is pure

fiction: a word. We cannot imagine an attraction without a \_purpose.--\_

Either the will to possess one's self of a thing, or the will to defend

one's self from a thing or to repel it--\_that\_ we "understand"; that

would be an interpretation which we could use.

In short, the psychological necessity of believing in causality lies in

the \_impossibility of imagining a process without a purpose\_: but of

course this says nothing concerning truth or untruth (the justification

of such a belief)! The belief in \_causæ\_ collapses with the belief in

τέλει (against Spinoza and his causationism).

628.

It is an illusion to suppose that something is \_known,\_ when all

we have is a mathematical formula of what has happened; it is only

\_characterised, described;\_ no more!

629.

If I bring a regularly recurring phenomenon into a formula, I have

facilitated and shortened my task of characterising the whole

phenomenon, etc. But I have not thereby ascertained a "law," I have

only replied to the question: How is it that something recurs here? It

is a supposition that the formula corresponds to a complex of really

unknown forces and the discharge of forces; it is pure mythology to

suppose that forces here obey a law, so that, as the result of their

obedience, we have the same phenomenon every time.

630.

I take good care not to speak of chemical "\_laws\_": to do so savours of

morality. It is much more a question of establishing certain relations

of power: the stronger becomes master of the weaker, in so far as the

latter cannot maintain its degree of independence,--here there is no

pity, no quarter, and, still less, any observance of "law."

631.

The unalterable sequence of certain phenomena does not prove any "law,"

but a relation of power between two or more forces. To say, "But it

is precisely this relation that remains the same!" is no better than

saying, "One and the same force cannot be another force."--It is not a

matter of \_sequence,\_ but a matter of \_interdependence,\_ a process in

which the procession of moments do \_not\_ determine each other after the

manner of cause and effect....

The separation of the "action" from the "agent"; of the phenomenon from

the \_worker\_ of that phenomenon: of the process from one that is not

process, but lasting, \_substance,\_ thing, body, soul, etc.; the attempt

to understand a life as a sort of shifting of things and a changing of

places; of a sort of "being" or stable entity: this ancient mythology

established the belief in "cause and effect," once it had found a

lasting form in the functions of speech and grammar.

632.

The "regularity" of a sequence is only a metaphorical expression, not

a fact, just \_as if\_ a rule were followed here! And the same holds

good of "conformity to law." We find a formula in order to express an

ever-recurring kind of succession of phenomena: but that does not show

that we have \_discovered a law\_; much less a force which is the cause

of a recurrence of effects. The fact that something always happens

thus or thus, is interpreted here as if a creature always acted thus

or thus as the result of obedience to a law or to a lawgiver: whereas

apart from the "law" it would be free to act differently. But precisely

that inability to act otherwise might originate in the creature itself,

it might be that it did not act thus or thus in response to a law,

but simply because it was so constituted. It would mean simply: that

something cannot also be something else; that it cannot be first this,

and then something quite different; that it is neither free nor the

reverse, but merely thus or thus. \_The fault lies in thinking a subject

into things.\_

633.

To speak of two consecutive states, the first as "cause," and the

second as "effect," is false. The first state cannot bring about

anything, the second has nothing effected in it.

It is a question of a struggle between two elements unequal in power:

a new adjustment is arrived at, according to the measure of power each

possesses. The second state is something fundamentally different from

the first (it is not its effect): the essential thing Is, that the

factors which engage in the struggle leave it with different quanta of

power.

634.

\_A. criticism of Materialism.\_--Let us dismiss the two popular

concepts, Necessity and Law, from this idea: the first introduces a

false constraint, the second a false liberty into the world. "Things"

do not act regularly, they follow no \_rule:\_ there are no things (that

is our fiction); neither do they act in accordance with any necessity.

There is no obedience here: for, the fact that \_something is\_ as it is,

strong or weak, is not the result of obedience or of a rule or of a

constraint....

The degree of resistance and the degree of superior power--this is the

question around which all phenomena turn: if we, for our own purposes

and calculations, know how to express this in formulas and "laws," all

the better for us! But that does not mean that we have introduced any

"morality" into the world, just because we have fancied it as obedient.

There are no laws: every power draws its last consequence at every

moment. Things are calculable precisely owing to the fact that there is

no possibility of their being otherwise than they are.

A quantum of power is characterised by the effect it produces

and the influence it resists. The adiaphoric state which would be

thinkable in itself, is entirely lacking. It is essentially a will to

violence and a will to defend one's self against violence. It is not

self-preservation: every atom exercises its influence over the whole of

existence--it is thought out of existence if one thinks this radiation

of will-power away. That is why I call it a quantum of "\_Will to

Power\_"; with this formula one can express the character which cannot

be abstracted in thought from mechanical order, without suppressing the

latter itself in thought.

The translation of the world of effect into a \_visible\_ world--a world

for the eye--is the concept "movement." Here it is always understood

that \_something\_ has been moved,--whether it be the fiction of an

atomic globule or even of the abstraction of the latter, the dynamic

atom, something is always imagined that has an effect--that is to say,

we have not yet rid ourselves of the habit into which our senses and

speech inveigled us. Subject and object, an agent to the action, the

action and that which does it separated: we must not forget that all

this signifies no more than semeiotics and--nothing real. Mechanics as

a teaching of \_movement\_ is already a translation of phenomena into

man's language of the senses.

635.

We are in need of "unities" in order to be able to reckon: but this is

no reason for supposing that "unities" actually \_exist.\_ We borrowed

the concept "unity" from our concept "ego,"--our very oldest article

of faith. If we did not believe ourselves to be unities we should never

have formed the concept "thing." Now--that is to say, somewhat late in

the day, we are overwhelmingly convinced that our conception of the

concept "ego" is no security whatever for a real entity. In order to

maintain the mechanical interpretation of the world theoretically, we

must always make the reserve that it is with fictions that we do so:

the concept of \_movement\_ (derived from the language of our senses)

and the concept of the \_atom\_ (= entity, derived from our psychical

experience) are based upon a \_sense-prejudice\_ and a \_psychological

prejudice.\_

Mechanics formulates consecutive phenomena, and it does so

semeiologically, in the terms of the senses and of the mind (that all

influence is \_movement\_; that where there is movement something is at

work moving): it does not touch the question of the causal force.

The \_mechanical\_ world is imagined as the eye and the sense of touch

alone could imagine a world (as "moved"),--in such a way as to be

calculable,--as to simulate causal entities "things" (atoms) whose

effect is constant (the transfer of the false concept of subject to the

concept atom).

The mixing together of the concept of numbers, of the concept of thing

(the idea of subject), of the concept of activity (the separation of

that which is the cause, and the effect), of the concept of movement:

all these things are phenomenal; our eye and our \_psychology\_ are still

in it all.

If we eliminate these adjuncts, nothing remains over but dynamic

quanta, in a relation of tension to all other dynamic quanta: the

essence of which resides in their relation to all other quanta, in

their "influence" upon the latter. The will to power, not Being, not

Becoming, but a \_pathos\_--is the elementary fact, from these first

results a Becoming, an influencing....

636.

The physicists believe in a "true world" after their own kind; a

fixed \_systematising of atoms\_ to perform necessary movements, and

holding good equally of all creatures, so that, according to them,

the "world of appearance" reduces itself to the side of general and

generally-needed Being, which is accessible to every one according to

his kind (accessible and also adjusted,--made "subjective"). But here

they are in error. The atom which they postulate is arrived at by the

logic of that perspective of consciousness; it is in itself therefore

a subjective fiction. This picture of the world which they project

is in no way essentially different from the subjective picture: the

only difference is, that it is composed simply with more extended

senses, but certainly with \_our\_ senses.... And in the end, without

knowing it, they left something out of the constellation: precisely

the necessary \_perspective factor,\_ by means of which every centre of

power--and not man alone--constructs the rest of the world \_from its

point of view\_--that is to say, measures it, feels it, and moulds it

according to its degree of strength.... They forgot to reckon with

this perspective-fixing power, in "true being,"--or, in school-terms,

subject-being. They suppose that this was "evolved" and added;--but

even the chemical investigator needs it: it is indeed \_specific Being,\_

which determines action and reaction according to circumstances.

\_Perspectivity is only a complex form, of specificness.\_ My idea is

that every specific body strives to become master of all space, and to

extend its power (its will to power), and to thrust back everything

that resists it. But inasmuch as it is continually meeting the same

endeavours on the part of other bodies, it concludes by coming to terms

with those (by "combining" with those) which are sufficiently related

to it--\_and thus they conspire together for power.\_ And the process

continues.

637.

Even in the inorganic world all that concerns an atom of energy is its

immediate neighbourhood: distant forces balance each other. Here is

the root of \_perspectivity,\_ and it explains why a living organism is

"egoistic" to the core.

638.

Granting that the world disposed of a quantum of force, it is obvious

that any transposition of force to any place would affect the whole

system--thus, besides the causality of \_sequence,\_ there would also be

a dependence, \_contiguity,\_ and \_coincidence.\_

639.

The only possible way of upholding the sense of the concept "God" would

be: to make \_Him not\_ the motive force, but the condition of \_maximum

power,\_ an \_epoch;\_ a point in the further development of the \_Will to

Power;\_ by means of which subsequent evolution just as much as former

evolution--up to Him--could be explained.

Viewed mechanically, the energy of collective Becoming remains

constant; regarded from the economical standpoint, it ascends

to its zenith and then recedes therefrom in order to remain

eternally rotatory. This "\_Will to Power\_" expresses itself in the

\_interpretation in the manner in which the strength is used.\_--The

conversion of energy into life; "life in its highest power"

thenceforward appears as the goal. The same amount of energy, at

different stages of development, means different things.

That which determines growth in Life is the economy which becomes ever

more sparing and methodical, which achieves ever more and more with a

steadily decreasing amount of energy.... The ideal is the principle of

the least possible expense....

The only thing \_that is proved\_ is that the world is \_not\_ striving

towards a state of stability. Consequently its zenith must not be

conceived as a state of absolute equilibrium....

The dire necessity of the same things happening in the course of the

world, as in all other things, is not an eternal determinism reigning

over all phenomena, but merely the expression of the fact that the

impossible is not possible; that a given force cannot be different

from that given force; that a given quantity of resisting force does

not manifest itself otherwise than in conformity with its degree of

strength;--to speak of events as being necessary is tautological.

2. The Will to Power as Life.

\_(a) The Organic Process.\_

640.

Man imagines that he was present at the generation of the organic

world: what was there to be observed, with the eyes and the touch,

in regard to these processes? How much of it can be put into round

numbers? What rules are noticeable in the movements? Thus, man would

fain arrange all phenomena as if they were \_for the eye and for the

touch,\_ as if they were forms of motion: he will discover \_formules\_

wherewith to \_simplify\_ the unwieldy mass of these experiences.

\_The reduction of all phenomena\_ to the level of men with senses and

with mathematics. It is a matter of making \_an inventory of human

experiences:\_ granting that man, or rather the \_human eye and the

ability to form concepts,\_ have been the eternal witnesses of all

things.

641.

A plurality of forces bound by a common nutritive process we call

"Life." To this nutritive process all so-called feeling, thinking,

and imagining belong as means--that is to say, (1) in the form of

opposing other forces; (2) in the form of an adjustment of other forces

according to mould and rhythm; (3) the form of a valuation relative to

assimilation and excretion.

642.

The bond between the inorganic and the organic world must lie in the

repelling power exercised by every atom of energy. "Life" might be

defined as a lasting form of \_force-establishing processes,\_ in which

the various contending forces, on their part, grow unequally. To what

extent does counter-strife exist even in obedience? Individual power is

by no means surrendered through it. In the same way, there exists in

the act of commanding, an acknowledgment of the fact that the absolute

power of the adversary has not been overcome, absorbed, or dissipated.

"Obedience," and "command," are forms of the game of war.

643.

The Will to Power \_interprets\_ (an organ in the process of formation

has to be interpreted): it defines, it determines gradations,

differences of power. Mere differences of power could not be aware of

each other as such: something must be there which \_will\_ grow, and

which interprets all other things that would do the same, according to

the value of the latter. In sooth, all interpretation is but a means

in itself to become master of something. (Continual \_interpretation\_ is

the first principle of the organic process.)

644.

Greater complexity, sharp differentiation, the contiguity of the

developed organs and functions, with the disappearance of intermediate

members--if \_that\_ is \_perfection,\_ then there is a Will to Power

apparent in the organic process by means of whose \_dominating,

shaping,\_ and \_commanding\_ forces it is continually increasing the

sphere of its power, and persistently simplifying things within that

sphere, it \_grows\_ imperatively.

"Spirit" is only a means and an instrument in the service of higher

life, in the service of the elevation of life.

645.

"\_Heredity,\_" as something quite incomprehensible, cannot be used

as an explanation, but only as a designation for the identification

of a problem. And the same holds good of "\_adaptability.\_" As a

matter of fact, the account of morphology, even supposing it were

perfect, \_explains\_ nothing, it merely describes an enormous fact.

\_How\_ a given organ gets to be used for any particular purpose is not

explained. There is just as little explained in regard to these things

by the assumption of \_causæ finales\_ as by the assumption of \_causæ

efficientes.\_ The concept "causa" is only a means of expression, no

\_more\_; a means of designating a thing.

646.

They are analogies; for instance, our \_memory\_ may suggest another kind

of memory which makes itself felt in heredity, development, and forms.

Our \_inventive\_ and experimentative powers suggest another kind of

inventiveness in the application of instruments to new ends, etc.

That which we call our "\_consciousness\_" is quite guiltless of any

of the essential processes of our preservation and growth; and no

human brain could be so subtle as to construct anything more than a

machine--to which every organic process is infinitely superior.

647.

\_Against Darwinism.\_--The use of an organ does \_not\_ explain its

origin, on the contrary! During the greater part of the time occupied

in the formation of a certain quality, this quality does not help to

preserve the individual; it is of no use to him, and particularly not

in his struggle with external circumstances and foes.

What is ultimately "useful"? It is necessary to ask, "Useful for what"?

For instance, that which promotes the \_lasting powers\_ of the

individual might be unfavourable to his strength or his beauty; that

which preserves him might at the same time fix him and keep him stable

throughout development. On the other hand, a \_deficiency,\_ a state of

\_degeneration,\_ may be of the greatest possible use, inasmuch as it

acts as a stimulus to other organs. In the same way, a \_state of need\_

may be a condition of existence, inasmuch as it reduces an individual

to that modicum of means which, though it \_keeps him together,\_ does

not allow him to squander his strength.--The individual himself is

the struggle of parts (for nourishment, space, etc.): his development

involves the \_triumph,\_ the \_predominance,\_ of isolated parts; the

\_wasting away,\_ or the "development into organs," of other parts.

The influence of "environment" is nonsensically \_overrated\_ in Darwin,

the essential factor in the process of life is precisely the tremendous

inner power to shape and to create forms, which merely \_uses, exploits\_

"environment."

The new forms built up by this inner power are not produced with a view

to any end; but, in the struggle between the parts, a new form does not

exist long \_without\_ becoming related to some kind of semi-utility,

and, according to its use, develops itself ever more and more perfectly.

648.

"Utility" in respect of the acceleration of the speed of evolution, is

a different kind of "utility" from that which is understood to mean the

greatest possible stability and staying power of the evolved creature.

649.

"Useful" in the sense of Darwinian biology means: that which favours a

thing in its struggle with others. But in my opinion the \_feeling of

being surcharged,\_ the feeling accompanying an \_increase in strength,\_

quite apart from the utility of the struggle, is the actual \_progress\_:

from these feelings the will to war is first derived.

650.

Physiologists should bethink themselves before putting down the

instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic

being. A living thing seeks above all to \_discharge\_ its strength:

"\_self-preservation" \_ is only one of the results thereof.--Let us

beware of \_superfluous\_ teleological principles!--one of which is the

whole concept of "self-preservation."[4]

651.

The most-fundamental--and most primeval activity of a protoplasm cannot

be ascribed to a will to self-preservation, for it absorbs an amount

of material which is absurdly out of proportion with the needs of its

preservation: and what is more, it does \_not\_ "preserve itself" in the

process, but actually falls to \_pieces....\_ The instinct which rules

here, must account for this total absence in the organism of a desire

to preserve itself: hunger is already an interpretation based upon the

observation of a more or less complex organism (hunger is a specialised

and later form of the instinct; it is an expression of the system of

divided labour, in the service of a higher instinct which rules the

whole).

652.

It is just as impossible to regard \_hunger\_ as the \_primum mobile,\_ as

it is to take self-preservation to be so. Hunger, considered as the

result of insufficient nourishment, means hunger as the result of a

will to power \_which can no longer dominate\_ It is not a question of

replacing a loss, it is only later on, as the result of the division of

labour, when the Will to Power has discovered other and quite different

ways of gratifying itself, that the appropriating lust of the organism

is \_reduced\_ to hunger--to the need of replacing what has been lost.

653.

We can but laugh at the false "\_Altruism\_" of biologists: propagation

among the amœbæ appears as a process of jetsam, as an advantage to

them. It is an excretion of useless matter.

654.

The division of a protoplasm into two takes place when its power is

no longer sufficient to subjugate the matter it has appropriated:

procreation is the result of impotence.

In the cases in which the males seek the females and become one with

them, procreation is the result of hunger.

655.

The weaker vessel is driven to the stronger from a need of nourishment;

it desires to get under it, if possible to become \_one\_ with it. The

stronger, on the contrary, defends itself from others; it refuses to

perish in this way; it prefers rather to split itself into two or more

parts in the process of growing. One may conclude that the greater the

urgency seems to become one with something else, the more weakness in

some form is present. The greater the tendency to variety, difference,

inner decay, the more strength is actually to hand.

The instinct to cleave to something, and the instinct to repel

something, are in the inorganic as in the organic world, the uniting

bond. The whole distinction is a piece of hasty judgment.

The will to power in every combination of forces, \_defending itself

against the stronger and coming down unmercifully upon the weaker, is

more correct.\_

N. B. \_All processes may be regarded as "beings".\_

656.

The will to power can manifest itself only against \_obstacles;\_ it

therefore goes in search of what resists it--this is the primitive

tendency of the protoplasm when it extends its \_pseudopodia\_ and feels

about it. The act of appropriation and assimilation is, above all, the

result of a desire to overpower, a process of forming, of additional

building and rebuilding, until at last the subjected creature has

become completely a part of the superior creature's sphere of power,

and has increased the latter.--If this process of incorporation

does not succeed, then the whole organism falls to pieces; and the

\_separation\_ occurs as the result of the will to power: in order to

prevent the escape of that which has been subjected, the will to power

falls into two wills (under some circumstances without even abandoning

completely its relation to the two).

"Hunger" is only a more narrow adaptation, once the fundamental

instinct of power has won power of a more abstract kind.

657.

What is "passive"?

To be hindered in the outward movement of grasping: it is

thus an act of resistance and reaction.

What is "active"?

To stretch out for power.

"Nutrition"...

Is only a derived phenomenon; the primitive form of it was

the will to stuff everything inside one's own skin.

"Procreation"...

Only derived; originally, in those cases In which one

will was unable to organise the collective mass it had

appropriated, an \_opposing will\_ came into power, which

undertook to effect the separation and establish a new

centre of organisation, after a struggle with the original

will.

"Pleasure"...

Is a feeling of power (presupposing the existence of pain).

658.

(1) The organic functions shown to be but forms of the fundamental

will, the will to power,--and buds thereof.

(2) The will to power specialises itself as will to nutrition, to

property, to \_tools,\_ to servants (obedience), and to rulers: the body

as an example.--The stronger will directs the weaker. There is no other

form of causality than that of will to will. It is not to be explained

mechanically.

(3) Thinking, feeling, willing, in all living organisms. What is a

desire if it be not: a provocation of the feeling of power by an

obstacle (or, better still, by rhythmical obstacles and resisting

forces)--so that it surges through it? Thus in all pleasure pain is

understood.--If the pleasure is to be very great, the pains preceding

it must have been very long, and the whole bow of life must have been

strained to the utmost.

(4) Intellectual functions. The will to shaping, forming, and making

like, etc.

\_(b) Man.\_

659.

\_With the body as clue.\_--Granting that the "\_soul\_" was only an

attractive and mysterious thought, from which philosophers rightly,

but reluctantly, separated themselves--that which they have since

learnt to put in its place is perhaps even more attractive and even

more mysterious. The human \_body,\_ in which the whole of the most

distant and most recent past of all organic life once more becomes

living and corporal, seems to flow through, this past and right over

it like a huge and inaudible torrent; the body is a more wonderful

thought than the old "soul." In all ages the body, as our actual

property, as our most certain being, in short, as our ego, has been

more earnestly believed in than the spirit (or the "soul," or the

subject, as the school jargon now calls it). It has never occurred to

any one to regard his stomach as a strange or a divine stomach; but

that there is a tendency and a predilection in man to regard all his

thoughts as "inspired," all his values as "imparted to him by a God,"

all his instincts as dawning activities--this is proved by the evidence

of every age in man's history. Even now, especially among artists,

there may very often be noticed a sort of wonder, and a deferential

hesitation to decide, when the question occurs to them, by what means

they achieved their happiest work, and from which world the creative

thought came down to them: when they question in this way, they are

possessed by a feeling of guilelessness and childish shyness. They dare

not say: "That came from me; it was my hand which threw that die."

Conversely, even those philosophers and theologians, who in their logic

and piety found the most imperative reasons for regarding their body as

a deception (and even as a deception overcome and disposed of), could

not help recognising the foolish fact that the body still remained: and

the most unexpected proofs of this are to be found partly in Pauline

and partly in Vedantic philosophy. But what does \_strength of faith\_

ultimately mean? Nothing!--A strong faith might also be a foolish

faith!--There is food for reflection.

And supposing the faith in the body were ultimately but the result

of a conclusion; supposing it were a false conclusion, as idealists

declare it is, would it not then involve some doubt concerning the

trustworthiness of the spirit itself which thus causes us to draw wrong

conclusions?

Supposing the plurality of things, and space, and time, and motion

(and whatever the other first principles of a belief in the body may

be) were errors--what suspicions would not then be roused against the

spirit which led us to form such first principles? Let it suffice that

the belief in the body is, at any rate for the present, a much stronger

belief than the belief in the spirit, and he who would fain undermine

it assails the authority of the spirit most thoroughly in so doing!

660.

\_The Body as an Empire.\_

The aristocracy in the body, the majority of the rulers (the fight

between the cells and the tissues).

Slavery and the division of labour: the higher type alone possible

through the \_subjection\_ of the lower to a function.

Pleasure and pain, not contraries. The feeling of power.

"Nutrition" only a result of the insatiable lust of appropriation in

the Will to Power.

"Procreation": this is the decay which supervenes when the ruling cells

are too weak to organise appropriated material.

It is the \_moulding\_ force which will have a continual supply of new

material (more "force"). The masterly construction of an organism out

of an egg.

"The mechanical interpretation": recognises only quantities: but the

real energy is in the quality. Mechanics can therefore only describe

processes; it cannot explain them.

"Purpose." We should start out from the "sagacity" of plants.

The concept of "meliorism": \_not\_ only greater complexity, but greater

\_power\_ (it need not be only greater masses).

Conclusion concerning the evolution of man: the road to perfection lies

in the bringing forth of the most powerful individuals, for whose use

the great masses would be converted into mere tools (that is to say,

into the most intelligent and flexible tools possible).

661.

Why is all \_activity,\_ even that of a \_sense,\_ associated with

pleasure? Because, before the activity was possible, an obstacle or

a burden was done away with. Or, rather, because all action is a

process of overcoming, of becoming master of, and of \_increasing\_ the

\_feeling of power\_? The pleasure of thought. Ultimately it is not

only the feeling of power, but also the pleasure of creating and of

contemplating the \_creation:\_ for all activity enters our consciousness

in the form of "works."

662.

Creating is an act of selecting and of finishing the thing selected.

(In every act of the will, this is the essential element.)

663.

All phenomena which are the result of intentions may be reduced to \_the

intention of increasing power.\_

664.

When we do anything, we are conscious of a \_feeling of strength;\_

we often have this sensation before the act--that is to say, while

imagining the thing to do (as, for instance, at the sight of an enemy,

of an obstacle, which we feel \_equal to\_): it is always an accompanying

sensation. Instinctively we think that this feeling of strength is

the cause of the action, that it is the "motive force." Our belief in

causation is the belief in force and its effect; it is a transcript

of our experience: in which we identify force and the feeling of

force.--Force, however, never moves things; the strength which is

conscious "does not set the muscles moving." "Of such a process we have

no experience, no idea." "We experience as little concerning force as

a motive power, as concerning the \_necessity\_ of a movement." Force is

said to be the constraining element! "All we know is that one thing

follows another;--we know nothing of either compulsion or arbitrariness

in regard to the one following the other. Causality is first invented

by thinking compulsion into the sequence of processes. A certain

"understanding" of the thing is the result--that is to say, we humanise

the process a little, we make it more "familiar"; the familiar is the

known habitual fact of \_human compulsion associated with the feeling of

force.\_

665.

I have the intention of extending my arm; taking it for granted that

I know as little of the physiology of the human body and of the

mechanical laws of its movements as the man in the street, what could

there be more vague, more bloodless, more uncertain than this intention

compared with what follows it? And supposing I were the astutest

of mechanics, and especially conversant with the formulæ which are

applicable in this case, I should not be able to extend my arm one

whit the better. Our "knowledge" and our "action" in this case lie

coldly apart: as though in two different regions.--Again: Napoleon

carries out a plan of campaign--what does that mean? In this case,

everything concerning the consummation of the campaign is \_known,\_

because everything must be done through words of command: but even here

subordinates are taken for granted, who apply and adapt the general

plan to the particular emergency, to the degree of strength, etc.

666.

For ages we have always ascribed the value of an action, of a

character, of an existence, to the \_intention,\_ to the \_purpose\_ for

which it was done, acted, or lived: this primeval idiosyncrasy of taste

ultimately takes a dangerous turn provided the lack of intention and

purpose in all phenomena comes ever more to the front in consciousness.

With it a general depreciation of all values seems to be preparing:

"All is without sense."--This melancholy phrase means: "All sense

lies in the intention, and if the intention is absolutely lacking,

then sense must be lacking too." In conformity with this valuation,

people were forced to place the value of life in a a life after death,

or in the progressive development of ideas, or of mankind, or of the

people, or of man to superman; but in this way the \_progressus in

infinitum\_ of purpose had been reached: it was ultimately necessary to

find one's self a place in the process of the world (perhaps with the

disdæmonistic outlook, it was a process which led to nonentity).

In regard to this point, "\_purpose\_" needs a somewhat more severe

criticism: it ought to be recognised that an action \_is never

caused by a purpose;\_ that an object and the means thereto are

interpretations, by means of which certain points in a phenomena

are selected and accentuated, at the cost of other, more numerous,

points, that every time something is done for a purpose, something

fundamentally different, and yet other things happen; that in regard

to the action done with a purpose, the case is the same as with the

so-called purposefulness of the heat which is radiated from the sun:

the greater part of the total sum is squandered; a portion of it, which

is scarcely worth reckoning, has a "purpose," has "sense"; that an

"end" with its "means" is an absurdly indefinite description, which

indeed may be able to command as a precept, as "will," but presupposes

a system of obedient and trained instruments, which, in the place of

the indefinite, puts forward a host of determined entities \_(i.e.\_ we

imagine a system of \_clever\_ but narrow intellects who postulate end

and means, in order to be able to grant our only known "end," the rôle

of the "cause of an action,"--a proceeding to which we have no right:

it is tantamount to solving a problem by placing its solution in an

inaccessible world which we cannot observe).

Finally, why could not an "end" be merely an \_accompanying feature\_

in the series of changes among the active forces which bring about

the action--a pale stenographic symbol stretched in consciousness

beforehand, and which serves as a guide to what happens, even as

a symbol of what happens, \_not\_ as its cause?--But in this way we

criticise \_will\_ itself: is it not an illusion to regard that which

enters consciousness as will-power, as a cause? Are not all conscious

phenomena only final phenomena--the lost links in a chain, but

apparently conditioning one another in their sequence within the plane

of consciousness? This might be an illusion.

667.

Science does \_not\_ inquire what impels us to will: on the contrary, it

\_denies\_ that \_willing\_ takes place at all, and supposes that something

quite different has happened--in short, that the belief in "will" and

"end" is an illusion. It does not inquire into the \_motives\_ of an

action, as if these had been present in consciousness previous to the

action, but it first divides the action up into a group of phenomena,

and then seeks the previous history of this mechanical movement--but

\_not\_ in the terms of feeling, perception, and thought; from this

quarter it can never accept the explanation: perception is precisely

the matter of science, \_which has to be explained.\_--The problem of

science is precisely to explain the world, \_without\_ taking perceptions

as the cause: for that would mean regarding \_perceptions\_ themselves

as the \_cause\_ of perceptions. The task of science is by no means

accomplished.

Thus: either there is \_no\_ such thing as will,--the hypothesis of

science,--or the will is \_free\_. The latter assumption represents the

prevailing feeling, of which we cannot rid ourselves, even if the

hypothesis of science were \_proved.\_

The popular belief in cause and effect is founded on the principle that

free will \_is the cause of every effect:\_ thereby alone do we arrive

at the feeling of causation. And thereto belongs also the feeling that

every cause is \_not\_ an effect, but always only a cause--if will is

the cause. "Our acts of will are \_not necessary\_"--this lies in the

very \_concept of "will."\_ The effect necessarily comes \_after\_ the

cause--that is what we feel. It is merely a \_hypothesis\_ that even our

willing is compulsory in every case.

668.

"To will" is not "to desire," to strive, to aspire to; it distinguishes

itself from that through the \_passion of commanding.\_

There is no such thing as "willing," but only the willing of

\_something:\_ the \_aim\_ must not be severed from the state--as the

epistemologists sever it. "Willing," as they understand it, is no more

possible than "thinking": it is a pure invention.

It is essential to willing that something should be \_commanded\_ (but

that does not mean that the will is carried into effect).

The general \_state of tension,\_ by virtue of which a force seeks to

discharge itself, is not "willing."

669.

"Pain" and "pleasure" are the most absurd \_means of expressing\_

judgments, which of course does not mean that the judgments which are

enunciated in this way must necessarily be absurd. The elimination

of all substantiation and logic, a yes or no in the reduction to a

passionate desire to have or to reject, an imperative abbreviation, the

utility of which is irrefutable: that is pain and pleasure. Its origin

is in the central sphere of the intellect; its prerequisite is an

infinitely accelerated process of perceiving, ordering, co-ordinating,

calculating, concluding: pleasure and pain are always final phenomena,

they are never causes.

As to deciding what provokes pain and pleasure, that is a question

which depends upon the \_degree of power:\_ the same thing, when

confronted with a small quantity of power, may seem a danger and may

suggest the need of speedy defence, and when confronted with the

consciousness of greater power, may be a voluptuous stimulus and may be

followed by a feeling of pleasure.

All feelings of pleasure and pain presuppose a \_measuring of collective

utility\_ and \_collective harmfulness\_: consequently a sphere where

there is the willing of an object (of a condition) and the selection of

the means thereto. Pleasure and pain are never "original facts."

The feelings of pleasure and pain are \_reactions of the will\_

(emotions) in which the intellectual centre fixes the value of certain

supervening changes as a collective value, and also as an introduction

of contrary actions.

670.

\_The belief in "emotions"\_--Emotions are a fabrication of the

intellect, an invention of \_causes\_ which do not exist. All general

\_bodily sensations\_ which we do not understand are interpreted

intellectually--that is to say, a \_reason\_ is sought why we feel

thus or thus among certain people or in certain experiences. Thus

something disadvantageous dangerous, and strange is taken for granted,

as if it were the cause of our being indisposed; as a matter of fact,

it gets \_added to\_ the indisposition, so as to make our condition

thinkable.--Mighty rushes of blood to the brain, accompanied by

a feeling of suffocation, are \_interpreted\_ as anger: the people

and things which provoke our anger are a means of relieving our

physiological condition. Subsequently, after long habituation, certain

processes and general feelings are so regularly correlated that the

sight of certain processes provokes that condition of general feeling,

and induces vascular engorgements, the ejection of seminal fluid, etc.:

we then say that the "emotion is provoked by propinquity."

\_Judgments\_ already inhere in pleasure and pain: stimuli become

differentiated, according as to whether they increase or reduce the

feeling of power.

\_The belief in willing.\_ To believe that a thought may be the cause

of a mechanical movement is to believe in miracles. The \_consistency

of science\_ demands that once we have made the world \_thinkable\_ for

ourselves by means of pictures, we should also make the emotions, the

desires, the will, etc., \_thinkable\_--that is to say, we should \_deny\_

them and treat them as \_errors of the intellect.\_

671.

Free will or no free will?--There is \_no such thing\_ as "\_Will\_": that

is only a simplified conception on the part of the understanding, like

"matter."

\_All actions must first be prepared and made possible mechanically

before they can be willed.\_ Or, \_in most cases\_ the "\_object\_" of an

action enters the brain only after everything is prepared for its

accomplishment. The object is an inner "stimulus"--nothing \_more.\_

672.

The most proximate prelude to an action relates to that action: but

\_further back still\_ there lies a preparatory history which covers \_a

far wider field:\_ the individual action is only a factor in a much more

extensive and \_subsequent\_ fact. The shorter and the longer processes

are not reported.

673.

The theory of \_chance:\_ the soul is a selecting and self-nourishing

being, which is persistently extremely clever and creative (this

\_creative\_ power is commonly overlocked! it is taken to be merely

passive).

I recognised the \_active\_ and creative \_power\_ within the

accidental.--Accident is in itself nothing more than \_the clashing of

creative impulses.\_

674.

Among the enormous multiplicity of phenomena to be observed in an

organic being, that part which becomes \_conscious\_ is a mere means:

and the particle of "virtue," "self abnegation," and other fanciful

inventions, are denied in a most thoroughgoing manner by the whole of

the remaining phenomena. We would do well to study our organism in all

its immorality....

The animal functions are, as a matter of fact, a million times more

important than all beautiful states of the soul and heights of

consciousness: the latter are an overflow, in so far as they are not

needed as instruments in the service of the animal functions. The whole

of \_conscious\_ life: the spirit together with the soul, the heart,

goodness, and virtue; in whose service does it work? In the greatest

possible perfection of the means (for acquiring nourishment and

advancement) serving the fundamental animal functions: above all, the

\_ascent of the line of Life.\_

That which is called "flesh" and "body" is of such incalculably greater

importance, that the rest is nothing more than a small appurtenance.

To continue the chain of life \_so that it becomes ever more

powerful\_--that is the task.

But now observe how the heart, the soul, virtue, and spirit together

conspire formally to thwart this purpose: as \_if they\_ were the object

of every endeavour! ... The \_degeneration of life\_ is essentially

determined by the extraordinary \_fallibility of consciousness,\_ which

is held at bay least of all by the instincts, and thus commits the

gravest and profoundest \_errors.\_

Now could any more insane extravagance of vanity be imagined than

to measure the \_value\_ of existence according to the \_pleasant or

unpleasant feelings of this consciousness\_? It is obviously only a

means: and pleasant or unpleasant feelings are also no more than means.

According to what standard is the objective value measured? According

to the quantity of \_increased\_ and \_more organised power\_ alone.

675.

The value of all \_valuing.\_--My desire would be to see the agent once

more identified with the action, after action has been deprived of all

meaning by having been separated in thought from the agent; I should

like to see the notion of doing \_something,\_ the idea of a "purpose,"

of an "intention," of an object, reintroduced into the action, after

action has been made insignificant by having been artificially

separated from these things.

All "objects," "purposes," "meanings," are only manners of expression

and metamorphoses of the one will inherent in all phenomena; of the

will to power. To have an object, a purpose, or an intention, in

fact \_to will\_ generally, is equivalent to the desire for \_greater

strength,\_ for fuller growth, and for the \_means\_ thereto \_in addition.\_

The most general and fundamental instinct in all action and willing

is precisely on that account the one which is least known and is most

concealed; for in practice we always follow its bidding, for the simple

reason that we \_are\_ in ourselves its bidding....

All valuations are only the results of, and the narrow points of view

in \_servings this\_ one will: valuing \_in itself\_ is nothing save this,

\_--will to power.\_

To criticise existence from the standpoint of any one of these

values is utter nonsense and error. Even supposing that a process of

annihilation follows from such a value, even so this process is in the

service of this will.

The \_valuation of existence itself!\_ But existence is this valuing

itself!--and even when we say "no," we still do what we \_are.\_

We ought now to perceive the \_absurdity\_ of this pretence at judging

existence; and we ought to try and discover \_what\_ actually takes place

there. It is symptomatic.

676.

\_Concerning the Origin of our Valuations.\_

We are able to analyse our body, and by doing so we get the same

idea of it as of the stellar system, and the differences between

organic and inorganic lapses. Formerly the movements of the stars were

explained as the effects of beings consciously pursuing a purpose:

this is no longer required, and even in regard to the movements of

the body and its changes, the belief has long since been abandoned

that they can be explained by an appeal to a consciousness which has

a determined purpose. By far the greater number of movements have

nothing to do with consciousness at all: \_neither have they anything

to do with sensation.\_ Sensations and thoughts are extremely \_rare\_

and \_insignificant\_ things compared with the innumerable phenomena

occurring every second.

On the other hand, we believe that a certain conformity of means

to ends rules over the very smallest phenomenon, which it is quite

beyond our deepest science to understand; a sort of cautiousness,

selectiveness, co-ordination, and repairing process, etc. In short, we

are in the presence of an \_activity\_ to which it would be necessary

to ascribe an \_incalculably higher and more extensive intellect\_ than

the one we are acquainted with. We learn to \_think less of\_ all that

is conscious: we unlearn the habit of making ourselves responsible for

ourselves, because, as conscious beings fixing purposes, we are but the

smallest part of ourselves.

Of the numerous influences taking effect every second, for instance,

air, electricity, we feel scarcely anything at all. There might be a

number of forces, which, though they never make themselves felt by

us, yet influence us continually. Pleasure and pain are very rare and

scanty phenomena, compared with the countless stimuli with which a cell

or an organ operates upon another cell or organ.

It is the phase of the \_modesty of consciousness.\_ Finally, we can

grasp the conscious ego itself, merely as an instrument in the

service of that higher and more extensive intellect: and then we may

ask whether all conscious \_willing,\_ all conscious \_purposes,\_ all

\_valuations,\_ are not perhaps only means by virtue of which something

essentially \_different is attained,\_ from that which consciousness

supposes. We \_mean\_: it is a question of our \_pleasure\_ and \_pain\_ but

pleasure and pain might be the means whereby we \_had something to do\_

which lies outside our consciousness.

This is to show how very \_superficial\_ all conscious phenomena

really are; how an action and the image of it differ; how \_little\_

we know about what \_precedes\_ an action; how fantastic our feelings,

"freewill," and "cause and effect" are; how thoughts and images, just

like words, are only signs of thoughts; the impossibility of finding

the grounds of any action; the superficiality of all praise and blame;

how \_essentially our\_ conscious life is composed of \_fancies\_ and

\_illusion\_; how all our words merely stand for fancies (our emotions

too), and how the \_union of mankind\_ depends upon the transmission

and continuation of these fancies: whereas, at bottom, the real union

of mankind by means of procreation pursues its unknown way. Does this

belief in the common fancies of men really \_alter\_ mankind? Or is the

whole body of ideas and valuations only an expression in itself of

unknown changes? \_Are there\_ really such things as will, purposes,

thoughts, values? Is the whole of conscious life perhaps no more than

\_mirage\_? Even when values seem to \_determine\_ the actions of a man,

they are, as a matter of fact, doing something quite different! In

short, granting that a certain conformity of means to end might be

demonstrated in the action of nature, without the assumption of a

ruling ego: could not \_our\_ notion of purposes, and our will, etc., be

only a \_symbolic language\_ standing for something quite different--that

is to say, something not-willing and unconscious? only the thinnest

semblance of that natural conformity of means to end in the organic

world, but not in any way different therefrom?

Briefly, perhaps the whole of mental development is a matter of the

\_body:\_ it is the consciously recorded history of the fact that a

\_higher body is forming.\_ The organic ascends to higher regions.

Our longing to know Nature is a means by virtue of which the body

would reach perfection. Or, better still, hundreds of thousands of

experiments are made to alter the nourishment and the mode of living

of the \_body\_: the body's consciousness and valuations, its kinds of

pleasure and pain, are \_signs of these changes and experiments. In the

end, it is not a question concerning man; for he must be surpassed.\_

677.

\_To what Extent are all Interpretations of the World Symptoms of a

Ruling Instinct.\_

The \_artistic\_ contemplation of the world: to sit before the world

and to survey it. But here the analysis of æsthetical contemplation,

its reduction to cruelty, its feeling of security, its judicial and

detached attitude, etc., are lacking. The artist himself must be taken,

together with his psychology (the criticism of the instinct of play, as

a discharge of energy, the love of change, the love of bringing one's

soul in touch with strange things, the absolute egoism of the artist,

etc.). What instincts does he sublimate?

The \_scientific\_ contemplation of the world: a criticism of the

psychological longing for science, the desire to make everything

comprehensible; the desire to make everything practical, useful,

capable of being exploited--to what extent this is anti-æsthetic.

Only that value counts, which may be reckoned in figures. How it

happens that a mediocre type of man preponderates under the influence

of science. It would be terrible if even history were to be taken

possession of in this way--the realm of the superior, of the judicial.

What instincts are here sublimated!

The religious contemplation of the world: a criticism of the religious

man. It is not necessary to take the moral man as the type, but the man

who has extreme feelings of exaltation and of deep depression, and who

interprets the former with thankfulness or suspicion without, however,

seeking their origin in \_himself\_ (nor the latter either). The man who

essentially feels anything but free, who sublimates his conditions and

states of submission.

The \_moral\_ contemplation of the world. The feelings peculiar to

certain social ranks are projected into the universe: stability,

law, the making of things orderly, and the making of things alike,

are \_sought\_ in the highest spheres, because they are valued most

highly,--above everything or behind everything.

What is \_common\_ to all: the ruling instincts \_wish to be regarded\_ as

\_the highest values in general,\_ even as the \_creative\_ and \_ruling

powers.\_ It is understood that these instincts either oppose or

overcome each other (join up synthetically, or alternate in power).

Their profound antagonism is, however, so great, that in those cases in

which they \_all\_ insist upon being gratified, a man of very thorough

\_mediocrity\_ is the outcome.

678.

It is a question whether the origin of our apparent "knowledge" is not

also a mere offshoot of our \_older valuations,\_ which are so completely

assimilated that they belong to the very basis of our nature. In this

way only \_the more recent\_ needs engage in battle \_with results of the

oldest needs.\_

The world is seen, felt, and interpreted thus and thus, in order

that organic life may be preserved with this particular manner of

interpretation. Man is \_not\_ only an individual, but the continuation

of collective organic life in one definite line. The fact that \_man\_

survives, proves that a certain species of interpretations (even though

it still be added to) has also survived; that, as a system, this method

of interpreting has not changed. "Adaptation."

Our "dissatisfaction," our "ideal," etc., may possibly be the \_result\_

of this incorporated piece of interpretation, of our particular point

of view: the organic world may ultimately perish owing to it just as

the division of labour in organisms may be the means of bringing about

the ruin of the whole, if one part happen to wither or weaken. The

\_destruction\_ of organic life, and even of the highest form thereof,

must follow the same principles as the destruction of the individual.

679.

Judged from the standpoint of the theory of descent, \_individuation\_

shows the continuous breaking up of one into two, and the equally

continuous annihilation of individuals \_for the sake of a few\_

individuals, which evolution bears onwards; the greater mass always

perishes ("the body").

The fundamental phenomena: \_innumerable individuals are sacrificed for

the sake of a few,\_ in order to make the few possible.--One must not

allow one's self to be deceived; the case is the same with \_peoples\_

and \_races\_: they produce the "body" for the generation of isolated and

valuable \_individuals,\_ who continue the great process.

680.

I am opposed to the theory that the individual studies the interests of

the \_species,\_ or of posterity, at the cost of his own advantage: all

this is only apparent.

The excessive importance which he attaches to the \_sexual instinct\_

is not the \_result\_ of the latter's importance to the species, for

procreation is the actual performance of the individual, it is his

greatest interest, and therefore it is his \_highest expression of

power\_ (not judged from the standpoint of consciousness, but from the

very centre of the individual).

681.

The \_fundamental errors\_ of the biologists who have lived hitherto: it

is not a matter of the species, but of rearing stronger individuals

(the many are only a means).

Life is \_not\_ the continuous adjustment of internal relations to

external relations, but will to power, which, proceeding from inside,

subjugates and incorporates an ever-increasing quantity of "external"

phenomena.

These biologists \_continue\_ the moral valuations ("the absolutely

higher worth of Altruism," the antagonism towards the lust of dominion,

towards war, towards all that which is not useful, and towards all

order of rank and of class).

682.

In natural science, the moral depreciation of the \_ego\_ still goes hand

in hand with the overestimation of the \_species.\_ But the species is

quite as illusory as the ego: a false distinction has been made. The

ego is a hundred times \_more\_ than a mere unit in a chain of creatures;

it is the chain \_itself,\_ in every possible respect, and the species

is merely an abstraction suggested by the multiplicity and partial

similarity of these chains. That the individual is \_sacrificed\_ to the

species, as people often say he is, is not a fact at all: it is rather

only an example of false interpretation.

683.

The formula of the \_"progress"-superstition\_ according to a famous

physiologist of the cerebral regions:--

\_"L'animal ne fait jamais de progrès comme espèce. L'homme seul fait de

progrès comme espèce.\_"

No.

684.

\_Anti-Darwin.\_--The \_domestication of man:\_ what definite value can

it have, or has domestication in itself a definite value?--There are

reasons for denying the latter proposition.

Darwin's school of thought certainly goes to great pains to convince

us of the reverse: it would fain prove that the influence of

domestication may be profound and fundamental. For the time being, we

stand firmly as we did before; up to the present no results save very

superficial modification or degeneration have been shown to follow upon

domestication. And everything that escapes from the hand and discipline

of man, returns almost immediately to its original natural condition.

The type remains constant, man cannot "\_dénaturer la nature\_."

Biologists reckon upon the struggle for existence, the death of the

weaker creature and the survival of the most robust, most gifted

combatant; on that account they imagine a \_continuous increase in the

perfection of all creatures.\_ We, on the contrary, have convinced

ourselves of the fact, that in the struggle for existence, accident

serves the cause of the weak quite as much as that of the strong;

that craftiness often supplements strength with advantage; that the

\_prolificness\_ of a species is related in a remarkable manner to that

species \_chances of destruction\_....

\_Natural Selection\_ is also credited with the power of slowly

effecting unlimited metamorphoses: it is believed that every advantage

is transmitted by heredity, and strengthened in the course of

generations (when heredity is known to be so capricious that ...);

the happy adaptations of certain creatures to very special conditions

of life, are regarded as the result of \_surrounding influences.\_

Nowhere, however, are examples of \_unconscious selection\_ to be found

(absolutely nowhere). The most different individuals associate one with

the other; the extremes become lost in the mass. Each vies with the

other to maintain his kind; those creatures whose appearance shields

them from certain dangers, do not alter this appearance when they are

in an environment quite devoid of danger.... If they live in places

where their coats or their hides do not conceal them, they do not adapt

themselves to their surroundings in any way.

The \_selection of the most beautiful\_ has been so exaggerated, that

it greatly exceeds the instincts for beauty in our own race! As a

matter of fact, the most beautiful creature often couples with the

most debased, and the largest with the smallest. We almost always see

males and females taking advantage of their first chance meeting, and

manifesting no taste or selectiveness at all.--Modification through

climate and nourishment--but as a matter of fact unimportant.

There are no \_intermediate forms.--\_

The growing evolution of creatures is assumed. All grounds for this

assumption are entirely lacking. Every type has its \_limitations\_:

beyond these evolution cannot carry it.

\_My general point of view. First proposition\_: Man as a species is

\_not\_ progressing. Higher specimens are indeed attained; but they do

not survive. The general level of the species is not raised.

\_Second proposition\_: Man as a species does not represent any sort of

progress compared with any other animal. The whole of the animal and

plant world does not develop from the lower to the higher.... but all

simultaneously, haphazardly, confusedly, and at variance. The richest

and most complex forms--and the term "higher type" means no more than

this--perish more easily: only the lowest succeed in maintaining their

apparent imperishableness. The former are seldom attained, and maintain

their superior position with difficulty, the latter are compensated

by great fruitfulness.--In the human race, also, the \_superior

specimens,\_ the happy cases of evolution, are the first to perish amid

the fluctuations of chances for and against them. They are exposed to

every form of decadence: they are extreme, and, on that account alone,

already decadents.... The short duration of beauty, of genius, of the

Cæsar, is \_sui generis:\_ such things are not hereditary. The \_type\_ is

inherited, there is nothing extreme or particularly "happy" about a

type----It is not a case of a particular fate, or of the "evil will" of

Nature, but merely of the concept "superior type": the higher type is

an example of an incomparably greater degree of complexity a greater

sum of co-ordinated elements: but on this account disintegration

becomes a thousand times more threatening. "Genius" is the sublimest

machine in existence--hence it is the most fragile.

\_Third propositio:\_: The domestication (culture) of man does not

sink very deep. When it does sink far below the skin it immediately

becomes degeneration (type: the Christian). The wild man (or, in moral

terminology, the \_evil\_ man) is a reversion to Nature--and, in a

certain sense, he represents a recovery, a \_cure\_ from the effects of

"culture." ...

685.

\_Anti-Darwin.\_--What surprises me most on making a general survey of

the great destinies of man, is that I invariably see the reverse of

what to-day Darwin and his school sees or \_will\_ persist in seeing:

selection in favour of the stronger, the better-constituted, and the

progress of the species. Precisely the reverse of this stares one in

the face: the suppression of the lucky cases, the uselessness of the

more highly constituted types, the inevitable mastery of the mediocre,

and even of those who are \_below mediocrity.\_ Unless we are shown some

reason why man is an exception among living creatures, I incline to the

belief that Darwin's school is everywhere at fault. That will to power,

in which I perceive the ultimate reason and character of all change,

explains why it is that selection is never in favour of the exceptions

and of the lucky cases: the strongest and happiest natures are weak

when they are confronted with a majority ruled by organised gregarious

instincts and the fear which possesses the weak. My general view of

the world of values shows that in the highest values which now sway the

destiny of man, the happy cases among men, the select specimens do not

prevail: but rather the decadent specimens,--perhaps there is nothing

more interesting in the world than this \_unpleasant\_ spectacle....

Strange as it may seem, the strong always have to be upheld against the

weak; and the well-constituted against the ill-constituted, the healthy

against the sick and physiologically botched. If we drew our morals

from reality, they would read thus: the mediocre are more valuable than

the exceptional creatures, and the decadent than the mediocre; the

will to nonentity prevails over the will to life--and the general aim

now is, in Christian, Buddhistic, Schopenhauerian phraseology: "It is

better not to be than to be."

I \_protest\_ against this formulating of reality into a moral: and I

loathe Christianity with a deadly loathing, because it created sublime

words and attitudes in order to deck a revolting truth with all the

tawdriness of justice, virtue, and godliness....

I see all philosophers and the whole of science on their knees before a

reality which is the reverse of "the struggle for life," as Darwin and

his school understood it--that is to say, wherever I look, I see those

prevailing and surviving, who throw doubt and suspicion upon life and

the value of life.--The error of the Darwinian school became a problem

to me: how can one be so blind as to make \_this\_ mistake?

That \_species\_ show an ascending tendency, is the most nonsensical

assertion that has ever been made: until now they have only manifested

a dead level. There is nothing whatever to prove that the higher

organisms have developed from the lower. I see that the lower, owing to

their numerical strength, their craft, and ruse, now preponderate,--and

I fail to see an instance in which an accidental change produces

an advantage, at least not for a very long period: for it would be

necessary to find some reason why an accidental change should become so

very strong.

I do indeed find the "cruelty of Nature" which is so often referred

to; but in a different place: Nature is cruel, but against her lucky

and well-constituted children; she protects and shelters and loves the

lowly.

In short, the increase of a species' power, as the result of the

preponderance of its particularly well-constituted and strong

specimens, is perhaps less of a certainty than that it is the result of

the preponderance of its mediocre and lower specimens ... in the case

of the latter, we find great fruitfulness and permanence: in the case

of the former, the besetting dangers are greater, waste is more rapid,

and decimation is more speedy.

686.

Man as he has appeared up to the present is the embryo of the man

of the future; \_all\_ the formative powers which are to produce the

latter, already lie in the former: and owing to the fact that they are

enormous, the more \_promising for the future\_ the modern individual

happens to be, the more \_suffering\_ falls to his lot. This is the

profoundest concept of \_suffering.\_ The formative powers clash.--The

isolation of the individual need not deceive one--as a matter of fact,

some uninterrupted current does actually flow through all individuals,

and does thus unite them. The fact that they feel themselves isolated,

is the \_most powerful spur\_ in the process of setting themselves the

loftiest of aims: their search for happiness is the means which keeps

together and moderates the formative powers, and keeps them from being

mutually destructive.

687.

\_Excessive intellectual\_ strength sets \_itself\_ new goals; it is not in

the least satisfied by the command and the leadership of the inferior

world, or by the preservation of the organism, of the "individual."

We are \_more\_ than the individual: we are the whole chain itself, with

the tasks of all the possible futures of that chain in us.

3. Theory of the Will to Power and of Valuations.

688.

\_The unitary view of psychology.\_--We are accustomed to regard the

development of a vast number of forms as compatible with one single

origin.

My theory would be: that the will to power is the primitive motive

force out of which all other motives have been derived;

That it is exceedingly illuminating to substitute \_power\_ for

individual "happiness" (after which every living organism is said to

strive): "It strives after power, after \_more\_ power";--happiness is

only a symptom of the feeling of power attained, a consciousness of

difference (it does not strive after happiness: but happiness steps

in when the object is attained, after which the organism has striven:

happiness is an accompanying, not an actuating factor);

That all motive force is the will to power; that there is no other

force, either physical, dynamic, or psychic.

In our science, where the concept cause and effect is reduced to a

relationship of complete equilibrium, and in which it seems desirable

for the \_same\_ quantum of force to be found on either side, \_all idea

of a motive power is absent\_: we only apprehend results, and we call

these equal from the point of view of their content of force....

It is a matter of mere experience that change never ceases: at bottom

we have not the smallest grounds for assuming that any one particular

change must follow upon any other. On the contrary, any state which

has been attained would seem almost forced to maintain itself intact

if it had not within itself a capacity for not desiring to maintain

itself.... Spinoza's proposition concerning "self-preservation" ought

as a matter of fact to put a stop to change. But the proposition is

false; the contrary is true. In all living organisms it can be clearly

shown that they do everything not to remain as they are, but to become

greater....

689.

\_"Will to power" and causality.\_--From a psychological point of view

the idea of "cause" is our feeling of power in the act which is called

willing--our concept effect is the superstition that this feeling of

power is itself the force which moves things....

A state which accompanies an event and is already an effect of

that event is deemed "sufficient cause" of the latter; the tense

relationship of our feeling of power (pleasure as the feeling of power)

and of an obstacle being overcome--are these things illusions?

If we translate the notion "cause" back into the only sphere which is

known to us, and out of which we have taken it, we cannot imagine \_any

change\_ in which the will to power is not inherent. We do not know how

to account for any change which is not a \_trespassing\_ of one power on

another.

Mechanics only show us the results, and then only in images (movement

is a figure of speech); gravitation itself has no mechanical cause,

because it is itself the first cause of mechanical results.

The will to \_accumulate force\_ is confined to the phenomenon of life,

to nourishment, to procreation, to inheritance, to society, states,

customs, authority. Should we not be allowed to assume that this will

is the motive power also of chemistry?--and of the cosmic order?

Not only conservation of energy, but the minimum amount of waste; so

that the only reality is this: \_the will of every centre of power to

become stronger\_--not self-preservation, but the desire to appropriate,

to become master, to become more, to become stronger.

Is the fact that science is possible a proof of the principle of

causation--"From like causes, like effects"--"A permanent law of

things"--"Invariable order"? Because something is calculable, is it

therefore on that account necessary?

If something happens thus, and thus only, it is not the manifestation

of a "principle," of a "law," of "order." What happens is that certain

quanta of power begin to operate, and their essence is to exercise

their power over all other quanta of power. Can we assume the existence

of a striving after power without a feeling of pleasure and pain,

\_i.e.\_ without the sensation of an increase or a decrease of power?

Is mechanism only a language of signs for the concealed fact of a

world of fighting and conquering quanta of will-power? All mechanical

first-principles, matter, atoms, weight, pressure, and repulsion, are

not facts in themselves, but interpretations arrived at with the help

of psychical fictions.

Life, which is our best known form of being, is altogether "will to

the accumulation of strength"--all the processes of life hinge on

this: everything aims, not at preservation, but at accretion and

accumulation. Life as an individual case (a hypothesis which may be

applied to existence in general) strives after the maximum feeling

of power; life is essentially a striving after more power; striving

itself is only a straining after more power; the most fundamental

and innermost thing of all is this will. (Mechanism is merely the

semeiotics of the results.)

690.

The thing which is the cause of the existence of development cannot

in the course of investigation be found above development; it should

neither be regarded as "evolving" nor as evolved ... the "will to

power" cannot have been evolved.

691.

What is the relation of the whole of the organic process towards the

rest of nature?--Here the fundamental will reveals itself.

692.

Is the "will to power" a kind of will, or is it identical with the

concept will? Is it equivalent to desiring or commanding; is it the

will which Schopenhauer says is the essence of things?

My proposition is that the will of psychologists hitherto has been an

unjustifiable generalisation, and that there is no such thing as this

sort of will, that instead of the development of one will into several

forms being taken as a fact, the character of will has been cancelled

owing to the fact that its content, its "whither," was subtracted from

it: in Schopenhauer this is so in the highest degree; what he calls

"will" is merely an empty word. There is even less plausibility in

the will to live: for life is simply one of the manifestations of the

will to power; it is quite arbitrary and ridiculous to suggest that

everything is striving to enter into this particular form of the will

to power.

693.

If the innermost essence of existence is the will to power; if

happiness is every increase of power, and unhappiness the feeling of

not being able to resist, of not being able to become master: may

we not then postulate happiness and pain as cardinal facts? Is will

possible without these two oscillations of yea and nay? But who feels

happiness? ... Who will have power? ... Nonsensical question! If the

essence of all things is itself will to power, and consequently the

ability to feel pleasure and pain! Albeit: contrasts and obstacles are

necessary, therefore also, relatively, units which trespass on one

another.

694.

According to the obstacles which a force seeks with a view of

overcoming them, the measure of the failure and the fatality thus

provoked must increase, and in so far as every force can only manifest

itself against some thing that opposes it, an element of unhappiness is

necessarily inherent in every action. But this pain acts as a greater

incitement to life, and increases the will to power.

695.

If pleasure and pain are related to the feeling of power, life would

have to represent such an increase in power that the difference, the

"plus," would have to enter consciousness. A dead level of power,

if maintained, would have to measure its happiness in relation

to depreciations of that level, \_i.e.\_ in relation to states of

unhappiness and not of happiness.... The will to an increase lies

in the essence of happiness: that power is enhanced, and that this

difference becomes conscious.

In a state of decadence after a certain time the opposite difference

becomes conscious, that is decrease: the memory of former strong

moments depresses the present feelings of happiness in this state

comparison reduces happiness.

696.

It is not the satisfaction of the will which is the cause of happiness

(to this superficial theory I am more particularly opposed--this absurd

psychological forgery in regard to the most simple things), but it is

that the will is always striving to overcome that which stands in its

way. The feeling of happiness lies precisely in the discontentedness of

the will, in the fact that without opponents and obstacles it is never

satisfied. "The happy man": a gregarious ideal.

697.

The normal discontent of our instincts--for instance, of the instinct

of hunger, of sex, of movement--contains nothing which is in itself

depressing; it rather provokes the feeling of life, and, whatever the

pessimists may say to us, like all the rhythms of small and irritating

stimuli, it strengthens. Instead of this discontent making us sick of

life, it is rather the great stimulus to life.

(Pleasure might even perhaps be characterised as the rhythm of small

and painful stimuli.)

698.

Kant says: "These lines of Count Verri's (\_Sull' indole del piacere

e del dolore;\_ 1781) I confirm with absolute certainty: 'Il solo

principio motore dell' uomo è il dolore. Il dolore precede ogni

piacere. Il piacere non è un essere positivo.'"[5]

699.

Pain is something different from pleasure--I mean it is not the

latter's opposite.

If the essence of pleasure has been aptly characterised as the feeling

of increased power (that is to say, as a feeling of difference which

presupposes comparison), that does not define the nature of pain.

The false contrasts which the people, and consequently the language,

believes in, are always dangerous fetters which impede the march of

truth. There are even cases where a kind of pleasure is conditioned

by a certain rhythmic sequence of small, painful stimuli: in this way

a very rapid growth of the feeling of power and of the feeling of

pleasure is attained. This is the case, for instance, in tickling,

also in the sexual tickling which accompanies the coitus: here we see

pain acting as the ingredient of happiness. It seems to be a small

hindrance which is overcome, followed immediately by another small

hindrance which once again is overcome--this play of resistance and

resistance overcome is the greatest excitant of that complete feeling

of overflowing and surplus power which constitutes the essence of

happiness.

The converse, which would be an increase in the feeling of pain through

small intercalated pleasurable stimuli, does not exist: pleasure and

pain are not opposites.

Pain is undoubtedly an intellectual process in which a judgment is

inherent--the judgment harmful, in which long experience is epitomised.

There is no such thing as pain in itself. It is not the wound that

hurts, it is the experience of the harmful results a wound may have for

the whole organism, which here speaks in this deeply moving way, and is

called pain. (In the case of deleterious influences which were unknown

to ancient man, as, for instance, those residing in the new combination

of poisonous chemicals, the hint from pain is lacking, and we are lost.)

That which is quite peculiar in pain is the prolonged disturbance,

the quivering subsequent to a terrible shock in the ganglia of the

nervous system. As a matter of fact, nobody suffers from the cause of

pain (from any sort of injury, for instance), but from the protracted

disturbance of his equilibrium which follows upon the shock. Pain is a

disease of the cerebral centres--pleasure is no disease at all.

The fact that pain may be the cause of reflex actions has appearances

and even philosophical prejudice in its favour. But in very sudden

accidents, if we observe closely, we find that the reflex action occurs

appreciably earlier than the feeling of pain. I should be in a bad way

when I stumbled if I had to wait until the fact had struck the bell

of my consciousness, and until a hint of what I had to do had been

telegraphed back to me. On the contrary, what I notice as clearly as

possible is, that first, in order to avoid a fall, reflex action on the

part of my foot takes place, and then, after a certain measurable space

of time, there follows quite suddenly a kind of painful wave in my

forehead. Nobody, then, reacts to pain. Pain is subsequently projected

into the wounded quarter--but the essence of this local pain is

nevertheless not the expression of a kind of local wound, it is merely

a local sign, the strength and nature of which is in keeping with the

severity of the wound, and of which the nerve centres have taken note.

The fact that as the result of this shock the muscular power of the

organism is materially reduced, does not prove in any way that the

essence of pain is to be sought in the lowering of the feeling of power.

Once more let me repeat: nobody reacts to pain: pain is no "cause" of

action. Pain itself is a reaction; the reflex movement is another and

earlier process--both originate at different points....

700.

The message of pain: in itself pain does not announce that which has

been momentarily damaged, but the significance of this damage for the

individual as a whole.

Are we to suppose that there are any pains which "the species" feel,

and which the individual does not?

701.

"The sum of unhappiness outweighs the sum of happiness: consequently

it were better that the world did not exist"--"The world is something

which from a rational standpoint it were better did not exist, because

it occasions more pain than pleasure to the feeling subject"--this

futile gossip now calls itself pessimism!

Pleasure and pain are accompanying factors, not causes; they are

second-rate valuations derived from a dominating value,--they are one

with the feeling "useful," "harmful," and therefore they are absolutely

fugitive and relative. For in regard to all utility and harmfulness

there are a hundred different ways of asking "what for?"

I despise this pessimism of sensitiveness: it is in itself a sign of

profoundly impoverished life.

702.

Man does not seek happiness and does not avoid unhappiness. Everybody

knows the famous prejudices I here contradict. Pleasure and pain are

mere results, mere accompanying phenomena--that which every man, which

every tiny particle of a living organism will have, is an increase of

power. In striving after this, pleasure and pain are encountered; it is

owing to that will that the organism seeks opposition and requires that

which stands in its way.... Pain as the hindrance of its will to power

is therefore a normal feature, a natural ingredient of every organic

phenomenon; man does not avoid it, on the contrary, he is constantly

in need of it: every triumph, every feeling of pleasure, every event

presupposes an obstacle overcome.

Let us take the simplest case, that of primitive nourishment; the

protoplasm extends its pseudopodia in order to seek for that which

resists it,--it does not do so out of hunger, but owing to its will to

power. Then it makes the attempt to overcome, to appropriate, and to

incorporate that with which it comes into contact--what people call

"nourishment" is merely a derivative, a utilitarian application, of the

primordial will to become stronger.

Pain is so far from acting as a diminution of our feeling of power,

that it actually forms in the majority of cases a spur to this

feeling,--the obstacle is the stimulus of the will to power.

703.

Pain has been confounded with one of its subdivisions, which is

exhaustion: the latter does indeed represent a profound reduction and

lowering of the will to power, a material loss of strength--that is

to say, there is \_(a)\_ pain as the stimulus to an increase or power,

and \_(b)\_ pain following upon an expenditure of power; in the first

case it is a spur, in the second it is the outcome of excessive

spurring.... The inability to resist is proper to the latter form of

pain: the provocation of that which resists is proper to the former....

The only happiness which is to be felt in the state of exhaustion is

that of going to sleep; in the other case, happiness means triumph....

The great confusion of psychologists consisted in the fact that they

did not keep these two kinds of happiness--that of falling asleep,

and that of triumph--sufficiently apart. Exhausted people will have

repose, slackened limbs, peace and quiet--and these things constitute

the bliss of Nihilistic religions and philosophies, the wealthy in

vital strength, the active, want triumph, defeated opponents, and the

extension of their feeling of power over ever wider regions. Every

healthy function of the organism has this need,--and the whole organism

constitutes an intricate complexity of systems struggling for the

increase of the feeling of power....

704.

How is it that the fundamental article of faith in all psychologies is

a piece of most outrageous contortion and fabrication? "Man strives

after happiness," for instance--how much of this is true? In order to

understand what life is, and what kind of striving and tenseness life

contains, the formula should hold good not only of trees and plants,

but of animals also. "What does the plant strive after?"--But here we

have already invented a false entity which does not exist,--concealing

and denying the fact of an infinitely variegated growth, with

individual and semi-individual starting-points, if we give it the

clumsy title "plant" as if it were a unit. It is very obvious that

the ultimate and smallest "individuals" cannot be understood in the

sense of metaphysical individuals or atoms; their sphere of power is

continually shifting its ground: but with all these changes, can it be

said that any of them strives after happiness?--All this expanding,

this incorporation and growth, is a search for resistance; movement

is essentially related to states of pain: the driving power here must

represent some other desire if it leads to such continual willing and

seeking of pain.--To what end do the trees of a virgin forest contend

with each other? "For happiness"?--For power! ...

Man is now master of the forces of nature, and master too of his own

wild and unbridled feelings (the passions have followed suit, and have

learned to become useful)--in comparison with primeval man, the man of

to-day represents an enormous quantum of power, but not an increase

in happiness! How can one maintain, then, that he has striven after

happiness?..

705.

But while I say this I see above me, and below the stars, the

glittering rat's-tail of errors which hitherto has represented the

greatest inspiration of man: "All happiness is the result of virtue all

virtue is the result of free will"!

Let us transvalue the values: all capacity is the outcome of a

happy organisation, all freedom is the outcome of capacity (freedom

understood here as facility in self-direction. Every artist will

understand me).

706.

"The value of life."--Every life stands by itself; all existence must

be justified, and not only life,--the justifying principle must be one

through which life itself speaks.

Life is only a means to something: it is the expression of the forms of

growth in power.

707.

The "conscious world" cannot be a starting-point for valuing: an

"objective" valuation is necessary.

In comparison with the enormous and complicated antagonistic processes

which the collective life of every organism represents, its conscious

world of feelings, intentions, and valuations, is only a small slice.

We have absolutely no right to postulate this particle of consciousness

as the object, the wherefore, of the collective phenomena of life:

the attainment of consciousness is obviously only an additional means

to the unfolding of life and to the extension of its power. That

is why it is a piece of childish simplicity to set up happiness,

or intellectuality, or morality, or any other individual sphere of

consciousness, as the highest value: and maybe to justify "the world"

with it.

This is my fundamental objection to all philosophical and moral

cosmologies and theologies, to all wherefores and highest values that

have appeared in philosophies and philosophic religions hitherto. A

kind of means is misunderstood as the object itself: conversely life

and its growth of power were debased to a means.

If we wished to postulate an adequate object of life it would not

necessarily be related in any way with the category of conscious life;

it would require rather to explain conscious life as a mere means to

itself....

The "denial of life" regarded as the object of life, the object of

evolution! Existence--a piece of tremendous stupidity! Any such mad

interpretation is only the outcome of life's being measured by the

factors of consciousness (pleasure and pain, good and evil). Here

the means are made to stand against the end--the "unholy," absurd,

and, above all, disagreeable means: how can the end be any use when

it requires such means? But where the fault lies is here--instead of

looking for the end which would explain the necessity of such means,

we posited an end from the start which actually excludes such means,

\_i.e.\_ we made a desideratum in regard to certain means (especially

pleasurable, rational, and virtuous) into a rule, and then only did we

decide what end would be desirable....

Where the fundamental fault lies is in the fact that, instead of

regarding consciousness as an instrument and an isolated phenomenon

of life in general, we made it a standard, the highest value in life:

it is the faulty standpoint of \_a parte ad totum,\_--and that is why

all philosophers are instinctively seeking at the present day for a

collective consciousness, a thing that lives and wills consciously with

all that happens, a "Spirit," a "God." But they must be told that it is

precisely thus that life is converted into a monster; that a "God" and

a general sensorium would necessarily be something on whose account the

whole of existence would have to be condemned.... Our greatest relief

came when we eliminated the general consciousness which postulates ends

and means--in this way we ceased from being necessarily pessimists....

Our greatest indictment of life was the existence of God.

708.

\_Concerning the value of "Becoming."\_--If the movement of the world

really tended to reach a final state, that state would already have

been reached. The only fundamental fact, however, is that it does

not tend to reach a final state: and every philosophy and scientific

hypothesis (\_e.g.\_ materialism) according to which such a final state

is necessary, is refuted by this fundamental fact.

I should like to have a concept of the world which does justice to this

fact. Becoming ought to be explained without having recourse to such

final designs. Booming must appear justified at every instant (or it

must defy all valuation: which has unity as its end); the present must

not under any circumstances be justified by a future, nor must the

past be justified for the sake of the present. "Necessity" must not

be interpreted in the form of a prevailing and ruling collective force

or as a prime motor; and still less as the necessary cause of some

valuable result. But to this end it is necessary to deny a collective

consciousness for Becoming,--a "God," in order that life may not be

veiled under the shadow of a being who feels and knows as we do and

yet \_wills\_ nothing: "God" is useless if he wants nothing; and if he

do want something, this presupposes a general sum of suffering and

irrationality which lowers the general value of Becoming. Fortunately

any such general power is lacking (a suffering God overlooking

everything, a general sensorium and ubiquitous Spirit, would be the

greatest indictment of existence).

Strictly speaking nothing of the nature of Being must be allowed to

remain,--because in that case Becoming loses its value and gets to be

sheer and superfluous nonsense.

The next question, then, is: how did the illusion Being originate (why

was it obliged to originate);

Likewise: how was it that all valuations based upon the hypothesis that

there was such a thing as Being came to be depreciated.

But in this way we have recognised that this hypothesis concerning

Being is the source of all the calumny that has been directed against

the world (the "Better world," the "True world" the "World Beyond," the

"Thing-in-itself").

(1) Becoming has no final state, it does not tend towards stability.

(2) Becoming is not a state of appearance, the world of Being is

probably only appearance.

(3) Becoming is of precisely the same value at every instant; the sum

of its value always remains equal: expressed otherwise, it has no

value; for that according to which it might be measured, and in regard

to which the word value might have some sense, is entirely lacking.

The collective value of the world defies valuation; for this reason

philosophical pessimism belongs to the order of farces.

709.

We should not make our little desiderata the judges of existence!

Neither should we make culminating evolutionary forms (\_e.g.\_ mind) the

"absolute" which stands behind evolution!

710.

Our knowledge has become scientific to the extent in which it has

been able to make use of number and measure. It might be worth while

to try and see whether a scientific order of values might not be

constructed according to a scale of numbers and measures representing

energy.... All other values are matters of prejudice, simplicity, and

misunderstanding. They may all be reduced to that scale of numbers and

measures representing energy. The ascent in this scale would represent

an increase of value, the descent a diminution.

But here appearance and prejudice are against one (moral values are

only apparent values compared with those which are physiological).

711.

Why the standpoint of "value" lapses:--

Because in the \_"whole process of the universe" the work of mankind

does not come under consideration\_; because a general process (viewed

in the light of a system) does not exist.

Because there is no such thing as a whole; because no \_depreciation of

human\_ existence or human aims can be made in regard to something that

does not exist.

Because "necessity," "causality," "design," are merely useful

"\_semblances.\_"

Because the aim is \_not\_ "the increase of the sphere of consciousness,"

\_but the increase of power\_; in which increase the utility of

consciousness is also contained; and the same holds good of pleasure

and pain.

Because a mere \_means\_ must not be elevated to the highest criterion

of value (such as states of consciousness like pleasure and pain, if

consciousness is in itself only a means).

Because the world is not an organism at all, but a thing of chaos;

because the development of "intellectuality" is only a means tending

relatively to extend the duration of an organisation.

Because all "desirability" has no sense in regard to the general

character of existence.

712.

"God" is the culminating moment: life is an eternal process of deifying

and undeifying. \_But withal there is no zenith of values,\_ but only a

zenith of \_power.\_

Absolute \_exclusion of mechanical and materialistic interpretations.\_

they are both only expressions of inferior states, of emotions deprived

of all spirit (of the "will to power").

\_The retrograde movement front the zenith\_ of development (the

intellectualisation of power on some slave-infected soil) may be shown

to be the \_result\_ of the highest degree of energy \_turning against\_

itself, once it no longer has anything to organise, and utilising its

power in order to \_disorganise.\_

\_(a)\_ The ever-increasing \_suppression\_ of societies, and the latter's

subjection by a smaller number of stronger individuals.

(b) The ever-increasing suppression of the privileged and the strong,

hence the rise of democracy, and ultimately of \_anarchy,\_ in the

elements.

713.

\_Value\_ is the highest amount of power that a man can assimilate--a

man, not mankind! Mankind is much more of a means than an end. It is a

question of type: mankind is merely the experimental material; it is

the overflow of the ill-constituted--a field of ruins.

714.

Words relating to values are merely banners planted on those spots

where a \_new blessedness\_ was discovered--a new \_feeling.\_

715.

The standpoint of "value" is the same as that of the \_conditions\_ of

\_preservation\_ and \_enhancement,\_ in regard to complex creatures of

relative stability appearing in the course of evolution.

There are no such things as lasting and ultimate entities, no atoms, no

monads: here also "permanence" was first introduced by ourselves (from

practical, utilitarian, and other motives).

"The forms that rule"; the sphere of the subjugated is continually

extended; or it decreases or increases according to the conditions

(nourishment) being either favourable or unfavourable.

"Value" is essentially the standpoint for the increase or decrease of

these dominating centres (pluralities in any case; for "unity" cannot

be observed anywhere in the nature of development).

The means of expression afforded by language are useless for the

purpose of conveying any facts concerning "development": the need of

positing a rougher world of stable existences and things forms part of

our \_eternal desire for preservation.\_ We may speak of atoms and monads

in a relative sense: and this is certain, \_that the smallest world

is the most stable world ...\_. There is no such thing as will: there

are only punctuations of will, which are constantly increasing and

decreasing their power.

III

THE WILL TO POWER AS EXEMPLIFIED IN SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.

1. Society and the State.

716.

We take it as a principle that only individuals feel any

responsibility. Corporations are invented to do what the individual

has not the courage to do. For this reason all communities are vastly

more upright and instructive, as regards the nature of man, than the

individual who is too cowardly to have the courage of his own desires.

All altruism is the prudence of the private man. societies are not

mutually altruistic. The commandment, "Thou shalt love thy next-door

neighbour," has never been extended to thy neighbour in general. Rather

what Manu says is probably truer: "We must conceive of all the States

on our own frontier, and their allies, as being hostile, and for the

same reason we must consider all of their neighbours as being friendly

to us."

The study of society is invaluable, because man in society is far more

childlike than man individually. Society has never regarded virtue as

anything else than as a means to strength, power, and order. Manu's

words again are simple and dignified: "Virtue could hardly rely on her

own strength alone. Really it is only the fear of punishment that keeps

men in their limits, and leaves every one in peaceful possession of his

own."

717.

The State, or \_unmorality\_ organised, is from within--the police, the

penal code, status, commerce, and the family; and from without, the

will to war, to power, to conquest and revenge.

A multitude will do things an individual will not, because of the

division of responsibility, of command and execution; because the

virtues of obedience, duty, patriotism, and local sentiment are all

introduced; because feelings of pride, severity, strength, hate,

and revenge in short, all typical traits are upheld, and these are

characteristics utterly alien to the herd-man.

718.

You haven't, any of you, the courage either to kill or to flog a man.

But the huge machinery of the State quells the individual and makes him

decline to be answerable for his own deed (obedience, loyalty, etc.).

Everything that a man does in the service of the State is against his

own nature. Similarly, everything he learns in view of future service

of the State. This result is obtained through division of labour (so

that responsibility is subdivided too):--

The legislator--and he who fulfils the law.

The teacher of discipline--and those who have grown hard and severe

under discipline.

719.

A division of labour among the emotions exists inside society, making

individuals and classes produce an imperfect, but more useful, kind

of soul. Observe how every type in society has become atrophied with

regard to certain emotions with the view of fostering and accentuating

other emotions.

Morality may be thus justified:--

\_Economically,\_--as aiming at the greatest possible use of all

individual power, with the view of preventing the waste of exceptional

natures.

\_Æsthetically,\_--as the formation of fixed types, and the pleasure in

one's own.

\_Politically,\_--as the art of bearing with the severe divergencies of

the degrees of power in society.

\_Psychologically,\_ as an imaginary preference for the bungled and the

mediocre, in order to preserve the weak.

720.

Man has one terrible and fundamental wish; he desires power, and this

impulse, which is called freedom, must be the longest restrained.

Hence ethics has instinctively aimed at such an education as shall

restrain the desire for power; thus our morality slanders the would-be

tyrant, and glorifies charity, patriotism, and the ambition of the herd.

721.

Impotence to power, how it disguises itself and plays the hypocrite, as

obedience, subordination, the pride of duty and morality, submission,

devotion, love (the idolisation and apotheosis of the commander is a

kind of compensation, and indirect self-enhancement). It veils itself

further under fatalism and resignation, objectivity, self-tyranny,

stoicism, asceticism, self-abnegation, hallowing. Other disguises are:

criticism, pessimism, indignation, susceptibility, beautiful soul,

virtue, self--deification, philosophic detachment, freedom from contact

with the world (the realisation of impotence disguises itself as

disdain).

There is a universal need to exercise some kind of power, or to create

for one's self the appearance of some power, if only temporarily, in

the form of intoxication.

There are men who desire power simply for the sake of the happiness it

will bring; these belong chiefly to political parties. Other men have

the same yearning, even when power means visible disadvantages, the

sacrifice of their happiness, and well-being; they are the ambitious.

Other men, again, are only like dogs in a manger, and will have power

only to prevent its falling into the hands of others on whom they would

then be dependent.

722.

If there be justice and equality before the law, what would thereby

be abolished?--Suspense, enmity, hatred. But it is a mistake to think

that you thereby increase happiness; for the Corsicans rejoice in more

happiness than the Continentals.

723.

Reciprocity and the expectation of a reward is one of the most

seductive forms of the devaluation of mankind. It involves that

equality which depreciates any gulf as immoral.

724.

Utility is entirely dependent upon the object to be attained,--the

wherefore? And this wherefore, this purpose, is again dependent upon

the degree of power. Utilitarianism is not, therefore, a fundamental

doctrine; it is only a story of sequels, and cannot be made obligatory

for all.

725.

Of old, the State was regarded theoretically as a utilitarian

institution; it has now become so in a practical sense. The time of

kings has gone by, because people are no longer worthy of them. They do

not wish to see the symbol of their ideal in a king, but only a means

to their own ends. That's the whole truth.

726.

I am trying to grasp the absolute sense of the communal standard of

judgment and valuation, naturally without any intention of deducing

morals.

The degree of psychological falsity and denseness required in order to

sanctify the emotions essential to preservation and expansion of power,

and to create a good conscience for them.

The degree of stupidity required in order that general rules and values

may remain possible (including education, formation of culture, and

training).

The degree of inquisitiveness, suspicion, and intolerance required in

order to deal with exceptions, to suppress them as criminals, and thus

to give them bad consciences, and to make them sick with their own

singularity.

727.

Morality is essentially a shield, a means of defence; and, in so far,

it is a sign of the imperfectly developed man (he is still in armour;

he is still stoical).

The fully developed man is above all provided with \_weapons:\_ he is a

man who \_attacks.\_

The weapons of war are converted into weapons of peace (out of scales

and carapaces grow feathers and hair).

728.

The very notion, "living organism", implies that there must be

growth,--that there must be a striving after an extension of power,

and therefore a process of absorption of other forces. Under the

drowsiness brought on by moral narcotics, people speak of the right of

the individual to \_defend himself;\_ on the same principle one might

speak of his right to \_attack\_: for \_both\_--and the latter more than

the former--are necessities where all living organisms are concerned:

aggressive and defensive egoism are not questions of choice or even of

"free will," but they are fatalities of life itself.

In this respect it is immaterial whether one have an individual, a

living body, or "an advancing society" in view. The right to punish

(or society's means of defence) has been arrived at only through a

misuse of the word "right": a right is acquired only by contract, but

self-defence and self-preservation do not stand upon the basis of a

contract. A people ought at least, with quite as much justification, to

be able to regard its lust of power, either in arms, commerce, trade,

or colonisation, as a right the right of growth, perhaps.... When the

instincts of a society ultimately make it give up war and renounce

conquest, it is decadent: it is ripe for democracy and the rule of

shopkeepers. In the majority of cases, it is true, assurances of peace

are merely stupefying draughts.

729.

The maintenance of the military State is the last means of adhering to

the great tradition of the past; or, where it has been lost, to revive

it. By means of it the superior or strong type of man is preserved,

and all institutions and ideas which perpetuate enmity and order of

rank in States, such as national feeling, protective tariffs, etc., may

on that account seem justified.

730.

In order that a thing may last longer than a person (that is to say,

in order that a work may outlive the individual who has created it),

all manner of limitations and prejudices must be imposed upon people.

But how? By means of love, reverence, gratitude towards the person

who created the work, or by means of the thought that our ancestors

fought for it, or by virtue of the feeling that the safety of our

descendants will be secured if we uphold the work--for instance, the

\_polis.\_ Morality is essentially the means of; making something survive

the individual, because it makes him of necessity a slave. Obviously

the aspect from above is different from the aspect from below, and

will lead to quite different interpretations. How is organised power

\_maintained\_?--By the fact that countless generations sacrifice

themselves to its cause.

731.

Marriage, property, speech, tradition, race, family, people, and

State, are each links in a chain--separate parts which have a more

or less high or low origin. Economically they are justified by the

surplus derived from the advantages of uninterrupted work and multiple

production, as weighed against the disadvantages of greater expense

in barter and the difficulty of making things last. (The working

parts are multiplied, and yet remain largely idle. Hence the cost of

producing them is greater, and the cost of maintaining them by no means

inconsiderable.) The advantage consists in avoiding interruption and

incident loss. Nothing is more expensive than a start. "The higher the

standard of living, the greater will be the expense of maintenance,

nourishment, and propagation, as also the risk and the probability of

an utter fall on reaching the summit."

732.

In bourgeois marriages, naturally in the best sense of the word

marriage, there is no question whatsoever of love any more than there

is of money. For on love no institution can be founded. The whole

matter consists in society giving leave to two persons to satisfy

their sexual desires under conditions obviously designed to safeguard

social order. Of course there must be a certain attraction between the

parties and a vast amount of good nature, patience, compatibility, and

charity in any such contract. But the word love should not be misused

as regards such a union. For two lovers, in the real and strong meaning

of the word, the satisfaction of sexual desire is unessential; it is a

mere symbol. For the one side, as I have already said, it is a symbol

of unqualified submission: for the other, a sign of condescension--a

sign of the appropriation of property. Marriage, as understood by the

real old nobility, meant the breeding forth of the race (but are there

any nobles nowadays? \_Quaeritur\_),--that is to say, the maintenance

of a fixed definite type of ruler, for which object husband and wife

were sacrificed. Naturally the first consideration here had nothing to

do with love; on the contrary! It did not even presuppose that mutual

sympathy which is the \_sine qua non\_ of the bourgeois marriage. The

prime consideration was the interest of the race, and in the second

place came the interest of a particular class. But in the face of the

coldness and rigour and calculating lucidity of such a noble concept

of marriage as prevailed among every healthy aristocracy, like that

of ancient Athens, and even of Europe during the eighteenth century,

we warm-blooded animals, with our miserably oversensitive hearts, we

"moderns," cannot restrain a slight shudder. That is why love as a

passion, in the big meaning of this word, was invented for, and in, an

aristocratic community--where convention and abstinence are most severe.

733.

\_Concerning the future of marriage.\_ A super-tax on inherited property,

a longer term of military service for bachelors of a certain minimum

age within the community.

Privileges of all sorts for fathers who lavish boys upon the world, and

perhaps plural votes as well.

A medical certificate as a condition of any marriage, endorsed by the

parochial authorities, in which a series of questions addressed to the

parties and the medical officers must be answered ("family histories").

As a counter-agent to prostitution, or as its ennoblement, I would

recommend leasehold marriages (to last for a term of years or months),

with adequate provision for the children.

Every marriage to be warranted and sanctioned by a certain number of

good men and true, of the parish, as a parochial obligation.

734.

\_Another commandment of philanthropy.\_--There are cases where to have a

child would be a crime--for example, for chronic invalids and extreme

neurasthenics. These people should be converted to chastity, and for

this purpose the music of \_Parsifal\_ might at all events be tried. For

Parsifal himself, that born fool, had ample reasons for not desiring

to propagate. Unfortunately, however, one of the regular symptoms of

exhausted stock is the inability to exercise any self-restraint in the

presence of stimuli, and the tendency to respond to the smallest sexual

attraction. It would be quite a mistake, for instance, to think of

Leopardi as a chaste man. In such cases the priest and moralist play

a hopeless game: it would be far better to send for the apothecary.

Lastly, society here has a positive duty to fulfil, and of all the

demands that are made on it, there are few more urgent and necessary

than this one. Society as the trustee of life, is responsible to life

for every botched life that comes into existence, and as it has to

atone for such lives, it ought consequently to make it impossible for

them ever to see the light of day: it should in many cases actually

prevent the act of procreation, and may, without any regard for rank,

descent, or intellect, hold in readiness the most rigorous forms of

compulsion and restriction, and, under certain circumstances, have

recourse to castration. The Mosaic law, "Thou shalt do no murder," is

a piece of ingenuous puerility compared with the earnestness of this

forbidding of life to decadents, "Thou shalt not beget"!!! ... For

life itself recognises no solidarity or equality of rights between the

healthy and unhealthy parts of an organism. The latter must at all

cost be \_eliminated,\_ lest the whole fall to pieces. Compassion for

decadents, equal rights for the physiologically botched--this would be

the very pinnacle of immorality, it would be setting up Nature's most

formidable opponent as morality itself!

735.

There are some delicate and morbid natures, the so-called idealists,

who can never under any circumstances rise above a coarse, immature

crime: yet it is the great justification of their anæmic little

existence, it is the small requital for their lives of cowardice and

falsehood to have been for one \_instant\_ at least--strong. But they

generally collapse after such an act.

736.

In our civilised world we seldom hear of any but the bloodless,

trembling criminal, overwhelmed by the curse and contempt of society,

doubting even himself, and always belittling and belying his deeds--a

misbegotten sort of criminal; that is why we are opposed to the idea

that \_all great men have been criminals\_ (only in the grand style, and

neither petty nor pitiful), that crime must be inherent in greatness

(this at any rate is the unanimous verdict of all those students of

human nature who have sounded the deepest waters of great souls). To

feel one's self adrift from all questions of ancestry, conscience, and

duty--this is the danger with which every great man is confronted.

Yet this is precisely what he desires: he desires the great goal, and

consequently the means thereto.

737.

In times when man is led by reward and punishment, the class of man

which the legislator has in view is still of a low and primitive

type: he is treated as one treats a child. In our latter-day culture,

general degeneracy removes all sense from reward and punishment. This

determination of action by the prospect of reward and punishment

presupposes young, strong, and vigorous races. In effete races impulses

are so irrepressible that a mere idea has no force whatever. Inability

to offer any resistance to a stimulus, and the feeling that one must

react to it: this excessive susceptibility of decadents makes all such

systems of punishment and reform altogether senseless.

The idea "amelioration" presupposes a normal and strong creature whose

action must in some way be balanced or cancelled if he is not to be

lost and turned into an enemy of the community.

738.

\_The effect of prohibition.\_ Every power which forbids and which knows

how to excite fear in the person forbidden creates a guilty conscience.

(That is to say, a person has a certain desire but is conscious of the

danger of gratifying it, and is consequently forced to be secretive,

underhand, and cautious.) Thus any prohibition deteriorates the

character of those who do not willingly submit themselves to it, but

are constrained thereto.

739.

\_"Punishment and reward."\_--These two things stand or fall together.

Nowadays no one will accept a reward or acknowledge that any authority

should have the power to punish. Warfare has been reformed. We have

a desire: it meets with opposition: we then see that we shall most

easily obtain it by coming to some agreement--by drawing up a contract.

In modern society where every one has given his assent to a certain

contract, the criminal is a man who breaks that contract. This at least

is a clear concept. But in that case, anarchists and enemies of social

order could not be tolerated.

740.

Crimes belong to the category of revolt against the social system, A

rebel is not punished, he is simply suppressed. He \_may\_ be an utterly

contemptible and pitiful creature; but there is nothing intrinsically

despicable about rebellion in fact, in our particular society revolt is

far from being disgraceful. There are cases in which a rebel deserves

honour precisely because he is conscious of certain elements in society

which cry aloud for hostility; for such a man rouses us from our

slumbers. When a criminal commits but one crime against a particular

person, it does not alter the fact that all his instincts urge him

to make a stand against the whole social system. His isolated act is

merely a symptom.

The idea of punishment ought to be reduced to the concept of the

suppression of revolt, a weapon against the vanquished (by means of

long or short terms of imprisonment). But punishment should not be

associated in any way with contempt. A criminal is at all events a man

who has set his life, his honour, his freedom at stake; he is therefore

a man of courage. Neither should punishment be regarded as penance or

retribution, as though there were some recognised rate of exchange

between crime and punishment. Punishment does not purify, simply

because crime does not sully.

A criminal should not be prevented from making his peace with society,

provided he does not belong to the race of criminals. In the latter

case, however, he should be opposed even before he has committed an

act of hostility. (As soon as he gets into the clutches of society the

first operation to be performed upon him should be that of castration.)

A criminal's bad manners and his low degree of intelligence should

not be reckoned against him. Nothing is more common than that he

should misunderstand himself (more particularly when his rebellious

instinct--the rancour of the \_unclassed\_--has not reached consciousness

simply because he has not read enough). It is natural that he should

deny and dishonour his deed while under the influence of fear at

its failure. All this is quite distinct from those cases in which,

psychologically speaking, the criminal yields to an incomprehensible

impulse, and attributes a motive to his deed by associating it with a

merely incidental and insignificant action (for example, robbing a man,

when his real desire was to take his blood).

The worth of a man should not be measured by any one isolated act.

Napoleon warned us against this. Deeds which are only skin-deep are

more particularly insignificant. If we have no crime--let us say no

murder--on our conscience; why is it? It simply means that a few

favourable circumstances have been wanting in our lives. And supposing

we were induced to commit such a crime would our worth be materially

affected? As a matter of fact, we should only be despised, if we were

not credited with possessing the power to kill a man under certain

circumstances. In nearly every crime certain qualities come into play

without which no one would be a true man. Dostoievsky was not far wrong

when he said of the inmates of the penal colonies in Siberia, that they

constituted the strongest and most valuable portion of the Russian

people. The fact that in our society the criminal happens to be a badly

nourished and stunted animal is simply a condemnation of our system. In

the days of the Renaissance the criminal was a flourishing specimen of

humanity, and acquired his own virtue for himself,--Virtue in the sense

of the Renaissance--that is to say, \_virtù;\_ free from moralic acid.

It is only those whom we do not despise that we are able to elevate.

Moral contempt is a far greater indignity and insult than any kind of

crime.

741.

Shame was first introduced into punishment when certain penalties

were inflicted on persons held in contempt, such as slaves. It was a

despised class that was most frequently punished, and thus it came to

pass that punishment and contempt were associated.

742.

In the ancient idea of punishment a religious concept was immanent,

namely, the retributive power of chastisement. Penalties purified; in

modern society, however, penalties degrade. Punishment is a form of

paying off a debt: once it has been paid, one is freed from the deed

for which one was so ready to suffer. Provided belief in the power of

punishment exist, once the penalty is paid a feeling of relief and

lightheartedness results, which is not so very far removed from a state

of convalescence and health. One has made one's peace with society,

and one appears to one's self more dignified pure.... To-day, however,

punishment isolates even more than the crime; the fate behind the sin

has become so formidable that it is almost hopeless. One rises from

punishment still an enemy of society. Henceforward it reckons yet

another enemy against it. The \_jus talionis\_ may spring from the spirit

of retribution (that is to say, from a sort of modification of the

instinct of revenge); but in the Book of Manu, for instance, it is the

need of having some equivalent in order to do penance, or to become

free in a religious sense.

743.

My pretty radical note of interrogation in the case of all more

modern laws of punishment is this: should not the punishment fit the

crime?--for in your heart of hearts thus would you have it. But then

the susceptibility of the particular criminal to pain would have to

be taken into account. In other words, there should be no such thing

as a preconceived penalty for any crime--no fixed penal code. But as

it would be no easy matter to ascertain the degree of sensitiveness

of each individual criminal, punishment would have to be abolished in

practice? What a sacrifice! Is it not? Consequently ...

744.

Ah! and the philosophy of jurisprudence! That is a science which, like

all moral sciences, has not even been wrapped in swaddling-clothes yet.

Even among jurists who consider themselves liberal, the oldest and

most valuable significance of punishment is still misunderstood--it

is not even known. So long as jurisprudence does not build upon a new

foundation--on history and comparative anthropology--it will never

cease to quarrel over the fundamentally false abstractions which are

fondly imagined to be the "philosophy of law," and which have nothing

whatever to do with modern man. The man of to-day, however, is such a

complicated woof even in regard to his legal valuation that he allows

of the most varied interpretation.

745.

An old Chinese sage once said he had heard that when mighty empires

were doomed they began to have numberless laws.

746.

Schopenhauer would have all rapscallions castrated, and all geese shut

up in convents. But from what point of view would this be desirable?

The rascal has at least this advantage over other men--that he is not

mediocre; and the fool is superior to us inasmuch as he does not suffer

at the sight of mediocrity. It would be better to widen the gulf--that

is to say, roguery and stupidity should be increased. In this way human

nature would become broader ... but, after all, this is Fate, and

it will happen, whether we desire it or not. Idiocy and roguery are

increasing: this is part of modern progress.

747.

Society, to-day, is full of consideration, tact, and reticence, and of

good-natured respect for other people's rights--even for the exactions

of strangers. To an even greater degree is there a certain charitable

and instinctive depreciation of the worth of man as shown by all

manner of trustful habits. Respect for men, and not only for the most

virtuous, is perhaps the real parting of the ways between us and the

Christian mythologists also have our good share of irony even when

listening to moral sermons. He who preaches morality to us debases

himself in our eyes and becomes almost comical. Liberal-mindedness

regarding morality is one of the best signs of our age. In cases where

it is most distinctly wanting, we regard it as a sign of a morbid

condition (the case of Carlyle in England, of Ibsen in Norway, and

Schopenhauer's pessimism throughout Europe). If there is anything

which can reconcile us to our own age, it is precisely the amount

of immorality which it allows itself without falling in its own

estimation--very much the reverse! In what, then, does the superiority

of culture over the want of culture consist--of the Renaissance, for

instance, over the Middle Ages? In this alone: the greater quantity of

acknowledged immorality. From this it necessarily follows that the very

\_zenith\_ of human development \_must\_ be regarded by the moral fanatic

as the \_non plus ultra\_ of corruption (in this connection let us recall

Savonarola's judgment of Florence, Plato's indictment of Athens under

Pericles, Luther's condemnation of Rome, Rousseau's anathemas against

the society of Voltaire, and Germany's hostility to Goethe).

A little more fresh air, for Heaven's sake! This ridiculous condition

of Europe \_must\_ not last any longer. Is there a single idea behind

this bovine nationalism? What possible value can there be in

encouraging this arrogant self-conceit when everything to-day points

to greater and more common interests?--at a moment when the spiritual

dependence and denationalisation, which are obvious to all, are paving

the way for the reciprocal \_rapprochements\_ and fertilisations which

make up the real value and sense of present-day culture! ... And it is

precisely now that "the new German Empire" has been founded upon the

most thread-bare and discredited of ideas--universal suffrage and equal

right for all.

Think of all this struggling for advantage among conditions which are

in every way degenerate: of this culture of big cities, of newspapers,

of hurry and scurry, and of "aimlessness"! The economic unity of

Europe must necessarily come--and with it, as a reaction, the pacivist

movement.

A pacivist party, free from all sentimentality, which forbids its

children to wage war; which forbids recourse to courts of justice;

which forswears all fighting, all contradiction, and all persecution:

for a while the party of the oppressed, and later the powerful

party:--this party would be opposed to everything in the shape of

revenge and resentment.

There will also be a war party, exercising the same thoroughness and

severity towards itself, which will proceed in precisely the opposite

direction.

749.

The princes of Europe should really consider whether as a matter of

fact they can dispense with our services--with us, the immoralists. We

are to-day the only power which can win a victory without allies: and

we are therefore far and away the strongest of the strong. We can even

do without lying, and let me ask what other power can dispense with

this weapon? A strong temptation fights for us; the strongest, perhaps,

that exists--the temptation of truth.... Truth? How do I come by this

word? I must withdraw it: I must repudiate this proud word. But no. We

do not even want it--we shall be quite able to achieve our victory of

power without its help. The real charm which fights for us, the eye

of Venus which our opponents themselves deaden and blind--this charm

is the magic of the extreme. The fascination which everything extreme

exercises: we immoralists--we are in every way the extremists.

750.

The corrupted ruling classes have brought ruling into evil odour. The

State administration of justice is a piece of cowardice, because the

great man who can serve as a standard is lacking. At last the feeling

of insecurity becomes so great that men fall in the dust before any

sort of will-power that commands.

751.

"The will to power" is so loathed in democratic ages that the whole of

the psychology of these ages seems directed towards its belittlement

and slander. The types of men who sought the highest honours are said

to have been Napoleon! Cæsar! and Alexander!--as if these had not been

precisely the greatest \_scorners\_ of honour.

And Helvetius would fain show us that we strive after power in order

to have those pleasures which are at the disposal of the mighty--that

is to say, according to him, this striving after power is the will to

pleasure--hedonism!

752.

According as to whether a people feels: "the rights, the keenness of

vision, and the gifts of leading, etc., are with the few" or "with the

many"--it constitutes En oligarchic or a democratic community.

Monarchy represents the belief in a man who is completely superior a

leader, a saviour, a demigod.

Aristocracy represents the belief in a chosen few--in a higher caste.

Democracy represents the disbelief in all great men and in all elite

societies: everybody is everybody else's equal, "At bottom we are all

herd and mob."

753.

I am opposed to Socialism because it dreams ingenuously of goodness,

truth, beauty, and equal rights (anarchy pursues the same ideal, but in

a more brutal fashion).

I am opposed to parliamentary government and the power of the press,

because they are the means whereby cattle become masters.

754.

The arming of the people means in the end the arming of the mob.

755.

Socialists are particularly ridiculous in my eyes, because of their

absurd optimism concerning the "good man" who is supposed to be waiting

in their cupboard, and who will come into being when the present

order of society has been overturned and has made way for natural

instincts. But the opposing party is quite as ludicrous, because it

will not see the act of violence which lies beneath every law, the

severity and egoism inherent in every kind of authority. "I and my kind

will rule and prevail. Whoever degenerates will be either expelled

or annihilated."--This was the fundamental feeling of all ancient

legislation. The idea of a higher order of man is hated much more

profoundly than monarchs themselves. Hatred of aristocracy always uses

hatred of monarchy as a mask.

756.

How treacherous are all parties! They bring to light something

concerning their leaders which the latter, perhaps, have hitherto kept

hidden beneath a bushel with consummate art.

757.

Modern Socialism would fain create a profane counterpart to jesuitism:

everybody a perfect instrument. But as to the object of it all, the

purpose of it--this has not yet been ascertained.

758.

\_The slavery of to-day\_: a piece of barbarism. Where are the masters

for whom these slaves work? One must not always expect the simultaneous

appearance of the two complementary castes of society.

Utility and pleasure are slave theories of life.

"The blessing of work" is an ennobling phrase for slaves. Incapacity

for leisure.

759.

There is no such thing as a right to live, a right to work, or a right

to be happy: in this respect man is not different from the meanest worm.

760.

We must undoubtedly think of these things as uncompromisingly as Nature

does: they preserve the species.

761.

We should look upon the needs of the masses with ironic compassion:

they want something which we have got--Ah!

762.

European democracy is only in a very slight degree the manifestation

of unfettered powers. It represents, above all, the unfettering of

laziness, fatigue, and \_weakness\_.

753.

\_Concerning the future of the workman\_--Workmen men should learn to

regard their duties as \_soldiers\_ do. They receive emoluments, incomes,

but they do not get wages!

There is no relationship between \_work done\_ and money received;

the individual should, \_according to his kind,\_ be so placed as to

\_perform\_ the \_highest\_ that is compatible with his powers.

764.

Noblemen ought one day to live as the bourgeois do now--but above

them, distinguishing themselves by the simplicity of their wants--the

superior caste will then live in a poorer and simpler way and yet be in

possession of power.

For lower orders of mankind the reverse valuations hold good: it is a

matter of implanting "virtues" in them. Absolute commands, terrible

compulsory methods, in order that they may rise above mere ease in

life. The remainder may obey, but their vanity demands that they may

feel themselves dependent, not upon great men, but upon principles.

765.

"\_The Atonement of all Sin?\_"

People speak of the profound injustice of the social arrangement, as

it the fact that one man is born in favourable circumstances and that

another is born in unfavourable ones--or that one should possess gifts

the other has not, were on the face of it an injustice. Among the

more honest of these opponents of society this is what is said: "We,

with all the bad, morbid, criminal qualities which we acknowledge we

possess, are only the inevitable result of the oppression for ages of

the weak by the strong"; thus they insinuate their evil natures into

the consciences of the ruling classes. They threaten and storm and

curse. They become virtuous from sheer indignation--they don't want

to have become bad men and \_canaille\_ for nothing. The name for this

attitude, which is an invention of the last century, is, if I am not

mistaken, pessimism; and even that pessimism which is the outcome of

indignation. It is in this attitude of mind that history is judged,

that it is deprived of its inevitable fatality, and that responsibility

and even guilt is discovered in it. For the great desideratum is to

find guilty people in it. The botched and the bungled, the decadents

of all kinds, are revolted at themselves, and require sacrifices

in order that they may not slake their thirst for destruction upon

themselves (which might, indeed, be the most reasonable procedure). But

for this purpose they at least require a semblance of justification,

\_i.e.\_ a theory according to which the fact of their existence, and of

their character, may be expiated by a scapegoat. This scapegoat may

be God,--in Russia such resentful atheists are not wanting,--or the

order of society, or education and upbringing, or the Jews, or the

nobles, or, finally, the well-constituted of every kind. "It is a sin

for a man to have been born in decent circumstances, for by so doing

he disinherits the others, he pushes them aside, he imposes upon them

the curse of vice and of work.... How can I be made answerable for my

misery; surely some one must be responsible for it, or I could not bear

to live."...

In short, resentful pessimism discovers responsible parties in order to

create a pleasurable sensation for itself--revenge.... "Sweeter than

honey"--thus does even old Homer speak of revenge.

\*\*\*

The fact that such a theory no longer meets with understanding--or

rather, let us say, contempt is accounted for by that particle of

Christianity which still circulates in the blood of every one of us; it

makes us tolerant towards things simply because we scent a Christian

savour about them.... The Socialists appeal to the Christian instincts;

this is their really refined piece of cleverness.... Thanks to

Christianity, we have now grown accustomed to the superstitious concept

of a soul--of an immortal soul, of soul monads, which, as a matter of

fact, hails from somewhere else, and which has only become inherent in

certain cases--that is to say, become incarnate in them--by accident:

but the nature of these cases is not altered, let alone determined by

it. The circumstances of society, of relationship, and of history are

only accidents for the soul, perhaps misadventures: in any case, the

world is not their work. By means of the idea of soul the individual is

made transcendental; thanks to it, a ridiculous amount of importance

can be attributed to him.

As a matter of fact, it was Christianity which first induced the

individual to take up this position of judge of all things. It made

megalomania almost his duty: it has made everything temporary and

limited subordinate to eternal rights! What is the State, what is

society, what are historical laws, what is physiology to me? Thus

speaks something from beyond Becoming, an immutable entity throughout

history: thus speaks something immortal, something divine--it is the

soul!

Another Christian, but no less insane, concept has percolated even

deeper into the tissues of modern ideas: the concept of the equality

of all souls before God. In this concept the prototype of all theories

concerning equal rights is to be found. Man was first taught to

stammer this proposition religiously: later, it was converted into

a moral; no wonder he has ultimately begun to take it seriously, to

take it \_practically\_!--that is to say, politically, socialistically,

resento-pessimistically.

Wherever responsible circumstances or people have been looked for,

it was the \_instinct of revenge\_ that sought them. This instinct of

revenge obtained such an ascendancy over man in the course of centuries

that the whole of metaphysics, psychology, ideas of society, and, above

all, morality, are tainted with it. Man has nourished this idea of

responsibility to such an extent that he has introduced the bacillus

of vengeance into everything. By means of it he has made God Himself

ill, and killed innocence in the universe, by tracing every condition

of things to acts of will, to intentions, to responsible agents. The

whole teaching of will, this most fatal fraud that has ever existed

in psychology hitherto, was invented essentially for the purpose of

punishment. It was the social utility of punishment that lent this

concept its dignity, its power, and its truth. The originator of that

psychology, that we shall call volitional psychology, must be sought in

those classes which had the right of punishment in their hands; above

all, therefore, among the priests who stood on the very pinnacle of

ancient social systems: these people wanted to create for themselves

the right to wreak revenge--they wanted to supply God with the

privilege of vengeance. For this purpose; man was declared "free": to

this end every action had to be regarded as voluntary, and the origin

of every deed had to be considered as lying in consciousness. But by

such propositions as these ancient psychology is refuted.

To-day, when Europe seems to have taken the contrary direction; when

we halcyonians would fain withdraw, dissipate, and banish the concept

of guilt and punishment with all our might from the world; when our

most serious endeavours are concentrated upon purifying psychology,

morality, history, nature, social institutions and privileges, and

even God Himself, from this filth; in whom must we recognise our most

mortal enemies? Precisely in those apostles of revenge and resentment,

in those who are \_par excellence\_ pessimists from indignation, who make

it their mission to sanctify their filth with the name of "righteous

indignation."... We others, whose one desire is to reclaim innocence on

behalf of Becoming, would fain be the missionaries of a purer thought,

namely, that no one is responsible for man's qualities; neither God,

nor society, nor his parents, nor his ancestors, nor himself--in

fact, that no one is to blame for him ... The being who might be made

responsible for a man's existence, for the fact that he is constituted

in a particular way, or for his birth in certain circumstances and

in a certain environment, is absolutely lacking.--\_And it is a great

blessing that such a being is non-existent ...\_. We are \_not\_ the

result of an eternal design, of a will, of a desire: there is no

attempt being made with us to attain to an "ideal of perfection," to

an "ideal of happiness," to an "ideal of virtue,"--and we are just as

little the result of a mistake on God's part in the presence of which

He ought to feel uneasy (a thought which is known to be at the very

root of the Old Testament). There is not a place nor a purpose nor a

sense to which we can attribute our existence or our kind of existence.

In the first place, no one is in a position to do this: it is quite

impossible to judge, to measure, or to compare, or even to deny the

whole universe! And why?--For five reasons, all accessible to the man

of average intelligence: for instance, \_because there is no existence

outside the universe ...\_ and let us say it again, this is a great

blessing, for therein lies the whole innocence of our lives.

2. The Individual.

766.

\_Fundamental errors:\_ to regard the \_herd\_ as an aim instead of

the individual! The herd is only a means and nothing \_more\_! But

nowadays people are trying to understand \_the herd\_ as they would an

individual, and to confer higher rights upon it than upon isolated

personalities. Terrible mistake!! In addition to this, all that makes

for gregariousness, \_e.g.\_ sympathy, is regarded as the \_more valuable\_

side of our natures.

767.

The individual is something quite \_new,\_ and capable of \_creating

new things.\_ He is something absolute, and all his actions are quite

his own. The individual in the end has to seek the valuation for his

actions in himself: because he has to give an individual meaning even

to traditional words and notions. His interpretation of a formula is at

least personal, even if he does not create the formula itself: at least

as an interpreter he is creative.

768.

The "ego" oppresses and kills. It acts like an organic cell. It is

predatory and violent. It would fain regenerate itself--pregnancy. It

would fain give birth to its God and see all mankind at its feet.

769.

Every living organism gropes around as far as its power permits, and

overcomes all that is weaker than itself: by this means it finds

pleasure in its own existence. The \_increasing "humanity"\_ of this

tendency consists in the fact that we are beginning to feel ever more

subtly how difficult it is really to \_absorb\_ others: while we could

show our power by injuring him, his will \_estranges\_ him from us, and

thus makes him less susceptible of being overcome.

770.

The degree of resistance which has to be continually overcome in order

to remain \_at the top,\_ is the measure of \_freedom,\_ whether for

individuals or for societies: freedom being understood as positive

power, as will to power. The highest form of individual freedom, of

sovereignty, would, according to this, in all probability be found not

five feet away from its opposite--that is to say, where the danger of

slavery hangs over life, like a hundred swords of Damocles. Let any one

go through the whole of history from this point of view: the ages when

the individual reaches perfect maturity, \_i.e.\_ the free ages, when the

classical type, \_sovereign man,\_ is attained to--these were certainly

not humane times!

There should be no choice: either one must be uppermost or

nethermost--like a worm, despised, annihilated, trodden upon. One

must have tyrants against one in order to become a tyrant, \_i.e.\_ in

order to be free. It is no small advantage to have a hundred swords of

Damocles suspended over one: it is only thus that one learns to dance,

it is only thus that one attains to any freedom in one's movements.

771.

Man more than any other animal was originally \_altruistic\_--hence

his slow growth (child) and lofty development. Hence, too, his

extraordinary and latest kind of egoism.--Beasts of prey are much more

\_individualistic.\_

772.

A criticism of \_selfishness.\_ The involuntary ingenuousness of La

Rochefoucauld, who believed that he was saying something bold, liberal,

and paradoxical (in his days, of course, truth in psychological matters

was something that astonished people) when he said. "\_Les grandes âmes

ne sont pas celles qui ont moins de passions et plus de vertus que les

âmes communes, mais seulement celles qui ont de plus grands desseins.\_"

Certainly, John Stuart Mill (who calls Chamfort the \_noble\_ and

philosophical La Rochefoucauld of the eighteenth century) recognises

in him merely an astute and keen-sighted observer of all that which is

the result of habitual selfishness in the human breast, and he adds: "A

noble spirit is unable to see the necessity of a constant observation

of \_baseness\_ and \_contemptibility\_, unless it were to show against

what corrupting influences a lofty spirit and a noble character were

able to triumph."

773.

\_The Morphology of the Feelings of Self.\_

\_First standpoint\_--To what extent are \_sympathy\_ or \_communal

feelings,\_ the lower or preparatory states, at a time when personal

self-esteem and initiative in valuation, on the part of individuals,

are not yet possible?

\_Second standpoint.\_--To what extent is the zenith of collective

self-esteem, the pride in the distinction of the clan, the feeling

of inequality and a certain abhorrence of mediation, of equal rights

and of reconciliation, the school for individual self-esteem? It may

be this in so far as it compels the individual to represent the pride

of the community --he is obliged to speak and act with tremendous

self-respect, because he stands for the community And the same

holds good when the individual regards himself as the instrument or

speaking-tube of a godhead.

\_Third standpoint.\_--To what extent do these forms of impersonality

invest the individual with enormous importance? In so far as higher

powers are using him as an intermediary: religious shyness towards

one's self is the condition of prophets and poets.

\_Fourth standpoint.\_--To what extent does responsibility for a whole

educate the individual in foresight, and give him a severe and

terrible hand, a calculating and cold heart, majesty of bearing and of

action--things which he would not allow himself if he stood only for

his own rights?

In short, collective self-esteem is the great preparatory school

for personal sovereignty. The noble caste is that which creates the

heritage of this faculty.

774.

The disguised forms of will to power:--

(1) \_The desire for freedom,\_ for independence for equilibrium,

for peace, for \_co-ordination.\_ Also that of the anchorite, the

"Free-Spirit." In its lowest form, the will to live at all costs--the

instinct of self-preservation.

(2) Subordination, with the view of satisfying the will to power of a

whole community; submissiveness, the making of one's self indispensable

and useful to him who has the power; love, a secret path to the heart

of the powerful, in order to become his master.

(3) The feeling of duty, conscience, the imaginary comfort of belonging

to a higher order than those who actually hold the reins of power;

the acknowledgment of an order of rank which allows of judging even

the more powerful, self-depreciation; the discovery of new \_codes of

morality\_ (of which the Jews are a classical example).

775.

\_Praise and gratitude as forms of will to power.--\_Praise and

gratitude for harvests, for good weather, victories, marriages, and

peace--all festivals need a subject on which feeling can be outpoured.

The desire is to make all good things that happen to one appear as

though they had been done to one: people will have a donor. The same

holds good of the work of art: people are not satisfied with it

alone, they must praise the artist.--What, then, is praise? It is a

sort of compensation for benefits received, a sort of giving back,

a manifestation of \_our\_ power--for the man who praises assents to,

blesses, values, \_judges\_. he arrogates to himself the right to give

his consent to a thing, to be able to confer honours. An increased

feeling of happiness or of liveliness is also an increased feeling

of power, and it is as a result of this feeling that a man \_praises\_

(it is as the outcome of this feeling that he invents a donor, a

"subject"). Gratitude is thus revenge of a lofty kind: it is most

severely exercised and demanded where equality and pride both require

to be upheld--that is to say, where revenge is practised to its fullest

extent.

776.

\_Concerning the Machiavellism of Power.\_

The \_will to power\_ appears:--

\_(a)\_ Among the oppressed and slaves of all kinds, in the form of will

to "\_freedom\_": the mere fact of breaking loose from something seems to

be an end in itself (in a religio-moral sense: "One is only answerable

to one's own conscience"; "evangelical freedom," etc. etc.),

\_(b)\_ In the case of a stronger species, ascending to power, in the

form of the will to overpower. If this fails, then it shrinks to the

"will to justice"--that is to say, to the will to the same measure of

rights as the ruling caste possesses.

\_(c)\_ In the case of the strongest, richest, most independent, and

most courageous, in the form of "love of humanity," of "love of the

people," of the "gospel," of "truth" of "God," of "pity," of self

sacrifice," etc. etc.; in the form of overpowering, of deeds of

capture, of imposing service on some one, of an instinctive reckoning

of one's self as part of a great mass of power to which one attempts

to give a direction: the hero, the prophet, the Cæsar, the Saviour,

the bell-wether. (The love of the sexes also belongs to this category,

it will overpower something, possess it utterly, and it looks like

self-abnegation. At bottom it is only the love of one's instrument, of

one's "horse"--the conviction that things belong to one because one is

in a position to use them.)

\_"Freedom," "Justice," "Love"\_!!!

777.

\_Love.\_--Behold this love and pity of women--what could be more

egoistic? ... And when they do sacrifice themselves and their honour

or reputation, to whom do they sacrifice themselves? To the man? Is it

not rather to an unbridled desire? These desires are quite as selfish,

even though they may be beneficial to others and provoke gratitude.

... To what extent can such a hyperfœtation of one valuation sanctify

everything else!!

778.

\_"Senses," "Passions.".\_--When the fear of the senses and of the

passions and of the desires becomes so great as to warn us against

them, it is already a symptom of \_weakness:\_ extreme measures always

characterise abnormal conditions. That which is lacking here, or more

precisely that which is decaying, is the power to resist an impulse:

when one feels instinctively that one must yield,--that is to say, that

one must react,--then it is an excellent thing to avoid opportunities

(temptations).

The stimulation of the senses is only a temptation in so far as those

creatures are concerned whose systems are easily swayed and influenced:

on the other hand, in the case of remarkable constitutional obtuseness

and hardness, strong stimuli are necessary in order to set the

functions in motion. Dissipation can only be objected to in the case of

one who has no right to it; and almost all passions have fallen into

disrepute thanks to those who were not strong enough to convert them to

their own advantage.

One should understand that passions are open to the same objections as

illnesses: yet we should not be justified in doing without illnesses,

and still less without passions. We require the abnormal; we give life

a tremendous shock by means of these great illnesses.

In detail the following should be distinguished:--

(1) The \_dominating passion,\_ which may even bring the supremest form

of health with it: in this case the co-ordination of the internal

system and its functions to perform one task is best attained,--but

this is almost a definition of health.

(2) The antagonism of the passions the double, treble, and multiple

soul in one breast:[6] this is very unhealthy; it is a sign of inner

ruin and of disintegration, betraying and promoting an internal dualism

and anarchy--unless, of course, one passion becomes master. \_Return to

health.\_

(3) The juxtaposition of passions without their being either opposed

or united with one another. Very often transitory, and then, as soon

as order is established, this condition may be a healthy one. A most

interesting class of men belong to this order, the chameleons; they are

not necessarily at loggerheads with themselves, they are both happy and

secure, but they cannot develop--their moods lie side by side, even

though they may seem to lie far apart. They change, but they become

nothing.

779.

The quantitative estimate of aims and its influence upon the valuing

standpoint, the \_great\_ and the \_small\_ criminal. The greatness or

smallness of the aims will determine whether the doer feels respect for

himself with it all, or whether he feels pusillanimous and miserable.

The degree of intellectuality manifested in the means employed may

likewise influence our valuation. How differently the philosophical

innovator, experimenter, and man of violence stands out against

robbers, barbarians, adventurers!--There is a semblance of

disinterestedness in the former.

Finally, noble manners, bearing, courage, self-confidence,--how they

alter the value of that which is attained by means of them!

\*\*\*

Concerning the optics of valuation:--

The influence of the greatness or smallness of the aims.

The influence of the intellectuality of the means. The influence of the

behaviour in action. The influence of success or failure. The influence

of opposing forces and their value. The influence of that which is

permitted and that which is forbidden.

780.

The tricks by means of which actions, measures, and passions are

legitimised, which from an individual standpoint are no longer good

form or even in good taste.--

Art, which allows us to enter such strange worlds, makes them tasteful

to us.

Historians prove its justification and reason; travels, exoticism,

psychology, penal codes, the lunatic asylum, the criminal, sociology.

Impersonality (so that as media of a collective whole we allow

ourselves these passions and action--the Bar, juries, the bourgeois,

the soldier, the minister, the prince, society, "critics") makes us

feel that we are \_sacrificing something.\_

781.

Preoccupations concerning one's self and one's eternal salvation are

not expressive either of a rich or of a self-confident nature, for the

latter lets all questions of eternal bliss go to the devil,--it is

not interested in such matters of happiness it is all power, deeds,

desires; it imposes itself upon things; it even violates things. The

Christian is a romantic hypochondriac who does not stand firmly on his

legs.

Whenever hedonistic views come to the front, one can always presuppose

the existence of pain and a certain ill-constitutedness.

782.

"The growing autonomy of the individual"--Parisian philosophers like

M. Fouillée talk of such things: they would do well to study the

\_race moutonnière\_ for a moment; for they belong to it. For Heaven's

sake open your eyes, ye sociologists who deal with the future! The

individual grew strong under quite opposite conditions: ye describe the

extremest weakening and impoverishment of man; ye actually want this

weakness and impoverishment, and ye apply the whole lying machinery of

the old ideal in order to achieve your end. Ye are so constituted that

ye actually regard your gregarious wants as an ideal! Here we are in

the presence of an absolute lack of psychological honesty.

783.

The two traits which characterise the modern European are apparently

antagonistic \_individualism and the demand for equal rights\_: this I

am at last beginning to understand. The individual is an extremely

vulnerable piece of vanity: this vanity, when it is conscious of its

high degree of susceptibility to pain, demands that every one should

be made equal; that the individual should only stand \_inter pares\_.

But in this way a social race is depicted in which, as a matter of

fact, gifts and powers are on the whole equally distributed. The pride

which would have loneliness and but few appreciators is quite beyond

comprehension: really "great" successes are only attained through the

masses--indeed, we scarcely understand yet that a mob success is in

reality only a small success; because \_pulchrum est paucorum hominum.\_

No morality will countenance order of rank among men, and the jurists

know nothing of a communal conscience. The principle of individualism

rejects \_really great\_ men, and demands the most delicate vision for,

and the speediest discovery of, a talent among people who are almost

equal; and inasmuch as every one has some modicum of talent in such

late and civilised cultures (and can, therefore, expect to receive his

share of honour), there is a more general buttering-up of modest merits

to-day than there has ever been. This gives the age the appearance of

\_unlimited justice.\_ Its want of justice is to be found not in its

unbounded hatred of tyrants and demagogues, even in the arts; but in

its detestation of noble natures who scorn the praise of the many. The

demand for equal rights (that is to say, the privilege of sitting in

judgment on everything and everybody) is anti-aristocratic.

This age knows just as little concerning the absorption of the

individual, of his mergence into a great type of men who do not want to

be personalities. It was this that formerly constituted the distinction

and the zeal of many lofty natures (the greatest poets among them); or

of the desire to be a \_polis,\_ as in Greece; or of Jesuitism, or of

the Prussian Staff Corps, and bureaucracy; or of apprenticeship and a

continuation of the tradition of great masters: to all of which things,

non-social conditions and the absence of \_petty vanity\_ are necessary.

784.

\_Individualism\_ is a modest and still unconscious form of will to

power; with it a single human unit seems to think it sufficient to free

himself from the preponderating power of society (or of the State or

Church). He does not set himself up in opposition as a \_personality,\_

but merely as a unit; he represents the rights of all other individuals

as against the whole. That is to say, he instinctively places himself

on a level with every other unit: what he combats he does not combat as

a person, but as a representative of units against a mass.

Socialism is merely an agitatory measure of individualism: it

recognises the fact that in order to attain to something, men must

organise themselves into a general movement--into a "power." But what

the Socialist requires is not society as the object of the individual,

\_but society as a means of making many individuals possible\_: this is

the instinct of Socialists, though they frequently deceive themselves

on this point (apart from this, however, in order to make their kind

prevail, they are compelled to deceive others to an enormous extent).

Altruistic moral preaching thus enters into the service of individual

egoism,--one of the most common frauds of the nineteenth century.

\_Anarchy\_ is also merely an agitatory measure of Socialism; with it

the Socialist inspires fear, with fear he begins to fascinate and to

terrorise: but what he does above all is to draw all courageous and

reckless people to his side, even in the most intellectual spheres.

In spite of all this, individualism is the most modest stage of the

will to power.

\*\*\*

When one has reached a certain degree of independence, one always

longs for more: separation in proportion to the degree of force;

the individual is no longer content to regard himself as equal to

everybody, he actually \_seeks for his peer\_--he makes himself stand out

from others. Individualism is followed by a development in groups and

organs; correlative tendencies join up together and become powerfully

active: now there arise between these centres of power, friction,

war, a reconnoitring of the forces on either side, reciprocity,

understandings, and the regulation of mutual services. Finally, there

appears an order of rank.

Recapitulation--

1. The individuals emancipate themselves.

2. They make war, and ultimately agree concerning equal rights (justice

is made an end in itself).

3. Once this is reached, the actual differences in degrees of power

begin to make themselves felt, and to a greater extent than before (the

reason being that on the whole peace is established, and innumerable

small centres of power begin to create differences which formerly were

scarcely noticeable). Now the individuals begin to form groups, these

strive after privileges and preponderance, and war starts afresh in a

milder form.

People demand freedom only when they have no power. Once power is

obtained, a preponderance thereof is the next thing to be coveted; if

this is not achieved (owing to the fact that one is still too weak for

it), then \_"justice" i.e. "equality\_ of power" become the objects of

desire.

785.

\_The rectification of the concept "egoism."\_--When one has discovered

what an error the "individual" is, and that every single creature

represents the whole process of evolution (not alone "inherited," but

in "himself"), the individual then acquires \_an inordinately great

importance.\_ The voice of instinct is quite right here. When this

instinct tends to decline, \_i.e.\_ when the individual begins to seek

his worth in his services to others, one may be sure that exhaustion

and degeneration have set in. An altruistic attitude of mind, when

it is fundamental and free from all hypocrisy, is the instinct of

creating a second value for one's self in the service of other egoists.

As a rule, however, it is only apparent--a circuitous path to the

preservation of one's own feelings of vitality and worth.

786.

\_The History of Moralisation and Demoralisation.\_

\_Proposition one.\_--There are no such things as moral actions: they

are purely imaginary. Not only is it impossible to demonstrate their

existence (a fact which Kant and Christianity, for instance, both

acknowledged) but they are not even possible. Owing to psychological

misunderstanding, a man invented an \_opposite\_ to the instinctive

impulses of life, and believed that a new species of instinct was

thereby discovered: a \_primum mobile\_ was postulated which does not

exist at all. According to the valuation which gave rise to the

antithesis "moral" and "immoral," one should say: \_There is nothing

else on earth but immoral intentions and actions.\_

\_Proposition two.\_----The whole differentiation, "moral" and "immoral,"

arises from the assumption that both moral and immoral actions are the

result of a spontaneous will--in short, that such a will exists; or in

other words, that moral judgments can only hold good with regard to

intuitions and actions \_that are free.\_ But this whole order of actions

and intentions is purely imaginary: the only world to which the moral

standard could be applied does not exist at all: \_there is no such

thing as a moral or an immoral action.\_

The \_psychological error\_ out of which the antithesis "moral" and

"immoral" arose is: "selfless," "unselfish," "self-denying"--all unreal

and fantastic.

A false dogmatism also clustered around the concept "ego"; it was

regarded as atomic, and falsely opposed to a non-ego; it was also

liberated from Becoming, and declared to belong to the sphere of

Being. The false materialisation of the ego: this (owing to the belief

in individual immortality) was made an article of faith under the

pressure of \_religio-moral discipline.\_ According to this artificial

liberation of the ego and its transference to the realm of the

absolute, people thought that they had arrived at an antithesis in

values which seemed quite irrefutable--the single ego and the vast

non-ego. It seemed obvious that the value of the individual ego could

only exist in conjunction with the vast non-ego, more particularly in

the sense of being subject to it and existing only for its sake. Here,

of course, the gregarious instinct determined the direction of thought:

nothing is more opposed to this instinct than the sovereignty of the

individual. Supposing, however, that the ego be absolute, then its

value must lie in \_self-negation.\_

Thus: (1) the false emancipation of the "individual" as an atom;

(2) The gregarious self-conceit which abhors the desire to remain an

atom, and regards it as hostile.

(3) As a result: the overcoming of the individual by changing his aim.

(4) At this point there appeared to be actions that were self-effacing:

around these actions a whole sphere of antitheses was fancied.

(5) It was asked, in what sort of actions does man most strongly

assert himself? Around these (sexuality, covetousness, lust for power,

cruelty, etc. etc.) hate, contempt, and anathemas were heaped: it

was believed that there could be such things as selfless impulses.

Everything selfish was condemned, everything unselfish was in demand.

(6) And the result was: what had been done? A ban had been placed

on the strongest, the most natural, yea, the only genuine impulses,

henceforward, in order that an action might be praiseworthy, there must

be no trace in it of any of those genuine impulses--\_monstrous fraud

in psychology.\_ Every kind of "self-satisfaction" had to be remodelled

and made possible by means of misunderstanding and adjusting one's self

\_sub specie boni.\_ Conversely: that species which found its advantage

in depriving mankind of its self-satisfaction, the representatives of

the gregarious instincts, \_e.g.\_ the priests and the philosophers, were

sufficiently crafty and psychologically astute to show how selfishness

ruled everywhere. The Christian conclusion from this was: "Everything

is sin, even our virtues. Man is utterly undesirable. Selfless actions

are impossible." Original sin. In short, once man had opposed his

instincts to a purely imaginary world of the good, he concluded by

despising himself as incapable of performing "good" actions.

\_N.B.\_ In this way Christianity represents a step forward in the

sharpening of psychological insight: La Rochefoucauld and Pascal. It

perceived the essential equality of human actions, and the equality of

their values as a whole (all immoral).

\*\*\*

Now the first serious object was to rear men in whom self-seeking

impulses were extinguished. \_priests, saints.\_ And if people doubted

that perfection was possible, they did not doubt what perfection was.

The psychology of the saint and of the priest and of the "good" man,

must naturally have seemed purely phantasmagorical. The real motive of

all action had been declared bad: therefore, in order to make action

still possible, deeds had to be prescribed which, though not possible,

had to be declared possible and sanctified. They now honoured and

idealised things with as much falsity as they had previously slandered

them.

Inveighing against the instincts of life came to be regarded as holy

and estimable. The priestly ideal was: absolute chastity, absolute

obedience, absolute poverty! The lay ideal: alms, pity, self-sacrifice,

renunciation of the beautiful, of reason, and of sensuality, and a dark

frown for all the strong qualities that existed.

\*\*\*

An advance is made: the slandered instincts attempt to re-establish

their rights (\_e.g.\_ Luther's Reformation, the coarsest form of

moral falsehood under the cover of "Evangelical freedom"), they are

rechristened with holy names.

The calumniated instincts try to demonstrate that they are necessary in

order that the virtuous instincts may be possible. \_Il faut vivre, afin

de vivre pour autrui:\_ egoism as a means to an end.[7]

But people go still further: they try to grant both the egoistic and

altruistic impulses the right to exist--equal rights for both--from the

utilitarian standpoint.

People go further: they see greater utility in placing the egoistic

rights before the altruistic--greater utility in the sense of more

happiness for the majority, or of the elevation of mankind, etc. etc.

Thus the rights of egoism begin to preponderate, but under the cloak of

an extremely altruistic standpoint--the collective utility of humanity.

An attempt is made to reconcile the altruistic mode of action with the

natural order of things. Altruism is sought in the very roots of life.

Altruism and egoism are both based upon the essence of life and nature.

The disappearance of the opposition between them is dreamt of as a

future possibility. Continued adaptation, it is hoped, will merge the

two into one.

At last it is seen that altruistic actions are merely a species of the

egoistic--and that the degree to which one loves and spends one's self

is a proof of the extent of one's individual power and personality. In

short, that the more evil man can be made, the better he is, and that

one cannot be the one without the other. At this point the curtain

rises which concealed the monstrous fraud of the psychology that has

prevailed hitherto.

\*\*\*

\_Results.\_--There are only immoral intentions and actions; the

so-called moral actions must be shown to be immoral. All emotions are

traced to a single will, the will to power, and are called essentially

equal. The concept of life: in the apparent antithesis good and evil,

degrees of power in the instincts alone are expressed. A temporary

order of rank is established according to which certain instincts are

either controlled or enlisted in our service. Morality is justified:

economically, etc.

\*\*\*

Against proposition two.--Determinism: the attempt to rescue the moral

world by transferring it to the unknown.

Determinism is only a manner of allowing ourselves to conjure our

valuations away, once they have lost their place in a world interpreted

mechanistically. Determinism must therefore be attacked and undermined

at all costs: just as our right to distinguish between an absolute and

phenomenal world should be disputed.

787.

It is absolutely necessary to emancipate ourselves from motives:

otherwise we should not be allowed to attempt to sacrifice ourselves

or to neglect ourselves! Only the innocence of Becoming gives us the

highest courage and the highest freedom.

788.

A clean conscience must be restored to the evil man--has this been my

involuntary endeavour all the time? for I take as the evil man him

who is strong (Dostoievsky's belief concerning the convicts in prison

should be referred to here).

789.

Our new "freedom." What a feeling of relief there is in the thought

that we emancipated spirits do not feel ourselves harnessed to any

system of teleological aims. Likewise that the concepts reward and

punishment have no roots in the essence of existence! Likewise that

good and evil actions are not good or evil in themselves, but only

from the point of view of the self-preservative tendencies of certain

species of humanity! Likewise that our speculations concerning pleasure

and pain are not of cosmic, far less then of metaphysical, importance!

(That form of pessimism associated with the name of Hartmann, which

pledges itself to put even the pain and pleasure of existence into

the balance, with its arbitrary confinement in the prison and within

the bounds of pre-Copernican thought, would be something not only

retrogressive, but degenerate, unless it be merely a bad joke on the

part of a "Berliner."[8])

790.

If one is clear as to the "wherefore" of one's life, then the "how" of

it can take care of itself.

It is already even a sign of disbelief in the wherefore and in the

purpose and sense of life--in fact, it is a sign of a lack of

will--when the value of pleasure and pain step into the foreground,

and hedonistic and pessimistic teaching becomes prevalent; and

self-abnegation, resignation, virtue, "objectivity," \_may,\_ at the very

least, be signs that the most important factor is beginning to make its

absence felt.

791.

Hitherto there has been no German culture. It is no refutation of this

assertion to say that there have been great anchorites in Germany

(Goethe, for instance); for these had their own culture. But it was

precisely around them, as though around mighty, defiant, and isolated

rocks, that the remaining spirit of Germany, \_as their antithesis,\_

lay that is to say, as a soft, swampy, slippery soil, upon which every

step and every footprint of the rest of Europe made an impression and

created forms. German culture was a thing devoid of character and of

almost unlimited yielding power.

792.

Germany, though very rich in clever and well-informed scholars, has

for some time been so excessively poor in great souls and in mighty

minds, that it almost seems to have forgotten what a great soul or

a mighty mind is; and to-day mediocre and even ill-constituted men

place themselves in the market square without the suggestion of a

conscience-prick or a sign of embarrassment, and declare themselves

great men, reformers, etc. Take the case of Eugen Dühring, for

instance, a really clever and well-informed scholar, but a man who

betrays with almost every word he says that he has a miserably small

soul, and that he is horribly tormented by narrow envious feelings;

moreover, that it is no mighty overflowing, benevolent, and spendthrift

spirit that drives him on, but only the spirit of ambition! But to be

ambitious in such an age as this is much more unworthy of a philosopher

than ever it was: to-day, when it is the mob that rules, when it is the

mob that dispenses the honours.

793.

My "future": a severe polytechnic education. Conscription; so that as

a rule every man of the higher classes should be an officer, whatever

else he may be besides.

IV.

THE WILL TO POWER IN ART.

794.

Our religion, morality, and philosophy are decadent human institutions.

The counter-agent. Art.

795.

The \_Artist-philosopher.\_ A higher concept of art. Can man stand at

so great a distance from his fellows as to mould them? (Preliminary

exercises thereto:--

1. To become a self-former, an anchorite.

2. To do what artists have done hitherto, \_i.e.\_ to reach a small

degree of perfection in a certain medium.)

796.

Art as it appears without the artist, \_i.e.\_ as a body, an organisation

(the Prussian Officers' Corps, the Order of the Jesuits). To what

extent is the artist merely a preliminary stage? The world regarded as

a self-generating work of art.

797.

The phenomenon, "artist," is the easiest to see through: from it one

can look down upon the fundamental instincts of power, of nature, etc.,

even of religion and morality.

"Play," uselessness--as the ideal of him who is overflowing with power,

as the ideal of the child. The childishness of God, παῑς παίζων.

798.

\_Apollonian, Dionysian.\_ There are two conditions in which art

manifests itself in man even as a force of nature, and disposes of

him whether he consent or not: it may be as a constraint to visionary

states, or it may be an orgiastic impulse. Both conditions are to be

seen in normal life, but they are then somewhat weaker: in dreams and

in moments of elation or intoxication.[9]

But the same contrast exists between the dream state and the state of

intoxication; both of these states let loose all manner of artistic

powers within us, but each unfetters powers of a different kind.

Dreamland gives us the power of vision, of association, of poetry:

intoxication gives us the power of grand attitudes, of passion, of

song, and of dance.

799.

Sexuality and voluptuousness belong to the Dionysiac intoxication:

but neither of them is lacking in the Apollonian state. There is also

a difference of tempo between the states.... \_The extreme peace of

certain feelings of intoxication\_ (or, more strictly, the slackening

of the feeling of time, and the reduction of the feeling of space) is

wont to reflect itself in the vision of the most restful attitudes

and states of the soul. The classical style essentially represents

repose, simplification, foreshortening, and concentration--the \_highest

feeling of power\_ is concentrated in the classical type. To react with

difficulty: great consciousness: no feeling of strife.

800.

The feeling of intoxication is, as a matter of fact, equivalent to a

sensation of \_surplus power\_: it is strongest in seasons of rut: new

organs, new accomplishments, new colours, new forms. Embellishment is

an outcome of \_increased power.\_ Embellishment is merely an expression

of a triumphant will, of an increased state of co-ordination, of a

harmony of all the strong desires, of an infallible and perpendicular

equilibrium. Logical and geometrical simplification is the result of an

increase of power: conversely, the mere aspect of such a simplification

increases the sense of power in the beholder.... The zenith of

development: the grand style.

Ugliness signifies \_the decadence of a type\_: contradiction and

faulty co-ordination among the inmost desires--this means a decline

in the \_organising\_ power, or, psychologically speaking, in the will.

The condition of pleasure which is called intoxication is really

an exalted feeling of power. ... Sensations of space and time are

altered; inordinate distances are traversed by the eye, and only then

become visible; the extension of the vision over greater masses and

expanses; the refinement of the organ which apprehends the smallest

and most elusive things; divination, the power of understanding at the

slightest hint, at the smallest suggestion; intelligent sensitiveness;

\_strength\_ as a feeling of dominion in the muscles, as agility and

love of movement, as dance, as levity and quick time; strength as the

love of proving strength, as bravado, adventurousness, fearlessness,

indifference in regard to life and death.... All these elated moments

of life stimulate each other; the world of images and of imagination

of the one suffices as a suggestion for the other: in this way states

finally merge into each other, which might do better to keep apart,

\_e.g.\_ the feeling of religious intoxication and sexual irritability

(two very profound feelings, always wonderfully co-ordinated. What is

it that pleases almost all pious women, old or young? Answer: a saint

with beautiful legs, still young, still innocent). Cruelty in tragedy

and pity (likewise normally correlated). Spring-time, dancing, music,

--all these things are but the display of one sex before the other,--as

also that "infinite yearning of the heart" peculiar to Faust.

Artists when they are worth anything at all are men of strong

propensities (even physically), with surplus energy, powerful animals,

sensual; without a certain overheating of the sexual system a man like

Raphael is unthinkable.... To produce music is also in a sense to

produce children; chastity is merely the economy of the artist, and

in all creative artists productiveness certainly ceases with sexual

potency.... Artists should not see things as they are; they should

see them fuller, simpler, stronger: to this end, however, a kind of

youthfulness, of vernality, a sort of perpetual elation, must be

peculiar to their lives.

801.

The states in which we transfigure things and make them fuller, and

rhapsodise about them, until they reflect our own fulness and love

of life back upon us: sexuality, intoxication, post-prandial states,

spring, triumph over our enemies, scorn, bravado, cruelty, the ecstasy

of religious feeling. But three elements above all are active:

\_sexuality, intoxication, cruelty\_; all these belong to the oldest

\_festal joys\_ of mankind, they also preponderate in budding artists.

Conversely: there are things with which we meet which already show

us this transfiguration and fulness, and the animal world's response

thereto is a state of excitement in the spheres where these states

of happiness originate. A blending of these very delicate shades of

animal well-being and desires is the \_æsthetic state.\_ The latter only

manifests itself in those natures which are capable of that spendthrift

and overflowing fulness of bodily vigour; the latter is always the

\_primum mobile.\_ The sober-minded man, the tired man, the exhausted and

dried-up man (\_e.g.\_ the scholar), can have no feeling for art, because

he does not possess the primitive force of art, which is the tyranny

of inner riches: he who cannot give anything away cannot feel anything

either.

\_"Perfection"\_--In these states (more particularly in the case of

sexual love) there is an ingenuous betrayal of what the profoundest

instinct regards as the highest, the most desirable, the most valuable,

the ascending movement of its type; also of the condition towards which

it is actually striving. Perfection: the extraordinary expansion of

this instinct's feeling of power, its riches, its necessary overflowing

of all banks.

802.

Art reminds us of states of physical vigour: it may be the overflow and

bursting forth of blooming life in the world of pictures and desires;

on the other hand, it may be an excitation of the physical functions by

means of pictures and desires of exalted life--an enhancement of the

feeling of life, the latter's stimulant.

To what extent can ugliness exercise this power? In so far as it may

communicate something of the triumphant energy of the artist who has

become master of the ugly and the repulsive; or in so far as it gently

excites our lust of cruelty (in some circumstances even the lust of

doing harm to ourselves, self-violence, and therewith the feeling of

power over ourselves).

803.

"Beauty" therefore is, to the artist, something which is above all

order of rank, because in beauty contrasts are overcome, the highest

sign of power thus manifesting itself in the conquest of opposites;

and achieved without a feeling of tension: violence being no longer

necessary, everything submitting and obeying so easily, and doing so

with good grace; this is what delights the powerful will of the artist.

804.

The biological value of \_beauty\_ and \_ugliness.\_ That which we feel

instinctively opposed to us æsthetically is, according to the longest

experience of mankind, felt to be harmful, dangerous, and worthy of

suspicion: the sudden utterance of the æsthetic instinct, \_e.g.\_ in the

case of loathing, implies an act of judgment. To this extent beauty

lies within the general category of the biological values, useful,

beneficent, and life-promoting: thus, a host of stimuli which for

ages have been associated with, and remind us of, useful things and

conditions, give us the feeling of beauty, \_i.e.\_ the increase of the

feeling of power (not only things, therefore, but the sensations which

are associated with such things or their symbols). In this way beauty

and ugliness are recognised as determined by our most fundamental

self-preservative values. Apart from this, it is nonsense to postulate

anything as beautiful or ugly. Absolute beauty exists just as little

as absolute goodness and truth. In a particular case it is a matter of

the self-preservative conditions of a certain type of man: thus the

gregarious man will have quite a different feeling for beauty from the

exceptional or super-man.

It is the optics of things in the foreground which only consider

immediate consequences, from which the value beauty (also goodness and

truth) arises.

All instinctive judgments are short-sighted in regard to the

concatenation of consequences: they merely advise what must be done

forthwith. Reason is essentially an obstructing apparatus preventing

the immediate response to instinctive judgments: it halts, it

calculates, it traces the chain of consequences further.

Judgments concerning beauty and ugliness are short-sighted (reason is

always opposed to them): but they are convincing in the highest degree;

they appeal to our instincts in that quarter where the latter decide

most quickly and say yes or no with least hesitation, even before

reason can interpose.

The most common affirmations of beauty stimulate each other

reciprocally; where the æsthetic impulse once begins to work, a

whole host of other and foreign perfections crystallise around the

"particular form of beauty." It is impossible to remain objective, it

is certainly impossible to dispense with the interpreting, bestowing,

transfiguring, and poetising power (the latter is a stringing together

of affirmations concerning beauty itself). The sight of a beautiful

woman....

Thus (1) judgment concerning beauty is short-sighted; it sees only the

immediate consequences.

(2) It smothers the object which gives rise to it with a charm that is

determined by the association of various judgments concerning beauty,

which, however, are quite alien to the \_essence of the particular

object.\_ To regard a thing as beautiful is necessarily to regard it

falsely (that is why incidentally love marriages are from the social

point of view the most unreasonable form of matrimony).

805.

\_Concerning the genesis of Art.\_ That making perfect and seeing

perfect, which is peculiar to the cerebral system overladen with sexual

energy (a lover alone with his sweetheart at eventide transfigures the

smallest details: life is a chain of sublime things, "the misfortune

of an unhappy love affair is more valuable than anything else"); on

the other hand, everything perfect and beautiful operates like an

unconscious recollection of that amorous condition and of the point of

view peculiar to it--all perfection, and the whole of the beauty of

things, through contiguity, revives aphrodisiac bliss. (Physiologically

it is the creative instinct of the artist and the distribution of

his semen in his blood.) The desire for art and beauty is an indirect

longing for the ecstasy; of sexual desire, which gets communicated to

the brain. The world become perfect through "love."

806.

\_Sensuality in its various disguises.\_--(1) As idealism (Plato), common

to youth, constructing a kind of concave-mirror in which the image of

the beloved is an incrustation, an exaggeration, a transfiguration, an

attribution of infinity to everything. (2) In the religion of love, "a

fine young man," "a beautiful woman," in some way divine; a bridegroom,

a bride of the soul. (3) In art, as a decorating force, \_e.g.\_ just as

the man sees the woman and makes her a present of everything that can

enhance her personal charm, so the sensuality of the artist adorns an

object with everything else that he honours and esteems, and by this

means perfects it (or idealises it). Woman, knowing what man feels

in regard to her, tries to meet his idealising endeavours half-way

by decorating herself, by walking and dancing well, by expressing

delicate thoughts: in addition, she may practise modesty, shyness,

reserve--prompted by her instinctive feeling that the idealising

power of man increases with all this, (In the extraordinary finesse

of woman's instincts, modesty must not by any means be considered as

conscious hypocrisy: she guesses that it is precisely artlessness and

real shame which seduces man most and urges him to an exaggerated

esteem of her. On this account, woman is ingenuous, owing to the

subtlety of her instincts which reveal to her the utility of a state of

innocence. A wilful closing of one's eyes to one's self.... Wherever

dissembling has a stronger influence by being unconscious it actually

becomes unconscious.)

807.

What a host of things can be accomplished by the state of intoxication

which is called by the name of love, and which is something else

besides love!--And yet everybody has his own experience of this matter.

The muscular strength of a girl suddenly increases as soon as a man

comes into her presence: there are instruments with which this can be

measured. In the case of a still closer relationship of the sexes,

as, for instance, in dancing and in other amusements which society

gatherings entail, this power increases to such an extent as to make

real feats of strength possible: at last one no longer trusts either

one's eyes, or one's watch! Here at all events we must reckon with the

fact that dancing itself, like every form of rapid movement, involves

a kind of intoxication of the whole nervous, muscular, and visceral

system. We must therefore reckon in this case with the collective

effects of a double intoxication.--And how clever it is to be a little

off your head at times! There are some realities which we cannot admit

even to ourselves: especially when; we are women and have all sorts

of feminine, \_"pudeurs."...\_Those young creatures dancing over there

are obviously beyond all reality: they are dancing only with a host

of tangible ideals: what is more, they even see ideals sitting around

them, their mothers!... An opportunity for quoting \_Faust.\_ They look

incomparably fairer, do these pretty creatures, when they have lost

their head a little; and how well they know it too, they are even more

delightful \_because\_ they know it! Lastly, it is their finery which

inspires them; their finery is their third little intoxication. They

believe in their dressmaker as in their God: and who would destroy this

faith in them? Blessed is this faith! And self-admiration is healthy!

Self-admiration can protect one even from cold! Has a beautiful woman,

who knew she was well-dressed, ever caught cold? Never yet on this

earth! I even suppose a case in which she has scarcely a rag on her.

808.

If one should require the most astonishing proof of how far the power

of transfiguring, which comes of intoxication, goes, this proof is

at hand in the phenomenon of love; or what is called love in all

the languages and silences of the world. Intoxication works to such

a degree upon reality in this passion that in the consciousness of

the lover the cause of his love is quite suppressed, and something

else seems to take its place,--a vibration and a glitter of all the

charm-mirrors of Circe.... In this respect to be man or an animal

makes no difference: and still less does spirit, goodness, or honesty.

If one is astute, one is befooled astutely; if one is thick-headed,

one is befooled in a thick-headed way. But love, even the love of

God, saintly love, "the love that saves the soul," are at bottom all

one; they are nothing but a fever which has reasons to transfigure

itself--a state of intoxication which does well to lie about itself....

And, at any rate, when a man loves, he is a good liar about himself

and to himself: he seems to himself transfigured, stronger, richer,

more perfect; he \_is\_ more perfect.... \_Art\_ here acts as an organic

function: we find it present in the most angelic instinct "love";

we find it as the greatest stimulus of life--thus art is sublimely

utilitarian, even in the fact that it lies.... But we should be wrong

to halt at its power to lie: it does more than merely imagine; it

actually transposes values. And it not only transposes the \_feeling\_

for values: the lover actually \_has\_ a greater value; he is stronger.

In animals this condition gives rise to new weapons, colours, pigments,

and forms, and above all to new movements, new rhythms, new love-calls

and seductions. In man it is just the same. His whole economy is

richer, mightier, and \_more complete\_ when he is in love than when he

is not. The lover becomes a spendthrift; he is rich enough for it. He

now dares; he becomes an adventurer, and even a donkey in magnanimity

and innocence; his belief in God and in virtue revives, because he

believes in love. Moreover, such idiots of happiness acquire wings and

new capacities, and even the door to art is opened to them.

If we cancel the suggestion of this intestinal fever from the lyric

of tones and words, what is left to poetry and music? ... \_L'art pour

l'art\_ perhaps; the professional cant of frogs shivering outside in

the cold, and dying of despair in their swamp.... Everything else was

created by love.

809.

All art works like a suggestion on the muscles and the senses which

were originally active in the ingenuous artistic man; its voice is only

heard by artists--it speaks to this kind of man, whose constitution

is attuned to such subtlety in sensitiveness. The concept "layman"

is a misnomer. The deaf man is not a subdivision of the class, whose

ears are sound. All art works as a \_tonic;\_ it increases strength, it

kindles desire \_(i.e.\_ the feeling of strength), it excites all the

more subtle recollections of intoxication; there is actually a special

kind of memory which underlies such states--a distant flitful world of

sensations here returns to being.

Ugliness is the contradiction of art. It is that which art \_excludes,\_

the \_negation\_ of art: wherever decline, impoverishment of life,

impotence, decomposition, dissolution, are felt, however remotely, the

æsthetic man reacts with his \_No.\_ Ugliness \_depresses\_: it is the sign

of depression. It \_robs\_ strength, it impoverishes, it weighs down, ...

Ugliness \_suggests\_ repulsive things. From one's states of health one

can test how an indisposition may increase one's power of fancying ugly

things. One's selection of things, interests, and questions becomes

different. Logic provides a state which is next of kin to ugliness:

heaviness, bluntness. In the presence of ugliness equilibrium is

lacking in a mechanical sense: ugliness limps and stumbles--the direct

opposite of the godly agility of the dancer.

The æsthetic state represents an overflow \_of means of communication\_

as well as a condition of extreme sensibility to stimuli and signs. It

is the zenith of communion and transmission between living creatures;

it is the source of languages. In it, languages, whether of signs,

sounds, or glances, have their birthplace. The richer phenomenon is

always the beginning: our abilities are subtilised forms of richer

abilities. But even to-day we still listen with our muscles, we even

read with our muscles.

Every mature art possesses a host of conventions as a basis: in so

far as it is a language. Convention is a condition of great art,

\_not\_ an obstacle to it.... Every elevation of life likewise elevates

the power of communication, as also the understanding of man. \_The

power of living in other people's souls\_ originally had nothing to do

with morality, but with a physiological irritability of suggestion:

"sympathy," or what is called "altruism," is merely a product of

that psycho-motor relationship which is reckoned as spirituality

(psycho-motor induction, says Charles Féré). People never communicate a

thought to one another: they communicate a movement, an imitative sign

which is then interpreted as a thought.

810.

\_Compared with music,\_ communication by means of words is a shameless

mode of procedure; words reduce and stultify; words make impersonal;

words make common that which is uncommon.

811.

It is exceptional states that determine the artist--such states as are

all intimately related and entwined with morbid symptoms, so that it

would seem almost impossible to be an artist without being ill.

The physiological conditions which in the artist become moulded into a

"personality," and which, to a certain degree, may attach themselves to

any man:--

(1) Intoxication, the feeling of enhanced power; the inner compulsion

to make things a mirror of one's own fulness and perfection.

(2) The extreme sharpness of certain senses, so that they are capable

of understanding a totally different language of signs--and to create

such a language (this is a condition which manifests itself in some

nervous diseases); extreme susceptibility out of which great powers of

communion are developed; the desire to speak on the part of everything

that is capable of making-signs; a need of being rid of one's self by

means of gestures and attitudes; the ability of speaking about one's

self in a hundred different languages--in fact, a state of \_explosion.\_

One must first imagine this condition as one in which there is a

pressing and compulsory desire of ridding one's self of the ecstasy of

a state of tension, by all kinds of muscular work and movement; also as

an involuntary \_co-ordination\_ of these movements with inner processes

(images, thoughts, desires)--as a kind of automatism of the whole

muscular system under the compulsion of strong stimuli acting from

within; the inability to resist reaction; the apparatus of resistance

is also suspended. Every inner movement (feeling, thought, emotion)

is accompanied by \_vascular changes,\_ and consequently by changes in

colour, temperature, and secretion. The suggestive power of music, its

"\_suggestion mentale.\_"

(3) \_The compulsion to imitate:\_ extreme irritability, by means of

which a certain example becomes contagious--a condition is guessed

and represented merely by means of a few signs.... A complete picture

is visualised by one's inner consciousness, and its effect soon shows

itself in the movement of the limbs,--in a certain suspension of the

\_will\_ (Schopenhauer!!!!). A sort of blindness and deafness towards the

external world,--the realm of admitted stimuli is sharply defined.

This differentiates the artist from the layman (from the spectator

of art): the latter reaches the height of his excitement in the mere

act of apprehending: the former in giving--and in such a way that

the antagonism between these two gifts is not only natural but even

desirable. Each of these states has an opposite standpoint--to demand

of the artist that he should have the point of view of the spectator

(of the critic) is equivalent to asking him to impoverish his creative

power.... In this respect the same difference holds good as that which

exists between the sexes: one should not ask the artist who gives to

become a woman--to \_"receive."\_

Our æsthetics have hitherto been women's æsthetics, inasmuch as they

have only formulated the experiences of what is beautiful, from the

point of view of the receivers in art. In the whole of philosophy

hitherto the artist has been lacking ... \_i.e.\_ as we have already

suggested, a necessary fault: for the artist who would begin to

understand himself would therewith begin to mistake himself--he must

not look backwards, he must not look at all; he must give.--It is an

honour for an artist to have no critical faculty; if he can criticise

he is mediocre, he is modern.

812.

Here I lay down a series of psychological states as signs of

flourishing and complete life, which to-day we are in the habit of

regarding as morbid. But, by this time, we have broken ourselves of

the habit of speaking of healthy and morbid as opposites: the question

is one of degree, what I maintain on this point is that what people

call healthy nowadays represents a lower level of that which under

favourable circumstances actually would be healthy--that we are

relatively sick....

The artist belongs to a much stronger race. That which in us would be

harmful and sickly, is natural in him. But people object to this that

it is precisely the impoverishment of the machine which renders this

extraordinary power of comprehending every kind of suggestion possible:

\_e.g.\_ our hysterical females.

An overflow of spunk and energy may quite as well lead to symptoms of

partial constraint, sense hallucinations, peripheral sensitiveness,

as a poor vitality does--the stimuli are differently determined, the

effect is the same.... What is not the same is above all the ultimate

result; the extreme torpidity of all morbid natures, after their

nervous eccentricities, has nothing in common with the states of the

artist, who need in no wise repent his best moments.... He is rich

enough for it all: he can squander without becoming poor.

Just as we now feel justified in judging genius as a form of neurosis,

we may perhaps think the same of artistic suggestive power,--and

our artists are, as a matter of fact, only too closely related to

hysterical females!!! This, however, is only an argument against the

present day, and not against artists in general.

The inartistic states are: objectivity, reflection suspension of the

will ... (Schopenhauer's scandalous misunderstanding consisted in

regarding art as a mere bridge to the denial of life)... The inartistic

states are: those which impoverish, which subtract, which bleach, under

which life suffers--the Christian.

813.

The modern artist who, in his physiology, is next of kin to the

hysteric, may also be classified as a character belonging to this state

of morbidness. The hysteric is false,--he lies from the love of lying,

he is admirable in all the arts of dissimulation,--unless his morbid

vanity hood-wink him. This vanity is like a perpetual fever which is

in need of stupefying drugs, and which recoils from no self-deception

and no farce that promises it the most fleeting satisfaction. (The

incapacity for pride and the need of continual revenge for his

deep-rooted self-contempt, this is almost the definition of this man's

vanity.)

The absurd irritability of his system, which makes a crisis out of

every one of his experiences, and sees dramatic elements in the most

insignificant occurrences of life, deprives him of all calm reflection;

he ceases from being a personality, at most he is a rendezvous of

personalities of which first one and then the other asserts itself with

barefaced assurance. Precisely on this account he is great as an actor

\_i\_ all these poor will-less people, whom doctors study so profoundly,

astound one through their virtuosity in mimicking, in transfiguration,

in their assumption of almost any character required.

814.

Artists are not men of great passion, despite all their assertions

to the contrary both to themselves and to others. And for the

following two reasons: they lack all shyness towards themselves (they

watch themselves live, they spy upon themselves, they are much too

inquisitive), and they also lack shyness in the presence of passion

(as artists they exploit it). Secondly, however, that vampire, their

talent, generally forbids them such an expenditure of energy as passion

demands.--A man, who has a talent is sacrificed to that talent; he

lives under the vampirism of his talent.

A man does not get rid of his passion by reproducing it, but rather

he is rid of it if he is able to reproduce it. (Goethe teaches the

reverse, but it seems as though he deliberately misunderstood himself

here--from a sense of delicacy.)

815.

\_Concerning a reasonable mode of life.\_--.Relative, chastity, a

fundamental and shrewd caution in regard to \_erotica,\_ even in thought,

may be a reasonable mode of life even in richly equipped and perfect

natures. But this principle applies more particularly to artists; it

belongs to the best wisdom of their lives. Wholly trustworthy voices

have already been raised in favour of this view, \_e.g.\_ Stendhal, Th.

Gautier, and Flaubert. The artist is perhaps in his way necessarily

a sensual man, generally susceptible, accessible to everything, and

capable of responding to the remotest stimulus or suggestion of a

stimulus. Nevertheless, as a rule he is in the power of his work, of

his will to mastership, really a sober and often even a chaste man. His

dominating instinct will have him so: it does not allow him to spend

himself haphazardly. It is one and the same form of strength which is

spent in artistic conception and in the sexual act: there is only one

form of strength. The artist who yields in this respect, and who spends

himself, is betrayed: by so doing he reveals his lack of instinct, his

lack of will in general. It may be a sign of decadence,--in any case it

reduces the value of his art to an incalculable degree.

816.

Compared with the artist, the scientific man, regarded as a phenomenon,

is indeed a sign of a certain storing-up and levelling-down of

life (but also of an increase of strength, severity, hardness, and

will-power). To what extent can falsity and indifference towards truth

and utility be a sign of youth, of childishness, in the artist? ...

Their habitual manner, their unreasonableness, their ignorance of

themselves, their indifference to "eternal values," their seriousness

in play, their lack of dignity; clowns and gods in one; the saint and

the rabble.... Imitation as an imperious instinct.--Do not artists of

ascending life and artists of degeneration belong to all phases? ...

Yes!

817.

Would any link be missing in the whole chain of science and art, if

woman, if woman's work, were excluded from it? Let us acknowledge the

exception--it proves the rule--that woman is capable of perfection in

everything which does not constitute a work: in letters, in memoirs,

in the most intricate handiwork--in short, in everything which is not

a craft; and just precisely because in the things mentioned woman

perfects herself, because in them she obeys the only artistic impulse

in her nature,--which is to captivate.... But what has woman to do

with the passionate indifference of the genuine artist who sees more

importance in a breath, in a sound, in the merest trifle, than in

himself?--who with all his five fingers gropes for his most secret

and hidden treasures?--who attributes no value to anything unless

it knows how to take shape (unless it surrenders itself, unless it

visualises itself in some way). Art as it is practised by artists--do

you not understand what it is? is it not an outrage on all \_our

pudeurs? ...\_ Only in this century has woman dared to try her hand at

literature ("\_Vers la canaille plumière écrivassière,"\_ to speak with

old Mirabeau): woman now writes, she now paints, she is losing her

instincts. And to what purpose, if one may put such a question?

818.

A man is an artist to the extent to which he regards everything

that inartistic people call "form" as the actual substance, as the

"principal" thing. With such ideas a man certainly belongs to a world

upside down: for henceforward substance seems to him something merely

formal,--his own life included.

819.

A sense for, and a delight in, nuances (which is characteristic of

modernity), in that which is not general, runs counter to the instinct

which finds its joy and its strength in grasping what is typical: like

Greek taste in its best period. In this there is an overcoming of the

plenitude of life; restraint dominates, the peace of the strong soul

which is slow to move and which feels a certain repugnance towards

excessive activity is defeated. The general rule, the law, is honoured

and made prominent, conversely, the exception is laid aside, and shades

are suppressed. All that which is firm, mighty, solid, life resting

on a broad and powerful basis, concealing its strength this pleases:

\_i.e.\_ it corresponds with what we think of ourselves.

820.

In the main I am much more in favour of artists than any philosopher

that has appeared hitherto: artists, at least, did not lose sight of

the great course which life pursues; they loved the things "of this

world,"--they loved their senses. To strive after "spirituality,"

in cases where this is not pure hypocrisy or self-deception, seems

to me to be either a misunderstanding, a disease, or a cure, I wish

myself, and all those who live without the troubles of a puritanical

conscience, and who are able to live in this way, an ever greater

spiritualisation and multiplication of the senses. Indeed, we would

fain be grateful to the senses for their subtlety, power, and

plenitude, and on that account offer them the best we have in the way

of spirit. What do we care about priestly and metaphysical anathemas

upon the senses? We no longer require to treat them in this way: it

is a sign of well-constitutedness when a man like Goethe clings with

ever greater joy and heartiness to the "things of this world"--in this

way he holds firmly to the grand concept of mankind, which is that man

becomes the glorifying power of existence when he learns to glorify

himself.

821.

\_Pessimism in art?\_--The artist gradually learns to like for their own

sake, those means which bring about the condition of æsthetic elation;

extreme delicacy and glory of colour, definite delineation, quality of

tone; distinctness where in normal conditions distinctness is absent.

All distinct things, all nuances, in so far as they recall extreme

degrees of power which give rise to intoxication, kindle this feeling

of intoxication by association;--the effect of works of art is the

excitation of the state which creates art, of æsthetic intoxication.

The essential feature in art is its power of perfecting

existence, its production of perfection and plenitude; art is

essentially the affirmation, the blessing, and the deification of

existence.... What does a pessimistic art signify? Is it not a

\_contradictio\_?--Yes.--Schopenhauer is in error when he makes certain

works of art serve the purpose of pessimism. Tragedy does not teach

"resignation." ... To represent terrible and questionable things

is, in itself, the sign of an instinct of power and magnificence

in the artist; he doesn't fear them.... There is no such thing as

a pessimistic, art.... Art affirms. Job affirms. But Zola? and the

Goncourts?--the things they show us are ugly, their reason, however,

for showing them to us is their love of ugliness ... I don't care what

you say! You simply deceive yourselves if you think otherwise.--What a

relief Dostoievsky is!

822.

If I have sufficiently initiated my readers into the doctrine that

even "goodness," in the whole comedy of existence, represents a form

of exhaustion, they will now credit Christianity with consistency for

having conceived the good to be the ugly. In this respect Christianity

was right.

It is absolutely unworthy of a philosopher to say that "the good and

the beautiful are one"; if he should add "and also the true," he

deserves to be thrashed. Truth is ugly.

Art is with us in order that we may not perish through truth.

823.

Moralising tendencies may be combated with art. Art is freedom from

moral bigotry and philosophy \_à la\_ Little Jack Horner: or it may be

the mockery of these things. The flight to Nature, where beauty and

terribleness are coupled. The concept of the great man.

--Fragile, useless souls-de-luxe, which are disconcerted by a mere

breath of wind, "beautiful souls."

--Ancient ideals, in their inexorable hardness and brutality, ought to

be awakened, as the mightiest of monsters that they are.

--We should feel a boisterous delight in the psychological perception

of how all moralised artists become worms and actors without knowing it.

--The falsity of art, its immorality, must be brought into the light of

day.

--The "fundamental idealising powers" (sensuality, intoxication,

excessive animality) should be brought to light.

824.

Modern counterfeit practices in the arts: regarded as necessary--that

is to say, as fully in keeping with the needs most proper to the modern

soul.

The gaps in the gifts, and still more in the education, antecedents,

and schooling of modern artists, are now filled up in this way:--

\_First:\_ A less artistic public is sought which is capable of unlimited

love (and is capable of falling on its knees before a personality).

The superstition of our century, the belief in "genius," assists this

process.

\_Secondly;\_ Artists harangue the dark instincts of the dissatisfied,

the ambitious, and the self-deceivers of a democratic age: the

importance of poses.

\_Thirdly:\_ The procedures of one art are transferred to the realm

of another; the object of art is confounded with that of science,

with that of the Church, or with that of the interests of the race

(nationalism), or with that of philosophy--a man rings all bells at

once, and awakens the vague suspicion that he is a god.

\_Fourthly:\_ Artists flatter women, sufferers, and indignant folk.

Narcotics and opiates are made to preponderate in art. The fancy of

cultured people, and of the readers of poetry and ancient history, is

tickled.

825.

We must distinguish between the "public" and the "select"; to satisfy

the public a man must be a charlatan to-day, to satisfy the select he

\_will\_ be a virtuoso and nothing else. The geniuses peculiar to our

century overcame this distinction, they were great for both; the great

charlatanry of Victor Hugo and Richard Wagner was coupled with such

genuine virtuosity that it even satisfied the most refined artistic

connoisseurs. This is why greatness is lacking: these geniuses had a

double outlook; first, they catered for the coarsest needs, and then

for the most refined.

826.

False "accentuation": (1) In romanticism, this unremitting

"\_expressivo\_" is not a sign of strength, but of a feeling of

deficiency;

(2) Picturesque music, the so-called dramatic kind, is above all

easier (as is also the brutal scandalmongering and the juxtaposition of

facts and traits in realistic novels);

(3) "Passion" as a matter of nerves and exhausted souls; likewise the

delight in high mountains, deserts, storms, orgies, and disgusting

details,--in bulkiness and massiveness (historians, for instance); as a

matter of fact, there is actually a cult of exaggerated feelings (how

is it that in stronger ages art desired just the opposite--a restraint

of passion?);

(4) The preference for exciting materials (\_Erotica\_ or \_Socialistica\_

or \_Pathologica\_): all these things are the signs of the style

of public that is being catered for to-day--that is to say, for

overworked, absentminded, or enfeebled people.

Such people must be tyrannised over in order to be affected.

827.

Modern art is the art of tyrannising. A coarse and salient definiteness

in delineation; the motive simplified into a formula; formulæ

tyrannise. Wild arabesques within the lines; overwhelming masses,

before which the senses are confused; brutality in coloration, in

subject-matter, in the desires. Examples: Zola, Wagner, and, in a more

spiritualised degree, Taine. Hence logic, massiveness, and brutality.

828.

In regard to the painter: \_Tous ces modernes sont des poètes qui ont

voulu être peintres, L'un a cherché des drames dans l'histoire,

l'autre des scènes de mœurs, celui ci traduit des religions, celui

là une philosophie.\_ One imitates Raphael, another the early Italian

masters. The landscapists employ trees and clouds in order to make odes

and elegies. Not one is simply a painter; they are all archæologists,

psychologists, and impresarios of one or another kind of event or

theory. They enjoy our erudition and our philosophy. Like us, they are

full, and too full, of general ideas. They like a form, not because it

is what it is, but because of what it expresses. They are the scions of

a learned, tormented, and reflecting generation, a thousand miles away

from the Old Masters who never read, and only concerned themselves with

feasting their eyes.

829.

At bottom, even Wagner's music, in so far as it stands for the whole

of French romanticism, is literature: the charm of exoticism (strange

times, customs, passions), exercised upon sensitive cosy-corner people.

The delight of entering into extremely distant and prehistoric lands to

which books lead one, and by which means the whole horizon is painted

with new colours and new possibilities.... Dreams of still more distant

and unexploited worlds; disdain of the boulevards. ... For Nationalism,

let us not deceive ourselves, is also only a form of exoticism....

Romantic musicians merely relate what exotic books have made of them:

people would fain experience exotic sensations and passions according

to Florentine and Venetian taste; finally they are satisfied to look

for them in an image.... The essential factor is the kind of novel

desire, the desire to imitate, the desire to live as people have

lived once before in the past, and the disguise and dissimulation of

the soul.... Romantic art is only an emergency exit from defective

"reality."

The attempt to perform new things: revolution, Napoleon. Napoleon

represents the passion of new spiritual possibilities, of an extension

of the soul's domain.

The greater the debility of the will, the greater the extravagances in

the desire to feel, to represent, and to dream new things.--The result

of the excesses which have been indulged in: an insatiable thirst for

unrestrained feelings.... Foreign literatures afford the strongest

spices.

830.

Winckelmann's and Goethe's Greeks, Victor Hugo's Orientals, Wagner's

Edda characters, Walter Scott's Englishmen of the thirteenth

century--some day the whole comedy will be exposed! All of it was

disproportionately historical and false, \_but\_--modern.

831.

Concerning the characteristics of national genius in regard to the

strange and to the borrowed--

English genius vulgarises and makes realistic everything it sees;

The French whittles down, simplifies, rationalises, embellishes;

The German muddles, compromises, involves, and infects everything with

morality;

The Italian has made by far the freest and most subtle use of borrowed

material, and has enriched it with a hundred times more beauty than

it ever drew out of it: it is the richest genius, it had the most to

bestow.

832.

The Jews, with Heinrich Heine and Offenbach, approached genius in

the sphere of art. The latter was the most intellectual and most

high-spirited satyr, who as a musician abided by great tradition,

and who, for him who has something more than ears, is a real relief

after the sentimental and, at bottom, degenerate musicians of German

romanticism.

833.

\_Offenbach;\_ trench music imbued with Voltaire's intellect, free,

wanton, with a slight sardonic grin, but clear and intellectual almost

to the point of banality (Offenbach never titivates), and free from the

\_mignardise\_ of morbid or blond-Viennese sensuality.

834.

If by artistic genius we understand the most consummate freedom

within the law, divine ease, and facility in overcoming the greatest

difficulties, then Offenbach has even more right to the title genius

than Wagner has. Wagner is heavy and clumsy: nothing is more foreign to

him than the moments of wanton perfection which this clown Offenbach

achieves as many as five times, six times, in nearly every one of his

buffooneries. But by genius we ought perhaps to understand something

else.

835.

\_Concerning "music."\_--French, German, and Italian music. (Our most

debased periods in a political sense are our most productive. The

Slavs?)--The ballet, which is the outcome of excessive study of the

history of strange civilisations, has become master of opera.--Stage

music and musicians music.--It is an error to suppose that what Wagner

composed was \_a. form\_: it was rather formlessness. The possibilities

of dramatic construction have yet to be discovered.--Rhythm.

"Expression" at all costs. Harlotry in instrumentation.--All honour to

Heinrich Schütz; all honour to Mendelssohn: in them we find an element

of Goethe, but nowhere else! (We also find another element of Goethe

coming to blossom in Rahel; a third element in Heinrich Heine.)

836.

Descriptive music leaves reality to work its effects alone.... All

these kinds of art are easier, and more easy to imitate; poorly gifted

people have recourse to them. The appeal to the instincts; suggestive

art.

837.

\_Concerning our modern music.\_--The decay of melody, like the decay

of "ideas," and of the freedom of intellectual activity, is a piece

of clumsiness and obtuseness, which is developing itself into new

feats of daring and even into principles;--in the end man has only the

principles of his gifts, or of his lack of gifts.

"Dramatic music"--nonsense! It is simply bad music.... "Feeling" and

"passion" are merely substitutes when lofty intellectuality and the

joy of it (\_e.g.\_ Voltaire's) can no longer be attained. Expressed

technically, feeling and "passion" are easier; they presuppose a much

poorer kind of artist. The recourse to drama betrays that an artist is

much more a master in tricky means than in genuine ones. To-day we have

both dramatic painting and dramatic poetry, etc.

838.

What we lack in music is an æsthetic which would impose laws upon

musicians and give them a conscience; and as a result of this we lack

a real contest concerning "principles."--For as musicians we laugh

at Herbart's velleities in this department just as heartily as we

laugh at Schopenhauer's. As a matter of fact, tremendous difficulties

present themselves here. We no longer know on what basis to found our

concepts of what is exemplary, masterly, perfect. With the instincts

of old loves and old admiration we grope about in a realm of values,

and we almost believe, "that is good which pleases us".... I am always

suspicious when I hear people everywhere speak innocently of Beethoven

as a "classic"; what I would maintain, and with some seventy, is that,

in other arts, a classic is the very reverse of Beethoven. But when

the complete and glaring dissolution of style, Wagner's so-called

dramatic style, is taught and honoured as exemplary, as masterly, as

progressive, then my impatience exceeds all bounds. Dramatic style in

music, as Wagner understood it, is simply renunciation of all style

whatever; it is the assumption that something else, namely, drama, is a

hundred times more important than music. Wagner can paint; he does not

use music for the sake of music, with it he accentuates attitudes; he

is a poet. Finally he made an appeal to beautiful feelings and heaving

breasts, just as all other theatrical artists have done, and with it

all he converted women and even those whose souls thirst for culture

to him. But what do women and the uncultured care about music? All

these people have no conscience for art: none of them suffer when the

first and fundamental virtues of an art are scorned and trodden upon in

favour of that which is merely secondary (as \_ancilla dramaturgica\_).

What good can come of all extension in the means of expression, when

that which is expressed, art itself, has lost all its law and order?

The picturesque pomp and power of tones, the symbolism of sound,

rhythm, the colour effects of harmony and discord, the suggestive

significance of music, the whole sensuality of this art which Wagner

made prevail--it is all this that Wagner derived, developed, and drew

out of music. Victor Hugo did something very similar for language: but

already people in France are asking themselves, in regard to the case

of Victor Hugo, whether language was not corrupted by him, whether

reason, intellectuality, and thorough conformity to law in language

are not suppressed when the sensuality of expression is elevated to a

high place? Is it not a sign of decadence that the poets in France have

become plastic artists, and that the musicians of Germany have become

actors and culturemongers?

839.

To-day there exists a sort of musical pessimism even among people

who are not musicians. Who has not met and cursed the confounded

youthlet who torments his piano until it shrieks with despair,

and who single-handed heaves the slime of the most lugubrious and

drabby harmonies before him? By so doing a man betrays himself as a

pessimist.... It is open to question, though, whether he also proves

himself a musician by this means. I for my part could never be made

to believe it. Wagnerite \_pur sang\_ is unmusical, he submits to the

elementary forces of music very much as a woman submits to the will

of the man who hypnotises her--and in order to be able to do this he

must not be made suspicious \_in rebus musicis et musicantibus\_ by a

too severe or too delicate conscience. I said "very much as"--but in

this respect I spoke perhaps more than a parable. Let any one consider

the means which Wagner uses by preference, when he wishes to make an

effect (means which for the greater part he first had to invent), they

are appallingly similar to the means by which a hypnotist exercises

his power (the choice of his movements, the general colour of his

orchestration; the excruciating evasion of consistency, and fairness

and squareness, in rhythm; the creepiness, the soothing touch, the

mystery, the hysteria of his "unending melody"). And is the condition

to which the overture to \_Lohengrin,\_ for instance, reduces the men,

and still more the women, in the audience, so essentially different

from the somnambulistic trance? On one occasion after the overture in

question had been played, I heard an Italian lady say, with her eyes

half closed, in a way in which female Wagnerites are adepts: "\_Come si

dorme con questa musica!\_"[10]

840.

\_Religion in music.\_--What a large amount of satisfaction all religious

needs get out of Wagnerian music, though this is never acknowledged

or even understood! How much prayer, virtue, unction, virginity,

salvation, speaks through this music!... Oh what capital this cunning

saint, who leads and seduces us back to everything that was once

believed in, makes out of the fact that he may dispense with words

and concepts! ... Our intellectual conscience has no need to feel

ashamed--it stands apart--if any old instinct puts its trembling lips

to the rim of forbidden philtres.... This is shrewd and healthy, and,

in so far as it betrays a certain shame in regard to the satisfaction

of the religious instinct, it is even a good sign.... Cunning

Christianity: the type of the music which came from the "last Wagner."

841.

I distinguish between courage before persons, courage before things,

and courage on paper. The latter was the courage of David Strauss, for

instance. I distinguish again between the courage before witnesses

and the courage without witnesses: the courage of a Christian, or

of believers in God in general, can never be the courage without

witnesses--but on this score alone Christian courage stands condemned.

Finally, I distinguish between the courage which is temperamental and

the courage which is the fear of fear; a single instance of the latter

kind is moral courage. To this list the courage of despair should be

added.

This is the courage which Wagner possessed. His attitude in regard to

music was at bottom a desperate one. He lacked two things which go

to make up a good musician: nature and nurture, the predisposition

for music and the discipline and schooling which music requires. He

had courage: out of this deficiency he established a principle; he

invented a kind of music for himself. The dramatic music which he

invented was the music which he was able to compose,--its limitations

are Wagner's limitations.

And he was misunderstood!--Was he really misunderstood?... Such is

the case with five-sixths of the artists of to-day. Wagner is their

Saviour: five-sixths, moreover, is the "lowest proportion." In any case

where Nature has shown herself without reserve, and wherever culture is

an accident, a mere attempt, a piece of dilettantism, the artist turns

instinctively--what do I say?--I mean enthusiastically, to Wagner; as

the poet says: "Half drew he him, and half sank he."[11]

842.

"Music" and the grand style. The greatness of an artist is not to be

measured by the beautiful feelings which he evokes: let this belief

be left to the girls. It should be measured according to the extent

to which he approaches the grand style, according to the extent to

which he is capable of the grand style. This style and great passion

have this in common--that they scorn to please; that they forget to

persuade; that they command: that they will.... To become master of

the chaos which is in one; to compel one's inner chaos to assume form;

to become consistent, simple, unequivocal, mathematical, law this is

the great ambition here. By means of it one repels; nothing so much

endears people to such powerful men as this,--a desert seems to lie

around them, they impose silence upon all, and awe every one with the

greatness Of their sacrilege.... All arts know this kind of aspirant to

the grand style: why are they absent in music? Never yet has a musician

built as that architect did who erected the Palazzo Pitti.... This is a

problem. Does music perhaps belong to that culture in which the reign

of powerful men of various types is already at an end? Is the concept

"grand style" in fact a contradiction of the soul of music,--of "the

Woman" in our music? ...

With this I touch upon the cardinal question: how should all our music

be classified? The age of classical taste knows nothing that can be

compared with it: it bloomed when the world of the Renaissance reached

its evening, when "freedom" had already bidden farewell to both men and

their customs--is it characteristic of music to be Counter-Renaissance?

Is music, perchance, the sister of the baroque style, seeing that in

any case they were contemporaries? Is not music, modern music, already

decadence? ...

I have put my finger before on this question: whether music is not an

example of Counter-Renaissance art? whether it is not the next of kin

to the baroque style? whether it has not grown in Opposition to all

classic taste, so that any aspiration to classicism is forbidden by the

very nature of music?

The answer to this most important of all questions of values would

not be a very doubtful one, if people thoroughly understood the

fact that music attains to its highest maturity and plenitude as

romanticism--likewise as a reactionary movement against classicism.

Mozart, a delicate and lovable soul, but quite eighteenth century,

even in his serious lapses ... Beethoven, the first great romanticist

according to the French conception of romanticism, just as Wagner is

the last great romanticist ... both of them are instinctive opponents

of classical taste, of severe style--not to speak of "grand" in this

regard.

843.

Romanticism: an ambiguous question, like all modern questions.

The æsthetic conditions are twofold:--

The abundant and generous, as opposed to the seeking and the desiring.

844.

A romanticist is an artist whose great dissatisfaction with himself

makes him productive--; who looks away from himself and his fellows,

and sometimes, therefore, looks backwards.

845.

Is art the result of dissatisfaction with reality? or is it the

expression of gratitude for happiness experienced? In the first case,

it is romanticism; in the second, it is glorification and dithyramb

(in short, apotheosis art): even Raphael belongs to this, except for

the fact that he was guilty of the duplicity of having defied the

appearance of the Christian view of the world. He was thankful for life

precisely where it was not exactly Christian.

With a moral interpretation the world is insufferable; Christianity was

the attempt to overcome the world with morality: \_i.e.\_ to deny it.

\_In praxi\_ such a mad experiment--an imbecile elevation of man above

the world--could only end in the beglooming, the dwarfing, and the

impoverishment of mankind: the only kind of man who gained anything by

it, who was promoted by it, was the most mediocre, the most harmless

and gregarious type.

Homer as an apotheosis artist; Rubens also. Music has not yet had such

an artist.

The idealisation of the great criminal (the feeling for his greatness)

is Greek; the depreciation, the slander, the contempt of the sinner, is

Judæo-Christian.

846.

Romanticism and its opposite. In regard to all æsthetic values I now

avail myself of this fundamental distinction: in every individual

case I ask myself has hunger or has superabundance been creative

here? At first another distinction might perhaps seem preferable, it

is far more obvious,--\_e.g.\_ the distinction which decides whether a

desire for stability, for eternity, for Being, or whether a desire for

destruction, for change, for Becoming, has been the cause of creation.

But both kinds of desire, when examined more closely, prove to be

ambiguous, and really susceptible of interpretation only according to

that scheme already mentioned and which I think is rightly preferred.

The desire for destruction, for change, for Becoming, may be the

expression of an overflowing power pregnant with promises for the

future (my term for this, as is well known, is Dionysian); it may,

however, also be the hate of the ill-constituted, of the needy and of

the physiologically botched, that destroys, and must destroy, because

such creatures are indignant at, and annoyed by everything lasting and

stable.

The act of immortalising can, on the other hand, be the outcome

of gratitude and love: an art which has this origin is always an

apotheosis art; dithyrambic, as perhaps with Rubens, happy, as perhaps

with Hafiz; bright and gracious, and shedding a ray of glory over all

things, as in Goethe. But it may also, however, be the outcome of the

tyrannical will of the great sufferer who would make the most personal,

individual, and narrow trait about him, the actual idiosyncrasy of his

pain--in fact, into a binding law and imposition, and who thus wreaks

his revenge upon all things by stamping, branding, and violating them

with the image of his torment. The latter case is romantic pessimism

in its highest form, whether this be Schopenhauerian voluntarism or

Wagnerian music.

847.

It is a question whether the antithesis, classic and romantic, does not

conceal that other antithesis, the active and the reactive.

848.

In order to be a classic, one must be possessed of all the strong and

apparently contradictory gifts and passions: but in such a way that

they run in harness together, and culminate simultaneously in elevating

a certain species of literature or art or politics to its height and

zenith (they must not do this after that elevation has taken place

...). They must reflect the complete state (either of a people or of

a culture), and express its most profound and most secret nature,

at a time when it is still stable and not yet discoloured by the

imitation of foreign things (or when it is still dependent ...); not

a reactive but a deliberate and progressive spirit, saying Yea in all

circumstances, even in its hate.

"And does not the highest personal value belong thereto?" It is worth

considering whether moral prejudices do not perhaps exercise their

influence here, and whether great moral loftiness is not perhaps a

contradiction of the classical? ... Whether the moral monsters must

not necessarily be romantic in word and deed? Any such preponderance

of one virtue over others (as in the case of the moral monster) is

precisely what with most hostility counteracts the classical power in

equilibrium, supposing a people manifested this moral loftiness and

were classical notwithstanding, we should have to conclude boldly that

they were also on the same high level in immorality! this was perhaps

the case with Shakespeare (provided that he was really Lord Bacon).

849.

\_Concerning the future. Against the romanticism of great passion.\_--We

must understand how a certain modicum of coldness, lucidity,

and hardness is inseparable from all classical taste: above all

consistency, happy intellectuality, "the three unities," concentration,

hatred of all feeling, of all sentimentality, of all \_esprit,\_

hatred of all multiformity, of all uncertainty, evasiveness, and of

all nebulosity, as also of all brevity, finicking, prettiness and

good nature. Artistic formulæ must not be played with: life must be

remodelled so that it should be forced to formulate itself accordingly.

It is really an exhilarating spectacle which we have only learned

to laugh at quite recently, because we have only seen through it

quite recently: this spectacle of Herder's, Winckelmann's, Goethe's,

and Hegel's contemporaries claiming that they had rediscovered the

classical ideal ... and at the same time, Shakespeare! And this same

crew of men had scurvily repudiated all relationship with the classical

school of France! As if the essential principle could not have been

learnt as well here as elsewhere! ... But what people wanted was

"nature," and "naturalness": Oh, the stupidity of it! It was thought

that classicism was a kind of naturalness!

Without either prejudice or indulgence we should try and investigate

upon what soil a classical taste can be evolved. The hardening,

the simplification, the strengthening, and the bedevilling of man

are inseparable from classical taste. Logical and psychological

simplification. A contempt of detail, of complexity, of obscurity.

The romanticists of Germany do not protest against classicism, but

against reason, against illumination, against taste, against the

eighteenth century.

The essence of romantico-Wagnerian music is the opposite of the

classical spirit.

The will to unity (because unity tyrannises. \_e.g.\_ the listener and

the spectator), but the artist's inability to tyrannise over himself

where it is most needed--that is to say, in regard to the work itself

(in regard to knowing what to leave out, what to shorten, what to

clarify, what to simplify). The overwhelming by means of masses

(Wagner, Victor Hugo, Zola, Taine).

850.

\_The Nihilism of artists.\_--Nature is cruel in her cheerfulness;

cynical in her sunrises. We are hostile to emotions. We flee thither

where Nature moves our senses and our imagination, where we have

nothing to love, where we are not reminded of the moral semblances and

delicacies of this northern nature; and the same applies to the arts.

We prefer that which no longer reminds us of good and evil. Our moral

sensibility and tenderness seem to be relieved in the heart of terrible

and happy Nature, in the fatalism of the senses and forces. Life

without goodness.

Great well-being arises from contemplating Nature's indifference to

good and evil.

No justice in history, no goodness in Nature. That is why the

pessimist when he is an artist prefers those historical subjects where

the absence of justice reveals itself with magnificent simplicity,

where perfection actually comes to expression--and likewise he prefers

that in Nature, where her callous evil character is not hypocritically

concealed, where that character is seen in perfection.... The

Nihilistic artist betrays himself in willing and preferring cynical

history and cynical Nature.

851.

What is tragic?--Again and again I have pointed to the great

misunderstanding of Aristotle in maintaining that the tragic emotions

were the two depressing emotions--fear and pity. Had he been right,

tragedy would be an art unfriendly to life: it would have been

necessary to caution people against it as against something generally

harmful and suspicious. Art, otherwise the great stimulus of life, the

great intoxicant of life, the great will to life, here became a tool of

decadence, the hand-maiden of pessimism and ill-health (for to suppose,

as Aristotle supposed, that by exciting these emotions we thereby

purged people of them, is simply an error). Something which habitually

excites fear or pity, disorganises, weakens, and discourages: and

supposing Schopenhauer were right in thinking that tragedy taught

resignation (\_i.e.\_ a meek renunciation of happiness, hope, and of

the will to live), this would presuppose an art in which art itself

was denied. Tragedy would then constitute a process of dissolution;

the instinct of life would destroy itself in the instinct of art.

Christianity, Nihilism, tragic art, physiological decadence; these

things would then be linked, they would then preponderate together

and assist each other onwards--downwards.... Tragedy would thus be a

symptom of decline.

This theory may be refuted in the most cold-blooded way, namely, by

measuring the effect of a tragic emotion by means of a dynamometer

The result would be a fact which only the bottomless falsity of

a doctrinaire could misunderstand: that tragedy is a tonic. If

Schopenhauer refuses to see the truth here, if he regards general

depression as a tragic condition, if he would have informed the Greeks

(who to his disgust were not "resigned") that they did not firmly

possess the highest principles of life: it is only owing to his \_parti

pris,\_ to the need of consistency in his system, to the dishonesty of

the doctrinaire--that dreadful dishonesty which step for step corrupted

the whole psychology of Schopenhauer (he who had arbitrarily and almost

violently misunderstood genius, art itself, morality, pagan religion,

beauty, knowledge, and almost everything).

852.

\_The tragic artist.\_--Whether, and in regard to what, the judgment

"beautiful" is established is a question of an individual's or of a

people's strength The feeling of plenitude, of overflowing strength

(which gaily and courageously meets many an obstacle before which

the weakling shudders)--the feeling of power utters the judgment

"beautiful" concerning things and conditions which the instinct of

impotence can only value as hateful and ugly. The \_flair\_ which

enables us to decide whether the objects we encounter are dangerous,

problematic, or alluring, likewise determines our æsthetic Yea. ("This

is beautiful," is an affirmation).

From this we see that, generally speaking, a preference for

questionable and terrible things is a symptom of strength; whereas the

taste for pretty and charming trifles is characteristic of the weak

and the delicate. The love of tragedy is typical of strong ages and

characters: its \_non plus ultra\_ is perhaps the \_Divina Commedia.\_ It

is the heroic spirits which in tragic cruelty say Yea unto themselves:

they are hard enough to feel pain as a pleasure.

On the other hand, supposing weaklings desire to get pleasure from

an art which was not designed for them, what interpretation must we

suppose they would like to give tragedy in order to make it suit their

taste? They would interpret their own feeling of value into it: \_e.g.\_

the "triumph of the moral order of things," or the teaching of the

"uselessness of existence," or the incitement to "resignation" (or also

half-medicinal and half-moral outpourings, \_à la\_ Aristotle). Finally,

the art of terrible natures, in so far as it may excite the nerves,

may be regarded by the weak and exhausted as a stimulus: this is now

taking place, for instance, in the case of the admiration meted out to

Wagner's art. A test of man's well-being and consciousness of power is

the extent to which he can acknowledge the terrible and questionable

character of things, and whether he is in any need of a faith at the

end.

This kind of artistic pessimism is precisely the reverse of that

religio-moral pessimism which suffers from the corruption of man

and the enigmatic character of existence: the latter insists upon

deliverance, or at least upon the hope of deliverance. Those

who suffer, doubt, and distrust themselves,--the sick, in other

words,--have in all ages required the transporting influence of visions

in order to be able to exist at all (the notion "blessedness" arose in

this way). A similar case would be that of the artists of decadence,

who at bottom maintain a Nihilistic attitude to life, and take

refuge in the beauty of form,--in those select cases in which Nature

is perfect, in which she is indifferently great and indifferently

beautiful. (The "love of the beautiful" may thus be something very

different from the ability to see or create the beautiful: it may be

the expression of impotence in this respect.) The most convincing

artists are those who make harmony ring out of every discord, and

who benefit all things by the gift of their power and inner harmony:

in every work of art they merely reveal the symbol of their inmost

experiences--their creation is gratitude for life.

The depth of the tragic artist consists in the fact that his æsthetic

instinct surveys the more remote results, that he does not halt

shortsightedly at the thing that is nearest, that he says Yea to the

whole cosmic economy, which justifies the terrible, the evil, and the

questionable; which more than justifies it.

853.

\_Art in the "Birth of Tragedy."\_

I.

The conception of the work which lies right in the background of this

book, is extraordinarily gloomy and unpleasant: among all the types

of pessimism which have ever been known hitherto, none seems to have

attained to this degree of malice. The contrast of a true and of an

apparent world is entirely absent here: there is but one world, and it

is false, cruel, contradictory, seductive, and without sense. A world,

thus constituted is the true world. We are in need of lies in order to

rise superior to this reality, to this truth--that is to say, in order

to live.... That lies should be necessary to life is part and parcel of

the terrible and questionable character of existence.

Metaphysics, morality, religion, science, in this book, all these

things are regarded merely as different forms of falsehood: by means of

them we are led to believe in life. "Life, must inspire confidence";

the task which this imposes upon us is enormous. In order to solve,

this problem man must already be a liar in his heart, but he must above

all else be an artist. And he is that. Metaphysics, religion, morality,

science, all these things are but the offshoot of his will to art,

to falsehood, to a flight from "truth," to a denial of "truth." This

ability, this artistic capacity \_par excellence\_ of man--thanks to

which he overcomes reality with lies,--is a quality which he has in

common with all other forms of existence. He himself is indeed a piece

of reality, of truth, of nature: how could he help being also a piece

of genius in prevarication!

The fact that the character of existence is misunderstood, is the

profoundest and the highest secret motive behind everything relating

to virtue, science, piety, and art. To be blind to many things, to

see many things falsely, to fancy many things: Oh, how clever man has

been in those circumstances in which he believed he was anything but

clever! Love, enthusiasm, "God"--are but subtle forms of ultimate

Self-deception; they are but seductions to life and to the belief in

life! In those moments when man was deceived, when he had befooled

himself and when he believed in life: Oh, how his spirit swelled within

him! Oh, what ecstasies he had! What power he felt! And what artistic

triumphs in the feeling of power! ... Man had once more become master

of "matter,"--master of truth! ... And whenever man rejoices it is

always in the same way: he rejoices as an artist, his power is his joy,

he enjoys falsehood as his power....

II.

Art and nothing else! Art is the great means of making life possible,

the great seducer to life, the great stimulus of life.

Art is the only superior counter-agent to all will to the denial of

life; it is \_par excellence\_ the anti-Christian, the anti-Buddhistic,

the anti-Nihilistic force.

Art is the alleviation of the seeker after knowledge,--of him who

recognises the terrible and questionable character Of existence, and

who will recognise it,--of the tragic seeker after knowledge.

Art is the alleviation of the man of action,--of him who not only sees

the terrible and questionable character of existence, but also lives

it, will live it,--of the tragic and warlike man, the hero. Art is the

alleviation of the sufferer,--as the way to states in which pain is

willed, is transfigured, is deified, where suffering is a form of great

ecstasy.

III.

It is clear that in this book pessimism, or, better still, Nihilism,

stands for "truth." But truth is not postulated as the highest measure

of value, and still less as the highest power. The will to appearance,

to illusion, to deception, to becoming, and to change (to objective

deception), is here regarded as more profound, as more primeval, as

more metaphysical than the will to truth, to reality, to appearance:

the latter is merely a form of the will to illusion. Happiness is

likewise conceived as more primeval than pain: and pain is considered

as conditioned, as a consequence Of the will to happiness (of the will

to Becoming, to growth, to forming, i.e. to creating; in creating,

however, destruction is included). The highest state of Yea-saying to

existence is conceived as one from which the greatest pain may not be

excluded: the tragico-Dionysian state.

IV.

In this way this book is even anti-pessimistic, namely, in the sense

that it teaches something which is stronger than pessimism and which

is more "divine" than truth: Art. Nobody, it would seem, would be more

ready seriously to utter a radical denial of life, an actual denial

of action even more than a denial of life, than the author of this

book. Except that he knows--for he has experienced it, and perhaps

experienced little else!--that art is of more value than truth.

Even in the preface, in which Richard Wagner is, as it were, invited

to join with him in conversation, the author expresses this article of

faith, this gospel for artists; "Art is the only task of life, art is

the metaphysical activity of life...."

FOURTH BOOK

DISCIPLINE AND BREEDING.

I.

THE ORDER OF RANK.

1. The Doctrine of the Order of Rank.

854.

In this age of universal suffrage, in which everybody is allowed to

sit in judgment upon everything and everybody, I feel compelled to

re-establish the order of rank.

855.

Quanta of power alone determine rank and distinguish rank: nothing else

does.

856.

\_The will to power.\_--How must those men be constituted who would

undertake this transvaluation? The order of rank as the order of power:

war and danger are the prerequisites which allow of a rank maintaining

its conditions. The prodigious example: man in Nature--the weakest and

shrewdest creature making himself master, and putting a yoke upon all

less intelligent forces.

857.

I distinguish between the type which represents ascending life and

that which represents decay, decomposition and weakness. Ought one to

suppose that the question of rank between these two types can be at all

doubtful?

858.

The modicum of power which you represent decides your rank; all the

rest is cowardice.

859.

The advantages of standing detached from one's age.--Detached from

the two movements, that of individualism and that of collectivist

morality; for even the first does not recognise the order of rank, and

would give one individual the same freedom as another. My thoughts are

not concerned with the degree of freedom which should be granted to

the one or to the other or to all, but with the degree of power which

the one or the other should exercise over his neighbour or over all;

and more especially with the question to what extent a sacrifice of

freedom, or even enslavement, may afford the basis for the cultivation,

of a \_superior\_ type. In plain words: \_how could one sacrifice the

development of mankind\_ in order to assist a higher species than man to

come into being.

860.

\_Concerning rank.\_--The terrible consequences of "equality"--in the end

everybody thinks he has the right to every problem. All order of rank

has vanished.

861.

It is necessary for \_higher\_ men to declare war upon the masses! In

all directions mediocre people are joining hands in order to make

themselves masters. Everything that pampers, that softens, and that

brings the "people" or "woman" to the front, operates in favour of

universal suffrage,--that is to say, the dominion of \_inferior\_ men.

But we must make reprisals, and draw the whole state of affairs (which

commenced in Europe with Christianity) to the light of day and to

judgment.

862.

A teaching is needed which is strong enough to work in a \_disciplinary\_

manner; it should operate in such a way as to strengthen the strong and

to paralyse and smash up the world-weary.

The annihilation of declining races. The decay of Europe. The

annihilation of slave-tainted valuations. The dominion of the world

as a means to the rearing of a higher type. The annihilation of the

humbug which is called morality (Christianity as a hysterical kind

of honesty in this regard: Augustine, Bunyan.) The annihilation of

universal suffrage--that is to say, that system by means of which the

lowest natures prescribe themselves as a law for higher natures. The

annihilation of mediocrity and its prevalence. (The one-sided, the

individuals--peoples; constitutional plenitude should be aimed at by

means of the coupling of opposites; to this end race-combinations

should be tried.) The new kind of courage--no \_a priori\_ truths (those

who were accustomed to believe in something sought such truths!),

but \_free\_ submission to a ruling thought, which has its time; for

instance, time conceived as the quality of space, etc.

2. The Strong and the Weak.

863.

\_The notion, "strong and weak man"\_ resolves itself into this, that in

the first place much strength is inherited--the man is a total sum; in

the other, \_not yet enough\_ (inadequate inheritance, subdivision of the

inherited qualities). Weakness may be a \_starting\_ phenomenon: \_not yet

enough\_; or a final phenomenon: "no more."

The determining point is there where great strength is present, or

where a great amount of strength can be discharged. The mass, as the

sum-total of the \_weak,\_ reacts \_slowly;\_ it defends itself against

much for which it is too weak,--against that for which it has no

use; it \_never\_ creates, it \_never\_ takes a step forward. This is

opposed to the theory which denies the strong individual and would

maintain that the "masses do everything." The difference is similar

to that which obtains between separated generations: four or even

five generations may lie between the masses and him who is the moving

spirit--it is a \_chronological\_ difference.

The \_values of the weak\_ are in the van, because the strong have

adopted them in order to \_lead\_ with them.

864.

\_Why the weak triumph.\_--On the whole, the sick and the weak have

more \_sympathy\_ and are more "humane"; the sick and the weak have

more intellect, and are more changeable more variegated, more

entertaining--more malicious; the sick alone invented \_malice.\_ (A

morbid precocity is often to be observed among rickety, scrofulitic,

and tuberculous people.) \_Esprit:\_ the property of older races; Jews,

Frenchmen, Chinese. (The anti-Semites do not forgive the Jews for

having both intellect--and money. Anti-Semites--another name for

"bungled and botched.")

The sick and the weak have always had \_fascination\_ on their side; they

are more \_interesting\_ than the healthy: the fool and the saint--the

two most interesting kinds of men.... Closely related thereto is the

"genius." The "great adventurers and criminals" and all great men,

the most healthy in particular, have always been \_sick\_ at certain

periods of their lives--great disturbances of the emotions, the

passion for power, love, revenge, are all accompanied by very profound

perturbations. And, as for decadence, every man who does not die

prematurely manifests it in almost every respect--he therefore knows

from experience the instincts which belong to it: for \_half his life\_

nearly every man is decadent.

And finally, woman! \_One-half of mankind is weak,\_ chronically sick,

changeable, shifty woman requires strength in order to cleave to it;

she also requires a religion of the weak which glorifies weakness,

love, and modesty as divine: or, better still, she makes the strong

weak--she \_rules\_ when she succeeds in overcoming the strong. Woman

has always conspired with decadent types,--the priests, for instance,

against the mighty, against the "strong," against \_men.\_ Women avail

themselves of children for the cult of piety, pity, and love:--the

\_mother\_ stands as the symbol of \_convincing\_ altruism.

Finally, the increase of civilisation with its necessary correlatives,

the increase of morbid elements, of the \_neurotic\_ and \_psychiatric\_

and of the \_criminal.\_ A sort of \_intermediary species\_ arises,

the artist. He is distinct from those who are criminals as the

result of weak wills and of the fear of society, although they may

not yet be ripe for the asylum; but he has antennas which grope

inquisitively into both spheres, this specific plant of culture,

the modern artist, painter, musician, and, above all, novelist, who

designates his particular kind of attitude with the very indefinite

word "naturalism."... Lunatics, criminals, and realists[1] are on

the increase: this is the sign of a growing culture plunging forward

at headlong speed--that is to say, its excrement, its refuse, the

rubbish that is shot from it every day, is beginning to acquire more

importance, the retrogressive movement \_keeps pace\_ with the advance.

Finally, \_the social mishmash,\_ which is the result of revolution,

of the establishment of equal rights, and of the superstition, the

"equality of men." Thus the possessors of the instincts of decline

(of resentment, of discontent, of the lust of destruction, of anarchy

and Nihilism), as also the instincts of slavery, of cowardice, of

craftiness, and of rascality, which are inherent among those classes

of society which have long been suppressed, are beginning to get

infused into the blood of all ranks. Two or three generations later,

the race can no longer be recognised--everything has become \_mob.\_ And

thus there results a collective instinct against \_selection,\_ against

every kind of \_privilege\_, and this instinct operates with such power,

certainty, hardness, and cruelty that, as a matter of fact, in the end,

even the privileged classes have to submit: all those who still wish to

hold on to power flatter the mob, work with the mob, and must have the

mob on their side--the "geniuses" \_above all.\_ The latter become the

\_heralds\_ of those feelings with which the mob can be inspired,--the

expression of pity, of honour, even for all that suffers, all that is

low and despised, and has lived under persecution, becomes predominant

(types: Victor Hugo, Richard Wagner).--The rise of the mob signifies

once more the rise of old values.

In the case of such an extreme movement, both in tempo and in means,

as characterises our civilisation, man's ballast is shifted. Those

men whose worth is greatest, and whose mission, as it were, is to

compensate for the very great danger of such a morbid movement,--such

men become dawdlers \_par excellence\_; they are slow to accept anything,

and are tenacious; they are creatures that are relatively lasting

in the midst of this vast mingling and changing of elements. In

such circumstances power is necessarily relegated to the \_mediocre:

mediocrity,\_ as the trustee and bearer of the future, consolidates

itself against the rule of the mob and of eccentricities (both of

which are, in most cases, united). In this way a new antagonist is

evolved for exceptional men--or in certain cases a new temptation.

Provided that they do not adapt themselves to the mob, and stand up

for what satisfies the instincts of the disinherited, they will find

it necessary to be "mediocre" and sound. They know: \_mediocritas\_

is also \_aurea,\_--it alone has command of money and \_gold\_ (of all

that glitters ...).... And, once more, old virtue and the whole

superannuated world of ideals in general secures a gifted host of

special-pleaders.... Result: mediocrity acquires intellect, wit, and

genius, it becomes entertaining, and even seductive.

\*\*\*

\_Result.\_--A high culture can only stand upon a broad basis, upon a

strongly and soundly consolidated mediocrity. In its service and

assisted by it, \_science\_ and even art do their work. Science could

not wish for a better state of affairs: in its essence it belongs to a

middle-class type of man,--among exceptions it is out of place,--there

is not anything aristocratic and still less anything anarchic in its

instincts.--The power of the middle classes is then upheld by means of

commerce, but, above all, by means of money-dealing: the instinct of

great financiers is opposed to everything extreme--on this account

the Jews are, for the present, the most \_conservative\_ power in the

threatening and insecure conditions of modern Europe. They can have

no use either for revolutions, for socialism, or for militarism: if

they would have power, and if they should need it, even over the

revolutionary party, this is only the result of what I have already

said, and it in no way contradicts it. Against other extreme movements

they may occasionally require to excite terror by showing how much

power is in their hands. But their instinct itself is inveterately

conservative and "mediocre, ... Wherever power exists, they know how to

become mighty; but the application of their power always takes the same

direction. The polite term for \_mediocre,\_ as is well known, is the

word \_"Liberal."\_

\_Reflection.\_--It is all nonsense to suppose that this general

\_conquest of values\_ is anti-biological. In order to explain it, we

ought to try and show that it is the result of a certain interest of

life to maintain the type "man," even by means of this method which

leads to the prevalence of the weak and the physiologically botched--if

things were otherwise, might man not cease to exist? Problem ...

The \_enhancement\_ of the type may prove fatal to the \_maintenance of

the species.\_ Why?--The experience of history shows that strong races

\_decimate\_ each other \_mutually,\_ by means of war, lust for power, and

venturousness; the strong emotions; wastefulness (strength is no longer

capitalised, disturbed mental systems arise from excessive tension);

their existence is a costly affair in short, they persistently give

rise to friction \_between themselves;\_ periods of \_profound slackness\_

and torpidity intervene: all great ages have to be \_paid for....\_ The

strong are, after all, weaker, less wilful, and more absurd than the

average weak ones.

They are \_squandering\_ races. "\_Permanence,\_" in itself, can have no

value: that which ought to be preferred thereto would be a shorter life

for the species, but a life \_richer\_ in creations. It would remain

to be proved that, even as things are, a richer sum of creations is

attained than in the case of the shorter existence; \_i.e.\_ that man, as

a storehouse of power, attains to a much higher degree of dominion over

things under the conditions which have existed hitherto.... We are here

face to face with a problem of \_economics.\_

865.

The state of mind which calls itself "idealism," and which will neither

allow mediocrity to be mediocre nor woman to be woman! Do not make

everything uniform! We should have a clear idea of how \_dearly we have

to pay for the establishment of a virtue;\_ and that virtue is nothing

generally desirable, but a \_noble piece of madness,\_ a beautiful

exception, which gives us the privilege of feeling elated....

866.

It is \_necessary\_ to show \_that a counter-movement is inevitably

associated\_ with any increasingly economical consumption of men

and mankind, and with an ever more closely involved "machinery" of

interests and services. I call this counter-movement the \_separation

of the luxurious surplus of mankind:\_ by means of it a stronger kind,

a higher type, must come to light, which has other conditions for its

origin and for its maintenance than the average man. My concept, my

metaphor for this type is, as you know, the word "Superman." Along the

first road, which can now be completely surveyed, arose adaptation,

stultification, higher Chinese culture, modesty in the Instincts,

and satisfaction at the sight of the belittlement of man--a kind of

\_stationary level of mankind.\_ If ever we get that inevitable and

imminent, general control of the economy of the earth, then mankind

\_can\_ be used as machinery and find its best purpose in the service of

this economy--as an enormous piece of clock-work consisting of ever

smaller and ever more subtly adapted wheels; then all the dominating

and commanding elements will become ever more superfluous; and the

whole gains enormous energy, while the individual factors which compose

it represent but small modicums of strength and of \_value.\_ To oppose

this dwarfing and adaptation of man to a specialised kind of utility, a

reverse movement is needed -the procreation of the \_synthetic\_ man who

\_embodies\_ everything and \_justifies\_ it; that man for whom the turning

of mankind into a machine is a first condition of existence, for whom

the rest of mankind is but soil on which he can devise his \_higher

mode\_ of existence.

He is in need of the \_opposition\_ of the masses, of those who are

"levelled down"; he requires that feeling of distance from them; he

stands upon them, he lives on them. This higher form of \_aristocracy\_

is the form of the future. From the moral point of view, the collective

machinery above described, that solidarity of all wheels, represents

the most extreme example in the \_exploitation of mankind\_: but it

presupposes the existence of those for whom such an exploitation would

have some \_meaning.[2]\_ Otherwise it would signify, as a matter of

fact, merely the general depreciation of the type man,--a \_retrograde

phenomenon\_ on a grand scale.

Readers are beginning to see what I am combating--namely, \_economic\_

optimism: as if the genera] welfare of everybody must necessarily

increase with the growing self-sacrifice of everybody. The very reverse

seems to me to be the case, \_the self-sacrifice of everybody amounts

to a collective loss;\_ man becomes \_inferior\_--so that nobody knows

what end this monstrous purpose has served. A wherefore? a \_new\_

wherefore?--this is what mankind requires.

867.

The recognition of the \_increase of collective power:\_ we should

calculate to what extent the ruin of individuals, of castes, of ages,

and of peoples, is included in this general increase.

The transposition of the \_ballast\_ of a culture. The \_cost\_ of every

vast growth: who bears it? \_Why must it be enormous at the present

time?\_

868.

General aspect of the future European: the latter regarded as the most

intelligent servile animal, very industrious, at bottom very modest,

inquisitive to excess, multifarious, pampered, weak of will,--a chaos

of cosmopolitan passions and intelligences. How would it be possible

for a stronger race to be bred from him?--Such a race as would have a

classical taste? The classical taste: this is the will to simplicity,

to accentuation, and to happiness made visible, the will to the

terrible, and the courage for psychological \_nakedness\_ (simplification

is the outcome of the will to accentuate; allowing happiness as well

as nakedness to become visible is a consequence of the will to the

terrible ...). In order to fight one's way out of that chaos, and up

to this form, a certain \_disciplinary constraint\_ is necessary: a man

should have to choose between either going to the dogs or \_prevailing.\_

A ruling race can only arise amid terrible and violent conditions.

Problem: where are the \_barbarians\_ of the twentieth century? Obviously

they will only show themselves and consolidate themselves after

enormous socialistic crises. They will consist of those elements which

are capable of the \_greatest hardness towards themselves,\_ and which

can guarantee the \_most enduring will-power.\_

869.

The mightiest and most dangerous passions of man, by means of which he

most easily goes to rack and ruin, have been so fundamentally banned

that mighty men themselves have either become impossible or else must

regard themselves as \_evil,\_ "harmful and prohibited." The losses are

heavy, but up to the present they have been necessary. Now, however,

that a whole host of counter-forces has been reared, by means of the

temporary suppression of these passions (the passion for dominion, the

love of change and deception), their liberation has once more become

possible: they will no longer possess their old savagery. We can now

allow ourselves this tame sort of barbarism: look at our artists and

our statesmen!

870.

\_The root of all evil:\_ that the slave morality of modesty, chastity,

selflessness, and absolute obedience should have triumphed. Dominating

natures were thus condemned (1) to hypocrisy, (2) to qualms of

conscience,--creative natures regarded themselves as rebels against

God, uncertain and hemmed in by eternal values.

The barbarians showed that the ability o\_f keeping within the bounds

of moderation\_ was not in the scope of their powers: they feared and

slandered the passions and instincts of nature--likewise the aspect

of the ruling Cæsars and castes. On the other hand, there arose the

suspicion that all \_restraint\_ is a form of weakness or of incipient

old age and fatigue (thus La Rochefoucauld suspects that "virtue" is

only a euphemism in the mouths of those to whom vice no longer affords

any pleasure). The capacity for restraint was represented as a matter

of hardness, self-control, asceticism, as a fight with the devil,

etc. etc. The natural \_delight\_ of æsthetic natures, in measure; \_the

pleasure derived from the beauty of measure,\_ was \_overlooked\_ and

\_denied,\_ because that which was desired was an anti-eudæmonistic

morality. The belief in the pleasure which comes of restraint has

been lacking hitherto--this pleasure of a rider on a fiery steed! The

moderation of weak natures was confounded with the restraint of the

strong!

In short, the best things have been blasphemed because weak or

immoderate swine have thrown a bad light upon them--the best men have

\_remained concealed\_--and have often \_misunderstood\_ themselves.

871.

\_Vicious\_ and \_unbridled people\_: their depressing influence upon the

\_value of the pussions.\_ It was the appalling barbarity of morality

which was principally responsible in the Middle Ages for the compulsory

recourse to a veritable "league \_of\_ virtue"--and this was coupled with

an equally appalling exaggeration of all that which constitutes the

value of man. Militant "civilisation" (taming) is in need of all kinds

of irons and tortures in order to maintain itself against terrible and

beast-of-prey natures.

In this case, contusion, although it may have the most nefarious

influences, is quite natural: that which \_men of power and will are

able to demand of themselves\_ gives them the standard for what they

may also allow themselves. Such natures are the very opposite of the

\_vicious\_ and the \_unbridled;\_ although under certain circumstances

they may perpetrate deeds for which an inferior man would be convicted

of vice and intemperance.

In this respect the concept, "\_all men are equal before God\_" does

an extraordinary amount of harm; actions and attitudes of mind were

forbidden which belonged to the prerogative of the strong alone, just

as if they were in themselves unworthy of man. All the tendencies of

strong men were brought into disrepute by the fact that the defensive

weapons of the most weak (even of those who were weakest towards

themselves) were established as a standard of valuation.

The confusion went so far that precisely the great \_virtuosos\_ of life

(whose self-control presents the sharpest contrast to the vicious and

the unbridled) were branded with the most opprobrious names. Even to

this day people feel themselves compelled to disparage a Cæsar Borgia:

it is simply ludicrous. The Church has anathematised German Kaisers

owing to their vices: as if a monk or a priest had the right to say

a word as to what a Frederick II. should allow himself. Don Juan is

sent to hell: this is very \_naïf.\_ Has anybody ever noticed that all

interesting men are lacking in heaven? ... This is only a hint to the

girls, as to where they may best find salvation. If one think at all

logically, and also have a profound insight into that which makes a

great man, there, can be no doubt at all that the Church has dispatched

all "great men" to Hades--its fight is \_against\_ all "greatness in man."

872.

The rights which a man arrogates to himself are relative to the duties

which he sets himself, and to the tasks which he feels \_capable of

performing.\_ The great majority of men have no right to life, and are

only a misfortune to their higher fellows.

873.

\_The misunderstanding of egoism:\_ on the part of \_ignoble natures\_ who

know nothing of the lust of conquest and the insatiability of great

love, and who likewise know nothing of the overflowing feelings of

power which make a man wish to overcome things, to force them over to

himself, and to lay them on his heart, the power which impels an artist

to his material. It often happens also that the active spirit looks

for a field for its activity. In ordinary "egoism" it is precisely the

... "non-ego," the \_profoundly mediocre creature,\_ the member of the

herd, who wishes to maintain himself--and when this is perceived by the

rarer, more subtle, and less mediocre natures, it revolts them. For the

judgment of the latter is this: "We are the \_noble\_! It is much more

important to maintain \_us\_ than \_that\_ cattle!"

874.

\_The degeneration of the ruler and of the ruling classes\_ has been the

cause of all the great disorders in history! Without the Roman Cæsars

and Roman society, Christianity would never have prevailed.

When it occurs to inferior men to doubt whether higher men exist, then

the danger is great I It is then that men finally discover that there

are virtues even among inferior, suppressed, and poor-spirited men,

and that everybody is equal before God: which is the \_non plus ultra\_

of all confounded nonsense that has ever appeared on earth! For in the

end higher men begin to measure themselves according to the standard

of virtues upheld by the slaves--and discover that they are "proud,"

etc., and that all their \_higher\_ qualities should be condemned.

When Nero and Caracalla stood at the helm, it was then that the paradox

arose: "The lowest man is of more value than that one on the throne!"

And thus the path was prepared for an \_image of God\_ which was as

remote as possible from the image of the mightiest,--God on the Cross!

875.

\_Higher man and gregarious man.\_--When great men are \_wanting,\_ the

great of the past are converted into demigods or whole gods: the rise

of religions proves that mankind no longer has any pleasure in man

("nor in woman neither," as in Hamlet's case). Or a host of men are

brought together in a heap, and it is hoped that as a Parliament they

will operate just as tyrannically.

Tyrannising is the distinctive quality of great men; they make inferior

men stupid.

876.

Buckle affords the best example of the extent to which a plebeian

agitator of the mob is incapable of arriving at a clear idea of

the concept, "higher nature." The opinion which he \_combats\_ so

passionately--that "great men," individuals, princes, statesmen,

geniuses, warriors, are the levers and \_causes\_ of all great movements,

is instinctively misunderstood by him, as if it meant that all that was

essential and valuable in such a "higher man," was the fact that he

was capable of setting masses in motion; in short, that his sole merit

was the effect he produced.... But the "higher nature" of the great man

resides precisely in being different, in being unable to communicate

with others, in the loftiness of his rank--\_not\_ in any sort of effect

he may produce even though this be the shattering of both hemispheres.

877.

The Revolution made Napoleon possible: that is its justification.

We ought to desire the anarchical collapse of the whole of our

civilisation if such a reward were to be its result. Napoleon made

nationalism possible: that is the latter's excuse.

The value of a man (apart, of course, from morality and immorality:

because with these concepts a man's \_worth\_ is not even skimmed) does

not lie in his utility; because he would continue to exist even if

there were nobody to whom he could be useful. And why could not that

man be the very pinnacle of manhood who was the source of the worst

possible effects for his race: so high and so superior, that in his

presence everything would go to rack and ruin from envy?

878.

To appraise the value of a man according to his \_utility\_ to mankind,

or according to what he costs it, or the \_damage\_ he is able to inflict

upon it, is just as good and just as bad as to appraise the value

of a work of art according to its \_effects.\_ But in this way the

value of one man compared with another is not even touched upon. The

"moral valuation," in so far as it is \_social\_ measures men altogether

according to their effects. But what about the man who has his own

taste on his tongue, who is surrounded and concealed by his isolation,

uncommunicative and not to be communicated with; a man whom no one has

fathomed yet--that is to say, a creature of a higher, and, at any rate,

\_different\_ species, how would ye appraise his worth, seeing that ye

cannot know him and can compare him with nothing?

\_Moral valuation\_ was the cause of the most enormous obtuseness

of judgment: the value of a man in himself is \_underrated,\_

well-nigh \_overlooked,\_ practically \_denied.\_ This is the remains of

simple-minded teleology: the value of man \_can only be measured with

regard to other men.\_

879.

\_To be obsessed by moral considerations\_ presupposes a very low

grade of intellect: it shows that the instinct for special rights,

for standing apart, the feeling of freedom in creative natures, in

"children of God" (or of the devil), is lacking. And irrespective of

whether \_he\_ preaches a ruling morality or \_criticises\_ the prevailing

ethical code from the point of view of his own ideal: by doing these

things a man shows that he belongs to the herd--even though he may be

what it is most in need of--that is to say, a "shepherd."

880.

We should substitute morality by the will to our own ends, and

\_consequently\_ to the means to them.

881.

\_Concerning the order of rank.\_--What is it that constitutes the

\_mediocrity\_ of the typical man? That he does not understand that

things necessarily have \_their other side;\_ that he combats evil

conditions as if they could be dispensed with, that he will not take

the one with the other; that he would fain obliterate and erase the

\_specific character of a thing,\_ of a circumstance, of an age, and

of a person, by calling only a portion of their qualities good, and

suppressing the remainder. The "desirability" of the mediocre is that

which we others combat: their \_ideal\_ is something which shall no

longer contain anything harmful, evil, dangerous, questionable, and

destructive. We recognise the reverse of this: that with every growth

of man his other side must grow as well; that the highest man, if

such a concept be allowed, would be that man who would represent \_the

antagonistic character of existence\_ most strikingly, and would be its

glory and its only justification.... Ordinary men may only represent

a small corner and nook of this natural character; they perish the

moment the multifariousness of the elements composing them, and the

tension between their antagonistic traits, increases: but this is the

prerequisite for greatness in man. That man should become better and at

the same time more evil, is my formula for this inevitable fact.

The majority of people are only piecemeal and fragmentary examples

of man: only when all these creatures are jumbled together does one

whole man arise Whole ages and whole peoples in this sense, have a

fragmentary character about them; it may perhaps be part of the economy

of human development that man should develop himself only piecemeal.

But, for this reason, one should not forget that the only important

consideration is the rise of the synthetic man; that inferior men, and

by far the great majority of people, are but rehearsals and exercises

out of which here and there a whole man may arise; a man who is a

human milestone, and who indicates how far mankind has advanced up to

a certain point. Mankind does not advance in a straight line,--often

a type is attained which is again lost (for instance, with all the

efforts of three hundred years, we have not reached the men of the

Renaissance again, and in addition to this we must not forget that the

man of the Renaissance was already behind his brother of classical

antiquity).

882.

The superiority of the Greek and the man of the Renaissance is

recognised, but people would like to produce them without the

conditions and causes of which they were the result.

883.

\_"Purification of taste"\_ can only be the result of the \_strengthening\_

of the type. Our society to-day represents only the cultivating

systems, the cultivated man is \_lacking.\_ The great \_synthetic man,\_ in

whom the various forces for attaining a purpose are correctly harnessed

together, is altogether wanting. The specimen we possess is the

\_multifarious\_ man, the most interesting form of chaos that has ever

existed: but \_not\_ the chaos \_preceding\_ the creation of the world, but

that following it: \_Goethe\_ as the most beautiful expression of the

type (\_completely and utterly un-Olympian\_!)[3]

884.

Handel, Leibniz, Goethe, and Bismarck, are characteristic of the

\_strong German type.\_ They lived with equanimity, surrounded by

contrasts. They were full of that agile kind of strength which

cautiously avoids convictions and doctrines, by using the one as a

weapon against the other, and reserving absolute freedom for themselves.

885.

Of this I am convinced, that if the rise of great and rare men had

been made dependent upon the voices of the multitude (taking for

granted, of course, that the latter knew the qualities which belong

to greatness, and also the price that all greatness pays for its

self-development), then there would never have been any such thing as a

great man!

The fact that things pursue their course \_independently\_ of the voice

of the many, is the reason why, a few astonishing things have taken

place on earth.

886.

\_The Order of Rank in Human Values.\_

\_(a)\_ A man should not be valued according to isolated acts. \_Epidermal

actions.\_ Nothing is more rare than a \_personal\_ act. Class, rank,

race, environment, accident--all these things are much more likely to

be expressed in an action or deed than the "personality" of the doer.

\_(b)\_ We should on no account jump to the conclusion that there are

many people who are personalities. Some men are but conglomerations

of personalities, whilst the majority are not even \_one.\_ In all

cases in which those average qualities preponderate, which ensure

the maintenance of the species, to be a personality would involve

unnecessary expense, it would be a luxury in fact, it would be

foolish to demand of anybody that he should be a personality. In such

circumstances everybody is a channel or a transmitting vessel.

\_(c)\_ A "personality" is a relatively \_isolated\_ phenomenon; in view of

the superior importance of the continuation of the race at an average

level, a personality might even be regarded as something \_hostile to

nature.\_ For a personality to be possible, timely isolation and the

necessity for an existence of offence and defence, are prerequisites;

something in the nature of a walled enclosure, a capacity for shutting

out the world; but above all, a much \_lower degree of sensitiveness\_

than the average man has, who is too easily infected with the views of

others.

The first \_question\_ concerning the \_order of rank:\_ how far is a man

disposed to be \_solitary\_ or \_gregarious?\_ (in the latter case, his

value consists in those qualities which secure the survival of his

tribe or his type; in the former case, his qualities are those which

distinguish him from others, which isolate and defend him, and make his

\_solitude possible\_).

\_Consequence:\_ the solitary type should not be valued from the

standpoint of the gregarious type, or \_vice versâ.\_

Viewed from above, both types are necessary; as is likewise their

antagonism,--and nothing is \_more\_ thoroughly reprehensible than

the "desire" which would develop a \_third\_ thing out of the two

("virtue" as hermaphroditism). This is as little worthy of desire as

the equalisation and reconciliation of the sexes. The \_distinguishing

qualities must be developed ever more and more,\_ the gulf must \_be made

ever wider....\_

The concept of \_degeneration\_ in both cases: the approximation of

the qualities of the herd to those of solitary creatures: and \_vice

versâ\_--in short, when they begin to \_resemble\_ each other. This

concept of degeneration is beyond the sphere of moral judgments.

887.

Where the \_strongest natures\_ are to be sought. The ruin and

degeneration of the \_solitary\_ species is much greater and more

terrible: they have the instincts of the herd, and the tradition of

values, against them; their weapons of defence, their instincts of

self-preservation, are from the beginning insufficiently strong and

reliable--fortune must be peculiarly favourable to them if they are \_to

prosper\_ (they prosper best in the lowest ranks and dregs of society;

if ye are seeking \_personalities\_ it is there that ye will find them

with much greater certainty than in the middle classes!)

When the dispute between ranks and classes, which aims at equality of

rights, is almost settled, the fight will begin against the \_solitary

person.\_ (In a certain sense \_the latter can maintain and develop

himself most easily in a democratic society:\_ there where the coarser

means of defence are no longer necessary, and a certain habit of

order, honesty, justice, trust, is already a general condition.) The

\_strongest\_ must be most tightly bound, most strictly watched, laid

in chains and supervised: this is the instinct of the herd. To them

belongs a régime of self-mastery, of ascetic detachment, of "duties"

consisting in exhausting work, in which one can no longer call one's

soul one's own.

888.

I am attempting an \_economic\_ justification of virtue. The object is to

make man as useful as possible, and to make him approximate as nearly

as one can to an infallible machine: to this end he must be equipped

with \_machine-like virtues\_ (he must learn to value those states in

which he works in a most mechanically useful way, as the highest of

all: to this end it is necessary to make him as disgusted as possible

with the other states, and to represent them as very dangerous and

despicable).

Here is the first stumbling-block: the tediousness and monotony

which all mechanical activity brings with it. To learn to endure

\_this\_--and not only to endure it, but to see tedium enveloped in a

ray of exceeding charm: this hitherto has been the task of all higher

schools. To learn something which you don't care a fig about, and to

find precisely your "duty" in this "objective" activity; to learn to

value happiness and duty as things apart; this is the invaluable task

and performance of higher schools. It is on this account that the

philologist has, hitherto, been the educator \_per se:\_ because his

activity, in itself, affords the best pattern of magnificent monotony

in action; under his banner youths learn to "swat": first prerequisite

for the thorough fulfilment of mechanical duties in the future (as

State officials, husbands, slaves of the desk, newspaper readers,

and soldiers). Such an existence may perhaps require a philosophical

glorification and justification more than any other: pleasurable

feelings must be valued by some sort of infallible tribunal, as

altogether of inferior rank; "duty \_per se\_" perhaps even the pathos

of reverence in regard to everything unpleasant,--must be demanded

imperatively as that which is above all useful, delightful, and

practical things.... A mechanical form of existence regarded as the

highest and most respectable form of existence, worshipping itself

(type: Kant as the fanatic of the formal concept "Thou shalt").

889.

The economic valuation of all the ideals that have existed

hitherto--that is to say, the selection and rearing of definite

passions and states at the cost of other passions and states. The

lawgiver (or the instinct of the community) selects a number of states

and passions the existence of which guarantees the performance of

regular actions (mechanical actions would thus be the result of the

regular requirements of those passions and states).

In the event of these states and passions containing ingredients

which were painful, a means would have to be found for overcoming

this painfulness by means of a valuation; pain would have to be

interpreted as something valuable, as something pleasurable in a higher

sense. Conceived in a formula: "\_How does something unpleasant become

pleasant?\_" For instance, when our obedience and our submission to the

law become honoured, thanks to the energy, power, and self-control

they entail. The same holds good of our public spirit, of our

neighbourliness, of our patriotism, our "humanisation," our "altruism,"

and our "heroism." The \_object of all idealism\_ should, be to induce

people to do unpleasant things cheerfully.

890.

The \_belittlement\_ of man must be held as the chief aim for a long

while: because what is needed in the first place is a broad basis from

which a stronger species of man may arise (to what extent hitherto has

\_every stronger\_ species of man arisen from a \_substratum of inferior

people?\_).

891.

The absurd and contemptible form of idealism which would not have

mediocrity mediocre, and which instead of feeling triumphant at being

exceptional, becomes \_indignant\_ at cowardice, falseness, pettiness,

and wretchedness. \_We should not wish things to be any different,\_ we

should make the gulfs even \_wider\_!--The higher types among men should

be compelled to distinguish themselves by means of the sacrifices which

they make to their own existence.

\_Principal point of view; distances\_ must be established, but \_no

contrasts must be created.\_ The \_middle classes\_ must be dissolved, and

their influence decreased: this is the principal means of maintaining

distances.

892.

Who would dare to disgust the mediocre of their mediocrity! As

you observe, I do precisely the reverse: every step away from

mediocrity--thus do I teach--leads to \_immorality.\_

893.

To hate mediocrity is unworthy of a philosopher: it is almost a note of

interrogation to his "\_right\_ to philosophy." It is precisely because

he is the exception that he must protect the rule and ingratiate all

mediocre people.

894.

What I combat: that an exceptional form should make war upon the

rule--instead of understanding that the continued existence of the rule

is the first condition of the value of the exception. For instance,

there are women who, instead of considering their abnormal thirst for

knowledge as a distinction, would fain dislocate the whole status of

womanhood.

895.

The \_increase of strength\_ despite the temporary ruin of the

individual:--

A new level must be established;

We must have a method of storing up forces for the maintenance of small

performances, in opposition to economic waste;

Destructive nature must for once be reduced to an \_instrument\_ of this

economy of the future;

The weak must be maintained, because there is an enormous mass of

\_finicking\_ work to be done;

The weak and the suffering must be upheld in their belief that

existence is still possible;

\_Solidarity\_ must be implanted as an instinct opposed to the instinct

of fear and servility;

War must be made upon accident, even upon the accident of "the great

man."

896.

War upon \_great\_ men justified on economic grounds. Great men are

dangerous; they are accidents, exceptions, tempests, which are strong

enough to question things which it has taken time to build and

establish. Explosive material must not only be discharged harmlessly,

but, if possible, its discharge must be \_prevented\_ altogether, this is

the fundamental instinct of all civilised society.

897.

He who thinks over the question of how the type man may be elevated

to its highest glory and power, will realise from the start that he

must place himself beyond morality; for morality was directed in its

essentials at the opposite goal--that is to say, its aim was to arrest

and to annihilate that glorious development wherever it was in process

of accomplishment. For, as a matter of fact, development of that sort

implies that such an enormous number of men must be subservient to

it, that a \_counter-movement\_ is only too natural: the weaker, more

delicate, more mediocre existences, find it necessary to take up sides

\_against\_ that glory of life and power; and for that purpose they

must get a new valuation of themselves by means of which they are

able to condemn, and if possible to destroy, life in this high degree

of plenitude. Morality is therefore essentially the expression of

hostility to life, in so far as it would overcome vital types.

898.

\_The strong of the future.\_--To what extent necessity on the one hand

and accident on the other have attained to conditions from which a

\_stronger species\_ may be reared: this we are now able to understand

and to bring about consciously; we can now create those conditions

under which such an elevation is possible.

Hitherto education has always aimed at the utility of society: \_not\_

the greatest possible utility for the future, but the utility of the

society actually extant. What people required were "instruments" for

this purpose. Provided the \_wealth of forces were greater,\_ it would

be possible to think of a draft being made upon them, the aim of which

would not be the utility of society, but some future utility.

The more people grasped to what extent the present form of society

was in such a state of transition as sooner or later to be \_no longer

able to exist for its own sake,\_ but only as a means in the hands of a

stronger race, the more \_this task would have to be brought forward.\_

The increasing belittlement of man is precisely the impelling

power which leads one to think of the cultivation of a \_stronger

race:\_ a race which would have a surplus precisely there where the

dwarfed species was weak and growing weaker (will, responsibility,

self-reliance, the ability to postulate aims for one's self).

The means would be those which history teaches: \_isolation\_ by means of

preservative interests which would be the reverse of those generally

accepted; exercise in transvalued valuations; distance as pathos; a

clean conscience in what to-day is most despised and most prohibited.

The \_levelling\_ of the mankind of Europe is the great process which

should not be arrested; it should even be accelerated. The necessity of

\_cleaving gulfs,\_ of \_distance,\_ of the \_order of rank,\_ is therefore

imperative; but not the necessity of retarding the process above

mentioned.

This \_levelled-down\_ species requires justification as soon as it is

attained: its justification is that it exists for the service of a

higher and sovereign race which stands upon it and can only be elevated

upon its shoulders to the task which it is destined to perform. Not

only a ruling race whose task would be consummated in ruling alone:

but a race with \_vital spheres\_ of its own, with an overflow of energy

for beauty, bravery, culture, and manners, even for the most abstract

thought; a yea-saying race which would be able to allow itself every

kind of great luxury--strong enough to be able to dispense with the

tyranny of the imperatives of virtue, rich enough to be in no need of

economy or pedantry; beyond good and evil; a forcing-house for rare and

exceptional plants.

899.

Our psychologists, whose glance dwells involuntarily upon the symptoms

of decadence, lead us to mistrust intellect ever more and more. People

persist in seeing only the weakening, pampering, and sickening effects

of intellect, but there are now going to appear:--

New Cynics The union of intellectual

barbarians Experimentalists superiority with well-being

Conquerors and an overflow of strength.

900.

I point to something new: certainly for such a democratic community

there is a danger of barbarians; but these are sought only down below.

There is also \_another kind of barbarians\_ who come from the heights: a

kind of conquering and ruling natures, which are in search of material

that they can mould. Prometheus was a barbarian of this stamp.

901.

\_Principal standpoint:\_ one should not suppose the mission of a higher

species to be the \_leading\_ of inferior men (as Comte does, for

instance); but the inferior should be regarded as the \_foundation\_

upon which a higher species may live their higher life--upon which

alone they \_can stand.\_ The conditions under which a \_strong, noble\_

species maintains itself (in the matter of intellectual discipline) are

precisely the reverse of those under which the industrial masses--the

tea-grocers \_à la\_ Spencer--subsist. Those qualities which are within

the grasp only of the \_strongest\_ and most \_terrible\_ natures, and

which make their existence possible leisure, adventure, disbelief, and

even dissipation--would necessarily ruin mediocre natures --and does

do so--when they possess them. In the case of the latter industry,

regularity, moderation, and strong "conviction" are in their proper

place--in short, all "gregarious virtues": under their influence these

mediocre men become perfect.

902.

\_Concerning the ruling types.\_ The shepherd as opposed to the "lord"

(the former is only a means to the maintenance of the herd; the latter,

the \_purpose\_ for which the herd exists).

903.

The temporary preponderance of social valuations is both comprehensible

and useful; it is a matter of building a \_foundation\_ upon which a

\_stronger\_ species will ultimately be made possible. The standard

of strength: to be able to live under the transvalued valuations,

and to desire them for all eternity. State and society regarded as a

sub-structure: economic point of view, education conceived as breeding.

904.

A consideration which "free spirits" \_lack\_: that the same discipline

which makes a strong nature still stronger, and enables it to go in for

big undertakings, \_breaks up and withers the mediocre\_: doubt --\_la

largeur de cœur\_--experiment--independence.

905.

The hammer. How should men who must value in the opposite way be

constituted?--Men who possess \_all\_ the qualities of the modern soul,

but are strong enough to convert them into real health? The means to

their task.

906.

The strong man, who is mighty in the instincts of a strong and healthy

organisation, digests his deeds just as well as he digests his meals;

he even gets over the effects of heavy fare: in the main, however, he

is led by an inviolable and severe instinct which prevents his doing

anything which goes against his grain, just as he never does anything

against his taste.

907.

\_Can\_ we \_foresee\_ the favourable circumstances under which creatures

of the highest value might arise? It is a thousand times too

complicated, and the probabilities of failure are \_very great:\_ on that

account we cannot be inspired by the thought of striving after them!

Scepticism.--To oppose this we can enhance courage, insight, hardness,

independence, and the feeling of responsibility; we can also subtilise

and learn to forestall the delicacy of the scales, so that favourable

accidents may be enlisted on our side.

908.

Before we can even think of acting, an enormous amount of work requires

to be done. In the main, however, \_a cautious exploitation\_ of the

present conditions would be our best and most advisable course of

action. The actual \_creation\_ of conditions such as those which occur

by accident, presupposes the existence of \_iron\_ men such as have not

yet lived. Our first task must be to make the personal ideal \_prevail\_

and \_become realised\_! He who has understood the nature of man and \_the

origin of mankind's greatest specimens, shudders before man and takes

flight from all action\_: this is the result of inherited valuations!!

My consolation is, that the nature of man is \_evil,\_ and this

guarantees his \_strength\_!

909.

\_The typical forms of self-development, or the eight principal

questions:\_--

1. Do we want to be more multifarious or more simple than we are?

2. Do we want to be happier than we are, or more indifferent to both

happiness and unhappiness?

3. Do we want to be more satisfied with ourselves, or more exacting and

more inexorable?

4. Do we want to be softer, more yielding, and more human than we are,

or more inhuman?

5. Do we want to be more prudent than we are, or more daring?

6. Do we want to attain a goal, or do we want to avoid all goals (like

the philosopher, for instance, who scents a boundary, a \_cul-de-sac,\_ a

prison, a piece of foolishness in every goal)?

7. Do we want to become more respected, or more feared, or more

\_despised\_?

8. Do we want to become tyrants, and seducers, or do we want to become

shepherds and gregarious animals?

910.

\_The type of my disciples.\_--To such men as \_concern vie in any way\_

I wish suffering, desolation, sickness, ill-treatment, indignities of

all kinds. I wish them to be acquainted with profound self-contempt,

with the martyrdom of self-distrust, with the misery of the defeated: I

have no pity for them; because I wish them to have the only thing which

to-day proves whether a man has any value or not, namely, \_the capacity

of sticking to his guns.\_

911.

The happiness and self-contentedness of the lazzaroni, or the

blessedness of "beautiful souls," or the consumptive love of Puritan

pietists, proves nothing in regard to \_the order of rank\_ among men.

As a great educator one ought inexorably to thrash a race of such

blissful creatures into unhappiness. The danger of belittlement and of

a slackening of powers follows immediately I am \_opposed\_ to happiness

\_à la\_ Spinoza or \_à la\_ Epicurus, and to all the relaxation of

contemplative states. But when virtue is the means to such happiness,

well then, \_one must master even virtue.\_

912.

I cannot see how any one can make up for having missed going to \_a

good school\_ at the proper time. Such a person does not know himself;

he walks through life without ever having learned to walk. His soft

muscles betray themselves at every step. Occasionally life itself is

merciful enough to make a man recover this lost and severe schooling:

by means of periods of sickness, perhaps, which exact the utmost

will-power and self-control; or by means of a sudden state of poverty,

which threatens his wife and child, and which may force a man to

such activity as will restore energy to his slackened tendons, and a

\_tough spirit\_ to his will to life. The most desirable thing of all,

however, is, under all circumstances to have severe discipline \_at

the right time, i.e.\_ at that age when it makes us proud that people

should expect great things from us. For this is what distinguishes hard

schooling, as good schooling, from every other schooling, namely, that

a good deal is demanded, that a good deal is severely exacted; that

goodness, nay even excellence itself, is required as if it were normal;

that praise is scanty, that leniency is non-existent; that blame is

sharp, practical, and without reprieve, and has no regard to talent and

antecedents. We are in every way in need of such a school: and this

holds good of corporeal as well as of spiritual things; it would be

fatal to draw distinctions here! The same discipline makes the soldier

and the scholar efficient; and, looked at more closely, there is no

true scholar who has not the instincts of a true soldier in his veins.

To be able to command and to be able to obey in a proud fashion; to

keep one's place in rank and file, and yet to be ready at any moment

to lead; to prefer danger to comfort; not to weigh what is permitted

and what is forbidden in a tradesman's balance; to be more hostile to

pettiness, slyness, and parasitism than to wickedness. What is it that

one \_learns\_ in a hard school?--\_to obey\_ and \_to command.\_

913.

We should \_repudiate\_ merit--and do only that which stands above all

praise and above all understanding.

914.

The new forms of morality:--

Faithful vows concerning that which one wishes to do or to leave

undone; complete and definite abstention from many things. Tests as to

whether one is \_ripe\_ for such discipline.

915.

It is my desire to \_naturalise asceticism:\_ I would substitute the

old intention of asceticism, "self-denial," by my own intention,

\_self-strengthening:\_ a gymnastic of the will; a period of abstinence

and occasional fasting of every kind, even in things intellectual; a

casuistry in deeds, in regard to the opinions which we derive from our

powers; we should try our hand at adventure and at deliberate dangers.

(\_Dîners chez Magny:\_ all intellectual gourmets with spoilt stomachs.)

\_Tests\_ ought also to be devised for discovering a man's power in

keeping his word.

916.

The things which have become \_spoilt\_ through having been abused by the

Church:--

(1) \_Asceticism.\_--People have scarcely got the courage yet to bring to

light the natural utility and necessity of asceticism for the purpose

of the \_education of the will.\_ Our ridiculous world of education,

before whose eyes the useful State official hovers as an ideal to

be striven for, believes that it has completed its duty when it has

instructed or trained the brain; it never even suspects that something

else is first of all necessary --the education of \_will-power;\_ tests

are devised for everything except for the most important thing of all:

whether a man can \_will,\_ whether he can \_promise;\_ the young man

completes his education without a question or an inquiry having been

made concerning the problem of the highest value of his nature.

(2) \_Fasting:\_--In every sense--even as a means of maintaining the

capacity for taking pleasure in all good things (for instance, to give

up reading for a while, to hear no music for a while, to cease from

being amiable for a while: one ought also to have fast days for one's

virtues).

(3) \_The monastery.\_--Temporary isolation with severe seclusion from

all letters, for instance; a kind of profound introspection and

self-recovery, which does not go out of the way of "temptations," but

out of the way of "duties"; a stepping out of the daily round of one's

environment; a detachment from the tyranny of stimuli and external

influences, which condemns us to expend our power only in reactions,

and does not allow it to gather volume until it bursts into spontaneous

activity (let anybody examine our scholars closely: they only think

reflexively, \_i.e.\_ they must first read before they can think).

(4) \_Feasts.\_--A man must be very coarse in order not to feel the

presence of Christians and Christian values as oppressive, so

oppressive as to send all festive moods to the devil. By feasts we

understand: pride, high-spirits, exuberance; scorn of all kinds of

seriousness and Philistinism; a divine saying of Yea to one's self, as

the result of physical plenitude and perfection--all states to which

the Christian cannot honestly say Yea. \_A feast is a pagan thing par

excellence.\_

(5) The \_courage of ones own nature: dressing-up in morality,\_--To be

able to call one's passions good without the help of a moral formula:

this is the standard which measures the extent to which a man is able

to say Yea to his own nature, namely, how much or how little he has to

have recourse to morality.

(6) \_Death.\_--The foolish physiological fact must be converted into a

moral necessity. One should live in such a way that \_one may have the

will to die at the right time\_!

917.

\_To feel ones self stronger\_ or, expressed otherwise: happiness always

presupposes a comparison (not necessarily with others, but with one's

self, in the midst of a state of growth, and without being conscious

that one is comparing).

\_Artificial\_ accentuation: whether by means of exciting chemicals or

exciting errors ("hallucinations.")

Take, for instance, the Christian's feeling of \_security\_; he feels

himself strong in his confidence, in his patience, and his resignation:

this artificial accentuation he owes to the fancy that he is protected

by a God. Take the feeling of \_superiority,\_ for instance: as when the

Caliph of Morocco sees only globes on which his three united kingdoms

cover four-fifths of the space. Take the feeling of \_uniqueness,\_

for instance: as when the European imagines that culture belongs to

Europe alone, and when he regards himself as a sort of abridged cosmic

process; or, as when the Christian makes all existence revolve round

the "Salvation of man."

The question is, where does one begin to feel the pressure of

constraint: it is thus that different degrees are ascertained. A

philosopher for instance, in the midst of the coolest and most

transmontane feats of abstraction feels like a fish that enters its

element: while colours and tones oppress him; not to speak of those

dumb desires--of that which others call "the ideal."

918.

A healthy and vigorous little boy will look up sarcastically if he be

asked: "Wilt thou become virtuous?"--but he immediately becomes eager

if he be asked: "Wilt thou become stronger than thy comrades?"

\*\*\*

How does one become stronger?--By deciding slowly; and by holding

firmly to the decision once it is made. Everything else follows

of itself. Spontaneous and changeable natures: both species of

the weak. We must not confound ourselves with them; we must feel

distance--betimes!

Beware of good-natured people!. Dealings with them make one torpid.

All environment is good which makes one exercise those defensive and;

aggressive powers which are instinctive in man. All one's inventiveness

should apply itself to putting one's power of will to the test....

\_Here\_ the determining factor must be recognised as something which is

not knowledge, astuteness, or wit.

One must learn to command betimes,--likewise to obey. A man must learn

modesty and tact in modesty: he must learn to distinguish and to

honour where modesty is displayed; he must likewise distinguish and

honour wherever he bestows his confidence.

What does one repent most? One's modesty; the fact that one has not

lent an ear to one's most individual needs; the fact that one has

mistaken one's self; the fact that one has esteemed one's self low;

the fact that one has lost all delicacy of hearing in regard to one's

instincts.--This want of reverence in regard to one's self is avenged

by all sorts of losses: in health, friendship, well-being, pride,

cheerfulness, freedom, determination, courage. A man never forgives

himself, later on, for this want of genuine egoism: he regards it as an

objection and as a cause of doubt concerning his real ego.

919.

I should like man to begin by \_respecting\_ himself: everything else

follows of itself. Naturally a man ceases from being anything to others

in this way: for this is precisely what they are least likely to

forgive. "What? a man who respects himself?"[4] This is something quite

different from the blind instinct to \_love\_ one's self. Nothing is more

common in the love of the sexes or in that duality which is called

ego, than a certain contempt for that which is loved the fatalism of

love.

920.

"I will have this or that"; "I would that this or that were so"; "I

know that this or that is so the degrees of power: the man of \_will,\_

the man of \_desire,\_ the man of \_fate.\_

921.

\_The means by which a strong species maintains itself\_:--

It grants itself the right of exceptional actions, as a test of the

power of self-control and of freedom.

It abandons itself to states in which a man is not allowed to be

anything else than a barbarian.

It tries to acquire strength of will by every kind of asceticism.

It is not expansive, it practises silence; it is cautious in regard to

all charms.

It learns to obey in such a way that obedience provides a test of

self-maintenance. Casuistry is carried to its highest pitch in regard

to points of honour.

It never argues, "What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the

gander,"--but conversely! it regards reward, and the ability to repay,

as a privilege, as a distinction.

It does not covet \_other\_ people's virtues.

922.

The way in which one has to treat raw savages and the impossibility of

dispensing with barbarous methods, becomes obvious, in practice, when

one is transplanted, with all one's European pampering, to a spot such

as the Congo, or anywhere else where it is necessary to maintain one's

mastery over barbarians.

923.

\_Warlike and peaceful people.\_--Art thou a man who has the instincts of

a warrior in thy blood? If this be so, another question must be put. Do

thy instincts impel thee to attack or to defend? The rest of mankind,

all those whose instincts are not warlike, desire peace, concord,

freedom, "equal rights": these things are but names and steps for one

and the same thing. Such men only wish to go where it is not necessary

for them to defend themselves,--such men become discontented with

themselves when they are obliged to offer resistance: they would fain

create circumstances in which war is no longer necessary. If the worst

came to the worst, they would resign themselves, obey, and submit: all

these things are better than waging war--thus does the Christian's

instinct, for instance, whisper to him. In the born warrior's

character there is something of armour, likewise in the choice of his

circumstances and in the development of every one of his qualities,

weapons are best evolved by the latter type, shields are best devised

by the former.

What expedients and what virtues do the unarmed and the undefended

require in order to survive--and even to conquer?

924.

What will become of a man who no longer has any reasons for either

defence or attack? What will remain of his \_passions\_ when he has lost

those which form his defence and his weapons?

925.

A marginal note to a \_niaiserie anglaise\_: "Do not to others that

which you would not that they should do unto you." This stands for

wisdom; this stands for prudence; this stands as the very basis of

morality as "a golden maxim." John Stuart Mill believes in it (and what

Englishman does not?).... But the maxim does not bear investigation.

The argument, Do not as you would not be done by, forbids action

which produce harmful results; the thought behind always is that an

action is invariably requited. What if some one came forward with the

\_"Principe"\_ in his hands, and said: "We must do those actions alone

which enable us to steal a march on others,--and which deprive others

of the power of doing the same to us"?--On the other hand, let us

remember the Corsican who pledges his honour to vendetta. He too does

not desire to have a bullet through him; but the prospect of one, the

probability of getting one, does not deter him from vindicating his

honour.... And in all really decent actions are we not intentionally

indifferent as to what result they will bring? To avoid an action which

might have harmful results,--that would be tantamount to forbidding all

decent actions in general.

Apart from this, the above maxim is valuable because it betrays a

certain \_type of man\_: it is the instinct of the herd which formulates

itself through him,--we are equal, we regard each other as equal: as

I am to thee so art thou to me.--In this community equivalence of

actions is really believed in--an equivalence which never under any

circumstances manifests itself in real conditions. It is impossible

to requite every action: among real individuals equal actions do not

exist, consequently there can be no such thing as "requital." ... When

I do anything, I am very far from thinking that any man is able to do

anything at all like it: the action belongs to me.... Nobody can pay

me back for anything I do; the most that can be done is to make me the

victim of another action.

926.

\_Against John Stuart Mill.\_--I abhor the man's vulgarity when he says:

"What is right for one man is right for another"; "Do not to others

that which you would not that they should do unto you. Such principles

would fain establish the whole of human traffic \_upon mutual services,\_

so that every action would appear to be a cash payment for something

done to us. The hypothesis here is ignoble to the last degree: it

is taken for granted that there is some sort of equivalence in value

between my actions and thine; the most personal value Of an action is

simply cancelled in this manner (that part of an action which has no

equivalent and which cannot be remunerated). "Reciprocity" is a piece

of egregious vulgarity; the mere fact that what I do \_cannot\_ and \_may\_

not be done by another, that there is \_no such thing as equivalence\_

(except in those \_very select circles\_ where one actually has one's

equal, \_inter pares\_), that in a really profound sense a man never

requites because he is something \_unique\_ in himself and can only do

\_unique\_ things,--this fundamental conviction contains the cause of

\_aristocratic aloofness from the mob\_, because the latter believes in

equality, and \_consequently\_ in the feasibility of equivalence and

"reciprocity."

927.

The suburban Philistinism of moral valuations and of its concepts

"useful" and "harmful" is well founded; it is the necessary point of

view of a community which is only able to see and survey \_immediate

and proximate\_ consequences. The \_State\_ and the \_political man\_ are

already in need of a more \_super-moral\_ attitude of mind: because

they have to calculate concerning a much more complicated tissue

of consequences. An economic policy for the whole world should be

possible which could look at things in such broad perspective that all

its isolated demands would seem for the moment not only unjust, but

arbitrary.

928.

"\_Should one follow one's feelings?\_"--To set one's life at stake on

the impulse of the moment, and actuated by a generous feeling, has

little worth, and does not even distinguish one. Everybody is alike in

being capable of this--and in behaving in this way with determination,

the criminal, the bandit, and the Corsican certainly outstrip the

honest man.

A higher degree of excellence would be to overcome this impulse, and to

refrain from performing an heroic deed at its bidding--and to remain

cold, \_raisonnable\_, free from the tempestuous surging of concomitant

sensations of delight.... The same holds good of pity: it must first be

\_sifted through\_ reason; without this it becomes just as dangerous as

any other passion.

The \_blind yielding\_ to a passion, whether it be generosity, pity, or

hostility, is the cause of the greatest evil. Greatness of character

does not consist in not possessing these passions--on the contrary, a

man should possess them to a terrible degree: but he should lead them

by the bridle.. and even this he should not do out of love of control,

but merely because....

929.

"To give up one's life for a cause"--very effective. But there are many

things for which one gives up one's life: the passions, one and all,

will be gratified. Whether one's life be pledged to pity, to anger,

or to revenge--it matters not from the point of view of value. How

many have not sacrificed their lives for pretty girls--and even what

is worse, their health! When one has temperament, one instinctively

chooses the most dangerous things: if one is a philosopher, for

instance, one chooses the adventures of speculation; if one is

virtuous, one chooses immorality. One kind of man will risk nothing,

another kind will risk everything. Are we despisers of life? On the

contrary, what we seek is life raised to a higher power, life in

danger.... But, let me repeat, we do not, on that account, wish to

be more virtuous than others, Pascal, for instance, wished to risk

nothing, and remained a Christian. That perhaps was virtuous.----A man

always sacrifices something.

930.

How many \_advantages\_ does not a man sacrifice! To how small an extent

does he seek his own profit! All his emotions and passions wish to

assert their rights, and how remote a passion is From that cautious

utility which consists in personal profit!

A man does \_not\_ strive after "happiness"; one must be an Englishman to

be able to believe that a man is always seeking his own advantage. Our

desires long to violate things with passion--their overflowing strength

seeks obstacles.

931.

All passions are generally \_useful,\_ some directly, others indirectly;

in regard to utility it is absolutely impossible to fix upon any

gradation of values,--however certainly the forces of nature in general

may be regarded as good (\_i.e.\_ useful), from an economic point of

view, they are still the sources of much that is terrible and much

that is fatally irrevocable. The most one might say would be, that

the mightiest passions are the most valuable: seeing that no stronger

sources of power exist.

932.

All well-meaning, helpful, good-natured attitudes of mind have \_not\_

come to be honoured on account of their usefulness: but because they

are the conditions peculiar to \_rich souls\_ who are able to bestow

and whose value consists in their vital exuberance. Look into the

eyes of the benevolent man! In them you will see the exact reverse of

self-denial, of hatred of self, of Pascalism.

933.

\_In short,\_ what we require is to dominate the passions and not to

weaken or to extirpate them!--The greater the dominating power of the

will, the greater the freedom that may be given to the passions.

The "great man" is so, owing to the free scope which he gives to his

desires, and to the still greater power which knows how to enlist these

magnificent monsters into its service.

The "good man" in every stage of civilisation is at one and the same

time the \_least dangerous\_ and the \_most useful:\_ a sort of medium;

the idea formed of such a man by the common mind is that he is some

one \_whom one has no reason to fear, but whom one must not therefore

despise.\_

Education: essentially a means of \_ruining\_ exceptions in favour of the

rule. Culture: essentially the means of directing taste against the

exceptions in favour of the mediocre.

Only when a culture can dispose of an overflow of force, is it capable

of being a hothouse for the luxurious culture of the exception, of the

experiment, of the danger, of the \_nuance: this\_ is the tendency of

\_every\_ aristocratic culture.

934.

All questions of strength: to what extent ought one to try and

prevail against the preservative measures of society and the latter's

prejudices?--to what extent ought one to unfetter \_one's terrible

qualities,\_ through which so many go to the dogs?--to what extent

ought one to run counter to \_truth,\_ and take up sides with its most

questionable aspects?--to what extent ought one to oppose suffering,

self-contempt, pity, disease, vice, when it is always open to question

whether one can ever master them (what does not kill us makes us

\_stronger...\_.)?--and, finally, to what extent ought one to acknowledge

the rights of the rule, of the common-place, of the petty, of the good,

of the upright, in fact of the average man, without thereby allowing

one's self to become vulgar? ... The strongest test of character is to

resist being ruined by the seductiveness of goodness. \_Goodness\_ must

be regarded as a luxury, as a refinement, as a \_vice.\_

3. The Noble Man.

935.

\_Type.\_ real goodness, nobility, greatness of soul, as the result of

vital wealth: which does not give in order to receive--and which has no

desire to \_elevate\_ itself by being good, \_squandering\_ is typical of

genuine goodness, vital \_personal\_ wealth is its prerequisite.

936.

\_Aristocracy.\_--Gregarious ideals at present culminating in the highest

standard of value for society. It has been attempted to give them a

cosmic, yea, and even a metaphysical, value.--I defend \_aristocracy\_

against them.

Any society which would of itself preserve a feeling of respect

and \_délicatesse\_ in regard to freedom, must consider itself as an

exception, and have a force against it from which it distinguishes

itself, and upon which it looks down with hostility.

The more rights I surrender and the more I level myself down to others,

the more deeply do I sink into the average and ultimately into the

greatest number. The first condition which an aristocratic society

must have in order to maintain a high degree of freedom among its

members, is that extreme tension which arises from the presence of

the most \_antagonistic\_ instincts in all its units: from their will to

dominate....

If ye would fain do away with strong contrasts and differences of rank,

ye will also abolish, strong love, lofty attitudes of mind, and the

feeling of individuality.

\*\*\*

Concerning the \_actual\_ psychology of societies based upon freedom and

equality.--What is it that tends to \_diminish\_ in such a society?

The will to be \_responsible for ones self\_ (the loss of this is a sign

of the decline of autonomy); the ability to defend and to attack, even

in spiritual matters; the power of command; the sense of reverence,

of subservience, the ability to be silent, \_great passion,\_ great

achievements, tragedy and cheerfulness.

937.

In 1814 Augustin Thierry read what Montlosier had said in his work, \_De

la Monarchie française:\_ he answered with a cry of indignation, and set

himself to his task. That emigrant had said:

"\_Race d'affranchis, race d'esclaves arrachés de nos mains, peuple

tributaire, peuple nouveau, licence vous fut octroyée d'être libres,

et non pas à nous d'être nobles; pour nous tout est de droit, pour

vous tout est de grâce, nous ne sommes point de votre communauté; nous

sommes un tout par nous mêmes.\_"

938.

How constantly the aristocratic world shears and weakens itself ever

more and more! By means of its noble instincts it abandons its

privileges, and owing to its refined and excessive culture, it takes

an interest in the people, the weak, the poor, and the poetry of the

lowly, etc.

939.

There is such a thing as a noble and dangerous form of carelessness,

which allows of profound conclusions and insight: the carelessness

of the self-reliant and over-rich soul, which has never \_troubled\_

itself about friends, but which knows only hospitality and knows

how to practise it; whose heart and house are open to all who will

enter--beggar, cripple, or king. This is genuine sociability: he who is

capable of it has hundreds of "friends," but probably not one friend.

940.

The teaching μηδὲν ἄγαν applies to men with overflowing

strength,--not to the mediocre, ἐγκράτεια and ἄσκησις are only

steps to higher things. Above them stands "golden Nature."

\_"Thou shalt"\_--unconditional obedience in Stoics, in Christian and

Arabian Orders, in Kant's philosophy (it is immaterial whether this

obedience is shown to a superior or to a concept).

Higher than "Thou shalt" stands "I will" (the heroes); higher than "I

will" stands "I am" (the gods of the Greeks).

Barbarian gods express nothing of the pleasure of restraint,--they are

neither simple, nor light-hearted, nor moderate.

941.

The essence of our gardens and palaces (and to the same extent the

essence of all yearning after riches) is \_the desire to rid the eye of

disorder and vulgarity, and to build a home for our soul's nobility.\_

The majority of people certainly believe that they will develop higher

natures when those beautiful and peaceful things have operated upon

them: hence the exodus to Italy, hence all travelling, etc., and all

reading and visits to theatres. \_People want to be formed\_--that is the

kernel of their labours for culture! But the strong, the mighty, would

themselves \_have a hand in the forming, and would fain have nothing

strange about them\_!

It is for this reason, too, that men go to open Nature, not to find

themselves, but to lose themselves and to forget themselves. The desire

"\_to get away from one's self\_" is proper to all weaklings, and to all

those who are discontented with themselves.

942.

The only nobility is that of birth and blood. (I do not refer here to

the prefix "Lord" and \_L'almanac de Gotha\_: this is a parenthesis for

donkeys.) Wherever people speak of the "aristocracy of intellect,"

reasons are generally not lacking for concealing something, it is

known to be a password among ambitious Jews. Intellect alone does

not ennoble; on the contrary, something is always needed \_to ennoble

intellect.\_--What then is needed?--Blood.

943.

What is noble?

--External punctiliousness; because this punctiliousness hedges a man

about, keeps him at a distance, saves him from being confounded with

somebody else.

A frivolous appearance in word, clothing, and bearing, with which

stoical hardness and self-control protect themselves from all prying

inquisitiveness or curiosity.

--A slow step and a slow glance. There are not too many valuable things

on earth: and these come and wish to come of themselves to him who has

value. We are not quick to admire.

--We know how to bear poverty, want, and even illness.

--We avoid small honours owing to our mistrust of all who are

over-ready to praise: for the man who praises believes he understands

what he praises: but to understand--Balzac, that typical man of

ambition, betrayed the fact \_comprendre c'est égaler.\_

--Our doubt concerning the communicativeness of our hearts goes very

deep; to us, loneliness is not a matter of choice, it is imposed upon

us.

--We are convinced that we only have duties to our equals, to others we

do as we think best: we know that justice is only to be expected among

equals (alas! this will not be realised for some time to come),

--We are ironical towards the "gifted"; we hold the belief that no

morality is possible without good birth.

--We always feel as if we were those who had to dispense honours: while

he is not found too frequently who would be worthy of honouring us.

--We are always disguised: the higher a man's nature the more is he

in need of remaining incognito. If there be a God, then out of sheer

decency He ought only to show Himself on earth in the form of a man.

--We are capable of \_otium,\_ of the unconditional conviction that

although a handicraft does not shame one in any sense, it certainly

reduces one's rank. However much we may respect "industry," and know

how to give it its due, we do not appreciate it in a bourgeois sense,

or after the manner of those insatiable and cackling artists who, like

hens, cackle and lay eggs, and cackle again.

--We protect artists and poets and any one who happens to be a master

in something; but as creatures of a higher order than those, who only

know how to do something, who are only "productive men," we do not

confound ourselves with them.

--We find joy in all \_forms\_ and ceremonies; we would fain foster

everything formal, and we are convinced that courtesy is one of the

greatest virtues; we feel suspicious of every kind of \_laisser aller,\_

including the freedom of the press and of thought; because, under such

conditions, the intellect grows easy-going and coarse, and stretches

its limbs.

--We take pleasure in women as in a perhaps daintier, more delicate,

and more ethereal kind of creature. What a treat it is to meet

creatures who have only dancing and nonsense and finery in their

minds! They have always been the delight of every tense and profound

male soul, whose life is burdened with heavy responsibilities.

--We take pleasure in princes and in priests, because in big things, as

in small, they actually uphold the belief in the difference of human

values, even in the estimation of the past, and at least symbolically.

--We are able to keep silence \_i\_ but we do not breathe a word of this

in the presence of listeners.

--We are able to endure long enmities: we lack the power of easy

reconciliations.

--We have a loathing of demagogism, of enlightenment, of amiability,

and plebeian familiarity.

--We collect precious things, the needs of higher and fastidious souls;

we wish to possess nothing in common. We want to have our own books,

our \_own\_ landscapes.

--We protest against evil and fine experiences, and take care not to

generalise too quickly. The individual case: how ironically we regard

it when it has the bad taste to put on the airs of a rule!

--We love that which is \_naïf,\_ and \_naïf\_ people, but as spectators

and higher creatures; we think Faust is just as simple as his Margaret.

--We have a low estimation of good people, because they are gregarious

animals: we know how often an invaluable golden drop of goodness

lies concealed beneath the most evil, the most malicious, and the

hardest exterior, and that this single grain outweighs all the mere

goody-goodiness of milk-and-watery souls.

--We don't regard a man of our kind as refuted by his vices, nor by his

tomfooleries. We are well aware that we are not recognised with ease,

and that we have every reason to make our foreground very prominent.

944.

\_What is noble?\_--The fact that one is constantly forced to be playing

a part. That one is constantly searching for situations in which one

is forced to put on airs. That one leaves happiness to the \_greatest

number:\_ the happiness which consists of inner peacefulness, of virtue,

of comfort, and of Anglo-angelic-back-parlour-smugness, \_à la\_ Spencer.

That one instinctively seeks for heavy responsibilities. That one knows

how to create enemies everywhere, at a pinch even in one's self. That

one contradicts the \_greatest number,\_ not in words at all, but by

continually behaving differently from them.

945.

Virtue (for instance, truthfulness) is \_our\_ most noble and most

dangerous luxury. We must not decline the disadvantages which it brings

in its train.

946.

We refuse to be \_praised:\_ we do what serves our purpose, what gives us

pleasure, or what we are obliged to do.

947.

What is chastity in a man? It means that his taste in sex has remained

noble; that \_in eroticis\_ he likes neither the brutal, the morbid, nor

the clever.

948.

The concept of honour is founded upon the belief in select society,

in knightly excellences, in the obligation of having continually to

play a part. In essentials it means that one does not take one's life

too seriously, that one adheres unconditionally to the most dignified

manners in one's dealings with everybody (at least in so far as they do

not belong to "us"); that one is neither familiar, nor good-natured,

nor hearty, nor modest, except \_inter pares\_; that one is \_always

playing a part.\_

949.

The fact that one sets one's life, one's health, and one's honour

at stake, is the result of high spirits and of an overflowing and

spendthrift will: it is not the result of philanthropy, but of the fact

that every danger kindles our curiosity concerning the measure of our

strength, and provokes our courage.

950.

Eagles swoop down straight nobility of soul is best revealed by the

magnificent and proud foolishness with which it makes its \_attacks.\_

951.

War should be made against all namby-pamby ideas of \_nobility\_!--A

certain modicum of brutality cannot be dispensed with: no more

than we can do without a certain approximation to criminality.

"Self-satisfaction" must \_not\_ be allowed; a man should look upon

himself with an adventurous spirit; he should experiment with himself

and run risks with himself--no beautiful soul-quackery should be

tolerated. I want to give \_a more robust ideal\_ a chance of prevailing.

952.

"Paradise is under the shadow of a swordsman"--this is also a symbol

and a test-word by which souls with noble and warrior-like origin

betray and discover themselves.

953.

\_The two paths.\_--There comes a period when man has a surplus amount

of power at his disposal. Science aims at establishing the \_slavery of

nature.\_

Then man acquires the \_leisure\_ in which to develop himself into

something new and more lofty. \_A new aristocracy.\_ It is then that a

large number of virtues which are now \_conditions of existence\_ are

superseded.--Qualities which are no longer needed are on that account

lost. We no longer need virtues: \_consequently\_ we are losing them

(likewise the morality of "one thing is needful," of the salvation of

the soul, and of immortality: these were means wherewith to make man

capable of enormous self-tyranny, through the emotion of great fear!!!).

The different kinds of needs by means of whose discipline man is

formed: need teaches work, thought, and self-control.

\*\*\*

\_Physiological\_ purification and strengthening. The new aristocracy is

in need of an opposing body which it may combat: it must be driven to

extremities in order to maintain itself.

\_The two futures of mankind\_: (1) the consequence of a levelling-down

to mediocrity, (2) conscious aloofness and self-development.

A doctrine which would cleave a \_gulf:\_ it maintains the \_highest and

the lowest species\_ (it destroys the intermediate).

The aristocracies, both spiritual and temporal, which have existed

hitherto prove nothing \_against\_ the necessity of a new aristocracy.

4. The Lords of the Earth.

954.

A certain question constantly recurs to us; it is perhaps a seductive

and evil question; may it be whispered into the ears of those who

have a right to such doubtful problems--those strong souls of to-day

whose dominion over themselves is unswerving: is it not high time,

now that the type "gregarious animal" is developing ever more and

more in Europe, to set about rearing, thoroughly, artificially, and

consciously, an opposite type, and to attempt to establish the latter's

virtues? And would not the democratic movement itself find for the

first time a sort of goal, salvation, and justification, if some one

appeared who availed himself of it--so that at last, beside its new

and sublime product, slavery (for this must be the end of European

democracy), that higher species of ruling and Cæsarian spirits might

also be produced, which would stand upon it, hold to it, and would

elevate themselves through it? This new race would climb aloft to new

and hitherto impossible things, to a broader vision, and to its task on

earth.

955.

The aspect of the European of to-day makes me very hopeful. A daring

and ruling race is here building itself up upon the foundation of

an extremely intelligent, gregarious mass. It is obvious that the

educational movements for the latter are not alone prominent nowadays.

956.

The same conditions which go to develop the gregarious animal also

force the development of the leaders.

957.

The question, and at the same time the task, is approaching with

hesitation, terrible as Fate, but nevertheless inevitable: how shall

the earth as a whole be ruled? And to what end shall man as a whole--no

longer as a people or as a race--be reared and trained?

Legislative moralities are the principal means by which one can form

mankind, according to the fancy of a creative and profound will:

provided, of course, that such an artistic will of the first order gets

the power into its own hands, and can make its creative will prevail

over long periods in the form of legislation, religions, and morals.

At present, and probably for some time to come, one will seek such

colossally creative men, such really great men, as I understand them,

in vain: they will be lacking, until, after many disappointments, we

are forced to begin to understand why it is they are lacking, and that

nothing bars with greater hostility their rise and development, at

present and for some time to come, than that which is now called \_the\_

morality in Europe. Just as if there were no other kind of morality,

and could be no other kind, than the one we have already characterised

as herd-morality. It is this morality which is now striving with

all its power to attain to that green-meadow happiness on earth,

which consists in security, absence of danger, ease, facilities for

livelihood, and, last but not least, "if all goes well," even hopes

to dispense with all kinds of shepherds and bell-wethers. The two

doctrines which it preaches most universally are "equality of rights"

and "pity for all sufferers"--and it even regards suffering itself as

something which must be got rid of absolutely. That such ideas may be

modern leads one to think very poorly of modernity. He, however, who

has reflected deeply concerning the question, how and where the plant

man has hitherto grown most vigorously, is forced to believe that this

has always taken place under the opposite conditions; that to this end

the danger of the situation has to increase enormously, his inventive

faculty and dissembling powers have to fight their way up under long

oppression and compulsion, and his will to life has to be increased

to the unconditioned will to power, to over-power: he believes that

danger, severity, violence, peril in the street and in the heart,

inequality of rights, secrecy, stoicism, seductive art, and devilry of

every kind--in short, the opposite of all gregarious desiderata--are

necessary for the elevation of man. Such a morality with opposite

designs, which would rear man upwards instead of to comfort and

mediocrity; such a morality, with the intention of producing a ruling

caste--the future lords of the earth--must, in order to be taught at

all, introduce itself as if it were in some way correlated to the

prevailing moral law, and must come forward under the cover of the

latter's words and forms. But seeing that, to this end, a host of

transitionary and deceptive measures must be discovered, and that the

life of a single individual stands for almost nothing in view of the

accomplishment of such lengthy tasks and aims, the first thing that

must be done is to rear \_a new kind\_ of man in whom the duration of

the necessary will and the necessary instincts is guaranteed for many

generations. This must be a new kind of ruling species and caste--this

ought to be quite as clear as the somewhat lengthy and not easily

expressed consequences of this thought. The aim should be to prepare

a \_transvaluation of values\_ for a particularly strong kind of man,

most highly gifted in intellect and will, and, to this end, slowly

and cautiously to liberate in him a whole host of slandered instincts

hitherto held in check: whoever meditates about this problem belongs

to us, the free spirits--certainly not to that kind of "free spirit"

which has existed hitherto: for these desired practically the reverse.

To this order, it seems to me, belong, above all, the pessimists of

Europe, the poets and thinkers of a revolted idealism, in so far as

their discontent with existence in general must \_consistently\_ at least

have led them to be dissatisfied with the man of the present; the same

applies to certain insatiably ambitious artists who courageously and

unconditionally fight against the gregarious animal for the special

rights of higher men, and subdue all herd-instincts and precautions

of more exceptional minds by their seductive art. Thirdly and lastly,

we should include in this group all those critics and historians by

whom the discovery of the Old World, which has begun so happily--this

was the work of the \_new\_ Columbus, of German intellect--will be

courageously \_continued\_ (for we still stand in the very first stages

of this conquest). For in the Old World, as a matter of fact, a

different and more lordly morality ruled than that of to-day; and the

man of antiquity, under the educational ban of his morality, was a

stronger and deeper man than the man of to-day--up to the present he

has been the only well-constituted man. The temptation, however, which

from antiquity to the present day has always exercised its power on

such lucky strokes of Nature, \_i.e.\_ on strong and enterprising souls,

is, even at the present day, the most subtle and most effective of

anti-democratic and anti-Christian powers, just as it was in the time

of the Renaissance.

958.

I am writing for a race of men which does not yet exist: for "the lords

of the earth."

In Plato's \_Theages\_ the following passage will be found: "Every one

of us would like if possible to be master of mankind; if possible, a

\_God!" This\_ attitude of mind must be reinstated in our midst.

Englishmen, Americans, and Russians.

959.

That primeval forest-plant Man always appears where the struggle for

power has been waged longest. \_Great\_ men.

Primeval forest creatures, the \_Romans.\_

960.

From now henceforward there will be such favourable first conditions

for greater ruling powers as have never yet been found on earth.

And this is by no means the most important point. The establishment

has been made possible of international race unions which will set

themselves the task of rearing a ruling race, the future "lords

of the earth"--a new, vast aristocracy based upon the most severe

self-discipline, in which the will of philosophical men of power and

artist-tyrants will be stamped upon thousands of years: a higher

species of men which, thanks to their preponderance of will, knowledge,

riches, and influence, will avail themselves of democratic Europe as

the most suitable and supple instrument they can have for taking the

fate of the earth into their own hands, and working as artists upon man

himself. Enough! The time is coming for us to transform all our views

on politics.

5. The Great Man.

961.

I will endeavour to see at which periods in history great men arise.

The significance of despotic moralities that have lasted a long time:

they strain the bow, provided they do not break it.

962.

A great man,--a man whom Nature has built up and invented in a grand

style,--What is such a man? \_First,\_ in his general course of action

his consistency is so broad that owing to its very breadth it can be

surveyed only with difficulty, and consequently misleads; he possesses

the capacity of extending his will over great stretches of his life,

and of despising and rejecting all small things, whatever most

beautiful and "divine" things of the world there may be among them.

\_Secondly,\_ he is \_colder, harder, less cautious and more free from

the fear of "public opinion";\_ he does not possess the virtues which

are compatible with respectability and with being respected, nor any

of those things which are counted among the "virtues of the herd." If

he is unable to \_lead\_, he walks alone; he may then perchance grunt

at many things which he meets on his way. \_Thirdly\_, he asks for no

"compassionate" heart, but servants, instruments; in his dealings with

men his one aim is \_to make\_ something out of them. He knows that he

cannot reveal himself to anybody: he thinks it bad taste to become

familiar; and as a rule he is not familiar when people think he is.

When he is not talking to his soul, he wears a mask. He would rather

lie than tell the truth, because lying requires more spirit and \_will\_.

There is a loneliness within his heart which neither praise nor blame

can reach, because he is his own judge from whom is no appeal.

963.

The great man is necessarily a sceptic (I do not mean to say by this

that he must appear to be one), provided that greatness consists in

this: to \_will\_ something great, together with the means thereto.

Freedom from any kind of conviction is a factor in his \_strength

of will\_. And thus it is in keeping with that "enlightened form of

despotism" which every great passion exercises. Such a passion enlists

intellect in its service; it even has the courage for unholy means;

it creates without hesitation; it allows itself convictions, it even

\_uses\_ them, but it never submits to them. The need of faith and

of anything unconditionally negative or affirmative is a proof of

weakness; all weakness is weakness of will. The man of faith, the

believer, is necessarily an inferior species of man. From this it

follows that "all freedom of spirit," \_i.e.\_ instinctive scepticism, is

the prerequisite of greatness.

964.

The great man is conscious of his power over a people, and of the fact

that he coincides temporarily with a people or with a century--this

\_magnifying\_ of his self-consciousness as \_causa\_ and \_voluntas\_

is \_misunderstood\_ as "altruism": he feels driven to \_means\_ of

communication: all great men are \_inventive\_ in such means. They want

to form great communities in their own image; they would fain give

multiformity and disorder definite shape; it stimulates them to behold

chaos.

The misunderstanding of love. There is a \_slavish\_ love which

subordinates itself and gives itself away--which idealises and deceives

itself; there is a \_divine\_ species of love which despises and loves at

the same time, and which \_remodels\_ and \_elevates\_ the thing it loves.

The object is to attain that enormous \_energy of greatness\_ which can

model the man of the future by means of discipline and also by means

of the annihilation of millions of the bungled and botched, and which

can yet avoid \_going to ruin\_ at the sight of the suffering \_created\_

thereby, the like of which has never been seen before.

965.

The revolution, confusion, and distress of whole peoples is in my

opinion of less importance than \_the misfortunes which attend great

individuals in their development.\_ We must not allow ourselves to be

deceived: the many misfortunes of all these small folk do not together

constitute a sum-total, except in the feelings of \_mighty\_ men.--To

think of one's self in moments of great danger, and to draw ones own

advantage from the calamities of thousands in the case of the man

who differs very much from the common ruck--may be a sign of a great

character which is able to master its feeling of pity and justice.

966.

In contradistinction to the animal, man has developed such a host

of \_antagonistic\_ instincts and impulses in himself, that he has

become master of the earth by means of this synthesis.--Moralities

are only the expression of local and limited \_orders of rank in\_ this

multifarious world of instincts which prevent man from perishing

through their \_antagonism.\_ Thus a masterful instinct so weakens and

subtilises the instinct which opposes it that it becomes an \_impulse\_

which provides the \_stimulus\_ for the activity of the principal

instinct.

The highest man would have the greatest multifariousness in his

instincts, and he would \_possess\_ these in the relatively strongest

degree in which he is able to endure them. As a matter of fact,

wherever the plant, man, is found strong, mighty instincts are to be

found opposing each other (\_e.g.\_ Shakespeare), but they are subdued.

967.

Would one not be justified in reckoning all great men among the

\_wicked?\_ This is not so easy to demonstrate in the case of

individuals. They are so frequently capable of masterly dissimulation

that they very often assume the airs and forms of great virtues. Often,

too, they seriously reverence virtues, and in such a way as to be

passionately hard towards themselves; but as the result of cruelty.

Seen from a distance such things are liable to deceive. Many, on the

other hand, misunderstand themselves; not infrequently, too, a great

mission will call forth great qualities, \_e.g.\_ justice. The essential

fact is: the greatest men may also perhaps have great virtues, but then

they also have the opposites of these virtues. I believe that it is

precisely out of the presence of these opposites and of the feelings

they suscitate, that the great man arises,--for the great man is the

broad arch which spans two banks lying far apart.

968.

In \_great men\_ we find the specific qualities of life in their highest

manifestation: injustice, falsehood, exploitation. But inasmuch as

their effect has always been \_overwhelming,\_ their essential nature has

been most thoroughly misunderstood, and interpreted as goodness. The

type of such an interpreter would be Carlyle.[5]

969.

Generally speaking, everything \_is worth no more and no less than one

has paid for it.\_ This of course does not hold good in the case of an

isolated individual; the great capacities of the individual have no

relation whatsoever to that which he has done, sacrificed, and suffered

for them. But if one should examine the previous history of his race

one would be sure to find the record of an extraordinary storing up and

capitalising of power by means of all kinds of abstinence, struggle,

industry, and determination. It is because the great man has cost so

much, and not because he stands there as a miracle, as a gift from

heaven, or as an accident, that he became great: "Heredity" is a false

notion. A man's ancestors have always paid the price of what he is.

970.

\_The danger of modesty.\_ To adapt ourselves too early to duties,

societies, and daily schemes of work in which accident may have placed

us, at a time when neither our powers nor our aim in life has stepped

peremptorily into our consciousness; the premature certainty of

conscience and feeling of relief and of sociability which is acquired

by this precocious, modest attitude, and which appears to our minds

as a deliverance from those inner and outer disturbances of our

feelings--all this pampers and keeps a man down in the most dangerous

fashion imaginable. To learn to respect things which people about us

respect, as if we had no standard or right of our own to determine

values; the strain of appraising things as others appraise them,

\_counter\_ to the whisperings of our inner taste, which also has a

conscience of its own, becomes a terribly subtle kind of constraint:

and if in the end no explosion takes place which bursts all the bonds

of love and morality at once, then such a spirit becomes withered,

dwarfed, feminine, and objective. The reverse of this is bad enough,

but still it is better than the foregoing: to suffer from one's

environment, from its praise just as much as from its blame; to be

wounded by it and to fester inwardly without betraying the fact; to

defend one's self involuntarily and suspiciously against its love; to

learn to be silent, and perchance to conceal this by talking; to create

nooks and safe, lonely hiding-places where one can go and take breath

for a moment, or shed tears of sublime comfort--until at last one has

grown strong enough to say: "What on earth have I to do with you?" and

to go \_one's\_ way alone.

971.

Those men who are in themselves destinies, and whose advent is the

advent of fate, the whole race of \_heroic\_ bearers of burdens: oh!

how heartily and gladly would they have respite from themselves for

once in a while!--how they crave after stout hearts and shoulders, that

they might free themselves, were it but for an hour or two, from that

which oppresses them! And how fruitlessly they crave! ... They wait;

they observe all that passes before their eyes: no man even cometh nigh

to them with a thousandth part of their suffering and passion, no man

guesseth to what end they have waited.... At last, at last, they learn

the first lesson of their life: to wait no longer; and forthwith they

learn their second lesson: to be affable, to be modest; and from that

time onwards to endure everybody and every kind of thing--in short, to

endure still a little more than they had endured theretofore.

6. The Highest Man as Lawgiver of the Future.

972.

\_The lawgivers of the future.\_--After having tried for a long time in

vain to attach a particular meaning to the word "philosopher,"--for I

found many antagonistic traits, I recognised that we can distinguish

between two kinds of philosophers:--

(1) Those who desire to establish any large system of values (logical

or moral);

(2) Those who are the \_lawgivers\_ of such valuations.

The former try to seize upon the world of the present or the past,

by embodying or abbreviating the multifarious phenomena by means of

signs: their object is to make it possible for us to survey, to reflect

upon, to comprehend, and to utilise everything that has happened

hitherto--they serve the purpose of man by using all past things to the

benefit of his future.

The second class, however, are \_commanders;\_ they say: "Thus shall it

be!" They alone determine the "whither" and the "wherefore," and that

which will be useful and beneficial to man; they have command over the

previous work of scientific men, and all knowledge is to them only

a means to their creations. This second kind of philosopher seldom

appears; and as a matter of fact their situation and their danger is

appalling. How often have they not intentionally blindfolded their

eyes in order to shut out the sight of the small strip of ground which

separates them from the abyss and from utter destruction. Plato, for

instance, when he persuaded himself that "the good," as he wanted it,

was not Plato's good, but "the good in itself," the eternal treasure

which a certain man of the name of Plato had chanced to find on his

way! This same will to blindness prevails in a much coarser form in the

case of the founders of religion; their "Thou shalt" must on no account

sound to their ears like "I will,"--they only dare to pursue their task

as if under the command of God; their legislation of values can only be

a burden they can bear if they regard it as "revelation," in this way

their conscience is not crushed by the responsibility.

As soon as those two comforting expedients--that of Plato and that of

Muhammed--have been overthrown, and no thinker can any longer relieve

his conscience with the hypothesis "God" or "eternal values," the

claim of the lawgiver to determine new values rises to an awfulness

which has not yet been experienced. Now those elect, on whom the

faint light of such a duty is beginning to dawn, try and see whether

they cannot escape it--as their greatest danger--by means of a timely

side-spring: for instance, they try to persuade themselves that their

task is already accomplished, or that it defies accomplishment, or that

their shoulders are not broad enough for such burdens, or that they

are already taken up with burdens closer to hand, or even that this

new and remote duty is a temptation and a seduction, drawing them away

from all other duties; a disease, a kind of madness. Many, as a matter

of fact, do succeed in evading the path appointed to them: throughout

the whole of history we can see the traces of such deserters and their

guilty consciences. In most cases,, however, there comes to such men

of destiny that hour of delivery, that autumnal season of maturity, in

which they are forced to do that which they did not even "wish to do":

and that deed before which in the past they have trembled most, falls

easily and unsought from the tree, as an involuntary deed, almost as a

present.

973.

\_The human horizon.\_--Philosophers may be conceived as men who make

the greatest efforts to \_discover\_ to what extent man can \_elevate\_

himself--this holds good more particularly of Plato: how far man's

\_power\_ can extend. But they do this as individuals; perhaps the

instinct of Cæsars and of all founders of states, etc., was greater,

for it preoccupied itself with the question how far man could be urged

forward in \_development\_ under "favourable circumstances." What they

did not sufficiently understand, however, was the nature of favourable

circumstances. The great question: "Where has the plant 'man' grown

most magnificently heretofore? In order to answer this, a comparative

study of history is necessary.

974.

Every fact and every work exercises a fresh persuasion over every age

and every new species of man. History always enunciates new truths.

975.

To remain objective, severe, firm, and hard while making a thought

prevail is perhaps the best forte of artists; but if for this purpose

any one have to work upon human material (as teachers, statesmen,

have to do, etc.), then the repose, the coldness, and the hardness

soon vanish. In natures like Cæsar and Napoleon we are able to divine

something of the nature of "disinterestedness" in their work on their

marble, whatever be the number of men that are sacrificed in the

process. In this direction the future of higher men lies: to bear the

greatest responsibilities and not to go to rack and ruin through

them.--Hitherto the deceptions of inspiration have almost always been

necessary for a man not to lose faith in his own hand, and in his right

to his task.

976.

The reason why philosophers are mostly failures. Because among the

conditions which determine them there are qualities which generally

ruin other men:--

(1) A philosopher must have an enormous multiplicity of qualities; he

must be a sort of abbreviation of man and have all man's high and base

desires: the danger of the contrast within him, and of the possibility

of his loathing himself;

(2) He must be inquisitive in an extraordinary number of ways: the

danger of versatility;

(3) He must be just and honest in the highest sense, but profound both

in love and hate (and in injustice);

(4) He must not only be a spectator but a lawgiver: a judge and

defendant (in so far as he is an abbreviation of the world);

(5) He must be extremely multiform and yet firm and hard. He must be

supple.

977.

The really \_regal\_ calling of the philosopher (according to the

expression of Alcuin the Anglo-Saxon): "\_Prava corrigere, et recta

corroborare, et sancta sublimare.\_"

978.

The new philosopher can only arise in conjunction with a ruling class,

as the highest spiritualisation of the latter. Great politics, the

rule of the earth, as a proximate contingency, the total \_lack of

principles\_ necessary thereto.

979.

Fundamental concept: the new values must first be created--this remains

\_our duty\_! The philosopher must be our lawgiver. New species. (How the

greatest species hitherto [for instance, the Greeks] were reared: this

kind of accident must now be \_consciously\_ striven for.)

980.

Supposing one thinks of the philosopher as an educator who, looking

down from his lonely elevation, is powerful enough to draw long chains

of generations up to him: then he must be granted the most terrible

privileges of a great educator. An educator never says what he himself

thinks; but only that which he thinks it is good for those whom he is

educating to hear upon any subject. This dissimulation on his part

must not be found out; it is part of his masterliness that people

should believe in his honesty, he must be capable of all the means of

discipline and education: there are some natures which he will only be

able to raise by means of lashing them with his scorn; others who are

lazy, irresolute, cowardly, and vain, he will be able to affect only

with exaggerated praise. Such a teacher stands beyond good and evil,

but nobody must know that he does.

981.

We must \_not\_ make men "better," we must \_not\_ talk to them about

morality in any form as if "morality in itself," or an ideal kind

of man in general, could be taken for granted; but we must \_create

circumstances\_ in which \_stronger men are necessary,\_ such as for

their part will require a morality (or, better still: a bodily and

spiritual discipline) which makes men strong, and upon which they will

consequently insist! As they will need one so badly, they will have it.

We must not let ourselves be seduced by blue eyes and heaving breasts:

\_greatness of soul has absolutely nothing romantic about it. And

unfortunately nothing whatever amiable either.\_

982.

From warriors we must learn: (1) to associate death with those

interests for which we are fighting--that makes us venerable; (2) we

must learn to \_sacrifice\_ numbers, and to take our cause sufficiently

seriously not to spare men; (3) we must practise inexorable discipline,

and allow ourselves violence and cunning in war.

983.

The \_education\_ which rears those \_ruling\_ virtues that allow a man to

become master of his benevolence and his pity: the great disciplinary

virtues ("Forgive thine enemies" is mere child's play beside them),

\_and the passions of the creator, must be elevated\_ to the heights--we

must cease from carving marble! The exceptional and powerful position

of those creatures (compared with that of all princes hitherto): the

Roman Cæsar with Christ's soul.

984.

We must not separate greatness of soul from intellectual greatness. For

the former involves \_independence\_; but without intellectual greatness

independence should not be allowed; all it does is to create disasters

even in its lust of well-doing and of practising "justice." Inferior

spirits \_must\_ obey, consequently they cannot be possessed of greatness.

985.

The more lofty philosophical man who is surrounded by loneliness, not

because he wishes to be alone, but because he is what he is, and cannot

find his equal: what a number of dangers and torments are reserved for

him, precisely at the present time, when we have lost our belief in

the order of rank, and consequently no longer know how to understand

or honour this isolation! Formerly the sage almost sanctified himself

in the consciences of the mob by going aside in this way; to-day

the anchorite sees himself as though enveloped in a cloud of gloomy

doubt and suspicions. And not alone by the envious and the wretched:

in every well-meant act that he experiences he is bound to discover

misunderstanding, neglect, and superficiality. He knows the crafty

tricks of foolish pity which makes these people feel so good and holy

when they attempt to save him from his own destiny, by giving him more

comfortable situations and more decent and reliable society. Yes, he

will even get to admire the unconscious lust of destruction with which

all mediocre spirits stand up and oppose him, believing all the while

that they have a holy right to do so! For men of such incomprehensible

loneliness it is necessary to put a good stretch of country between

them and the officiousness of their fellows: this is part of their

prudence. For such a man to maintain himself uppermost to-day amid

the dangerous maelstroms of the age which threaten to draw him under,

even cunning and disguise will be necessary. Every attempt he makes to

order his life in the present and with the present, every time he draws

near to these men and their modern desires, he will have to expiate as

if it were an actual sin: and withal he may look with wonder at the

concealed wisdom of his nature, which after every one of these attempts

immediately leads him back to himself by means of illnesses and painful

accidents.

986.

\_"Maledetto colui\_

\_che contrista, un spirto immortal!"\_

MANZONI (\_Conte di Carmagnola,\_ Act II.)

987.

The most difficult and the highest form which man can attain is the

most seldom successful: thus the history of philosophy reveals a

superabundance of bungled and unhappy cases of manhood, and its march

is an extremely slow one; whole centuries intervene and suppress what

has been achieved: and in this way the connecting-link is always made

to fail. It is an appalling history, this history of the highest men,

of the sages.--What is most often damaged is precisely the recollection

of great men, for the semi-successful and botched cases of mankind

misunderstand them and overcome them by their "successes." Whenever

an "effect" is noticeable, the masses gather in a crowd round it;

to hear the inferior and the poor in spirit having their say is a

terrible ear-splitting torment for him who knows and trembles at the

thought, that the fate of man depends upon the success of its highest

types. From the days of my childhood I have reflected upon the sage's

conditions of existence, and I will not conceal my happy conviction

that in Europe he has once more become possible--perhaps only for a

short time.

988.

These new philosophers begin with a description of a systematic order

of rank and difference of value among men,--what they desire is, alas

precisely the reverse of an assimilation and equalisation of man: they

teach estrangement in every sense, they cleave gulfs such as have

never yet existed, and they would fain have man become more evil than

he ever was. For the present they live concealed and estranged even

from each other. For many reasons they will find it necessary to be

anchorites and to wear masks--they will therefore be of little use

in the matter of seeking for their equals. They will live alone, and

probably know the torments of all the loneliest forms of loneliness.

Should they, however, thanks to any accident, meet each other on the

road, I wager that they would not know each other, or that they would

deceive each other in a number of ways.

989.

"Les philosophes ne sont pas faits pour s'aimer. Les aigles ne volent

point en compagnie. Il faut laisser cela aux perdrix, aux étourneaux

... Planer au-dessus et avoir des griffes, voila le lot des grands

génies."--GALIANI.

990.

I forgot to say that such philosophers are cheerful, and that they

like to sit in the abyss of a perfectly clear sky: they are in need of

different means for enduring life than other men; for they suffer in

a different way (that is to say, just as much from the depth of their

contempt of man as from their love of man).--The animal which suffered

most on earth discovered for itself \_--laughter.\_

991.

\_Concerning the misunderstanding of "cheerfulness."\_ --It is a

temporary relief from long tension; it is the wantonness, the

Saturnalia of a spirit, which is consecrating and preparing itself for

long and terrible resolutions. The "fool" in the form of "science."

992.

The new order of rank among spirits; tragic natures no longer in the

van.

993.

It is a comfort to me to know that over the smoke and filth of human

baseness there is a \_higher and brighter\_ mankind, which, judging from

their number, must be a small race (for everything that is in any way

distinguished is \_ipso facto\_ rare). A man does not belong to this race

because he happens to be more gifted, more virtuous, more heroic, or

more loving than the men below, but because he is \_colder, brighter,

more far-sighted, and more lonely;\_ because he endures, prefers, and

even insists upon, loneliness as the joy, the privilege, yea, even the

condition of existence; because he lives amid clouds and lightnings as

among his equals, and likewise among sunrays, dewdrops, snowflakes,

and all that which must needs come from the heights, and which in its

course moves ever from heaven to earth. The desire to look aloft is not

our desire.--Heroes, martyrs, geniuses, and enthusiasts of all kinds,

are not quiet, patient, subtle, cold, or slow enough for us.

994.

The absolute conviction that valuations above and below are different;

that innumerable experiences are wanting to the latter: that when

looking upwards from below misunderstandings are necessary.

995.

How do men attain to great power and to great tasks? All the virtues

and proficiences of the body and the soul are little by little

laboriously acquired, through great industry, self-control, and keeping

one's self within narrow bounds, through a frequent, energetic, and

genuine repetition of the same work and of the same hardships; but

there are men who are the heirs and masters of this slowly acquired

and manifold treasure of virtues and proficiences because, owing

to happy and reasonable marriages and also to lucky accidents, the

acquired and accumulated forces of many generations, instead of being

squandered and subdivided, have been assembled together by means of

steadfast struggling and willing. And thus, in the end, a man appears

who is such a monster of strength, that he craves for a monstrous

task. For it is our power which has command of us: and the wretched

intellectual play of aims and intentions and motivations lies only in

the foreground--however much weak eyes may recognise the principal

factors in these things.

990.

The sublime man has the highest value, even when he is most delicate

and fragile, because an abundance of very difficult and rare things

have been reared through many generations and united in him.

997.

I teach that there are higher and lower men, and that a single

individual may under certain circumstances justify whole millenniums of

existence --that is to say, a wealthier, more gifted, greater, and more

complete man, as compared with innumerable imperfect and fragmentary

men.

998.

Away from rulers and rid of all bonds, live the highest men: and in the

rulers they have their instruments.

999.

\_The order of rank:\_ he who \_determines\_ values and leads the will of

millenniums, and does this by leading the highest natures--he \_is the

highest man.\_

1000.

I fancy I have divined some of the things that lie hidden in the soul

of the highest man; perhaps every man who has divined so much must go

to ruin: but he who has seen the highest man must do all he can to

make him \_possible.\_ Fundamental thought: we must make the future the

standard of all our valuations--and not seek the laws for our conduct

behind us.

1001.

Not "mankind," but \_Superman\_ is the goal!

1002.

"Come l'uom s'eterna...."--\_Inf.\_ xv. 85.

II.

DIONYSUS.

1003.

To \_him who is one of Nature's lucky strokes,\_ to, him unto whom my

heart goes out, to him who is carved from one integral block, which is

hard, sweet, and fragrant--to him from whom even my nose can derive

some pleasure--let this book be dedicated.

He enjoys that which is beneficial to him.

His pleasure in anything ceases when the limits of what is beneficial

to him are overstepped.

He divines the remedies for partial injuries; his illnesses are the

great stimulants of his existence.

He understands how to exploit his serious accidents.

He grows stronger under the misfortunes which threaten to annihilate

him.

He instinctively gathers from all he sees, hears, and experiences,

the materials for what concerns him most,--he pursues a selective

principle,--he rejects a good deal.

He reacts with that tardiness which long caution and deliberate

\_pride\_ have bred in him,--he tests the stimulus: whence does it come?

whither does it lead? He does not submit.

He is always in his own company, whether his intercourse be with books,

with men, or with Nature.

He honours anything by choosing it, by conceding to it, by trusting it.

1004.

We should attain to such a height, to such a lofty eagle's ledge, in

our observation, as to be able to understand that everything happens,

\_just as it ought to happen\_: and that all "imperfection," and the pain

it brings, belong to all that which is most eminently desirable.

1005.

Towards 1876 I experienced a fright; for I saw that everything I had

most wished for up to that time was being compromised. I realised this

when I perceived what Wagner was actually driving at: and I was bound

very fast to him--by all the bonds of a profound similarity of needs,

by gratitude, by the thought that he could not be replaced, and by the

absolute void which I saw facing me.

Just about this time I believed myself to be inextricably entangled in

my philology and my professorship--in the accident and last shift of my

life: I did not know how to get out of it, and was tired, used up, and

on my last legs.

At about the same time I realised that what my instincts most desired

to attain was precisely the reverse of what Schopenhauer's instincts

wanted--that is to say, a \_justification of life,\_ even where it was

most terrible, most equivocal, and most false: to this end, I had the

formula "\_Dionysian\_" in my hand.

Schopenhauer's interpretation of the "absolute" as \_will\_ was certainly

a step towards that concept of the "absolute" which supposed it to be

necessarily good, blessed, true, and integral, but Schopenhauer did

not understand how to deify this will: he remained suspended in the

moral-Christian ideal. Indeed, he was still so very much under the

dominion of Christian values, that, once he could no longer regard

the absolute as God, he had to conceive it as evil, foolish, utterly

reprehensible. He did not realise that there is an infinite number of

ways of being different, and even of being God.

1006.

Hitherto, moral values have been the highest values: does anybody doubt

this? If we bring down the values from their pedestal, we thereby

alter \_all\_ values; the principle of their \_order of rank\_ which has

prevailed hitherto is thus overthrown.

1007.

Transvalue values--what does this mean? It implies that all spontaneous

motives, all new, future, and stronger motives, are still extant; but

that they now appear under false names and false valuations, and have

not yet become conscious of themselves.

We ought to have the courage to become, conscious, and to affirm all

that which has been \_attained\_--to get rid of the humdrum character

of old valuations, which makes us unworthy of the best and strongest

things that we have achieved.

1008.

Any doctrine would be superfluous for which everything is not already

prepared in the way of accumulated forces and explosive material. A

transvaluation of values can only be accomplished when there is a

tension of new needs, and a new set of needy people who feel all old

values as painful,--although they are not conscious of what is wrong.

1009.

The standpoint from which my values are determined: is abundance or

desire active? ... Is one a mere spectator, or is one's own shoulder

at the wheel--is one looking away or is one turning aside? ... Is one

acting spontaneously, as the result of accumulated strength, or is one

merely reacting to a goad or to a stimulus? ... Is one simply acting

as the result of a paucity of elements, or of such an overwhelming

dominion over a host of elements that this power enlists the latter

into its service if it requires them? ... Is one a \_problem\_ one's

self or is one a \_solution\_ already? ... Is \_one perfect\_ through

the smallness of the task, or \_imperfect\_ owing to the extraordinary

character of the aim? ... Is one genuine or only an \_actor;\_ is one

genuine as an actor, or only the bad copy of an actor? is one a

representative or the creature represented? Is one a personality or

merely a rendezvous of personalities? ... Is one ill from a disease or

from surplus health? Does one lead as a shepherd, or as an "exception"

(third alternative: as a fugitive)? Is one in need of dignity, or can

one play the clown? Is one in search of resistance, or is one evading

it? Is one imperfect owing to one's precocity or to one's tardiness? Is

it one's nature to say yea, or no, or is one a peacock's tail of garish

parts? Is one proud enough not to feel ashamed even of one's vanity? Is

one still able to feel a bite of conscience (this species is becoming

rare; formerly conscience had to bite too often: it is as if it now no

longer had enough teeth to do so)? Is one still capable of a "duty"?

(there are some people who would lose the whole joy of their lives

if they were \_deprived\_ of their duty--this holds good especially of

feminine creatures, who are born subjects).

1010.

Supposing our common comprehension of the universe were a

\_misunderstanding,\_ would it be possible to conceive of a form of

\_perfection,\_ within the limits of which even such a \_misunderstanding

as this\_ could be sanctioned?

The concept of a \_new\_ form of perfection: that which does \_not\_

correspond to our logic, to our "beauty," to our "good," to our

"truth," might be perfect in a \_higher\_ sense even than our ideal is.

1011.

Our most important limitation: we must not deify the unknown; we are

just beginning to know so little. The false and wasted endeavours.

Our "new world": we must ascertain to what extent we are the \_creators\_

of our valuations--we will thus be able to put "sense" into history.

This belief in truth is reaching its final logical conclusion in

us--ye know how it reads: that if there is anything at all that must

be worshipped it is \_appearance;\_ that \_falsehood\_ and \_not\_ truth

is--divine.

1012.

He who urges rational thought forward, thereby also drives its

antagonistic power--mysticism and foolery of every kind--to new feats

of strength.

We should recognise that every movement is (1) \_partly\_ the

manifestation of fatigue resulting from a previous movement (satiety

after it, the malice of weakness towards it, and disease); and (2)

\_partly\_ a newly awakened accumulation of long slumbering forces, and

therefore wanton, violent, healthy.

1013.

Health and morbidness: let us be careful! The standard is the bloom of

the body, the agility, courage, and cheerfulness of the mind--but also,

of course, how much \_morbidness a man can bear and overcome,\_--and

convert into health. That which would send more delicate natures to the

dogs, belongs to the stimulating means of \_great\_ health.

1014.

It is only a question of power: to have all the morbid traits of the

century, but to balance them I by means of overflowing, plastic, and

rejuvenating power. The \_strong\_ man.

1015.

\_Concerning the strength of the nineteenth century.--\_We are more

mediæval than the eighteenth century; not only more inquisitive or more

susceptible to the strange and to the rare. We have revolted against

the \_Revolution,\_ ... We have freed ourselves from the fear of reason,

which was the spectre of the eighteenth century: we once more dare to

be childish, lyrical, absurd, in a word, we are musicians. And we are

just as little frightened of the \_ridiculous\_ as of the \_absurd.\_ The

\_devil\_ finds that he is tolerated even by God:[6] better still, he has

become interesting as one who has been misunderstood and slandered for

ages,--we are the saviours of the devil's honour.

We no longer separate the great from the terrible. We reconcile good

things, in all their complexity, with the very \_worst\_ things; we

have overcome the \_desideratum\_ of the past (which wanted goodness to

grow without the increase of evil). The \_cowardice\_ towards the ideal,

peculiar to the Renaissance, has diminished--we even dare to aspire to

the latter's morality. \_Intolerance\_ towards priests and the Church has

at the same time come to an end; "It is immoral to believe in God"--but

this is precisely what we regard as the best possible justification of

this belief.

On all these things we have conferred the civic rights of our minds. We

do not tremble before the back side of "good things" (we even look for

it, we are brave and inquisitive enough for that), of Greek antiquity,

of morality, of reason, of good taste, for instance (we reckon up

the losses which we incur with all this treasure: we almost reduce

ourselves to poverty with such a treasure). Neither do we conceal the

back side of "evil things" from ourselves.

1016.

\_That which does us honour.\_--If anything does us honour, it is this:

we have transferred our seriousness to other things; all those things

which have been despised and laid aside as base by all ages, we regard

as important--on the other hand, we surrender "fine feelings" at a

cheap rate.

Could any aberration be more dangerous than the contempt of the body?

As if all intellectuality were not thereby condemned to become morbid,

and to take refuge in the \_vapeurs\_ of "idealism"!

Nothing that has been thought out by Christians and idealists holds

water: we are more radical. We have discovered the "smallest world"

everywhere as the most decisive.

The paving-stones in the streets, good air in our rooms, food

understood according to its worth: we value all the \_necessaries\_ of

life seriously, and \_despise\_ all "beautiful soulfulness" as a form of

"levity and frivolity." That which has been most despised hitherto, is

now pressed into the front rank.

1017

In the place of Rousseau's "man of Nature," the nineteenth century has

discovered a much \_more genuine\_ image of "Man,"--it had the courage

to do this.... On the whole, the Christian concept of man has in a way

been reinstalled. What we have not had the courage to do, was to call

precisely this "man \_par excellence\_," good, and to see the future of

mankind guaranteed in him. In the same way, we did not dare to regard

the \_growth in the terrible side\_ of man's character as an accompanying

feature of every advance in culture; in this sense we are still

under the influence of the Christian ideal, and side with it against

paganism, and likewise against the Renaissance concept of \_virtù.\_ But

the key of culture is not to be found in this way: and \_in praxi\_ we

still have the forgeries of history in favour of the "good man" (as if

he alone constituted the progress of humanity) and the \_socialistic

ideal (i.e.\_ the \_residue\_ of Christianity and of Rousseau in the

de-Christianised world).

\_The fight against the eighteenth century:\_ it meets with its \_greatest

conquerors\_ in \_Goethe\_ and \_Napoleon.\_ Schopenhauer, too, fights

against the eighteenth century; but he returns involuntarily to

the seventeenth--he is a modern Pascal, with Pascalian valuations,

\_without\_ Christianity. Schopenhauer was not strong enough to invent a

\_new yea.\_

\_Napoleon:\_ we see the necessary relationship between the higher and

the terrible man. "Man" reinstalled, and her due of contempt and fear

restored to woman. Highest activity and health are the signs of the

great man; the straight line and grand style rediscovered in action;

the mightiest of all instincts, that of life itself,--the lust of

dominion,--heartily welcomed.

1018.

(\_Revue des deux mondes,\_ 15th February 1887. Taine concerning

Napoleon) "Suddenly the master faculty reveals itself: the \_artist,\_

which was latent in the politician, comes forth from his scabbard; he

creates \_dans l'idéal et l'impossible.\_ He is once more recognised as

that which he is: the posthumous brother of Dante and of Michelangelo;

and verily, in view of the definite contours of his vision, the

intensity, the coherence, and inner consistency of his dream, the depth

of his meditations, the superhuman greatness of his conception, he is

their equal: \_son génie a la même taille et la même structure; il est

un des trois esprits souverains de la renaissance italienne.\_"

\_Nota bene.\_ Dante, Michelangelo, Napoleon.

1019.

\_Concerning the pessimism of strength.\_ In the internal economy of

\_the primitive\_ man's soul, the \_fear\_ of evil preponderates. What is

\_evil!\_ Three kinds of things: accident, uncertainty, the unexpected.

How does primitive man combat evil?--He conceives it as a thing of

reason, of power, even as a person. By this means he is enabled to

make treaties with it, and generally to operate upon it in advance--to

forestall it.

--Another expedient is to declare its evil and harmful character to

be but apparent: the consequences of accidental occurrences, and of

uncertainty and the unexpected, are interpreted as \_well-meant,\_ as

reasonable.

--A third means is to interpret evil, above all, as merited: evil is

thus justified as a punishment.

--In short, \_man submits to in\_ all religious and moral interpretations

are but forms of submission to evil.--The belief that a good purpose

lies behind all evil, implies the renunciation of any desire to combat

it.

Now, the history of every culture shows a diminution of this \_fear

of the accidental, of the uncertain, and of the unexpected.\_ Culture

means precisely, to learn to reckon, to discover causes, to acquire

the power of forestalling events, to acquire a belief in necessity.

With the growth of culture, man is able to dispense with that primitive

form of submission to evil (called religion or morality), and that

"justification of evil." Now he wages war against "evil,"--he gets rid

of it. Yes, a state of security, of belief in law and the possibility

of calculation, is possible, in which consciousness regards these

things with tedium,--in which the joy of the accidental, of the

uncertain, and of the unexpected, actually becomes a spur.

Let us halt a moment before this symptom of \_highest\_ culture, I

call it the \_pessimism of strength.\_ Man now no longer requires a

"justification of evil"; justification is precisely what he abhors:

he enjoys evil, \_pur, cru\_; he regards purposeless evil as the most

interesting kind of evil. If he had required a God in the past, he now

delights in cosmic disorder without a God, a world of accident, to the

essence of which terror, ambiguity, and seductiveness belong.

In a state of this sort, it is precisely \_goodness\_ which requires

to be justified--that is to say, it must either have an evil and a

dangerous basis, or else it must contain a vast amount of stupidity:

\_in which case it still pleases.\_ Animality no longer awakens terror

now; a very intellectual and happy wanton spirit in favour of the

animal in man, is, in such periods, the most triumphant form of

spirituality. Man is now strong enough to be able to feel ashamed of

\_a belief in God:\_ he may now play the part of the devil's advocate

afresh. If in practice he pretends to uphold virtue, it will be for

those reasons which lead virtue to be associated with subtlety,

cunning, lust of gain, and a form of the lust of power.

\_This pessimism of strength\_ also ends in a \_theodicy, i.e.\_ in an

absolute saying of yea to the world--but the same arguments will

be raised in favour of life which formerly were raised against it:

and in this way, in a conception of this world \_as the highest ideal

possible,\_ which has been effectively attained.

1020.

\_The principal kinds of pessimism:--\_

The pessimism of \_sensitiveness\_ (excessive irritability with a

preponderance of the feelings of pain).

The pessimism of the \_will that is not free\_ (otherwise expressed: the

lack of resisting power against stimuli).

The pessimism of \_doubt\_ (shyness in regard to everything fixed, in

regard to all grasping and touching).

The psychological conditions which belong to these different kinds of

pessimism, may all be observed in a lunatic asylum, even though they

are there found in a slightly exaggerated form. The same applies to

"Nihilism" (the penetrating feeling of nonentity).

What, however, is the nature of Pascal's moral pessimism, and the

\_metaphysical pessimism\_ of the Vedânta-Philosophy? What is the nature

of the \_social pessimism\_ of anarchists (as of Shelley), and of the

pessimism of compassion (like that of Leo Tolstoy and of Alfred de

Vigny)?

Are all these things not also the phenomena of decay and sickness?...

And is not excessive seriousness in regard to moral values, or in

regard to "other-world" fictions, or social calamities, or \_suffering\_

in general, of the same order? All such \_exaggeration\_ of a single and

narrow standpoint is in itself a sign of sickness. The same applies to

the preponderance of a negative over an affirmative attitude!

\_In this respect we must not confound with the above:\_ the joy of

saying and doing \_no,\_ which is the result of the enormous power and

tenseness of an affirmative attitude--peculiar to all rich and mighty

men and ages. It is, as it were, a luxury, a form of courage too,

which opposes the terrible, which has sympathy with the frightful and

the questionable, because, among other things, one is terrible and

questionable: the \_Dionysian\_ in will, intellect, and taste.

1021.

\_My Five "Noes."\_

(1) My fight against \_the feeling of sin\_ and the introduction of

the notion of \_punishment\_ into the physical and metaphysical world,

likewise into psychology and the interpretation of history. The

recognition of the fact that all philosophies and valuations hitherto

have been saturated with morality.

(2) My identification and my discovery of the \_traditional\_ ideal,

of the Christian ideal, even where the dogmatic form of Christianity

has been wrecked. The \_danger of the Christian ideal\_ resides in its

valuations, in that which can dispense with concrete expression: my

struggle against \_latent Christianity\_ (for instance, in music, in

Socialism).

(3) My struggle against the eighteenth century of Rousseau, against

his "Nature," against his "good man," his belief in the dominion of

feeling--against the pampering, weakening, and moralising of man: an

ideal born of the \_hatred of aristocratic culture,\_ which in practice

is the dominion of unbridled feelings of resentment, and invented as a

standard for the purpose of war (the Christian morality of the feeling

of sin, as well as the morality of resentment, is an attitude of the

mob).

(4) My fight against \_Romanticism,\_ in which the ideals of Christianity

and of Rousseau converge, but which possesses at the same time a

yearning for that \_antiquity\_ which knew of sacerdotal and aristocratic

culture, a yearning for \_virtù,\_ and for the "strong man"--something

extremely hybrid; a false and imitated kind of \_stronger\_ humanity,

which appreciates extreme conditions in general and sees the symptom

of strength in them ("the cult of passion"; an imitation of the

most expressive \_forms, furore espressivo,\_ originating not out of

plenitude, but out \_of want).\_--(In the nineteenth century there are

some things which are born out of relative plenitude--\_i.e.\_ out of

\_well-being;\_ cheerful music, etc.--among poets, for instance, Stifter

and Gottfried Keller give signs of more strength and inner well-being

than--. The great strides of engineering, of inventions, of the natural

sciences and of history (?) are relative products of the strength and

self-reliance of the nineteenth century.)

(5) My struggle against the \_predominance of gregarious instincts,\_ now

science makes common cause with them; against the profound hate with

which every kind of order of rank and of aloofness is treated.

1022.

From the pressure of plenitude, from the tension of forces that are

continually increasing within us and which cannot yet discharge

themselves, a condition is produced which is very similar to that which

precedes a storm: we--like Nature's sky--become overcast. I hat, too,

is "pessimism.".. A teaching which puts an end to such a condition by

the fact that it \_commands\_ something: a transvaluation of values by

means of which the accumulated forces are given a channel, a direction,

so that they explode into deeds and flashes of lightning-does not

in the least require to be a hedonistic teaching: in so far as it

\_releases strength\_ which was compressed to an agonising degree, it

brings happiness.

1023.

\_Pleasure\_ appears with the feeling of power.

\_Happiness\_ means that the consciousness of power and triumph has begun

to prevail.

\_Progress\_ is the strengthening of the type, the ability to exercise

great will-power, everything else is a misunderstanding and a danger.

1024.

There comes a time when the old masquerade and moral togging-up of the

passions provokes repugnance: \_naked Nature;\_ when the \_quanta\_ of

\_power\_ are recognised as \_decidedly\_ simple (as \_determining rank\_);

when \_grand style\_ appears again as the result of great passion.

1025.

The purpose of culture \_would have\_ us enlist everything terrible,

step by step and experimentally, into its service; but before it is

\_strong enough\_ for this it must combat, moderate, mask, and even curse

everything terrible.

Wherever a culture points to anything as evil, it betrays its \_fear\_

and therefore weakness.

\_Thesis:\_ everything good is the evil of yore which has been rendered

serviceable. \_Standard:\_ the more terrible and the greater the passions

may be which an age, a people, and an individual are at liberty to

possess, because they are able to use them as \_a means, the higher is

their culture:\_ the more mediocre, weak, submissive, and cowardly a man

may be, the more things he will regard as \_evil:\_ according to him the

kingdom of evil is the largest. The lowest man will see the kingdom of

evil (\_i.e.\_ that which is forbidden him and which is hostile to him)

everywhere.

1026.

It is not a fact that "happiness follows virtue"--but it is the mighty

man who first \_declares his happy state to be virtue.\_

Evil actions belong to the mighty and the virtuous: bad and base

actions belong to the subjected.

The mightiest man, the creator, would have to be the most evil,

inasmuch as he makes his ideal prevail over all men in \_opposition\_ to

their ideals, and remoulds them according to his own image.

Evil, in this respect, means hard, painful, enforced.

Such men as Napoleon must always return and always settle our belief

in the self-glory of the individual afresh: he himself, however, was

corrupted by the means he had to stoop to, and had \_lost noblesse\_

of character. If he had had to prevail among another kind of men, he

could have availed himself of other means; and thus it would not seem

\_necessary\_ that a Cæsar \_must become bad.\_

1027.

Man is a combination of the \_beast\_ and the \_super-beast\_; higher

man a combination of the monster and the superman:[7] these opposites

belong to each other. With every degree of a man's growth towards

greatness and loftiness, he also grows downwards into the depths and

into the terrible: we should not desire the one without the other;--or,

better still: the more fundamentally we desire the one, the more

completely we shall achieve the other.

1028.

Terribleness belongs to greatness: let us not deceive ourselves.

1029.

I have taught the knowledge of such terrible things, that all

"Epicurean contentment" is impossible concerning them. Dionysian

pleasure is the only \_adequate\_ kind here: \_I was the first to discover

the tragic.\_ Thanks to their superficiality in ethics, the Greeks

misunderstood it. Resignation is not the lesson of tragedy, but only

the misunderstanding of it! The yearning for nonentity is the \_denial\_

of tragic wisdom, its opposite!

1030.

A rich and powerful soul not only gets over painful and even terrible

losses, deprivations, robberies, and insults: it actually leaves such

dark infernos in possession of still greater plenitude and power;

and, what is most important of all, in possession of an increased

blissfulness in love. I believe that he who has divined something of

the most fundamental conditions of love, will understand Dante for

having written over the door of his Inferno: "I also am the creation of

eternal love."

1031.

To have travelled over the whole circumference of the modern soul,

and to have sat in all its corners--my ambition, my torment, and my

happiness.

Veritably to have \_overcome\_ pessimism, and, as the result thereof, to

have acquired the eyes of a Goethe--full of love and goodwill.

1032.

The first question is by no means whether we are satisfied with

ourselves; but whether we are satisfied with anything at all. Granting

that we should say yea to any single moment, we have then affirmed

not only ourselves, but the whole of existence. For nothing stands by

itself, either in us or in other things: and if our soul has vibrated

and rung with happiness, like a chord, once only and only once, then

all eternity was necessary in order to bring about that one event,--and

all eternity, in this single moment of our affirmation, was called

good, was saved, justified, and blessed.

1033.

The passions which \_say yea.\_ I ride, happiness, health, the love of

the sexes, hostility and war, reverence, beautiful attitudes, manners,

strong will, the discipline of lofty spirituality, the will to power,

and gratitude to the Earth and to Life: all that is rich, that would

fain bestow, and that refreshes, gilds, immortalises, and deifies

Life--the whole power of the virtues that \_glorify\_--all declaring

things good, saying yea, and doing yea.

1034.

We, many or few, who once more dare to live in a world \_purged of

morality\_, we \_pagans\_ in faith, we are probably also the first who

understand what a \_pagan faith\_ is: to be obliged to imagine higher

creatures than man, but to imagine them \_beyond\_ good and evil; to be

compelled to value all higher existence as \_immoral\_ existence. We

believe in Olympus, and \_not\_ in the "man on the cross."

1035.

The more modern man has exercised his idealising power in regard to a

\_God\_ mostly by \_moralising the latter\_ ever more and more--what does

that mean?--nothing good, a diminution in man's strength.

As a matter of fact, the reverse would be possible: and indications

of this are not wanting. God imagined as emancipation from morality,

comprising the whole of the abundant assembly of Life's contrasts, and

\_saving\_ and \_justifying\_ them in a divine agony. God as the beyond,

the superior elevation, to the wretched \_cul-de-sac\_ morality of "Good

and Evil."

1036.

A humanitarian God cannot be \_demonstrated\_ from the world that

is known to us: so much are ye driven and forced to conclude

to-day. But what conclusion do ye draw from this? "He cannot be

demonstrated to \_us\_": the scepticism of knowledge. You all \_fear\_

the conclusion: "From the world that is known to us quite a different

God would be \_demonstrable,\_ such a one as would certainly not be

humanitarian"--and, in a word, you cling fast to your God, and invent a

world for Him which \_is unknown to us.\_

1037.

Let us banish the highest good from our concept of God: it is unworthy

of a God. Let us likewise banish the highest wisdom: it is the vanity

of philosophers who have perpetrated the absurdity of a God who is a

monster of wisdom: the idea was to make Him as like them as possible.

No! God \_as the highest power\_--that is sufficient!--Everything

follows from that, even--"the world"!

1038

And how many new Gods are not still possible! I, myself, in whom the

religious--that is to say, the god-\_creating\_ instinct occasionally

becomes active at the most inappropriate moments: how very differently

the divine has revealed itself every time to me! ... So many strange

things have passed before me in those timeless moments, which fall into

a man's life as if they came from the moon, and in which he absolutely

no longer knows how old he is or how young he still may be! ... I would

not doubt that there are several kinds of gods.... Some are not wanting

which one could not possibly imagine without a certain halcyonic calm

and levity.... Light feet perhaps belong to the concept "God". Is it

necessary to explain that a \_God\_ knows how to hold Himself preferably

outside all Philistine and rationalist circles? also (between

ourselves) beyond good and evil? His outlook is a \_free\_ one--as Goethe

would say.--And to invoke the authority of Zarathustra, which cannot be

too highly appreciated in this regard: Zarathustra goes as far as to

confess, "I would only believe in a God who knew how to \_dance\_ ..."

Again I say: how many new Gods are not still possible! Certainly

Zarathustra himself is merely an old atheist: he believes neither in

old nor in new gods. Zarathustra says, \_"he would"\_--but Zarathustra

will not.... Take care to understand him well.

The type God conceived according to the type of creative spirits, of

"great men."

1039.

And how many new \_ideals\_ are not, at bottom, still possible? Here is

a little ideal that I seize upon every five weeks, while upon a wild

and lonely walk, in the azure moment of a blasphemous joy. To spend

one's life amid delicate and absurd things; a stranger to reality,

half-artist, half-bird, half-metaphysician; without a yea or a nay for

reality, save that from time to time one acknowledges it, after the

manner of a good dancer, with the tips of one's toes; always tickled

by some happy ray of sunlight; relieved and encouraged even by sorrow

--for sorrow \_preserves\_ the happy man; fixing a little tail of jokes

even to the most holy thing: this, as is clear, is the ideal of a heavy

spirit, a ton in weight \_of the spirit of gravity.\_

1040.

\_From the military-school of the soul.\_ (Dedicated to the brave, the

good-humoured, and the abstinent.)

I should not like to undervalue the amiable virtues; but greatness

of soul is not compatible with them. Even in the arts, grand style

excludes all merely pleasing qualities.

\*\*\*

In times of painful tension and vulnerability, choose war. War hardens

and develops muscle.

\*\*\*

Those who have been deeply wounded have the Olympian laughter; a man

only has what he needs.

\*\*\*

It has now already lasted ten years: no sound any longer \_reaches\_

me--a land without rain. A man must have a vast amount of humanity at

his disposal in order not to pine away in such drought.[8]

1041.

\_My new road to an affirmative attitude.\_--Philosophy, as I have

understood it and lived it up to the present, is the voluntary quest

of the repulsive and atrocious aspects of existence. From the long

experience derived from such wandering over ice and desert, I learnt

to regard quite differently everything that had been philosophised

hitherto: the \_concealed\_ history of philosophy, the psychology of its

great names came into the light for me. "How much truth can a spirit

\_endure\_; for how much truth is it \_daring\_ enough?"--this for me

was the real measure of value. Error is a piece of \_cowardice\_ ...

every victory on the part of knowledge, is the \_result\_ of courage, of

hardness towards one's self, of cleanliness towards one's self.... The

kind of \_experimental philosophy\_ which I am living, even anticipates

the possibility of the most fundamental Nihilism, on principle: but

by this I do not mean that it remains standing at a negation, at a

\_no,\_ or at a will to negation. It would rather attain to the very

reverse--to a \_Dionysian affirmation\_ of the world, as it is, without

subtraction, exception, or choice--it would have eternal circular

motion: the same things, the same reasoning, and the same illogical

concatenation. The highest state to which a philosopher can attain: to

maintain a Dionysian attitude to Life--my formula for this is \_amor

fati.\_

To this end we must not only consider those aspects of life which

have been denied hitherto, as: \_necessary,\_ but as desirable, and not

only desirable to those aspects which have been affirmed hitherto (as

complements or first prerequisites, so to speak), but for their own

sake, as the more powerful, more terrible, and more \_veritable\_ aspects

of life, in which the latter's will expresses itself most clearly.

To this end, we must also value that aspect of existence which alone

has been affirmed until now; we must understand whence this valuation

arises, and to how slight an extent it has to do with a Dionysian

valuation of Life: I selected and understood that which in this respect

says "yea" (on the one hand, the instinct of the sufferer; on the

other, the gregarious instinct; and thirdly, the \_instinct of the

greater number\_ against the exceptions).

Thus I divined to what extent a stronger kind of man must necessarily

imagine--the elevation and enhancement of man in another direction:

\_higher creatures,\_ beyond good and evil, beyond those values which

bear the stamp of their origin in the sphere of suffering, of the herd,

and of the greater number--I searched for the data of this topsy-turvy

formation of ideals in history (the concepts "pagan," "classical,"

"noble," have been discovered afresh and brought forward).

1042.

We should demonstrate to what extent the religion of the Greeks was

\_higher\_ than Judæo-Christianity. The latter triumphed because the

Greek religion was degenerate (and decadent).

1043.

It is not surprising that a couple of centuries have been necessary in

order to link up again--a couple of centuries are very little indeed.

1044.

There must be some people who sanctify functions, not only eating and

drinking, and not only in memory of them, or in harmony with them; but

this world must be for ever glorified anew, and in a novel fashion.

1045.

The most intellectual men feel the ecstasy and charm of \_sensual\_

things in a way which other men --those with "fleshy hearts"--cannot

possibly imagine, and ought not to be able to imagine: they are

sensualists with the best possible faith, because they grant the senses

a more fundamental value than that fine sieve, that thinning and

mincing machine, or whatever it is called, which in the language of the

people is termed \_"spirit"\_ The strength and power of the senses--this

is the most essential thing in a sound man who is one of Nature's lucky

strokes: the splendid beast must first be there--otherwise what is the

value of all "humanisation"?

1046.

(1) We want to hold fast to our senses, and to the belief in them--and

accept their logical conclusions! The hostility to the senses in the

philosophy that has been written up to the present, has been man's

greatest feat of nonsense.

(2) The world now extant, on which all earthly and living things have

so built themselves, that it now appears as it does (enduring and

proceeding slowly), we would fain \_continue building\_--not criticise it

away as false!

(3) Our valuations help in the process of building; they emphasise and

accentuate. What does it mean when whole religions say: "Everything is

bad and false and evil"? This condemnation of the whole process can

only be the judgment of the failures!

(4) True, the failures might be the greatest sufferers and therefore

the most subtle! The contented might be worth little!

(5) We must understand the fundamental \_artistic\_ phenomenon which is

called "Life,"--\_the formative\_ spirit, which constructs under the most

unfavourable circumstances: and in the slowest manner possible----The

\_proof\_ of all its combinations must first be given afresh: \_it

maintains itself.\_

1047.

Sexuality, lust of dominion, the pleasure derived from appearance

and deception, great and joyful gratitude to Life and its typical

conditions--these things are essential to all paganism, and it has

a good conscience on its side.--\_That which is hostile to Nature\_

(already in Greek antiquity) combats paganism in the form of morality

and dialectics.

1040.

An anti-metaphysical view of the world--yes, but an artistic one.

1049.

\_Apollo's\_ misapprehension: the eternity of beautiful forms, the

aristocratic prescription, "\_Thus shall it ever be!\_"

\_Dionysus\_. Sensuality and cruelty. The perishable nature of existence

might be interpreted as the joy of procreative and destructive force,

as \_unremitting creation.\_

1050.

The word "\_Dionysian\_" expresses: a constraint to unity, a soaring

above personality, the common-place, society, reality, and above

the abyss of the \_ephemeral\_, the passionately painful sensation of

superabundance, in darker, fuller, and more fluctuating conditions;

an ecstatic saying of yea to the collective character of existence,

as that which remains the same, and equally mighty and blissful

throughout all change, the great pantheistic sympathy with pleasure

and pain, which declares even the most terrible and most questionable

qualities of existence good, and sanctifies them; the eternal will to

procreation, to fruitfulness, and to recurrence; the feeling of unity

in regard to the necessity of creating and annihilating.

The word "\_Apollonian\_" expresses: the constraint to be absolutely

isolated, to the typical "individual," to everything that simplifies,

distinguishes, and makes strong, salient, definite, and typical to

freedom within the law.

The further development of art is just as necessarily bound up with the

antagonism of these two natural art-forces, as the further development

of mankind is bound up with the antagonism of the sexes. The plenitude

of power and restraint, the highest form of self-affirmation in a cool,

noble, and reserved kind of beauty: the Apollonianism of the Hellenic

will.

This antagonism of the Dionysian and of the Apollonian in the Greek

soul, is one of the great riddles which made me feel drawn to the

essence of Hellenism. At bottom, I troubled about nothing save the

solution of the question, why precisely Greek Apollonianism should have

been forced to grow out of a Dionysian soil: the Dionysian Greek had

need of being Apollonian; that is to say in order to break his will to

the titanic, to the complex, to the uncertain, to the horrible by a

will to measure, to simplicity, and to submission to rule and concept.

Extravagance, wildness, and Asiatic tendencies lie at the root of the

Greeks. Their courage consists in their struggle with their Asiatic

nature: they were not given beauty, any more than they were given Logic

and moral! naturalness: in them these things are victories, they are

willed and fought for--they constitute the \_triumph\_ of the Greeks.

1051.

It is clear that only the rarest and most lucky cases of humanity

can attain to the highest and most sublime human joys in which Life

celebrates its own glorification; and this only happens when these

rare creatures themselves and their forbears have lived a long

preparatory life leading to this goal, without, however, having done

so consciously. It is then that an overflowing wealth of multifarious

forces and the most agile power of "free will" and lordly command

exist together in perfect concord in one man; then the intellect is

just as much at ease, or at home, in the senses as the senses are at

ease or at home in it; and everything that takes place in the latter

must give rise to extraordinarily subtle joys in the former. And \_vice

versâ:\_ just think of this \_vice versâ\_ for a moment in a man like

Hafiz; even Goethe, though to a lesser degree, gives some idea of this

process. It is probable that, in such perfect and well-constituted

men, the most sensual functions are finally transfigured by a symbolic

elatedness of the highest intellectuality; in themselves they feel a

kind of \_deification of the body\_ and are most remote from the ascetic

philosophy of the principle "God is a Spirit": from this principle it

is clear that the ascetic is the "botched man" who declares only that

to be good and "God" which is absolute, and which judges and condemns.

From that height of joy in which man feels himself completely and

utterly a deified form and self-justification of nature, down to the

joy of healthy peasants and healthy semi-human beasts, the whole of

this long and enormous gradation of the light and colour of \_happiness\_

was called by the Greek--not without that grateful quivering of one

who is initiated into secret, not without much caution and pious

silence--by the godlike name: \_Dionysus.\_ What then \_do\_ all modern

men--the children of a crumbling, multifarious, sick and strange age

\_know\_ of the \_compass\_ of Greek happiness, how \_could\_ they know

anything about it! Whence would the slaves of "modern ideas" derive

their right to Dionysian feasts!

When the Greek body and soul were in full "bloom," and not, as it were,

in states of morbid exaltation and madness, there arose the secret

symbol of the loftiest affirmation and transfiguration of life and the

world that has ever existed. There we have a \_standard\_ beside which

everything that has grown since must seem too short, too poor, too

narrow: if we but pronounce the word "Dionysus" in the presence of

the best of more recent names and things, in the presence of Goethe,

for instance, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare, or Raphael, in a trice we

realise that our best things and moments are \_condemned.\_ Dionysus

is a \_judge!\_ Am I understood? There can be no doubt that the Greeks

sought to interpret, by means of their Dionysian experiences, the

final mysteries of the "destiny of the soul" and everything they knew

concerning the education and the purification of man, and above all

concerning the absolute hierarchy and inequality of value between man

and man. There is the deepest experience of all Greeks, which they

conceal beneath great silence,--\_we do not know the Greeks\_ so long

as this hidden and sub-terranean access to them remains obstructed.

The indiscreet eyes of scholars will never perceive anything in these

things, however much learned energy may still have to be expended in

the service of this excavation--; even the noble zeal of such friends

of antiquity as Goethe and Winckelmann, seems to savour somewhat of

bad form and of arrogance, precisely in this respect. To wait and to

prepare oneself; to await the appearance of new sources of knowledge;

to prepare oneself in solitude for the sight of new faces and the

sound of new voices; to cleanse one's soul ever more and more of the

dust and noise, as of a country fair, which is peculiar to this age;

to \_overcome\_ everything Christian by something super-Christian,

and not only to rid oneself of it,--for the Christian doctrine is

the counter-doctrine to the Dionysian; to rediscover the \_South\_

in oneself, and to stretch a clear, glittering, and mysterious

southern sky above one; to reconquer the southern healthiness and

concealed power of the soul, once more for oneself; to increase the

compass of one's soul step by step, and to become more supernational,

more European, more super-European, more Oriental, and finally more

\_Hellenic\_--for Hellenism was, as a matter of fact, the first great

union and synthesis of everything Oriental, and precisely on that

account, the \_beginning\_ of the European soul, the discovery of \_our

"new\_ world":--he who lives under such imperatives, who knows what he

may not encounter some day? Possibly--a \_new dawn!\_

1052.

\_The two types; Dionysus and Christ on the Cross.\_ We should ascertain

whether the typically \_religious\_ man is a decadent phenomenon (the

great innovators are one and all morbid and epileptic); but do not let

us forget to include that type of the religious man who is \_pagan.\_ Is

the pagan cult not a form of gratitude for, and affirmation of, Life?

Ought not its most representative type to be an apology and deification

of Life? The type of a well-constituted and ecstatically overflowing

spirit! The type of a spirit which absorbs the contradictions and

problems of existence, and which \_solves\_ them!

At this point I set up the \_Dionysus\_ of the Greeks: the religious

affirmation of Life, of the whole of Life, not of denied and partial

Life (it is typical that in this cult the sexual act awakens ideas of

depth, mystery, and reverence).

Dionysus \_versus\_ "Christ"; here you have the contrast. It is \_not\_

a difference in regard to the martyrdom,--but the latter has a

different meaning. Life itself--Life s eternal fruitfulness and

recurrence caused anguish, destruction, and the will to annihilation.

In the other case, the suffering of the "Christ as the Innocent One"

stands as an objection against Life, it is the formula of Life's

condemnation.--Readers will guess that the problem concerns the meaning

of suffering; whether a Christian or a tragic meaning be given to it.

In the first case it is the road to a holy mode of existence; in the

second case \_existence itself is regarded as sufficiently holy\_ to

justify an enormous amount of suffering. The tragic man says yea even

to the most excruciating suffering: he is sufficiently strong, rich,

and capable of deifying, to be able to do this; the Christian denies

even the happy lots on earth: he is weak, poor, and disinherited enough

to suffer from life in any form. God on the Cross is a curse upon Life,

a signpost directing people to deliver themselves from it;--Dionysus

cut into pieces is a \_promise\_ of Life: it will be for ever born anew,

and rise afresh from destruction.

III.

ETERNAL RECURRENCE.

1053.

My philosophy reveals the triumphant thought through which all other

systems of thought must ultimately perish. It is the great disciplinary

thought: those races that cannot bear it are doomed; those which regard

it as the greatest blessing are destined to rule.

1054.

The \_greatest\_ of all fights: for this purpose a new \_weapon\_ is

required.

A hammer: a terrible alternative must be created. Europe must be

brought face to face with the logic of facts, and confronted with the

question whether its will for ruin is really earnest.

General levelling down to mediocrity must be avoided. Rather than this

it would be preferable to perish.

1055.

A pessimistic attitude of mind and a pessimistic doctrine and ecstatic

Nihilism, may in certain circumstances even prove indispensable to the

philosopher--that is to say, as a mighty form of pressure, or hammer,

with which he can smash up degenerate, perishing races and put them out

of existence; with which he can beat a track to a new order of life,

or instil a longing for nonentity in those who are degenerate and who

desire to perish.

1056.

I wish to teach the thought which gives unto many the right to cancel

their existences--the great disciplinary thought.

1057.

\_Eternal Recurrence. \_ A prophecy.

1. The exposition of the doctrine and its \_theoretical\_ first

principles and results.

2. The proof of the doctrine.

3. Probable results which will follow from its being \_believed.\_ (It

makes everything break open.)

\_(a)\_ The means of enduring it.

\_(b)\_ The means of ignoring it.

4. Its place in history is a means.

The period \_of\_ greatest danger. The foundation of an oligarchy \_above\_

peoples and their interests: education directed at establishing a

political policy for humanity in general.

\_A counterpart of Jesuitism.\_

1058.

The two greatest philosophical points of view (both discovered by

Germans).

(a) That of \_becoming\_ and that of \_evolution.\_

(b) That based upon the \_values of existence\_ (but the wretched form of

German pessimism must first be overcome!)--

Both points of view reconciled by me in a decisive manner.

Everything becomes and returns for ever, \_escape is impossible!\_

Granted that we \_could\_ appraise the value of existence, what would

be the result of it? The thought of recurrence is a principle \_of

selection\_ in the service of \_power\_ (and barbarity!).

The ripeness of man for this thought.

1059.

1. The thought of eternal recurrence: its first principles which must

necessarily be true if it were true. What its result is.

2. It is the most \_oppressive\_ thought: its probable results, provided

it be not prevented, that is to say, provided all values be not

transvalued.

3. The means of \_enduring it:\_ the transvaluation of all values.

Pleasure no longer to be found in certainty, but in uncertainty; no

longer "cause and effect," but continual creativeness; no longer

the will to self-preservation, but to power; no longer the modest

expression "it is all \_only\_ subjective," but "it is all \_our\_ work!

let us be proud of it."

1060.

In order to endure the thought of recurrence, freedom from morality

is necessary; new means against the \_fact pain\_ (pain regarded as

the instrument, as the father of pleasure; there is no accretive

consciousness of pain); pleasure derived from all kinds of uncertainty

and tentativeness, as a counterpoise to extreme fatalism; suppression

of the concept "necessity"; suppression of the "will"; suppression of

"absolute knowledge."

\_Greatest elevation\_ of man's \_consciousness of strength,\_ as that

which creates superman.

1061.

The two extremes of thought--the materialistic and the platonic--are

reconciled in \_eternal recurrence\_: both are regarded as ideals.

1062.

If the universe had a goal, that goal would have been reached by now.

If any sort of unforeseen final state existed, that state also would

have! been reached. If it were capable of any halting or stability of

any being, it would only have possessed this capability of becoming

stable for one instant in its development; and again becoming would

have been at an end for ages, and with it all thinking and all

"spirit." The fact of "intellects" being in a \_state of development\_

proves that the universe can have no goal, no final state, and is

incapable of being. But the old habit of thinking of some purpose in

regard to all phenomena, and of thinking of a directing and creating

deity in regard to the universe, is so powerful, that the thinker has

to go to great pains in order to avoid thinking of the very aimlessness

of the world as intended. The idea that the universe intentionally

evades a goal, and even knows artificial means wherewith it prevents

itself from falling into a circular movement, must occur to all those

who would fain attribute to the universe the capacity of eternally

regenerating itself--that is to say, they would fain impose upon a

finite, definite force which is invariable in quantity, like the

universe, the miraculous gift of renewing its forms and its conditions

\_for all eternity.\_ Although the universe is no longer a God, it must

still be capable of the divine power of creating and transforming;

it must forbid itself to relapse into any one of its previous forms;

it must not only have the intention, but also the means, of avoiding

any sort of repetition, every second of its existence, even, it must

control every single one of its movements, with the view of avoiding

goals, final states, and repetitions and all the other results of such

an unpardonable and insane method of thought and desire. All this

is nothing more than the old religious mode of thought and desire,

which, in spite of all, longs to believe that in some way or other the

universe resembles the old, beloved, infinite, and infinitely-creative

God--that in some way or other "the old God still lives"--that longing

of Spinoza's which is expressed in the words "\_deus sive natura\_"

(what he really felt was "\_natura sive deus\_"). Which, then, is the

proposition and belief in which the decisive change, the present

\_preponderance\_ of the scientific spirit over the religious and

god-fancying spirit, is best formulated? Ought it not to be: the

universe, as force, must not be thought of as unlimited, because it

cannot be thought of in this way,--we forbid ourselves the concept

\_infinite\_ force, because it is \_incompatible\_ with the idea of force?

Whence it follows that the universe lacks the power of eternal renewal.

1063.

The principle of the conservation of energy inevitably involves

\_eternal recurrence.\_

1064.

That a state of equilibrium has never been reached, proves that it is

impossible, but in infinite space it must have been reached. Likewise

in spherical space. The \_form\_ of space must be the cause of the

eternal movement, and ultimately of all imperfection. That "energy" and

"stability" and "immutability" are contradictory. The measure of energy

(dimensionally) is fixed though it is essentially fluid.

"That which is timeless" must be refuted, any given moment of energy,

the absolute conditions for a new distribution of all forces are

present, it cannot remain stationary. Change is part of its essence,

therefore time is as well; by this means, however, the necessity of

change has only been established once more in theory.

1065.

A certain emperor always bore the fleeting nature of all things in his

mind, in order not to value them too seriously, and to be able to live

quietly in their midst. Conversely, everything seems to me much too

important for it to be so fleeting, I seek an eternity for everything:

ought one to pour the most precious salves and wines into the sea? My

consolation is that everything that has been is eternal: the sea will

wash it up again.

1066.

\_The new concept of the universe.\_ The universe exists; it is nothing

that grows into existence and that passes out of existence. Or, better

still, it develops, it passes away, but it never began to develop,

and has never ceased from passing away; it \_maintains\_ itself in both

states. It lives on itself, its excrements are its nourishment.

We need not concern ourselves for one instant with the hypothesis of a

\_created\_ world. The concept create is to-day utterly indefinable and

unrealisable; it is but a word which hails from superstitious ages,

nothing can be explained with a word. The last attempt that was made

to conceive of a world that \_began\_ occurred quite recently, in many

cases with the help of logical reasoning,--generally, too, as you will

guess, with an ulterior theological motive.

Several attempts have been made lately to show that the concept that

"the universe has an infinite past (\_regressus in infinitum\_) is

contradictory, it was even demonstrated, it is true, at the price

of confounding the head with the tail. Nothing can prevent me from

calculating backwards from this moment of time, and of saying: "I

shall never reach the end"; just as I can calculate without end in a

forward direction, from the same moment. It is only when I wish to

commit the error--I shall be careful to avoid it--of reconciling this

correct concept of a \_regressus in infinitum\_ with the absolutely

unrealisable concept of a finite \_progressus\_ up to the present; only

when I consider the direction (forwards or backwards) as logically

indifferent, that I take hold of the head--this very moment--and think

I hold the tail: this pleasure I leave to you, Mr. Dühring!...

I have come across this thought in other thinkers before me, and every

time I found that it was determined by other ulterior motives (chiefly

theological, in favour of a \_creator spiritus).\_ If the universe were

in any way able to congeal, to dry up, to perish; or if it were capable

of attaining to a state of equilibrium; or if it had any kind of goal

at all which a long lapse of time, immutability, and finality reserved

for it (in short, to speak metaphysically, if becoming could resolve

itself into being or into nonentity), this state ought already to have

been reached.

But it has not been reached: it therefore follows.... This is the only

certainty we can grasp, which can serve as a corrective to a host of

cosmic hypotheses possible in themselves. If, for instance, materialism

cannot consistently escape the conclusion of a finite state, which

William Thomson has traced out for it, then materialism is thereby

refuted.

If the universe may be conceived as a definite quantity of energy,

as a definite number of centres of energy,--and every other concept

remains indefinite and therefore useless,--it follows therefrom that

the universe must go through a calculable number of combinations in

the great game of chance which constitutes its existence. In infinity,

at some moment or other, every possible combination must once have

been realised; not only this, but it must have been realised an

infinite number of times. And inasmuch as between every one of these

combinations and its next recurrence every other possible combination

would necessarily have been undergone, and since every one of these

combinations would determine the whole series in the same order, a

circular movement of absolutely identical series is thus demonstrated:

the universe is thus shown to be a circular movement which has already

repeated itself an infinite number of times, and which plays its game

for all eternity.--This conception is not simply materialistic; for if

it were this, it would not involve an infinite recurrence of identical

cases, but a finite state. Owing to the fact that the universe has

not reached this finite state, materialism shows itself to be but an

imperfect and provisional hypothesis.

1067.

And do ye know what "the universe" is to my mind? Shall I show it

to you in my mirror? This universe is a monster of energy, without

beginning or end; a fixed and brazen quantity o; energy which grows

neither bigger nor smaller, which does not consume itself, but only

alters its face; as a whole its bulk is immutable, it is a household

without either losses or gains, but likewise without increase and

without sources of revenue, surrounded by nonentity as by a frontier,

it is nothing vague or wasteful, it does not stretch into infinity;

but it is a definite quantum of energy located in limited space,

and not in space which would be anywhere empty. It is rather energy

everywhere, the play of forces and force-waves, at the same time one

and many, agglomerating here and diminishing there, a sea of forces

storming and raging in itself, for ever changing, for ever rolling

back over in calculable ages to recurrence, with an ebb and flow of

its forms, producing the most complicated things out of the most

simple structures; producing the most ardent, most savage, and most

contradictory things out of the quietest, most rigid, and most frozen

material, and then returning from multifariousness to uniformity, from

the play of contradictions back into the delight of consonance, saying

yea unto itself, even in this homogeneity of its courses and ages; for

ever blessing itself as something which recurs for all eternity,--a

becoming which knows not satiety, or disgust, or weariness:--this, my

Dionysian world of eternal self-creation, of eternal self-destruction,

this mysterious world of twofold voluptuousness; this, my "Beyond Good

and Evil" without aim, unless there is an aim in the bliss of the

circle, without will, unless a ring must by nature keep goodwill to

itself,--would you have a name for my world? A \_solution\_ of all your

riddles? Do ye also want a light, ye most concealed, strongest and

most undaunted men of the blackest midnight?--\_This world is the Will

to Power--and nothing else!\_ And even ye yourselves are this will to

power--and nothing besides!