

# Proof of AI: Consensus Mechanisms for Machine Learning Workloads

Version 1.0

Zach Kelling\*

*Hanzo Industries Inc (Techstars '17)*

*Lux Partners*

*Zoo Labs Foundation*

research@zoo.ngo

April 2022

## Abstract

We introduce **Proof of AI** (PoAI), a consensus mechanism that secures blockchain networks through verifiable machine learning computation rather than wasteful hash puzzles or capital-concentrated staking. In PoAI, nodes earn block production rights by contributing useful AI work: model inference, training iterations, or experience extraction. Our protocol addresses three fundamental challenges: (1) **Compute Verification**—proving that claimed ML work was actually performed without re-executing it, (2) **Quality Assessment**—evaluating the value of heterogeneous AI contributions, and (3) **Sybil Resistance**—preventing adversaries from claiming credit for others’ work. We combine Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) attestations with probabilistic verification and multi-party quality scoring to achieve Byzantine fault tolerance with  $f < n/3$  adversarial nodes. Theoretical analysis proves incentive compatibility under rational assumptions. Experimental evaluation on a 100-node testnet demonstrates 847 transactions per second with 2.3-second finality while achieving 94% useful work efficiency—meaning 94% of network compute contributes to AI tasks rather than consensus overhead.

**Keywords:** consensus mechanism, proof of useful work, AI compute verification, trusted execution environments, Byzantine fault tolerance

## 1 Introduction

Blockchain consensus mechanisms determine who may produce blocks and how the network agrees on canonical state. The dominant mechanisms—Proof of Work (PoW) and Proof of Stake (PoS)—each have significant drawbacks:

- **Proof of Work:** Consumes 150+ TWh annually (Bitcoin alone) on cryptographic puzzles that serve no purpose beyond consensus. This energy expenditure represents pure waste.
- **Proof of Stake:** Concentrates power among wealthy token holders, creating plutocratic dynamics where the rich accumulate more influence over time.

Meanwhile, AI compute demand grows exponentially. Training frontier models requires thousands of GPUs for months; inference serves billions of daily requests. What if this compute could simultaneously secure a blockchain?

---

\*Corresponding author: zach@hanzo.ai

## 1.1 The Useful Work Challenge

“Proof of Useful Work” has been proposed before, but practical implementations face fundamental obstacles:

1. **Verification Asymmetry:** Verifying arbitrary computation typically requires re-executing it, eliminating efficiency gains.
2. **Work Heterogeneity:** Different tasks have different values. How do we compare training a language model vs. serving inference requests?
3. **Output Subjectivity:** Unlike hash puzzles with objectively verifiable solutions, AI output quality is inherently subjective.
4. **Front-Running:** If useful work is valuable, adversaries may steal it before the original worker can claim credit.

## 1.2 Our Approach

PoAI solves these challenges through three innovations:

1. **TEE-Based Attestation:** Trusted Execution Environments (Intel SGX, AMD SEV, ARM TrustZone) provide hardware-rooted proofs that specific code executed on specific data.
2. **Probabilistic Verification:** Rather than verifying all work, we randomly audit a fraction, with penalties severe enough to deter cheating.
3. **Multi-Party Quality Scoring:** A committee of evaluators assesses work quality, with incentives aligned to honest evaluation.

## 1.3 Contributions

This paper makes the following contributions:

1. **PoAI Protocol:** A complete consensus mechanism specification combining TEE attestation, probabilistic verification, and quality scoring (Section 3)
2. **Verification Framework:** Novel techniques for efficiently verifying ML workloads (Section 4)
3. **Quality Assessment:** Multi-party evaluation protocol with incentive-compatible scoring (Section 5)
4. **Security Analysis:** Formal proofs of Byzantine fault tolerance and incentive compatibility (Section 6)
5. **Implementation and Evaluation:** Working prototype with comprehensive benchmarks (Section 8)

## 2 Background

### 2.1 Consensus Mechanisms

A consensus mechanism enables distributed nodes to agree on a single canonical state despite Byzantine failures. Key properties include:

**Definition 2.1** (Byzantine Fault Tolerance). *A protocol is  $f$ -Byzantine fault tolerant if it maintains safety and liveness with up to  $f$  arbitrarily malicious nodes.*

Classical results establish that BFT requires  $n \geq 3f + 1$  nodes for synchronous networks and  $n \geq 2f + 1$  with additional assumptions for asynchronous networks.

### 2.2 Trusted Execution Environments

TEEs provide isolated execution with hardware-rooted attestation:

**Definition 2.2** (TEE Attestation). *An attestation  $A = \text{Sign}_{sk_{TEE}}(H(\text{code}), H(\text{input}), H(\text{output}))$  proves that code executed on input producing output within the TEE.*

TEE attestations are unforgeable assuming hardware security. We rely on this for compute verification.

### 2.3 Machine Learning Workloads

We consider three categories of AI compute:

1. **Inference:** Forward pass through a model. Output: predictions.
2. **Training:** Gradient computation and weight updates. Output: model deltas.
3. **Experience Extraction:** Distilling reasoning patterns from interactions. Output: semantic experiences.

Each has different verification challenges and quality metrics.

## 3 Protocol Specification

### 3.1 System Model

The network consists of  $n$  nodes partitioned into:

- **Workers:** Contribute AI compute and produce blocks
- **Validators:** Verify work and participate in consensus
- **Evaluators:** Assess work quality for reward distribution

Nodes may serve multiple roles. We assume  $f < n/3$  Byzantine nodes.

### 3.2 Work Submission

Workers submit work claims:

$$W = (t, \text{input\_hash}, \text{output\_hash}, \text{attestation}, \text{quality\_claims}) \quad (1)$$

where  $t$  is the task specification (inference request, training batch, etc.).

### 3.3 Block Production

Block production rights are allocated proportionally to verified useful work:

$$P(\text{node } i \text{ produces block}) = \frac{\sum_j Q(W_{i,j})}{\sum_k \sum_j Q(W_{k,j})} \quad (2)$$

where  $Q(W)$  is the quality-weighted value of work  $W$ .

### 3.4 Consensus Flow

---

**Algorithm 1** PoAI Consensus Round

---

- 1: Workers submit work claims  $\{W_1, \dots, W_m\}$
  - 2: Validators verify attestations
  - 3: Random audit: select  $k$  claims for full verification
  - 4: Evaluators score work quality
  - 5: Leader election based on quality-weighted work
  - 6: Leader proposes block
  - 7: BFT finalization (2/3 validator signatures)
- 

## 4 Compute Verification

### 4.1 TEE Attestation Verification

For TEE-enabled workers, verification is straightforward:

1. Validate attestation signature against known TEE public keys
2. Verify code hash matches approved ML runtime
3. Check input/output hashes match claimed work

Complexity:  $O(1)$  cryptographic operations.

### 4.2 Probabilistic Verification

For non-TEE workers or as an additional check, we use probabilistic verification:

**Theorem 4.1** (Probabilistic Verification Security). *If a fraction  $p$  of work is randomly audited and cheating incurs penalty  $P$  while honest work earns reward  $R$ , then cheating is unprofitable when:*

$$p \cdot P > (1 - p) \cdot R \quad (3)$$

*Proof.* Expected value of cheating:  $(1-p) \cdot R - p \cdot P$ . For this to be negative:  $p \cdot P > (1-p) \cdot R$ .  $\square \quad \square$

With  $P = 10R$  and  $p = 0.1$ , cheating expected value is  $0.9R - 1.0R = -0.1R < 0$ .

### 4.3 Inference Verification

For inference workloads, we verify using:

1. **Spot Checks:** Re-execute random samples
2. **Consistency Tests:** Same input should produce same output
3. **Boundary Tests:** Edge cases with known correct outputs

### 4.4 Training Verification

Training verification uses gradient checkpointing:

$$\text{verify}(\Delta\theta) = \text{check}(\nabla L(x_{\text{checkpoint}}, \theta) \approx \Delta\theta) \quad (4)$$

Re-computing gradients on checkpointed samples validates the claimed updates.

## 5 Quality Assessment

### 5.1 Quality Dimensions

Work quality is multi-dimensional:

$$Q(W) = w_1 \cdot \text{correctness}(W) + w_2 \cdot \text{utility}(W) + w_3 \cdot \text{novelty}(W) \quad (5)$$

- **Correctness:** Does the output satisfy task requirements?
- **Utility:** How valuable is the output for downstream use?
- **Novelty:** Does it provide new information vs. duplicating existing work?

### 5.2 Evaluator Committee

Quality scoring uses a randomly selected evaluator committee:

---

#### Algorithm 2 Quality Scoring Protocol

---

- 1: Select  $k$  evaluators randomly, weighted by stake
  - 2: Each evaluator  $e_i$  submits sealed score  $c_i = \text{commit}(s_i)$
  - 3: After all commitments, evaluators reveal scores
  - 4: Final score:  $Q = \text{trimmed\_mean}(\{s_1, \dots, s_k\})$
  - 5: Reward evaluators close to consensus; penalize outliers
-




Figure 1: POAI system architecture

### 5.3 Incentive Compatibility

**Theorem 5.1** (Evaluator Incentive Compatibility). *Under the scoring rule with quadratic penalties for deviation from consensus, honest scoring is a Nash equilibrium.*

*Proof.* Evaluator  $e_i$ 's utility:  $U_i = R - \alpha(s_i - \bar{s})^2$  where  $\bar{s}$  is the consensus score. Maximizing:  $\frac{\partial U_i}{\partial s_i} = -2\alpha(s_i - \bar{s}) = 0 \Rightarrow s_i = \bar{s}$ . If all evaluators report honestly,  $\bar{s}$  equals true quality, making honest reporting optimal.  $\square$   $\square$

## 6 Security Analysis

### 6.1 Byzantine Fault Tolerance

**Theorem 6.1** (PoAI BFT). *POAI maintains safety and liveness with  $f < n/3$  Byzantine nodes.*

*Proof Sketch.* Safety follows from the underlying BFT finalization requiring  $2f + 1$  signatures. Liveness follows from probabilistic leader election ensuring honest leaders are selected with probability  $> 2/3$ . Full proof in Appendix A.  $\square$   $\square$

### 6.2 Sybil Resistance

**Proposition 6.2** (Sybil Resistance). *Creating multiple identities does not increase expected rewards under POAI.*

*Proof.* Rewards are proportional to verified useful work, which requires actual compute. Splitting identity doesn't increase compute capacity, hence doesn't increase rewards.  $\square$   $\square$

### 6.3 Front-Running Protection

Work is protected through:

1. **Commit-Reveal:** Workers commit to work hash before revealing
2. **TEE Timestamps:** Hardware-attested execution timestamps
3. **Priority Ordering:** First valid commitment wins disputes

## 7 Implementation

### 7.1 Architecture

### 7.2 TEE Integration

We support multiple TEE backends:

- Intel SGX for x86 platforms
- AMD SEV for AMD processors
- ARM TrustZone for mobile/edge

A unified attestation format enables cross-platform verification.

### 7.3 ML Runtime

The approved ML runtime includes:

- PyTorch inference engine
- Training with gradient checkpointing
- Experience extraction pipeline

Code is audited and hash-verified during attestation.

## 8 Evaluation

### 8.1 Experimental Setup

- **Testnet:** 100 nodes across 5 geographic regions
- **Hardware:** Mix of consumer GPUs (RTX 3090) and data center (A100)
- **Workloads:** Inference (70%), training (20%), extraction (10%)

### 8.2 Performance Results

Table 1: Consensus performance metrics

Metric	Value
Throughput (TPS)	847
Finality (seconds)	2.3
Useful Work Efficiency	94%
Verification Overhead	3.2%

### 8.3 Comparison with Baselines

### 8.4 Security Evaluation

- **Attack simulations:** System maintained safety with 30% malicious nodes
- **Cheating detection:** 99.7% of fraudulent claims detected within 2 blocks
- **Recovery time:** Network recovered from 40% node failures in 12 seconds

Table 2: Comparison with existing consensus mechanisms

Mechanism	TPS	Useful Work	Decentralization
Bitcoin (PoW)	7	0%	High
Ethereum (PoS)	30	0%	Medium
Solana (PoH)	65,000	0%	Low
<b>PoAI (Ours)</b>	847	94%	High

## 9 Related Work

**Proof of Useful Work:** Prior proposals include Primecoin (prime number search) and FoldingCoin (protein folding). These target narrow applications; POAI generalizes to arbitrary ML workloads.

**zkML:** Zero-knowledge proofs for ML verification offer cryptographic guarantees but impose 1000x+ overhead. POAI achieves practical efficiency through TEE attestation.

**Decentralized Compute:** Protocols like Golem and Render Network coordinate compute but don’t integrate with consensus. POAI unifies compute contribution with block production.

## 10 Conclusion

POAI demonstrates that blockchain consensus can be secured by useful AI work rather than waste. By combining TEE attestation, probabilistic verification, and multi-party quality scoring, we achieve Byzantine fault tolerance while directing 94% of network compute toward productive AI tasks.

Future work includes integration with the ZOO ecosystem for decentralized AI training and extension to zero-knowledge verification for enhanced privacy.

## Acknowledgments

We thank the Lux Partners team for infrastructure support and the Zoo community for protocol feedback.

## References

- [1] S. Nakamoto, “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System,” 2008.
- [2] V. Buterin, “Ethereum: A Next-Generation Smart Contract and Decentralized Application Platform,” 2014.
- [3] V. Costan and S. Devadas, “Intel SGX Explained,” IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2016.
- [4] M. Castro and B. Liskov, “Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance,” OSDI 1999.