

# Secure Smart Lock System

by  
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# Abstract

# Acknowledgements

## CONTENTS

# Contents

<b>Abstract</b>	<b>i</b>
<b>Acknowledgements</b>	<b>ii</b>
<b>List of Figures</b>	<b>v</b>
<b>List of Tables</b>	<b>vi</b>
<b>1 Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 Problem Statement . . . . .	1
1.2 Aims and Objectives . . . . .	2
1.2.1 Aim of the Project - Technical . . . . .	2
1.2.2 Aim of the Project - For the User . . . . .	3
1.2.3 Project Objectives - Technical . . . . .	3
1.2.4 Project Objectives - For the User . . . . .	3
<b>2 Literature Review</b>	<b>5</b>
2.1 Aim . . . . .	5
2.2 Objectives . . . . .	5
2.3 Current Smart Locks . . . . .	5
2.3.1 Overview . . . . .	5
2.3.2 The August Lock . . . . .	6
2.3.3 Kwikset Kevo . . . . .	8
2.3.4 Specific Lock 3 Detail . . . . .	9
2.3.5 Specific Lock 4 Detail . . . . .	10
2.3.6 Specific Lock 5 Detail . . . . .	10
2.4 Certificate Pinning . . . . .	10
2.5 Avoiding NFC Relay Attacks . . . . .	11
2.6 TLS 1.2 Security . . . . .	12

## CONTENTS

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2.7	Android Fingerprint Keystore Security . . . . .	13
<b>3</b>	<b>Requirements</b>	<b>14</b>
3.1	Requirements Specification . . . . .	14
3.1.1	Minimum Requirements . . . . .	14
3.1.2	Extra Requirements . . . . .	15
3.2	Risk Management . . . . .	15
<b>4</b>	<b>Design</b>	<b>16</b>
4.1	Analysing the Problem . . . . .	16
4.2	Ensuring Ease of Use . . . . .	16
4.2.1	App User Interface . . . . .	16
4.3	Ensuring Security . . . . .	17
4.3.1	TLS/HTTPS . . . . .	17
4.3.2	Certificate Pinning . . . . .	17
4.3.3	CAA DNS Record . . . . .	18
4.3.4	Central Server . . . . .	18
4.3.5	Offline Temporary Tokens . . . . .	18
4.3.6	Core UUID Changing . . . . .	19
4.4	User and Data Flow . . . . .	19
4.4.1	Technical System Overview . . . . .	19
4.4.2	Initial Core Raspberry Pi Setup . . . . .	20
4.4.3	New Device Pairing to Existing Network . . . . .	21
4.5	Project Plan . . . . .	23
4.5.1	Technical Design Decisions . . . . .	24
<b>5</b>	<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>27</b>
	<b>References</b>	<b>28</b>
<b>A</b>	<b>Appendix Chapter</b>	<b>31</b>
A.1	Appending Section . . . . .	31

# List of Figures

4.1	Block Diagram of the System Overview . . . . .	20
4.2	Sequence Diagram for Setup of Core Raspberry Pi . . . . .	21
4.3	Sequence Diagram for Setup of a New Device on an Existing Smart Lock Network . . . . .	22

# List of Tables

# Chapter 1

# Introduction

## 1.1 Problem Statement

With smart devices being created left right and centre nowadays with very little care towards security, it is going to become more common that houses are being hacked with devices slowly controlling more and more sensitive areas of the home. An example of this would be the August lock, an idea similar to what I am trying to achieve here, however the device has multiple security flaws that were found and outlined at the security conference Defcon and is detailed in the paper by Fuller & Jenkins (2017). This is far from the first smart home device that was found to have security issues, there have been hundreds of different WiFi Security cameras that connect themselves to the web with little care towards the security of that device which has the capability of letting someone spy on your home. Not to long ago, there was a huge attack that brought down DynDNS, and therefore all the sites that used it which included Twitter, Spotify and Reddit were heavily impacted. This attack was using the internet connections of innocent people who happened to have insecure smart home devices in their homes. Millions of smart home devices were involved in the attack as they were hacked due to their inadequate or sometimes non-existent security with Dyn saying that “Not only has it highlighted vulnerabilities in the security of “Internet of Things” (IoT) devices that need to be addressed...” (Hilton 2016). The Guardian also ran an article on the attack saying that “Because it has so many internet-connected devices to choose from, attacks from Mirai are much larger than what most DDoS attacks could previously achieve” (Woolf 2016). This is a serious issue that has the potential to become much larger if IoT device manufactures keep making poorly secured devices.

The proposed solution was to create a product unlike these other smart home devices, one that is secure enough that I would be happy to put it in my own home. At the end of



the day, a camera being infected doesn't matter so much, but a system that unlocks your house needs to be bulletproof on the security front. Looking at the implementation of the August lock, it just isn't something that I would be willing to use to secure my house, yet thousands, maybe more unknowing customers have purchased the august lock and use it to secure their homes every day. I want to create something that is easy to use and secure, something that most companies seem to have trouble with nowadays.

Some current locks on the market have glaring security holes that still have not been fixed, it is these issues that I would like to learn from and fix in my lock. "The hacker jmaxxz found that the key in slow 0 has special privileges and coined this key the 'firmware key'." (Fuller & Jenkins 2017) This issue is with the August Lock and that master key is accessible by the owner and can gain full control of the lock. This means that if the lock was sold on, the previous owner could have theoretically kept the master key and could gain access to the lock again which is a huge security risk. Another issue I want to solve is removing access from others when the lock is offline or the user is away from home. This is a flaw of many smart locks as they work over bluetooth, some without Wi-Fi bridges which means outside of the home they are completely inaccessible. There are other issues with smart locks on the market that I will detail later, however these are the main two I will be taking into account whilst developing my smart lock system.

## 1.2 Aims and Objectives

### 1.2.1 Aim of the Project - Technical

The project objective is to create a smart lock system that would be able to automate the unlocking and locking of a house's front door. The system will be comprised of multiple Raspberry Pi's with sensors connected to them to retrieve data from a variety of sources to determine whether the door should be locked or unlocked. The system will use RESTful APIs so that it can be easily extended to more devices in the future, and will ensure that all communication between devices is done so in a fully encrypted and secure manner. An example of some authentication methods that the system may use would be using the phone itself, fingerprint, RFID/NFC, Facial Recognition, etc.

Security is key as this will be securing a home. It is imperative that all communication is done securely, and that the system is certain that the user is who they say they are before they let them into the house. I will be conducting research into the best and most accessible security methods that could be used for this project for the initial implementation and demonstration. The idea however, is that the system will be built in such a way that anyone could create a device for this system using the RESTful APIs that will be available

from the core control centre in the house.

### 1.2.2 Aim of the Project - For the User

So security is all well and good, but the product must still be easy to use for the user. At the end of the day, a lot of users don't care about how secure a product is, and will trust that the company has put in the correct security measures. This reason alone is why there are so many unsecured smart devices out in the wild as your average person doesn't have the technical knowledge to ensure that the product is secure. The companies that make these products know this and so don't actually implement robust security, something that, in my opinion, should be regulated more closely. This product should make the users lives easier whilst still maintaining the security of any normal key based locking system.

A simple run down of what I would want from this lock for the user would be the following. They walk up to their home after having setup their system, and all they need to do to get in is tap unlock on their phone screen to unlock the door, and potentially have it lock itself again after they have entered the house, probably on a timer. If the door fails to lock for any reason, the user should be notified (another issue with the august lock, if it fails to lock, it simply reports the door as locked, even if it isn't).

### 1.2.3 Project Objectives - Technical

- Design a Database Schema that can be used to store all the users data and settings efficiently (each query takes under 0.5 seconds)
- Develop a core application for the house that will control the main system functions
- Develop a REST API for the core application that other systems (i.e. door unlock module or authentication systems) can talk to
- Implement a minimum of one authentication method that can be used to unlock the door
- Develop a central server that can be used as a central point of confidence for all data, authentication keys and settings
- Ensure that the security of the product is solid and that all communication is secured with TLS 1.2

### 1.2.4 Project Objectives - For the User

- Develop a minimal Android application that the user can use to setup and use their system

## CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

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- Lock should be simple and quick to setup after initial installation (easy for user to understand how to operate it and takes less than 5 minutes to complete setup)
- Ensure security of the system doesn't affect the users overall experience \_\_\_\_\_

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## Chapter 2

# Literature Review

### 2.1 Aim

Investigate different aspects of a secure smart lock system to see where potential security issues could be and how to avoid or counteract them.

### 2.2 Objectives

- Evaluate different areas of the Secure Smart Lock System
- Investigate methods of ensuring the security of the system
- Investigate ways to avoid potential security risks imposed by necessary parts of the system
- Ensure that security doesn't make the system considerably more difficult for the user to setup, use day-to-day or manage

### 2.3 Current Smart Locks

#### 2.3.1 Overview

Smarts locks and internet of things (IoT) devices, in general, have increased massively in availability and use over the last couple of years and according to Buhov et al. (2016), there will be 50 billion devices connected to the internet by 2020. Having these devices in and around your home constantly connected to the internet introduces some risk if they are not properly secured. This risk is exaggerated if they are devices that secure your home such as

a smart lock.

Ho et al. (2016) compare 5 commonly available smart locks that are on the market right now. These locks operated in three different ways: touch-to-unlock, mobile app unlocking, and automatic unlocking. For my purposes, I am mostly interested in the mobile app unlocking as it will be the main way to unlock the Secure Smart Lock System. All the smart locks except for the Lockitron connect to the internet through a Bluetooth connection to the phone, rather than connecting directly, this is interesting as my system will only use Wi-Fi, and will only communicate directly with the phone if they are on the same Wi-Fi network. The study concluded that all the smart locks except for the Lockitron were vulnerable to the attacks that they undertook, this was down to the Lockitron using Wi-Fi directly and therefore being able to verify with the server for the most up-to-date access control lists. They continue to explain that direct connections, while good, do mean that the device must include a Wi-Fi module which increases power usage on the device and so battery-only operation isn't feasible. A good point they make about the Lockitron is that it doesn't maintain its own access control list locally, so in the event of their servers being unavailable, the lock will not function. This is something I plan to avoid in my lock by maintaining a local access control list, however, due to the attacks mentioned in the study, I will ensure that any changes to the access control list are passed onto the lock before the user is told they are saved.

Ye et al. (2017) did a study specifically on the security of the August Smart Lock. This study focussed on more specific attacks such as moving the owner account from one phone to another and taking control of it. All of the attacks that they performed required root access to the Android device in order to perform, which is unreasonable to assume you will be able to get without taking the users device and knowing their unlock code to perform the rooting process. This is further shown by Fuller & Jenkins (2017) who also tried to penetrate the August Lock but without using rooting as their main point of entry. The attacks that Ye et al. (2017) performed certainly aren't ideal, but rooting compromises the integrity of the device and exposes all the data on the device including encryption keys, app data and anything else the device has stored. As shown by Fuller & Jenkins (2017) the August Lock has had a lot of past security issues, however, they have been fixed by the development team since then.

### **2.3.2 The August Lock**

#### **2.3.2.1 Overview**

The August lock is one of the most well known locks on the market, it has a wide variety of different features and comes with support for both Android and iOS devices. One of the

major benefits of the August lock is you can fit it to your existing door lock so installation required is minimal. There are two different models of the August Lock, their original model and their new "Smart Lock Pro".

### 2.3.2.2 Significant Features

- Mobile phone is now your key
- You can allow other people access to your property with virtual keys and can also set time constraints on each virtual key
- Keep existing door hardware, don't have to replace lock and you can still use original keys if you want to
- Has an Android and iOS app for controlling the lock so most people can use it
- Works with Apple HomeKit, Amazon Alexa, Google Home, Nest and IFTTT
- Can automatically unlock and lock the door when you enter and leave the house
- DoorSense allows the lock to detect if the door is left ajar

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### 2.3.2.3 Auto Unlocking/Locking

According to August (2017), this feature works by using the bluetooth on your phone along with GPS and Wi-Fi to detect when you are in range of the door and then unlocks it for you over bluetooth. When you are more than 200m away from your house, the phone sits in what they call "away mode" which means it is no longer searching for the lock over bluetooth until the phone gets near to the house again. The problem with this kind of system is that bluetooth is vulnerable to relay attacks, and if the phone is using Wi-Fi to detect its location then according to Feng & Gong (2014) it's a fairly trivial attack to spoof the devices location, therefore activating the bluetooth search for the lock allowing for bluetooth relay attacks on the app and the lock. Aside from attacks, the feature itself has other issues such as not automatically locking until you are quite a distance from your lock, in the case of So (2017) the smart lock was still unlocked until she was 1/4 mile from her lock. This is plenty of time for someone else to walk into your house if you live in a built-up area.

### 2.3.2.4 DoorSense

DoorSense allows the lock to send you a notification if your door is left open for more than a certain amount of time. This is a feature that will be rarely useful as most people don't leave

their door ajar when they enter or leave the house, but in the odd occasion that you do, it would be good to know. However, as mentioned by So (2017), this feature definitely has some issues, after installing the DoorSense sensor into the doorframe and enabling notifications if the door is left open for one minute, she received no notifications. She then checked it manually by leaving the door open and waiting for notifications on her phone, but got nothing. When working however, the DoorSense feature does integrate with the smart lock directly and allow for instant auto locking when the door is closed which alleviates some of the issues mentioned above.

### **2.3.2.5 Conclusion**

The August Smart Lock Pro + Connect is a package with a lot of features, however some of them don't work as well as they should, and coming to rely on them may one day result in your house being left unlocked if they don't work as expected. The product has good integration with other technologies such as Apple HomeKit, Amazon Alexa and Google Home, however there's no API available for you to add your own integrations into the system which would be a nice addition.

## **2.3.3 Kwikset Kevo**

### **2.3.3.1 Overview**

Kwikset are a well known lock manufacturer who have jumped on the smart lock bandwagon. The Kevo lock has multiple different designs which allow you to choose one which suits your home. On the technology side it isn't slacking either coming with integrations into multiple different smart home technologies and the ability to add remote access with the kevo plus, much like the august connect does.

### **2.3.3.2 Significant Features**

- Mobile phone is now your key
- You can allow other people access to your property with virtual keys and can also set time constraints on each virtual key
- Keep existing door hardware, don't have to replace lock but has different options if you want an entirely new lock
- Has an Android and iOS app for controlling the lock so most people can use it
- Works with Amazon Alexa, Nest and IFTT

- Touch the lock to open when registered device is in range, auto unlock is also available in the app
- Can purchase a fob that allows keyless entry without a smartphone

### 2.3.3.3 Auto Unlocking/Locking

This lock allows auto unlocking through a setting in the app, however auto locking has to be enabled by changing a dip switch on the lock itself which might not be obvious to a normal user. The auto unlocking is done by communicating with a phone that is within range and verifying that it has a key corresponding to the lock, but also checking that the phone is outside the house rather than inside to ensure security. Unlike the August lock, the auto unlock does require a physical touch on the lock in order for it to detect the phone and unlock the door. According to De Looper & Hayward (2018) this process of unlocking takes a few seconds, so you don't have the convenience of walking up to your door and it already being open for you. The auto locking is also worse than the August lock as it isn't based on proximity, it's just based on a simple timer, however it means you know that the lock will definitely be locked after a set time of you leaving, which would add to your peace of mind and increases security.

### 2.3.3.4 Kevo Fob

The Kevo Fob allows you to have keyless access to the house without having to use your smartphone. This is something that the August lock does not offer and would be great for anyone who doesn't have a smartphone such as older relatives. This is something I plan to have in my system time permitting as it would be good to allow entry to the property without a traditional key but also without requiring the use of a smartphone.

### 2.3.3.5 Conclusion

The Kwikset Kevo + Kevo Plus is less feature filled than the August smart lock, but comes from a much more well known company in the world of locks. The lock lacks integrations with other products compared to the likes of the August Lock, but I couldn't find any published security flaws with the Kwikset Kevo compared to the large amount that are published for the August Lock.

## 2.3.4 Specific Lock 3 Detail

Choose a lock and write a detailed analysis of it from the webpage and official sources released by the company



### 2.3.5 Specific Lock 4 Detail

### 2.3.6 Specific Lock 5 Detail

Choose a lock and write a detailed analysis of it from the webpage and official sources released by the company

## 2.4 Certificate Pinning

Choose a lock and write a detailed analysis of it from the webpage and official sources released by the company

Certificate pinning is one of many ways to ensure you are talking to the server you think you are. If you end up doing this badly, however, you can decrease the security of your app. A study performed by Buhov et al. (2016) does an evaluation of 25,000 android apps on the play store to see how many of them implement security properly. It turns out that only 21% of applications have no issues, with 36% having a broken implementation of either the Trust Manager or the Hostname Verifier. This issue is brought about by people using self-signed certificates or pinning certificates and trying to, therefore, implement their own version of the Trust Manager and/or Hostname Verifier but doing so incorrectly. As pointed out by the study, many of the incorrect implementations of the Trust Manager lead to the app accepting any certificate it was given, therefore breaking the chain of trust that is usually in place on the device. Tendulkar & Enck (2014) back this up showing that out of the apps they tested, only 43% use SSL verification correctly with the remaining apps either accept all certificates or accept all hostnames. An even more interesting fact that they discovered was that 53% of the apps they tested implement this custom code to allow all certificates or all hostnames even though they are using valid and signed certificates. The inclusion of this incorrect code allows for man-in-the-middle attacks which would compromise the security of user data being transferred over the network.

Buhov et al. (2016) mentions the different security you get from different levels of certificate pinning. You can pin the end (leaf) certificate which tells you with absolute certainty that you are connecting to the server you think you are. One downside of this is that you must make updates to your app frequently as most certificates only have a lifetime of a year. This problem is made even worse with LetsEncrypt who's certificates expire after a maximum of 3 months. The study explains other solutions for certificate pinning including intermediate and root certificate pinning. Intermediate certificate pinning is less secure than leaf certificate pinning, however, as long as you trust the Certificate Authority (CA) you are using to not sign a certificate for your domain erroneously, then it is just as secure. The major benefit of intermediate certificate pinning is that they update a lot less frequently, the current LetsEncrypt certificate doesn't expire until the year 2021. The last option of root

certificate pinning is a lot less secure as you are trusting a lot more parties as potentially multiple CA's will use the same root certificate for signing their SSL certificates.

The studies show me that certificate pinning is overall a good idea, however, it must be implemented correctly. Based off of the tests that were performed by these studies I will ensure that my app only accepts certificates signed by the LetsEncrypt intermediate certificate and that my app ensures the hostname on the certificate matches the hostname on the certificate. If either of these tests fail then it means I have implemented the security incorrectly and as these studies have shown that would make my app vulnerable to MITM attacks which would severely impact the security of my smart lock system.

## 2.5 Avoiding NFC Relay Attacks

During my research it became apparent to me that NFC has no way of verifying that the device it is communicating with is actually right next to it, making it subject to relay attacks (Francis et al. 2010). This study explains the relay attack as the ability to send the NFC communication over a separate communication channel using other phones as the proxy. This introduces problems if the app is always able to receive NFC communication and unlock the door, as an attacker could then unlock the door by having someone by the door NFC reader and also by a person with permission to unlock the door and just send the data between the two attackers. Oh et al. (2015) suggests distance bounding as a potential solution to this issue as communicating between the proxy devices will add a delay that would normally not be present in the system. The NFC reader should be able to determine the distance between the NFC device and the reader by determining the latency in sending and receiving data. The study points out that this kind of verification can vary massively in latency and therefore you may sometimes end up rejecting legitimate users if their device doesn't respond quickly enough. Two-factor Authentication is another solution that the study suggests and is a much more reliable solution as you can request that as well as the NFC card a user must input a pin, provide a fingerprint or enter a password. Another suggestion they make to directly counter relay attacks is to emit a jamming signal around the reader so that the device can't communicate externally via 3G, 4G, Wi-Fi or Bluetooth. Whilst this is an interesting solution, there are many situations where this would be impractical or illegal to implement a jammer in an NFC enabled device.

Francis et al. (2010) shows how trivial it is to relay NFC data across a Bluetooth connection even on old devices. This study shows that another potential attack mitigation strategy would be to include the location in the NFC transaction as the attacks can only relay the data, not modify it. If this was done the reader could check that the location was within the expected range to be considered near the reader. The issue with this strategy is that

the location is not always accurate, getting accurate location through GPS takes time and may not be possible if the reader is undercover.

Using NFC for my project will require investigation into the methods specified above to prevent relay attacks. This has certainly opened up a lot of potential work for me to ensure that the smart lock is easy to use but also secure from relay attacks. I'll be looking into how effective the distance bounding is, but if that proves ineffective or unreliable I will make it so the device has to be unlocked in order to respond to the NFC signal. I will be investigating and comparing these options to the security of a conventional key based lock system.

## 2.6 TLS 1.2 Security

TLS 1.2 is the most recent version of the transport layer protocol used to secure communications across a network to prevent eavesdropping and tampering. The security of TLS 1.2 is vital for the project as it is what will be used for all communications between the phone, the lock and the server.

Meyer (2014) offers a fairly comprehensive study of SSL/TLS from the very beginning when SSL 1.0 was released. The study points out that SSL/TLS have had many vulnerabilities throughout the time that they have been commonplace in securing internet traffic. It also points out that there are lots of different implementations of the TLS standard, all of which have their own differences and bugs. OpenSSL is the most used implementation on the web at the time of the study based on the usage of web servers and browsers that use the implementations. Part of this study lists a lot of different attacks that have been possible against TLS or some of its implementations over time, all of which have now been resolved in the latest implementations of the TLS standard. The existence of this list does show however that TLS is not perfect, and neither are the implementations. As pointed out by Turner (2014) a lot of the security is left down to the system administrators, whether that is ensuring that only the most secure algorithms are allowed to be used, or patching a security flaw by making a configuration change. TLS can be a very secure protocol if setup in the correct way using up-to-date implementations, but it can also be insecure if badly configured or not updated when exploits are found and patched.

This research has shown me that TLS 1.2 is secure and uses cryptographically secure and proven algorithms for all the encryption it forms, but must be configured to not use the old algorithms and must be kept up-to-date by the system administrators managing the systems using it. I conclude that TLS 1.2 is sufficient for securing the smart lock system from this research, more technical investigation will be done during implementation to ensure that the system is configured as securely as possible.

## 2.7 Android Fingerprint Keystore Security

This system will utilise the android fingerprint keystore functionality to store and protect the keys used to communicate with and unlock the smart lock. The security of this keystore is fundamental to the security of the app. Does & Maarse (2016) show in their study a few different attacks on the fingerprint authentication methods in Android and how you would go about doing them.

The first attack Does & Maarse (2016) show is trying to get the device to accept a fingerprint which isn't enrolled on the device. Due to the Android system itself not knowing about any of the fingerprints enrolled into the device and therefore having to query the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) about whether the user provided the necessary authentication, this attack isn't feasible without replacing a core component of the Android system. The attack was possible, but only by replacing `fingerprintd` to return a value other than 0, which is the only value the system determines as a failure, every time it is invoked. To replace `fingerprintd` requires root access to the system, and the system will warn you on every boot that the `/system` directory has been modified and could be corrupt. This means the attack is not feasible as you would need to root the device in order to be able to perform this attack.

The second attack that Does & Maarse (2016) performed on the Android system was trying to replay AuthTokens from the Keystore to the Keymaster which would allow them to perform cryptographic operations authenticated by the replayed AuthToken. To do this they forced the system to give them the same AuthToken every time and then waited for the challenge ID to become the same twice. When the challenge ID was returned as the same twice, they were able to send the same AuthToken and authenticate with the Keymaster to perform cryptographic operations. Two key factors of this attack are that they retrieved the AuthToken from the device memory which would not be possible without root permissions in a normal case. Secondly, they forced the device to always return the same AuthToken, which is not normal behaviour as generally, the device will return a different AuthToken with every request, along with a different challenge ID, therefore avoiding this issue.

In conclusion, the study couldn't find any exploitable flaws with the fingerprint keystore security under normal circumstances, only when they had root access to the device and could, therefore, replace binaries with ones they had constructed themselves. For my use case, I assume that if someone can gain root access to the device, they already had the ability to unlock the device and therefore access the smart lock app to unlock the door.

## Chapter 3

# Requirements

### 3.1 Requirements Specification

#### 3.1.1 Minimum Requirements

The following requirements are what must be implemented in the system prior to submission of the project in order to provide a minimal viable project (MVP) that could actually be connected to motor and used in a house:

- System should indicate whether door is unlocked or locked with LEDs
- Seperate Raspberry Pi's should be used to show system modularity (i.e. core, door lock and nfc)
- Core should provide an API for other modules to use so that making new modules is easy
- Remote server should be setup with an API and database for a central point of trust
- All communication should be secured and tested against common vulnerabilities
- An Android app should be created to make setup and configuration of the system easy for an inexperienced user
- It should be as easy or easier to use this system than to use a normal key lock system
- More than just the owner of the lock should be able to have the app and unlock the house

### 3.1.2 Extra Requirements

If extra time is available at the end of the project, I would like to implement extra features that would expand the project from an MVP into something more feature rich and useful for an everyday user. Some of those features may include the following:

- Allow certain people to only enter the house at set times through the Android app
- Mount the system to a real door and have a motor unlock the door automatically
- Include a web interface so that people can manage their account and lock from the web panel
- Allow more than one lock system to be used per account for people who want multiple locks in a house or have more than one property
- Implement automatic unlocking when a phone gets close enough to the door
- Get alerted if people are still in the house after their allotted access period has expired
- Make extra modules for the lock such as a face recognition module, a doorbell module, etc

## 3.2 Risk Management

For a project such as this, there is obviously a large amount of risk involved if for some reason the system isn't secured correctly. My plan is to limit these risks as much as possible by ensuring that all communication is using enforced TLS 1.2 as well as not running the system on an actual door until I have a working system that I have run penetration testing on. Replay attacks were something that I had to consider, but these are averted by using TLS 1.2, as it has protection against that built in using the MAC secret and the sequence number. When running this system on a real door, there will be much larger risk involved as it is obviously securing a real house, however as long as all the proper testing is done before it gets installed on a real door, then that should eliminate the risk involved. Obviously, if this gets installed on any door, then it will be in my own house, so I will ensure that the system is functioning properly before installation and any updates are fully tested before being installed on the live system.

## Chapter 4

# Design

### 4.1 Analysing the Problem

Problem Analysis was simple as I had clearly defined goals for the project. Making decisions for the project when you are your own product owner is significantly easier as you just have to satisfy your own goals with no risk of others having other views about where the project should go which could slow progress. Most of my analysis was done on a rolling basis, with me coming up with ideas over a period of a few weeks and noting them down for later use, then expanding on them when I got to working on that section of the project.

### 4.2 Ensuring Ease of Use

The app needs to be easy to use, if it isn't then the user may end up using other, less secure smart lock products. At the end of the day most users don't care about security, or at least they only care that the product claims to be secure. Most users just care about how easily they can setup and use the product. If they have problems whilst trying to do that then that's when you start to get bad reviews and unsatisfied users. To ensure ease of use, my approach will simply be to have as few obstacles as possible between the user and getting the lock ready to use.

#### 4.2.1 App User Interface

The app's user interface will be very simple as it must be easy for an inexperienced user to understand and use. Overall, the app needs to be able to: let the user signup for an account or login to their existing account; setup their device if they don't have one already attached to their account; and lock or unlock the door. Anything on top of that will be added if time

is available at the end of the project as the main focus is to prove that good security can be implemented and that if the system were to be extended it could be both secure and feature filled.

### 4.3 Ensuring Security

The security of the system will be ensured in many ways, most of which are analysed in the literature review. Here I will run over the security measures I will implement, and any further security measures that could be implemented given adequate time.

#### 4.3.1 TLS/HTTPS

Ensuring that all communication is sent through HTTPS using at least TLS 1.2 will be a huge step towards having a secure system. TLS is the protocol used for any website that you would visit on your browser that is using HTTPS technology. There are a huge array of benefits received from using TLS such as:

- Encryption of all transferred data
- Encryption of metadata such as the endpoint you are connecting to
- Verification that the server you are talking to owns the domain you are connected to
- Protection against replay attacks

There are plenty of other benefits, those are just some of the most major ones. This will definitely be used in my project for all communication as it takes care of a lot of security concerns automatically.

#### 4.3.2 Certificate Pinning

Certificate pinning is another very important but rarely used security measure. If you are connecting to a known server who's certificate doesn't change constantly, then you can ensure that you only connect to that server by pinning the certificate you connect to. In my case I will be using LetsEncrypt certificates which change every 3 months, so instead of pinning the main certificate I will pin the Certificate Authorities (CA) certificate. This is less secure, however it means that you are guaranteed to only connect to a system that has been issued a certificate by that CA for that domain, this is still a very high level of security as CA's are trusted to only issue certificates to the owner of the domain.



### 4.3.3 CAA DNS Record

Certificate Authority Authorization (CAA) DNS Records are there to ensure that only the Certificate Authority that you're using can issue certificates for your domain. When a CA is testing whether the request for a certificate is coming from the owner of the domain, one of the checks they do is to see if there is a CAA record on the DNS for the domain, and if so, whether they are listed as one of the authorised CA's. If they are not, they won't issue a certificate for the domain, therefore stopping any potential false certificates from being created if somehow an attacker managed to fool the system into believing they owned the domain. This will also definitely be used within my project as provides a lot of extra security for just a couple of seconds of setup.

### 4.3.4 Central Server

In my system I will be implementing a central server that will store accounts, registered devices, settings, device status, etc. This system will be the central trust point for the system as it will be considered secure at all times. Communication to and from the server will be secured as mentioned above using TLS/HTTPS and the server can be verified using certificate pinning along with the CAA DNS Record to ensure only LetsEncrypt can issue certificates for the smartlockapp.zackpollard.pro domain. The server will provide an API that the user and devices can connect to in order to talk to each other. This will be the main communication method between the smart lock and the users device, all unlock requests and other interactions will go through the server. If other authentication devices are implemented locally, then those will be able to communicate directly with the Core RPi in order to unlock the door, however that will be within the closed loop of the home network and will also all be encrypted using HTTPS/TLS. The central server will be a core part of the system so will definitely be used within the project.

### 4.3.5 Offline Temporary Tokens

This idea is for if/when the internet in the house goes down or the Core RPi just loses connection to the network. In that case, the core server would detect that the Core is no longer connected and would send a notification to the admin account for the lock. This notification would tell the user that they can download and distribute offline keys that the central server has pre-prepared with the lock for this occasion. These keys will allow the admin to control the lock even when the connection to the server has been lost, and the keys can also be shared with family and friends that may need access to the property during the time that the internet connection is down. Once the connection comes back up, these keys are immediately invalidated by the Core RPi and new keys are established between

the central server and Core RPi for the next time that the internet connection becomes unavailable.

### 4.3.6 Core UUID Changing

The Core RPi will have a UUID that is generated during initial setup. This will be the main identifier for the device, there will be no master key or anything similar, just a UUID, device name, and the JWT that it uses to authenticate with the API on the central server. Every time the device is setup with another account, the UUID is changed although the device name remains the same. This changes the generated JWT even more as it will also incorporate a timestamp of the current time. This system completely eliminates the issues mentioned in the problem statement regarding the august locks “firmware key.”


## 4.4 User and Data Flow

The flow of data around the system and the way in which the user will interact with the system to cause this data flow is important to get established early on as it is the basis around which the system will be built.

### 4.4.1 Technical System Overview

Figure 4.1 below shows the overview of how the seperate components of the system will communicate with eachother. This is the initial idea and so details could change slightly when programming begins however this is the main idea as to how it will all come together.


Figure 4.1: Block Diagram of the System Overview



#### 4.4.2 Initial Core Raspberry Pi Setup

Figure 4.2 below shows the planned sequence of interactions between different devices for setting up a new core raspberry pi including connecting it to the wifi and adding it to the users account. The initial setup section is mandatory, the alt section which allows the user to pair the device again at a later date is an optional implementation step and will be done if time permits.


Figure 4.2: Sequence Diagram for Setup of Core Raspberry Pi




### 4.4.3 New Device Pairing to Existing Network

Figure 4.3 below shows the planned sequence of interactions between different devices for setting up a new device when an existing network already exists, where a core has already been paired to an account. This process would add the new device to the existing core however this won't be needed if extra authentication methods aren't added to the network, again this will be time dependent.

Figure 4.3: Sequence Diagram for Setup of a New Device on an Existing Smart Lock Network



## 4.5 Project Plan



### 4.5.1 Technical Design Decisions

In this section I will describe certain aspects of the project where I had to make decisions as to how they could be implemented best. In each section I will give a high level description of each method followed by which method I decided to go with and why. Some of the solutions may not be required as they may not get implemented in the demo, however they would be required for a full implementation and so are worth discussing.

#### 4.5.1.1 Initiate Connection from Another Device to Core Raspberry Pi

This is a difficult issue to get around as finding a specific device on the network is not trivial, especially if the network is particularly large. There are various different ways I could solve this which are described below.

**4.5.1.1.1 Method 1 - IP Broadcasting** One option is to use IP Broadcasting, where the core uses the networks broadcast range to send data to all the other devices on the network. This would work, but I'm unsure of the reliability of this method and broadcasting the IP of the core to the entire network doesn't seem like something I would want to do. It would likely be fine on a home network, however if it was on a much larger network in a business, this method may not work at all as they could block broadcasting on their switches entirely, or if multiple cores are running on the network it could become quite congested with the number of devices trying to announce themselves to other devices.

**4.5.1.1.2 Method 2 - Bluetooth Sync Device to Core** This would use the Bluetooth on both devices to contact each other and find out the IP of the core on the network. The device would then use this IP to establish a connection to the core. This method has a few issues, namely the security of communicating over Bluetooth as it doesn't have the same kind of security as Wi-Fi. The other issue is that this means the two devices must be within Bluetooth range, which is much shorter than Wi-Fi range and can't be easily extended, unlike Wi-Fi range which has highly available and cheap range extenders.

**4.5.1.1.3 Method 3 - Contact the remote server to get the Core IP** For this to work, the Core would have to announce its IP to the remote server whenever it changed. This would be very simple as the Core will already have a connection established to the remote server. The device that is trying to connect to the Core would then simply have to contact the remote server and request the IP of the Core on the local network, and then establish a connection with it. This is the easiest method to secure as it gives one point of contact to retrieve this information, and eliminates the need for any kind of discovery. This

also allows devices to be as far away from each other as required if they are on the same network.

**4.5.1.1.4 Decision** Method 3 would be the best way to go about this as it provides the most security and is also the most simple to implement. Devices can quickly look up the IP whenever they need and have to be authorised in order to do so.

### **4.5.1.2 Initiate Connection to Core Raspberry Pi for Initial Setup**

**4.5.1.2.1 Method 1 Connect using 4-digit code through the remote server** The first issue here is that using a code means that you don't have to be within proximity of the device to attach to it as it goes through the remote server to establish the link. There are some potential ways that attackers could guess or work out the code and then connect to it themselves, or find some way to force the remote server to override the owner of that Core. The initial setup should be handled on the Core itself, and the phone should not contact the remote server regarding this, the Core should contact the remote server to establish that a link has been created.

**4.5.1.2.2 Method 2 Connect using Bluetooth sync between the Core and users phone** This method requires that the user is close to the Core to establish a link with it as they must be within Bluetooth range and push a physical button on the device to start the pairing process. If the device is already paired to an account, then it will either need to be confirmed by the current account that they want to pair to a new account or they will need to wait for a timeout to expire before the pairing can be done (unless it is cancelled from the current owners account). Within the app, they will need to select the option to connect to a new Core, and then select the Core they want to pair with from the list. The phone will then establish a Bluetooth connection with the Core, the Core will generate a private key to identify itself, and will upload the public key to the remote server for validation when communicating with it. This will bind the Core to the account the user was logged into and they will then be able to add new devices and users to the Core, as well as modify the settings for the Core, all from the app.

**4.5.1.2.3 Method 3 Connect to Wi-Fi network broadcasted by the Core on users phone** This method requires that the user must be close to the Core to push the physical button on the device to create the Wi-Fi network to start the setup of the device. All other steps are the same as Method 2, however this method has the benefit of not requiring every device to have Bluetooth as well as Wi-Fi, lowering the physical size, cost and power required to run each device. Wi-Fi can also be more easily secured than Bluetooth, and I



will carry out testing to see if I can lower the power of the Wi-Fi adapter when in access point mode to lower the range of the network, so the user must be close to the device when performing the initial setup.

**4.5.1.2.4 Decision** Method 3 is the best way to do this as we are already using Wi-Fi so don't require extra hardware on the device, also interfacing with and securing Wi-Fi is easier than Bluetooth which will save time in the development stage.

### 4.5.1.3 Initiate Connection from New Device to Core Raspberry Pi for Setup

**4.5.1.3.1 Method 1 Bluetooth pairing between Device and Core** This method would work, but could introduce difficulties for the user as it requires the two devices to be close to each other as they must be within Bluetooth range. It would also require the core to store the Wi-Fi password in a readable form to give it to new devices that will also need it. This is not something that I want to do as that means if someone can access the device then they can access the Wi-Fi password and therefore the entire network.

**4.5.1.3.2 Method 2 Bluetooth pairing between device and users phone** This method will work in the same way as the initial setup of the core. The User will press a pairing button on the device itself, then go to an add device page on their phone (only available for people who are already admins of a Core). On this page they will see any devices that are in pairing mode that they can add to their network. Once they have added the device, the app will request they connect it to the same Wi-Fi network as the Core, and request the password for the network. The device will then have successfully been added to the door unlocking system, will exit syncing mode, and will then communicate with the Core directly. The user will see the device in their list of devices on their door unlocking system, and will be able to change any settings it has.

**4.5.1.3.3 Method 3 Wi-Fi pairing between the device and users phone** This method will work in the same way as method 2, however it will use Wi-Fi instead of Bluetooth for the setup, for the same reasons mentioned in Method 3 of the Initiate Connection to Core Raspberry Pi for Initial Setup section.

**4.5.1.3.4 Decision** Method 3 has been chosen for the same reason as in the Initiate Connection to Core Raspberry Pi for Initial Setup section.

### 4.5.1.4 Security During the Setup Phase

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## Chapter 5

# Conclusion

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Notes


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## Appendix A

# Appendix Chapter

### A.1 Appending Section

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