

Monthly Report

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Architecture of Risk Assessment

Modelling of Bayesian Network

Fuzzy Risk Assessment

Performance Analysis

Task Planning

Architecture of Risk Assessment


Architecture of Risk Assessment

The architecture of the dynamic risk assessment module is shown as following figure.




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
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
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
Modelling of Bayesian Network

Simplification of Bayesian Network

In this paper, the resource node is introduced to simplify the Bayesian network, the following figure shows two Bayesian network with/without resource node.



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Estimation of Fuzzy Conditional Probabilities

In this paper, there are only two states of a node in the Bayesian network, which is shown as follows.

$$x = \begin{cases} F, & \text{the corresponding event of node } x \text{ does not happen,} \\ T, & \text{the corresponding event of node } x \text{ does happen.} \end{cases}$$

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Assume that a node x has m parent nodes $^*x_1, ^*x_2, \dots, ^*x_m$. There exists a conditional probability table of the node x , which is shown as follows.

*x_1	F	F	\dots	T	T	T
*x_2	F	F	\dots	T	T	T
\vdots	\vdots	\vdots	\ddots	\vdots	\vdots	\vdots
$^*x_{m-2}$	F	F	\dots	T	T	T
$^*x_{m-1}$	F	F	\dots	F	T	T
*x_m	F	T	\dots	T	F	T
x	p_1	p_2	\dots	p_{2^m-2}	p_{2^m-1}	p_{2^m}


Estimation of Fuzzy Conditional Probabilities

Because the size of historical data of malicious attacks for ICSs is too small, the conditional probabilities from the statistical analysis of historical data is not always accurate. To solve this problem, in this paper, the fuzzy probability is used to replace the crisp probability which is hard to be obtained.

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Because the size of historical data of malicious attacks for ICSs is too small, the conditional probabilities from the statistical analysis of historical data is not always accurate. To solve this problem, in this paper, the fuzzy probability is used to replace the crisp probability which is hard to be obtained.

This fuzzy probability is denoted by $\tilde{p} = (\underline{p}, p, \bar{p})$, where $0 \leq \underline{p} \leq p \leq \bar{p} \leq 1$. The following figure shows the fuzzy number \tilde{p} .



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
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Fuzzy Risk Assessment

α -cuts Based Fuzzy Bayesian Approximate Inference

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
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- Many algorithms have been developed for Bayesian inference, such as probability propagation in trees of clusters, variable elimination algorithm, junction tree algorithm. These exact inference algorithms are NP-hard.

To solve the aforementioned problems, a novel inference algorithm named **α -cuts Based Fuzzy Bayesian Approximate Inference** is proposed.


α -cuts Based Fuzzy Bayesian Approximate Inference

Assuming that node x is a node in Bayesian network \mathcal{B} . Its parent node set is ${}^*x = \{{}^*x_1, {}^*x_2, \dots, {}^*x_m\}$ and child node set is $x^* = \{x_1^*, x_2^*, \dots, x_n^*\}$. The information spreading process is shown as following figure.




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
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
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
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$$\begin{bmatrix} \lambda_x^{(t+1)}(^*x_i = F) \\ \lambda_x^{(t+1)}(^*x_i = T) \end{bmatrix} = \beta \begin{bmatrix} \sum_x \lambda_x(x) \prod_j \lambda_{x_j^*}^{(t)}(x) \sum_{^*x_i} p(x | ^*x_i, ^*x_i = F) \prod_{k \neq i} \pi_x^{(t)}(^*x_k) \\ \sum_x \lambda_x(x) \prod_j \lambda_{x_j^*}^{(t)}(x) \sum_{^*x_i} p(x | ^*x_i, ^*x_i = T) \prod_{k \neq i} \pi_x^{(t)}(^*x_k) \end{bmatrix},$$

where $^*x_i = ^*x \setminus \{^*x_i\}$. And the message that x sends to its child node x_j^* is given by following equation.

$$\begin{bmatrix} \pi_{x_j^*}^{(t+1)}(x = F) \\ \pi_{x_j^*}^{(t+1)}(x = T) \end{bmatrix} = \beta \begin{bmatrix} \lambda_x(x = F) \prod_{k \neq j} \lambda_{x_k^*}^{(t)}(x = F) \sum_{^*x} p(x = F | ^*x) \prod_k \pi_x^{(t)}(^*x_k) \\ \lambda_x(x = T) \prod_{k \neq j} \lambda_{x_k^*}^{(t)}(x = T) \sum_{^*x} p(x = T | ^*x) \prod_k \pi_x^{(t)}(^*x_k) \end{bmatrix}.$$

α -cuts Based Fuzzy Bayesian Approximate Inference

The function $\lambda_x(\cdot)$ is the message that the node x sends to itself, which is presented as following equations.

$$\lambda_x(x = F) = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{when } x \in E, \text{ and the value of observed } x \text{ is } T, \\ 1, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

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At the end of (t) th iteration, the fuzzy belief of node x is given by following equation.

$$\begin{bmatrix} \text{Bel}^{(t)}(x = F) \\ \text{Bel}^{(t)}(x = T) \end{bmatrix} = \beta \begin{bmatrix} \lambda^{(t)}(x = F) \cdot \pi^{(t)}(x = F) \\ \lambda^{(t)}(x = T) \cdot \pi^{(t)}(x = T) \end{bmatrix},$$

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and

$$\begin{bmatrix} \pi^{(t)}(x = F) \\ \pi^{(t)}(x = T) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \sum_{*x} P(x = F | *x) \prod_k \pi_x^{(t)}(*x_k) \\ \sum_{*x} P(x = T | *x) \prod_k \pi_x^{(t)}(*x_k) \end{bmatrix}.$$

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The iteration will be terminated when at least one of the conditions which are shown in following inequations are satisfied.

$$t \geq t_{\max},$$
$$\forall x \in \mathcal{B}, \quad D(\text{Bel}^{(t)}(x = T), \text{Bel}^{(t-1)}(x = T)) \leq D_{\min},$$

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where $D(\text{Bel}^{(t)}(x = T), \text{Bel}^{(t-1)}(x = T))$ represents the Hamming distance between two fuzzy numbers $\text{Bel}^{(t)}(x = T)$ and $\text{Bel}^{(t-1)}(x = T)$. The Hamming distance is defined as following equation.

$$D(\text{Bel}^{(t)}(x = T), \text{Bel}^{(t-1)}(x = T)) = \int_0^1 |\mu^{(t)}(\rho) - \mu^{(t-1)}(\rho)| d\rho.$$

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When the iteration is terminated, the $\text{Bel}^{(t)}(x)$ is considered to be the approximate posterior fuzzy probability of node x under the evidence set \mathbf{E} .

$$\tilde{p}(x = T|\mathbf{E}) \approx \text{Bel}^{(t)}(x = T).$$

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The fuzzy numbers are expressed by α -cuts for calculation. For example, the triangular fuzzy probability $\tilde{p} = (\underline{p}, p, \bar{p})$ is defined as following equation.

$$\mu(\rho) = \begin{cases} \frac{\rho - \underline{p}}{p - \underline{p}}, & \text{when } \underline{p} \leq \rho \leq p, \\ -\frac{\rho - \bar{p}}{\bar{p} - p}, & \text{when } p < \rho \leq \bar{p}, \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

α -cuts Based Fuzzy Bayesian Approximate Inference

There are two expression of fuzzy probability:

$$\tilde{p} = (\underline{p}, p, \bar{p}),$$

$$\tilde{p} = [\ell(\alpha), u(\alpha)], \forall \alpha \in [0, 1],$$

where

$$\ell(\alpha) = \alpha(p - \underline{p}) + \underline{p},$$

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
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The relationship between two kinds of expressions are shown in the following figure.



α -cuts Based Fuzzy Bayesian Approximate Inference

The basic operations of addition and multiplication between fuzzy numbers used in LBP algorithm are given as following equations.

$$\begin{aligned}\tilde{n}_1 + \tilde{n}_2 &= [\ell_1(\alpha), u_1(\alpha)] + [\ell_2(\alpha), u_2(\alpha)] \\ &= [\ell_1(\alpha) + \ell_2(\alpha), u_1(\alpha) + u_2(\alpha)], \forall \alpha \in [0, 1],\end{aligned}$$

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It is noted that, a crisp number can be regarded as a special fuzzy number whose membership function is a unit-impulse function. Therefore, the operations between fuzzy number and crisp number are shown as following equations.

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In this paper, the normalization algorithm developed by Dubois and Prade¹ are employed to normalize the fuzzy numbers. Assuming \tilde{n}_1 and \tilde{n}_2 are two fuzzy numbers, the normalization algorithm is shown as the following equation.

$$\beta \begin{bmatrix} \tilde{n}_1 \\ \tilde{n}_2 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \left[\frac{\ell_1(\alpha)}{\ell_1(\alpha) + u_2(\alpha)}, \frac{u_1(\alpha)}{u_1(\alpha) + \ell_2(\alpha)} \right], \forall \alpha \in [0, 1] \\ \left[\frac{\ell_2(\alpha)}{\ell_2(\alpha) + u_1(\alpha)}, \frac{u_2(\alpha)}{u_2(\alpha) + \ell_1(\alpha)} \right], \forall \alpha \in [0, 1] \end{bmatrix}.$$

¹Didier Dubois and Henri Prade. The use of fuzzy numbers in decision analysis. *Fuzzy information and decision processes*, pages 309–321, 1982.

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$$\alpha = \left\{ \alpha_i \mid \alpha_i = \frac{i-1}{n-1}, i = 1, 2, \dots, n \right\}.$$


Data Filter

The architecture of the data filter is shown in the following figure.




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
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
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
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The architecture of the data filter is shown in the following figure.




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
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where C_{\min} is the minimum value of evidence confidence level, and C_{\min} can be equal to 2.5%, 5%, etc.

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Because $C(f = T) = 6.8542 \cdot 10^{-10} < C_{\min}$, the evidence $f = T$ is a noise evidence.

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
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where $v(z)$ is the value of the asset z .

Performance Analysis


Performance Analysis

There are several cybersecurity vulnerabilities in the control system.




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Performance Analysis

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
Performance Analysis

The evidence list are shown in the following table.

Start Time	End Time	Evidence Description
49	81	attacker launches network scanning attack a_1
90	142	attacker launches vulnerability scanning attack a_2
163	204	attacker launches DoS attack a_6 on HDS
195	205	attacker launches spoofing attack a_8 on ES
238	260	attacker reconfiguration of PLC6
268	367	traffic control function f_3 of V3 is failed
279	388	temperature control function f_{11} is failed
312	402	incident temperature anomaly e_3 occurs

Performance Analysis

The following figure shows the curve of dynamic cybersecurity risk from 1st minute to 498th minute.



Performance Analysis


To verify the efficiency of noise reduction, a contrast simulation is designed. The following figure shows the program of the contrast simulation.



The symbol E is the evidence sequence which is shown in the evidence list,

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
Performance Analysis

To demonstrate the execution time of our approach, another simulation is designed. In the second simulation, the set α 's size $n = 10$, the maximum number of iterations $t_{\max} = 100$, the accuracy $D_{\min} = 1 \times 10^{-4}$, the inference process is repeated 5,000 times. The distribution curve of the execution time is shown in the following figure.




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To show the possible upper/lower bounds and the scalability of our approach, the fourth simulation is implemented.




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To show the possible upper/lower bounds and the scalability of our approach, the fourth simulation is implemented. In this simulation, for each number of interval values $N \in \{5, 10, 20, 30, \dots, 100\}$, the Bayesian network is inferred 5,000 times with stochastic evidence set.



Performance Analysis

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Thanks to Li Xuan & Chu Zhongtao.

Task Planning

Task Planning

- Finish the simulation of 2nd paper.
- Finish the outline of 4th paper.