Discrete Mathematics Lecture 3

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Summary of Lecture 2

Sum of ideals: $a\mathbb{Z} + b\mathbb{Z} = \gcd(a, b)\mathbb{Z}$. $\{a, b\} \neq \{0\}$

Greatest common divisor: gcd(a, b) = as + bt.

- $c|ab, \gcd(c, a) = 1 \Rightarrow c|b|$
- p is a prime, $p|ab \Rightarrow p|a$ or p|b
- Uniqueness proof for FTA
- Infinity of primes

Equivalence relation: a binary relation *R* on a set *A*

- reflexive, symmetric, transitive
- equivalence class $[a]_R$

Congruence: $R = \{(a, b) \in \mathbb{Z}^2 : n | (a - b)\}$

- $a \equiv b \pmod{n}$: $(a, b) \in R$
- a = bq + r: $a \mod n = r$
- $[a]_n$

Residue Class

DEFINITION: Let $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}$.

- $[\alpha]$: **floor** of α , the largest integer $\leq \alpha$
- $[\alpha]$: **ceiling** of α , the smallest integer $\geq \alpha$
 - If a = bq + r, then $q = \lfloor a/b \rfloor$ and r = a bq
- **DEFINITION:** Let $a \in \mathbb{Z}$, $n \in \mathbb{Z}^+$. We denote the equivalence class of a under the equivalence relation mod n with $[a]_n$ and call it the **residue class of** a mod n.
 - $[a]_n = a + n\mathbb{Z} = \{a + nx : x \in \mathbb{Z}\}$
 - any element of $[a]_n$ is a **representative** of $[a]_n$

EXAMPLE: $[0]_6 = \{0, \pm 6, \pm 12, ...\}; [1]_6 = \{..., -11, -5, 1, 7, 13, ...\}; ...$

Residue Class

THEOREM: Let $n \in \mathbb{Z}^+$, $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}$. Then

$$[a]_n \cap [b]_n = \emptyset \text{ or } [a]_n = [b]_n.$$

- $[a]_n \cap [b]_n = \emptyset$: done
- $[a]_n \cap [b]_n \neq \emptyset$
 - $\exists c \in [a]_n \cap [b]_n$
 - $c \equiv a \pmod{n}, c \equiv b \pmod{n}$
 - $a \equiv b \pmod{n}$
 - $\exists t \in \mathbb{Z} \text{ such that } a = b + nt$

• $[a]_n = \{a + nx : x \in \mathbb{Z}\} = \{b + nt + nx : x \in \mathbb{Z}\} = [b]_n$

COROLLARY: $[a]_n = [b]_n$ iff $a \equiv b \pmod{n}$.

COROLLARY: $\{[0]_n, [1]_n, ..., [n-1]_n\}$ is a partition of \mathbb{Z} .

- $[a]_n \cap [b]_n = \emptyset$ for all $a, b \in \{0, 1, ..., n 1\}$
- $\mathbb{Z} = [0]_n \cup [1]_n \cup \cdots \cup [n-1]_n$

\mathbb{Z}_n

DEFINITION: Let n be any positive integer. We define \mathbb{Z}_n to be set of all residue classes modulo n.

•
$$\mathbb{Z}_n = \{[0]_n, [1]_n, ..., [n-1]_n\}$$

• $\mathbb{Z}_n = \{0,1,...,n-1\};$
• $\mathbb{Z}_n = \{[1]_n, [2]_n, ..., [n]_n\}$
• $\mathbb{Z}_n = \{1,2,...,n\}$

EXAMPLE: Two representations of the set \mathbb{Z}_6

•
$$\mathbb{Z}_6 = \{[0]_6, [1]_6, [2]_6, [3]_6, [4]_6, [5]_6\}$$

= $\{0,1,2,3,4,5\}$

•
$$\mathbb{Z}_6 = \{[-3]_6, [-2]_6, [-1]_6, [0]_6, [1]_6, [2]_6\}$$

= $\{-3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2\}$

\mathbb{Z}_n

DEFINITION: Let $n \in \mathbb{Z}^+$. For all $[a]_n$, $[b]_n \in \mathbb{Z}_n$, define

- **addition**: $[a]_n + [b]_n = [a + b]_n$
- subtraction: $[a]_n [b]_n = [a b]_n$
- multiplication: $[a]_n \cdot [b]_n = [a \cdot b]_n$

Well-defined? If $a \equiv a' \pmod{n}$ and $b \equiv b' \pmod{n}$, then $a \pm b \equiv a' \pm b' \pmod{n}$ and $ab \equiv a'b' \pmod{n}$.

- Hence, $[a]_n \pm [b]_n = [a']_n \pm [b']_n$; $[a]_n \cdot [b]_n = [a']_n \cdot [b']_n$
 - $a \equiv a' \pmod{n} \Rightarrow n \mid (a a') \Rightarrow \exists x \text{ such that } a a' = nx$
 - $b \equiv b' \pmod{n} \Rightarrow n | (b b') \Rightarrow \exists y \text{ such that } b b' = ny$
 - (a+b) (a'+b') = nx + ny
 - (a-b) (a'-b') = nx ny
 - ab a'b' = a(b b') + b'(a a') = any + b'nx

\mathbb{Z}_n^*

- **DEFINITION:** Let $n \in \mathbb{Z}^+$ and $[a]_n \in \mathbb{Z}_n$. $[s]_n \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ is called an **inverse** of $[a]_n$ if $[a]_n[s]_n = [1]_n$.
 - **division**: If $[a]_n [s]_n = [1]_n$, define $\frac{[b]_n}{[a]_n} = [b]_n \cdot [s]_n$
- **THEOREM**: Let $n \in \mathbb{Z}^+$. $[a]_n \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ has an inverse iff gcd(a, n) = 1.
 - Only if: $\exists s \text{ s.t. } [a]_n[s]_n \equiv [1]_n; \exists t, as -1 = nt; \gcd(a, n) = 1$
 - If: $\exists s, t \text{ s.t. } as + nt = 1$; $as \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$
- **DEFINITION**: Let $n \in \mathbb{Z}^+$. Define $\mathbb{Z}_n^* = \{[a]_n \in \mathbb{Z}_n : \gcd(a, n) = 1\}$
 - If *n* is prime, then $\mathbb{Z}_n^* = \{1, 2, ..., n-1\}$
 - If *n* is composite, then $\mathbb{Z}_n^* \subset \mathbb{Z}_n$
- **EXAMPLE:** $\mathbb{Z}_5^* = \{1,2,3,4\}; \mathbb{Z}_6^* = \{1,5\}; \mathbb{Z}_8^* = \{1,3,5,7\}$

Euler's Phi Function

QUESTION: How many elements are there in \mathbb{Z}_n^* ?

• $|\mathbb{Z}_n^*|$ is the number of integers $a \in [n]$ such that $\gcd(a, n) = 1$

DEFINITION: (Euler's Phi Function) $\phi(n) = |\mathbb{Z}_n^*|, \forall n \in \mathbb{Z}^+$.

• $\phi(n)$ is the number of integers $a \in [n]$ such that gcd(a, n) = 1

THEOREM: Let p be a prime. Then $\forall e \in \mathbb{Z}^+$, $\phi(p^e) = p^{e-1}(p-1)$.

- Let $x \in [p^e]$.
- $gcd(x, p^e) \neq 1 \text{ iff } p|x$

iff
$$x = p, 2p, ..., p^{e-1} \cdot p$$

•
$$\phi(p^e) = p^e - p^{e-1} = p^{e-1}(p-1)$$

EXAMPLE: $\phi(3^2) = 3(3-1) = 6$

•
$$\mathbb{Z}_9^* = \{1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9\}$$

EXAMPLE: $\phi(p) = p - 1$

•
$$\mathbb{Z}_p^* = \{1, 2, ..., p-1\}$$

Euler's Phi Function

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QUESTION: Formula of $\phi(n)$ for general integer n?

THEOREM: If $n = p_1^{e_1} \cdots p_k^{e_k}$ for distinct primes p_1, \dots, p_k and integers $e_1, \dots, e_k \ge 1$, then $\phi(n) = \phi(p_1^{e_1}) \cdots \phi(p_k^{e_k})$. Hence, $\phi(n) = n(1 - p_1^{-1}) \cdots (1 - p_k^{-1})$.

There are many proofs. We will see in the future.

COROLLARY: If n = pq for two different primes p and q, then $\phi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)$.

EXAMPLE: $\phi(10) = (2-1)(5-1) = 4$; n = 10; p = 2, q = 5

• $\mathbb{Z}_{10}^* = \{1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10\}$

Euler's Theorem

THEOREM (Euler) Let $n \ge 1$ and $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$. Then $\alpha^{\phi(n)} = 1$.

- $\alpha^{\phi(n)}$, 1 are both residue classes modulo n
- Suppose that $\alpha = [a]_n$ for $a \in \mathbb{Z}$. Then $\alpha^{\phi(n)} = 1$ is $([a]_n)^{\phi(n)} = [1]_n$
- How to prove?
 - Consider the map $f: \mathbb{Z}_n^* \to \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ $[x]_n \mapsto [a]_n \cdot [x]_n$
 - We show that f is <u>injective</u> 单封
 - $\bullet \quad f([x]_n) = f([y]_n)$
 - $[a]_n \cdot [x]_n = [a]_n \cdot [y]_n$
 - $[ax]_n = [ay]_n$
 - n|a(x-y)
 - n|(x-y), this is because gcd(n, a) = 1
 - $[x]_n = [y]_n$



Euler's Theorem

THEOREM (Euler) Let $n \ge 1$ and $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$. Then $\alpha^{\phi(n)} = 1$.

- $\alpha^{\phi(n)}$, 1 are both residue classes modulo n
- Suppose that $\alpha = [a]_n$ for $a \in \mathbb{Z}$. Then $\alpha^{\phi(n)} = 1$ is $([a]_n)^{\phi(n)} = [1]_n$
- How to prove?
 - Consider the map $f: \mathbb{Z}_n^* \to \mathbb{Z}_n^* \quad [x]_n \mapsto [a]_n \cdot [x]_n$
 - Suppose that $\mathbb{Z}_n^* = \{[x_1]_n, \dots, [x_{\phi(n)}]_n\}.$
 - $f([x_1]_n) \cdots f([x_{\phi(n)}]_n) = [x_1]_n \cdots [x_{\phi(n)}]_n$
 - $[ax_1]_n \cdots [ax_{\phi(n)}]_n = [x_1]_n \cdots [x_{\phi(n)}]_n$
 - $\left[a^{\phi(n)} x_1 \cdots x_{\phi(n)} \right]_n^n = \left[x_1 \cdots x_{\phi(n)} \right]_n^n$
 - $n | (a^{\phi(n)} 1) x_1 \cdots x_{\phi(n)}$
 - $n \mid (a^{\phi(n)} 1)$, this is because $gcd(n, x_1 \cdots x_{\phi(n)}) = 1$
 - $[a^{\phi(n)}]_n = [1]_n$, i. e., $([a]_n)^{\phi(n)} = [1]_n$

Fermat's Little Theorem

EXAMPLE: Understand Euler's theorem with $\mathbb{Z}_{10}^* = \{1,3,7,9\}$.


- $n = 10, \phi(n) = 4$,
- $1^4 \equiv 1 \pmod{10} \Rightarrow ([1]_{10})^4 = [1]_{10}$
- $3^4 = 81 \equiv 1 \pmod{10} \Rightarrow ([3]_{10})^4 = [1]_{10}$
- $7^4 = 2401 \equiv 1 \pmod{10} \Rightarrow ([7]_{10})^4 = [1]_{10}$
- $9^4 = 6561 \equiv 1 \pmod{10} \Rightarrow ([9]_{10})^4 = [1]_{10}$
 - Consider the map $f: \mathbb{Z}_{10}^* \to \mathbb{Z}_{10}^* \quad [x]_n \mapsto [9]_n \cdot [x]_n$
 - $f([1]_{10}) = [9]_{10} \cdot [1]_{10} = [9]_{10}; f([3]_{10}) = [7]_{10}; f([7]_{10}) = [3]_{10}, f([9]_{10}) = [1]_{10}$
 - *f* is injective
 - $f([1]_{10})f([3]_{10})f([7]_{10})f([9]_{10}) = [9]_{10}[7]_{10}[3]_{10}[1]_{10}$

Fermat's Little Theorem: If p is a prime and $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_p$.

Then $\alpha^p = \alpha$.


- This is a corollary of Euler's theorem for n = p
- By Euler's theorem, $\alpha^{p-1} = 1$
 - $\alpha^p = \alpha$

Cryptography



• **Confidentiality**: The property that sensitive information is not disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities, or processes. --FIPS 140-2

Public-Key Encryption




- **Gen**, **Enc**, **Dec**: key generation, encryption, decryption
- m, c, pk, sk: plaintext (message), ciphertext, public key, private key
- M, C: plaintext space, ciphertext space
 - $\Pi = (\mathbf{Gen}, \mathbf{Enc}, \mathbf{Dec}) + \mathcal{M}, |\mathcal{M}| > 1$
 - Correctness: Dec(sk, Enc(pk, m)) = m for any pk, sk, m
 - **Security**: if sk is not known, it's difficult to learn m from pk, c

RSA

A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystem

- Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman (1977)-MIT
- Scientific Contributions: Turing Award (2002)
 - Public-Key Encryption: the first construction
 - Digital Signature: the first construction







Shamir



Adleman

Plain RSA

CONSTRUCTION: $\Pi = (Gen, Enc, Dec) + \mathcal{M}$, the message space

is $\mathcal{M} = \{m : m \in [N], \gcd(m, N) = 1\}$? $\mathbf{PDec}(sk, \mathbf{Enc}(pk, m) = m)$

- $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \mathbf{Gen}(1^n)$
 - choose two *n*-bit primes $p \neq q$;
 - N = pq; $\phi(N) = (p-1)(q-1)$
 - $[e]_{\phi(N)} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\phi(N)}^*$
 - $[d]_{\phi(N)} = ([e]_{\phi(N)})^{-1}$ $\emptyset \le e, d < \phi(N)$ output pk = (N, e) and sk = (N, d)
- $c \leftarrow \mathbf{Enc}(pk, m)$:
 - output $c = m^e \mod N$
 - $0 \le c < N$
- $m \leftarrow \mathbf{Dec}(sk,c)$:
 - output $m = c^d \mod N$
 - 0 < m < N

- $[d]_{\phi(N)} = ([e]_{\phi(N)})^{-1}$
- $\exists t \in \mathbb{Z} \text{ s.t. } ed = 1 + t \cdot \phi(N)$
- $[c^d]_N = ([c]_N)^d$ $=([m^e]_N)^d$ $=\left(([m]_N)^e\right)^d$ $=([m]_N)^{ed}$
 - $=([m]_N)^{1+t\phi(N)}$
 - $= [m]_N \cdot ([m]_N)^{\phi(N)t}$
 - $= [m]_N \cdot [1]_N$
 - $= [m]_N$
- $m = c^d \mod N$

RSA is correct!

Plain RSA

EXAMPLE: this is a toy example; all numbers are very small

•
$$(pk, sk) \leftarrow \mathbf{Gen}(1^n)$$

•
$$p = 7, q = 13,$$

•
$$N = 91, \phi(N) = 72$$

•
$$[e]_{72} = [5]_{72}$$

•
$$[d]_{72} = [29]_{72}$$

•
$$pk = (91, 5); sk = (91, 29)$$
 • $([2]_{91})^{\phi(91)} = [1]_{91}$

•
$$c \leftarrow \mathbf{Enc}(pk, m) : m = 2$$

•
$$c = (2^5 \mod 91) = 32$$

•
$$m \leftarrow \mathbf{Dec}(sk, c)$$
: $c = 10$

•
$$m = (32^{29} \mod 91) = 2$$

•
$$32^{29} = (2^5)^{29} = 2^{145}$$

•
$$2^{145} \equiv ? \pmod{91}$$

•
$$[2^{145}]_{91} = [?]_{91}$$

•
$$([2]_{91})^{145} = [?]_{91}$$

•
$$[2]_{91} \in \mathbb{Z}_{91}^*$$

•
$$([2]_{91})^{\phi(91)} = [1]_{91}$$

•
$$([2]_{91})^{145} = ([2]_{91})^{72} ([2]_{91})^{72} [2]_{91}$$

= $[1]_{91} [1]_{91} [2]_{91}$
= $[2]_{91}$

Security

Security: If *sk* is not known, it's difficult to learn *m* from *pk*, *c*

At least, it should be difficult to learn d from pk

Plain RSA and Integer Factoring (given N, find p, q):

- "Factoring is easy" ⇒ "Plain RSA is not secure"
 - $N \to (p,q) \to \phi(N) \to d$: computable with EEA
- "Plain RSA is secure" ⇒ "Factoring is hard"
- "Factoring is hard"

 "Plain RSA is secure"
- It is likely that "Factoring is hard"⇒ "Plain RSA is secure"
 - The best known method of computing *d* is via factoring *N*

How Large is the *N* in practice?

- |N| = 2048 is recommended from present to 2030
- |N| = 3072 is recommended after 2030

RSA

EXAMPLE: A sample execution of the RSA public-key encryption.

- p = 1797693134862315907729305190789024733617976978942306572734300811577326758055009631327084 7732240753602112011387987139335765878976881441662249284743063947412437776789342486548527630 2219601246094119453082952085005768838150682342462881473913110540827237163350510684586298239 947245938479716304835356329624225795083
- $\begin{array}{l} \bullet \quad q = & 1797693134862315907729305190789024733617976978942306572734300811577326758055009631327084\\ 7732240753602112011387987139335765878976881441662249284743063947412437776789342486548527630\\ 2219601246094119453082952085005768838150682342462881473913110540827237163350510684586298239\\ 947245938479716304835356329624227077847 \end{array}$
- N = 3231700607131100730071487668866995196044410266971548403213034542752465513886789089319720 1411522913463688717960921898019494119559150490921095088152386448283120630877367300996091750 1977503896521067960576383840675682767922186426197561618380943384761704705816458520363050428 8757589154106580860755239912393121219074286119866604856013109808143051877484634725921533261 1759149330725252437276424147817808729273755165527379964561074264587032664709511346018327798 3737152901481295041417951323149293889926882474402327275395755146886332824477192285306647065 20939357878528540284184156513405575872085703420500969966917951381310826301
- $\phi(N) = 3231700607131100730071487668866995196044410266971548403213034542752465513886789089319$ 7201411522913463688717960921898019494119559150490921095088152386448283120630877367300996091 7501977503896521067960576383840675682767922186426197561618380943384761704705816458520363050 4288757589154106580860755239912393121219038332257169358537858523704327271382812275186342687 1297212289168409787085665422221552391774628940093485139736801331477871715085171882512773342 1035124363418993739683549454013443767845534857552519938213736713446770956061463545436049017 58694718276224054213583162787340809095977593826461068360296205292132857953372

RSA

EXAMPLE: A sample execution of the RSA public-key encryption.

- e = 15
- d = 4308934142841467640095316891822660261392547022628731204284046057003287351849052119092960 1882030551284918290614562530692658826078867321228126784203181931044160841169823067994789000 2636671862028090614101845120900910357229581901596748824507924513015606274421944693817400571 8343452205475441147673653216524161625384443009559144717144698272436361843749700248456916172 9616385557879716114220562962069855699505253457980186315735108637162286780229176683697789471 3499151225324986244732605351258357127379810070026584284982284595694608081951393914732023449 2629103496540561811088371645441212797012510194809114706160705617714393783
- m = 1060492175475872144576165469414485300895277760828043761504547236562152874067991556927005 1503191522500036448557172487959011926112038398359402756573149541644330968641767630622070720 6300611302597838253559482233713309491580368127421870570456049345468117909489758782001441890 4834424987320032029927723446568903940998962231923268398424184371118321200199145779352875281 2978134072787404790207031482099444968252108690296363773578594703102617386738297675080295774 0914472401975212215460354590300865381144285160786447331806555401091337782416072602736553356 61777894173665137928787960365220712025120785257907244561721692764755210375
- $\begin{array}{l} \bullet \quad c = & 1052638995813896291959559409341115889309974350846590234712847813990877461431177809735479\\ & 5345791726768384252751637693995592403757856185437083738829836072472243389583367910268799453\\ & 3780394197213455665495167301873084368644600883966117266700507232420801391760803347202941953\\ & 0404891500380565634181654830724988604902791048824931866006271433570305757657601698851348414\\ & 8308512574950252535463185824865665499749033598201370342142901944632549253564037639312442875\\ & 0397358269093293568406659937836951014476104859227269159699679685846612404304259821941895044\\ & 00469889762574275824269475495394920107921066723277769226199475558068627049 \end{array}$

Questions from RSA

CONSTRUCTION: $\Pi = (Gen, Enc, Dec) + \mathcal{M}$, the message space

is
$$\mathcal{M} = \{m: m \in [N], \gcd(m, N) = 1\}$$
• $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \operatorname{Gen}(1^n)$
• choose two n -bit primes $p \neq q$
• $N = pq$; $\phi(N) = (p-1)(q-1)$
• $[e]_{\phi(N)} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\phi(N)}^*$
• $0 \leq e, d < \phi(N)$
• output $pk = (N, e)$ and $sk = (N, d)$
• $0 \leq c < N$
• $m \leftarrow \operatorname{Dec}(sk, c)$:
• output $m = c^d \mod N$

How to choose p, q

EFFICIENTLY?

EFFICIENTLY?

How to compute d

EFFICIENTLY?

EFFICIENTLY?

 $0 \le m \le N$