

# Protection Profile for QQQQ



Version: 1.0

2015-08-14

**National Information Assurance Partnership**

# Revision History

---

Version	Date	Comment
Round 1	2015-04-23	First draft of version 1.0 for comment
1.0	2015-08-14	Release - first version released

# Contents

---

- 1 Introduction
  - 1.1 Overview
  - 1.2 Terms
    - 1.2.1 Common Criteria Terms
    - 1.2.2 Technology Terms
  - 1.3 Compliant Targets of Evaluation
    - 1.3.1 TOE Boundary
    - 1.3.2 TOE Platform
  - 1.4 Use Cases
- 2 Conformance Claims
- 3 Security Problem Definition
  - 3.1 Threats
  - 3.2 Assumptions
- 4 Security Objectives
  - 4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
  - 4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
  - 4.3 Security Objectives Rationale
- 5 Security Requirements
  - 5.1 Security Functional Requirements
    - 5.1.1 QQQQ
  - 5.2 Security Assurance Requirements
    - 5.2.1 Class ASE: Security Target
    - 5.2.2 Class ADV: Development
    - 5.2.3 Class AGD: Guidance Documentation
    - 5.2.4 Class ALC: Life-cycle Support
    - 5.2.5 Class ATE: Tests
    - 5.2.6 Class AVA: Vulnerability Assessment
- Appendix A - Optional Requirements
- Appendix B - Selection-Based Requirements
- Appendix C - Objective Requirements
- Appendix D - Inherently Satisfied Requirements
- Appendix E - Entropy Documentation and Assessment
  - E.1 Design Description
  - E.2 Entropy Justification
  - E.3 Operating Conditions
  - E.4 Health Testing
- Appendix F - References
- Appendix G - Acronyms

# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Overview

The scope of this Protection Profile (PP) is to describe the security functionality of operating systems in terms of [CC] and to define functional and assurance requirements for such products. An operating system is software that manages computer hardware and software resources, and provides common services for application programs. The hardware it manages may be physical or virtual.

## 1.2 Terms

The following sections provide both Common Criteria and technology terms used in this Protection Profile.

### 1.2.1 Common Criteria Terms

Common Criteria (CC)	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation.
Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM)	Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation.
Protection Profile (PP)	An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of products.
Security Target (ST)	A set of implementation-dependent security requirements for a specific product.
Target of Evaluation (TOE)	The product under evaluation. In this case, the SDN Controller and its supporting documentation.
TOE Security Functionality (TSF)	The security functionality of the product under evaluation.
TOE Summary Specification (TSS)	A description of how a TOE satisfies the SFRs in a ST.
Security Functional Requirement (SFR)	A requirement for security enforcement by the TOE.
Security Assurance Requirement (SAR)	A requirement to assure the security of the TOE.

### 1.2.2 Technology Terms

SOMETHING  
()

## 1.3 Compliant Targets of Evaluation

### 1.3.1 TOE Boundary

□

Figure 1: Figure 1: General TOE

### 1.3.2 TOE Platform

## 1.4 Use Cases

Requirements in this Protection Profile are designed to address the security problems in at least the following use cases. These use cases are intentionally very broad, as many specific use cases exist for an operating system. These use cases may also overlap with one another. An operating system's functionality may even be effectively extended by privileged applications installed onto it. However, these are out of scope of this PP.

[USE CASE 1] End User Devices

## 2 Conformance Claims

To be conformant to this PP, a ST must demonstrate Exact Conformance, a subset of Strict Conformance as defined in [\[CC\]](#) Part 1 (ASE\_CCL). The ST must include all components in this PP that are:

- unconditional (which are always required)
- selection-based (which are required when certain *selections* are chosen in the unconditional requirements)

and may include components that are

- optional or
- objective.

Unconditional requirements are found in the main body of the document, while appendices contain the selection-based, optional, and objective requirements. The ST may iterate any of these components, but it must not include any additional component (e.g. from CC Part 2 or 3 or a PP not conformant with this one, or extended by the ST) not defined in this PP or a PP conformant to this one.

Some components in this Protection Profile have a dependency on other components. In accordance with [\[CC\]](#) Part 1, [Appendix D - Inherently Satisfied Requirements](#) includes justifications for those cases where the PP does not explicitly contain the component upon which there is a dependency.

This PP is conformant to Parts 2 (extended) and 3 (extended) of Common Criteria Version 3.1, Revision 4. [\[CC\]](#).

This PP does not claim conformance to any other Protection Profile.

This PP does not claim conformance to any packages.

# 3 Security Problem Definition

The security problem is described in terms of the threats that the is expected to address, assumptions about the operational environment, and any organizational security policies that the is expected to enforce.

## 3.1 Threats

---

T.QQQQ

## 3.2 Assumptions

---

A.QQQQ

The product relies QQQQ its execution. This underlying platform is out of scope of this PP.

# 4 Security Objectives

## 4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

---

**O.ACCOUNTABILITY**

Conformant s ensure that information exists that allows administrators to discover unintentional issues with the configuration and operation of the operating system and discover its cause. Gathering event information and immediately transmitting it to another system can also enable incident response in the event of system compromise.

Addressed by: fau\_gen.1

## 4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

---

The following security objectives for the operational environment assist the in correctly providing its security functionality. These track with the assumptions about the environment.

**OE.PLATFORM**

The relies on being installed on trusted hardware.

**OE.PROPER\_USER**

The user of the is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the software within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy. Standard user accounts are provisioned in accordance with the least privilege model. Users requiring higher levels of access should have a separate account dedicated for that use.

**OE.PROPER\_ADMIN**

The administrator of the is not careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and administers the OS within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.

## 4.3 Security Objectives Rationale

---

This section describes how the assumptions, threats, and organization security policies map to the security objectives.

Threat, Assumption, or OSP	Security Objectives	Rationale
T.QQQQ	O.QQQQ	The threat T.QQQQ is countered by O.QQQQ as this provides for .
A.QQQQ	OE.PLATFORM	The operational environment objective OE.PLATFORM is realized through A.PLATFORM.

# 5 Security Requirements

This chapter describes the security requirements which have to be fulfilled by the . Those requirements comprise functional components from Part 2 and assurance components from Part 3 of [CC]. The following notations are used:

- **Refinement** operation (denoted by **bold text**): is used to add details to a requirement, and thus further restricts a requirement.
- **Selection** (denoted by *italicized text*): is used to select one or more options provided by the [CC] in stating a requirement.
- **Assignment** operation (denoted by *italicized text*): is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter, such as the length of a password. Showing the value in square brackets indicates assignment.
- **Iteration** operation: are identified with a number inside parentheses (e.g. "(1)")

## 5.1 Security Functional Requirements

The Security Functional Requirements included in this section are derived from Part 2 of the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 4, with additional extended functional components.

### 5.1.1 QQQQ

QQQ\_QQQ.1 QQQQQ

QQQ\_QQQ.1.1

Application Note:

Evaluation Activity ▼

## 5.2 Security Assurance Requirements

The Security Objectives in [Section 4 Security Objectives](#) were constructed to address threats identified in [Section 3.1 Threats](#). The Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) in [Section 5.1 Security Functional Requirements](#) are a formal instantiation of the Security Objectives. The PP identifies the Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) to frame the extent to which the evaluator assesses the documentation applicable for the evaluation and performs independent testing. This section lists the set of SARs from CC part 3 that are required in evaluations against this PP. Individual Assurance Activities to be performed are specified both in [Section 5 Security Requirements](#) as well as in this section. The general model for evaluation of s against STs written to conform to this PP is as follows: After the ST has been approved for evaluation, the ITSEF will obtain the , supporting environmental IT, and the administrative/user guides for the OS. The ITSEF is expected to perform actions mandated by the Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) for the ASE and ALC SARs. The ITSEF also performs the Assurance Activities contained within [Section 5 Security Requirements](#), which are intended to be an interpretation of the other CEM assurance requirements as they apply to the specific technology instantiated in the OS. The Assurance Activities that are captured in [Section 5 Security Requirements](#) also provide clarification as to what the developer needs to provide to demonstrate the OS is compliant with the PP.

### 5.2.1 Class ASE: Security Target

As per ASE activities defined in [\[CEM\]](#).

### 5.2.2 Class ADV: Development

The information about the is contained in the guidance documentation available to the end user as well as the TSS portion of the ST. The developer must concur with the description of the product that is contained in the TSS as it relates to the functional requirements. The Assurance Activities contained in [Section 5.1 Security Functional Requirements](#) should provide the ST authors with sufficient information to determine the appropriate content for the TSS section.

#### ADV\_FSP.1 Basic Functional Specification (ADV\_FSP.1)

The functional specification describes the TSFIs. It is not necessary to have a formal or complete specification of these interfaces. Additionally, because s conforming to this PP will necessarily have interfaces to the Operational Environment that are not directly invocable by users, there is little point specifying that such interfaces be described in and of themselves since only indirect testing of such interfaces may be possible. For this PP, the activities for this family should focus on understanding the interfaces presented in the TSS in response to the functional requirements and the interfaces presented in the AGD documentation. No additional “functional specification” documentation is necessary to satisfy the assurance activities specified. The interfaces that need to be evaluated are characterized through the information needed to perform the assurance activities listed, rather than as an independent, abstract list.

#### Developer action elements:

ADV\_FSP.1.1D      The developer shall provide a functional specification.

ADV\_FSP.1.2D

The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to the SFRs.

**Application Note:** As indicated in the introduction to this section, the functional specification is comprised of the information contained in the AGD\_OPE and AGD\_PRE documentation. The developer may reference a website accessible to application developers and the evaluator. The assurance activities in the functional requirements point to evidence that should exist in the documentation and TSS section; since these are directly associated with the SFRs, the tracing in element ADV\_FSP.1.2D is implicitly already done and no additional documentation is necessary.

**Content and presentation elements:**

ADV\_FSP.1.1C

The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use for each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI.

ADV\_FSP.1.2C

The functional specification shall identify all parameters associated with each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI.

ADV\_FSP.1.3C

The functional specification shall provide rationale for the implicit categorization of interfaces as SFR-non-interfering.

ADV\_FSP.1.4C

The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in the functional specification.

**Evaluator action elements:**

ADV\_FSP.1.1E

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

ADV\_FSP.1.2E

The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate and complete instantiation of the SFRs.

**Evaluation Activity** ▼

*There are no specific assurance activities associated with these SARs, except ensuring the information is provided. The functional specification documentation is provided to support the evaluation activities described in [Section 5.1 Security Functional Requirements](#), and other activities described for AGD, ATE, and AVA SARs. The requirements on the content of the functional specification information is implicitly assessed by virtue of the other assurance activities being performed; if the evaluator is unable to perform an activity because there is insufficient interface information, then an adequate functional specification has not been provided.*

### 5.2.3 Class AGD: Guidance Documentation

The guidance documents will be provided with the ST. Guidance must include a description of how the IT personnel verifies that the Operational Environment can fulfill its role for the security functionality. The documentation should be in an informal style and readable by the IT personnel. Guidance must be provided for every operational environment that the product supports as claimed in the ST. This guidance includes instructions to successfully install the TSF in that environment; and Instructions to manage the security of the TSF as a product and as a component of the larger operational environment. Guidance pertaining to particular security functionality is also provided; requirements on such guidance are contained in the assurance activities specified with each requirement.

#### AGD\_OPE.1 Operational User Guidance (AGD\_OPE.1)

**Developer action elements:**

AGD\_OPE.1.1D

The developer shall provide operational user guidance.

**Application Note:** The operational user guidance does not have to be contained in a single document. Guidance to users, administrators and application developers can be spread among documents or web pages. Rather than repeat information here, the developer should review the assurance activities for this component to ascertain the specifics of the guidance that the evaluator will be checking for. This will provide the necessary information for the preparation of acceptable guidance.

**Content and presentation elements:**

AGD\_OPE.1.1C

The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the user-accessible functions and privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing environment, including appropriate warnings.

**Application Note:** User and administrator are to be considered in the definition of user role.



AGD_OPE.1.2C	The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to use the available interfaces provided by the in a secure manner.
AGD_OPE.1.3C	<p>The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the available functions and interfaces, in particular all security parameters under the control of the user, indicating secure values as appropriate.</p> <p><b>Application Note:</b> This portion of the operational user guidance should be presented in the form of a checklist that can be quickly executed by IT personnel (or end-users, when necessary) and suitable for use in compliance activities. When possible, this guidance is to be expressed in the eXtensible Configuration Checklist Description Format (XCCDF) to support security automation. Minimally, it should be presented in a structured format which includes a title for each configuration item, instructions for achieving the secure configuration, and any relevant rationale.</p>
AGD_OPE.1.4C	The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present each type of security-relevant event relative to the user-accessible functions that need to be performed, including changing the security characteristics of entities under the control of the TSF.
AGD_OPE.1.5C	The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of operation of the (including operation following failure or operational error), their consequences, and implications for maintaining secure operation.
AGD_OPE.1.6C	The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the security measures to be followed in order to fulfill the security objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.
AGD_OPE.1.7C	The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.

#### Evaluator action elements:

AGD_OPE.1.1E	The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
--------------	--

#### Evaluation Activity ▼

*Some of the contents of the operational guidance are verified by the assurance activities in [Section 5.1 Security Functional Requirements](#) and evaluation of the according to the [\[CEM\]](#). The following additional information is also required. If cryptographic functions are provided by the , the operational guidance shall contain instructions for configuring the cryptographic engine associated with the evaluated configuration of the . It shall provide a warning to the administrator that use of other cryptographic engines was not evaluated nor tested during the CC evaluation of the . The documentation must describe the process for verifying updates to the by verifying a digital signature – this may be done by the or the underlying platform. The evaluator will verify that this process includes the following steps: Instructions for obtaining the update itself. This should include instructions for making the update accessible to the (e.g., placement in a specific directory). Instructions for initiating the update process, as well as discerning whether the process was successful or unsuccessful. This includes generation of the hash/digital signature. The will likely contain security functionality that does not fall in the scope of evaluation under this PP. The operational guidance shall make it clear to an administrator which security functionality is covered by the evaluation activities.*

### AGD\_PRE.1 Preparative Procedures (AGD\_PRE.1)

#### Developer action elements:

AGD_PRE.1.1D	The developer shall provide the , including its preparative procedures.
--------------	---

**Application Note:** As with the operational guidance, the developer should look to the assurance activities to determine the required content with respect to preparative procedures.

#### Content and presentation elements:

AGD_PRE.1.1C	The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure acceptance of the delivered in accordance with the developer's delivery procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.2C	The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure installation of the and for the secure preparation of the operational environment in accordance with the security objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.

**Evaluator action elements:**

- AGD\_PRE.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
- AGD\_PRE.1.2E The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the can be prepared securely for operation.

**Evaluation Activity** ▼

*As indicated in the introduction above, there are significant expectations with respect to the documentation—especially when configuring the operational environment to support functional requirements. The evaluator shall check to ensure that the guidance provided for the adequately addresses all platforms claimed for the in the ST.*

**5.2.4 Class ALC: Life-cycle Support**

At the assurance level provided for OSs conformant to this PP, life-cycle support is limited to end-user-visible aspects of the life-cycle, rather than an examination of the OS vendor's development and configuration management process. This is not meant to diminish the critical role that a developer's practices play in contributing to the overall trustworthiness of a product; rather, it is a reflection on the information to be made available for evaluation at this assurance level.

**ALC\_CMC.1 Labeling of the TOE (ALC\_CMC.1)**

This component is targeted at identifying the such that it can be distinguished from other products or versions from the same vendor and can be easily specified when being procured by an end user.

**Developer action elements:**

- ALC\_CMC.1.1D The developer shall provide the and a reference for the .

**Content and presentation elements:**

- ALC\_CMC.1.1C The shall be labeled with a unique reference.

**Application Note:** Unique reference information includes:

- OS Name
- OS Version
- OS Description
- Software Identification (SWID) tags, if available

**Evaluator action elements:**

- ALC\_CMC.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

**Evaluation Activity** ▼

*The evaluator will check the ST to ensure that it contains an identifier (such as a product name/version number) that specifically identifies the version that meets the requirements of the ST. Further, the evaluator will check the AGD guidance and samples received for testing to ensure that the version number is consistent with that in the ST. If the vendor maintains a web site advertising the, the evaluator will examine the information on the web site to ensure that the information in the ST is sufficient to distinguish the product.*

**ALC\_CMS.1 TOE CM Coverage (ALC\_CMS.1)**

Given the scope of the and its associated evaluation evidence requirements, this component's assurance activities are covered by the assurance activities listed for ALC\_CMC.1.

**Developer action elements:**

- ALC\_CMS.1.1D The developer shall provide a configuration list for the .

**Content and presentation elements:**

- ALC\_CMS.1.1C The configuration list shall include the following: the itself; and the evaluation evidence required by the SARs.
- ALC\_CMS.1.2C The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.

#### Evaluator action elements:

ALC\_CMS.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

#### Evaluation Activity ▼

*The "evaluation evidence required by the SARs" in this PP is limited to the information in the ST coupled with the guidance provided to administrators and users under the AGD requirements. By ensuring that the is specifically identified and that this identification is consistent in the ST and in the AGD guidance (as done in the assurance activity for ALC\_CMC.1), the evaluator implicitly confirms the information required by this component. Life-cycle support is targeted aspects of the developer's life-cycle and instructions to providers of applications for the developer's devices, rather than an in-depth examination of the TSF manufacturer's development and configuration management process. This is not meant to diminish the critical role that a developer's practices play in contributing to the overall trustworthiness of a product; rather, it's a reflection on the information to be made available for evaluation.*

*The evaluator will ensure that the developer has identified (in guidance documentation for application developers concerning the targeted platform) one or more development environments appropriate for use in developing applications for the developer's platform. For each of these development environments, the developer shall provide information on how to configure the environment to ensure that buffer overflow protection mechanisms in the environment(s) are invoked (e.g., compiler and linker flags). The evaluator will ensure that this documentation also includes an indication of whether such protections are on by default, or have to be specifically enabled. The evaluator will ensure that the TSF is uniquely identified (with respect to other products from the TSF vendor), and that documentation provided by the developer in association with the requirements in the ST is associated with the TSF using this unique identification.*

#### ALC\_TSU\_EXT.1 Timely Security Updates

This component requires the OS developer, in conjunction with any other necessary parties, to provide information as to how the end-user devices are updated to address security issues in a timely manner. The documentation describes the process of providing updates to the public from the time a security flaw is reported/discovered, to the time an update is released. This description includes the parties involved (e.g., the developer, carriers(s)) and the steps that are performed (e.g., developer testing, carrier testing), including worst case time periods, before an update is made available to the public.

#### Developer action elements:

ALC\_TSU\_EXT.1.1D The developer shall provide a description in the TSS of how timely security updates are made to the .

ALC\_TSU\_EXT.1.2D The developer shall provide a description in the TSS of how users are notified when updates change security properties or the configuration of the product.

#### Content and presentation elements:

ALC\_TSU\_EXT.1.1C The description shall include the process for creating and deploying security updates for the software.

ALC\_TSU\_EXT.1.2C The description shall include the mechanisms publicly available for reporting security issues pertaining to the .

**Note:** The reporting mechanism could include web sites, email addresses, as well as a means to protect the sensitive nature of the report (e.g., public keys that could be used to encrypt the details of a proof-of-concept exploit).

#### Evaluator action elements:

ALC\_TSU\_EXT.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

#### Evaluation Activity ▼

*The evaluator will verify that the TSS contains a description of the timely security update process used by the developer to create and deploy security updates. The evaluator will verify that this description addresses the entire application. The evaluator will also verify that, in addition to the OS developer's process, any third-party processes are also addressed in the description. The evaluator will also verify that each mechanism for deployment of security updates is described.*

*The evaluator will verify that, for each deployment mechanism described for the update process, the TSS lists a time between public disclosure of a vulnerability and public availability of the security update to the OS patching this vulnerability, to include any third-party or carrier delays in deployment. The evaluator will verify that this time is expressed in a number or range of days.*

*The evaluator will verify that this description includes the publicly available mechanisms (including either an email address or website) for reporting security issues related to the OS. The evaluator shall verify that the description of this mechanism includes a method for protecting the report either using a public key for encrypting email or a trusted channel for a website.*

### 5.2.5 Class ATE: Tests

Testing is specified for functional aspects of the system as well as aspects that take advantage of design or implementation weaknesses. The former is done through the ATE\_IND family, while the latter is through the AVA\_VAN family. At the assurance level specified in this PP, testing is based on advertised functionality and interfaces with dependency on the availability of design information. One of the primary outputs of the evaluation process is the test report as specified in the following requirements.

#### ATE\_IND.1 Independent Testing – Conformance (ATE\_IND.1)

Testing is performed to confirm the functionality described in the TSS as well as the administrative (including configuration and operational) documentation provided. The focus of the testing is to confirm that the requirements specified in [Section 5.1 Security Functional Requirements](#) being met, although some additional testing is specified for SARs in [Section 5.2 Security Assurance Requirements](#). The Assurance Activities identify the additional testing activities associated with these components. The evaluator produces a test report documenting the plan for and results of testing, as well as coverage arguments focused on the platform/ combinations that are claiming conformance to this PP. Given the scope of the and its associated evaluation evidence requirements, this component's assurance activities are covered by the assurance activities listed for ALC\_CMC.1.

#### Developer action elements:

ATE\_IND.1.1D                      The developer shall provide the for testing.

#### Content and presentation elements:

ATE\_IND.1.1C                      The shall be suitable for testing.

#### Evaluator action elements:

ATE\_IND.1.1E                      The evaluator *shall confirm* that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

ATE\_IND.1.2E                      The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF operates as specified.

**Application Note:** The evaluator will test the OS on the most current fully patched version of the platform.

#### Evaluation Activity ▼

*The evaluator will prepare a test plan and report documenting the testing aspects of the system, including any application crashes during testing. The evaluator shall determine the root cause of any application crashes and include that information in the report. The test plan covers all of the testing actions contained in the [\[CEM\]](#) and the body of this PP's Assurance Activities.*

*While it is not necessary to have one test case per test listed in an Assurance Activity, the evaluator must document in the test plan that each applicable testing requirement in the ST is covered. The test plan identifies the platforms to be tested, and for those platforms not included in the test plan but included in the ST, the test plan provides a justification for not testing the platforms. This justification must address the differences between the tested platforms and the untested platforms, and make an argument that the differences do not affect the testing to be performed. It is not sufficient to merely assert that the differences have no affect; rationale must be provided. If all platforms claimed in the ST are tested, then no rationale is necessary. The test plan describes the composition of each platform to be tested, and any setup that is necessary beyond what is contained in the AGD documentation. It should be noted that the evaluator is expected to follow the AGD documentation for installation and setup of each platform either as part of a test or as a standard pre-test condition. This may include special test drivers or tools. For each driver or tool, an argument (not just an assertion) should be provided that the driver or tool will not adversely affect the performance of the functionality by the and its platform.*

*This also includes the configuration of the cryptographic engine to be used. The*

cryptographic algorithms implemented by this engine are those specified by this PP and used by the cryptographic protocols being evaluated (IPsec, TLS). The test plan identifies high-level test objectives as well as the test procedures to be followed to achieve those objectives. These procedures include expected results. The test report (which could just be an annotated version of the test plan) details the activities that took place when the test procedures were executed, and includes the actual results of the tests. This shall be a cumulative account, so if there was a test run that resulted in a failure; a fix installed; and then a successful re-run of the test, the report would show a "fail" and "pass" result (and the supporting details), and not just the "pass" result.

### 5.2.6 Class AVA: Vulnerability Assessment

For the first generation of this protection profile, the evaluation lab is expected to survey open sources to discover what vulnerabilities have been discovered in these types of products. In most cases, these vulnerabilities will require sophistication beyond that of a basic attacker. Until penetration tools are created and uniformly distributed to the evaluation labs, the evaluator will not be expected to test for these vulnerabilities in the . The labs will be expected to comment on the likelihood of these vulnerabilities given the documentation provided by the vendor. This information will be used in the development of penetration testing tools and for the development of future protection profiles.

#### AVA\_VAN.1 Vulnerability Survey (AVA\_VAN.1)

##### Developer action elements:

AVA\_VAN.1.1D            The developer shall provide the for testing.

##### Content and presentation elements:

AVA\_VAN.1.1C            The shall be suitable for testing.

##### Evaluator action elements:

AVA\_VAN.1.1E            The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

AVA\_VAN.1.2E            The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify potential vulnerabilities in the .

**Application Note:** Public domain sources include the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) dictionary for publicly-known vulnerabilities. Public domain sources also include sites which provide free checking of files for viruses.

AVA\_VAN.1.3E            The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on the identified potential vulnerabilities, to determine that the is resistant to attacks performed by an attacker possessing Basic attack potential.

#### Evaluation Activity ▼

*The evaluator will generate a report to document their findings with respect to this requirement. This report could physically be part of the overall test report mentioned in ATE\_IND, or a separate document. The evaluator performs a search of public information to find vulnerabilities that have been found in similar applications with a particular focus on network protocols the application uses and document formats it parses. The evaluator documents the sources consulted and the vulnerabilities found in the report.*

*For each vulnerability found, the evaluator either provides a rationale with respect to its non-applicability, or the evaluator formulates a test (using the guidelines provided in ATE\_IND) to confirm the vulnerability, if suitable. Suitability is determined by assessing the attack vector needed to take advantage of the vulnerability. If exploiting the vulnerability requires expert skills and an electron microscope, for instance, then a test would not be suitable and an appropriate justification would be formulated.*

# Appendix A - Optional Requirements

As indicated in [Section 2 Conformance Claims](#), the baseline requirements (those that must be performed by the ) are contained in the body of this PP. Additionally, there are three other types of requirements specified in [Appendix A - Optional Requirements](#), [Appendix B - Selection-Based Requirements](#), and [Appendix C - Objective Requirements](#). The first type (in this Appendix) are requirements that can be included in the ST, but are not required in order for a OS to claim conformance to this PP. The second type (in [Appendix B - Selection-Based Requirements](#)) are requirements based on selections in the body of the PP: if certain selections are made, then additional requirements in that appendix must be included. The third type (in [Appendix C - Objective Requirements](#)) are components that are not required in order to conform to this PP, but will be included in the baseline requirements in future versions of this PP, so adoption by vendors is encouraged. Note that the ST author is responsible for ensuring that requirements that may be associated with those in [Appendix A - Optional Requirements](#), [Appendix B - Selection-Based Requirements](#), and [Appendix C - Objective Requirements](#) but are not listed (e.g., FMT-type requirements) are also included in the ST.

## Appendix B - Selection-Based Requirements

As indicated in the introduction to this PP, the baseline requirements (those that must be performed by the OS or its underlying platform) are contained in the body of this PP. There are additional requirements based on selections in the body of the PP: if certain selections are made, then additional requirements below will need to be included.

# Appendix C - Objective Requirements

This appendix includes requirements that specify security functionality which also addresses threats. The requirements are not currently mandated in the body of this PP as they describe security functionality not yet widely-available in commercial technology. However, these requirements may be included in the ST such that the OS is still conformant to this PP, and it is expected that they be included as soon as possible.



# Appendix D - Inherently Satisfied Requirements

This appendix lists requirements that should be considered satisfied by products successfully evaluated against this Protection Profile. However, these requirements are not featured explicitly as SFRs and should not be included in the ST. They are not included as standalone SFRs because it would increase the time, cost, and complexity of evaluation. This approach is permitted by [\[CC\]](#) Part 1, **8.2 Dependencies between components**.

This information benefits systems engineering activities which call for inclusion of particular security controls. Evaluation against the Protection Profile provides evidence that these controls are present and have been evaluated. Requirement Rationale for Satisfaction FIA\_UAU.1 - Timing of authentication [FIA\\_AFL.1](#) implicitly requires that the OS perform all necessary actions, including those on behalf of the user who has not been authenticated, in order to authenticate; therefore it is duplicative to include these actions as a separate assignment and test. FIA\_UID.1 - Timing of identification [FIA\\_AFL.1](#) implicitly requires that the OS perform all necessary actions, including those on behalf of the user who has not been identified, in order to authenticate; therefore it is duplicative to include these actions as a separate assignment and test. FMT\_SMR.1 - Security roles [FMT\\_MOF\\_EXT.1](#) specifies role-based management functions that implicitly defines user and privileged accounts; therefore, it is duplicative to include separate role requirements. FPT\_STM.1 - Reliable time stamps [FAU\\_GEN.1.2](#) explicitly requires that the OS associate timestamps with audit records; therefore it is duplicative to include a separate timestamp requirement. FTA\_SSL.1 - TSF-initiated session locking [FMT\\_MOF\\_EXT.1](#) defines requirements for managing session locking; therefore, it is duplicative to include a separate session locking requirement. FTA\_SSL.2 - User-initiated locking [FMT\\_MOF\\_EXT.1](#) defines requirements for user-initiated session locking; therefore, it is duplicative to include a separate session locking requirement. FAU\_STG.1 - Protected audit trail storage [FPT\\_ACF\\_EXT.1](#) defines a requirement to protect audit logs; therefore, it is duplicative to include a separate protection of audit trail requirements. FAU\_GEN.2 - User identity association [FAU\\_GEN.1.2](#) explicitly requires that the OS record any user account associated with each event; therefore, it is duplicative to include a separate requirement to associate a user account with each event. FAU\_SAR.1 - Audit review [FPT\\_ACF\\_EXT.1.2](#) requires that audit logs (and other objects) are protected from reading by unprivileged users; therefore, it is duplicative to include a separate requirement to protect only the audit information.

# Appendix E - Entropy Documentation and Assessment

This appendix describes the required supplementary information for the entropy source used by the OS. The documentation of the entropy source should be detailed enough that, after reading, the evaluator will thoroughly understand the entropy source and why it can be relied upon to provide sufficient entropy. This documentation should include multiple detailed sections: design description, entropy justification, operating conditions, and health testing. This documentation is not required to be part of the TSS.

## E.1 Design Description

---

Documentation shall include the design of the entropy source as a whole, including the interaction of all entropy source components. Any information that can be shared regarding the design should also be included for any third-party entropy sources that are included in the product.

The documentation will describe the operation of the entropy source to include, how entropy is produced, and how unprocessed (raw) data can be obtained from within the entropy source for testing purposes. The documentation should walk through the entropy source design indicating where the entropy comes from, where the entropy output is passed next, any post-processing of the raw outputs (hash, XOR, etc.), if/where it is stored, and finally, how it is output from the entropy source. Any conditions placed on the process (e.g., blocking) should also be described in the entropy source design. Diagrams and examples are encouraged.

This design must also include a description of the content of the security boundary of the entropy source and a description of how the security boundary ensures that an adversary outside the boundary cannot affect the entropy rate.

If implemented, the design description shall include a description of how third-party applications can add entropy to the RBG. A description of any RBG state saving between power-off and power-on shall be included.

## E.2 Entropy Justification

---

There should be a technical argument for where the unpredictability in the source comes from and why there is confidence in the entropy source delivering sufficient entropy for the uses made of the RBG output (by this particular OS). This argument will include a description of the expected min-entropy rate (i.e. the minimum entropy (in bits) per bit or byte of source data) and explain that sufficient entropy is going into the OS randomizer seeding process. This discussion will be part of a justification for why the entropy source can be relied upon to produce bits with entropy.

The amount of information necessary to justify the expected min-entropy rate depends on the type of entropy source included in the product.

For developer provided entropy sources, in order to justify the min-entropy rate, it is expected that a large number of raw source bits will be collected, statistical tests will be performed, and the min-entropy rate determined from the statistical tests. While no particular statistical tests are required at this time, it is expected that some testing is necessary in order to determine the amount of min-entropy in each output.

For third-party provided entropy sources, in which the OS vendor has limited access to the design and raw entropy data of the source, the documentation will indicate an estimate of the amount of min-entropy obtained from this third-party source. It is acceptable for the vendor to “assume” an amount of min-entropy, however, this assumption must be clearly stated in the documentation provided. In particular, the min-entropy estimate must be specified and the assumption included in the ST. Regardless of type of entropy source, the justification will also include how the DRBG is initialized with the entropy stated in the ST, for example by verifying that the min-entropy rate is multiplied by the amount of source data used to seed the DRBG or that the rate of entropy expected based on the amount of source data is explicitly stated and compared to the statistical rate. If the amount of source data used to seed the DRBG is not clear or the calculated rate is not explicitly related to the seed, the documentation will not be considered complete.

The entropy justification shall not include any data added from any third-party application or from any state saving between restarts.

## E.3 Operating Conditions

---

The entropy rate may be affected by conditions outside the control of the entropy source itself. For example, voltage, frequency, temperature, and elapsed time after power-on are just a few of the factors that may affect the operation of the entropy source. As such, documentation will also include the range of operating conditions under which the entropy source is expected to generate random data. It will clearly describe the measures that have been taken in the system design to ensure the entropy source continues to operate under those conditions. Similarly, documentation shall describe the conditions under which the entropy source is known to malfunction or become inconsistent. Methods used to detect failure or degradation of the source shall be included.

## E.4 Health Testing

---

More specifically, all entropy source health tests and their rationale will be documented. This includes a description of the health tests, the rate and conditions under which each health test is performed (e.g., at start, continuously, or on-demand), the expected results for each health test, and rationale indicating why each test is believed to be appropriate for detecting one or more failures in the entropy source.

# Appendix F - References

Identifier	Title
[CC]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">Part 1: Introduction and General Model</a>, CCMB-2012-09-001, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.</li><li>• <a href="#">Part 2: Security Functional Components</a>, CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.</li><li>• <a href="#">Part 3: Security Assurance Components</a>, CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.</li></ul>
[CEM]	<a href="#">Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security - Evaluation Methodology</a> , CCMB-2012-09-004, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[CESG]	CESG - <a href="#">End User Devices Security and Configuration Guidance</a>
[CSA]	<a href="#">Computer Security Act of 1987</a> , H.R. 145, June 11, 1987.
[OMB]	<a href="#">Reporting Incidents Involving Personally Identifiable Information and Incorporating the Cost for Security in Agency Information Technology Investments</a> , OMB M-06-19, July 12, 2006.

# Appendix G - Acronyms

Acronym	Meaning
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
ANSI	American National Standards Institute
API	Application Programming Interface
ASLR	Address Space Layout Randomization
CESG	Communications-Electronics Security Group
CMC	Certificate Management over CMS
CMS	Cryptographic Message Syntax
CN	Common Names
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
CSA	Computer Security Act
DEP	Data Execution Prevention
DES	Data Encryption Standard
DHE	Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral
DNS	Domain Name System
DRBG	Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSS	Digital Signature Standard
DT	Date/Time Vector
DTLS	Datagram Transport Layer Security
EAP	Extensible Authentication Protocol
ECDHE	Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EST	Enrollment over Secure Transport
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standards
DSS	Digital Signature Standard
HMAC	Hash-based Message Authentication Code
HTTP	Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS	Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
DSS	Digital Signature Standard
IETF	Internet Engineering Task Force
IP	Internet Protocol
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
IT	Information Technology
ITSEF	Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
NFC	Near Field Communication
NIAP	National Information Assurance Partnership

NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
OCSF	Online Certificate Status Protocol
OID	Object Identifier
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OS	Operating System
PII	Personally Identifiable Information
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
PP	Protection Profile
RBG	Random Bit Generator
RFC	Request for Comment
RNG	Random Number Generator
RNGVS	Random Number Generator Validation System
SAN	Subject Alternative Name
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
S/MIME	Secure/Multi-purpose Internet Mail Extensions
SIP	Session Initiation Protocol
SWID	Software Identification
TLS	Transport Layer Security
URI	Uniform Resource Identifier
URL	Uniform Resource Locator
USB	Universal Serial Bus
XCCDF	eXtensible Configuration Checklist Description Format
XOR	Exclusive Or