Message Protocol Alice Message Server Bob Web API Browser B IDB B IDB A Browser A Message DB [User-to-Server Public Key Advertisement] New User 1. Generate Key Pairs: IA, SA, OA1, OA2, ..., OAk. 2. Sign key & with keyA. Send only Public Keys and user metadata Verify signature on S Store public keys and metadata **User Created** Encrypt key pairs with a password + salt derived key Store encrypted keys and salt [User-to-User Key Exchange] New Chat Retrieve key pairs Request Bob's PKs: IB, SB, and one **@**k Retrieve PKs Remove Osk Return PKs Genrate an ephemeral key pair E
 Generate shared\_secret as: ECDH(A, SB) || ECDH(EA, B) ||
ECDH(EA, SB) || ECDH(EA, OBk)

3. Create Root and Chain keys as:
(RKAB1,CKAB1,1) = HKDF(shared\_secret)

4. Prepend metadata to any messages: PKs of (A, EA) and OB index k Store keys [Initial Messages] loop Send message w/ metadata Store until Bob online (see below) Retrieve key pairs Get any messages Return messages Remove stored & 1. Generate shared\_secret as: ECDH(SB, IA) || ECDH(B, EA) ||
ECDH(SB, EA) || ECDH(OBK, EA)

2.Create Root and Chain keys as:
(RKAB1,CKAB1,1) = HKDF(shared\_secret)

3. Decrypt message (see below). Store keys Message Exchange [User-to-User Messages] Retrieve keys Generate new ephemeral key pair [Send j'th Message] loop 1. Generate Message Key as: MABj = HMAC(CKAB1,j, 0x01)

2. Update Chain Key as:
CKAB1,j+1= HMAC(CKAB1,j, 0x02)

3. Decompose MBj as:
(AESkey, HMACkey, AESiv) = MABj 4. Pepare message as:
Metadata: PK of Æ, index (1,j), \*etc.
Body: Enc(msg, AESey, AESiv)
Auth: HMAC(Metadata || Body, HMA) Store until Bob online Send (Metadata, Body, Auth) Retrieve keys [Receive j'th Message] loop Get any messages Return messages 1. Generate Message Key as: MABj = HMAC(CKAB1,j, 0x01)

2. Update Chain Key as:
CKAB1,j+1= HMAC(CKAB1,j, 0x02) 3. Decompose MBj as: (AESkey, HMACkey, AESiv) = MABj4. Decode message as: Verify: Auth == HMAC(Metadata || Body, HMAC msg: Dec(Body, All Sy, AESiv) First DH Key Ratchet 1. Generate new ephemeral key pair E 2. Update Root and Chain Key as:  $(R\dot{K}_{AB2},CK_{AB2,1}) = HMAC(R\dot{K}_{B1},ECDH(EB,EA))$ ref