

# Modelling and Analysis of Complex Networks

— Semester 3, Master of Data Science —

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University of Luxembourg

# Network Effects and Cascading Behaviour

# Spreading through Networks

- ▶ Spreading through networks: cascading behaviour, diffusion of innovations, network effects, epidemics
- ▶ Behaviours that cascade from node to node like an epidemic!
- ▶ Examples:
  - ▶ Biological: diseases via contagion, e.g. COVID-19
  - ▶ Technological: cascading failures, spread of information
  - ▶ Social: misinformation, news, viral marketing

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# Spreading through Networks

 Barack Obama   
@BarackObama 

"No one is born hating another person because of the color of his skin or his background or his religion..."



2:06 AM · Aug 13, 2017 

 4.1M  Reply  Copy link to Tweet

[Read 66.5K replies](#)

Social media post sharing

# Spreading through Networks



Viral marketing: product adoption


# Spreading through Networks




Spread of disease: COVID-19, Ebola, etc.

# Network Cascades

- ▶ **Contagion** spreads over the edges of the network
- ▶ It creates a propagation tree, i.e., **cascade**



Network



Cascade (propagation graph)

- ▶ **Contagion:** stuff that spreads
- ▶ **Adaption, infection, activation:** “infection” event
- ▶ **Infected/active nodes, adopters**

# How Do We Model Diffusion?

- ▶ Decision-based models:
  - ▶ Models of product adoption, decision making (a node observes the decisions of its neighbours and makes its own decision)
  - ▶ Example: you join a demonstration if  $k$  of your friends do so
- ▶ Probabilistic models:
  - ▶ Models of influence or disease spreading (an infected node tries to “push” the contagion to an uninfected node)
  - ▶ Example: you “catch” a disease with some probability from each active neighbour in the network

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
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# Decision-based Diffusion Models

# Game Theoretic Model of Cascades [Morris, 2000]

Based on 2-player coordination game:


- ▶ Two players: each chooses option  $A$  or  $B$
- ▶ Each player can **only adopt one “behaviour”**, either  $A$  or  $B$
- ▶ The player gains more payoff if his friend has adapted the same behaviour



Local view of the network of node  $v$ .

# The Model for Two Nodes (Players)


- ▶ Payoff matrix:
  - ▶ If both  $v$  and  $w$  adopt behaviour  $A$ , they each get payoff  $a > 0$
  - ▶ If both  $v$  and  $w$  adopt behaviour  $B$ , they each get payoff  $b > 0$
  - ▶ If both  $v$  and  $w$  adopt the opposite behaviours, they each get 0



- ▶ In a large network:
  - ▶ Each node  $v$  is playing a copy of the game with each of its neighbours
  - ▶ Payoff: sum of node payoffs per game


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## Calculation of Node $v$




Let  $v$  have  $d$  neighbours. Assume fraction  $p$  of  $v$ 's neighbours adapt  $A$ .

$$\text{Payoff}_a = a \cdot p \cdot d \quad \text{if } v \text{ chooses } A$$

$$\text{Payoff}_b = b \cdot (1 - p) \cdot d \quad \text{if } v \text{ chooses } B$$

So  $v$  chooses  $A$  if  $p = \frac{a}{d} > \frac{b}{d} = \frac{b}{a+b} = q$  (e.g. payoff threshold).

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
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


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## An Example Scenario

Consider the following scenario:

- ▶ A graph where everyone starts with all  $B$
- ▶ A small set  $S$  of early adopters of  $A$  (hard-wire  $S$ : they keep using  $A$  no matter what payoffs tell them to do)
- ▶ Assume payoffs are set in such a way that nodes will
  - ▶ take  $A$ , if  $q \geq 50\%$  of their friends take  $A$ ,


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
## An Example Scenario

Example scenario:  $S = \{u, v\}$ , if  $q > 50\%$  of my neighborhood is **A**, I will also be **A**.




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Example scenario:  $S = \{u, v\}$ , if  $q > 50\%$  of my friends are red, I will also be red.




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
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
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
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In this game we assume the players are rational.

# Probabilistic Diffusion & Epidemic Models

# Epidemics vs Cascade Spreading

- ▶ In decision based models, nodes make decisions based on payoff benefits of adopting one strategy or the other
- ▶ In epidemic spreading,
  - ▶ Lack of decision making
  - ▶ Process of contagion is complex and unobservable
  - ▶ In some cases it involves or can be modeled as randomness

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# Probabilistic Spreading Models



High contagion probability:  
The disease spreads


Low contagion probability:  
The disease dies out



# Spreading Models for Viruses


Virus propagation: two parameters

- ▶ Virus transmission rate  $\beta$  (probability that a susceptible node gets infected by a neighbor )
- ▶ Virus death rate  $\delta$  (probability that an infected node heals)



# A General Scheme


General scheme for epidemic models:



Each node can go through phases, and transition probabilities are governed by the model parameters.

# SI Model


- ▶ Susceptible-Infective (SI) model



- ▶ Models HIV
  - (once you get infected, you can never recover and stay infectious)
- ▶ Assuming perfect mixing: a complete graph

$$\frac{dS}{dt} = -\beta SI, \quad \frac{dI}{dt} = \beta SI$$

Logistic growth curve




# SIR Model

- ▶ Susceptible-Infective-Recovered (SIR) model




- ▶ Models chickenpox or plague  
(once you heal, you can never get infected again)
- ▶ Assuming perfect mixing: a complete graph

$$\frac{dS}{dt} = -\beta SI, \quad \frac{dR}{dt} = \delta I, \quad \frac{dI}{dt} = \beta SI - \delta I$$



## SIS Model


- ▶ Susceptible-Infective-Susceptible (SIS) model
- ▶ Cured nodes immediately become susceptible
- ▶ Virus “strength”:  $s = \beta/\delta$



# SIS Model

- Models flu:
  - A susceptible node becomes infected
  - The node then heals and becomes susceptible again
- Assuming perfect mixing: a complete graph

$$\frac{dS}{dt} = -\beta SI + \delta I, \quad \frac{dI}{dt} = \beta SI - \delta I$$



Susceptible  $\longleftrightarrow$  Infected

## SIS Model

Epidemic threshold of an arbitrary graph  $G$  is  $\tau$ , such at if the virus “strength”  $s = \beta/\delta < \tau$ , the epidemic cannot happen.

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
Given a graph  $G$  represented by adj.  $A$ , we have no epidemic if:

$$\boxed{\beta/\delta < \tau = 1/\lambda_{1,A}}$$

(Virus) Death rate      Epidemic threshold  
↑  
(Virus) Birth rate      largest eigenvalue of adj. matrix  $A$  of  $G$

$\lambda_{1,A}$  alone captures the property of the graph!  
([Wang et al. 2003])

# SIS Model




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
Does it matter how many people are initially infected?

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
Does it matter how many people are initially infected?



(a) Below the threshold,  
 $s=0.912$




(b) At the threshold,  
 $s=1.003$



(c) Above the threshold,  
 $s=1.1$

[Wang et al. 2003]

# SI, SIR, SIS in One Picture



## Real-life Applications

## Application on Real Networks

Rumour spread modelling using SEIZ Model

Epidemiological Modeling of News and Rumors on Twitter. [Jin et al.  
SNAKDD 2013]

# SEIZ Model

An Extension of SIS Model:



Susceptible    S    Twitter accounts

Infected    I    Believe news / rumor, (I) post a tweet

Exposed    E    Be exposed but not yet believe


Skeptics    Z    Skeptics, do not tweet

Disease

Twitter

# SEIZ Model

S= Susceptible, I = Infected, E= Exposed, Z= Skeptics



# Application on Real Networks

Tweets collected from eight stories:

- ▶ Real events
  - ▶ Boston Marathon Explosion, 15/04/2013
  - ▶ Pope Resignation, 11/02/2013
  - ▶ Venezuela's Refinery Explosion, 25/08/2012
  - ▶ Michelle Obama at the 2013 Oscars, 24/02/2013
- ▶ Rumours
  - ▶ Obama Injured, 23/04/2013
  - ▶ Doomsday Rumour, 21/12/2012
  - ▶ Fidel Castro's Coming Death, 15/10/2012
  - ▶ Riots and Shooting in Mexico, 05/09/2012


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
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## Method: Fitting SEIZ Model to Data


- ▶ SEIZ model is solved as an ODE and provides  $I(t)$ : an estimated number of rumour tweets.
- ▶ Fit to each cascade to minimize the difference between  $|I(t) - \text{tweets}(t)|$ , where  $\text{tweets}(t)$  are the rumour tweets.
- ▶ Use grid-search: iterate through all possible parameters and keep the ones that give a minimum error.
- ▶ Each of the aforementioned cascades has different parameters.



# Method: Fitting SEIZ Model to Cascade Data



SIS Model



SEIZ Model


$$\text{Error} = \text{norm}(I - \text{tweets}) / \text{norm}(\text{tweets})$$

SEIZ model better models the real data, especially at initial points

## Method: Rumour Detection with SEIZ Model

- ▶ Define a new metric that quantifies whether a cascade is a rumor or not, using the fit parameters.


By SEIZ model parameters



$$R_{SI} = \frac{(1-p)\beta + (1-l)b}{p + e} \quad (1)$$

- ▶  $R_{SI}$  represents the ratio of the users entering state E to those leaving state E.

# Method: Rumour Detection with SEIZ Model



Parameters obtained by fitting SEIZ model  
efficiently identifies rumors vs. news

# Real-life Application

Modeling protest recruitment on social networks:



- ▶ Anti-austerity protest in Spain May 15-22, 2011 as a response to the financial crisis
- ▶ Twitter was used to organise and mobilise users to participate in the protest

"The Dynamics of Protest Recruitment through an Online Network"  
[Bailon et al., Nature Scientific Reports, 2011]

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Modeling protest recruitment on social networks:

- ▶ 70 hashtags were crawled for one month period: **581,750 tweets**
- ▶ Relevant users who tweeted any relevant hashtags and its followers and followees: **87,569 users**
- ▶ Full social (directed) network with all Twitter follow links
- ▶ Symmetric ‘strong’ social network with only the reciprocal follow links:  $i \rightarrow j$  and  $j \rightarrow i$

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# Real-life Application

Modeling protest recruitment on social networks:

- ▶ User activation time: moment when user starts tweeting protest messages
- ▶  $k_n$ : total number of neighbours when a user became active
- ▶  $k_a$ : number of active neighbours when a user became active
- ▶  $k_a/k_n$ : activation threshold
  - ▶ If  $k_a/k_n \approx 0$ , the user joins the movement when very few neighbours are active, i.e., no social pressure
  - ▶ If  $k_a/k_n \approx 1$ , the user joins the movement after most of its neighbours are active, i.e., high social pressure


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# Real-life Application

- ▶ Is a user more likely to protest if several neighbors become active in a short time period?
- ▶ Calculate the burstiness of active neighbors as  $\Delta k_a/k_a = (k_a^{t+1} - k_a^t)/k_a^{t+1}$ . Compare it with the threshold:



Users who are susceptible to high social pressure are effected by bursts in neighborhood adoption.

## Real-life Application

Social cascades on Flickr and estimating  $R_0$  from real data:  
“Characterizing social cascades in Flickr” [Cha et al., ACM WOSN, 2008]

- ▶ The basic reproduction number of popular photos is between 1 and 190
- ▶ This is much higher than very infectious diseases like measles, indicating that social networks are efficient transmission media and online content can be very infectious.

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