

Review: Building Adversary Resistant Deep Neural Networks with Random Feature Nullification

Summary

The paper presents the random feature nullification (RFN) to preserve the DNN's integrity against adversarial samples. The problem is motivated by pointing out that a DNN can be tricked into doing a wrong classification by introducing perturbations that the human eye cannot observe. The perturbations are obtained using the *fast gradient sign* method [Goodfellow et al., 2014] where a cost function $\mathcal{L}(\theta, X, Y)$ is differentiated with respect to X denoted by

$$\mathcal{J}_{\mathcal{L}}(X) = \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}(\theta, X, Y)}{\partial X}$$

and the perturbation is calculated by the formula

$$\delta X = \phi \cdot \text{sign}(\mathcal{J}_{\mathcal{L}}(X))$$

Based on the discussion on the currently related work to increase the DNN's resistance to adversarial samples, the inclusion of a non-deterministic feature serves to make the construction of effective adversarial samples¹ hard for the attacker. The trade off of the model is that every sample undergoes a nullification process before it is being trained. The nullification is implemented by using a I_p matrix with dimensions same as the real sample and each i, j component to be Bernoulli distributed with parameter p .

(weakness of adversarial training and model complexity enhancement here?) The paper points out that to be able to put up a strong resistance against adversarial attacks, the model architecture has to be one that makes it impossible to generate adversarial samples even when it is disclosed. However, [Goodfellow et al., 2014]

Positivity

The discussed approaches to tackle the problem of adversarial attacks have so far been trying to train the model on adversarial samples or to increase the non-linearity of the model. The RFN technique adopts another approach which is to make the construction of effective adversarial samples a tall order for the attackers, through the addition of random variables. Making it hard to construct adversarial samples might be a better approach that future efforts of tackling adversarial attacks might want to explore as the doing adversarial training has its limitations; (the augmentation of adversarial samples to the training set to increase the resistance of the model from adversarial samples only trains the model well on adversarial samples that it has been exposed to.)

Negativity

In its adversarial resistant analysis on why its RFN method is more robust than the known methods of adversarial resistance, its argument only assumed that the attackers used the same method to obtain perturbations which are then added to the real sample to form the adversarial samples. The discussion on how attackers might tweak their methodology to generate adversarial samples effective against them is little, not very clear and not convincing. Based on my naive thinking, the attacker might chose to not draw a sample I_p^* which then the nullified adversarial sample looks like

$$(X + \delta X) \odot I_p = (X \odot I_p) + \delta X \odot I_p$$

thus there is no distortion of the δX . In the first place how much different is $\delta X \odot I_p$ from δX is still not really known based on my point in the third paragraph. But the lack of analysis on the next point makes the RFN method less desirable as a technique to foil adversarial attacks.

From [Goodfellow et al., 2014] adversarial examples are known to generalize, i.e. an adversarial example generated for one model can be misclassified by another model, although they were trained on different learning architectures using disjoint training sets. Hence although the experimental results shown by the paper does numerically points to better resilience of their RFN method, it is only resilient to adversarial samples constructed using their RFN learning technique; it say anything about resilience against adversarial samples generated from other learning techniques.

The paper worked with only the MNIST dataset where each real sample is a 28×28 grayscale image. And the nullification of MNIST data to 0 would simply mean it changed the pixel to a white pixel and since an image from MNIST is predominantly white², it is possible that the RFN technique does not really “null” much of the information from the images. A reason for this suspicion is even with their choice of nullification rate to be a high 50%, the classification error is 0.0170. Even with the highest reported nullification rate of 70% the classification error is still

¹adversarial samples that is able to successful deceive the DNN to make wrong classifications.

²no preprocessing of the dataset is assumed here as the paper does not say anything about it

a decent 0.0266. Such results are counter-intuitively, as one might feel that by nulling such a high proportion of the image could be thought of as the image being occluded and occlusions in images limit the information that could be obtained (might need to find some papers that support my claim here). Such a problem might also cause a problem in trying to extend the RFN technique to colour images like CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and ImageNet, which leads to the next point.

As seen in the examples from [Szegedy et al., 2013], we see that the perturbations introduced are not visible to the human eye but are classified by the trained model as classes that are very far from its original class. A lack of showing how their RFN technique to datasets of colour images like those mentioned above makes this paper less complete. Perhaps the RFN technique cannot be applied to colour images or the paper has not considered extending to a more complex dataset with more classes in a bigger space.

References

- [Goodfellow et al., 2014] Goodfellow, I. J., Shlens, J., and Szegedy, C. (2014). Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.6572*.
- [Szegedy et al., 2013] Szegedy, C., Zaremba, W., Sutskever, I., Bruna, J., Erhan, D., Goodfellow, I., and Fergus, R. (2013). Intriguing properties of neural networks. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.6199*.