# Fundamentals of Cryptography Homework 2

# 周书予

2000013060@stu.pku.edu.cn

September 24, 2022

# Problem 1

We construct PRG G' like this: on input x of length n,

- 1. G' first finds the largest m such that  $m \leq n$  and  $m \in \mathcal{I}$ . If no such m exists, G' just simply outputs  $0^{n+1}$  (an arbitrary string of length n+1).
- 2. Then it truncates x to m bits and stretches the input seed into length n+1 by repetitively replacing the last m bits (say x') with G(x').

According to the second property of polynomial-time-enumerable set, n = poly(m), which means any negligible function of m is also negligible of n. Thus the stretching procedure preserves pseudorandomness, which can be formally described as, for all PPT distinguisher D, there is a negligible function  $\varepsilon(m) = \text{negl}(m)$ , such that

$$\left| \Pr_{s \leftarrow \{0,1\}^m} [D(\mathsf{STRETCH}(s)) = 1] - \Pr_{r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n+1}} [D(r) = 1] \right| \leqslant \varepsilon(m)$$

Notice that

$$\Pr_{s \leftarrow \{0,1\}^m}[D(\mathsf{STRETCH}(s)) = 1] = \Pr_{s \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n}[D(G'(s)) = 1]$$

thus,

$$\left| \Pr_{s \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n} [D(G'(s)) = 1] - \Pr_{r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n+1}} [D(r) = 1] \right| \le \varepsilon(m) = \varepsilon'(n)$$

which finish the prove that G' is a PRG of stretch  $\ell(n) = n + 1$ .

# Problem 2

Assume 
$$|G(s)| = |G_0(s)| = |G_1(s)| = \ell(|s|)$$
.

# Part A

G' is a PRG of stretch  $\ell(n/2)$ .

For any fixed PPT distinguisher D, define  $\varepsilon : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{R}$  as

$$\varepsilon(n) = \left| \Pr_{s \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n} [D(G'(s)) = 1] - \Pr_{r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell(n/2)}} [D(r) = 1] \right|$$

By the definition of G', we know that

$$\Pr_{s \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n}[D(G'(s)) = 1] = \Pr_{s \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n/2}}[D(G(s)) = 1]$$

thus

$$\varepsilon(n) = \left| \Pr_{s \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n/2}} [D(G(s)) = 1] - \Pr_{r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell(n/2)}} [D(r) = 1] \right| \leqslant \varepsilon'(n/2)$$

where  $\varepsilon'$  is a negligible function since G is assumed to be a secure PRG.  $\varepsilon(n) \leqslant \varepsilon'(n/2)$  means  $\varepsilon$  is also negligible, thus G' is a PRG.

#### Part B

G' may not be a PRG.

Let H be a PRG of stretch  $\ell(n)$ , and let  $G(s) = s_1 || H(s_2, \dots, s_n)$ . Obviously G is a PRG whose first bit of input and output are always the same.

When G' is constructed based on G, G' always outputs 0 as its first bit, which can be apparently distinguished from the uniform distribution over  $\{0,1\}^{\ell(n+1)}$ .

#### Part C

G' may not be a PRG.

Let G be a PRG who ignores its last bit of input, and consider a PPT distinguisher D who examines whether the two halves of the output of G' are the same.

With probability 1/2, the last bit of input s is 0, which indicates the output of G(s) and G(s+1) are totally the same. Thus,

$$\Pr_{s \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n} [D(G'(s)) = 1] \ge 1/2$$

meanwhile,

$$\Pr_{r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{2\ell(n)}}[D(r) = 1] = 2^{-\ell(n)}$$

G' is not a PRG in this case.

#### Part D

G' is a PRG of stretch  $\ell(n/2)$ .

We will use a *hybird argument* to show this conclusion.

For any PPT distinguisher D of G', consider two distinguishers  $D_0$  and  $D_1$ , corresponding to  $G_0$  and  $G_1$ , respectively:

- $D_0$  takes input  $r_0$  of length  $\ell(n/2)$ , randomly samples  $r_1 \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell(n/2)}$ , and then outputs  $D(r_0 \oplus r_1)$ .
- $D_1$  takes input  $r_1$  of length  $\ell(n/2)$ , randomly samples  $s_0 \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n/2}$ , and then outputs  $D(G_0(s_0) \oplus r_1)$ .

Since  $G_0$  and  $G_1$  are both PRGs, there is two negligible functions  $\varepsilon_0(n)$ ,  $\varepsilon_1(n)$  such that

$$\left| \Pr_{s_0 \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n/2}} [D_0(G_0(s_0)) = 1] - \Pr_{r_0 \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell(n/2)}} [D_0(r_0) = 1] \right| \leqslant \varepsilon_0(n)$$

$$\left| \Pr_{s_1 \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n/2}} [D_1(G_1(s_1)) = 1] - \Pr_{r_1 \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell(n/2)}} [D_1(r_1) = 1] \right| \leqslant \varepsilon_1(n)$$

and notice that

$$\Pr_{s_{1} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n/2}}[D_{1}(G_{1}(s_{1})) = 1] = \Pr_{s_{0} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n/2}}[D(G_{0}(s_{0}) \oplus G_{1}(s_{1})) = 1]$$

$$\Pr_{s_{0} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n/2}}[D_{0}(G_{0}(s_{0})) = 1] = \Pr_{s_{0} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n/2}}[D(G_{0}(s_{0}) \oplus r_{1}) = 1]$$

$$\Pr_{r_{1} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell(n/2)}}[D_{1}(r_{1}) = 1] = \Pr_{s_{0} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n/2}\atop r_{1} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell(n/2)}}[D(G_{0}(s_{0}) \oplus r_{1}) = 1]$$

$$\Pr_{r_{0} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell(n/2)}}[D_{0}(r_{0}) = 1] = \Pr_{r_{0} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell(n/2)}\atop r_{1} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell(n/2)}}[D(r_{0} \oplus r_{1}) = 1]$$

which indicates that

$$\left| \Pr_{\substack{s_0 \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n/2} \\ s_1 \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n/2}}} [D(G_0(s_0) \oplus G_1(s_1)) = 1] - \Pr_{\substack{r_0 \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell(n/2)} \\ r_1 \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell(n/2)}}} [D(r_0 \oplus r_1) = 1] \right| \leqslant \varepsilon_0(n) + \varepsilon_1(n)$$

The choice of distinguisher D is arbitrary, which means  $G'(s) = G_0(s_0) \|G_1(s_1)\|$  is a PRG.

#### Part E

G' may not be a PRG.

By using the similar argument in **Part B**, we let  $G_0$  be a PRG who has its first bit of output always equal to its first bit of input, and let  $G_1$  be just the opposite, i.e. has its first bit of output always differ from its first bit of input.

We can find that  $G'(s) = G_{s_1}(s)$  always outputs 0 as its first bit, which can be easily distinguished.

## Part F

G' is a PRG of stretch  $\ell(n-1)+1$ .

For any PPT distinguisher D of G', consider two distinguishers  $D_0$  and  $D_1$ , corresponding to  $G_0$  and  $G_1$ , respectively:

- $D_0$  takes input r of length  $\ell(n-1)$  and outputs D(0||r).
- $D_1$  takes input r of length  $\ell(n-1)$  and outputs D(1||r).

Since  $G_0$  and  $G_1$  are both PRGs, there is two negligible functions  $\varepsilon_0(n)$ ,  $\varepsilon_1(n)$  such that

$$\begin{aligned} & \left| \Pr_{s \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n-1}} [D_0(G_0(s)) = 1] - \Pr_{r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell(n-1)}} [D_0(r) = 1] \right| \leqslant \varepsilon_0(n) \\ & \left| \Pr_{s \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n-1}} [D_1(G_1(s)) = 1] - \Pr_{r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell(n-1)}} [D_1(r) = 1] \right| \leqslant \varepsilon_1(n) \end{aligned}$$

notice that

$$\Pr_{s \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n}[D(G'(s)) = 1] = \frac{1}{2} \left( \Pr_{s \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n-1}}[D_0(G_0(s)) = 1] + \Pr_{s \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n-1}}[D_1(G_1(s)) = 1] \right)$$

$$\Pr_{r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell(n-1)+1}}[D(r) = 1] = \frac{1}{2} \left( \Pr_{r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell(n-1)}}[D_0(r) = 1] + \Pr_{r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell(n-1)}}[D_1(r) = 1] \right)$$

thus

$$\left| \Pr_{s \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n} [D(G'(s)) = 1] - \Pr_{r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell(n-1)+1}} [D(r) = 1] \right| \leqslant \frac{\varepsilon_0(n) + \varepsilon_1(n)}{2}$$

which finish the proof that G' is a PRG.

## Problem 5

#### Part A

f' is an OWF.

FSOC we assume PPT adversary  $\mathcal{A}'$  breaks f' as OWF, which means that

$$\Pr_{x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n} \left[ \mathcal{A}'(f(x) || f(f(x))) \to x' : f(x) || f(f(x)) = f(x') || f(f(x')) \right] \geqslant \frac{1}{\text{poly}(n)}$$

then we can construct adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  which breaks f as OWF: on input y, call  $\mathcal{A}'$  with input y||f(y), and output whatever  $\mathcal{A}'$  outputs. It's clear that  $\mathcal{A}$  runs in poly-time, and

$$\Pr_{x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n} \left[ \mathcal{A}(f(x)) \to x' : f(x) = f(x') \right] \geqslant \frac{1}{\text{poly}(n)}$$

which indicates that f is not an OWF. A contradiction.

#### Part B

f' may not be an OWF.

Assume that there is a length-perserving OWF h, we construct f as  $f(x_1||x_2) = 0^n h(x_1)$  where  $|x_1| = |x_2| = n$ . First we prove briefly that f is also a length-perserving OWF.

FSOC PPT adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  breaks f as OWF, which on input  $0^n || h(x_1)$  outputs  $x_1' || x_2'$  such that  $0^n || h(x_1') = 0^n || h(x_1)$ , with probability at least  $\frac{1}{\text{poly}(n)}$ . Then an adversary for h can be built, which simply concatenate  $0^n$  before its input and then call  $\mathcal{A}$ , and outputs the first half of  $\mathcal{A}$ 's output.

By the construction of f',  $f'(x_1||x_2) = x_1||(x_2 \oplus h(x_1))$ . An adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ , with  $\mathcal{A}(y_1||y_2) = y_1||(y_2 \oplus h(y_1))$ , runs in poly-time and breaks f as OWF.

#### Part C

f' may not be an OWF.

Assume h is a length-perserving OWF, we construct f as

$$f(x_1||x_2) = \begin{cases} x_1||h(x_2), & x_1 \text{ starts with } 0\\ h(x_1)||x_2, & x_1 \text{ starts with } 1 \end{cases}$$

First we prove that f is also an OWF: with adversary  $\mathcal{A}'$  which breaks f, one can construct  $\mathcal{A}$ , on input y it calls  $\mathcal{A}'$  with input  $0^n || y$  and outputs the second half of the output of  $\mathcal{A}'$ . Then A breaks h as OWF, an contradiction.

Depending on the first bit of input, the output of  $f(x_1||x_2)$  must be in the form of either  $x_1||h(x_2)||h(\overline{x_1})||\overline{x_2}$  or  $h(x_1)||x_2||\overline{x_1}||h(\overline{x_2})$ , so an adversary can be constructed, which on input  $y_1||y_2||y_3||y_4$ , simply tries  $y_1||\overline{y_4}|$  and  $\overline{y_3}||y_2|$  as answers and outputs the correct one (if there is). So f' here is not a OWF.

#### Part D

f' is an OWF.

If f' is not an OWF, a.k.a. there exists adversary  $\mathcal{A}'$  such that

$$\Pr_{x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n} [\mathcal{A}'(f(G(x))) \to x' : f(G(x')) = f(G(x))] \geqslant \frac{1}{\text{poly}(n)}$$

We construct a PPT distinguisher  $\mathcal{D}$  that breaks G as PRG using  $\mathcal{A}'$ : on input r, it outputs  $\mathbb{1}[f(r) = f(G(\mathcal{A}'(f(r))))]$ . We use the notation  $U_n$  to indicate the uniform distribution over  $\{0,1\}^n$  in the following statement.

- When r is sampled from  $G(U_n)$ , by the assumption above  $\mathcal{D}$  outputs 1 with probability at least  $\frac{1}{\text{poly}(n)}$ .
- When r is sampled from  $U_{n+1}$ , recall that f is an OWF, so by definition, for the adversary  $G \circ \mathcal{A}'$ , we have

$$\Pr_{x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n+1}} [G \circ \mathcal{A}'(f(y)) \to y' : f(y') = f(y)] < \varepsilon(n)$$

which means that  $\mathcal{D}$  outputs 1 with probability less than  $\varepsilon(n)$ .

Thus  $\mathcal{D}$  breaks G as a PRG. An contradiction.

#### Part E

f' may not be an OWF.

Let f be the OWF mentioned in **Part B**  $(f(x_1||x_2) = 0^n||h(x_2))$  and G be the PRG in **Problem 2 Part A**  $(G(s) = G'(s_1, \dots, s_{n/2}))$ .

Now  $f \circ G \equiv f(G(0^n))$  is constant, and is obviously not OWF.

#### Part F

f' is an OWF.

FSOC assume that adversary A breaks f' as OWF, which is, for some polynomial p(n),

$$\Pr_{x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n} [\mathcal{A}(f(x||0^{\log n})) \to x' : f(x'||0^{\log n}) = f(x||0^{\log n})] \geqslant \frac{1}{p(n)}$$

We assert that A is also an adversary which breaks f as OWF:

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr_{x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n + \log n}}[\mathcal{A}(f(x)) \to x' : f(x') = f(x)] \\ & \geqslant \Pr_{x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n + \log n}}[\mathcal{A}(f(x)) \to x' : f(x') = f(x) \land \text{ last log } n \text{ bits of } x \text{ are all 0s}] \\ & = \Pr_{x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n}}[\mathcal{A}(f(x\|0^{\log n})) \to x' : f(x'\|0^{\log n}) = f(x\|0^{\log n})] \cdot \frac{1}{2^{\log n}} \\ & \geqslant \frac{1}{np(n)} \end{aligned}$$

np(n) is also a polynomial, so  $\mathcal{A}$  breaks f as OWF, which causes a contradiction.

#### Part G

#### Problem 6

#### Part A

$$\Pr[f(\hat{x}_1) = f(x_1), \dots, f(\hat{x}_m) = f(x_m)]$$

$$= \Pr[f(\hat{x}_1) = f(x_1), \dots, f(\hat{x}_m) = f(x_m) \land \text{ some } x_i \text{ is bad}]$$

$$+ \Pr[f(\hat{x}_1) = f(x_1), \dots, f(\hat{x}_m) = f(x_m) \land \text{ all } x_i \text{ are good}]$$

$$\leqslant \sum_{j=1}^{m} \Pr[f(\hat{x}_1) = f(x_1), \dots, f(\hat{x}_m) = f(x_m) \land x_j \text{ is bad}] + (\Pr[x \text{ is good}])^m$$

$$\leqslant \sum_{j=1}^{m} \Pr[f(\hat{x}_1) = f(x_1), \dots, f(\hat{x}_m) = f(x_m) | x_j \text{ is bad}] + (\Pr[x \text{ is good}])^m$$

$$\leqslant \sum_{j=1}^{m} m \cdot \Pr[\mathcal{A}(f(x_j)) \to x' : f(x') = f(x_j) | x_j \text{ is bad}] + (\Pr[x \text{ is good}])^m$$

$$\leqslant \frac{m^2}{r(n)} + (\Pr[x \text{ is good}])^m$$

# Part B

Let m(n) = 2nq(n) and  $r(n) = 2m(n)^2p(n)$ .

From **Part A** we know that

$$\frac{1}{p(n)} < \frac{m(n)^2}{r(n)} + (\Pr[x \text{ is good}])^m \Rightarrow (\Pr[x \text{ is good}])^m > \frac{1}{2p(n)}$$

which implies  $\Pr[x \text{ is good}] \geqslant 1 - \frac{1}{2q(n)}$  since otherwise we have

$$\frac{1}{2p(n)} < \left(\Pr[x \text{ is good}]\right)^m < \left(1 - \frac{1}{2q(n)}\right)^{2nq(n)} \approx \exp(-n)$$

RHS of this inequility is negligible while LHS is non-negligible, which shows a contradiction.

So 
$$\Pr[x \text{ is good}] \geqslant 1 - \frac{1}{2q(n)} \text{ and } \Pr[x \text{ is bad}] \leqslant \frac{1}{2q(n)}$$

## Part C

We show that  $\mathcal{A}_{\text{repeat}}$  breaks f as weak-OWF.

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}_{\text{repeat}}(f(x)) \to x' : f(x') \neq f(x)]$$

$$= \Pr[\mathcal{A}_{\text{repeat}}(f(x)) \to x' : f(x') \neq f(x) \land x \text{ is good}]$$

$$+ \Pr[\mathcal{A}_{\text{repeat}}(f(x)) \to x' : f(x') \neq f(x) \land x \text{ is bad}]$$

$$\leqslant \Pr[\mathcal{A}_{\text{repeat}}(f(x)) \to x' : f(x') \neq f(x) | x \text{ is good}] + \Pr[x \text{ is bad}]$$

$$\leqslant \left(1 - \frac{1}{r(n)}\right)^{n \cdot r(n)} + \frac{1}{2q(n)}$$

$$\approx \exp(-n) + \frac{1}{2q(n)}$$

$$< \frac{1}{q(n)}$$

which violates the definition (q(n)-weakness) of f.

So we have already finished the proof that f' is an OWF.