

The Cultural Impact of Joining the European Union on 2004 and 2007 Expansion Countries

ECON 378: Comparative Analysis of Legal Systems

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Abstract: The European Union (EU) has significantly expanded the number of its members with the potential of accepting more in the future. Two of the most historically significant expansions occurred in 2004 and 2007 with mostly former post-communist countries and transition economies. These EU enlargements unified the West and East after a period of Eastern isolation from the rest of Europe. Since then, the EU has also expanded its influence outside of the purely economic into the social, cultural, and political. With this shift into more holistic values and the goal to curate a national identity for Europe, do member states converge to the average value of the EU founding members? By using the staggered difference-in-difference method, I could create an average EU value for a variable and subtract the EU value from all of the values to see the difference. After analyzing p-values and coefficient values, this study concludes that convergence only occurs for tolerance toward racial minorities and immigrants.

JEL codes: D91, A13, Z13

Keywords: social convergence, social divergence, the European Union, 2004 member states, 2007 member states, EU founding members

Introduction

As the European Union (EU) solidifies its presence outside of purely economic causes, citizens question what effect this will have on their cultural values and national identity. EU membership is a marker of status among European countries because membership brings high intra-EU trade (Badinger & Breuss, 2003), enhanced general economic welfare (Martin, Velazquez, and Funck, 2001), social cohesion (Pardo 2005), human capital training (Prado 2005), and improved rates of productivity (Brada, Kutan, and Yigit, 2006). The convergence hypothesis itself could be the reason many former communist states in Eastern Europe view EU membership as a vital step in its transition to a market economy after the fall of communism (Siljak and Nagy, 2019). Beyond the initial association with economic development and growth, the EU has explicitly stated its hopes as an entity with greater socio-political influence in their “Atlas of European Values” which it publishes with new waves of the European Values Survey.

As the EU increasingly speaks of curating a rich European identity and integrating its member states, this paper explores to what extent countries that joined the European Union in 2004 and 2007 socially converge to the EU value, the average across founding members, for each variable. The 2004 member states are Poland, Czech Republic (Czechia), Slovak Republic (Slovakia), Cyprus, Malta, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Hungary, Slovenia. The 2007 member states are Bulgaria and Romania. These expansion countries were chosen in this study because they increased the cultural diversity of the EU by incorporating the East, after relative isolation due to communism, with West Europe.

When countries apply for membership, they are accepted as candidates until they meet the Copenhagen Criteria. The Copenhagen Criteria requires countries to meet the following requirements: stable institutions, human rights, rule of law, a functioning market economy, and an ability to capture the obligations of membership. By implementing policies to meet the Copenhagen Criteria, countries are preparing to adopt EU values but convergence does not occur for 2004 and 2007 countries until membership. I hypothesize a country's convergence toward EU values is an ongoing process that starts with the transition into a market economy then with meeting the Copenhagen Criteria and finally, membership. The transition into a

market economy after a communist system can be difficult to navigate because of the new shift in values. The Copenhagen Criteria ensured future members would have other features besides a market economy in common: stable institutions, democracy, human rights, rule of law etc. Convergence occurs after countries become members because of friendly proximity to founding members of the EU. Ultimately, the objective of this paper is to determine to what extent countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 socially converge. Do these new member states converge to a shared point because of membership and proximity to founding members?

Other social convergence studies on the EU have included trust in others and confidence in public services (Sarracino and Mikucka 2017), well-being and life satisfaction (Welsch and Bonn 2006), and social welfare systems (Attia and Berenger 2009) but they were limited in their analysis by not looking at the unification of the West and East angle to membership. This paper focuses on the effect EU membership has on convergence or divergence to EU values for 2004 and 2007 countries.

The EU is a self-described peace project founded on the principles of human dignity, human rights, freedom, democracy, equality, and the rule of law. The EU developed out of the economic, political, and societal ruination following WWII. The challenges and circumstances it faced then are much different than the ones it faces now. The 2004 and 2007 expansions stand out because they unify the West with the East after the fall of communism and their transitions into market economies. For post-Soviet countries in the 2004 and 2007 group, the existence of their market economy is only a few years longer than their membership to the EU. The constant evolution of the EU to reflect the changes in Europe leads to deeper integration that makes each expansion more involved than the next. The acceptance of countries coming from Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and Mediterranean challenged the EU socially, politically, and economically as a union. As the EU expanded its influence by accepting new candidates with a variety of histories and legacies around Europe, it began to take on a more involved role in the cultural and social values of its member states (Atlas of European Values 2022).

An alternative explanation to the findings of this paper is globalization (Dowrick and de Long, 2003). Dowrick and de Long (2003) argue convergence could happen with favorable

circumstances and institutions. The EU's Copenhagen Criteria as a barrier to entry exists in order to facilitate convergence in member states with these favorable circumstances. Where this paper and the Dowrick and de Long (2003) differ is the assertion that convergence occurs because of "a common mixed-economy market-oriented economic setup, and a commitment to cutting back on protectionist barriers and to an open world economy" since this is a claim about economic integration.

For my study, I used the staggered difference-in-difference method to test whether EU member states that joined in 2004 and 2007 socially converged to an EU average value after obtaining the treatment, EU membership. The EU average value was the maximum average value across the EU founding countries by year. I chose to base the EU average value on the EU founding members because the EU's values should be a reflection of their values since they collectively formed the EU with the purpose of unifying countries economically. As the EU changes, the founders are the best benchmark to compare convergence in new members to. After finding the average EU value, I subtracted the maximum average EU value from all of the values to find the value difference. The variables that were statistically significant were tolerance toward people of a different race and immigrant workers. The remaining variables were statistically insignificant, meaning it was unclear whether these results proved convergence or divergence to the EU value because of the treatment. This study can only prove that convergence occurs for the variables on tolerance toward racial minorities and immigrants. Therefore, the fears that countries have about losing their cultural values and national identity after joining the EU are not supported by these findings.

EU Background

Before a country becomes a member, they first have to apply and become candidates. The process to move from candidacy to membership is not linear for every country, some stay candidates for decades while others attain membership within a short period as candidates. The timeline for application turnaround and the road from candidacy to membership appears arbitrary but the process depends on a country's success in meeting the Copenhagen criteria.

While the application process has remained the same since its founding, membership and the level of EU involvement has changed from the economic focus of the EU's predecessor, the Economic Community (EC). The EC's purpose was to eliminate trade barriers through the creation of a single, common market with a common external trade policy (Gabel 2024). The legacy of the EC persists in the EU's commitment to the economic benefits it proposes for its member states. However, the European Union has expanded its scope beyond that of the EC.

The findings from my study determine that statistically significant convergence occurred for two values: tolerance toward people of a different race and immigrant workers. In testing for convergence in national pride and willingness to fight for their country, another measure for national pride, the results are statistically insignificant. Therefore, what is observed in the difference-in-difference for the difference between the maximum mean value for EU founding members and the total value for these two variables could be due to chance. The fear of losing their cultural and national identity for a unified, single European identity could cause countries to resist membership. Though the EU has an explicit social model, there is no evidence from this study that joining the EU drastically affects a country's willingness to fight and national pride. Neither convergence or divergence to the founding members' willingness to fight and national pride occurred using the staggered difference-in-difference method. Using the line graphs in the Appendix, we come to the same conclusion that countries do not significantly decrease their national pride and willingness to bear arms for their country after membership into the EU.

Data

To test my hypothesis, I use data from the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey waves. The WVS has a new survey every five years and the EVS has one every nine years. In theory, these surveys should have data for every European country from the last forty years. Unfortunately, coverage was severely limited for many countries and variables. Therefore, I had to forego some survey questions and interpolate data in between the waves to increase coverage.

The variables I chose asked participants about equality, traditional notions of family and/or motherhood, national pride, welfare, and generalized trust. For equality, there was a set of survey questions asking participants which groups they would not like to have as neighbors. After taking out the questions related to personality, the remainder corresponded with tolerance towards people of a different race, sexuality, and immigration status than the participants.

After equality, traditional notions of family and motherhood were next because of McGlynn's (2001) paper and the differences in the cultural approach to motherhood for the West and East. In her 2001 paper, McGlynn claims that the EU's ideology on family constructs a normative model of motherhood for women and assumes the existence of a strong maternal instinct across women regardless of their cultural values. McGlynn's observations, discussed in detail later, raise several questions on culture and motherhood. Are traditional notions of motherhood in the founding member states responsible? Anecdotal evidence suggests that women's emancipation in the West has created a more nuanced view of femininity and their ability to move outside of the domestic sphere (Beets, Schippers, and te Velde, 2011). Therefore, it is unlikely that the European Union bases its familial values on the societies accepting the tides of the contemporary feminist movement. Could it be the acceptance of Eastern European and Mediterranean countries into the EU to explain its stance on motherhood? In the East especially, feelings toward motherhood are more direct. Women need to become mothers in order to be fulfilled and carry out their legacy. However, life under communism normalized the working mother (Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln, 2020). It would follow that women in Eastern Europe would like to spend more time with their new family but they have not had the privilege to do so in the past. This coupled with anti-LGBTQ sentiment connects EU familial values with Eastern European values and their effect on policy (Mole, 2016).

The creation of a European national identity as one of the EU's long-term goals is met with some opposition from those against the EU using its resources to enact policies that expand its influence on the lives of European citizens. How enduring is national pride despite the perceived threat to cultural identity in members? The variables for national pride is the willingness to fight for their country and their level of pride in their nationality.

As opposed to measuring welfare in Europe using happiness or life satisfaction measures, I chose to observe public sentiment on a government's responsibility to care for its citizens. Welfare is a more complicated concept in the East than it is for the West given a collective history under communism. Therefore, this part of the study aims to see, on average, what kind of stance the East had on welfare and whether that changed after membership. Furthermore, this study also includes a variable on generalized trust. Supposing the East became more favorable to welfare after membership, their views on welfare and generalized trust converge with those of earlier EU member states and the founders.

Tests

I will be doing a staggered difference-in-difference with the 2004 and 2007 member states as the treated group. The staggered difference-in-difference method is used because there are multiple treatment times for EU membership though I am choosing to only focus on the 2004 and 2007 treatment times. It is preferable to use the staggered difference-in-difference method over a synthetic control because the EU has treated and non-treated units in Europe. Rather than creating a group without a control, use the non-EU countries that are already there.

My chosen controls are fertility rate, inflation rate, GDP per capita, maternal mortality rate, death rate, life expectancy, and the refugee population. Fertility rate, maternal mortality rate, life expectancy, and death rate control for differences in member states regarding the longevity of their population and their ability to maintain their population size. Maternal mortality rate and fertility rate relate to the traditional notions of motherhood and family because if a country is having mothers die during childbirth or has a low fertility rate, the notion of motherhood will be affected by these factors. Keeping in mind the EU's policy failures when it came to the recession and refugee crisis as suggested by Badinger (2018), my remaining controls were GDP per capita, inflation rate, and the refugee population of a country.

By first running a staggered difference-in-difference for the variable and the treated group, I see how a variable is affected pre and post-treatment into the EU. Then, to determine whether convergence/divergence occurred to/from EU values for the treatment group, I followed these

steps: (1) I took the mean for each variable in the founding member states, (2) found the max value from these averages, and (3) subtracted the maximum mean from the variable to find the difference between the EU founders and treatment group. The value from max EU value minus the value is referred to as the value difference. If the value difference decreases over time, convergence toward EU values occurs. If the value difference increases, the 2004 and 2007 expansion countries were diverging from the EU value. For each variable, I will first run a pretrends test and report the p-value for the null hypothesis that all pre-treatment are equal to 0. In my results section, I will be discussing the staggered difference-in-difference result from the variables created on the difference between the founding EU countries and the treatment countries.

Results

Tolerance and Equality

Tolerance toward people of other races should increase with membership and show convergence with the maximum mean value from founding members. Given that the EU requires countries to guarantee human rights for its populace as part of the Copenhagen Criteria, one could hypothesize that convergence occurs during candidacy. The figure below shows that the values begin to decrease around the -7 period to treatment but the noticeable change toward the EU value occurs after they become members.

The p-value for the pretrends test was 0.0119, meaning we can reject the null hypothesis that pretreatment is equal to 0. The statistical significance is further supported by a p-value of 0.003 for the average treatment effect on the treated group. Though the difference between the two treatment groups is only three years, their p-values suggest some differences in the timing of treatment. Countries treated in 2004 have a p-value of 0.01 and those treated in 2007 have a p-value of 0. Though these are both under the threshold of 0.05 and considered statistically significant, the 2007 group shows stronger evidence against the null hypothesis than the 2004 group.




Fig. 1 Value Difference for Tolerance Towards Other Races

The figure above is the result after taking the maximum mean value for tolerance in the EU founding members and subtracting it from the remaining values. The data for this variable is coded as 0 (Tolerant) and 1 (Intolerant). The closer a country's value for this measure is to 0, the more tolerant they are toward people of a different race. Since tolerance is a value of 0 and the EU is relatively more tolerant toward people of a different race, a negative coefficient from both treatment groups shows convergence. Since joining the EU, the 2004 and 2007 expansion countries have become more tolerant toward people of a different race.

The EVS and WVS surveys include two more tolerance measures relevant to equality: attitudes toward homosexuals and immigrant workers. The EU, as an organization, is accepting of both groups. Member and accession states feel an increased pressure to ensure equal rights and legal equality for their LGBTQ citizens (Mole, 2016). As for immigrant workers, one of the benefits of EU membership is the ability to have its citizens work in an EU country.

The p-value for the pretrends test was 0.0069, meaning we can reject the null hypothesis that all pre-treatment effects are equal to 0. Countries treated in 2004 have a p-value of 0.002 and those treated in 2007 have a p-value of 0.00. Since both of these p-values are below our threshold of 0.05, we can conclude our findings are statistically significant.

The negative coefficient for the 2004 group (-0.048) and the 2007 group (-0.05) point to convergence because the EU value is low compared to the new members. The decline in the graph shows that after becoming members, the 2004 and 2007 expansion countries became more tolerant toward immigrant workers.




Fig. 2 Value Difference for the Tolerance Toward Immigrant Workers

So far, the 2004 and 2007 countries have converged with the EU values on tolerance toward people of a different race and immigrant workers. For homosexuality, there is no statistically significant effect on tolerance due to membership. With a p-value of 0.212, we fail to reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there is no convincing evidence to reject in favor of the

alternative. The plot is also lack-luster in terms of conveying any further information. There is a spike shortly after membership in the figure below which is difficult to explain without statistically significant results. Rather than disqualifying the hypothesis of membership having a potential effect on homosexuality, I could look into using a different set of controls on hate crimes against homosexuals and anti-LGBT sentiment among Europeans from 2004 and 2007 member states.

The coefficient is positive for the 2004 member states, suggesting divergence from the EU value. As for 2007, the coefficient is negative suggesting potential convergence. Regardless, the p-values for both of these are too high to fail to reject the null hypothesis.




Fig. 3 Value Difference for the Tolerance Toward Homosexuality

Traditional Notions of Family

McGlynn (2001) describes how the EU has reinforced a stagnant view of gender roles in families and traditional notions of motherhood in EU law to a point where this ideology limits the potential of the EU's laws to create change. Since McGlynn's paper was published in 2001, the EU has worked towards equality for same-sex couples by including sexual orientation in the equalities agenda through Article 19 of Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Mole, 2016). However, the stance the EU takes on parental leave by excluding men reinforces the "idealized vision of motherhoods that is dominant" (McGlynn 2001). The figure below on the value difference between the maximum average value for founding members and the value does not describe any definitive phenomenon. Given a p-value of 0.902 for the 2004 group and 0.622 for the 2007 group in the average treatment effect by group, the findings are not statistically significant even with controls. Perhaps cultural values do not explain why the EU has endorsed a traditional model of family and motherhood. An alternative explanation for the EU's traditional values is its anxiety about the aging European population for the future of Europe.




Fig 4. Value Difference for the Sentiment that Women are Only Fulfilled by Becoming Mothers

National Pride

Though the EU started as an economic union, its influence has expanded beyond into sociopolitical and cultural spheres. The question of national pride and an individual's willingness to fight for their country depends on their family, previous experiences, and the strength of the country's national identity. For example, Malta. They have historically had a strong national identity yet Abela's (2006) paper found that Malta shifted from a strong traditional national identity to a regional sense of belonging, European and Mediterranean. As people shift from a traditional national identity to a regional sense of belonging, will they converge toward whatever willingness the founding members have?

The pretend test comes back with a p-value of 0.0119 which meets the threshold of 0.05 to reject the null hypothesis. However, the p-value for the average treatment effect of the 2004 treated group has a statistically insignificant p value of 0.655 and 0.066 for the 2007 group. Without statistically significant results, the null hypothesis can not be rejected and therefore, membership may or may not have an effect on national identity through the willingness to fight for their country.




Fig. 5 Value Difference in Willingness to Fight for Country

Similarly, pride in nationality passes the pretrends test by having a p-value of 0.00 yet on the average treatment effect on treated front, it is also statistically insignificant. Regarding my theory that countries converge after joining the EU to the values of the founding states, I find that these two measures do not contribute using a difference-in-difference method because of the lack of statistical significance.




Fig. 6 Value Difference in Pride

Welfare

The variable for welfare is whether Europeans feel it is a government's responsibility to care for the wellness of its residents. I hypothesized that once a country joins the EU, especially if it comes from a communist background, it will view welfare with distrust. In turn, that would show divergence from the EU value.

In the pretrends test, we were able to reject the null because the p-value was 0.00. However, the average treatment effect on treated was statistically insignificant because the p-values for the 2004 and 2007 group were 0.496 and 0.051 respectively. The coefficients are positive for both 2004 and 2007 groups, indicating that if the results were statistically significant, there would be divergence. Given that the p-values are not statistically significant, I can not reject the null hypothesis in favor of an alternative hypothesis. If I could treat my results as significant, the figure would support my hypothesis that communist countries view welfare negatively. This

negative view of welfare would contribute to the opinion that governments do not have an obligation to ensure welfare for their citizens.




Fig. 7 Value Difference in Welfare over Government Responsibility

Generalized Trust

In the pretrends test, we fail to reject the null because the p-value is 0.6545. The findings are unusual because the average treatment effect on treated is statistically insignificant for the 2004 group but not for the 2007 group. The p-value for the 2004 group using the average treatment effect by group is 0.306. On the other hand, the p-value for the average treatment effect for Bulgaria and Romania (2007 countries) is 0.001 which is statistically significant. The coefficient is positive for the 2004 group which would point to divergence if the results were statistically significant. However, since the 2007 countries have statistically significant results, we see that the negative coefficient points to convergence.




Fig. 8 Value Differences in Generalized Trust

Overall, tolerance toward another race and immigrant workers were the only two statistically significant findings. If there had been consistent coverage for all of the countries and years, it is possible the results would have been more reliable.

Limitations

There were two limitations in this study that can be attributed to issues with data coverage in the EVS and WVS surveys. As mentioned before, coverage across waves and variables was limited where some questions were asked during some years and not others or some questions were never asked for countries. Interpolating data for years in between the waves was the only way to have enough data to work with using the staggered difference-in-difference method. Due to some questions never being asked for some countries, I had to omit some important variables related to sustainability, immigration, linguistic diversity, and religious values from this study. Though the values that are included in this study are important, the results could have been more comprehensive of social values had the data been available or collected.

Implications and Conclusion

One of the biggest shocks to the European Union was Great Britain leaving the EU, also known as Brexit in the media. Badinger (2018) claims Brexit occurred because of the EU's policy failures during the 2008 economic crisis and the refugee crisis. A delayed response time to shocks, creating solutions that favor the founding members, and an absence of coherent policy during these crises prompted Brexit (Badinger 2018). Though Brexit did not occur because Great Britain feared for its national identity and cultural values, it is an excellent example of what happens when a political entity tries to do too much. The EU within the last few decades has expanded its influence geographically, politically, and socially. If they are unable to balance their expansion and responsibilities to their members during times when policy is needed, similar retaliations to Brexit are predicted to occur.

The current candidate states are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Turkey, and Ukraine with Kosovo as an applicant state. If these countries ever become members of the European Union, their presence and the expansion of the EU's influence will aid in the EU's mission to create a national identity. Whether or not social convergence to EU values will become stronger with more members depends on economic, social, political, and democratic events in the years to come. As of now, my study concludes that there is no statistically significant convergence or divergence except for tolerance toward racial minorities and immigrants. Therefore, candidate countries and applicants can ease their potential fears over losing their national identities and cultural values with EU membership.

I used the staggered difference-in-difference method because I had multiple treatment times and I wanted to see whether treatment affected the cultural values and national identity of the 2004 and 2007 expansion countries. My hypothesis was that a country's convergence toward EU values is an ongoing process that starts with the transition into a market economy then with meeting the Copenhagen Criteria and finally, membership. I chose these three benchmarks because they are specific to the experience of most of the 2004 and 2007 expansion countries. Those that came from post-communist countries needed to form a market economy, an arduous process that differs country to country. Part of meeting the Copenhagen Criteria is having a market economy

along with several other political, democratic, and social requirements. This ensures that members have more than just an economy in common. Ultimately, the expectation was that convergence occurred after countries became members and had increased interaction with the founding members of the EU. My research question was to determine to what extent countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 socially converge.

By using the staggered difference-in-difference method, I could measure the average treatment effect on the treated group for pre trends and statistical significance. Most of the variables passed the pretends test but only a few of the variables were statistically significant. For both the 2004 and 2007 expansion countries, the variables for tolerance toward people of a different race and immigrant workers showed statistical significance. With EU membership, convergence occurred toward the EU value of tolerance for these two groups. My study does not determine whether the remaining variables converge or diverge from the average EU value but it does set some of these fears to ease since the findings were not statistically significant. If cultural change occurs in a member state, there are other explanations for this phenomenon or this study could be revised to include better controls.

Appendix

Robustness Checks

To test for robustness, I went through each variable again and created a line graph with the countries in the 2004 and 2007 groups to see whether there is a decrease in their scores after membership.

Tolerance and Equality




Fig. 9 Individual Country Scores Compared to the EU Value for Tolerance Toward Different Races Variable




Fig. 10 Individual Country Scores Compared to the EU Value for Tolerance Toward Immigrant Workers




Fig. 11 Individual Country Scores Compared to the EU Value for Tolerance Toward Homosexuals

The graphs show the oddities in the data points for these surveys and the interpolated data more clearly than the staggered difference-in-difference method does. Though there was no statistically significant effect for tolerance toward homosexuals, the countries are moving toward a 0 measure (tolerant) but there is still quite a gap between the most tolerant treated country and the maximum average value across the founding members. Founding members are more tolerant toward homosexuals, people of a different race, and immigrant workers than 2004 and 2007 members. However, the scores for all of these variables decrease for a number of treated countries though there are some unusual spikes that warrant greater study.

Traditional Notions of Motherhood

The variable on sentiment toward women only being fulfilled when they are in maternal roles was too important to omit from the study even with limited coverage because I could still look at the effect of EU policy and law from McGlynn's (2001) paper up until 2008. Some countries

had begun to move down toward the EU value for this variable. Though the EU reinforced traditional notions of motherhood, this ideology was still stronger in 2004 and 2007 members. If data collection ever resumed, this would be an important variable to study especially with the new developments to the feminist movement in the 2004, 2007, and 2013 member states.




Fig. 12 Individual Country Scores Compared to the EU Value for Whether Women Can Only be Fulfilled in Life by Becoming Mothers

National Pride

There is no significant decrease in an individual's pride over their nationality or willingness to fight for their country. Therefore, the slight decrease observed in the data below could be attributed to other influences and cultural changes not related to EU membership.




Fig. 13 Individual Country Scores Compared to the EU Value for the Willingness to Fight Variable




Fig. 14 Individual Country Scores Compared to the EU Value for the “Proud of Nationality” Variable

Welfare




Fig. 15 Individual Country Scores Compared to the EU Value for the “Government Responsibility is Welfare of its People” Variable

Perspectives on welfare and government responsibility vary across the board with 2004 and 2007 expansion countries. There is no discernible decrease or increase in the sentiment that coincides with the EU value.

Generalized Trust

For the variable on generalized trust, an answer of 1 indicates trust towards most people while an answer of 2 indicates mistrust. The lower a line is on the y-axis, the more trusting the country is. The EU value shows that by 2020, the founding members of the EU are more trusting than the 2004 and 2007 expansion countries. The countries are becoming more trusting but this appears to be a slow process.




Fig. 16 Individual Country Scores Compared to the EU Value for Generalized Trust Variable

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