
Hacking Piazza

or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love TOS (violations)

Piazza



Tools

- Microsoft Windows 7 x64 SP1 (v. 6.1.7601)
- Oracle VM Virtual Box Manager (v.4.2.10 r84104)
 - A virtualization software package developed by Sun Microsystems.
- Kali Linux (kali-linux-1.0.1-amd64)
 - A distribution based on the Debian GNU/ Linux distribution aimed at digital forensics and penetration testing use.
- Notepad++ (v.5.9.8-UNICODE)
 - A free source code editor which supports several programming languages
- puTTY (v.0.62)
 - A free implementation of Telnet and SSH for Windows and Unix platforms, along with an xterm terminal emulator.

- Google Chrome Web Browser (v. 26.0.1410.43 m)
 - Chrome Developers Tools
 - Provide web developers deep access into the internals of the browser and their web application.
- Mozilla Firefox Web Browser (19.02-R)
 - Firebug (v.1.11.2)
 - Developer toolkit for Mozilla Firefox.
 - Tamper Data (v.11.0.1)
 - A tool to view and modify HTTP/HTTPS headers and post parameters.
 - HttpRequester (v.1.0.4)
 - A tool for easily making HTTP requests, viewing the responses, replaying and keeping a history of transactions.
- Misc. Homebrew Scripts & Programs

Web Application Review

- Client Side
 - Renders HTML documents served by Piazza
 - Interprets CSS for styling
 - Executes JavaScript
 - dynamic content generation
 - Client-side validation
 - Primary functionality encapsulated within dashboardXXXX.js
 - Dispatches XMLHttpRequests (XHR) for asynchronous communication

- Server Side
 - Deliver CSS
 - Deliver JavaScript
 - Generates and serves
 HTML documents
 - Dynamically generated from:
 - Internal state of the system
 - User Input
 - Communicated via XHR

Web Server

- Recon info available in response headers and network traffic
- This may be just one of many, or a load balancer
- Northeastern U.S.A.
- Amazon EC2
 - IP: 54.243.185.105 (at the time)
- nginx/1.2.1.16
 - HTTP and reverse proxy server, as well as a mail proxy server.
 - Used by 12.96% busiest sites in April 2013[1]
- Phusion Passenger (mod_rails/ mod_rack) 3.0.7

API Server

- Recon info available in response headers and network traffic
- Handles API requests
- Northeastern U.S.A.
- Amazon EC2
 - IP: 54.243.185.105 (at the time)
 - CloudFront sitting on top
- nginx/1.2.1.1345
- Jetty/v.?.?.?
 - Web server and javax.servlet container
 - support for SPDY, Web Sockets, OSGi, JMX, JNDI, JASPI, AJP and many other integrations.

Background

- Initially interested in performing unauthorized actions
 - Double-voting, impersonating other users
- Looked at circumventing client-side validation
 - Trivial!
 - Digging through client-side JavaScript and analyzing network traffic allowed me to analyze and enumerate the underlying REST API
- Why not just send forged requests directly to the API?

REST API

- Allow the user to communicate with the system by way of HTTP GET/POST requests
- Bi-Directional Communication
 - Request and Post parameters: Pass data in
 - Response body: Pass data out
- Traditionally, requests and responses are engineered around the transfer of resource representations to allow the client to transition between states
- However, with XHR requests occurring in the background, the system is in a constant state of flux

REST API

URL Format

http://piazza.com/logic/api?method=[TYPE]&aid=[HASH]

- Content
 - Content.create , Content.get, Content.vote , Content.answer ...
- Network
 - Network.create , Network.get_all_users , Network.update ...
- User
 - User.get_user_profile , User.update_user_profile , User.update ...

REST API

URL Format

http://piazza.com/logic/api?method=[TYPE]&aid=[HASH]

Generated as follows (JavaScript):

```
(new Date()).getTime().toString(36) \
+Math.round(Math.random()*1679616).toString(36);
```

- Base 36 Encoding [a-z,0-9]
- Concatenation of:
 - Current UNIX Epoch timestamp (milliseconds elapsed since 1 Jan, 1970 UTC)
 - Nonce of range: [0-1679616)

POST data (JSON) {"method":"[type]","params":{"param1":"value1",...}}

REST API

POST Data

- Contained in the HTTP body
- JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) encoding
- Format {"method":"[type]","params":{"param1":"value1", "param2":"value2",...}}
- Examples:
 - {"method":"content.get","params":{"cid":"hf93123l4be6ei","nid":"hf4zsf2w7jv5ri"}}
 - {"method":"network.get_users","params":{"ids": ["gxm5422kbqz4yi"],"nid":"hf4zsf5ri"}}
 - {"method":"user.get_user_profile","params":
 {"nid":"hf41234w7jv5ri","uid":"hf425we5d6r2fu","preview_profile":false,"campaign _id":"click-selfProfileFromTopbar"}}:


REST API

- Response Data
 - Contained in the HTTP response body
 - JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) encoding
 - Format {"method":"[type]","params":{"param1":"value1", "param2":"value2", ...}}
 - Examples:
 - Content.edit {"result":"hfjqv458fxb4k9","error":null,"aid":"hfjqvok0eol3"}
 - Network.get_users
 {"result":[{"id":"hf5c11237zv2qd","admin":false,"name":"Dumme Dave
 Aunt","role":"student","us":false,"facebook_id":null,"photo":null},
 {"id":"hf5568w8zzp32m","admin":false,"name":"Dumme Dave
 Sister","role":"","us":false,"facebook_id":"123","photo":null}],"error":null,"aid":"hfjquoy427db"
 }
 }
 - User.update_user_profile {"result":"OK","error":null,"aid":"hfjqvu7rmf1c"}

REST API

- Four primary pieces of meta-data used to communicate with the API
 - Nonce? (aid)
 - Sent with ever request
 - Generated as discussed earlier
 - Unsure of actual use; re-using/random values does not seem to have an affect
 - User ID (uid)
 - Used to identify the user
 - · Generated similar to aid
 - Instead of random value appended to the date, it is sequential number (proven through experimentation)

- Network ID (nid)
 - Used to identify a network (course)
 - Generated similar to aid
 - Could not determine if the second half of the hash is random or sequential
- Content ID (cid)
 - Sent with ever request
 - Generated similar to aid



Now that we have discussed how the API is implemented

How can we abuse it?



 Piazza determines authorization primarily through the use of Session Keys

- Piazza determines authorization primarily through the use of Session Keys
 - Recall: HTTP is a state-less protocol
 - Each authenticated user has a *session key* associated with them
 - Server keeps a copy; Client keeps another copy
 - Communicated via a cookie over top of an established https connection
 - Whenever authorization to perform an action (eg. view a network, comment on a post) is checked, the user is authenticated using the session key
 - A Session key is sent with each HTTP request

• Why not just send the uid of the logged in user with each request?


Why not just send the uid of the logged in user with each request?

Simple
Never Trust the User.

If a malicious user wanted to perform an action they were not authorized to, they could simply substitute the *uid* of a user known to have that level of authorization.

Vulnerability?

- Session Keys over a week old appear to be still valid
 - After logging out
 - After closing the web browser
 - After client-machine restarts
- Hypothesis: Session keys are not being destroyed properly server-side
- Conclusion: Something is amiss.... Not enough time to fully investigate.



What else can we do?



• Gmail ignores periods in the username

- Gmail ignores periods in the username
 - ace@gmail.com
 - a.ce@gmail.com
 - •ac.e@gmail.com
 - a.c.e@gmail.com
 - a.c.e.@gmail.com
 - a.c.e..@gmail.com
 - •a.c.e...@gmail.com

- ace...@gmail.com
- a.ce...@gmail.com
- •ac.e...@gmail.com
- •a.c.e...@gmail.com
- a.c.e....@gmail.com
- a.c.e....@gmail.com
- a.c.e.....@gmail.com

- Gmail ignores periods in the username
 - ace@gmail.com
 - a.ce@gmail.com
 - •ac.e@gmail.com
 - a.c.e@gmail.com
 - •a.c.e.@gmail.com
 - •a.c.e..@gmail.com
 - •a.c.e...@gmail.com

- ace...@gmail.com
- a.ce...@gmail.com
- •ac.e...@gmail.com
- a.c.e...@gmail.com
- •a.c.e....@gmail.com
- •a.c.e.....@gmail.com
- a.c.e.....@gmail.com

Piazza does not!

- What does this mean?
 - •We can create a tonne of Piazza accounts with only one (maybe legit?) email account!

- What does this mean?
 - •We can create a tonne of Piazza accounts with only one (maybe legit?) email account!
- But won't I still have to create each Piazza account individually?
 - Luckily for us, Piazza makes it easy to create multiple accounts; provided we have unique emails to feed it (or at least, what Piazza thinks are unique emails)

General Settings

Customize

Q&A

Manage

Enrollment

Have all of your students been enrolled yet? Has each activated his/her account? You can always re-send the welcome emails to students who have not yet activated their

Piazza accounts.

Enroll Students Copy and paste email addresses in any format. 4 Once added, they receive a Welcome email with a link to activate their Piazza account. Enable Add/Drop ?? Add Students or upload a file Student Roster: ..out of 2052 (estimated) Edit The following students are enrolled in your class. 2040 students have not activated their accounts. Resend activation email? 4 Those who've activated their accounts will have names alongside their email addresses. t.hi.si.sa.d.umm.e@gmail.com th.i.s.is.adu.m.m.e@gmail.com t.his.is.a.d.um.m.e@gmail.com thi.si.s.ad.u.mme@gmail.com th.is.isa.du.mm.e@gmail.com th.i.s.i.s.adum.me@gmail.com thi.s.is.adu.m.m.e@gmail.com t.hi.s.is.a.d.um.me@gmail.com

Create

Groups

Customize

Course Page

t.hi.s.i.s.a.du.m.m.e@gmail.com

General Settings

Customize Q&A Manage Enrollment Create Groups Customize Course Page

Have all of your students been enrolled yet? Has each activated his/her account? You can always re-send the welcome emails to students who have not yet activated their Piazza accounts.

Enroll Students	
Copy and paste email addresses in any format. L Once added, they receive a Welcome email with a link to activate their Piazza accou Enable Add/Drop 2	int.
Add Students or upload a file	
Student Roster:	.out of 2052 (estimated) Edit
	2052 enrolled
The following students are enrolled in your class. 2040 students have not activated their accounts. Resend activation emails. Those who've activated their accounts will have names alongside their email address.	
t.hi.si.sa.d.umm.e@gmail.com	
th.i.s.is.adu.m.m.e@gmail.com	
t.his.is.a.d.um.m.e@gmail.com	
thi.si.s.ad.u.mme@gmail.com	
th.is.isa.du.mm.e@gmail.com	
th.i.s.i.s.adum.me@gmail.com	
thi.s.is.adu.m.m.e@gmail.com	
t.hi.s.is.a.d.um.me@gmail.com	
t.hi.s.i.s.a.du.m.m.e@gmail.com	

Have all of your students been enrolled yet? Has each activated his/her account? You can always re-send the welcome emails to students who have not yet activated their Piazza accounts. Customize Q&A

General Settings

Enroll Students

Manage Enrollment Create Groups Customize Course Page

Copy and paste email addresses in any format. L Once added, they receive a Welcome email with a link to activate their Piazza accoun Enable Add/Drop	t.
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The following students are enrolled in your class. 2040 students have not activated their accounts. Resend activation email L. Those who've activated their accounts will have names alongside their email address	
t.hi.si.sa.d.umm.e@gmail.com	
th.i.s.is.adu.m.m.e@gmail.com	
t.his.is.a.d.um.m.e@gmail.com	
thi.si.s.ad.u.mme@gmail.com	
th.is.isa.du.mm.e@gmail.com	
th.i.s.i.s.adum.me@gmail.com	
thi.s.is.adu.m.m.e@gmail.com	
t.hi.s.is.a.d.um.me@gmail.com	
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Now that we have all these Smurf Accounts, what can we do with them?

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Some very interesting things....



Merging Users

Piazza allows for users to merge two accounts

Merging Users

- Piazza allows for users to merge two accounts
 - Can be done during account registration OR from an already-existing account
 - All that is required is the email address of the account to be merged with
 - The account that the merge is initiated from becomes the dominate account

Domination

Domination

- ALICE inherits almost all of BOBs attributes
 - Profile Picture
 - Networks
 - BOB is effectively kicked out of his networks
 - Admin privileges in networks
 - Content submission list
 - A lot of other attributes used by Piazza behind the scenes

Domination

- ALICE inherits almost all of BOBs attributes
 - Profile Picture
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- What ALICE does not inherit from BOB
 - User ID (uid)
 - Actual content postings
 - Statistics
 - Login Credentials
 - BOB will inherit ALICE's
 - Facebook Attributes

Domination

Suppose user **ALICE** initiates a merge with **BOB**


• End Result?

Domination

- End Result? BOB is now essentially a zombie account.
 - Account and uid is retained on the system BUT...

Domination

- End Result? BOB is now essentially a zombie account.
 - Account and uid is retained on the system BUT...
 - User is essentially locked out
 - Attempts to login with either ALICE's or BOB's credentials will sign into ALICE's account.
 - Could not find a way to undo merges
 - But we can still drop classes, effectively removing access to that network for both ALICE and BOB (denial of service)



• Great, I can lock myself out of my own account just like Dave the Dummy...

So What?

 Gaining entrance into networks without the admin's consent


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 - Recall: The merged account inherits all the networks
 - Thus, you can get users with new uid's into a network you were already in

- Gaining entrance into networks without the admin's consent
 - Recall: The merged account inherits all the networks
 - Thus, you can get users with new uid's into a network you were already in
- Not only that, but because the merged user has a new uid, so they can now replay all the activities of the first user (eg. voting again in polls)

BUT WAIT.... THERE'S MORE!!!

• When merging, we neglected the details about how the merge is confirmed by the other party.


Recall: ALICE initiates a merge with BOB by providing his email address associated with his Piazza account.




• When merging, we neglected the details about how the merge is confirmed by the other party.

Recall: ALICE initiates a merge with BOB by providing his email address associated with his Piazza account.

 BOB receives an email informing him of a merge request



- A link is provided that will bring BOB to a web page with the option to
 - Accept
 - Decline
 - Report to Piazza this was a bad request
- No, authentication required. Just knowledge of the URL



How is this merge request link generated? https://piazza.com/verify_email/ hf5cxrptw2a1vm/hf6rag7dikg5lb?preferred=yes

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ALICEs uid

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https://piazza.com/verify_email/
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ALICEs uid
HASH code

ALICEs uid

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
HASH code

Status

Accept
How is this merge request link generated?

https://piazza.com/verify_email/
hf5cxrptw2a1vm/hf6rag7dikg5lb?verify=yes

ALICES vid HASH code Status



Can Alice (the adversary) predict this URL?

```
https://piazza.com/verify_email/
hf5cxrptw2a1vm/hf6rag7dikg5lb?verify=yes

ALICEs uid HASH code Status
```

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
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hf6rag7d ikg5lb

Can Alice (the adversary) predict this URL?



- Base 36 Encoding [a-z,0-9]
- Entropy: $36^8 \Rightarrow O(2^{41}) \Rightarrow 41$ bits
- **UNIX** Epoch timestamp (milliseconds elapsed since 1 Jan, 1970 UTC)
- Predictable?
 - Ad-Hoc experimentation allowed me to narrow this down to a 1 second window
- Effective Entropy

$$O(2^{10}) => 10 \text{ bits } \bigcirc$$



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- Base 36 Encoding [a-z,0-9]
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- 32-bit nonce
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 - Maybe...
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Can Alice (the adversary) predict this URL?

https://piazza.com/verify_email/ hf5cxrptw2a1vm/hf6rag7dikg5lb?verify=yes **ALICE**s uid HASH code Status

hf6rag7d

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~ 42 bits Total Entropy



Miscalculations & Gross Oversights

 Brute Forcing a remote system is NOT the same as brute forcing hashes offline

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 - HTTP Requests take time... can't throw a GPU at it.
 - DOS mitigations
 - Detection!
 - Time to complete (being very generous)

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 - HTTP Requests take time... can't throw a GPU at it.
 - DOS mitigations
 - Detection!
 - Time to complete (being very generous)
 - (to hit every one)
 - (to have a reasonable chance of success)

All hope is not lost

Perhaps knowing the time the request was generated will make the nonce more predictable?

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 - Poor nonce generation by Piazza developers?
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- Perhaps knowing the time the request was generated will make the nonce more predictable?
 - Poor nonce generation by Piazza developers?
 - Weakness in Java Random API implementation?
- Perhaps the nonce is not really random at all, or is at least influenced by other factors
 - » uid (sender and receiver), nid, aid
 - Multiple merge requests to/from same parties will result in identical nonce values
 - More research is needed regarding nonce generation

All hope is not lost (Part II)

Why just focus on the hash code? What if we could tamper with how the merge request is delivered?

All hope is not lost (Part II)

- Why just focus on the hash code? What if we could tamper with how the merge request is delivered?
- Piazza uses JavaMail to deliver it's emails

```
DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-shal; c=nofws; d=piazza.com; h=from:to
        :subject:mime-version:content-type; q=dns; s=smtpapi; b=WWyHctM3
        mA3dgoNNH17NDa+S0Aq8XuqVhYKHPs2bAUfZm9NjdA1o9978Xp7bLaSd3TeA7bdb
        HwHmb52WZU0+U3Zw4PhrMJ8cr0BUTydNaqFa56iKEU2GhQadRMiFJhUKEJuHjYzk
        rGD5o/HPuLPPG1Gz2RxFayDRoFthAhaQPKY=
Received: by 10.36.109.179 with SMTP id mf48.26340.5169ECEA5
        Sat, 13 Apr 2013 23:40:26 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from smtp.sendgrid.net (ec2-50-19-144-23.compute-1.amazonaws.com [50.19.144.23])
        by mi20 (SG) with ESMTP id 5169ece9.be6.10ae97
        for <the.l.i.z.ard.kingami@gmail.com>; Sat, 13 Apr 2013 18:40:25 -0500 (CST)
Date: Sat, 13 Apr 2013 23:40:24 +0000 (UTC)
From: Piazza Team <no-reply@piazza.com>
To: the.l.i.z.ard.kingami@gmail.com
Message-ID: <2035347102.2061.1365896425092.JavaMail.ec2-user@appserver03>
Subject: Confirm Your Email Address for Piazza
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
        boundary="---= Part 2059 904220434.1365896424980"
X-SG-EID:
qBvDszCdXxEIaeo111AFw8eTRGvPi5zYMD32tZZX+MuZbu1xNi3YwI4F6MttFBjCEMkuE8mTzWvfNB2W/VsKUtFcupBiCaFKfLzW64ERsK/zCANV5391js9cYXSYssuS
YCSCLUdqUx+4NAEfJq90/A==
----= Part 2059 904220434.1365896424980
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Hello!
We received a request to merge the.l.i.z.ard.kingami@gmail.com to your mbclark@ucalgary.ca account on Piazza.
To confirm this request, follow this link: https://piazza.com/verify email/qxbbchjnaoq4pb/hfhfqpu45zo2je?preferred=no
If you did not send this request, you can safely ignore it. Contact us at team@piazza.com or 1-800-818-4124 if you need help.
Thanks,
The Piazza Team
```

All hope is not lost (Part II)

- Why just focus on the hash code? What if we could tamper with how the merge request is delivered?
- Piazza uses JavaMail to deliver it's email
 - Attempts to trick the service into delivering to multiple recipients failed
 - target@gmail.com; evil@gmail.com
 - target@gmail.com, evil@gmail.com
 - Functionality not a part of JavaMail
 - No CVEs found for allowing this

Merging Accounts

Assuming we could somehow abuse our knowledge of a user's email address...

...how would one expect to find out the email address of other users?



During analysis of the client-side
 JavaScript code two interesting objects
 sitting in the DOM were discovered

- During analysis of the client-side javascript code two interesting objects sitting in the DOM were discovered
 - PA.user
 - Local cache of user information
 - Populated from the response to an API call
 - Cache is used to minimize network traffic

```
Elements
           Resources
                     Network
                               Sources
                                         Timeline
                                                  Profiles
                                                           Audits
                                                                   Console
> PA.user
  ▼ Object {networks: Array[2], sid: "hfjqvp7qfxb4k9", new_questions: Object, last_network: "hf4zsf2w7jv5ri", last_content: Object...} [3]
      activated: 1365245862603
    ▶ can_admin: Object
      can_anonymize: false
    ▶ config: Object
      email: "t.h.is.isadu.m.m.e@gmail.com"
    ▶ emails: Array[3]
    ▶ facebook: Object
      facebook_id: undefined
     feed_prefetch: null
     id: "hf5cxwe5d6r2fu"
     is_admin: false
      is_public: false
    ▶ last_content: Object
     last_network: "hf4zsf2w7jv5ri"
      name: "Dumme Daves Uncle"
    ▶ networks: Array[2]
    ▶ new_questions: Object
      photo: "1366036651_35.png"
      photo_original: ""
    ▶ profile: Object
     sid: "hfjqvp7qfxb4k9"
    ▶ __proto__: Object
> I
```

The more interesting of the two DOM objects

- PA.Users[uid]
 - Local cache of other users known to the logged-in user
 - *Known*: any other user who has posted something you have viewed, or your browser has rendered their username on the screen
 - Students are always known to their professors, and Professors to their Students
 - Similarly, is populated via a series of API calls
 - Network.get_users([uid],nid)

```
Console
 Elements
          Resources
                                        Timeline
                                                 Profiles
                                                          Audits
                     Network
                               Sources
> PA.users
  ▼ Object {hf4zt6r3xof536: Object, gxbbchjnaog4pb: Object, hf5cxwe5d6r2fu: Object, hf5cxzad7zv2qd: Object, hf5cy1w8zzp32m: Object} 🔢
    ▼ gxbbchjnaog4pb: Object
       admin: true
       admin permission: 15
       email: "mbclark@ucalgary.ca"
       facebook_id: null
       id: "gxbbchjnaog4pb"
       name: "Michael Clark"
       photo: "1327296898.png"
       role: "Professor"
       us: false
      ▶ __proto__: Object
    ▶ hf4zt6r3xof536: Object
    ▼ hf5cxwe5d6r2fu: Object
       id: "hf5cxwe5d6r2fu"
       name: "Dumme Daves Uncle"
       photo: "1366036651_35.png"
      ▶ __proto__: Object
    ▼ hf5cxzad7zv2qd: Object
       admin: false
       facebook_id: null
       id: "hf5cxzad7zv2qd"
       name: "Dumme Dave Aunt"
       photo: null
       role: "student"
       us: false
     ▶ proto : Object
    ▼ hf5cv1w8zzp32m: Object
       admin: false
       facebook id: "123456"
       id: "hf5cy1w8zzp32m"
       name: "Dumme Dave Sister"
       photo: null
       role: ""
       us: false
     ▶ __proto__: Object
    ▶ __proto__: Object
>
```

- However, you can make the API call directly to get user information
 - •Network.get_users([uid_array],nid)
- Furthermore, if you omit nid, the API will return successfully!!!
- What does this mean?
 - We can retrieve user info on ANY user, as long as we know their uid, regardless of if they are in our network

- Enumerating Users
 - In theory, we could enumerate every user on Piazza
 - In practice, we may only want to creep on our fellow classmates

Enumerating Users

- In theory, we could enumerate every user on Piazza
- In practice, we may only want to creep on our fellow classmates
- How?
 - Recall: The *nid* (which is common knowledge) is incorporates a timestamp.... So does the user id.
 - Also, uids are unique, in that the second half is sequential
 - Start making API calls based from when the class was created...
 - or better yet, if the instructor did a batch add, begin exploring from our *uid* upwards and downwards in value

• What else can we find out?

- What else can we find out?
 - Facebook user ids

```
Resources Network
                                                         Audits
                                                                 Console
 Elements
                              Sources
                                       Timeline
                                                 Profiles
> PA.users
  ▼ Object {hf4zt6r3xof536: Object, gxbbchjnaog4pb: Object, hf5cxwe5d6r2fu: Object, hf5cxzad7zv2qd: Object, hf5cy1w8zzp32m: Object} [3]
    ▼ gxbbchjnaog4pb: Object
       admin: true
       admin permission: 15
       email: "mbclark@ucalgary.ca"
       facebook_id: null
       id: "gxbbchjnaog4pb"
       name: "Michael Clark"
       photo: "1327296898.png"
       role: "Professor"
       us: false
     ▶ __proto__: Object
    ▶ hf4zt6r3xof536: Object
    ▼ hf5cxwe5d6r2fu: Object
       id: "hf5cxwe5d6r2fu"
       name: "Dumme Daves Uncle"
       photo: "1366036651 35.png"
     ▶ __proto__: Object
    ▼ hf5cxzad7zv2qd: Object
       admin: false
       facebook id: null
       id: "hf5cxzad7zv2qd"
       name: "Dumme Dave Aunt"
       photo: null
       role: "student"
       us: false
     ▶ __proto__: Object
    ▼hf5cy1w8zzp32m: Object
       admin: false
       facebook_id: "123456"
       id: "hf5cy1w8zzp32m"
       name: "Dumme Dave Sister"
       photo: null
       role: ""
       us: false
     ▶ __proto__: Object
    ▶ __proto__: Object
> |
```

- What else can we find out?
 - Facebook user ids
 - One would not expect that by using the Facebook connect feature (an authentication convenience feature), that other Piazza users would be able to link you to your Facebook

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 - Facebook user ids
 - One would not expect that by using the Facebook connect feature (an authentication convenience feature), that other Piazza users would be able to link you to your Facebook
 - What if you are bad-mouthing our Professor?

- What else can we find out?
 - Facebook user ids
 - One would not expect that by using the Facebook connect feature (an authentication convenience feature), that other Piazza users would be able to link you to your Facebook
 - What if you are bad-mouthing our Professor?
 - What if your Professor is bad-mouthing you?

- More confidential information?
 - •How about private communications between students and instructors?


```
🊧 🚏 < > 🗏 ▼ Console HTML CSS Script DOM Net ▼ Cookies
    Clear Persist All HTML CSS JS XHR Images Flash Media
               # resource_sections
                                                                                   [ Object { title="Homework", date_title="Due Date", visibility=true, more... }, Object { title="Homework Solutions", visibility=false, name="homework_solutions", more... }, Object { title="Lecture
                                                                                  Notes", date title="Lecture Date", visibility=true, more...}, Object { title="General Resources", visibility=true, name="general", more...}}
              + seen message
                                                                                  ["first day", "tips tricks", "startclass-3d-after-1t50", "startclass-7d-after-1t80"]
                 tips_tricks_nr
                                                                                  Object { requesting users=[1], requests=[2] }
                 requesting users
                                                                                  [ "h6xur6k0y945ng" ]
                 □ requests
                                                                                                                                                                                  ", more... }, Object { to=[1], uid="h6xur6k0y945ng", text="Dear Dr. Mohassel,\n\nI
                                                                                  [ Object { to=[1], uid="h6xur6k0y945ng", text="Dear Dr. Mohassel,\n\nI c...C 526 student
                                                                                                             ", more... } ]
                   0
                                                                                  Object { to=[1], uid="h6xur6k0y945ng", text="Dear Dr. Mohassel,\n\nI c...C 526 student
                                                                                   "h6xur6k0y945ng"
                     ■ text
                                                                                   "Dear Dr. Mohassel,
                                                                                  I created CPSC 526 on piazza.com due to the discussion in class. If you would like to, you could continue the process of registering this class.
                                                                                   It only takes two minutes to set up a class:
                                                                                   https://piazza.com/?nid=hbsqin344st6in
                                                                                   Adrian Cristea, CPSC 526 student
                        subject
                                                                                   "Can we use Piazza for CPSC 526?"
                        date
                                                                                   "2013-01-11T03:37:37Z"
                                                                                  Object { to=[1], uid="h6xur6k0y945ng", text="Dear Dr. Mohassel,\n\nI c...C 526 student
                        uid
                     # text
                                                                                   "Dear Dr. Mohassel, \n\nI c...C 526 student
                        subject
                                                                                   "Can we use Diagga for CDSC 5262"
                                                                                   "2013-01-11T03:37:48Z"
                        date
               syllabus
               enrollment
                                                                                  25
                                                                                  [ Object { id="hbssul5ict248e", email="pmohasse@cpsc.ucalgary.ca", admin=true, more... } ]
              course number
```

**Used with the explicit written consent of both parties

Finally, you may ask:

What good is this if you must provide a valid university email to register (or at least the Professor does)?

Doesn't this guarantee attribution, and thus afford some sort of protection against a malicious user exploiting these vulnerabilities?



```
Received: by 10.42.80.142 with SMTP id filter-076.18359.5167DD5A1
        Fri, 12 Apr 2013 10:09:30 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from smtp.sendgrid.net (ec2-54-242-110-184.compute-1.amazonaws.com [54.242.110.184])
        by mi21 (SG) with ESMTP id 5167dd5a.4c79.141e09
         5.1 <.ne.li.zard.king... m.i@gmail.com>; Fri, 12 Apr 2013 05:09:30 -0500 (CST)
Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2013 10:09:30 +0000 (UTC)
From: Piazza Team <no-reply@piazza.com>
To: the.li.zard.king.a.m.i@gmail.com
Message-ID: <1174509471.6293.1365761370342.JavaMail.ec2-user@ip-10-30-135-56>
Schiect: Access code for 101
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
        boundary="---= Part 6292 1901334633.1365761370228"
X-SG-EID: xRK9Rr6FjcReaZcp2Fj7/hq703Qmd3xcVZhhgDTYbmMNeIO8mVb8EqaFWGRRCXGIt53Hmm+D/d5aqBwT2AccNZp+OFlViE709wtdky18YiKCSKEfp//eJj5Y1yxT3bt7K4aA0we15g1DQ3Hy8bOCiQ==
----= Part 6292 1901334633.1365761370228
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
The access code for your class is 101
Please share this code with anyone who will be enrolling themselves in your [lass: http://piazza.com/hard knocks/spring2013/101
You can change your code at any time through your "Manage Class" page.
Thanks,
The Piazza Team
Contact us at team@piazza.com
----= Part 6292 1901334633.1365761370228
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
The access code for your class is <b>101</b>
Please share this code with anyone who will be enrolling themselves in your class: http://piazza.com/hard knocks/spring2013/101
You can change your code at any time through your "Manage Class" page.
<br>
<br>
Thanks, <br>
The Piazza Team<br>
Contact us at team@piazza.com<br>
----= Part 6292 1901334633.1365761370228--
```

Finally, you may ask:

What good is this if you must provide a valid university email to register (or at least the Professor does)?

Doesn't this guarantee attribution, and thus afford some sort of protection against a malicious user exploiting these vulnerabilities?

- No!
 - Anyone can create a fictitious school, using a throwaway email address.



Vendor Response

Vendor was contacted through a built in Bug Reporting widget within the Piazza web interface.

Vendor Response?

Nothing

Vendor was again contacted, this time through a different 'contact us' link on the web site portal.

Still awaiting a response...
Actually heard back this morning Monday April
15, 2013.

Conclusion

- Didn't get root
- Didn't drop a shell (sorry Alex)

BUT

- I was able to use the existing API to do some really cool things
- Systems are complex
- APIs present a large attack surface
- Breaking the API can be fun and rewarding (for both yourself and the vendor... free QA!)

If that switch is on, I'm turning it off.
If that switch is off, then I'm turning it on.
And by-golly, if there's a red button,
I'm pushing it twice.

Jayson E. Street



Questions?

Obligatory "Don't-Sue-Me" Blurb

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R.S., 1985, c. C-42, s. 29; R.S., 1985, c. 10 (4th Supp.), s. 7; 1994, c. 47, s. 61; 1997, c. 24, s. 18; 2012, c. 20, s. 21.

Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb

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