# Bitcoin Mechanics

Transaction and script

#### Recap

(1) <u>SHA256</u>: a collision resistant hash function that outputs 32-byte hash values

#### Applications:

- a binding commitment to one value: commit(m) → H(m)
   or to a list of values: commit(m<sub>1</sub>, ..., m<sub>n</sub>) → Merkle(m<sub>1</sub>, ..., m<sub>n</sub>)
- Proof of work with difficulty D

#### Recap

(2) Digital signatures: (Gen, Sign, Verify)


Gen() 
$$\rightarrow$$
 (pk, sk),

Sign(sk, m) 
$$\rightarrow \sigma$$
, Verify(pk, m,  $\sigma$ )  $\rightarrow$  accept/reject

signing key

verification key

#### First: overview of the Bitcoin consensus layer




#### First: overview of the Bitcoin consensus layer

miners broadcast received Tx to the P2P network

every miner:

validates received Tx and stores them in its **mempool** (unconfirmed Tx)

note: miners see Tx before they are posted on chain



Bitcoin P2P network


#### First: overview of the Bitcoin consensus layer

#### blockchain




#### Every **10 minutes**:

- Each miner creates a candidate block from Tx in its mempool
- a "random" miner is selected (how: next week), and broadcasts its block to P2P network
- all miners validate new block




Bitcoin P2P network

#### Bitcoin blockchain: a sequence of block headers, 80 bytes each



#### This lecture

View the blockchain as a sequence of Tx (append-only)



#### **Bitcoin Transaction**

- An account-based ledger
  - Like bank, Alipay

Create 25 coins and credit to Alice ASSERTED BY MINERS

Transfer 17 coins from Alice to Bob<sub>SIGNED(Alice)</sub>


Transfer 8 coins from Bob to Carol<sub>SIGNED(Bob)</sub>

Transfer 5 coins from Carol to Alice<sub>SIGNED(Carol)</sub>


Transfer 15 coins from Alice to David<sub>SIGNED(Alice)</sub>

#### **Bitcoin Transaction**


#### Input & Output




```
Inputs: Ø
    Outputs: 25.0→Alice
    Inputs: 1[0]
    Outputs: 17.0→Bob, 8.0→Alice
                                                SIGNED(Alice)
    Inputs: 2[0]
3
    Outputs: 8.0→Carol, 9.0→Bob
                                                 SIGNED(Bob)
    Inputs: 2[1]
4
    Outputs: 6.0→David, 2.0→Alice
                                                SIGNED(Alice)
```



# Tx structure (non-coinbase)



# **Example**




#### **UTXO Set**

- UTXO set and is being constantly maintained by every Bitcoin node
- Technically they are known as the *chainstate* and are stored in the chainstate data directory of a node
- The chainstate updates every time a new block is accepted in the blockchain



UTXOs size



#### **UTXO**

- Advantage:
  - Scalability: process multiple UTXOs in parallel
  - Private: as long as a user uses new address for each transaction
- Disadvantage:
  - Not intuitive
  - Not efficient

#### **Transaction Script**

- Metadata.
  - the size of the transaction,
  - the number of inputs, and the number of outputs. T
  - the hash of the entire transaction which serves as a unique ID for the transaction
- Inputs.
  - The transaction inputs form an array, and each input has the same form.
  - User needs to sign to show he/she has the ability to claim those previous transaction outputs.
- Outputs.
  - The outputs are again an array. Each output has just two fields. the sum of all the output values has to be less than or equal to the sum of all the input values
  - the difference is a transaction fee to the miner who publishes this transaction.



## Validating Tx2

Miners check (for each input):

program from funding Tx: under what conditions can UTXO be spent

1. The program ScriptSig | ScriptPK returns true

2. TxID | index | is in the current UTXO set


3. sum input values ≥ sum output values


After Tx2 is posted, miners remove UTXO<sub>2</sub> from UTXO set

- scriptPubkey is served as a lock
  - Output needs to specify who can use the output; and ensures that only the legitimate user can actually use it
  - Scriptsig in fact is the key to the lock

- Stack machine
  - An example: the calculator
  - Infix expression: 1+((2+3)\*4)-5
  - To use a stack, postfix expression
    - 123+4\*+5-

- Anna will give 1 btc to any one who knows the answer to 5-3
  - She will create a transaction, sets a challenge in the output script
  - 3 OP\_ADD 5 OP\_EQUAL
  - Anyone can use the output by supplying 2 in the scriptsig





- Practice
  - 7 OP\_ADD 3 OP\_SUB 1 OP\_ADD 7 OP\_EQUAL
  - What would be the sigscript?

- Practice
- OP\_HASH256
   6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a
   089c68d619000000000 OP\_EQUAL

# Focusing on Tx2: TxInp[0]

from UTXO (Bitcoin script)

Value 0.05000000 BTC

Pkscript OP\_DUP

OP\_HASH160

45b21c8a0cb687d563342b6c729d31dab58e3a4e

OP\_EQUALVERIFY

**OP\_CHECKSIG** 

from TxInp[0]

Sigscript 304402205846cace0d73de82dfbdeba4d65b9856d7c1b1730eb401cf4906b2401a69b

dc90220589d36d36be64e774c8796b96c011f29768191abeb7f56ba20ffb0351280860

c01

03557c228b080703d52d72ead1bd93fc72f45c4ddb4c2b7a20c458e2d069c8dd9e

A stack machine. Not Turing Complete: no loops.

Quick survey of op codes:

1. **OP\_TRUE** (OP\_1), **OP\_2**, ..., **OP\_16**: push value onto stack 81 82 96

2. **OP\_DUP**: push top of stack onto stack

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#### 3. control:

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```
    OP_IF <statements> OP_ELSE <statements> OP_ENDIF
    OP_VERIFY: abort fail if top = false
    OP_RETURN: abort and fail
        what is this for? ScriptPK = [OP_RETURN, <data>]
```

**OP\_EQVERIFY**: pop, pop, abort fail if not equal

4. arithmetic:

OP\_ADD, OP\_SUB, OP\_AND, ...: pop two items, add, push

5. crypto:

OP\_SHA256: pop, hash, push

**OP\_CHECKSIG**: pop sig, pop pk, verify sig. on Tx, push 0 or 1

6. Time: **OP\_CheckLockTimeVerify** (CLTV):

fail if value at the top of stack > Tx locktime value.

usage: UTXO can specify min-time when it can be spent


```
<sig>
<pub/>pubKey>
OP_DUP
OP_HASH160
<pub/>
<pub/>
y
OP_EQUALVERIFY
OP_CHECKSIG
```

## Example: a common script

```
<sig> <pk> DUP HASH256 <pkhash> EQVERIFY CHECKSIG
```

```
stack: empty
                                           init
       <sig> <pk>
                                           push values
       <sig> <pk> <pk>
                                           DUP
       <sig> <pk> <hash>
                                           HASH256
       <sig> <pk> <hash> <pkhash>
                                           push value
       <sig> <pk>
                                           EQVERIFY
                                           CHECKSIG
                                               verify(pk, Tx, sig)
   ⇒ successful termination
```

• The validation




### **Transaction types: (1) P2PKH**

pay to public key hash

#### Alice wants to pay Bob 5 BTC:

- step 1: Bob generates sig key pair  $(pk_R, sk_R) \leftarrow Gen()$
- step 2: Bob computes his Bitcoin address as  $Addr_B \leftarrow H(pk_B)$
- step 3: Bob sends *Addr<sub>B</sub>* to Alice
- step 4: Alice creates Tx:



ScriptPK<sub>B</sub>:

DUP HASH256 < Addr<sub>R</sub> > EQVERIFY CHECKSIG

# Transaction types: (1) P2PKH

create a Tx<sub>spend</sub> Later, when Bob wants to spend his UTXO: ScriptSig<sub>B</sub> Tx<sub>spend</sub>: output ГхID output points to  $UTXO_{R}$  $\langle sig \rangle \langle pk_B \rangle$ ScriptSig<sub>R</sub>:

 $\langle sig \rangle = Sign(sk_B, Tx)$  where  $Tx = (Tx_{spend} excluding all ScriptSigs)$ (SIGHASH ALL)

Miners validate that | ScriptSig<sub>R</sub> | ScriptPK<sub>R</sub>

returns true

#### **P2PKH:** comments

Alice specifies recipient's pk in UTXO<sub>B</sub>

 Recipient's pk is not revealed until UTXO is spent (some security against attacks on pk)

 Miner cannot change <Addr<sub>B</sub>> and steal funds: invalidates the signature that created the UTXO<sub>B</sub>

#### **ECDSA** malleability:

- given (m, sig) anyone can create (m, sig') with sig ≠ sig'
- $\Rightarrow$  miner can change sig in Tx and change TxID = SHA256(Tx)
- ⇒ Tx issuer cannot tell what TxID is, until Tx is posted
- ⇒ leads to problems and attacks

**Segregated witness:** signature is moved to witness field in Tx TxID = Hash(Tx without witnesses)

- Malleability
  - A gold coin got hammered, so it is not round any more; will this gold coin be used later?
- Transaction Malleability
  - The signature of the transaction is modified a little; however, it is still a valid signature
  - Without accessing private key
  - Due to many reasons:
    - One example, OpenSSL verifies the signature not strictly
- The consequence
  - Txid will be changed

- mtgox attack:
  - An attacker applies an account in an exchange center; and deposit bitcoins in it
  - The attacker then apply a withdraw; the exchange center will initiate a transaction
  - The transaction will be broadcast to the network; but before the transaction is confirmed in the network, the attacker received the transaction and slightly modifies the scriptsig, generate a new transaction(still valid); and broadcast to the network

- After the hacker's new transaction is in the blockchain (the hacker can use the bitcoin now and the original transaction will be regarded as a double-spending), he would file a complain to the exchange center, saying he hasn't received the bitcoin yet
- The exchange center will check the blockchain with the original txid, which indeed is not included, so the exchange center will repay the hacker

## Segragated witness

- Segregated Witness, or SegWit, is the process by which the block size limit on a blockchain is increased by removing signature data from transactions that are included in each block.
  - Originally, there was no limit to the size of blocks.
     However, this allowed malicious actors to make up fake "block" data that was very long as a form of DoS attack
  - Block is constrained to a max size of one megabyte

### Segragated witness

- Digital signature accounts for 65% of the space in a given transaction
- Segwit ignores the signature, therefore increase the one MB limit for block sizes to a little under four MB

#### Transaction types: (2) P2SH: pay to script hash

(pre SegWit in 2017)

Let's payer specify a redeem script (instead of just pkhash)

Usage: payee publishes hash(redeem script) ← Bitcoint addr. payer sends funds to that address

ScriptPK in UTXO: HASH160 <H(redeem script)> EQUAL

**ScriptSig** to spend:  $\langle sig_1 \rangle \langle sig_2 \rangle \dots \langle sig_n \rangle \langle redeem script \rangle$ 

payer can specify complex conditions for when UTXO can be spent

#### P2SH

Miner verifies:

(1) <ScriptSig> ScriptPK = true ← payee gave correct script

(2) ScriptSig = true ← script is satisfied

# **Example P2SH:** multisig

**Goal**: spending a UTXO requires t-out-of-n signatures

Redeem script for 2-out-of-3: (set by payer)

hash gives P2SH address

ScriptSig to spend: (by payee) <0> <sig1> <sig3> <redeem script>

# END OF LECTURE