

Bitcoin Mechanics

Transactions

Recap: Bitcoin Script

<sig>

<pubKey>

OP_DUP

OP_HASH160

<pubKeyHash?>

OP_EQUALVERIFY

OP_CHECKSIG

Recap : a P2PKH script

<sig> <pk> DUP HASH256 <pkhash> EQVERIFY CHECKSIG

stack: empty

<sig> <pk>

<sig> <pk> <pk>

<sig> <pk> <hash>

<sig> <pk> <hash> <pkhash>

<sig> <pk>

1

⇒ successful termination

init

push values

DUP

HASH256

push value


EQVERIFY

CHECKSIG

verify(pk, Tx, sig)

Recap: stack operation

- The validation



Recap: P2PKH

- Alice specifies recipient's pk in UTXO_B
- Recipient's pk is not revealed until UTXO is spent (the 1st usage) (some security against attacks on pk)
- Miner cannot change $\langle \text{Addr}_B \rangle$ and steal funds:
invalidates the signature that created the UTXO_B

Practice

- Before P2PKH, there used to be P2PK
 - That is, pay-to-public-key
 - What would the scriptpk and scriptsig be like in such transaction?

"For several weeks MtGox customers have been affected by bitcoin withdrawal issues that compounded on themselves. Publicly, MtGox declared that 'transaction malleability' caused the system to be subject to theft, and that something needed to be done by the core devs to fix it.

Gox's own workaround solution was criticized, and eventually a fix was provided by Blockchain.info. The truth, it turns out, is that the damage had already been done. At this point 744,408 BTC are missing due to malleability-related theft which went unnoticed for several years.

The cold storage has been wiped out due to a leak in the hot wallet. The reality is that MtGox can go bankrupt at any moment, and certainly deserves to as a company."

Segregated Witness

ECDSA malleability:

- given (m, sig) anyone can create (m, sig') with $\text{sig} \neq \text{sig}'$
- ⇒ miner can change sig in Tx and change $\text{TxID} = \text{SHA256}(\text{Tx})$
- ⇒ Tx issuer cannot tell what TxID is, until Tx is posted
- ⇒ leads to problems and attacks

Segregated witness: signature is moved to witness field in Tx

$\text{TxID} = \text{Hash}(\text{Tx without witnesses})$

Segregated Witness

- **Malleability**
 - **A gold coin got hammered, so it is not round any more; will this gold coin be used later?**
- **Transaction Malleability**
 - The signature of the transaction is modified a little; however, it is still a valid signature
 - Without accessing private key
 - Due to many reasons:
 - One example, OpenSSL verifies the signature not strictly
- **The consequence**
 - Txid will be changed

Segregated Witness

- mtgox attack:
 - An attacker applies an account in an exchange center; and deposit bitcoins in it
 - The attacker then apply a withdraw; the exchange center will initiate a transaction
 - The transaction will be broadcast to the network; but before the transaction is confirmed in the network, the attacker received the transaction and slightly modifies the scriptsig, generate a new transaction(still valid); and broadcast to the network

Segregated Witness

- After the hacker's new transaction is in the blockchain (the hacker can use the bitcoin now and the original transaction will be regarded as a double-spending), he would file a complain to the exchange center, saying he hasn't received the bitcoin yet
- The exchange center will check the blockchain with the original txid, which indeed is not included, so the exchange center will repay the hacker

Segregated witness

- **Segregated Witness**, or **SegWit**, is the process by which the block size limit on a blockchain is increased by removing signature data from transactions that are included in each block.
 - Originally, there was no limit to the size of blocks. However, this allowed malicious actors to make up fake "block" data that was very long as a form of DoS attack
 - Block is constrained to a max size of one megabyte

Segragated witness

- Digital signature accounts for 65% of the space in a given transaction
- Segwit ignores the signature, therefore increase the one MB limit for block sizes to a little under four MB

Transaction Ops: multisig

- Why **OP_CHECKMULTISIG**?
 - Added to bitcoin in 2011
 - requires specifying *N public keys, and a parameter M, for a threshold, M-of-N multi-signature (2-of-3; 3-of-5)*
 - M <Public Key 1> <Public Key 2> ... <Public Key N> N
OP_CHECKMULTISIG
 - Two-factor authentication wallet - One private key is on your primary computer, the other on your smartphone — the funds cannot be spent without a signature from both devices

multisig

- Why **OP_CHECKMULSIG**?
 - 2-of-3: family expenditure, at least 2 of the family members agree on the expenditure
 - Escrow transaction:
 - Alice buys from bob; but they don't trust each other
 - They both trust Carol
 - Initiate a 2-of-3 transaction

multisig

- How does it work?
 - To redeem: OP_0 ...signatures...
 - For example: 2-of-3
 - Stack before OP_checkmultisig

3

(pubKey3)

(pubKey2)

(pubKey1)

2

(sig2)

(sig1)

0

Multi-sig

1. Pop n off of the stack (number of public keys)
2. Pop n public keys off of the stack.
3. Pop m off of the stack (number of required signatures)
4. Pop m signatures off of the stack.
5. Pop one more element off of the stack, and ignore it. (This is a bug, but it can't be fixed because this is consensus-critical code.)
6. Loop through all of the public keys, starting with the keys at the top of the stack.
 - ① For each public key, check a single signature.
 - ② For the first public key checked, start with the signature closest to the top of the stack.
 - ③ If it fails to verify, go to the next public key and check the same signature.
 - ④ If it succeeds, go to the next public key with the next signature.
 - ⑤ Note that the signatures need to be in the same order as the key's that they're signing for.
7. If all of the signatures succeeded with one of the keys, CHECKMULTISIG returns 1, otherwise 0.

Transaction types: P2SH: pay to script hash 2012

Let payer specify a redeem script (instead of just pkhash)

Usage: payee publishes $\text{hash}(\text{redeem script}) \leftarrow \text{Bitcoin addr.}$
payer sends funds to that address

ScriptPK in UTXO: `HASH160 <H(redeem script)> EQUAL`

ScriptSig to spend: `<sig1> <sig2> ... <sign> <redeem script>`

payer can specify complex conditions for when UTXO can be spent

Why P2SH?

- P2SH: pay-to-script-hash
 - P2SH means “pay to a script matching this hash, a script which will be presented later when this output is spent”.

Table 5-4. Complex Script without P2SH

Locking Script	2 PubKey1 PubKey2 PubKey3 PubKey4 PubKey5 5 OP_CHECKMULTISIG
Unlocking Script	Sig1 Sig2

Table 5-5. Complex Script as P2SH

Redeem Script	2 PubKey1 PubKey2 PubKey3 PubKey4 PubKey5 5 OP_CHECKMULTISIG
Locking Script	OP_HASH160 <20-byte hash of redeem script> OP_EQUAL
Unlocking Script	Sig1 Sig2 redeem script

Why P2SH?

- Complex scripts are replaced by shorter fingerprint in the transaction output, making the transaction smaller
- P2SH shifts the burden of constructing the script to the recipient not the sender
- P2SH shifts the burden in data storage for the long script from the output (which is in the UTXO set and therefore impacts memory) to the input (only stored on the blockchain)
- P2SH shifts the burden in data storage for the long script from the present time (payment) to a future time (when it is spent)
- P2SH shifts the transaction fee cost of a long script from the sender to the recipient who has to include the long redeem script to spend it

P2SH

Miner verifies:

- (1) $\langle \text{ScriptSig} \rangle \text{ScriptPK} = \text{true}$ \leftarrow payee gave correct script
- (2) $\text{ScriptSig} = \text{true}$ \leftarrow script is satisfied

Example P2SH: multisig

Goal: spending a UTXO requires t-out-of-n signatures

Redeem script for 2-out-of-3: (set by payer)

`<2> <PK1> <PK2> <PK3> <3> CHECKMULTISIG`


 hash gives P2SH address

ScriptSig to spend: (by payee)

`<0> <sig1> <sig3> <redeem script>`


P2SH

- Alice pays to Bob in P2SH (pay to P2SH)
 - scriptPubkey:
 - OP_HASH160 [20-byte-hash-value] OP_EQUAL



P2SH

- Spend P2SH
 - ...signatures... {serialized script}



Spending A P2SH Output

P2SH example

- The script is a 2-of-3 multisig script
 - go-bitcoin-multisig keys --count 3 --concise

```
KEY #1
Private key:
5TruagvxNLXTnkksvLMfgFgf3CagI3Ekxu5oGxpTm5mPfTAPez3
Public key hex:
04a882d414e478039cd5b52a92ffb13dd5e6bd4515497439dff691a0f12af9575fa349b5694ed3155b136f09e63975a17
Public Bitcoin address:
1JzVFZSN1kxGLTHG41EVvY5gHxLAX7o1Rh
-----
-----

KEY #2
Private key:
5IX3oAwDEEaapvLXRfbXRMSivReRSW9WjgxevIQWvBugbudCwsk
Public key hex:
046ce31db9bdd543e72fe3039a1f1c047dab87037c36a669ff90e28da1848f640de68c2fe913d363a51154a0c62d7adea1
Public Bitcoin address:
14IfSvqEo8A8S7ocvxexaSCxhnlull7lvo4
-----
-----

KEY #3
Private key:
```

P2SH Example

- `go-bitcoin-multisig address --m 2 --n 3 --public-keys`
04a882d414e478039cd5b52a92ffb13dd5e6bd451549743
9dff691a0f12af9575fa349b5694ed3155b136f09e63975
a1700c9f4d4df849323dac06cf3bd6458cd,
046ce31db9bdd543e72fe3039a1f1c047dab87037c36a66
9ff90e28da1848f640de68c2fe913d363a51154a0c62d7ad
ea1b822d05035077418267b1a1379790187,
0411ffd36c70776538d079fbae117dc38effafb33304af83c
e4894589747aee1ef992f63280567f52f5ba870678b4ab4f
f6c8ea600bd217870a8b4f1f09f3a8e83

P2SH example

- ----- Your *P2SH ADDRESS* is:
347N1Thc213QqfYCz3PZkjoJpNv5b14kBd

Give this to sender funding multisig address with Bitcoin.

----- Your *REDEEM SCRIPT* is:
524104a882d414e478039cd5b52a92ffb13dd5e6bd4515497439dff691a0
f12af9575fa349b5694ed3155b136f09e63975a1700c9f4d4df849323dac06
cf3bd6458cd41046ce31db9bdd543e72fe3039a1f1c047dab87037c36a669f
f90e28da1848f640de68c2fe913d363a51154a0c62d7adea1b822d0503507
7418267b1a1379790187410411ffd36c70776538d079fbae117dc38effafb3
3304af83ce4894589747aee1ef992f63280567f52f5ba870678b4ab4ff6c8ea
600bd217870a8b4f1f09f3a8e8353ae

- Keep private and provide this to redeem multisig balance later. -----

Description	redeemScript bytes
OP_2	52
Push 65 bytes to stack	41
<pubKeyA>	04a882d414e478039cd5b52a92ffb13dd5e6bd4515497439dff691a0f12af9575fa349b5694ed3155b136f09e63975a1700c9f4d4df849323dac06cf3bd6458cd
Push 65 bytes to stack	41
<pubKeyB>	046ce31db9bdd543e72fe3039a1f1c047dab87037c36a669ff90e28da1848f640de68c2fe913d363a51154a0c62d7adea1b822d05035077418267b1a1379790187
Push 65 bytes to stack	41
<pubKeyC>	0411ffd36c70776538d079fbae117dc38effafb33304af83ce4894589747aee1ef992f63280567f52f5ba870678b4ab4ff6c8ea600bd217870a8b4f1f09f3a8e83
OP_3	53
OP_CHECKMULTISIG	ae

P2SH

- P2SH address:
 - `redeemScriptHash = RIPEMD160(SHA256(redeemScript))`
 - `P2SHAddress := base58check.Encode("05", redeemScriptHash)`

- Alice's Transaction

Description		Hex Bytes
Version byte		01000000
Input count		01
Previous tx hash (reversed)		acc6fb9ec2c3884d3a12a89e7078c83853d9b7912281cefb14bac00a2737d33a
Output index		00000000
scriptSig length of 138 bytes		8a
scriptSig	Push 71 bytes to stack	47
	<signature>	304402204e63d034c6074f17e9c5f8766bc7b5468a0dce5b69578bd08554e8f21434c58e0220763c6966f47c39068c8dcd3f3dbd8e2a4ea13ac9e9c899ca1fbc00e2558cbb8b01
	Push 65 bytes to stack	41
	<pubKey>	0431393af9984375830971ab5d3094c6a7d02db3568b2b06212a7090094549701bbb9e84d9477451acc42638963635899ce91bacb451a1bb6da73ddfbcf596bddf
Sequence		ffffff
No. of outputs		01
Amount of 65600 in LittleEndian		4000010000000000
scriptPubKey length of 23 bytes		17
scriptPubKey	OP_HASH160	a9
	Push 20 bytes to stack	14
	redeemScriptHash	1a8b0026343166625c7475f01e48b5ede8c0252e
	OP_EQUAL	87
locktime		00000000

P2SH

- Bob's Transaction

scriptSig length of 349 bytes		fd5d01
scriptSig	OP_0	00
	Push 71 bytes	47
	<sig A>	30440220762ce7bca626942975bfd5b130ed3470b9f538eb2ac120c2043b445709369628022051d73c80328b543f744aa64b7e9ebefa7ade3e5c716eab4a09b408d2c307ccd701
	Push 72 bytes	48
	<sig C>	3045022100abf740b58d79cab000f8b0d328c2fff7eb88933971d1b63f8b99e89ca3f2dae602203354770db3cc2623349c87dea7a50cee1f78753141a5052b2d58aeb592bcf50f01
	OP_PUSHDATA1	4c
	Push 201 bytes	c9
	<redeemScript>	524104a882d414e478039cd5b52a92ffb13dd5e6bd4515497439dff691a0f12af9575fa349b5694ed3155b136f09e63975a1700c9f4d4df849323dac06cf3bd6458cd41046ce31db9bdd54

P2SH

- Bob's Transaction

No. of outputs		01
Amount of 55600 in LittleEndian		30d9000000000000
scriptPubKey length of 25 bytes		19
scriptPubKey	OP_DUP	76
	OP_HASH160	a9
	Push 20 bytes	14
	<pubKeyHash>	569076ba39fc4ff6a2291d9ea9196d8c08f9c7ab
	OP_EQUALVERIFY	88
	OP_CHECKSIG	ac

P2SH

- Combining Alice's script pubkey & Bob Scriptsig
- <OP_0> <sig A> <sig C> <redeemScript>
<OP_HASH160> <redeemScriptHash> <OP_EQUAL>

P2SH

- Stepping through this script:
- *OP_0* and the two signatures are added to the stack, kept for later.
- The redeemScript is added to the stack.
- *OP_HASH160* hashes our redeemScript.
- redeemScriptHash is added to the stack.
- *OP_EQUAL* will compare *OP_HASH160*(redeemScript) and redeemScriptHash and check for equality. This confirms that our spending transaction is providing the correct redeemScript.
- Now the redeemScript can be evaluated:
- <OP_2> <A pubkey> <B pubkey> <C pubkey> <OP_3> <OP_CHECKMULTISIG>
- *OP_CHECKMULTISIG* will look at the 3 public keys and 2 signatures in the stack, and compare them one by one. As stated earlier, the order of signatures matters here and must match the order that the public keys were provided in.

Base58

- Discrepancy:
 - In command line:
 - --destination 347N1Thc213QqfYCz3PZkjoJpNv5b14kBd
 - In Alice's transaction:
 - 1a8b0026343166625c7475f01e48b5ede8c0252e
- 1a... is the hashed the result of redeem script
- 347.... is the base58 encoded version of 1a8....
- Why should the hash resulted be encoded again?
- What is Base58?

Base58

- With version 05, resulting in Base58Check encoded addresses that start with a “3”

```
@ubuntu:~/Desktop$ ./bx base58check-decode 347N1Thc213QqfYCz3PZkjoJpNv5b14kBd
```

```
wrapper
```

```
{
```

```
    checksum 2891525823
```

```
    payload 1a8b0026343166625c7475f01e48b5ede8c0252e
```

```
    version 5
```

```
}
```

```
@ubuntu:~/Desktop$ ./bx base58check-encode 1a8b0026343166625c7475f01e48b5ede8c0252e
```

```
13RM5vDAU6j2kVqmrwiyL7SNfrdMxSEegV
```

```
@ubuntu:~/Desktop$ ./bx base58check-encode 1a8b0026343166625c7475f01e48b5ede8c0252e --version 05
```

```
347N1Thc213QqfYCz3PZkjoJpNv5b14kBd
```


Base58

- Base58 alphabet consists of the following characters:
- 123456789ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijk
lmnopqrstuvwxyz

Base58 Mapping table

Byte	Character	Byte	Character	Byte	Character	Byte	Character
0	1	1	2	2	3	3	4
4	5	5	6	6	7	7	8
8	9	9	A	10	B	11	C
12	D	13	E	14	F	15	G
16	H	17	J	18	K	19	L
20	M	21	N	22	P	23	Q
24	R	25	S	26	T	27	U
28	V	29	W	30	X	31	Y
32	Z	33	a	34	b	35	c
36	d	37	e	38	f	39	g
40	h	41	i	42	j	43	k
44	m	45	n	46	o	47	p
48	q	49	r	50	s	51	t
52	u	53	v	54	w	55	x
56	y	57	z				

Base58Check Encoding



END OF LECTURE