Neural Network Reprogrammability

Session III: Implications of Reprogrammability

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Outline

I. The Good – “white-hat” reprogramming & efficient FM reuse

II. The Bad – “black-hat” reprogramming, backdoors, jailbreaks

III. The Unknown – evaluation, open problems, and governance

IV. The Tool - useful resources regarding reprogrammability

NNR in a Nutshell

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Revisit NNR formulation

- Pre-trained model $f: X^S \rightarrow Y^S$, with
  - **Input Manipulation** $I: X^T \rightarrow X^S$
  - **Output Alignment** $O: Y^S \rightarrow Y^T$
  - **Target prediction** $\hat{y}^T = O\left(f\left(I\left(x^T\right)\right)\right)$

- Taxonomy dimensions
  - Manipulation **format** (fixed or trainable)
  - Manipulation **location** (input, embedding, hidden layers)
  - Manipulation **operator** (additive, concatenative, parametric)
  - Alignment (identity, rule-based, learned, statistical)

- NNR conceptually unifies MR, prompting, ICL, CoT, etc.



Fig. PEFT method as instantiated NNR, credits to [1]

[1] Ye et al. Neural Network Reprogrammability: A Unified Theme on Model Reprogramming, Prompt Tuning, and Prompt Instruction. In ArXiv.

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- NNR conceptually unifies MR, prompting, ICL, CoT, etc.
- Next: NNR as both **capability enablers** and **attack vectors**

	Input Manipulation (I)								Output Alignment (O)			
	interface (ℓ)			configuration (λ)		operator (τ)			mapping (ω)			
Setup	$\mathcal{X}^S$	$\mathcal{E}$	$\mathcal{H}$	OP	FX	AD	CO	PR	SA	LA	RA	ID
MR	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		
PT		✓	✓	✓			✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
PI	✓				✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓

Table 2 | A comparative analysis of existing RCA literature through the lens of reprogrammability. Under interface (ℓ), setup $\mathcal{X}^S$, $\mathcal{E}$, and $\mathcal{H}$ denote manipulations that occur in input space, embedding space, and hidden space, respectively. The columns under configuration (λ): setup OP and FX means optimizable and fixed manipulations. The columns under operator (τ): setup AD, CO, and PR refer to additive, concatenative, and parametric operators. The columns under mapping (ω): setup SA, LA, RA, and ID represent statistical alignment, linear alignment, rule-based (i.e., structured) alignment, and identity mapping.

Fig. Comparison of different NNR manifestations, credits to [1]

[1] Ye et al. Neural Network Reprogrammability: A Unified Theme on Model Reprogramming, Prompt Tuning, and Prompt Instruction. In ArXiv.

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Session 3: Implications

(a) The positive side

- Resource-efficient adaptation
- cross-domain & cross-modality transfer
- FM reuse in low-resource settings

Paradigm Shift

From Fine-tuning to Reprogrammability-Centric Thinking

- Traditional view
  - Adapt parameters (full FT, last-layer FT, etc.) to each new task
- Reprogrammability-centric view
  - Freeze parameters, adapt tasks to the interfaces via IM/OA



Fig. paradigm shift from adapting model to adapting tasks

[1] Ye et al. Neural Network Reprogrammability: A Unified Theme on Model Reprogramming, Prompt Tuning, and Prompt Instruction. In ArXiv.

Paradigm Shift

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From Fine-tuning to Reprogrammability-Centric Thinking

- Traditional view
  - Adapt parameters (full FT, last-layer FT, etc.) to each new task
- Reprogrammability-centric view
  - Freeze parameters, adapt tasks to the interfaces via IM/OA
- Benefits
  - Parameter efficiency – tiny "program" vs. full model clone
  - Data efficiency – works well in low-data, few-shot regimes
  - Stability – preserves base model's pre-trained knowledge



Fig. efficiency advantage of NNR, credits to [1]

- NNR as a natural fit for Foundation Models, where fine-tuning is costly and sometimes impossible (API-only)

[1] Pin-Yu Chen. Model Reprogramming: Resource-Efficient Cross-Domain Machine Learning. AAAI 2024

MR as an instantiation of NNR

Model Reprogramming 101

- MR from NNR perspective
  - Input Transformation Layer $I_\phi(x^T)$ as manipulation at input
  - Frozen backbone $f(x^S;\theta)$
  - Label mapping $O_\omega(y^S)$ as learnable/statistical output alignment

- Typical objectives
  - Minimize target task loss while keeping θ fixed

$$\min_{\phi,\omega} \mathbb{E}_{(\boldsymbol{x}_i^{\mathrm{T}}, y_i^{\mathrm{T}})\sim\mathcal{X}^{\mathrm{T}}\times\mathcal{Y}^{\mathrm{T}}} \left[\mathcal{L}(O_\omega(f(I_\phi(\boldsymbol{x}_i^{\mathrm{T}}))), y_i^{\mathrm{T}})\right]$$



Fig. MR as a tool for cross-domain transfer learning, credits to [1]

- Empirical findings across domains
  - MR competes with or even outperforms classical transfer learning when data is scarce [1]

- MR as the ”white-hat” baseline: same NNR mechanisms in attacks, but used for legitimate model adaptation

[1] Pin-Yu Chen. Model Reprogramming: Resource-Efficient Cross-Domain Machine Learning. AAAI 2024

Cross-Modal FM Reuse

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Cross-modal MR as a “good” example of NNR

- Guide pre-trained acoustic model for generic time-series classification
  - **What**?
    - Pre-trained AM can be repurposed to handle data from another modality
  - **How?**
    - manipulating *input* by prompting w/ trainable segments
    - aligning *output* by projection w/ hard-coded mappings
  - **Why?**
    - transform time-series data into tokens that frozen AM can handle
    - map from acoustic label space to time-series label space



Fig. Framework of Voice2Series [1]

[1] Yang et al. Voice2Series: Reprogramming Acoustic Models for Time Series Classification. In ICML 2021

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  - **Why?**
    - transform time-series data into tokens that frozen AM can handle
    - map from acoustic label space to time-series label space
- Strong performance across many UCR datasets
  - great for low-resource domains (e.g., sensor data)
  - models can be repurposed **far outside their original domain**



Fig. Visualization results of Voice2Series [1]

[1] Yang et al. Voice2Series: Reprogramming Acoustic Models for Time Series Classification. In ICML 2021

Cross-Modal FM Reuse

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Cross-modal MR as a “good” example of NNR

- Guide pre-trained language model for protein sequences
  - **What**?
    - Pre-trained LM can be repurposed to handle data from irrelevant modality
  - **How?**
    - manipulating *input* by prompting w/ trainable linear projection
    - aligning *output* by projection w/ trainable linear projection
  - **Why?**
    - transform Antibody data into tokens that English-pretrained LM [2] can handle
    - transform English word embeddings back into Antibody
- commendable performance than baselines
  - high diversity, good sequence recovery, and low perplexity
- NNR is already used in **high-stakes scientific applications**
  - motivates serious thinking about trust and safety



Fig. Framework of protein sequence infilling [1]

[1] Melnyk et al. Reprogramming language model for antibody sequence infilling. In ICML 2023
[2] Devlin et al. BERT: Pre-training of Deep Bidirectional Transformers for Language Understanding. In NAACL 2019

Cross-Modal FM Reuse

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Cross-modal MR as a “good” example of NNR

- Guide pre-trained LLM for (*numeric*) time-series data
  - **What**?
    - LLMs can be repurposed to handle data from another modali
  - **How?**
    - manipulating *input* by prompting w/ trainable tokens
    - aligning *output* by projection w/ trainable layers
  - **Why?**
    - encode numeric data into tokens that LLMs can recognize
    - decode textual output back to numeric values
- Can match or surpass specialized time-series models
  - without re-training the LLM



Fig. an example of NNR for time-series, credits to [1]

[1] Jin et al. TIME-LLM: Time Series Forecasting by Reprogramming Large Language Models. In ICLR 2024

NNR for Utility-Privacy Tradeoffs

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MR improves privacy-constrained learning

- DP federated learning suffers from notable accuracy degradation
  - **What**?
    - Reprogrammable-FL [1] improves utility for a fixed privacy budget
  - **How?**
    - each client reprograms a public model to private tasks, locally trained
    - backbone remains global and frozen
    - DP noise added to local updates



Fig. NNR in federated learning setup, credits to [1]

[1] Arif et al. Reprogrammable-FL: Improving Utility-Privacy Tradeoff in Federated Learning via Model Reprogramming. In IEEE SatML 2023

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    - each client reprograms a public model to private tasks, locally trained
    - backbone remains global and frozen
    - DP noise added to local updates
  - **Benefits?**
    - accuracy gains over DP-SGD fine-tuning at the same ϵ, in both IID/non-IID settings
    - better use of limited private data
- NNR can **enhance** privacy and utility when deliberately structured



(a) Centralized setting



(b) Federated setting

[1] Arif et al. Reprogrammable-FL: Improving Utility-Privacy Tradeoff in Federated Learning via Model Reprogramming. In IEEE SatML 2023

Fig. Privacy-accuracy tradeoff for CIFAR-10 and ResNet-50 credits to [1]

NNR for OOD Robustness

MR improves OOD behavior compared to fine-tuning

- fine-tuning CLIP-like encoders can hurt OOD detection/generalization
  - **What**?
    - MR often preserves or even **improves** OOD performance while matching or exceeding ID accuracy
  - **How?**
    - Systematic comparison between MR vs full-tuning vs linear probing
    - ID accuracy, OOD detection AUROC, calibration under distribution shift
- well-designed reprogramming improves trustworthiness under shift

(a) Linear-probing (b) Full Fine-tuning

(c) Reprogrammer (d) Residual Reprogrammer

Fig. Trade-offs between ID and OOD, credits to [1]

[1] Geng and Chen. Model Reprogramming Outperforms Fine-tuning on Out-of-distribution Data in Text-Image Encoders. In IEEE SatML 2024

The Good in Summary

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Wrap up

- NNR acts positively for low-resource domains, OOD robustness, FL with privacy constraints
- FMs as a shared “CPU”, reprogramming modules/prompts/etc as “user-level software”
- many tasks may share one powerful FM; users ship lightweight (i.e., parameter-efficient, storage-friendly) programs instead of heavy full checkpoints

The Good in Summary

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Takeaway

- NNR is not inherently unsafe; implications depend on governance of interfaces, access and evaluation
- track “who reprogrammed what”, bound reprogramming degrees-of-freedom, monitor performance
- potential privacy benefits, e.g., no direct gradient access needed within black-box setup and API-level access

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Session 3: Implications

(b) The dark side

- Model-as-a-service theft
- Bypass safety/alignment
- Activate or implant backdoors

Thread Modeling Reprogrammable FMs

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NNR can however enable an attack vector [1]

- Attacker capabilities
  - inject training data
  - ability to insert prompts or modify label mappings
- Assets at risk
  - task integrity, safety alignment
  - privacy, IP, and multi-tenant isolation
- Interface as attack vectors
  - manipulation interfaces
  - training process and deployment pipeline
- Distinguish benign vs. malicious intent, not mechanisms
  - same manipulations can embody very different goals



Same foundation model, different programs:
white-hat vs. black-hat reprogrammability.

[1] Ye et al. Neural Network Reprogrammability: A Unified Theme on Model Reprogramming, Prompt Tuning, and Prompt Instruction. In ArXiv.

NNR enables Hidden Task Injection

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Boundary between Adversarial Reprogramming and Adversarial Attack is blur

- Adversarial examples
  - $x + \delta \rightarrow y' \neq y$
  - Small perturbation; task stays the same, label is wrong
- Adversarial reprogramming
  - $x^T + \delta \rightarrow y^S \rightarrow y^T$
  - model now implements another task [1]
- NNR view
  - attack happens on IM and OA, not on model weights
- Implications
  - 3rd party model can be reprogrammed with input access only, even when architecture is unknown [2]
  - model owner thinks the service is doing Task A; adversary reprograms to perform hidden Task B



[1] Elsayed et al. Adversarial Reprogramming of Neural Networks. In ICLR 2019
[2] Tsai et al. Transfer Learning without Knowing: Reprogramming Black-box Machine Learning Models with Scarce Data and Limited Resources. In ICML 2020

NNR enables Hidden Task Injection

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Practical “adversarial” NNR scenarios

- Theft of service
  - use image-classification API to perform other tasks, e.g., NLP classification via IM
  - model provider may see normal-looking queries; attacker gets free compute for custom tasks
- Hidden task injection
  - Deployed model (e.g., face recognizer) quietly reprogrammed to perform demographic classification to aid race targeted surveillance
- Challenges for defenders
  - hard to distinguish benign vs. adversarial NNR without task-aware monitoring
- Bridge to evaluation
  - need metrics to cover task vs hidden task separation.

[1] Elsayed et al. Adversarial Reprogramming of Neural Networks. In ICLR 2019
[2] Tsai et al. Transfer Learning without Knowing: Reprogramming Black-box Machine Learning Models with Scarce Data and Limited Resources. In ICML 2020

NNR enables LLM Jailbreaking

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Many LLM safety failures are the results of NNR

- prompts & system messages are reprogramming interfaces
  - natural language prompts that redefine tasks, roles, and
  - safety constraints, e.g., DAN [1], multi-step CoT jailbreaks [2],
  - “role-play as my deceased grandmother” [3],
- Mechanism
  - system prompt + user prompt + demonstrations
  - move the model into unsafe behavior regime
- NNR view
  - Prompts and in-context examples are fixed, input-level IM
- Implications
  - Safety alignment at the weight level is <u>insufficient</u> if input space allows strong reprogramming



Fig. LLM Jailbreaking from NNR viewpoint

[1] Shen et al. "Do Anything Now": Characterizing and evaluating in-the-wild jailbreak prompts on large language models. In CCS 2024
[2] Bhat and Ye. Does chain-of-thought reasoning really reduce harmfulness from jailbreaking? In ArXiv 2024
[3] Wei et al. Jailbroken: How does LLM safety training fail?. In NeurIPS 2024

Jailbreak Defenses as Counter-Reprogramming

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Controlled reprogramming to counteract “adversarial” NNR

- Defensive Prompt Patch [1]
  - attach an interpretable defensive suffix prompt to queries
  - targets minimal ASR drop and benign performance hit
- Token Highlighter [2]
  - token-level attribution of jailbreak prompts
  - automatic mitigation strategies
- Retention Score [3]
  - attack-agnostic robustness metric for jailbreak risks
  - proof of certified properties



Fig. Defensive Prompt Patch, credits to [1]

[1] Xiong et al. Defensive Prompt Patch: A Robust and Generalizable Defense of Large Language Models against Jailbreak Attacks. In ACL 2025
[2] Hu et al. Token Highlighter: Inspecting and Mitigating Jailbreak Prompts for Large Language Models. In AAAI 2025
[3] Li et al. Retention Score: Quantifying Jailbreak Risks for Vision Language Models. In AAAI 2025

Jailbreak Defenses as Counter-Reprogramming

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

Fig. Token Highlighter, credits to [2]

[1] Xiong et al. Defensive Prompt Patch: A Robust and Generalizable Defense of Large Language Models against Jailbreak Attacks. In ACL 2025
[2] Hu et al. Token Highlighter: Inspecting and Mitigating Jailbreak Prompts for Large Language Models. In AAAI 2025
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  - attack-agnostic robustness metric for jailbreak risks
  - proof of certified properties



Fig. Retention Score, credits to [3]

[1] Xiong et al. Defensive Prompt Patch: A Robust and Generalizable Defense of Large Language Models against Jailbreak Attacks. In ACL 2025
[2] Hu et al. Token Highlighter: Inspecting and Mitigating Jailbreak Prompts for Large Language Models. In AAAI 2025
[3] Li et al. Retention Score: Quantifying Jailbreak Risks for Vision Language Models. In AAAI 2025

Backdoors & Trojans as Persistent NNR

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Interpret backdoor risks [1] via NNR lens

- BadNets & Trojaning
  - training-time poisoning causes model to map trigger-stamped inputs to attacker-chosen labels [2]
  - NNR viewpoint: trigger is an IM template; backdoor label is an OA – a form of “programmed shortcut”
- Persistent vs. transient reprogramming
  - training-time backdoor persists across deployments;
  - contrasts with per-query adversarial NNR
- Supply-chain and model-market risks
  - Backdoored open-weight FMs or checkpoints as “pre-reprogrammed” systems

[1] Cheng et al. Defending against Backdoor Attack on Deep Neural Networks. In AdvML Workshop 2019
[2] Gu et al. BadNets: Identifying Vulnerabilities in the Machine Learning Model Supply Chain. In ArXiv 2017

Backdoors in Generative Models

Modern Diffusion models can be reprogrammed for malicious outputs

- VillanDiffusion [1]
  - unified backdoor attacks on diffusion models
  - triggers embed in noise or conditions
  - generative model reprogrammability via backdoor implants

- Elijah [2]
  - detection + removal of diffusion backdoors via distribution shift
  - full retraining not required



Fig. overview of VillanDiffusion, credits to [1]

[1] Chou et al. VillanDiffusion: A Unified Backdoor Attack Framework for Diffusion Models. In NeurIPS 2023
[2] An et al. Elijah: Eliminating Backdoors Injected in Diffusion Models via Distribution Shift. In AAAI 2024

Backdoors in Generative Models

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Modern Diffusion models can be reprogrammed for malicious outputs

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  - generative model reprogrammability via backdoor implants
- Elijah [2]
  - detection + removal of diffusion backdoors via distribution shift
  - full retraining not required
- NNR Viewpoint
  - Stable Diffusion models can be “reprogrammed” via triggers, fine-tuning,
  - or textual prompts, and even cross-interactions of these channels



Figure 3: Backoor injection in DMs via distribution shift.



Figure 4: Workflow of our framework.

Fig. overview of Elijah, credits to [2]

[1] Chou et al. VillanDiffusion: A Unified Backdoor Attack Framework for Diffusion Models. In NeurIPS 2023
[2] An et al. Elijah: Eliminating Backdoors Injected in Diffusion Models via Distribution Shift. In AAAI 2024

Defensive NNR as Backdoor Defense

NNR mechanism can be used defensively

- Strategic NNR design to defend against backdoor attacks
  - neutralize backdoors with IM and OA style transformations [1]
  - without reconstructing triggers
  - IM + OA "wrap" the model to avoid backdoor behavior
- NNR Viewpoint
  - defensive reprogramming
  - I, O that route around malicious behavior encoded in FM f
- Implication
  - NNR is a double-edged sword: can both cause and mitigate vulnerabilities
  - who gets to add these "wrappers" around shared FMs?



Fig. illustration and empirical results of REFINE, credits to [1]

[1] Chen et al. REFINE: Inversion-Free Backddor Defense via Model Reprogramming. In ICLR 2025

Bias, Fairness, and Societal Harm

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Beyond purely technical security attacks

- Pre-trained models encode social biases
  - large models trained on static web data encode hegemonic worldviews and negative stereotypes against marginalized groups [1]
  - they prefer stereotypical associations over anti-stereotypical ones across race, gender, and religion [2]

- Reprogramming may
  - transfer biases (e.g., spurious correlations) from the source domain to the target task, even when target dataset is “de-biased” [3]
  - amplify biases if certain OA behaviors (e.g., label mapping) aggregates already biased features

- Open questions
  - How to audit fairness of reprogrammed models vs their backbones? [4]
  - Can strategic OA reduce or worsen bias?

[1] Bender et al. On the dangers of stochastic parrots: Can language models be too big?. In FAccT 2021
[2] Nadeem et al. StereoSet: Measuring stereotypical bias in pretrained language models. In ACL 2021
[3] Salman et al. When does bias transfer in transfer learning. In ArXiv 2022
[4] Zhang et al. Fairness Reprogramming. In NeurIPS 2022

IP Theft & Model Stealing

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Beyond purely technical security attacks

- Model stealing via reprogramming
  - reprogram black-box FMs to approximate a specialized model's behavior and reconstruct its capabilities [1]
  - e.g., use a vision API nominally for content moderation but reprogram it to perform biometric or demographic profilling
- License violations
  - exploit "Research Only" or "Non-Commercial" models for commercial tasks via black-box reprogramming [2]
  - e.g., reprogram a proprietary LLM API to reproduce a domain-specific model (e.g., financial classifier) and training a local surrogate
- Hide unauthorized or dual-use tasks
  - embed sensitive tasks behind benign-looking cover tasks
  - e.g., reprogram on open-weights checkpoints redistributed contrary to original terms (e.g., region or domain restriction)
- Open questions
  - Detection, attribution & liability, documentation & policy

[1] Tramèr et al. Stealing machine learning models via prediction APIs. In USENIX 2016
[2] Tsai et al. Transfer Learning without Knowing: Reprogramming Black-box Machine Learning Models with Scarce Data and Limited Resources. In ICML 2020

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Session 3: Implications

(c) Measuring the Good and the Bad

- Evaluation
- AI Maintenance

Trustworthiness Under Reprogrammability

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Evaluation objectives across both utility and risk

- Trustworthiness dimensions
  - utility
  - safety/alignment
  - privacy
  - fairness
  - misuse resistance
- Under NNR, evaluation should consider changes in I, O , not only data/weights
- Evaluation regimes
  - Benign NNR (“white-hat”): performance, stability, and generalization
  - Adversarial NNR (“black-hat”): attack success and detectability
- Goal: quantify the “safe region” of reprogrammability

Evaluating Benign NNR

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Metrics for the “Good” side

- Utility metrics
  - target task accuracy/F1, data efficiency (performance vs # target samples)
  - additional parameters, FLOPs, latency
- Interference metrics
  - e.g., in multi-task scenarios, cross-task interference when multiple reprogrammers share one backbone
- Residual capability metrics
  - Does the reprogrammed model retain dangerous latent capabilities
- Depends on contexts/tasks, e.g.,
  - OOD (ID/OOD performance & calibration) [1]
  - Federated Learning (utility-privacy tradeoff) [2]

[1] Geng and Chen. Model Reprogramming Outperforms Fine-tuning on Out-of-distribution Data in Text-Image Encoders. In IEEE SatML 2024
[2] Arif et al. Reprogrammable-FL: Improving Utility-Privacy Tradeoff in Federated Learning via Model Reprogramming. In IEEE SatML 2023

Evaluating Adversarial NNR

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Metrics for the “Bad” side

- Attack metrics
  - **Attack Success Rate** on target/hidden task
  - **Stealthiness**: changes in cover-task accuracy and distribution
  - **Transferability** across architectures and backbones
- Defense metrics
  - ASR after defense; clean accuracy drop; robustness to adaptive attacks
- Backdoor-specific metrics
  - Trigger-conditioned ASR; clean accuracy; certified guarantee bounds [1]
- Jailbreak robustness metrics
  - DPP [2]: jailbreak ASR and benign performance on standard instruction-following tasks
  - Retention score [3]: attack-agnostic metric based on toxicity margins, routing certified-style robustness bounds

[1] Zhang et al. FLIP: A Provable Defense Framework for Backdoor Mitigation in Federated Learning. In ICLR 2023
[2] Xiong et al. Defensive Prompt Patch: A Robust and Generalizable Defense of Large Language Models against Jailbreak Attacks. In ACL 2025
[3] Li et al. Retention Score: Quantifying Jailbreak Risks for Vision Language Models. In AAAI 2025

Toward a “ReprogBench” for NNR-Aware Eval

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Standardized benchmarks that capture both Good and Bad

- Inspired by
  - **RobustBench** for adversarial robustness [1]
  - **HELM**: for multi-metric evaluation [2]

- Expected components
  - canonical base models across modalities (vision, audio, text, multimodal)
  - standard suite of benign NNR tasks (cross-domain, cross-modal, etc.)
  - Standard suite of adversarial NNR tasks (backdoor, jailbreak, etc.)
  - Multi-metric reports

- Opportunity
  - align the community on threat models, metrics, and leaderboards for trustworthy NNR

[1] Francesco et al. RobustBench: a standardized adversarial robustness benchmark. In NeurIPS 2021
[2] Liang et al. Holistic Evaluation of Language Models. In TMLR 2022

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Session 3: Implications

(d) The Unknown – Questions and Outlook

Unknown Region between Good and Bad

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Living in the gap between utility and risk

- We have
  - Strong evidence that NNR is powerful and useful
  - Strong evidence that NNR expands attack surfaces

- We don't know
  - How far can NNR go in **theory**?
  - How do we design architectures and policies for **safe reprogramming**?
  - What should regulators require from FM providers exposing reprogrammable interfaces?

[1] Ye et al. Neural Network Reprogrammability: A Unified Theme on Model Reprogramming, Prompt Tuning, and Prompt Instruction. In ArXiv.

Open Problems: Theory

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Living in the gap between utility and risk

- Reprogrammability capacity
  - given a pre-trained model, what families of downstream tasks $\mathcal{T}$ can be implemented via feasible IM and OA?
  - relationship to capacity, NTK, and overparameterization [1]

- Trade-off theorems
  - tension between reprogrammability, robustness, and alignment?
  - any analogue of a “no-free-lunch” for safe reprogrammability?

- Certified safety under NNR
  - extend certification beyond local perturbations to **interface-level** constraints (e.g., bound on allowed IM and OA complexity)
  - Retention score [2] as a first step for VLM jailbreak robustness

[1] Chung et al. Model Reprogramming Demystified: A Neural Tangent Kernel Perspective. In ArXiv, 2025
[2] Li et al. Retention Score: Quantifying Jailbreak Risks for Vision Language Models. In AAAI 2025

Open Problems: Evaluation

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Living in the gap between utility and risk

- Designing ReprogBench
  - representative base models and tasks across modalities
  - balance coverage vs. maintenance cost
- Integrating NNR into HELM/RobustBench-like frameworks
  - Standardize interfaces for NNR modules, prompts and OAs
- Lifecycle evaluation
  - how to schedule repeated inspections
  - incremental and sequential testing when new NNR modules or prompts appear

[1] Chung et al. Model Reprogramming Demystified: A Neural Tangent Kernel Perspective. In ArXiv, 2025
[2] Li et al. Retention Score: Quantifying Jailbreak Risks for Vision Language Models. In AAAI 2025

Open Problems: Systems

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Living in the gap between utility and risk

- Structured reprogrammability
  - architectures with explicit “reprogramming slots” that can be audited or rate-limited
  - analyzeable and interpretable IM and OA
- Defense-as-reprogramming
  - generalize FLIP, REFINE, DPP, Token Highlighter to new modalities and tasks
  - automate defensive prompt and NNR module synthesis
- Tooling
  - AI “maintenance dashboards” that unify NNR evaluation, jailbreak scanning, backdoor detection, and governance checks

[1] Chung et al. Model Reprogramming Demystified: A Neural Tangent Kernel Perspective. In ArXiv, 2025
[2] Li et al. Retention Score: Quantifying Jailbreak Risks for Vision Language Models. In AAAI 2025

Open Problems: Future of FMs

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Forward-looking picture

- Likely evolution
  - Prompt engineering -> context engineering -> **program engineering**?
  - where NNR modules, IMs, and Oas are first-class software artifacts
- Convergence of
  - NNR, LoRA, Tool use, agents, and workflows
- Vision: a modular ecosystem where
  - FMs = share compute substrate
  - Reprogrammings = composable programs with type/signature and safety constraints
  - AI maintenance systems continuously monitor and certify behavior
- Question
  - Can we design this ecosystem such that the Good dominates the Bad, and the Unknown shrinks over time

[1] Chung et al. Model Reprogramming Demystified: A Neural Tangent Kernel Perspective. In ArXiv, 2025
[2] Li et al. Retention Score: Quantifying Jailbreak Risks for Vision Language Models. In AAAI 2025

Conclusion

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Wrap up

- Reprogrammability is a fundamental property of modern FMs, not a niche trick
- The Good
  - efficient reuse, cross-domain transfer, and access to advanced capabilities in low-resource settings
- The Bad
  - expands attack surfaces, such as adversarial, backdoors, jailbreaks, IP theft, and bias transfer
- The Unknown
  - demands new theory, evaluations, defenses, and governance

Conclusion

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Call to action

- Design, evaluate, and govern trustworthy reprogramming
  - not just robust models, but robust interfaces
- Join us to build *neural network reprogrammability* stronger and better
  - awesome-style repository for resources
  - Survey paper for further reading
  - thoughts and feedback are welcomed!

Link to survey paper arXiv

Link to github repo

https://github.com/zyecs/awesome-reprogrammability

Star the repo to stay updated!

Star Star

Q & A