



## 5. The Security and Integrity Constraints (1/2)



# Introduction

- The destruction of database is generally caused by the following factors:
  1. System failure
  2. Inconsistency caused by concurrent access
  3. Man-caused destruction (intentionally or accidentally)
  4. The data inputted is incorrect, the updating transaction didn't obey the rule of consistency preservation
- In above factors, 1 and 2 should be resolved by recovery mechanism of DBMS (Chapter 4); 3 belongs to database security; 4 belongs to integrity constraints



# Security of Database

- Protect databases not be accessed illegally.
  - View and query rewriting
  - Access control
    - General user
    - User with resource privilege
    - DBA
  - Identification and authentication of users
    - Password
    - Special articles, such as key, IC card, etc.
    - Personal features, such as fingerprint, signature, etc.
  - Authorization
    - GRANT CONNECT TO JOHN IDENTIFIED BY xyzabc;
    - GRANT SELECT ON TABLE S TO U1 WITH GRANT OPTION;
  - Role
  - Data encryption
  - Audit trail
    - AUDIT SELECT, INSERT, DELETE, UPDATE ON emp WHENEVER SUCCESSFUL;



# Security of Statistical Database

- In many situation, the statistical data is public while the detailed individual data is secret.
- Public *statistical database*
- But some detailed individual data can be derived from public statistical data
  - How prevent this leak? --- not a easy thing

STATS

| NAME  | SEX | DEPENDENTS | OCCUPATION | SALARY |
|-------|-----|------------|------------|--------|
| Wang  | M   | 2          | Programmer | 120    |
| Chang | F   | 2          | Manager    | 240    |
| Chen  | F   | 0          | Programmer | 140    |
| Li    | F   | 2          | Engineer   | 160    |
| Liu   | M   | 2          | Clerk      | 110    |
| Zhu   | F   | 1          | Teacher    | 80     |
| Zhao  | M   | 0          | Professor  | 180    |
| Sun   | M   | 1          | Teacher    | 110    |
| Xu    | F   | 2          | Programmer | 130    |
| Ma    | F   | 1          | Programmer | 150    |



# Individual Tracker

- Suppose we know Wang is a male programmer, and salary in STATS is secret but other information is public, we can get wang's salary from public data.

➤ Q1: SELECT COUNT(\*)  
FROM STATS  
WHERE SEX='M' AND OCCUPATION='programmer'

result = 1

Q2: SELECT SUM(SALARY)  
FROM STATS  
WHERE SEX='M' AND OCCUPATION='programmer';

result = 120



# Individual Tracker ( $c > b$ , $b = 2$ )

➤ Q3: SELECT COUNT(\*)  
FROM STATS;

result = 10

Q4: SELECT COUNT(\*)  
FROM STATS

WHERE NOT(SEX='M' AND OCCUPATION='programmer');

result = 9

Now we know only one male programmer, that must be Wang.

➤ Q5: SELECT SUM(SALARY)  
FROM STATS;

result = 1420

Q6: SELECT SUM(SALARY)  
FROM STATS

WHERE NOT(SEX='M' AND OCCUPATION='programmer');

result = 1300

Wang's salary = Q5 - Q6 = 120



# Individual Tracker ( $b < c < n - b$ , $b = 2$ , $n$ is 10)

➤ Q7: SELECT COUNT(\*)  
FROM STATS  
WHERE SEX = 'M';

result = 4

Q8: SELECT COUNT(\*)  
FROM STATS  
WHERE SEX='M' AND NOT(OCCUPATION='programmer');

result = 3

Now we know only one male programmer, that must be Wang.

➤ Q9: SELECT SUM(SALARY)  
FROM STATS  
WHERE SEX = 'M';

result = 520

Q10: SELECT SUM(SALARY)  
FROM STATS  
WHERE SEX='M' AND NOT(OCCUPATION='programmer');

result = 400

Wang's salary = Q9 - Q10 = 120



# General Tracker

## ■ Individual tracker

- Suppose predicate  $p=p_1 \text{ and } p_2$ ,  $\text{SET}(p)$  is set of tuples which fulfill  $p$ , then
- $\text{SET}(p) = \text{SET}(p_1 \text{ and } p_2) = \text{SET}(p_1) - \text{SET}(p_1 \text{ and not } p_2)$

## ■ General tracker

- It is a predicate  $T$  which fulfill:  
 $2b \leq |\text{SET}(T)| \leq (n-2b)$ ,  $b < n/4$
- Suppose a tuple  $R$  can be limited uniquely by predicate  $p$ , that is  $\text{SET}(p) = \{R\}$ , then  
 $\text{SET}(p) = \text{SET}(p \text{ or } T) \underline{\cup} \text{SET}(p \text{ or not } T) - \text{SET}(T) - \text{SET}(\text{not } T)$
- $\cup$  means union without eliminating repeated tuples.





# Integrity Constraints

- An IC describes conditions that every *legal instance* of a relation must satisfy.
  - Inserts/deletes/updates that violate IC's are disallowed.
  - Can be used to ensure application semantics (e.g., *sid* is a key), or prevent inconsistencies (e.g., *sname* has to be a string, *age* must be  $< 200$ )



# Types of Integrity Constraints

- Static constraints: constraints to database state
  - Inherent constraints (data model), such as 1NF
  - Implicit constraints : implied in data schema, indicated by DDL generally. Such as domain constraints, primary key constraints, foreign key constraints.
    - *Domain constraints*: Field values must be of right type. Always enforced.
  - Explicit constraints or general constraints
- Dynamic constraints: constraints while database transferring from one state to another. Can be combined with trigger.



# Database Modification

- If  $\alpha$  is foreign key in  $r_2$  which references to  $K_1$  in  $r_1$ , the following tests must be made in order to preserve the following referential integrity constraint:

$$\Pi_{\alpha}(r_2) \subseteq \Pi_{K_1}(r_1)$$

- **Insert.** If a tuple  $t_2$  is inserted into  $r_2$ , the system must ensure that there is a tuple  $t_1$  in  $r_1$  such that  $t_1[K_1] = t_2[\alpha]$ . That is

$$t_2[\alpha] \in \Pi_{K_1}(r_1)$$

- **Delete.** If a tuple,  $t_1$  is deleted from  $r_1$ , the system must compute the set of tuples in  $r_2$  that reference  $t_1$ :

$$\sigma_{\alpha = t_1[K_1]}(r_2)$$

If this set is not empty, either the delete command is **rejected as an error**, or the tuples that reference  $t_1$  must themselves be deleted (**cascading deletions** are possible).



# Database Modification (Cont.)

- **Update.** There are two cases:
  - If a tuple  $t_2$  is updated in relation  $r_2$  and the update modifies values for foreign key  $\alpha$ , then a test similar to the insert case is made. Let  $t_2'$  denote the new value of tuple  $t_2$ . The system must ensure that

$$t_2'[\alpha] \in \Pi_{K1}(r_1)$$

- If a tuple  $t_1$  is updated in  $r_1$ , and the update modifies values for the primary key ( $K_1$ ), then a test similar to the delete case is made. The system must compute

$$\sigma_{\alpha = t_1[K1]}(r_2)$$

using the old value of  $t_1$  (the value before the update is applied). If this set is not empty, the update may be **rejected as an error**, or the **update may be cascaded** to the tuples in the set, or the tuples in the set may be **deleted**.



# Definition of Integrity Constraints

- Indicated with procedure
  - Let application programs responsible for the checking of integrity constraints.
- Indicated with *ASSERTION*
  - Defined with *assertion specification language*, and checked by DBMS automatically
    - ASSERT balanceCons ON account: balance>=0;
- Indicated with *CHECK* clause in base table definition, and checked by DBMS automatically



# General Constraints

- Useful when more general ICs than keys are involved.
- Can use queries to express constraint.
- Constraints can be named.

```
CREATE TABLE Reserves
( sname CHAR(10),
  bid INTEGER,
  day DATE,
  PRIMARY KEY (bid, day),
  CONSTRAINT noInterlakeRes
  CHECK ('Interlake' <>
        ( SELECT B.bname
          FROM Boats B
          WHERE B.bid=bid)))
```

```
CREATE TABLE Sailors
( sid INTEGER,
  sname CHAR(10),
  rating INTEGER,
  age REAL,
  PRIMARY KEY (sid),
  CHECK ( rating >= 1
        AND rating <= 10))
```



# Constraints Over Multiple Relations

```
CREATE TABLE Sailors
( sid INTEGER,
  sname CHAR(10),
  rating INTEGER,
  age REAL,
  PRIMARY KEY (sid),
  CHECK
    ( (SELECT COUNT (S.sid) FROM Sailors S)
      +(SELECT COUNT (B.bid) FROM Boats B) < 100 )
```

*Number of boats  
plus number of  
sailors is < 100*

- Awkward and wrong!
- If Sailors is empty, the number of Boats tuples can be anything!



# Assertion

- ASSERTION is the right solution; not associated with either table.

**CREATE ASSERTION** smallClub

CHECK

( (SELECT COUNT (S.sid) FROM Sailors S)

+(SELECT COUNT (B.bid) FROM Boats B) < 100 )